Agency—Imputation of Notice as Between Principal and Agent—Dishonest Conduct of Agent
COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS

AGENCY—IMPUTATION OF NOTICE AS BETWEEN PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—
DISHONEST CONDUCT OF AGENT—[Federal].—Action on a bank's blanket
fidelity bond. Board of directors of plaintiff bank instructed its cashier to
sign in its behalf the application for the bond. The cashier, although
knowing of his own past fraud and dishonesty, represented in the applica-
tion that no losses were known to have been sustained by the bank and
that its officers and employees scheduled in the application were honest.
Held, for defendant. The cashier's knowledge of the fraud is imputed to
the plaintiff, and the representation being false the contract is vitiated. 1

The general rule is that a principal is chargeable with the notice or
knowledge received by its agent within the scope of the agency. 2 This rule
is generally based either upon the theory of the legal identity of principal
and agent, 3 or upon the theory that it is the duty of the agent to disclose
his knowledge to the principal and that the agent is presumed to have
discharged that duty. 4 A well-established exception to this rule is that a
principal is not charged with the knowledge of its agent where the latter
is acting for his own benefit and adversely to the interest of the principal, 5
because it can not be presumed that the agent will communicate such
knowledge to his principal. 6

Where, however, the principal seeks to enforce the benefit of a trans-
action based on a fraud perpetrated by its agent on a third party, it has
been frequently held, in denying recovery, that the dishonest agent's knowl-
edge is imputed to the principal on the ground that a principal accepts the
burdens as well as the benefits of its agent's acts. 7 But the majority of

1. First Nat'l Bank of Weatherly v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (C. C.
  A. 3, 1939) 105 F. (2d) 339.
2. Curtis Co. v. United States (1922) 262 U. S. 215; Gibson Oil Co. v.
  Hayes Equipment Mfg. Co. (1933) 163 Okla. 134, 21 P. (2d) 17, 88 A. L. R.
  104; Hickman v. Green (1894) 125 Mo. 165, 22 S. W. 455, 27 S. W. 440, 29
  55, 65 L. R. A. 209.
  Co. (1911) 174 Ala. 190, 56 So. 726; Sooy v. State (1879) 41 N. J. L. 394;
  Houseman v. Gerard Mutual Bldg. & Loan Ass'n (1876) 86 S. E. 743.
  151 N. Y. 1, 45 N. E. 355, 36 L. R. A. 658; Traders' & Truckers' Bank v.
  Black (1908) 108 Va. 59, 60 S. E. 743.
5. Appeal of Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1932) 310 Pa. 17, 164 Atl. 715,
6. Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Capitol Electric Co. (C. C. A. 6,
  1894) 65 Fed. 341; Sebald v. Citizens' Deposit Bank (1907) 31 Ky. L. 1244,
  105 S. W. 130, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 376; Allen v. South Boston R. R. (1889)
  Taylor v. Flynt (1902) 28 Tex. Civ. App. 219, 67 S. W. 347. See Restate-
  ment, Agency (1933) 625, sec. 282 (2c); also 2 Mechem, Agency (2d ed.
  1914) 1404, sec. 1818.
courts hold the contrary where, as here, the benefit sought to be enforced is the liability on a fidelity bond executed by the dishonest agent. 8

It would seem that the question of whether an insured shall be permitted to recover in this latter situation should turn on a question of contract rather than on the technical doctrine of imputed notice. 9 Probably the parties had no "actual intention" with respect to the matter in issue at the time the contract was executed. Where such ambiguity of intent exists, the courts of necessity must determine what the parties would have intended had the specific question been presented at the time; 10 and it would seem fair to assume that, if it had been considered when the bond was issued, the parties would have intended that the bond cover the matter.

The federal court in the present case, however, was required 11 to follow Pennsylvania law 12 which denies recovery to the principal because of the doctrine of imputed notice. It is submitted that the better rule is in accord with the majority view which permits a recovery on the bond. 13

P. H. A.

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9. In Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Gate City Nat'l Bank (1895) 97 Ga. 634, 25 S. E. 392, 393, 33 L. R. A. 821, 54 Am. St. Rep. 440, Lumpkin, J., said, "... we cannot think that the parties to this contract contemplated that the bank would be bound to act upon mere constructive notice of Redwine's [the agent] shortcomings. The 'knowledge' referred to meant actual knowledge."


13. Generally, where a contractual ambiguity arises in the case of fidelity or guarantee contracts, the courts construe them strictly against the insurer, and such surety's obligation is not considered to be strictissimi juris. Galveston Causeway Construction Co. v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. (D. C. S. D. Tex. 1922) 284 Fed. 137; Royal Indemnity Co. v. Northern Granite & Stone Co. (1919) 100 Ohio 373, 126 N. E. 405, 12 A. L. R. 378. See Note (1921) 12 A. L. R. 382, where many authorities are collected.