A Statutory Proposal Protecting Employment Expectations of a Close Corporation's Minority Shareholders

Russell D. Phillips Jr.
Washington University School of Law
A STATUTORY PROPOSAL PROTECTING EMPLOYMENT
EXPECTATIONS OF A CLOSE CORPORATION'S
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS

So I returned and considered all the oppressions that are done under the
sun: and behold the tears of such as were oppressed, and they had no com-
forter; and on the side of their oppressors there was power, but they had no com-
forter.1

In a close corporation,2 majority shareholders3 have the capacity to
squeeze-out4 one or more minority shareholders from the corporation.5
The minority shareholder has few available remedies to counter majority

2. A small number of shareholders typically own and manage a close corporation. The shares
of the corporation generally are not traded in the securities market. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
308 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).

The Delaware corporations statute defines a close corporation as a corporation whose certificate of
incorporation (1) limits record ownership of its stock to not more than a specified number of per-
sons, not exceeding thirty; (2) subjects all its issued stock to one or more statutorily permitted
restrictions on transfer; and (3) prohibits the corporation from making a public offering of its stock
under the federal Securities Act of 1933. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 342 (1975).

In Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 305 (1975), the court listed the
following characteristics of a close corporation: “(1) a small number of stockholders; (2) no ready
market for the corporate stock; and (3) substantial majority stockholder participation in the manage-
ment, direction and operation of the corporation.” Id. at 586, 328 N.E.2d at 511.

Professor O'Neal defines the term “close corporation” as a “corporation whose shares are not
generally traded in the securities markets.” 1 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.02, at 3-4 (2d

3. Commentators define the terms “majority” and “minority shareholders” as follows:
[T]he terms “majority” and “minority” are used to distinguish those shareholders who
possess the actual power to control the operations of the firm from those who do not.
Although control is most often determined by the size of shareholdings, it does not depend
upon 51% ownership. For example, control might be exercised by a nonmajority share-
holder who has special skills upon which the business depends.

Hetherington & Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remain-
ing Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1, 5 n.7 (1977).

4. The term “squeeze-out” describes the method by which some of the owners in a business
enterprise utilize strategic position, inside information, power of control, or legal devices to eliminate
one or more owners or participants from the enterprise. See F. O'NEAL, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS § 1.01, at 1 (1975 & Supp. 1984) [hereinafter cited as F. O'NEAL]. The terms
“freeze-out” and “squeeze-out” are synonyms. 1 H. MARSH, MARSH'S CALIFORNIA CORPORATION

5. As a general proposition, the persons holding a majority of the voting shares of a corpora-
tion have the power to elect all the corporate directors. The directors determine corporate policy,
select corporate officers, hire employees, and supervise the operation of the corporation. Majority
interests can deprive minority interests of any voice in the operation of the business. F. O'NEAL,
supra note 4, § 1.03, at 3.
shareholder oppression. If he is dissatisfied with his position in the corporation, the minority shareholder may desire to sell his stock in the corporation. Unlike shares in a public corporation that are traded regularly, however, minority shares in a close corporation may be unmarketable because potential purchasers often hesitate to assume an inferior position in a close corporation. Because they already enjoy control, the majority shareholders would gain little from buying out the minority shareholder. Thus, to liquidate his investment, the minority shareholder may be forced to accept a majority shareholder’s offer for the stock that is substantially below its true market value.

A common squeeze-out technique is to discharge the minority shareholder from corporate employment. The minority shareholder in a close corporation often expects the corporation to employ him on a full-time bases.

6. A number of states have enacted statutes authorizing dissolution as a remedy for minority shareholders. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.

Some courts consider dissolution to be drastic, however, and hesitate to grant such relief. See, e.g., Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 274 (Alaska 1980); Notzke v. Art Gallery, Inc., 84 Ill. App. 3d 294, 300, 405 N.E.2d 839, 844 (1980).

Minority shareholders may preclude relief by failing to insist upon a shareholders’ agreement or appropriate charter or bylaw provisions. Minority shareholders may be unaware of the potential risks involved, or they may lack the bargaining power necessary to negotiate for protection. See F. O’Neal, supra note 4, § 9.03, at 582.


8. See, e.g., Fox v. J.L Bar Ranch Co., 198 Mont. 201, 645 P.2d 929 (1982) (to prevent bank from calling in its loan to the minority shareholder on the assertion his stock had no value for collateral purposes, another shareholder had to assure the bank he would purchase the shares if the loan were foreclosed); Meiselman v. Meiselman, 58 N.C. App. 758, 295 S.E.2d 249 (1982), modified, 309 N.C. 279, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983) (court deemed the minority shareholder’s interest, having a book value between three and seven million dollars, worthless as a producer of income).


10. The only benefit that the majority can gain by purchasing the minority’s interest is the portion of earnings attributable to that interest. See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 3, at 6.

