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Superfund and the Preemption of State Hazardous Waste Cleanup: Exxon Corporation v. Hunt {106 S. Ct. 1103}

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SUPERFUND AND THE PREEMPTION OF STATE HAZARDOUS WASTE CLEANUP: EXXON CORPORATION v. HUNT

The growing concern over hazardous waste has led many states and the federal government to enact emergency response and cleanup statutes. The sources of funding for these cleanup measures include taxes, general revenues, fines, bond forfeitures, and recoveries from liable par-


2. Warren, supra note 1, at 10,352. Of the 36 states that have enacted such legislation, about eighteen passed their laws after CERCLA. See infra notes 6, 45. Other states amended their statutes to complement the CERCLA legislation.

New Jersey, the country's largest generator of hazardous waste, is familiar with the consequences of poor disposal. See Rollins Envtl. Services, Inc. v. Township of Logan, 199 N.J. Super. 70, 80, 488 A.2d 258, 263 (Law Div. 1984), rev'd, 209 N.J. Super. 556, 508 A.2d 271 (App. Div. 1986). In recent years, New Jersey's problems have included the contamination of rivers from nearby landfills, the forced closing of private wells, and the endangering of Atlantic City's principal source of drinking water. Id. While some experts fear an explosion at a New Jersey dump site could produce a toxic cloud endangering thousands of people in the New York metropolitan area, the state "is having difficulty finding a safe disposal site for more than 40,000 barrels of hazardous waste." Note, Preemptive Scope, supra note 1, at 638 n.25 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 19-20 (1980)). In recent years, however, New Jersey has made substantial strides to clean up its 300 hazardous waste sites. As of April 1981, the state had expended more than $25 million from the Spill Fund on cleanup. Lesniak v.
ties. The funds are then utilized in emergency situations and in remedi-

dying general problems. The New Jersey Spill Compensation and

Control Act (Spill Fund or SCCA) is an example of one such state

statute. Under federal legislation known as the Comprehensive Envi-

ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (Superfund or

CERCLA), states are allowed to conduct fund raising and cleanup

activities to combat hazardous waste. CERCLA also, however,

preempts state activities and the extent of the preemption is not al-

tways clear. CERCLA and SCCA both utilize a front-end tax to cover

the costs of hazardous waste cleanup. In *Exxon Corporation v. Hunt* the United States Supreme Court examined the language and congressional intent of CERCLA's taxing provision and held that the federal statute partially preempted New Jersey's front-end tax.

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3. Warren, *supra* note 1, at 10,353. Most states obtain funding through "back-end" taxes. Thirty-five states use this method, taxing transporters or generators of hazardous waste or owners and operators of disposal facilities. Some states vary the tax according to the weight or volume, the type of waste, or the disposal method. *Id.*

4. *Id.* The author observes that states have a variety of solutions to hazardous waste problems that will cause confusion for companies with facilities in more than one state. *Id.* at 10,349.


7. Warren, *supra* note 1, at 10,351. The author states that CERCLA "expressly saves certain types of state programs and expressly preempts others." *Id.*

8. 42 U.S.C. § 9614(c) (1982). See *infra* note 16 for the full text of § 9614(c). CER-

CLA precludes states from "imposing additional financial responsibility beyond those spelled out in § 108 of CERCLA and from allowing double recovery for claims compensable under state law or the federal fund." Warren, *supra* note 1, at 10,351.


12. *Id.*
New Jersey taxed both the state petroleum and chemical industries pursuant to SCCA. The Exxon Corporation filed suit against New Jersey, in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, seeking reimbursement for taxes paid between the enactment of CERCLA and the suit filing date. Exxon argued that section 114(c) of CERCLA precluded New Jersey from taxing the company because the state tax conflicted with the federal legislation. The district

13. The Taxation of Major Facilities section reads in pertinent part:
   There is hereby levied upon each owner or operator of one or more major facilities a tax to insure compensation for cleanup costs and damages associated with any discharge of hazardous substances to be paid by the transferee.
   The New Jersey Spill Compensation Fund is hereby established as a nonlapsing, revolving fund in the Department of the Treasury to carry out the purposes of this act. The fund shall be credited with all taxes and penalties related to this act. Interest received on moneys in the fund shall be credited to the fund.


