A World of Peace Under the Rule of Law: The View from Europe

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We convene in St. Louis at Washington University School of Law, and specifically at the Whitney R. Harris Institute for Global Legal Studies to commemorate the remarkable event of the judgment against twenty-two major Nazi war criminals before the International Military Tribunal in Nürnberg,¹ which came to an end after a 218-day court session sixty years ago, by reflecting upon the effects it has upon us today. The topic which has been entrusted to me, A World of Peace Under the Rule of Law—The View from Europe, carries quite a heavy burden. It seems rather ironic to ask someone who possesses the same nationality as those responsible for the greatest humanitarian catastrophe on the European continent to speak about “A World of Peace” at a conference remembering their convictions. Sixty years after the end of the Nürnberg Trials, this invitation to discuss a global rule of law demonstrates a substantial amount of trust in the German people, who come from a country where the Nazis had abolished every democratic principle and eliminated all individual liberties by dissolving the separation of power. Although sixty years is a long time in the case of our individual lives, the recent discussion about a German military contribution to the enforcement of Security Council Resolution 1701,² and the deployment of German troops to the Middle East region as part of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) engagement, demonstrates that in the context of international relations, sixty years is but a short moment, like the blink of an eye.³ Taking all this into account, I will endeavour to reflect on the experiences and lessons learned, or not learned, from the past sixty years from a German’s viewpoint.

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I. THE DREAM OF ETERNAL PEACE

A. A Human Desire

Eternal peace is one of the world’s oldest dreams. However, it seems to be something unusual, even transcendent, not to be achieved on this earthly side of life. It is not by accident that the report of the birth of Christ mentions the fact that there was peace on earth at the very moment of his birth. 4 Peace is associated with the kingdom of God, with paradise. 5 The human experience of life is quite different. The status naturalis, writes Immanuel Kant, is a state of war. Even if there is no permanent armed conflict, there is a permanent threat of a violent outbreak. 6

Philosophers and lawyers have always attempted to justify wars. 7 In his treatise, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Hugo Grotius states that it would be a natural thing to go to war in order to accomplish one’s goals, even in an attempt to achieve peace. 8 If it is “natural” to do something, why does it need a justification? Maybe a “war” is not so natural after all. The general question, whether the human being is naturally peaceful or naturally evil, remains unsolved. Experience shows that human beings are both good and evil at the same time. Whereas each individual has the ability to use his or her fist, he also has the ability to restrain from using violence. 9 He has the urge to harm and even kill his wrongdoer, 10 while at the same time he dreams of a life in peace.

4. The Roman Catholic Martyrology mentions that the announcement of the birth of Christ was: "in the 42nd year of the rule of Octavian Augustus, when the whole world was at peace..." See The Roman Martyrology, http://www.breviary.net/martyrology/mart12/mart1225.htm.
5. The Roman Catholic philosopher Aurelius Augustinus differentiated between the pax terrena (earthly peace) and the pax aeterna (eternal peace), which can only be achieved in the heavenly kingdom after life on earth has terminated. AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, DE CIVITATE DE, 426 (P.G. Walsh ed., Oxbow Books 2005).
8. HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLII AC PACIS [on the Law of War and Peace], Bk. 1, Ch. 1, ¶ 1625.
9. For interesting insight into the psychological research regarding the use of force, see HARALD WELZER, TÄTER: WIE AUS GANZ NORMALEN MENSCHEN MÄSSENMÖRDER WERDEN (S. Fischer 2005).
10. The great German nineteenth century criminal law scholar Franz von Liszt called this the human instinct of taking revenge. Franz von Liszt, Marburger Programm, 3 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DIE GESAMTE STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 1 (1883).
B. Political Solutions

At a regional level, establishing an executive power to hold a monopoly of force and implement a state structure works fairly well in preventing private wars in the Grotian sense, and in thus upholding peaceful co-existence within a country. In the Kantian sense, the republican constitution of a state, one committed to equality and liberty of the person, is a corollary to the control of aggression. The “Rechtsstaat,” which is the German term for the rule of law, is generally capable of guaranteeing peace and security domestically.

The obvious question then is: can adherence to the rule of law promote global peace as much as it guarantees national peace?

In On Eternal Peace, Kant has elaborated on this and proposed two hypotheses. First, any well-ordered democratic society will not start wars, because it would be unreasonable for the citizens to vote in favor of their own corporal and economic suffering. Citizens would not start such an “evil game.” Second, assuming a global state is not desirable, Kant further suggested that nation-states should be incorporated into a “league of nations,” or a “league of peace.” Such a “league” would not have a monopoly of power as does a national democratic state, but it would be based on bilateral and multilateral treaties amongst states of equal power.

