Author's School

Graduate School of Arts & Sciences

Author's Department/Program

Philosophy/Neuroscience, and Psychology

Language

English (en)

Date of Award

January 2010

Degree Type

Dissertation

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Chair and Committee

José Luis Bermúdez

Abstract

My dissertation articulates and resolves a problem at the heart of debates about how perception guides our actions and deliberations. The problem arises from the independent plausibility but mutual inconsistency of the following theses: * Some perceptions provide us reasons * Only belief-like states provide us reasons * No perception is belief-like I argue that this problem is deeper than has been acknowledged. Simply rejecting any one thesis leads to serious challenges. Nonetheless, I argue that we can unravel the link between having reasons and having belief-like states in a way that explains the initial plausibility of the first thesis. I provide a formulation of what being a reason-giving state amounts to, which does not require it to be belief-like. I then offer a substantive account of perceptual content that both respects its non-belief-like: nonconceptual) character and explains its ability to provide us reasons.

DOI

https://doi.org/10.7936/K71V5C2H

Comments

Permanent URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.7936/K71V5C2H

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