11. See, e.g., Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 264 Or. 614, 637, 507 P.2d 387, 398 (1973) (it is common knowledge that the minority interest is worth considerably less than book value).

time basis. He may invest all of his assets, expecting to live off the salary he receives from the corporation. If the corporation discharges him, the minority shareholder may lose his means of livelihood as well as the value of his investment in the corporation.

Absent an express or implied employment contract, the minority shareholder-employee is subject to the employer's traditional right to discharge employees for any reason. Unlike the employees in a majority of other industrialized nations, private sector employees in the United States generally lack protection from unjust discharge. Either the employee or the employer can terminate the employment at will. Some courts have been sympathetic to the employee-at-will, creating exceptions to the employment-at-will rule.

Part One of this Note examines various squeeze-out techniques. Part Two of this Note describes the historical development of the employment-at-will rule and provides an overview of the major judicially developed exceptions. Part Three discusses recent court cases offering protection to minority shareholders based on their reasonable expectations. Part Four proposes an involuntary dissolution and alternative relief statute that would create an exception to the employment-at-will rule for close corporation shareholder-employees and would enable courts to grant relief to minority shareholders. This Note concludes that the pro-


18. To mitigate the impact of the employment-at-will rule, unions typically negotiate an agreement providing for dismissal only for just cause. For an example of such a clause, see Phillips Petroleum Co., 48 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 402, 403 (1967).

19. See infra notes 52-75 and accompanying text.
posed statute would effectively balance the interests of both minority and majority shareholders.

I. SQUEEZE-OUT CAUSES, TECHNIQUES, AND REMEDIES IN CLOSE CORPORATIONS

When an investor decides to become a shareholder in a close corporation, he usually assumes that during the life of the corporation the shareholders will determine the operation of the corporation.\(^\text{20}\) The individual shareholders may regard themselves as partners with common control of the business.\(^\text{21}\)

Not all close corporations, however, are harmoniously managed. Disagreement over corporate policy may arise for many different reasons, including greed and desire for power by one or more shareholders.\(^\text{22}\) Disagreement over corporate policy may eventually lead to a squeeze-out of minority shareholders. Majority shareholders use various squeeze-out techniques, including withholding dividend payments on corporate stock,\(^\text{23}\) voting the minority shareholder off the board of directors, and discharging the minority shareholder from corporate employment.\(^\text{24}\)


\(^{21}\) See, e.g., Cressy v. Shannon Continental Corp., 177 Ind. App. 224, 228, 378 N.E.2d 941, 945 (1978) ("while parties incorporate to obtain the benefits of limited liability, perpetual existence of business entity or tax considerations accruing to the corporate form, they often expect to act and be treated as partners in their dealings among themselves").

\(^{22}\) See Frasier v. Trans-Western Land Corp., 210 Neb. 681, 316 N.W.2d 612 (1982) (greedy majority shareholders attempted to oust minority shareholders to realize greater profits). Disagreement may also occur for the following reasons: the existence of an inactive shareholder, see Schwartz v. Marien, 43 A.D.2d 307, 351 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1974); the death of a founder, see *In re Radmon & Neidorff, Inc.*, 307 N.Y. 1, 119 N.E.2d 563 (1954); the existence of an autocratic controlling shareholder, see Crandall v. Canole, 230 F. Supp. 705 (E.D. Pa. 1964); the entry of a minority shareholder in a competing business, see Hyman v. Velsicol Corp., 342 Ill. App. 489, 97 N.E.2d 122 (1951); the failure to reduce the barrier to writing, see Lewis v. Compton, 416 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. App. 1982); and the occurrence of personality clashes, see Johnson v. Livingston Nursing Home, 282 Ala. 309, 211 So. 2d 151 (1968).


\(^{24}\) See *supra* note 12 and accompanying text. If a clause in the corporate charter or bylaws authorizes the corporation to purchase the shares of a holder who ceases to be an employee, removing the shareholder can be the first of two steps to eliminate him from the corporation. See, e.g., Ketchum v. Green, 557 F.2d 1022 (3d Cir.), *cert. denied*, 434 U.S. 940 (1977); Keating v. B.B.D.O. Int'l, 438 F. Supp. 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).

Majority shareholders also can utilize state corporate code provisions to squeeze out minority shareholders. These provisions may enable a board of directors: 1) to alter shareholder rights for a
The principles of majority rule and the business judgment rule have often prevented the minority shareholder from obtaining effective relief from these tactics. As a result of this hardship, some states have enacted legislation designed to protect the interests of the minority shareholder.

25. The persons holding a majority of the voting shares possess the power to elect all the directors. The directors determine corporate policy, select corporate officers, and supervise the operation of the corporation. Majority interests can deprive minority interests of any voice in the operation of the business. F. O'Neal, supra note 4, § 1.03, at 3.