This vision is in many respects rather realistic. However, Hypothesis One has proven to be empirically wrong, as democratic states do go to war. Hypothesis Two is realistic because public international law still operates exactly on a Westphalian level and has not succeeded in establishing eternal peace thus far. My hypothesis is that the lack of a mandatory judiciary and an application of an international rule of law is the exact reason for this failure. The vision that reason will prevail, and a democratic structure will prevent wars, is supported by the experiences of nation-states. Appealing to reason alone, however, is too weak; power must be separated and channelled, and its use controlled.

11. The difference between private and public wars is discussed in GROTIIUS, supra note 8, Bk. 1, Ch. 3, ¶¶ 1-4.
13. Kant, supra note 6, at 250.
14. Id. at 254.
II. BETWEEN SETBACKS AND ACHIEVEMENTS

The nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Europe can be illustrated by a number of achievements and dramatic setbacks regarding the dream of a world without war. We can observe the attempt to subdue international relations to the rule of law. We can also observe the establishment and development of truly democratic states in Europe. But for a long time, this did not put an end to wars.

A. The European Development

War as a means of politics was perfectly acceptable during the nineteenth century. Acting in accordance with the maxim “expansion is everything” formulated by Cecil Rhodes, European states colonized, suppressed, and exploited nearly the entire hemisphere. These wars took place in far away countries, but even Europe at that time was full of wars. For example, German Unity in 1871 was coerced by military force, first by military occupation of northern Germany by Prussia, then by the German-German war of 1866 (the so-called Bruderkrieg or “Brother’s War”), and finally by the Franco-German War of 1870-1871.

Public international law contains a considerable amount of disparity. On the one hand, several world peace conferences held at the turn of the century aimed to prevent harm to the civilian population. The Hague law was crafted during this time, giving substance to the rudimentary bones of jus in bello. On the other hand, Europe was en route to a disaster, beginning with the assassination of Crown Prince Franz Ferdinand on June 28, 1914, in Sarajevo. Shortly after the agreements prohibiting the use of gas, and after consent to the Martens Clause outlawing unnecessary suffering in warfare as a principle of humanitarian law, the battlefields in France were spoiled with bodies corroded by mustard gas.

The catastrophic end of the First World War in Europe was followed by several steps meant to prevent future conflicts of this kind. First, Germany was identified as an aggressor in the Treaty of Versailles and

restricted by severe armament controls. Second, a criminalization of international law violations was contemplated, but did not materialize. The Emperor was not prosecuted\(^\text{18}\) because the principle of immunity for heads of states was considered a hindrance.\(^\text{19}\) Nor were other military and political leaders prosecuted on an international level.\(^\text{20}\) The national trials Germany was coerced to hold against a handful of its army leaders were nothing more than mock trials. The so-called “Leipziger Prozesse” (Leipzig Trials) were a clear sign that the classical nineteenth century nation-state viewed warfare as a matter of national pride and military honor.\(^\text{21}\)

Third, the Kantian idea of an international league was introduced in 1919 by the Treaty of Versailles and the creation of the League of Nations. A new age of international relations was to begin. The rule of law, in a rather reduced form of compulsory arbitration,\(^\text{22}\) was to be introduced on an international level through the Permanent Court of Justice as the judicial branch of the Montesquieu-like separation of powers. Despite the fact that U.S. President Woodrow Wilson presented the idea of such an organization,\(^\text{23}\) the U.S. did not become a member of the League of Nations, which certainly did not help the organization’s success.

B. The German Development in Particular

In the meantime, Germany attempted to transform itself into a democratic state. With a rather fine and balanced democratic constitution, which was drafted mainly by the renowned scholar Hugo Preuss,\(^\text{24}\) the

\(^{18}\) This is despite the fact that “William II of Hohenzollern, formerly German Emporer” was identified by the Versailles Treaty as one of the persons responsible for the human tragedy caused by World War I; see Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and German art. 227, June 28, 1919, 11 Martens (ser.3) 323, 2 Bevans 43 [hereinafter Treaty of Versailles].


\(^{20}\) See Treaty of Versailles, supra note 18, art. 228.


\(^{22}\) The term “compulsory arbitration” encompasses both the successes and the failures of the Permanent International Court of Justice, see Grewe, supra note 7, at 611–16.

\(^{23}\) President Woodrow Wilson, The Fourteen Points, Address to Congress (Feb. 11, 1918).

\(^{24}\) See generally Jan Iimmel, Hugo Preuss und die Weimarer Reichsverfassung (2002);
“Weimarer Republik” was founded. Yet the new constitution, based on the ideal of Preuss’ “Volksstaat” (“state of the people”) was not supported by a majority. It has thus been called a “democracy without democrats.” Indeed, the old national thinking and the dishonor of the military defeat were present in the minds of many Germans. Likewise, the new democracy was not capable of dealing with the political struggle between communists and fascists. The attempts to establish the rule of law both nationally and internationally failed. Both the League of Nations and the Weimarer Republik in Germany were ill-equipped to deal with attacks from within. The finest democratic state is useless if there is no will to support it; an international league is worthless if the people are not willing to give up a piece of their sovereignty. It is rather devastating and depressing that the horrific disaster of the First World War was not disheartening enough to the people of Europe to really change their way of thinking. Thus, power still prevailed over reason.

