Unilateral patent misuse : a comparative study of U.S., EC and Brazilian patent and antitrust laws
Date of Award
Doctor of Juridical Science (SJD)
The first part of this dissertation defines an objective test that enables courts to detect misuse, yet sparing them from analising the complicated and needless trade-offs above mentioned. When a patentee asks for relief against an infringer, it does not matter whether patents provide rewards or prospects to patentees, or even whether their role is to avoid rent dissipation. If courts were required to verify whether the patentees had extracted the reward they are entitled to, first it would be necessary to gauge the reasonableness of the reward, which would lead courts to perform a regulatory function.... The second part includes a study of current unilateral patent misuse law but it will also be used to provide a practical illustration of how the test I suggest can be applied. As I do not believe that the patent system performs different functions in different countries (in fact, I think it performs the same function in different ways)the analysis of the law includes a comparison of U.S., EC and Brazilian patent laws.
Chair and Committee
Charles R. RcManis, Chair, John Drobak, Arthur Denzau
Carvalho, Nuno T.P., "Unilateral patent misuse : a comparative study of U.S., EC and Brazilian patent and antitrust laws" (1993). School of Law Dissertations. 50.