Interspousal Immunity—Maine Allows Suit for Personal Injury Between Husband and Wife

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Williams v. Martin will exert only a slight impact on the appointment of experts to assist indigent defendants. Certainly the decision sends a clear signal to state trial judges that, on a proper showing,\(^5\) they must provide expert assistance at an indigent defendant’s request. Thus Williams should persuade judges to provide experts in cases in which the due process argument is not sufficiently persuasive.\(^5\) The Williams rule also will promote the interests of judicial economy and greater efficiency in the criminal process because it will eliminate the need for new trials for indigent defendants denied effective assistance of counsel by a trial court’s refusal to provide an expert. Yet the overlap between the equal protection and due process claims at the remedial stage may, in practice, make the Williams equal protection analysis superfluous.\(^5\)

TORTS—INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY—MAINE ALLOWS SUIT FOR PERSONAL INJURY BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71 (Me. 1980). In MacDonald v. MacDonald\(^1\) a wife sought damages from her former husband alleging that his negligent

provided an indigent defendant denied effective assistance of counsel, see notes 47-51 supra and accompanying text, at least one court has indicated that the Williams test might produce a broader remedy. In Pedrero v. Wainwright, 590 F.2d 1383 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 943 (1979), the court said that the “decisions in the circuit . . . strongly suggest that prejudice will be presumed if the petitioner shows that the matter on which he needed the assistance of experts was seriously in issue.” Id. at 1391 n.9. The “seriously in issue” formulation resembles the first tail of the test used in Williams: The indigent must show that there is a substantial question which requires expert testimony for its resolution. See notes 28, 36 supra and accompanying text. If prejudice is presumed once the defendant satisfies the test, the defendant need not demonstrate prejudice independently on appeal absent evidence by the state which rebuts the presumption.

53. See notes 27-28 supra and accompanying text.
54. See notes 18-25 supra and accompanying text.
55. While the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has intimated that the standard might produce new results, see note 52 supra, it has not yet so held, and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021 (4th Cir. 1980), refused to extend the doctrine.

In addition, the proliferation of state statutes providing for expert assistance for indigent criminal defendants may diminish the present need to announce another constitutional right. Presently, at least 40 states—including all those within the Fourth Circuit—have provided for state funding of expert assistance for indigents. See note 18 supra. Because courts should not decide questions of constitutional law if there are other grounds on which a case may be decided, see Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1926) (Brandeis, J., concurring), there should be no need for the announcement of another constitutional right absent state standards for invoking the statute that are more stringent than those required by the Constitution.

1. 412 A.2d 71 (Me. 1980). Prusinski v. Prusinski, 412 A.2d 71 (Me. 1980), was decided at the same time on similar facts.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

operation of an automobile during their marriage caused her bodily injury. The trial court denied relief by relying on the rule of interspousal tort immunity. On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court held: A person injured by the tortious conduct of a spouse can recover from the tortfeasor in a civil action even though the tortious conduct occurred during the marriage.

The interspousal tort immunity rule originated in the common law of England. The common law considered a husband and wife as a single legal unit. Because procedure compelled joinder of the husband in all legal actions involving his wife, suits between spouses were impossible. In 1876, an English court in Phillips v. Barnett determined that even if the courts resolved the procedural question, the unity of married couples still would preclude suits between spouses. Most American courts adopted the common-law rule of interspousal immunity.

The decline of interspousal immunity began in the mid-1800's with

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2. The couple's two unemancipated minor children were also seeking damages. The trial court rejected their claim based on the rule of parental immunity, which was later abrogated in Black v. Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634 (Me. 1979).

3. MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71 (Me. 1980).


5. See 1 Blackstone, Commentaries 442 (1769) which summarizes the common-law view: “By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband.” Cf. W. Prosser, supra note 4, at 859 (arguing that unity was only important in a limited context).

6. See McCurdy, Torts, supra note 4, at 1033. The husband had the right to reduce all of the wife's choses in action to possession. If he committed a tort against his wife, he could reduce the chose in action to possession. The union of the right and the duty in the husband would discharge the duty. If the woman committed the tort, the wife's duty would become a derivative duty of the husband's which would be discharged by the union of the right and the duty in the same person.

