Abstract

We seem to perceive events, like songs playing, thunderstorms, and people having conversations. Extensive empirical research suggests that we indeed perceive events. Yet the philosophy of perception has not addressed event perception much at all. I lay out goals and methods for a fruitful philosophical investigation of event perception, then pursue that investigation. Primarily on the basis of the empirical evidence, I argue that we perceive events across the senses, and that event representations are a unique type of perceptual representation. In doing so, I address concerns about event perception as such, relative to object and property perception. I argue, furthermore, that event representations are sui generis, and that we typically perceptually attribute temporal boundness only to events. I end by noting potential directions for future work on event perception.

Committee Chair

Casey O'Callaghan

Committee Members

Rebecca Copenhaver, John Heil, Ron Mallon, Jeff Zacks,

Degree

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Author's Department

Philosophy/Neuroscience, and Psychology

Author's School

Graduate School of Arts and Sciences

Document Type

Dissertation

Date of Award

Spring 5-15-2021

Language

English (en)

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