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Legal Education: A Perspective on the Last 130 Years of American Legal Training

Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr.*

It is customary on an occasion such as this for one to acknowledge that he is deeply honored by this appointment. Elevation to a distinguished professorship at one of the world's leading research universities is the pinnacle of recognition for an academic. All of that is true in my case. This is yet another high honor graciously bestowed upon me by this great institution for which I am humbly grateful. However, such sentiments, valid as they are, fall far short of expressing what I feel about this appointment.

When Joel Seligman came to my faculty office to tell me that he had recommended, and that Chancellor Wrighton had approved, my appointment to this chair, I was overwhelmed. It was not just the appointment to a distinguished professorship, as much as that means to me; it was the appointment to this specific chair, the William R. Orthwein Distinguished Professorship, that moved me. This is the chair that Bill Orthwein, a man whom I have grown to respect and admire, generously endowed in memory of his father, a graduate of this law school.

I first met Bill shortly after I arrived here in 1987. Not long before, he endowed the predecessor to this chair to help the school achieve its goal of further strengthening the faculty by making a major senior appointment. In our first discussion he enthusiastically embraced our determination not to settle for less than the very best person. He understood that success would not come easily or quickly. His only desire was to help better this school. Throughout the lengthy recruiting process, Bill was patient and encouraging. Thanks to his generosity we were able to have a series of truly distinguished visitors and to recruit Lynn LoPucki as the first permanent Orthwein

* William R. Orthwein Distinguished Professor of Law. This Article is a slightly revised version of an address delivered by the author on November 3, 1999, on the occasion of his installation as the William R. Orthwein Distinguished Professor of Law.
professor. All those whom we attracted because of Bill’s generosity contributed to the law school’s rise in stature.

There is no need for me to remind you of Bill’s unique influence on the success of McDonnell-Douglas and of his contributions to the betterment of Washington University and other St. Louis institutions. I want to highlight the generous gifts Bill and his wife Laura have made to support the work of two other St. Louis institutions with which my wife Sondra and I have ties. As many of you know, Sondra regularly volunteers at the Missouri Botanical Garden and is an avid supporter of that wonderful institution. Thanks to Bill and Laura, the Missouri Botanical Garden is the location of the Orthwein Floral Display Hall and now the Orthwein Entry Hall at the garden’s new Monsanto Research Center. And a little over a month ago, we joined many others in celebrating the dedication of the Orthwein Plaza at the Missouri Historical Society, on whose Board of Trustees I am privileged to serve. So, you see why this chair has special meaning to me.

Holding the chair named for William R. Orthwein, Sr., Bill’s father, adds to the luster of this honor. Born in St. Louis in 1881, son of a German immigrant and Civil War veteran who built up a very successful grain business in St. Louis, William R. Orthwein, Sr., was destined to make his mark in law, business, public service and politics. He graduated from this School of Law in 1905. Like his forty-nine classmates, he completed the course of study for the LL.B. degree in only two years. He was one of the minority among his class who had acquired a B.A. before entering law school, in his case, from Yale.

Throughout his professional life he was active in Republican politics in St. Louis. A powerful orator who effectively utilized the new medium of radio as early as 1929, he tenaciously pressed for clean government and elections. He served as a campaign manager for gubernatorial candidates and candidates for mayor. Mr. Orthwein was largely responsible for the election of William D. Becker as mayor of St. Louis in 1941. He was appointed supply commissioner of the city, responsible for the purchase and management of the supplies for all city offices and institutions. He held that fiduciary post with honor during the stressful years of World War II when scarcity and rationing compounded the burdens and pressures on his
office. Simultaneously, he served as property custodian for the Office of Civil Defense. In 1950, at the age of sixty-seven, he scored a big upset in the local elections by winning the Republican nomination for collector of revenue for the City of St. Louis, defeating the candidates supported by a well-oiled party machine. In the election that fall, he was the party’s chief hope, but the coattails of the Democratic candidate for senator, Thomas C. Hennings, Jr., were too long and Mr. Orthwein lost the election. In his only bid for statewide office, he was the Republican candidate for lieutenant governor.

