Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases

Authors

Marcel Kahan, New York University
Michael Klausner, New York University

Publication Title

Washington University Law Quarterly

Abstract

Part I of this Article reviews our prior analysis of increasing returns in corporate contract terms. Within the rubric of increasing returns, we discuss learning and network externalities in corporate contracts. Parts II and III examine how agency costs and behavioral biases can lead to standardization.

Recommended Citation

Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 Wash. U. L. Q. 347 (1996).
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol74/iss2/3