
Scholarship@WashULaw
Document Type
Article
Language
English (en)
Publication Date
1978
Publication Title
University of Dayton Law Review
Abstract
On April 28th of last year, the Securities and Exchange Commission announced it would begin a comprehensive reexamination of the shareholders' role in corporate governance. After receiving close to one hundred and fifty letters of comment, the Commission commenced hearings on September 29th in Washington D.C.
Few issues are so worthy of the Commission's concern. Under state corporation law, shareholders have the power to nominate and elect members of the board of directors. Today this power is virtually meaningless in publicly held corporations. The vast majority of shareholders vote by proxy. But neither state nor federal law guarantees shareholders access to the corporate proxy machinery. Instead, incumbent management is allowed to use corporate funds to solicit proxies on their own behalf while all other shareholders must pay for proxy solicitations for their nominees out of their own pockets. The result is that only incumbent management can afford to make nominations.
Keywords
Corporate Democracy, Shareholders' Role in Corporate Governance, SEC, Proxy Voting
Publication Citation
Joel Seligman, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Democracy., 3 U. Dayton L. Rev. 1 (1978)
Repository Citation
Seligman, Joel, "The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Democracy" (1978). Scholarship@WashULaw. 773.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_scholarship/773