Mr. Orthwein was a leader of the bar. An active member of the St. Louis, Missouri and American Bar Associations and of the St. Louis Lawyers Association, he was unanimously elected president of the Lawyers Association in 1939. He chaired the judicial committee of the Lawyers Association that was charged to scrutinize and evaluate the judicial system. Mr. Orthwein was a founder and the first secretary of the Legal Aid Society of St. Louis, which ultimately became Legal Services of Eastern Missouri.

He was a leader in many other civic activities. He was a member of the Board of Deacons at the Second Presbyterian Church for forty years and a director of the church corporation. He was vice-president and legal advisor of the St. Louis Grand Opera Guild. He was a founder of the Missouri Athletic Club. In addition, he was active in Washington University alumni affairs, serving as president of the Law School Alumni Association.

Lawyer, businessman, politician, civic leader, and man of integrity, William R. Orthwein held a position of outstanding influence in business, politics, and the legal profession for more than half a century. I am proud to hold the professorship named in his honor and memory.

As I thought about the subject of this afternoon’s talk, I pondered the significance of the high honor of this distinguished chair. It is hardly a secret that what scholarly accomplishments I may claim were achieved more than a decade ago. For eleven years, my intellectual energy was devoted not to the law of products liability or antitrust, or any other subject in which I once claimed a modest level of expertise, but rather on the subject of legal education itself. Hence I must infer that those who decided to appoint me to this chair did so in light of my work in legal education and not my scholarship alone.
hasten to add that I accept the chair as a challenge to publish significant scholarship in the future.

With that in mind, I decided to use the occasion to talk with you about the subject of legal education. I begin with some observations about the past and conclude with some brief thoughts for the future.

After I was appointed dean in 1987, I was invited to be an honorary initiate of the local chapter of Phi Delta Phi, a legal fraternity. The impressive induction ceremony was held in a federal courtroom. Before administering the oath, the senior members, arrayed across the bench in judicial robes, catechized each of the student initiates. The questions related to the principles and history of the fraternity. Fortunately, they excused the honorary initiate from displaying such erudition. But I was struck by a student initiate’s correct answer to the question: “Who was the first honorary initiate of this chapter?” It was William Gardiner Hammond.

At the end of the ceremony, I inquired if the new honorary initiate might address a question to the bench. I detected some misgivings but the benchers courteously acquiesced. I asked them, “Who was William Gardiner Hammond?” I was not surprised, but I think the newly sworn in members were amused, to learn that not one erstwhile inquisitor, including the faculty adviser, could answer the question. Sic transit gloria decanorum. Former deans are soon forgotten. A current radio commercial plays on the theme that if you want to be remembered, you better be first. Being the second won’t do.

Many are familiar with founding dean Henry Hitchcock’s singular devotion, perseverance, and his self-sacrifice in establishing and nurturing this institution in its infancy. There is much in the school’s institutional memory to remind us of this active practicing lawyer’s critical role in launching and setting the initial course of the St. Louis Law School, as the law department of Washington University was then known.

Few now recall his successor, William Gardiner Hammond, this school’s first full-time professor and dean, who was appointed in 1881. Hammond was the second dean and so has been largely forgotten. However, he deserves to be remembered. His contributions to this law school, the legal profession, and the development of what is now universally regarded as the American model of university legal education should be recalled and honored.
Hammond was a highly regarded scholar, legal educator, and remarkably successful dean at another law school. When Hammond accepted Washington University’s offer, other schools were vigorously recruiting him. The appointment drew heightened attention to the school.

I want to tell you a little about this remarkable legal educator and his accomplishments. I think then you will understand why I view what he and this school achieved as good omens for the future. As the historian Thomas Barnes observed, Hammond was among the “first generation of academic teachers-scholars in the law who were the creators of the modern American law school.”

