ORCID
Jeremy Bertomeu, https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6746-5767
Language
English (en)
Publication Date
2012
Abstract
This article develops a theory of standard-setting in which accounting standards emerge endogenously from an institutional bargaining process. It provides a unified framework with investment and voluntary disclosure to examine the lin ks between regulatory institu- tions and accounting choice. Disclosure rules tend to be mor e comprehensive when con- trolled by a self-regulated professional organization tha n when they are under the direct oversight of elected politicians. These institutions may n ot implement standards desirable to diversified investors and, when voluntary disclosures ar e possible, allowing choice be- tween competing standards increases market value over a sin gle uniform standard. Several new testable hypotheses are also offered to explain differe nces in accounting regulations.
Document Type
Working Paper
DOI
https://doi.org/10.7936/xcte-za66
Author's Department
Accounting
Recommended Citation
Bertomeu, Jeremy and Cheynel, Edwige, "Toward a Positive Theory of Disclosure Regulation: In Search of Institutional Foundations" (2012). Olin Business School Faculty Research. 22.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/business_facpubs/22