Author's School

Graduate School of Arts & Sciences

Author's Department/Program

Political Science


English (en)

Date of Award

Spring 4-17-2014

Degree Type


Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Chair and Committee

Elizabeth M Penn


In this dissertation, I present three models of communication in collective choice environments. The first two models demonstrate how collective choice procedures provide opportunities for informed communicators to manipulate outcomes by strategically obfuscating information to appeal to different coalitions at different times. Paradoxically, the members of the collective choice institution are often better off gathering no information at all rather than relying on an expert who manipulates outcomes in this way. The final chapter characterizes the incentives of candidates to reveal information about their preferences to voters in an election when multiple policy issues are at stake. I show that candidates can credibly reveal directional information about their preferences but will leave the voters uncertain about which candidate is more extreme.


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