15. Id. at 65,695 (petitioner's complaint point 3). Exxon sought a refund of $750,000 that it had paid to the Spill Fund between December 3, 1980 (the date of CERCLA's enactment) and May 12, 1981 (the date of filing). Id. Compare this refund with the estimate for 1982 that the American petrochemical industry lost $350 to $400 million to sources such as Spill Fund and Superfund. DiNal & Kovall, The Superfund Blues: CERCLA Reauthorization and A New Proposal for Funding, 13 A.B.A. BRIEF 29, 31 (1984).

16. Section 114(b) reads in pertinent part:
   Recovery under other State or Federal law of compensation for removal costs of damages, or payment of claims
   Any person who receives compensation for removal costs or damages or claims pursuant to this chapter shall be precluded from recovering compensation for the same removal costs or damages or claims pursuant to any other State or Federal law. Any person who receives compensation for removal costs or damages or claims pursuant to any other Federal or State law shall be precluded from receiving compensation for the same removal costs or damages or claims as provided in this chapter.

42 U.S.C. § 964(b) (1982). Section 114(c) reads in pertinent part:
   Contributions to other funds:
   Except as provided in this chapter, no person may be required to contribute to any fund, the purpose of which is to pay compensation for claims for any costs of response or damages or claims which may be compensated under this subchapter. Nothing in this section shall preclude any State from using general revenues for such a fund, or from imposing a tax or fee upon any person or upon any substance in order to finance the purchase or prepositioning of hazardous substance response
court dismissed the suit on jurisdictional grounds. Exxon subsequently brought suit in the New Jersey Tax Court. The Tax Court granted the state's motion for summary judgment, holding that CERCLA did not preempt the Spill Fund. The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, and the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the Tax Court's decision. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction, and subsequently affirmed in part and reversed in part.

The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that any laws that "interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of Congress . . . are invalid." Thus, under this "check on state power,"

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equipment or other preparation for the response to a release of hazardous substances which affects such State.


18. Exxon's co-plaintiffs were B.F. Goodrich Co., Union Carbide Corp., Monsanto Co., and Tenneco Chemicals, Inc.


20. Id. On cross-motions for summary judgment, Exxon argued that the state tax compensated hazardous waste sites that the Superfund might ultimately compensate. New Jersey argued that the Spill Fund, as a supplement to Superfund, provided compensation for claims not receiving Superfund coverage. 97 N.J. 526, 529, 481 A.2d 271, 272 (1984).


state law yields to federal law if a conflict between the two exists.\(^{28}\) State law is preempted if it hinders a strong federal legislative purpose.\(^{29}\)

Although the Court's preemption standards vary\(^{30}\) when it applies the Supremacy Clause\(^{31}\) and Congress has not explicitly preempted the field, the Court exhibits a preference for state regulatory power.\(^{32}\) In


28. Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972) (due to the Atomic Energy Commission’s exclusive authority over the construction and operation of nuclear power plants, state efforts to regulate radioactive releases are precluded); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978) (state law is void when in direct conflict with federal legislation, but state regulations stand when the Secretary of Transportation has not promulgated regulations); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977) (state laws that are less stringent or require different information expressly preempted by federal statutory language and purpose); City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973) (the pervasive nature of the federal regulatory scheme preempts state and local control). See also Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) (state law preempted if Congress expressly provides federal law is exclusive authority in a particular field). See generally Note, Superfund and California’s Implementation: Potential Conflict, 19 CAL. W.L. REV. 373, 389-90 (1983).


31. Comment, supra note 27, at 146.

32. Id. at 145. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983) (Congress preserved a dual system of regulation under which state regulations are not preempted because the federal government regulates safety and the state regulates traditional economic concerns such as generating capacity); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) (federal inspection laws do not preempt the state's power to promote local health and
New York State Department of Social Services v. Dublino, for instance, the plaintiffs, New York public assistance recipients, were subject to New York's conditions for aid. The plaintiffs argued that the Federal Work Incentive Program (WIN) preempted New York's statutory scheme. The Court reasoned that because the state program coordinates and complements the federal program the preemption argument is less persuasive.

The ability of state and federal legislation to coexist in a given area is illustrated in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., v. Ware. The case involved a state law that protected employees from post-employment forfeiture clauses. The Court held that a New York Stock Exchange rule allowing such clauses did not preempt the state law and emphasized that courts should favor the reconciliation of state and federal schemes.

Although the federal government is involved in environmental regulation, Congress has not completely preempted the field. In fact, many federal environmental programs are executed with the states' cooperation. Under these circumstances, Dublino and Ware suggest that states are free to regulate areas such as hazardous waste cleanup.


