Abstract

This dissertation is composed of three papers that examine the ways that electoral rules may provide elites incentives that cut against citizen interests. In the first, titled ``Maybe Later: Term Limits and Strategy Behind Candidate Entry," I use the context of term limits to reexamine conditions for candidate entry. I argue they reduce the number of candidates who challenge incumbents, leading to a lock-in effect. By increasing the frequency of open races, term limits incentivize potential challengers to wait for an open race. To demonstrate this, I analyze primary data from 85 legislative chambers in 44 states over a two-decade period to see how term limits alter challenger entry patterns. I show that term-limited incumbents face fewer challengers in their last two terms in office and challenges are weaker, while competition for open races ramps up. In the second paper, ``Bias at the Ballot: Partisan Influence Over Direct Democracy", I argue that when partisan officials are in charge of the process, they will write more complex descriptions for citizen-proposed and out-party initiatives, making them more difficult for voters to understand. To test this, I gather data on over 1,000 ballot questions over the last twenty-two years to test whether the ballot language for out-group initiatives is more complex. I find that partisan officials are writing more complex summaries for out-group proposals. I also show that complex language correlates with a reduced vote-share for initiatives. In the final paper, ``Here Today, Gone Tomorrow: Term Limits and Lawmaking Incentives in State Legislatures", I argue that term limits cause two shifts in the lawmaking process: a shift in experience, with long-time members being forced out, and a shift in incentives causing legislators to prioritize legacy-building policy. Using a combination of legislative effectiveness scores and sponsorship of legislation that appears in state newspapers, I examine how productivity in state legislatures shifts after term limits. I find that term-limited legislators benefit from the lack of experience in office and propose significantly more bills that are covered by newspapers. Yet only leaders, particularly committee chairs and majority leaders, are able to utilize the changes to advance more noteworthy legislation. In addition, majority party leaders use these conditions to enhance majority control.

Committee Chair

Daniel Butler

Committee Members

Steven Smith, Andrew Reeves; Michael Olson; Steven Rogers

Degree

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Author's Department

Political Science

Author's School

Graduate School of Arts and Sciences

Document Type

Dissertation

Date of Award

4-21-2026

Language

English (en)

Author's ORCID

https://orcid.org/0009-0001-9447-9889

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