Abstract

The topic of this dissertation is the kind of understanding or grasping necessary for successfully using something as evidence. I call this kind of grasp “appreciation”. Take the case of a fossil. Intuitively, you can only successfully use a fossil as evidence for the existence of dinosaurs if you appreciate the epistemic link between the fossil and dinosaurs. If you fail to grasp the relevance of the fossil and you think it is just a rock with a funny pattern, you would not be justified to form the belief that dinosaurs once existed based on that fossil. However, what it takes to appreciate the relevance of evidence is unclear and no account exists of it in the literature on evidence or reasons. After developing an account of appreciation, I proceed to apply that account to mental states. It is often assumed that some mental states, like beliefs and perceptual experiences, can be used as evidence. For instance, seeing a dog in the park, or believing that there is a dog in the park, can be used as evidence that there are animals in the park. I investigate how we can appreciate the import of our own mental states for specific conclusions such that they can be used as evidence and argue that this is not as easy nor automatic as is often presumed.

Committee Chair

Matthew McGrath

Committee Members

Matthew McGrath;

Degree

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Author's Department

Philosophy

Author's School

Graduate School of Arts and Sciences

Document Type

Dissertation

Date of Award

5-6-2025

Language

English (en)

Author's ORCID

https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4959-5992

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