ORCID

0009-0007-9667-7751

Date of Award

4-30-2024

Author's School

Graduate School of Arts and Sciences

Author's Department

Philosophy

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Degree Type

Dissertation

Abstract

It has grown increasingly common to hold that some emotions that feel bad can be important to our well-being. This idea appears in “common sense” views, such as the view that it is important to feel grief after the loss of a loved one, as well as in sustained philosophical defenses, such as those written defending the value of anger for securing justice. I seek to push back on this idea. After preliminary clarifications, I defend the claim that an emotion’s feeling bad provides a prima facie reason to assign it a negative impact on our well-being on every plausible account of well-being. Next, I consider several kinds of value that negative emotions may nevertheless promote that could render them all-things-considered positively impactful on our well-being, including epistemic value, motivational value, and aretaic value. I will defend the claim that to the extent negative emotions promote such values, those values could be better promoted by alternatives such as more positive emotions. Therefore, negative emotions do not positively contribute to our well-being as much as available alternatives and it would be generally best for us to avoid them.

Language

English (en)

Chair and Committee

Eric Brown

Available for download on Wednesday, April 29, 2026

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