7. 1 Q.B.D. 436 (1876). In Phillips a husband assaulted his wife. After they were divorced, the wife brought a suit for personal injuries. Justice Blackburn wrote:

   I was at first inclined to think, having regard to the old procedure and the form of pleas in abatement, that the reason why a wife could not sue her husband was a difficulty as to parties; but I think that when one looks at the matter more closely, the objection to the action is not merely with regard to the parties, but a requirement of the law founded on the principle that husband and wife are one person.

   Id. at 438.

8. Id. at 438.

the passage of Married Woman's Emancipation Acts in many jurisdictions.  By the early 1900's all states had adopted these statutes. The state legislatures intended these acts to allow women to own property. Few statutes expressly addressed the issue of interspousal tort immunity. Some courts, without specific guidance from the legislature, interpreted the statutes to abrogate interspousal immunity. Other courts, however, contended that the statutes did not deal with the immunity rule.

10. W. Prosser, supra note 4, at 861. McCurdy, Personal Injury, supra note 4, summarizes the content of typical statutes:

In most states it is provided that a married woman may (or can or shall) sue (or be sued) as if (or in the same manner as if) single (or unmarried). In some of these states she may sue, or be sued, "separately" or "without joinder of her husband." In some [states] she may sue or be sued in her own name, or alone. . . . Torts may or may not be mentioned. Some statutes expressly include them in general terms; some mention injuries to person and character.

Id. at 311.

11. See W. Prosser, supra note 4, at 861.

12. Id.; Comment, supra note 9, at 154.


Most jurisdictions originally refused to allow interspousal suits, but now only sixteen retain the restriction. In those jurisdictions that maintain interspousal immunity, the common-law unity of husband and wife is no longer the primary justification for the rule. Current supporters of the rule contend that it promotes family harmony and prevents the maintenance of frivolous or fraudulent suits. A few

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Critics also have observed that in most cases family harmony was destroyed before the action was commenced. See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 A. 889 (1914); Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Co., 97 Idaho 14, 539 P.2d 566 (1974); Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 335, 388 A.2d 951 (1978); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 771 (1972). See generally 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 646 (1956); W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 863; McCurdy, Personal Injury, supra note 4, at 336; Comment, supra note 9, at 160; Comment, Lewis v. Lewis: Dissolving the "Metaphysical" Merger in Interspousal Torts, 12 NEW ENG. L. REV. 333, 355 (1977); 19 DEPAUL L. REV. 590, 597 (1970).


19. Courts supporting the rule often assert that it prevents fraud. See, e.g., Thompson v.
courts assert that alternative remedies, such as criminal or divorce proceedings, are adequate to deal with interspousal torts. 20 Other courts argue that judicial intervention would intrude on the legislature's province if the courts alter the longstanding public policy against interspousal tort suits. 21

Many jurisdictions, responding to the harshness of a denial of compensation to an injured party, have abolished or developed exceptions


to the interspousal tort immunity rule.\textsuperscript{22} Courts have refused to apply the rule to torts that occurred prior to marriage,\textsuperscript{23} suits begun after divorce,\textsuperscript{24} cases involving motor vehicle negligence,\textsuperscript{25} or intentional torts.\textsuperscript{26}

A Maine court first addressed interspousal tort immunity for personal injury in \textit{Abbott v. Abbott}.\textsuperscript{27} In \textit{Abbott} a husband assaulted and falsely imprisoned his wife. She brought suit after the couple’s divorce. The court, citing common-law unity and public policy considerations, adopted the English common-law rule of interspousal tort immunity.\textsuperscript{28} The court reasoned that the wife had an adequate alternative remedy in either a criminal or divorce action.\textsuperscript{29} The court found that interspousal

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\item \textit{See, e.g.,} Gaston v. Pittman, 224 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1969); Packenham v. Milmore, 89 Ill. App. 2d 452, 252 N.E.2d 42 (1967); O'Grady v. Potts, 193 Kan. 644, 396 P.2d 285 (1964); Hamilton v. Fulkerson, 285 S.W.2d 642 (Mo. 1955); Childress v. Childress, 569 S.W.2d 816 (Tenn. 1978).