26. The business judgment rule grants broad discretion to directors to determine business policy and conduct corporate affairs. The rule is based on the following beliefs: (1) courts should not substitute their judgment for that of directors who were selected to manage the business; (2) courts are not qualified to make complex business decisions; and (3) shareholders should be discouraged from instituting frivolous litigation. F. O'Neal, supra note 4, § 9.04, at 583. See, e.g., In re Reading Co., 711 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1983) (court will not disturb the judgment of a board of directors if the judgment has any rational business purpose); Willis v. Dillsburg Grain & Milling, 490 F. Supp. 46 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (court will not interfere with the internal business policies of a corporation absent a clear showing of fraud or abuse of discretion).

27. Some state statutes permit shareholders to petition for involuntary dissolution of a corporation. Involuntary dissolution refers to mandatory dissolution by court order rather than voluntary dissolution by a majority vote of shareholders. For an example of involuntary dissolution legislation, see Model Business Corp. Act §§ 94-103 (1971). Courts, however, are reluctant to authorize dissolution of a corporation because its liquidation value is usually less than the value of the going business concern. See Patton v. Nicholas, 154 Tex. 385, 398, 279 S.W.2d 848, 857 (1955) (“[W]e agree with the practically unanimous judicial opinion that liquidation of solvent going corporations should be the extreme or ultimate remedy, involving as it usually will, accentuation of the economic waste incident to many receiverships and most forced sales.”).


Most state statutes follow the Model Business Corporation Act to determine whether dissolution or alternative relief is appropriate. The Act focuses on "illegal, oppressive or fraudulent" actions of majority shareholders. Model Business Corp. Act § 97 (1971). Courts interpret these statutes narrowly, usually requiring a finding of wrongful conduct prior to granting statutory relief. See, e.g., Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351 (Mo. App. 1976) (combination of provisions giving long-term management control to majority shareholder, heavy corporate losses, and salary increases to the majority deemed not oppressive). For similar holdings, see Notzke v. Art Gallery, Inc., 84 Ill.
Traditionally, however, the minority shareholder has limited recourse against the discharge from employment technique because of a common-law rule known as the employment-at-will rule.

II. EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL RULE

A. Development and Legislative Limitations

The employment-at-will rule, which developed domestically, grants an employer complete freedom to discharge any employee. The courts adopted the rule to foster growth during the industrial revolution in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. During this period of laissez-faire economics, the rule seemed equitable. The United States Supreme Court in Adair v. United States and Coppage v. Kansas held


31. The writers of this period insisted upon freedom of bargaining as a "fundamental and indispensable requisite of progress." Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 365, 366 (1921).

In Pitcher v. United Oil & Gas Syndicate, Inc., 174 La. 66, 139 So. 760 (1932), the court explained why an employment contract for an indefinite term would be terminable at will:

An employee is never presumed to engage his services permanently, thereby cutting himself off from all chances of improving his condition; indeed, in this land of opportunity it would be against public policy and the spirit of our institutions that any man should thus handicap himself. . . . And if the contract of employment be not binding on the employee . . . then it cannot be binding upon the employer; there would be lack of "mutuality."

Id. at 67, 139 So. at 761.

For the assertion that the contract principles of mutuality of obligation and mutuality of consideration are no longer important, see Murg & Scharman, Employment at Will: Do the Exceptions Overwhelm the Rule?, 23 B.C.L. Rev. 329, 337 (1982).

32. 208 U.S. 161 (1908). In Adair, the Court struck down a federal statute that barred common carriers from dismissing employees for union membership. Id. at 168.

33. 236 U.S. 1 (1915). In Coppage, the Court invalidated a Kansas statute forbidding "yellow
the rule constitutional, stating that employers had the right to enter and terminate contracts and to acquire and hold property free from judicial and legislative restraints.  

In the era of recovery following the Depression, the development of a technologically advanced economy altered the roles of employers and employees. Employers wielded significantly greater bargaining power than employees. Recognizing this disparity, the Supreme Court backed away from a strict employment-at-will rule. In *NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.*, the Court upheld Congress' power to protect union activity, limiting employers' ability to discharge employees for union affiliation.

Federal legislation further limited the employment-at-will rule, prohibiting employers from discriminating on the basis of race, sex, dog” contracts.  

Id. at 6-7. A “yellow dog” contract is an agreement between an employer and employee that obligates the employee not to join or remain a member of a labor organization.

34. Id. at 23. The Court relied heavily on *Adair*, reasoning that each party had the right to stipulate the terms of the agreement relative to continuance of the employment relationship at the contract’s inception.

35. The rapid expansion of the early American industrial economy initially created jobs at a rate sufficient to provide work for those displaced as a result of technological advances and to accommodate an increase in the size of the work force. This situation, however, was short-lived. Y. Brenner, *A Short History of Economic Progress* 210-11 (1969). Inevitably, the number of qualified workers began to exceed the number of available positions. As a result, the employer acquired significant leverage in negotiating employment contracts. The inequality in bargaining position resulted in long hours and poor working conditions for the labor force. J. Galbraith, *American Capitalism* 114-15 (1956).


