Abstract

This dissertation advances our understanding of when firms are able to get information from outside agents and the impact of that information on innovation. In chapter one, I set up a theoretical model that illuminates how vertical integration changes the incentives for producers to share information with suppliers. Both transaction costs and bargain ability play major roles in information sharing. One result from chapter one is that producers share less information with vertically integrated suppliers. The second chapter tests this prediction, finding robust evidence that once a supplier vertically integrates, it gains fewer spillovers from competitor producers. Finally, the last chapter looks at how information brought by an external CEO can change the firm’s innovation direction. The third chapter finds that external CEOs tend to shift the direction of innovation less often that internal hires.

Committee Chair

Anne Marie Knott

Committee Members

Nicholas S. Argyres, Lamar Pierce, Michael D. Ryall, Ulya Tsolmon,

Comments

Permanent URL: https://doi.org/10.7936/K76W99HX

Degree

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Author's Department

Business Administration

Author's School

Graduate School of Arts and Sciences

Document Type

Dissertation

Date of Award

Spring 5-15-2018

Language

English (en)

Download

Included in

Business Commons

Share

COinS