Scholarship@WashULaw
Boeing v. Roche and the Benefit Theory of Allocability: Unlocking Lockheed or Ignoring Northrop
Document Type
Article
Language
English (en)
Publication Date
2002
Publication Title
Public Contract Law Journal
Abstract
The crux of the allowability determination of the costs in Boeing (and many other cost allowability cases) is whether the costs are reasonable (a factor not addressed by the Boeing court) and whether they are similar or related to expressly disallowed costs. Allocability is not a significant inquiry for costs traditionally included as G&A expenses. Boeing reaches this conclusion, but its reasoning is unsatisfying because of its tacit two-step around the benefit theory. Even after a second bite at the apple, Boeing fails to address the puzzling language in Lockheed and ignores the clear language in Northrop, thus leaving intact an artificially constructed allocability requirement that is both intellectually unsound and legally confusing. Future courts would be well-served to settle this confusion once and for all.
Keywords
Boeing v. Roche, Benefit Theory of Allocability, Costs, Government Contractor
Publication Citation
John D. Inazu, Boeing v. Roche and the Benefit Theory of Allocability: Unlocking Lockheed or Ignoring Northrop, 32 Pub. Cont. L.J. 39 (2002)
Repository Citation
Inazu, John D., "Boeing v. Roche and the Benefit Theory of Allocability: Unlocking Lockheed or Ignoring Northrop" (2002). Scholarship@WashULaw. 641.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_scholarship/641