A Game Theoretic Approach to Behavioral Economics

Abstract

This thesis explores games that are played between individuals who exhibit non-standard preferences. The first two essays focus on firm behavior, while the third one focuses on the behavior of individuals. In the first essay (Chapter 2), I explore the welfare effect of advertising as a memory aid to consumers with limited attention. In the second essay (Chapter 3), jointly authored with Aleksandr Yankelevich, we explore asymmetries in firm pricing that stem from differences in consumer characteristics such as proximity to a particular firm. In the third essay (Chapter 4), I explore whether repetition can generate strategic altruism when players exhibit altruism towards kin, but kin recognition is noisy.

Committee Chair

David K Levine

Committee Members

John H Nachbar, Bruce Petersen, Pamela Jakiela, Dmitri Kuksov, Maher Said

Comments

Permanent URL: https://doi.org/10.7936/K7T151MD

Degree

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Author's Department

Economics

Author's School

Graduate School of Arts and Sciences

Document Type

Dissertation

Date of Award

Spring 5-15-2012

Language

English (en)

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