Others have characterized him as “a man of broad vision whose chief interest lay in legal education,” “an eminent person” in his time, “a magnetic teacher who manifested a keen interest in his students,” the “most eminent authority in America on the history of the common law,” “one of the top ten law teachers in . . . America, ranking with Langdell and Ames (Harvard), Theodore Timothy Dwight (Columbia), . . . Thomas McIntyre Cooley (Michigan), Theodore Salisbury Woolsey (Yale), and two or three others of like stature.”

Hammond was born in Rhode Island in 1829. Under his lawyer-father’s tutelage, the young Hammond read widely and became fluent in Latin, Greek, French, and German, and could read other European languages as well. He graduated first in his class from Amherst College in 1849.

Preparation for the bar in a Brooklyn lawyer’s office was an intellectual let down for the bookish Hammond and markedly influenced his later life. Twenty years later, as he began working out

2. The Seventy-Fifth Anniversary of the School of Law of Washington University Saint Louis 1867-1942, 10 (1942).
4. Id. at 2142.
6. Barnes, supra note 1, at 89.
a plan for systematic legal education, he would remark, “of the many injuries for which I may thank [my mentor] not the least is that he never in a single instance sent me to a case or volume of reports to look for law.” Hammond was admitted to the bar in 1851 and practiced law in Brooklyn until 1856 where he developed a low regard for the learning and ability of his fellow lawyers. He then sailed to Europe to study civil law and legal history at Heidelberg. The financial crash of 1857 forced him to return after two years and resume his practice in Manhattan, where he found his colleagues at the bar no more competent than those in Brooklyn.

In 1860, he traveled to Iowa at the request of his brother, a railroad civil engineer. He took employment as a chainman for one dollar a day on a construction project in Anamosa, Iowa. He raised a company of militia for the Union army, although apparently the closest they came to the fighting was drilling in the village square. In 1863 he opened a law practice in Anamosa and three years later moved to Des Moines, Iowa. He was designated as the official Reporter to the Supreme Court of Iowa and commenced work on a digest of the court’s decisions, which became his first legal publication. He had his first opportunity to teach law at the law school established by two members of the Iowa Supreme Court. In 1867, he became the editor of a new journal, The Western Jurist, which was the only legal periodical published west of the Allegheny mountains.

In 1868, the Regents of the State University invited Hammond and the school to move to the University at Iowa City, where he was appointed chancellor of the law department, a position he held until he became dean of the St. Louis Law School at Washington University in 1881. Hammond was appointed in 1870 to a commission to revise and codify Iowa’s statutes. He was responsible for the substantive law

9. William G. Hammond, Digest of the Decisions of the Supreme Court of the State of Iowa from the Close of the Year 1859 to the June Term, 1866 (1866).
10. Emlin McClain, Law Department of the State University of Iowa, 1 Green Bag 374 (1889); Helen S. Moylan, A Manuscript Record of the Early Days of the Iowa Law School, 22 Iowa L. Rev. 108 (1936).
sections and the overall organization of the Iowa Code of 1873.  His structure withstood repeated recodifications.  

He proposed to write a treatise on the history of the common law: “with secret hope of leaving something by which I could be remembered after I am gone.” He taught himself Anglo-Saxon and carefully read the English Year Books, making voluminous notes and even translating some cases. Unfortunately, that work was never completed, although it did provide the basis for lectures later delivered at Boston and Ann Arbor. However, in 1876, he published an American edition of the Institutes of Justinian. His scholarly “Introduction” to that work, subsequently published separately, took issue with the then prevalent idea that the civil law reflected a scientific system of classification whereas the common law was completely unsystematic.  

Hammond followed four years later with the publication of a new edition of Francis Leiber’s Hermeneutics, in its day one of the most esteemed treatments of the theory of interpretation. Perhaps Hammond’s crowning scholarly achievement was the edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries he published after coming to St. Louis. For this “variorum” edition, Hammond examined all of the English and American editions, as well as 2500 American cases. His lengthy and erudite “Introduction” is a defense of Blackstone against the attacks of John Austin and the English analytic school of legal thought. 

