Unlawful Assembly as Social Control

Authors

John D. Inazu, Washington University in St. Louis School of LawFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2017

Publication Title

UCLA Law Review

Abstract

Recent public protests from Occupy to Ferguson have highlighted anew the offense of unlawful assembly. This Article advances the simple but important thesis that contemporary approaches to unlawful assembly cede too much discretion to law enforcement. Too many unlawful assembly provisions neglect important elements of earlier statutory formulations. They also ignore constitutional principles meant to constrain the scope and extent of discretionary enforcement of social control by public authorities. In doing so, they fall short of the aspirations of the First Amendment — stifling dissent, muting expression, and ultimately weakening the democratic experiment. We can do better. We can start by reclaiming a more measured approach to unlawful assembly that recognizes both constitutional and common sense limitations.

Keywords

Constitutional Law, Freedom of Assembly, Freedom of Association, First Amendment, Legal History, Political Theory

Publication Citation

John D. Inazu, Unlawful Assembly as Social Control, 64 UCLA L. Rev. 2 (2017)

Repository Citation

Inazu, John D., "Unlawful Assembly as Social Control" (2017). Scholarship@WashULaw. 571.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_scholarship/571