33. 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
34. Id. at 422-23.
35. Id. at 411. Dublino involved the Federal Work Incentive Program (WIN) amendment of 1967 to the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1982). Under WIN, employable aid recipients were to register with the state for manpower services, training, and employment as a condition of assistance. New York had a similar requirement for state granted aid. 413 U.S. at 407 n.1.
36. 413 U.S. at 421. The Court held that Congress did not intend to preempt state work programs, but remanded for a determination of whether specific provisions of New York's law conflicted with the Social Security Act. Id. at 422-23.
38. In particular, the statute invalidated employment contracts that restrained a person from engaging in a related post-employment business. Id. at 121.
39. Id. at 127.
40. Comment, supra note 30, at 208-10.
41. Warren, supra note 1, at 10,351. "[U]nlike other environmental legislation that has been held to preempt state laws, CERCLA expressly preserves them." Id.
and removal.\textsuperscript{43}

To regulate waste production, Congress enacted the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA).\textsuperscript{44} Because RCRA, however, did not adequately deal with the problems of hazardous waste,\textsuperscript{45} Congress enacted CERCLA to amend RCRA.\textsuperscript{46} CERCLA created a trust fund to finance joint state-federal cleanup operations.\textsuperscript{47} Congress funded the 1.6 billion dollar fund through taxes imposed on both the petrochemical and oil industries and from general appropriations.\textsuperscript{48} In spite of criticism of its poor construction and confusing language,\textsuperscript{49} the federal financial incentives to states in order to develop programs preserving coastal areas.

\textsuperscript{43} Note, \textit{supra} note 28, at 390-95.


\textsuperscript{45} Note, \textit{supra} note 28, at 3768 n.23. The Act was prospective and did not deal with the cleanup of older sites. Another reason further legislation was necessary was the EPA’s lax enforcement of RCRA. \textit{Id.}


\textsuperscript{47} Note, \textit{supra} note 28, at 374. This is a “cost sharing scheme requiring state participation.” The Superfund provides “liability, compensation, cleanup, and emergency response for hazardous substances released into the environment” and the cleanup of inactive waste disposal sites. \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{48} 26 U.S.C. §§ 4611, 4661 (1982). \textit{See Warren, supra} note 1, at 10,350. Of this amount, $1.38 billion came from “taxes on crude oil, certain petroleum products, and 42 chemical feedstocks with the remainder coming from appropriations.” \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{49} 1A F. GRAD, \textit{supra} note 46, at 4A-150. Some of the confusion derives from CERCLA’s reliance on and cross-reference to other laws. \textit{Id.} at 4A-106. Opponents pointed out that the bill was flawed and contained many “substantive defects.” Congressman Broyhill gave Congress a “three-page list of various defects and technical errors.” 126 \textit{CONG. REC.} H31,969 (1980). Courts reviewing the legislative history to
legislation passed into law.

Although CERCLA preempts certain state activities, it expressly requires states to pay at least ten percent of the expenditures for joint operations. Section 114(c) specifies the uses to which a state can apply its taxes under CERCLA's scheme. In determining whether a federal statute preempts a state statutory scheme, courts typically apply the ordinary meaning of the statute's language, assuming that it expresses legislative intent. CERCLA's statutory language suggests broad federal preemption. Section 114(c) states that "no person may be required to contribute to any fund . . . which may be compensated under this subchapter." The Act fails to indicate, however, how to interpret the phrase "may be compensated." Whether compensation is discretionary under the ordinary meaning of the phrase or mandatory under a narrower interpretation turns on the legislative intent, discover congressional intent have commented that the legislative history is "unusually riddled [with] self-serving and contradictory statements," United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1983), and both the statute itself and its legislative history are vague. City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1142 (E.D. Pa. 1982). Congress also did not provide a committee report clarifying the scope of the legislation. United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1109 (D.N.J. 1983).

50. Note, supra note 44, at 310. But see Warren, supra note 1, at 10,351. "The only apparent limitation on state programs in the federal Act is preemption of certain state hazardous waste cleanup tax-financed funds . . . ." Id.

51. 1A F. GRAD, supra note 46, § 4A-109. CERCLA also requires the states to pay for subsequent maintenance of the targeted site. Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(3)(A) (1982).


53. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 105 S. Ct. 2380, 2388 (1985). The Court also noted it must presume Congress "did not intend to preempt areas of traditional state regulation." Id. (citing Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)). But see Aloha Airlines v. Director of Taxation, 464 U.S. 7 (1983) (when a federal statute unambiguously forbids certain types of state actions, the courts "need not look beyond the plain language of the federal statute to determine whether a state statute . . . is pre-empted").

