Scholarship@WashULaw
Document Type
Article
Language
English (en)
Publication Date
2024
Publication Title
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)
Abstract
In digital markets, antitrust law and special regulations aim to ensure that markets remain competitive despite the dominating role that digital platforms play today in everyone's life. Unlike traditional markets, market participant behavior is easily observable in these markets. We present a series of empirical investigations into the extent to which Amazon engages in practices that are typically described as self-preferencing. We discuss how the computer science tools used in this paper can be used in a regulatory environment that is based on algorithmic auditing and requires regulating digital markets at scale.
Keywords
Amazon, Antitrust, Self-Preferencing, Digital Markets Act, Regulating at Scale
Publication Citation
Abhisek Dash et al., Antitrust, Amazon, and Algorithmic Auditing, 180 J. Inst. & Theoretical Econ. 319 (2024)
Repository Citation
Frankenreiter, Jens; Dash, Abhisek; Chakraborty, Abhijnan; Ghosh, Saptarshi; Mukherjee, Animesh; Bechtold, Stefan; and Gummadi, Krishna P., "Antitrust, Amazon, and Algorithmic Auditing" (2024). Scholarship@WashULaw. 649.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_scholarship/649
Included in
Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Business Organizations Law Commons, Computer Law Commons, Consumer Protection Law Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Legal Studies Commons