More recently, however, commentators have defended the employment-at-will rule. See, e.g., *Power, A Defense of the Employment at Will Rule*, 27 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 881 (1983); Note, *Limiting the Right to Terminate at Will—Have the Courts Forgotten the Employer?*, 35 VAND. L. REV. 201 (1982) [hereinafter cited as *Right to Terminate*].


37. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).

38. Id. at 33.


40. Id.
age,\textsuperscript{41} physical handicap,\textsuperscript{42} or union activity.\textsuperscript{43} Following the lead of Congress, many states passed statutes banning unjust dismissals in the areas of civil rights,\textsuperscript{44} workers' compensation,\textsuperscript{45} labor relations,\textsuperscript{46} political activity,\textsuperscript{47} jury duty,\textsuperscript{48} health and safety,\textsuperscript{49} and whistle blowing.\textsuperscript{50}

**B. Judicial Limitations on the Employment-At-Will Rule**

Courts have also limited the employment-at-will rule,\textsuperscript{51} developing a public policy exception\textsuperscript{52} and imposing a good faith and fair dealing requirement in the employment relationship.\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{41} See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 631, 633(a) (1982). The Act protects persons between the ages of 40 and 70 years from age discrimination by private employers, the federal government, and labor unions. The Act also protects workers from retaliatory discharge for exercising rights under the Act.


\textsuperscript{44} See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(1)(a)(e) (Consol. 1983).

\textsuperscript{45} See, e.g., TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307(e) (Vernon Supp. 1984).

\textsuperscript{46} See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3519(a) (Deering 1982).

\textsuperscript{47} See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 56, § 33 (West 1978).

\textsuperscript{48} See, e.g., N.Y. JUD. LAW § 532 (Consol. 1983).

\textsuperscript{49} See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 6310 (Deering 1982 & Supp. 1985).

\textsuperscript{50} See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-51 (West 1983).


\textsuperscript{53} State law in the following 18 states recognizes some form of wrongful discharge action for breach of an implied covenant of good faith: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Idaho, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, and Washington. Id. at 17 n.92.
1. Public Policy Exception

The public policy exception is the most widely accepted judicial limitation on the employment-at-will rule. The cases in jurisdictions that recognize this exception fall into three categories. First, some courts have refused to apply the employment-at-will rule when an employer discharges an employee for refusing to commit an unlawful or wrongful act. Second, some courts have refused to apply the rule when an employer discharges an employee for exercising a statutory right. Finally, some courts have refused to apply the rule when an employer discharges an employee for performing a public obligation.


In order to invoke this exception, a showing must be made that the discharge involves public policy and not just private interests. Scrogan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977). In Scrogan, the court held that no public policy was involved when the employer fired an employee for announcing his intention to attend night law school contrary to the employer's wishes.


In a majority of the jurisdictions that recognize the public policy exception, the cause of action is grounded in tort law. The rationale is that the employer's duty arises from public policy independent of the contract between the employer and employee. See Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 177, 610 P.2d 1330, 1335, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 845 (1980); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, 179 Conn. 471, 480, 427 A.2d 385, 388-89 (1980). Contra Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983).


55. See infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.

56. See infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.

57. See infra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 396\textsuperscript{58} typifies the first category. In Petermann, the plaintiff alleged that his employer instructed him to commit perjury. When he refused, the employer discharged him.\textsuperscript{59} The California Court of Appeals noted that although an employer generally has the right to terminate an employee-at-will, that right could be limited by public policy considerations.\textsuperscript{60} The Petermann court viewed the discharge as retaliation against the employee for refusing to commit an act prohibited by statute. In order to effectuate the declared public policy behind the statute, the court limited the employer's power to terminate the employee-at-will.\textsuperscript{61}

Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co.\textsuperscript{62} illustrates the second category. In Frampton, the employee filed a workman’s compensation claim for a job-related injury. After the employee received a settlement, the employer fired her in retaliation.\textsuperscript{63} The court limited the employer's power to terminate the employee-at-will, concluding that fear of discharge may have a deleterious effect on an employee's exercise of a statutory right.\textsuperscript{64} Other jurisdictions have disagreed whether discharging an employee in retaliation for filing a workman's compensation claim is actionable.\textsuperscript{65}


\textsuperscript{59} 174 Cal. App. 2d at 185, 344 P.2d at 27.

\textsuperscript{60} \textit{Id.} at 186, 344 P.2d at 27.


\textsuperscript{62} 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).

\textsuperscript{63} \textit{Id.} at 251, 297 N.E.2d at 427.