11. McClain, supra note 5, at 224-25.  
12. Id. at 225.  
13. Id. at 230.  
15. Hammond, System of Legal Classification of Hale and Blackstone in its Relation to the Civil Law (1876).  
Except for his contributions to periodicals, the foregoing comprises the entire corpus of Hammond’s published work. His aspiration to leave “something by which [he] could be remembered after [he was] gone” was not realized. But his published scholarship does not begin to measure his original contributions to legal education. His failure to complete his magnum opus is justified, if not explained by, his tireless efforts devoted to creating the university law school as we now know it.

When he began teaching law in 1866, Hammond had not himself experienced a law school education and had no opportunity to observe other law schools as models. However, probably no one then working in the field was more knowledgeable than Hammond, not just of the law schools that were in operation in post-civil war America, but of the law schools that enjoyed a brief existence in the post-revolutionary period, the English Inns of Court, and the medieval law schools of Europe. Hammond also had personal experience with the prevailing law office training.

As Hammond reflected on how best to teach law, he quickly rejected the approaches then followed as totally inadequate for educating lawyers. The mode of teaching adopted in the existing law schools, including Washington University prior to his arrival here, was a combination of set lectures and recitations by students of passages memorized from assigned texts. Hammond rejected the “mere learning by rote of the pages of a law book in which were recited the deductions of the author from cases which the student had no means, or took no pains, to investigate.”19 “It is a common error,” he observed, “to think of legal education as consisting entirely in a set of rules which are to be learned . . ..”20 He expressed his view of legal education in terms that have a distinctly modern ring:

The law school is a place where the student may learn to

19. McClain, supra note 5, at 220. Moreover, the texts themselves were inadequate in Hammond’s view because they were written for the practitioner, not for the student. “All of them,” he wrote, “have been written to serve a purpose entirely different from [the student’s], and inconsistent with it, and they presuppose in their reader the very knowledge which he is set to learn from their pages. William Gardiner Hammond, Legal Education and the Present State of the Literature of the Law, 1 CENTRAL L.J. 292 (1874).
20. Hammond, supra note 19, at 293.
analyze a complicated statement of facts, and distinguish those
that have legal significance from those that have not—to
discriminate authorities and tell why one has more weight than
another; to put a client’s demand or defense in such shape that
he may be sure of having the benefit of all the law that is really
on his side.21

In the final analysis, Hammond viewed the law school as “the place
for the student] to learn how to learn law during all the remainder of
his professional life.”22

Hammond’s first recorded thoughts on legal education are found
in his journal for 1869, entitled Plan for a Textbook.23 There, he
wrote:

One purpose of the work should be to lead the student to read
cases as much as possible in the place of text-books, and to fix
these in his mind as the basis of all his study . . . . [T]he habit of
looking at the actual decisions instead of the principle deduced
seems to me the best possible way of guarding against the
danger of making the faithful student a mere book-lawyer. I
have no fear of his becoming a case-lawyer thereby, as
distinguished from one who reasons out his conclusions by
principle. On the contrary I am sure that the practice of taking
the cases just as they stand, and deducing the principle from
them for one’s self, is the best possible safeguard against such
an intellectual fault.24

This remarkable passage was written a year before Christopher
Columbus Langdell, universally regarded as the father of the “case-
method,” was appointed dean at Harvard,25 and two years before
publication of Langdell’s seminal Cases on Contracts,26 in which he

21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Hammond, supra note 8, at 490.
24. Id. at 493-94.
(1978).
26. CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS: WITH REFERENCES AND CITATIONS (1871).
set forth his influential theory of legal education.\textsuperscript{27}

