Washington University Law Quarterly
This Article fills a few of the gaps in current scholarship about gatekeepers and sets forth a proposal for a modified strict liability regime that would avoid many of the problems and costs associated with the current due diligence-based approaches. Under the proposed regime, gatekeepers would be strictly liable for any securities fraud damages paid by the issuer pursuant to a settlement or judgment. Gatekeepers would not have any due diligence based defenses for securities fraud. Instead, gatekeepers could limit their liability by agreeing to and disclosing a percentage limitation on the scope of their liability for the issuer’s damages.
Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?: A Proposal for a Modified Strict Liability Regime,
79 Wash. U. L. Q. 491
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss2/3