Abstract

Abstract: This paper explores debt choice between relationship loans and callable bonds since both financing approaches are commonly used to mitigate agency cost and information asymmetry. By testing loan and firm samples from 1987 to 2015 in the U.S., we find that borrowers with bank relationship is also more likely to issue fixed price callable bonds and early refinance before the due date of public debt. In addition, we find that short term bank loans are substituted with long term public debt at early refinancing stage. Moreover, lenders forming strong relationship with borrowing firms tend to charge higher cost at refinancing to compensate for less reliance on bank loans.

Committee Chair

Mark Leary

Committee Members

na

Degree

Doctor of Business Administration (DBA)

Author's Department

Business Administration

Author's School

Olin Business School

Document Type

Dissertation

Date of Award

5-15-2024

Language

English (en)

Included in

Finance Commons

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