\item \textit{See, e.g.,} Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77 (1978); Apitz v. Dames, 205 Or. 242, 287 P.2d 585 (1955); Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1977).

\item \textit{Id.} at 307.

\item \textit{Id.}
tort suits might impair family harmony, create a flood of litigation, and destroy the finality of divorce actions. The Maine courts also have refused to allow suits between husband and wife on promissory notes, misuse of trust funds, costs in defending a suit, personal services, and negligent use of an automobile.

In 1963 the Maine courts began to move away slowly from the interspousal tort immunity rule. In Bedall v. Reagan the court held that a third party could implead a husband in a suit instituted by his wife. The court reasoned that the public policy of compensating those harmed by others outweighed policy considerations inherent in the interspousal tort immunity rule.

Ten years later, a Maine court created a second exception to the interspousal tort immunity rule. In Moulton v. Moulton the court allowed a wife to sue her husband for a tort, which occurred before their marriage. The court reasoned that the parties' knowledge of the existence of the tort at marriage ameliorated the danger to family harmony. Moulton also rejected the risk of fraudulent suits as a serious countervailing policy factor.

In MacDonald v. MacDonald the court decided that changes in social conditions since Abbott rendered the common-law doctrine of interspousal tort immunity obsolete. The court reaffirmed the Bedall and Moulton reasoning that the harm of leaving a wrong uncompensated outweighed the possibility of domestic discord. The court re-

30. Id. at 308.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Perkins v. Blether, 107 Me. 473, 78 A. 574 (1911) (husband immune to suit from third party assignee of wife's note); Crowther v. Crowther, 55 Me. 358 (1868).
34. Anthony v. Anthony, 135 Me. 54, 188 A. 724 (1937).
35. Smith v. Gorman, 41 Me. 405 (1856).
39. Id. at 297, 192 A.2d at 26.
40. 309 A.2d 224 (Me. 1973).
41. Id. at 229.
42. Id.
43. 412 A.2d 71 (Me. 1980).
44. 67 Me. 304 (1877).
45. 412 A.2d at 72.
46. 159 Me. 292, 192 A.2d 224 (1963).
47. 309 A.2d 224 (Me. 1973).
48. 412 A.2d at 73 (citing Bedall v. Reagan, 159 Me. 292, 192 A.2d 24 (1963)).
jected the risk of fraudulent suits as a rationale for retaining the rule by finding that the judicial system can detect most fraudulent suits.\textsuperscript{49} The \textit{MacDonald} court also contended, as in \textit{Bedall} and \textit{Moulton}, that the courts have an affirmative duty to update prior holdings.\textsuperscript{50}

\textit{MacDonald} justifiably rejects the public policy arguments traditionally advanced to support the interspousal tort immunity rule. The policies of protecting family harmony,\textsuperscript{51} and limiting frivolous\textsuperscript{52} or fraudulent\textsuperscript{53} suits are not adequate to justify its retention.

Allowance of interspousal tort suits will not seriously harm family harmony. In many cases family harmony already has been destroyed by the date that suit is filed.\textsuperscript{54} All states allow actions between spouses on property-related torts with no apparent adverse effect on spousal relations.\textsuperscript{55} In addition, most interspousal tort suits arise out of the negligent use of an automobile. The almost universal existence of automobile liability insurance assures that most interspousal suits actually will be maintained between a spouse and an insurance company, thus limiting the risk of disturbing family harmony.\textsuperscript{56}

Allowing interspousal tort suits will not increase the number of frivolous suits, although spouses may bring suit on common and unimportant occurrences.\textsuperscript{57} Courts, however, can detect frivolous suits regardless of the relationship between the parties.\textsuperscript{58} Furthermore, in those states that have abrogated the interspousal immunity rule, frivo-

