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Motor Vehicles—Registration

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"lawful" and that one who, in attempting to commit suicide, kills another is guilty of manslaughter prevails. Commonwealth v. Mink (1878) 123 Mass. 422; State v. Lindsey, supra.

The cases are also divided as to the effect of suicide pacts and of one person aiding another to commit suicide. It is generally recognized that if two persons encourage each other to commit suicide jointly and one succeeds and the other fails in the attempt upon himself, the survivor is guilty of the murder of the other. Even in states where suicide itself is not a crime this result is reached. Blackburn v. Ohio (1872) 23 Ohio St. 146; Burnett v. People (1903) 204 Ill. 208, 68 N. E. 505. One who furnishes another with means for committing suicide at the latter's request may be guilty of murder. People v. Roberts (1920) 211 Mich. 187, 178 N. W. 690; Commonwealth v. Bowen (1816) 13 Mass. 356. Contra to these decisions is Sanders v. State (1908) 54 Tex. Cr. Rep. 101, 112 S. W. 68, holding that since it is not a violation of law for a person to commit suicide, one furnishing another the means to the commission of suicide violates no law. E. M. H., '35.

MOTOR VEHICLES—REGISTRATION.—In the recent case of Furtado v. Humphrey (Popkin v. Same, Warren v. Same) 188 N. E. 391, decided Dec. 28, 1933, Massachusetts has gone even farther in extending her peculiar doctrine of the necessity of proper registration of automobiles in order to avoid the taint of outlawry on the highways. Gen. Laws of Mass. (Ter. Ed.) c. 90, paragraphs 2, 9. This doctrine which allows the owner of an "improperly" registered car no recovery for personal injuries or for injuries to his car although a clear case of negligence exists against a third party seems to be well established in Massachusetts. Dudley v. Northampton St. Ry. (1909) 202 Mass. 443, 89 N. E. 25; Hanson v. Culon (1929) 269 Mass. 471, 169 N. E. 272. However, Georgia is the only one of a number of states having similar registration statutes that follows the "outlawry" interpretation. 17 Iowa Law Rev. (1931) L. c. 95, n. 4; 96, n. 6. There have been several articles and notes containing well-directed criticism of the Massachusetts rule. 17 Iowa Law Rev. (1931) 94; 95 Cent. L. J. 274 (1922); 32 Yale L. J. 394 (1922); 38 Harv. L. R. 531 (1924).

The case of Furtado v. Humphrey extends the doctrine of "outlawry" by more strictly construing what shall constitute "proper registration." In that case a Mr. Popkin, one of three partners, registered a truck owned by the partnership under the following title, "United Produce Co. by B. Popkin." In answering one of the statements required to be made under the penalties of perjury—"Is this vehicle owned by you individually?"—Popkin said "Yes"; and he did not answer "Yes" or "No" to the question—"Or is it owned jointly or by a cooperative association or corporation?" The court held that inasmuch as the Statute required that "application for the registration of motor vehicles and trailers may be made by the owner thereof" and as this requirement of statement of ownership is a matter made vital by the Statute to be strictly construed the registration being in Popkin's name alone when he was only joint owner, the truck was improperly registered (outlawed) and therefore Popkin, his partner, and the partnership chauffeur could not recover for personal injuries and damages to the truck although the defendant admits that "there was evidence upon which the jury could have found him negligent." (Not only the owner of an improp-
COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS

erly registered vehicle but also one who knows or ought to know of the improper registration is precluded from recovery. G. L., c. 90, para. 9.)

It is interesting to note that one of the two cases (Nash v. Lang (1929) 268 Mass. 407, 167 N. E. 762) relied upon by the Court for the doctrine of "strict compliance" is directly contrary to such an idea. There the Court held the registration to be proper though the applicant answered the question "From where did you purchase the vehicle?" incorrectly. The Court said the answer "did not affect the main purpose of registration which is to afford identification of the owner and of the motor vehicle." In Harlow v. Sinman (1922) 241 Mass. 462, 135 N. E. 553, the Court allowed recovery though the plaintiff was driving a car registered in her own name alone when the ownership was held in common with her daughter. In Crompton v. Williams (1913) 216 Mass. 184, 108 N. E. 298, the Court held a registration by the owner in the trade name of his company valid where the name was well known and the purpose was not concealment. (In the Furtado case the Court intimated if Popkin had been sole owner the registration in "United Produce Co." would have been valid.) In Bacon v. Boston Elevated (1926) 256 Mass. 30, 152 N. E. 35, a married woman's registration in her maiden name was held invalid, but here the purpose was concealment, according to the Court, as the woman was known only by her married name.

But the courts have been Draconian in such decisions as Kilduff v. Boston Elevated (1924) 247 Mass. 453, 142 N. E. 98, and Hanley v. American Ry. Exp. (1923) 244 Mass. 248, 138 N. E. 323, and so there is precedent for the strict compliance exacted in the Furtado case. However, if the purpose is, as the Court has said in the principal case, "to afford easy identification of the owner of the motor vehicle involved in an accident 'and' to avoid ambiguous or confusing registration," it is hard to see why the courts should be so ready to thrust such a dire penalty upon owners of cars and others when the vehicles may have been registered in good faith and in a manner sufficient to reveal to the Commonwealth who are the owners. Apparently the courts are content to overturn all sense of justice merely to render the identification of vehicles "easier."

T. C., '35.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS—CONSTITUTIONAL DEBT LIMITATION.—The defendant owned and operated its own light plant and public waterworks. The plant produced a net profit of $10,000 per year which went into the general fund of the town. The board of trustees entered into an agreement with Fairbanks-Morse & Co. for the purchase of two engines and other equipment. A down payment was provided and the balance in monthly installments. The board passed an ordinance providing for the payment of pledge orders out of the net earnings of the plant only; the indebtedness was not to be a general obligation of the town. The plaintiff, a taxpayer, seeks to restrain the defendant from carrying out the terms of the agreement. Held: The general indebtedness of the town is increased by the contract beyond the constitutional limitation and the authorizing ordinance is consequently void. Reimer v. Town of Holyoke (Colo. 1933) 27 Pac. (2d) 1032.

State constitutions universally provide a limit of indebtedness beyond which a municipality cannot go. 1 Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th ed. 1911) 387. The purpose of these provisions is to prevent the abuse of the corporate credit and the burdensome taxation which would necessarily re-