Although Hammond appears to have anticipated Langdell, it was the latter whose method was emulated by legal educators throughout the land. Moreover, the similarities between Hammond’s and Langdell’s approaches to teaching the law, the principal one being the emphasis on cases rather than texts, were probably less significant than the differences. Unlike Langdell, Hammond never published the book he described in his journal. Hammond did use cases in his teaching, believing that “as a means of learning the law, [texts] are not to be compared with a judicious selection and arrangement of the cases from which they are made up. But the cases can be so used only under the guidance of an instructor, and with access to an ample library.”\textsuperscript{28} The Iowa Law School catalogue for 1869-70 declared: “Upon all the topics a large collection of reported cases are included in each day’s work, and the students are expected to be examined on these as well as on the treatises.”\textsuperscript{29} Rather than lecturing formally and assigning textbooks, Hammond “prepared in his principal subjects . . . printed synopses showing an analytical classification of the subject matter and giving references to leading cases to be read . . . . [H]e made familiar to his students by precept and example the methods by which the lawyer and the judge actually find out what the case law is and become skilful [sic] in applying the law of a case to its facts.”\textsuperscript{30} I have found no evidence that the class discussion or recitation was conducted in a Socratic mode.

Langdell viewed law as a science and the law library as the laboratory, with the cases providing the basis for learning those “principles or doctrines’ of which “law, considered as a science, consists.”\textsuperscript{31} Langdell “[e]mphasized . . . a national common law, which theoretically controlled the courts of every state.”\textsuperscript{32} Hammond, like Langdell, also wrote of law as a science and spoke of the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{27} Id. at v-vii.
  \item \textsuperscript{28} Hammond, supra note 19, at 293.
  \item \textsuperscript{29} Millard W. Hansen, \textit{The Early History of the College of Law, State University of Iowa: 1865-1884}, 30 IOWAL. REV. 31, 46 (1944).
  \item \textsuperscript{30} McClain, supra note 5, at 220-21.
  \item \textsuperscript{31} LANGDELL, supra note 26.
  \item \textsuperscript{32} SELIGMAN, supra note 25, at 36.
\end{itemize}
importance of learning the principles and the theory of law. But, perhaps because his vantage point for scrutinizing American law was the west bank of the Mississippi rather than the banks of the Charles, he displayed a far more sophisticated understanding of the complexity and contradictions manifest in nineteenth century common law. He was conscious of the implications of “nearly forty different courts of last resort, each independent of all the rest . . . making decisions that may be quoted to each other.” He well understood the extent to which this system freed the judiciary from the constraints of precedent as venerated in England’s unitary legal system.

“It is useless,” he opined, “for judges to quote a score of cases from the digest to sustain almost every sentence, when every one knows that another score might be collected to support the opposite ruling.” Hammond explained that “the most honest judge knows that the authorities with which his opinions are garnished often have had very little to do with the decision of the case; perhaps have only been looked up after that decision was reached, upon the general equities of the case.” In words that foreshadowed the insights of Karl Llewellyn, Jerome Frank, and the Realists of the 1930s, Hammond perceived how problematic this multiplicity of jurisdictions made consistent application of any supposed theory or principles of law: “It is the power of stating the facts as [the judge] himself views them, which preserves the superficial consistency and certainty of the law, and hides from careless eyes its utter lack of definiteness and precision.” Thus a judge, “[a]nxious to do justice, and free from the restrain[t]s which settled rules would impose . . . follows his sense of equity in giving the case to plaintiff or defendant, and then sets himself to the task, demanded by custom, of showing that such a decision is consistent with certain arbitrarily selected

33. Hammond was not always consistent. In some of his writings, especially his annotations to Leiber’s *Hermeneutics* and his introduction to Blackstone’s *Commentaries*, he appeared to subscribe to a theory of law that approaches Langdell’s.
34. Hammond, *supra* note 19, at 293.
35. William G. Hammond, American Law Schools in the Past and in the Future, Address Before Law Department of the State University of Iowa 6 (June 20, 1881).
36. *Id.*
37. *Id.* at 7.
Hammond’s astute comprehension of the law as it actually existed in United States Courts informed his thinking about legal education and the essential role of law schools in preparing would-be lawyers. This is best seen in an address that he twice delivered, in slightly different form, first upon his departure from Iowa and then on his assumption of the dean’s post at Washington University. 39