\textsuperscript{64} \textit{Id.}

Those courts that have refused to limit the employment-at-will rule insist that such causes of action are best created by the legislature. 66

_Palmateer v. International Harvester Co._ exemplifies the third category. 67 In _Palmateer_, the employer discharged the employee for supplying law enforcement authorities with information concerning another employee's possible involvement in criminal activities. 68 The Illinois Supreme Court allowed the employee's wrongful discharge action, 69 holding that no public policy is more important than that favoring the effective protection of lives and property through enforcement of a state criminal code. 70

2. _Implied Covenant of Good Faith_

Some courts have overridden the employment-at-will rule by imposing


67. Some courts, however, have extended protection to employees who exercised statutory rights other than filing workers' compensation claims. See, e.g., Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber, 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979) (right to refuse to take a polygraph test); Montalvo v. Zamora, 7 Cal. App. 3d 69, 86 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1970) (right to designate an attorney to negotiate terms of employment); Krystad v. Lau, 65 Wash. 2d 827, 400 P.2d 72 (1965) (en bane) (right to join a labor union).

68. _But cf._ Kavanagh v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 566 F. Supp. 242 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (permissible discharge when employee hired attorney); Catania v. Eastern Airlines, 381 So. 2d 265 (Fla. App. 1980) (employee's nonunion or union status is not actionable despite state's right-to-work law).

69. _Id._ at 132, 421 N.E.2d at 879.

70. _Id._ at 133, 421 N.E.2d at 880. The court stated that "[n]o specific constitutional or statu-tory provision requires a citizen to take an active part in ferreting out and prosecution of crime, but public policy nevertheless favors citizen crime fighters."
a duty of good faith and fair dealing in the employment relationship. In *Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.*, the seminal case imposing such a duty, the employer discharged the plaintiff, a female machine operator, when she refused to date her foreman. In recognition of Monge's claim, the court stated that if an employer terminates an employee-at-will for reasons of bad faith, malice, or retaliation, the termination is not in the best interest of the public good and constitutes a breach of the employment contract. Other jurisdictions recognizing the good faith doctrine typically apply it to cases in which the discharged employee has worked for the employer for a long period of time, or in which the employer has deprived the employee of bonuses, wages, or commissions.

III. PROTECTION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS' REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS

Majority oppression statutes generally focus on the majority shareholders' oppressive acts to provide relief to minority shareholders. Recently, however, several courts have shifted the focus of their analysis under majority oppression statutes, examining minority shareholders' reasonable expectations to determine if majority oppression has occurred. Similarly, several states have enacted new statutes that attempt

72. Id. at 132, 316 A.2d at 550.
73. Id. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551. Although the court made this statement in regard to an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, many courts and commentators discuss the case under the public policy exception. See generally DeGuiseppe, supra note 28, at 26.

The New Hampshire Supreme Court subsequently limited the broad language it used in Monge. See Howard v. Door Woolen Co., 120 N.H. 295, 414 A.2d 1273 (1980) (holding that Monge would be applied only when an employer discharged an employee for performing an act that public policy would encourage or refusing to do an act that public policy would condemn).


See also Chancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1318 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that employees must allege longevity of service and the existence of personnel policies or oral representations showing an implied promise not to deal with employees arbitrarily).

75. In Fortune v. National Cash Register, 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977), the plaintiff, a salesman with forty years of experience, alleged that his employer discharged him to avoid awarding commission on a five million dollar sale. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that an implied covenant of good faith existed in this particular case but refused to imply such a duty in every employment contract. See also Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 391 Mass. 333, 461 N.E.2d 796 (1984) (upholding employee's right to receive commission after wrongful discharge).

to protect the rights and interests of the minority shareholder. Courts have interpreted these new statutes to provide relief if conduct by the majority breaches the reasonable expectations of the minority shareholder.

For example, in *In Re Topper,* Topper held a one-third interest in two corporations. Topper, who had invested his life savings in the corporations, relocated from Florida to New York and terminated his previous employment of twenty-five years in order to serve as an officer and employee of the two corporations. The majority shareholders who controlled the two companies removed Topper from his positions as officer and employee, terminated his salary, and changed the locks on the corporate offices. Applying a reasonable expectations test, the court found

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78. In 1983 Minnesota adopted ground-breaking legislation that specifically provides that shareholders' reasonable expectations should be considered in determining relief in a shareholder controversy. See *Minn. Stat. Ann. § 302A.751(3)(a) (West 1984).* The statute reads as follows:

In determining whether to order equitable relief, dissolution, or a buy-out, the court shall take into consideration the duty which all shareholders in a closely-held corporation owe one another to act in honest, fair, and reasonable manner in the operation and the reasonable expectations of the shareholders as they exist at the inception and develop during the course of the shareholders' relationship with the corporation and with each other.

Id. (emphasis added).


