Compensating Unsecured Creditors for Extraordinary Bankruptcy Reorganization Risks

Authors

Lynn M. LoPucki, UCLA School of Law
William C. Whitford, Wisconsin Law School.

Publication Title

Washington University Law Quarterly

Abstract

To reduce creditors' and shareholders' incentives to resist managers' efforts to maximize, we proposed that parties to the reorganization case who stand to benefit during the pendency of a Chapter 11 reorganization from a particular investment be required to compensate those disadvantaged by it. The purpose of this article is to elaborate on that proposal.

Recommended Citation

Lynn M. LoPucki and William C. Whitford, Compensating Unsecured Creditors for Extraordinary Bankruptcy Reorganization Risks, 72 Wash. U. L. Q. 1133 (1994).
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol72/iss3/26