54. Note, supra note 28, at 388-89 n.122. "The language of the federal act is broader than the legislative intent to prevent double taxation." Id.

55. See supra note 16.


statutory context, and the subject matter of the dispute.

In an attempt to clarify the ambiguity of section 114(c), New Jersey initiated two suits against the federal government. In *New Jersey v. United States* the court noted that the federal government “genuinely took no position” on whether CERCLA preempted state law. *Lesniak v. United States* was also part of New Jersey’s effort to prove that CERCLA did not preempt the state taxing provision. This suit (1923); *Kraft v. Board of Educ.*, 247 F. Supp. 21, 24-25 (D.C.C. 1965), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 958 (1967) (interpretation based on the legislative intent as shown by the statute and legislative history). If, however, “may” and “shall” appear in the same sentence, or the words are close juxtaposition in different places of the same statute, the courts apply the words’ ordinary meaning. *Hecht Co. v. Bowles*, 321 U.S. 321, 326-27 (1944) (the use of “may” and “shall” in the same sentence implies the purposeful use of each); *United States v. Tapor-Ideal Dairy Co.*, 175 F. Supp. 678, 682 (N.D. Ohio 1959) (citing *Federal Land Bank of Springfield v. Hansen*, 113 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1940)) (the general rule is that “may” is permissive and grants discretion, especially when juxtaposed with “shall”). In *Jensen v. Lehigh Valley R. Co.*, 255 F. 795 (S.D.N.Y. 1919), Judge Learned Hand analyzed the use of “may” and “shall” in the first and third paragraphs of the statute. He stated that “may” sometimes means “shall,” but “hardly when the two words are in such immediate contrast.” *Id.* at 796.

58. *Kraft*, 247 F. Supp. at 24-25. New Jersey argued that according to the legislative history, the phrase “may be compensated” strictly limits federal preemption of state taxation to items under Superfund coverage. Thus, the state can use Spill Fund monies when Superfund financing is inadequate or unavailable. Brief for Appellees at 9-11, *Exxon Corp. v. Hunt*, 106 S. Ct. 1103 (1986) (No. 84-978) [hereinafter Brief for Appellees]. *Exxon* argued that the plain meaning of “may be compensated” means eligibility for compensation and not actual payment. Brief for Appellants, *supra* note 10, at 24. *Exxon* also argued that CERCLA’s legislative history supports this interpretation. *Id.* at 40-41 (Senator Magnuson’s formulation of “may be compensated” prohibited duplicative funds).


60. *Farmers’ & Merchants’ Bank*, 262 U.S. at 662.

61. See *infra* notes 62-67 and accompanying text.


63. [12 Curr. Dev.] Env’t Rep. (BNA) 933 (Nov. 27, 1981). The court dismissed the complaint as not ripe for review, stating that New Jersey is not “in apprehension of imminent federal action threatening its program.” *Id.*


ended when the Environmental Protection Agency agreed that CERCLA did not preclude New Jersey from using the state's Spill Fund to respond to hazardous wastes. These two suits constituted New Jersey's attempts to clarify existing law so that the state could efficiently operate its cleanup and removal programs.

In *Exxon Corporation v. Hunt* the United States Supreme Court reviewed the New Jersey Supreme Court decision and reversed in part the New Jersey Tax Court's grant of summary judgment. The Tax Court relied on Superfund's legislative history as well as its scope and purpose to conclude that "even if § 114(c) of [Superfund] is construed to preempt part of the [S]pill [F]und, the . . . nonpreempted areas are more than sufficient to sustain the Fund's continued validity." The Court noted that because *Exxon* was an express preemption case, the Court need only look to the statutory language to determine the extent of federal preemption. The Court acknowledged but rejected the Solicitor General's amicus curiae reading of the phrase "costs of response or damages or claims." The majority found sup-