79. In *Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty,* 167 N.J. Super. 141, 400 A.2d 554 (1979), aff'd, 173 N.J. Super. 559, 414 A.2d 994 (1980), the court recognized the minority shareholder's reasonable expectation that he would someday participate in managing the company restaurant. The court, however, refused to award dissolution, finding that the minority shareholder's failure to learn the business frustrated his reasonable expectation. The court held that the minority shareholder's discharge was not oppressive.

The California Court of Appeals took a somewhat different approach in *Stumpf v. C.E. Stumpf & Sons,* 47 Cal. App. 3d 230, 120 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1975). In *Stumpf,* hostility existed between two brothers, each of whom owned a one-third interest in a family corporation. After one brother severed ties with the family, the family limited his voice in the operation of the business and denied his salary and dividends. The court held that these actions failed to qualify as oppressive within the meaning of the statute, but ordered dissolution under the minority interest provision of the statute to "assure fairness to minority shareholders." *Id.*


81. *Id.* at 27, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 361-62.

82. *Id.* at 31, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 365. The court cited Professor O'Neal's treatise, *supra* note 4, which states the underlying principle of the reasonable expectations test as follows:
that the majority’s squeeze-out destroyed Topper’s reasonable expectation of actively participating in the corporations, thereby oppressing him within the meaning of the statute. The court ordered the majority shareholders to buy out Topper’s interest, noting that the reasonable expectations of minority shareholders constitute part of the bargain between shareholders when they form a corporation.83

In Meiselman v. Meiselman,84 the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the minority shareholder’s rights and interests in a close corporation include his reasonable expectations.85 In Meiselman, two brothers, Ira and Michael Meiselman, owned shares and served as employees in several corporations founded by their father.86 Ira, however, held a majority of the shares in the corporations.87 Michael brought a derivative suit alleging that Ira caused one corporation to enter into an unfair management contract with another company solely owned by Ira.88 Ira discharged Michael from employment in the family businesses in retaliation for Michael’s suit.89

Michael sought relief under the state’s majority oppression statute that required liquidation to be “reasonably necessary” to protect the “rights or interests” of a complaining minority shareholder.90 The supreme court declined to decide whether dissolution was reasonably necessary.

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83. 107 Misc. 2d at 31, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 365. The court ordered the majority shareholders to buy out the shares of the minority pursuant to N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1118 (Consol. 1983). Id. at 28-29, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 362.
85. Id. at 291, 307 S.E.2d at 563. In Meiselman, the plaintiff brought suit under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125(a)(4) (1982), which provides for dissolution or another more appropriate remedy when “reasonably necessary” for the protection of the “right or interests” of the complaining shareholder.
86. 309 N.C. at 282, 307 S.E.2d at 553.
87. Id. at 282-83, 307 S.E.2d at 553-54. Ira owned a 70% interest and Michael owned a 30% interest.
88. Id. at 283, 307 S.E.2d at 554.
89. Id. Ira also took Michael’s company car, his hospital and life insurance, his corporate credit cards, and his interest in a profit-sharing trust. Id.
90. Id. at 282, 307 S.E.2d at 552-53.
because the trial court failed to determine Michael's rights or interests.\textsuperscript{91} In instructions to the trial court for consideration on remand, the supreme court stated that a complaining shareholder's rights or interests in a close corporation include his reasonable expectations in the corporation.\textsuperscript{92} The court explained that in ascertaining these reasonable expectations, the trial court must consider expectations generated during the entire relationship between the shareholder and the corporation, not just expectations existing at the inception of this relationship.\textsuperscript{93}

IV. PROPOSED INVOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION AND ALTERNATIVE RELIEF STATUTE

Although all states have enacted statutes giving courts the power to dissolve corporations, neither these statutes nor the case law provides uniform standards to determine when a minority shareholder may obtain dissolution or alternative relief.\textsuperscript{94} Because oppressive conduct occurs in an infinite variety of forms and circumstances,\textsuperscript{95} a statute specifically defining oppressive conduct would be underinclusive.\textsuperscript{96} Likewise, an overbroad statute may injure both majority and minority shareholders.\textsuperscript{97}

This Note proposes a flexible involuntary dissolution and alternative relief statute for shareholders in close corporations. The proposed statute seeks to insure equitable results by defining acceptable majority

\textsuperscript{91} Id. at 291, 307 S.E.2d at 563.

\textsuperscript{92} Id.

\textsuperscript{93} Id. Professor O'Neal adopts a similar view: "[A] court should examine the whole history of the participant's relationship as expectations alter and new expectations develop over the course of the participants' cooperative efforts in operating the business." \textit{F. O'Neal, supra} note 4, \textsection{} 7.15 at 527.

\textsuperscript{94} See \textit{supra} notes 27 & 76-77 and accompanying text. See also Davidian, \textit{supra} note 20, at 59.

