Analogy, Decision, and Theory-Formation as Defeasible Reasoning

Authors

R. P. Loui, Washington University in St Louis

Document Type

Technical Report

Publication Date

1993

Filename

WUCS-93-39.pdf

Technical Report Number

WUCS-93-39

Abstract

The development of computationally informed formalisms for reasoning with defeasible rules affords new accounts of familiar forms of reasoning. This paper points to recent accounts of defeasible reasoning and portrays analogy, decision, and theory-formation as essentially defeasible, in the same way that statistical reasoning has been portrayed. Each portrayal depends largely on the idea of partial computation, which is inherent in actual reasoning, largely ignored by past formalisers, and formalizable now.

Comments

Permanent URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.7936/K71834V9

Recommended Citation

Loui, R. P., "Analogy, Decision, and Theory-Formation as Defeasible Reasoning" Report Number: WUCS-93-39 (1993). All Computer Science and Engineering Research.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/cse_research/534