ORCID
Jeremy Bertomeu, https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6746-5767
Language
English (en)
Publication Date
9-7-2026
Abstract
We estimate a dynamic model of voluntary disclosure, using annual management forecasts of earnings, that features a manager with pri ce motives and an uncertain but persistent information endowment. Our estimates imply that: (i) managers face disclosure frictions 35% of the time; (ii) conditional on being informed, managers withhold information 17% of the time; and ( iii) conditional on being silent, managers possess information 24% of the time. Managers’ strategic withholding motives increase investors’ uncertainty about earnings by 3%. We find that managers’ price motives reduce strategic withholding by one-third, in response to investors’ increased skepticism in the event of non-disclosure.
Document Type
Working Paper
DOI
https://doi.org/10.7936/vp2z-7n35
Author's Department
Accounting
Recommended Citation
Bertomeu, Jeremy; Ma, Paul; and Marinovic, Ivan, "How Often Do Managers Withhold Information?" (2026). Olin Business School Faculty Research. 23.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/business_facpubs/23