\textsuperscript{95} See \textit{supra} notes 12-14 & 22-24 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{96} In Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976), the court, commenting on judicial definition of "oppression," stated: "Such definitions are suggested perimeters of the broad term rather than narrow definitions which would tend to rob the term of its useful flexibility. As we read the statute, it is intended the courts will proceed on a case-by-case basis." \textit{Id.} at 358. See also Davidian, \textit{supra} note 20, at 59.

\textsuperscript{97} See Note, \textit{Corporate Dissolution for Illegal Oppressive or Fraudulent Acts: The Maryland Solution}, 28 Md. L. Rev. 360, 372 (1968). The directors and controlling shareholders may be forced to make their business judgments with a view toward avoiding violating a vague standard rather than serving the best interests of the corporation. The possibility of broad judicial construction may also discourage new companies from selecting the particular state as their state of incorporation. \textit{Id.} at 362.

A vague statute will also harm the minority shareholders' interests because of the court's recognition of the business judgment rule and the right of majority control. See \textit{supra} notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
shareholder conduct according to the reasonable expectations of the minority shareholder.\textsuperscript{98} The proposed statute clarifies the level of oppression that would warrant judicial relief by reflecting investment realities in a close corporation.\textsuperscript{99}

The proposed statute reads as follows:

\textbf{Involuntary dissolution; alternative relief}

(1) In the case of a close corporation having 35 shareholders or less, a court may order dissolution or grant any alternative relief under this section in an action brought by one or more directors or one or more shareholders upon proof that those in control of the corporation have

(a) acted fraudulently or illegally;
(b) mismanaged the corporation; or
(c) violated the strict good faith fiduciary duty that shareholders in a close corporation owe one another by frustrating the reasonable expectations of one or more shareholders.\textsuperscript{100}

(2) A court shall take the following into account when determining the reasonable expectations of a shareholder:

(a) the reasonable expectations of a shareholder existing at the time of incorporation and those developing during the shareholder's participation in the corporation;\textsuperscript{101}
(b) the reasonable expectations of a shareholder to serve as an employee, officer or director of the corporation.\textsuperscript{102}

This proposed statute would enable courts to grant relief to minority shareholders despite traditional principles such as majority rule, the busi-

\textsuperscript{98} See supra notes 76-93 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{99} See Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty, 167 N.J. Super. 141, 400 A.2d 554 (1979), aff'd, 173 N.J. Super. 559, 414 A.2d 994 (1980). The special circumstances, arrangements and personal relationships that frequently underlie the formation of close corporations generate certain expectations among the shareholders concerning their respective roles in corporate affairs, including management and earnings. These expectations preclude the drawing of any conclusions about the impact of a particular course of corporate conduct on a shareholder without taking into consideration the role that he is expected to play.
\textsuperscript{100} See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751(3)(a) (West 1984). See generally Olson, supra note 77, at 10.
\textsuperscript{101} See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{102} For a similar provision, see N.J. STAT. ANN. 14A:12-7(1)(e) (West Supp. 1984-85). The Commissioner's comment to this New Jersey statute states that "the additional words [whether in his capacity as a shareholder, director, or employee of the corporation] reflect the fact in a closely-held corporation oppressive conduct often takes the form of freezing-out a minority shareholder by removing him from his various offices . . . in the absence the courts might feel constrained to look exclusively to direct injury to the shareholders' stock interest." N.J. STAT. ANN. 14A:12-7(1)(e), comment (West Supp. 1984-85).
ness judgment rule, and the employment-at-will rule. First, the proposed statute would limit the exercise of majority control by imposing a strict good faith fiduciary duty upon the shareholders.103 This concept was illustrated in Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home.104 In Wilkes, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the removal of Wilkes as a salaried officer and director breached the fiduciary duties of utmost good faith and loyalty owed him by the other shareholders in the close corporation.105 The court allowed Wilkes to recover the salary he would have received had he remained an officer and director.106 The court stated that minority shareholders expect to participate in corporate management.107 Thus, the general corporate law’s reliance on the principle of majority rule, which presumes that the minority shareholder consents to corporate policies as determined by the majority, conflicts with the realities of investor expectations in a close corporation.108 Therefore, little justification exists to extend the principle of majority rule to a close corporation.

Second, the proposed statute would limit the exercise of the business judgment rule. As an example, the New Jersey Superior Court, in Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty,109 adopted the reasonable expectations test and noted that the business judgment rule should not apply because the rule enables majority shareholders to abuse their authority at the minority’s expense.110 The business judgment rule is based on premises inconsistent with the special characteristics of close corporations.111

103. See Involuntary Dissolution, supra note 9, at 1140-41.
105. Id. at 848, 352 N.E.2d at 661. The court defined the fiduciary duty as substantially the same fiduciary duty that partners owe to one another, a duty of utmost good faith and loyalty. Id.
106. Id. at 851, 353 N.E.2d at 662-63.
107. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
110. Id. at 154, 400 A.2d at 561. In Exadaktilos, the court held that the minority shareholder’s expectation to participate in management was frustrated by his own failure to learn the business. The majority, therefore, had a legitimate business purpose for discharging the minority shareholder and did not act oppressively. Id. at 155-56, 400 A.2d at 526.
111. See supra notes 20, 21 & 26 and accompanying text; F. O’Neal, supra note 4, § 9.04, at 583 n.7.
Even though a majority shareholder has been selected a director, the minority shareholder still has a reasonable expectation to participate in management. This expectation justifies courts substituting their judgment for that of the controlling directors. Moreover, in a close corporation, the decisions facing directors are not as complex as those facing directors in public corporations and are well within the scope of judicial understanding.

