Author's Department/Program
Philosophy/Neuroscience, and Psychology
Language
English (en)
Date of Award
January 2010
Degree Type
Dissertation
Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Chair and Committee
José Luis Bermúdez
Abstract
My dissertation articulates and resolves a problem at the heart of debates about how perception guides our actions and deliberations. The problem arises from the independent plausibility but mutual inconsistency of the following theses: * Some perceptions provide us reasons * Only belief-like states provide us reasons * No perception is belief-like I argue that this problem is deeper than has been acknowledged. Simply rejecting any one thesis leads to serious challenges. Nonetheless, I argue that we can unravel the link between having reasons and having belief-like states in a way that explains the initial plausibility of the first thesis. I provide a formulation of what being a reason-giving state amounts to, which does not require it to be belief-like. I then offer a substantive account of perceptual content that both respects its non-belief-like: nonconceptual) character and explains its ability to provide us reasons.
Recommended Citation
Cahen, Arnon, "Perception and Nonconceptual Apprehension" (2010). All Theses and Dissertations (ETDs). 51.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd/51
Comments
Permanent URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.7936/K71V5C2H