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67. *Id.* at 10,352. See *supra* note 65.
68. 106 S. Ct. 1103 (1986).
70. 106 S. Ct. at 1109.
71. 97 N.J. at 529, 481 A.2d at 272.
72. *Id.* at 530, 481 A.2d at 273 (quoting 4 N.J. Tax 294, 320 (1982)). The Tax Court would also have upheld the tax scheme "because the statute contained an express severability clause." Warren, *supra* note 1, at 10,352. "The court found it could, therefore, sever uses of the fund that potentially duplicated CERCLA but uphold the tax scheme itself." *Id.*
73. 106 S. Ct. at 1119 (citing Aloha Airlines v. Director of Taxation, 464 U.S. 7, 12 (1983)). See *supra* note 53.
74. 106 S. Ct. at 1109. The New Jersey Supreme Court argued that "[a]lthough it may be true that many of the purposes to which Superfund moneys are put overlap with the purposes of Spill Fund, this fact alone does not require a conclusion of preemption." 97 N.J. at 536, 481 A.2d at 276.
75. 106 S. Ct. at 1111. The Court analyzed the Solicitor General's opinion because its logical force helped in understanding Exxon's and New Jersey's arguments. *Id.*
port for its rejection of the narrow amicus interpretation of the pre-emption provision in CERCLA's legislative history, the wording of section 114(b), and the saving provision of section 114(c). Upon comparing section 114(b) with section 114(c) the Court noted that the New Jersey Supreme Court's ruling made the first sentence of section 114(c) redundant and violated the plain meaning of the phrase "may be compensated." Rejecting New Jersey's argument that section 114(c) applies only when Superfund pays a claim or would have paid a claim, the Court stated that New Jersey failed to consider other congressional policy choices, distorted the "language and logic" of section 114(c), and lacked sufficient support for its view in CERCLA's spare legislative history.

Solicitor General argued that Superfund preempts only one of the five uses of Spill Fund monies (i.e., the payment of other parties' damages and cleanup costs) and may preempt the entire tax on non-severability grounds. See Amicus Curiae, supra note 10, at 20. See also N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:10-23.11o(2), -23.11q (West 1982). The Solicitor General further argued that § 114(c) prohibits funds that "pay compensation for claims of any costs of response or damages . . . [or] claims which may be compensated under [the] subchapter." Amicus Curiae, supra note 10, at 16. The Solicitor General interpreted "claim" narrowly as a private party's demand for reimbursement for cleanup expenses from a state fund or Superfund. 106 S. Ct. at 1110.

The saving provision, or the second sentence of § 114(c), allows the state to impose a tax "to finance the purchase or prepositioning of hazardous substance response equipment" or otherwise prepare for the release of hazardous substances. 42 U.S.C. § 9614(c) (1982). The Court concluded that the Solicitor General's interpretation made the saving provision redundant. 106 S. Ct. at 1113.

The Court made this comparison in order to determine the meaning of § 114(c)'s phrase "which may be compensated under this subchapter." By reading "may be compensated" to mean "is compensated," § 114(c) became redundant because Congress banned double compensation under § 114(b).

Congress was also concerned, the court stated, with the adverse effects of overtaxation on the petrochemical industry. See also H.R. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 22 (1979); DiNal & Kovall, supra note 15 for a general discussion of congressional policy choices.

Although the debate between Senators Bradley and Randolph, see 126 CONG. REC. S30,949 (1980), supports New Jersey's stance, the majority, because of ambiguities, inaccuracies, and the truncated consideration of the bill, declined to give the statements much weight. 106 S. Ct. at 1115. See supra notes 49-52. The New
Finally, the Court defined the category of expenses that "may be compensated" by Superfund and compared this category with the Spill Fund scheme in order to determine the extent of federal preemption. According to the Court, the National Contingency Plan (NCP) provides criteria such as the annual National Priorities List for determining what expenses at which sites are eligible for federal money. Although the Court did not accept Exxon's total preemption argument, it held that section 114(c) preempted Spill Fund expenditures beyond the required ten percent state contribution for both costs incurred to remedy sites on the National Priorities List and removal costs eligible for compensation under NCP criteria. Justice Stevens dissented, concluding inter alia that the New Jersey tax was not subject to federal preemption because the Spill Fund had purposes...

Jersey Supreme Court also relied on various statements made by Congressman Randolph, particularly his remark that the language of § 144(c) "is a prohibition against double taxation for the same purposes. . . . In summary, . . . this preemption provision is narrow in scope and limited to the particular purpose of preventing double taxation." 126 Cong. Rec. S30,993 (1980). See also Brief for Appellees, supra note 58, at 19. New Jersey argued that the presumption against preemption is particularly strong when a traditional function of state government, such as taxing, is involved. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 105 S. Ct. 2380, 2389-90 (1985); Brief for Appellees, supra note 58, at 19.