Hammond began his address by asking what accounted for the growth of law schools in the previous two decades. He identified two factors: the adoption of code pleading and the coming of the railroads. Code pleading, which displaced the arcane system of writs that had grown up without systematic thought over the centuries, was originally intended by the reformers as a simplification and rationalization of legal procedure. In fact, in Hammond’s view, it had created the need for lawyers to think rather than to simply copy out the prescribed form. He observed:

The code has made it impossible to practice law, or even to draw a single pleading, without an activity of thought that might formerly have been dispensed with, in all but really difficult cases. It has destroyed the uniformity of practice which enabled a beginner to employ form-books and precedents safely, without a real comprehension of their meaning. It has rendered useless, or worse than useless, that great stock of things learned by rote, in acquiring which the period of pupilage used to be mostly spent. 40

The change required that the lawyer “know the reason of everything he is to do, the principles which underlie all parts of his employment.” 41 Rote learning of the law office was utterly inadequate to the purpose, and mechanical recitation of memorized passages from texts was scarcely better.

This inadequacy of traditional legal training was compounded by

38. Id. at 6-7.
39. Although he presumably was unaware of it at the time, he was at precisely the halfway point of his academic career, having served for thirteen years at Iowa and embarking on what would be a thirteen year tenure at Washington.
41. Id.
the development of the railway system, for now the country was on the move as it had never been before. The railroad “changed the entire character of emigration and the formation of new states.”42 As a result, said Hammond, “our young lawyers have been drawn by the offer of such prizes for success, as were not dreamed of in the days of our fathers. To win these prizes, they needed an entirely different education from that which trained them to follow in the footsteps of their instructors.”43 Traditional training did not prepare the lawyer to take advantage of these opportunities:

[If, for example, as has often happened, he reads law in a New England city or village, to practice it upon the western prairies, or the shores of the Pacific, he will almost certainly find that his treasured practical knowledge is a burden upon his back, and that the only thing of value he has saved from those laborious years, is the scanty stock of legal principles which have taken root in his mind, in spite of his efforts to fill that mind with mere forms.44

Hammond had, in modern terminology, “thought outside the box”; like Langdell at Harvard, he had shifted the paradigm of legal education to create a system that conformed to the needs of a rapidly changing society. His influence on legal education, although perhaps not as extensive as Langdell’s, extended far beyond the law schools with which he was associated. During his tenure as dean at Washington University, he was instrumental in the creation and was a founding member of the American Bar Association’s Committee on Legal Education and Admission to the Bar. During his chairmanship of that Committee, the parent body adopted the Committee’s influential report and recommendations for accreditation and standards for admission to the bar.

Significantly, while Hammond was dean at Washington University, the school admitted and graduated its first African-American law student, Walter Moran Farmer. Although Missouri had remained in the Union during the Civil War, prejudice against

42.   Id. at 5.
43.   Id.
44.   Id.
African-Americans still prevailed in St. Louis and at the University. Farmer endured many manifestations of that prejudice as a law student. As a final insult, the members of his class refused to walk with him in the graduation procession. Dean Hammond walked with him.

William Gardiner Hammond clearly merited the high regard in which he was held by his contemporaries and deserves more homage than he receives today. His academic career spanned the three decades following the Civil War when the nation was undergoing profound changes, changes that transformed the legal profession. He responded by initiating fundamental changes in the education of lawyers in order to equip students of his generation to cope with the challenges they would confront.

Today, we are in a comparable situation. Hammond’s society was transformed by the railroad, ours by the Internet. Hammond’s generation saw the practice of law move from the provincial to encompass the national; ours from the national to the global. Under Hammond’s leadership, this law school responded to the stimuli of change by adapting its curriculum and mode of teaching to the needs of its time. At the initiative of our current dean, this law school has adopted a new strategic plan, again committing itself to change in ways that respond to the new needs of a global society. Under Hammond’s leadership, the law school thrived, increasing in quality and stature, and that should strengthen our confidence that we can do so now.