ORCID
0000-0003-1965-9713
Date of Award
5-8-2024
Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Degree Type
Dissertation
Abstract
I believe that rights are enforceable in two distinct ways, corresponding to the two domains under which a wrongdoer may forfeit her rights against the imposition of harm: defensive force and punishment. Indeed, I believe that any adequate account of what justifies the visiting of defensive or punitive harms upon a perpetrator will invoke the notion of rights forfeiture. In brief, a rights forfeiture theory of punishment alleges that the rights we possess are conditional upon our treatment of others. Typically, we have rights against interference which protect our life, liberty, and property. However, the forfeiture theorist claims that rights against hard treatment can be lost when a wrongdoer attempts to violate the rights of an innocent party, thus establishing the permissibility of punishment. This dissertation aims to develop rights forfeiture theory in new and underexplored directions. Two broad themes give unity to the project. First, and most significantly, I aim to develop a theory of rights reclamation. While the notion of rights forfeiture has received a fair amount of attention by philosophers who work on the ethics of punishment, very little consideration has been given to how forfeited rights can be recovered, and whether there might be non-punitive means for rights reclamation. Second, I am to investigate how the two different types of forfeiture (forfeiture against defensive attack and forfeiture against punishment) are related. In chapter one, I give an overview of forfeiture theory, clarify the concept, and discuss a number of puzzles and objections raised by the theory. In chapter two, I aim to expand forfeiture theory by considering how forfeited rights might be reclaimed. Built into the very notion of proportionate punishment is the idea that forfeited rights can be recovered. The interesting question is whether punishment is the sole means for reclaiming forfeited rights. I argue for a pluralistic theory of rights reclamation, according to which, there are multiple ways by which a wrongdoer can recapture her forfeited rights. In particular, I argue that offering remorseful compensation is a valid means by which a wrongdoer might partially, or fully, reclaim her rights against punishment. In chapter three, I present a philosophical account of the standing to punish. Recently, a number of moral philosophers have argued that hypocritical blame is inappropriate. I argue that something similar is true about punishment. I contend that the right to punish, like all other rights, is forfeitable. My thesis is that when a wrongdoer culpably violates the rights of another, she forfeits both a claim right against hard treatment and a liberty right to exact punishment (against those guilty of similar wrongdoing). I argue that forfeiture of the executive right is grounded in considerations pertaining to fairness. An interesting question, however, concerns how this latter right might be reclaimed. The paradigmatic way forfeited rights against hard treatment are reclaimed is through punishment. However, I argue that punishment is not the primary mechanism by which a forfeited executive right is restored. Rather, I claim that the issuing of a genuine apology is one of the primary ways a wrongdoer can recapture this right. I conclude by considering what political applications follow from my argument. Chapter four explores how forfeiture against defensive harms and forfeiture against punitive harms relate to one another. In particular, I seek to outline the various conceptual options for how the imposition of defensive harms might impact one’s vulnerability to punishment. The question pursued is this: Does an injury sustained through the successful use of defensive force in averting a culpable attacker reduce the attacker’s subsequent moral liability to punishment? Ultimately, I attempt to motivate the claim that all defensive injuries have some rights-reclaiming effect against punishment. A significant theoretical consequence of this claim is that forfeitures against defensive and punitive harms should be thought of as operating in tandem. Chapter five contains what is likely the most controversial argument defended in my dissertation. There is near unanimous agreement by those working in the relevant literature that the permissible use of defensive force is governed by a necessity constraint. In brief, it is assumed that the imposition of defensive harms against an assailant is only permissible when there are no other morally better means by which the threat could be averted. In my view, the most compelling formulation of the necessity condition is developed by Firth and Quong, who argue that necessity is grounded in a more general humanitarian right to aid and rescue. In this essay, I aim to challenge the validity of the necessity condition, focusing especially upon the Rescue Account. Contrary to prevailing opinion, I argue the permissible use of defensive force against culpable aggressors is unconstrained by considerations pertaining to necessity. In the sixth chapter, I turn my attention to a very practical issue—the problem of prison violence in the United States carceral system. Inadequate supervision and overcrowding have resulted in unsafe prison conditions where inmates are regularly threatened with rape, assault, and other forms of physical violence. Such callous disregard and exposure to unreasonable risk constitutes a severe violation of the rights of prisoners by the state. While there have been numerous legal, political, and activist efforts to draw attention to this issue—with the goal of reforming and making prisons safer—my goal in this final chapter is different. I argue that inmates who are victims of prison violence should have their sentences automatically reduced. Two distinct arguments are advanced in support of this claim. First, I argue that acts of prison violence are a sort of state-mediated harm which can thus be appropriately described as punishment-constituting. Second, and more straightforwardly, I argue that the compensation owed to prisoners who are victims of prison violence may naturally take the form of a reduced sentence.
Language
English (en)
Chair and Committee
Kit Wellman
Recommended Citation
Bell, William, "On the Enforceability of Rights: Forfeiture and Reclamation" (2024). Arts & Sciences Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 3006.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/art_sci_etds/3006