86. 106 S. Ct. at 1115-16.
87. Id. at 1116.
89. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(8)(B) (1982). The NCP list includes about 400 high priority facilities as determined by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency. Id. See also 40 C.F.R. § 300 app. B (1986).
90. 106 S. Ct. at 1115-16. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.65 (1986) (Superfund will finance removal or immediate cleanup only in emergency situations); 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(a) (1986) (sites listed on the National Priorities List are exclusively eligible for remedial financing); 50 Fed. Reg. 9593 (1985) (Environmental Protection Agency criteria for using Superfund monies for national resource claims).
91. 106 S. Ct. at 1116. See also Brief for Appellants, supra note 10, at 19-20. Exxon argued that because states cannot duplicate Superfund uses, they cannot duplicate Superfund taxes, thus invalidating the New Jersey tax. Id. Total preemption, however, would render the "may be compensated under this subchapter" language meaningless. 106 S. Ct. at 1116.
92. Id. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. 106 S. Ct. at 1117-21.
other than compensating valid claims made against the Superfund.96

New Jersey's response to federal inaction in the cleanup of hazardous waste97 was to continue its own taxing and cleanup efforts.98 Although CERCLA requires active state involvement in the Superfund legislative scheme,99 the preemption issue turns on whether section 114(c) is narrowly or broadly interpreted.100 A broad reading of the preemption provision discourages state efforts to clean up and control hazardous wastes101 and severely limits a state's ability to raise needed funds for the cleanup and removal of toxic wastes.102 On the other hand, a narrow interpretation of the preemption provision flouts congressional policies and intent and violates the plain meaning of "may be compensated."103 The Court's compromise between Exxon's total preemption standard and New Jersey's "all or nothing" preemption standard104 invalidates particular parts of New Jersey's taxing scheme105 yet leaves the severability issue to the New Jersey courts.106

Although the Court recognized that both houses of Congress had

96. Id. at 1118. Justice Stevens also argued that Congress knew of the New Jersey Spill Fund if Congress had intended to preempt the Spill Fund it would have done so in less ambiguous language. Id. at 1119.

97. Chamberlain, Superfund Cleanup A Question of Pace, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Aug. 31, 1985, at 3B. As of August 31, 1985, the EPA had cleaned only ten sites. Id. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.

98. See supra note 2.


100. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.

101. Note, Preemptive Scope, supra note 1, at 655. A narrow reading encourages more state involvement and "provide[s] states with greater flexibility in meeting their matching grant and other obligations under CERCLA." Warren, supra note 1, at 10,352. "Courts should not impede these state efforts [to clean up hazardous waste] by an overly broad interpretation of CERCLA's preemption clause." Note, supra note 44, at 337.

102. Id. at 320. The preemption provision "casts doubt on the status of these state programs [taxes, fines, or fees on generators or disposal facilities]." Id. This puts states in a "double bind." The states "may not be permitted to raise funds such as under the New Jersey Spill Act. Yet they are required to contribute ten percent. . . . As a result, states may not receive the monies necessary to clean up and abate a hazardous waste spill." Note, supra note 28, at 388 n.121.

103. See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.

104. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text. See also 97 N.J. at 536, 481 A.2d at 276.

105. 106 S. Ct. at 1116. See supra note 36. See also New York State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973).

106. 106 S. Ct. at 1116.
recently passed bills repealing section 114(c), it did not address the Environmental Protection Agency's interpretation of that section. The EPA's position is that section 114(c) does not apply to state spending that the Superfund could, but does not, reimburse. Congressional committees have also interpreted section 114(c) narrowly. The New Jersey Supreme Court relied on CERCLA's legislative history to support a narrow reading of section 114(c), and interpreted "may" to mean "shall." The Court, however, dismissed the legislative history as ambiguous and inaccurate and properly interpreted the phrase "may be compensated." New Jersey was the only state using a front-end tax to finance hazardous waste cleanup measures. The Court invalidated this scheme because of the preempted expenditures and articulated a preemption standard that utilizes National Contingency Plan criteria. As a re-

sult, the Court's holding reduces the potential financial burden on the petrochemical and petroleum industries\textsuperscript{117} and is in step with congressional policy to save domestic jobs and help these industries remain competitive with imports.\textsuperscript{118}

\textit{Gary E. Cooke, II}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{117} Chamberlain, \textit{supra} note 97. Currently, only twelve corporations pay almost 70\% of Superfund taxes. Environmental Protection Agency data on materials found at 549 National Priority List sites, which showed the petroleum refining industry identifiable at only 5\% of these sites, demonstrates that the industry burden is already out of proportion with liability. DiNal & Kovall, \textit{supra} note 15, at 31.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{118} See \textit{supra} note 83.}