Author's School

Graduate School of Arts & Sciences

Author's Department/Program

Political Science

Language

English (en)

Date of Award

Spring 4-17-2014

Degree Type

Dissertation

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Chair and Committee

Elizabeth M Penn

Abstract

In this dissertation, I present three models of communication in collective choice environments. The first two models demonstrate how collective choice procedures provide opportunities for informed communicators to manipulate outcomes by strategically obfuscating information to appeal to different coalitions at different times. Paradoxically, the members of the collective choice institution are often better off gathering no information at all rather than relying on an expert who manipulates outcomes in this way. The final chapter characterizes the incentives of candidates to reveal information about their preferences to voters in an election when multiple policy issues are at stake. I show that candidates can credibly reveal directional information about their preferences but will leave the voters uncertain about which candidate is more extreme.

DOI

https://doi.org/10.7936/K7CN7214

Comments

Permanent URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.7936/K7CN7214

Share

COinS