Section (2)(a) emphasizes the expectations generated by the original business bargain but also recognizes the need to examine the entire history of the employer-employee relationship. This section, therefore, provides courts flexibility to consider the changing expectations that develop over the course of the shareholder’s participation in the business.

Third, the proposed statute would limit the exercise of the employment-at-will rule by enabling courts to grant relief according to the minority shareholder’s reasonable employment expectations. Like most employees today, minority shareholders in close corporations depend on their corporate employers for economic survival. Because minority shareholders expect continued employment, courts could provide relief for wrongful discharge under the proposed statute. This statutory relief addresses the concerns of those courts that refuse to permit a wrongful discharge action absent legislative approval.

The potential plaintiff pool for wrongful discharge actions under the proposed statute would be limited. Because the statutory exception to the employment-at-will rule would be narrow, most employees would remain subject to the rule. Therefore, the proposed statute would not encourage wrongful discharge litigation. In addition, the proposed statute

112. See supra notes 13, 14 & 78-92 and accompanying text.
113. See F. O’Neal, supra note 4, § 9.04, at 584; Involuntary Dissolution, supra note 9, at 1150.
114. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
115. Professor Olson has discussed a similar provision, Minn. Stat. Ann. § 302A.751 (West 1984): “While certain expectations are probably common to all noncontrolling shareholders, the reasonable expectations of a particular shareholder will vary depending on the circumstances and the nature of the corporation... An examination of the assumptions and expectations of the parties will allow the court to determine when and in what form that return [on his capital] should be made.” Olson, supra note 77, at 23.
116. Under the proposed statute, courts could apply a public policy exception to the employment-at-will rule. The second classification of the public policy exception, discharge of an employee for exercising a statutory right, would cover a shareholder’s reasonable employment expectation as recognized by the proposed statute. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 66.
would limit excessive damage awards by protecting only reasonable employment expectations.119 Because of the inherent personal characteristics of a close corporation, juries would not perceive the litigation as pitting a terminated shareholder employee against a large, impersonal corporation.120

Courts often justify their reluctance to grant dissolution by stating that dissolution may have an adverse effect on the community, eliminating jobs and depriving consumers of a viable business.121 The proposed statute, however, would not necessarily result in dissolution of the corporation. Section (1) would give courts authority to order dissolution or to grant any alternative relief.122 Courts would consider all the facts and circumstances of each case in determining the appropriate form of relief.123 Thus, courts could require the controlling shareholders to buy out an oppressed shareholder, thereby avoiding interruption in business operations. Prospective investors would be encouraged to invest in close corporations knowing that they would not become locked into the corporation without recourse against the majority shareholders.124

V. CONCLUSION

By imposing an obligation of utmost good faith, the proposed statute would protect minority shareholders from the harsh results of majority rule. Likewise, the incorporation of the reasonable expectations test

119. For examples of jury verdicts exceeding one million dollars, see Chancellor v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1982) ($1.9 million actual and punitive damages plus $400,000 in attorney's fees for three executives), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1983); McGrath v. Zenith Radio, 651 F.2d 458 (7th Cir.) ($1.3 million actual and punitive damages after remittitur to single employee), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 835 (1981).
120. Commentators who argue for revision or abolition of the employment-at-will rule fail to address the problem that juries may sympathize with the employee, a common man, when management dismisses him. Lopatka, The Emerging Law of Wrongful Discharge—A Quadrennial Assessment of the Labor Law Issue of the 80's, 40 BUS. LAW. 1, 3-4 (1984).
121. See, e.g., Belcher v. Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank, 348 F. Supp. 61, 125 (N.D. Ala. 1968); see also Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 3, at 27.
123. See Olson, supra note 77, at 19. "The court's remedial discretion is without statutory limit. . . . The relief granted should be proportioned to the degree of mistreatment that has been suffered by the non-controlling shareholder." Id.
124. See Involuntary Dissolution, supra note 9, at 1151.
would temper the application of the business judgment rule. Finally, the proposed statute would recognize the minority shareholder’s reasonable employment expectation and would create a narrow public policy exception to the employment-at-will rule. The proposed involuntary dissolution and alternative relief statute would afford minority shareholders greater relief and would effectively balance the minority shareholder's interests with those of the majority.

Russell D. Phillips, Jr.