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\item \textsuperscript{49} Id. (citing Moulton v. Moulton, 309 A.2d 224 (Me. 1973)).
\item \textsuperscript{50} 412 A.2d at 74 (citing Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 351 N.E.2d 526 (1976)).
\item \textsuperscript{51} See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{52} See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{53} See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{54} See Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 A. 889 (1914); Roger v. Yellowstone Park Co., 97 Idaho 14, 593 P.2d 566 (1974).
\item \textsuperscript{55} See Richard v. Richard, 131 Vt. 98, 300 A.2d 637 (1973).
\item \textsuperscript{56} See id. Some courts and scholars have expressed a concern that any decrease in the risk of disturbing family harmony created by insurance is accompanied by an increase in the risk of fraud. \textit{See}, e.g., Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1979); Smith v. Smith, 205 Or. 286, 287 P.2d 572 (1955); Ashdown, supra note 18, at 249.
\item Courts that have abrogated the interspousal immunity rule contend that fraud is not unique to interspousal suits and that the judicial system can detect fraud. \textit{See} note 19 supra and accompanying text. On the effects of insurance, see generally Ashdown, supra note 18; James, \textit{Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance}, 57 \textit{Yale L.J.} 549 (1948).
\item \textsuperscript{57} See Corren v. Corren, 47 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1950) (en banc) (indicating relationship between frivolous suits and family harmony).
\item \textsuperscript{58} See Ashdown, supra note 18. Ashdown states that "the frivolous suit argument presents no substantial difficulties since behavior which might otherwise be deemed to provide adequate grounds for imposing liability is often simply not 'unreasonable' when viewed in the context of a
lous suits have not posed a significant problem to the courts.\textsuperscript{59}

Although abrogation of interspousal tort immunity may increase the risk of fraudulent suits, courts regularly must discern the fraudulent nature of many types of suits.\textsuperscript{60} The risk of fraud, therefore, does not justify denying compensation to an entire class of litigants.\textsuperscript{61}

Alternative remedies are inadequate forms of compensation for an injured spouse.\textsuperscript{62} Alimony is intended only to discharge a duty of support, not to compensate tort victims.\textsuperscript{63} Criminal sanctions deal solely with a public wrong,\textsuperscript{64} providing no compensation for the victim.

Judicial abrogation of interspousal tort immunity rules will not conflict with legislative preeminence in public policymaking.\textsuperscript{65} Because courts promulgated most interspousal tort immunity rules,\textsuperscript{66} they clearly enjoy the power and the duty to change these outmoded rules.\textsuperscript{67}

The \textit{MacDonald} decision is a step forward in modernizing the tort law field. Interspousal tort immunity is no longer appropriate because it frustrates the societal goal of compensating those harmed by others while contributing only slightly to the goals of protecting family harmony and limiting frivolous or fraudulent suits.

\textsuperscript{59} See Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 694, 376 P.2d 70, 72, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 104 (1962).

\textsuperscript{60} Id.

\textsuperscript{61} Id.


\textsuperscript{63} 376 Mich. at 547, 138 N.W.2d at 346.

\textsuperscript{64} 84 N.M. at 603, 506 P.2d at 347.


\textsuperscript{66} See, e.g., Brauner v. Brauner, 327 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. 1959).

\textsuperscript{67} In \textit{Digby v. Digby} the Rhode Island Supreme Court stated, "We abdicate our own function, in a field peculiarly nonstatutory, when we refuse to consider a court-made rule." \textit{Id. at 388 A.2d at 2. Accord, Brooks v. Robinson, 259 Ind. 16, 23, 284 N.E.2d 794, 796 (1972) ("[c]ourt should not hesitate to alter, amend or abrogate the common law"); Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 628, 351 N.E.2d 526, 531 (1976) ("a court not only has the authority but also the duty to reexamine its precedents"); Mosier v. Carney, 376 Mich. 532, 543, 138 N.W.2d 343, 344 (1965) ("it is our duty to reexamine it and, if necessary to avoid continuing injustice, to change it"); Rubert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 399, 528 P.2d 1013, 1014 (1974) ("the doctrine is subject to amendment, modification, and abrogation if current conditions so dictate").