C. The Road to Disaster

The consequences of this failure were dramatic. Inside Germany the newly elected Führer, Adolf Hitler, abandoned all democratic structure and imposed a fascist totalitarian regime. In September 1939, the Second World War began and resulted in the total destruction of civilization and humanity.

Despite President Franklin Roosevelt’s efforts to keep the U.S. out of the war, the tragedy could not be solved without American help. On May 8, 1945, Europe was an expanse of ruins. The world needed a new order, a new start.

In contrast to the lax prosecution of war criminals following World War I, the allied powers now decided to hold a spectacular trial and show to the entire world that aggression and war crimes would be followed by

26. See KURT SONTHEIMER, ANTIDEMOKRATISCHES DENKEN IN DER WEIMARER REPUBLIK: DIE POLITISCHEN IDEEN DES DEUTSCHEN NATIONALISMUS ENISCHEN 1918 UND 1933 (Nymphenburger Verlagshandlung 1968). For a contemporary viewpoint, see GERHARD LEIBHOLZ, DIE AUFLÖSUNG DER LIBERALEN DEMOKRATIE IN DEUTSCHLAND UND DAS AUTORITÄTRE STAATSbild (1933). A splendid contemporary non-legal description of the general social situation during the Weimarer Republik is given in SEBASTIAN HAFNER, GESCHICHTE EINES DEUTSCHEN: DIE ERINNERUNGEN 1914-1933 (Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt 2000).
severe punishment. This was a turning point in European history. Indeed, as Justice Robert H. Jackson said in his opening address, the Nürnberg Trial was "the most significant tribute that power has ever paid to reason." The Jacksonian trial held at Nürnberg taught Europe that hate and revenge can be channelled by a criminal trial, power can be controlled, and the most heinous crimes can be answered by the rule of law.

Attempts to establish a global institution which would be the basis of a new world order led to the creation of the United Nations (U.N.). It was meant to be an institution for all peace-loving nations; aggression would be ruled out and a collective system of peace and security would be established. The U.N. Charter, on its face, is simply an attempt to establish the rule of law on a global level. It addresses the good will of nations, and attempts to channel the use of violence into a monopoly of power—the U.N. Security Council.

However, political reality frustrated all hopes of a global rule of law as the Cold War began shortly after the end of World War II. Notwithstanding the confirmation of the Nürnberg principles, neither a code of international criminal norms nor a statute creating an international criminal court could be achieved. The Korean War buried all hopes of a monopoly of military power; hundreds of military incidents kept the U.N. deadlocked, due to the fact that the East-West conflict was present from Vietnam to the Middle East, from Central America to Africa.

28. Id.
29. U.N. Charter pmbl. (signatories agreed "to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours").
31. In reality, the Cold War commenced after the defeat of the German army in the summer of 1945. The term "Iron Curtain" was crafted by Winston Churchill, not in his famous speech at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri on March 5, 1948, but in a communication with President Truman as early as June of 1945; see Winston Churchill, Der Zweite Weltkrieg [The Second World War] 1079-1083 (3d ed. 2004).
The United Nations is not a success story. What is missing for the rule of law to function is a mandatory judiciary. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is not the kind of institution that could serve as a reliable backbone for a global rule of law. It is too weak, and in many instances it looks more like an arbitration tribunal without mandatory authority. Nevertheless, the U.N. provides a forum for discussion and at least a theoretical structure which, sadly, is only adhered to on a loose, voluntary level, whenever it suits the most powerful players in the global game.

The last century in world history has shown that in international relations, reason does not prevail over power as long as power is not separated and controlled. The hypothesis of Kant—that a democratic state would not go to war—has proven to be unrealistic. Democratic states are not less likely to go to war, but they go to war for different reasons and with different means, as Habermas has observed.\textsuperscript{35} War is still the continuation of politics with different means, as Clausewitz stated.\textsuperscript{36} And, of course, the justification for war is different; we do not characterize war as a “necessary expansion” or as being in our “economic interests”; rather, we call it “humanitarian intervention” and “state building”. A purely domestic rule of law cannot guarantee international peace and security. Likewise, a “league of nations” that respects the sovereignty of its members to the fullest extent cannot assure peace and security.

III. WHERE DO WE, THE PEOPLE OF EUROPE, STAND TODAY?

Let me finally reflect on the idea of establishing peace and security that has been followed by Europe. Europe has experienced the most brutal wars imaginable. Animosities, mutual anxieties, and oppressive politics once led to a total collapse of any sense of humanity.

As a solution, Churchill proposed in a speech in Zurich on September 20, 1946:

What is this sovereign remedy? It is to recreate the European fabric, or as much of it as we can, and to provide it with a structure under which it can dwell in peace, in safety, and in freedom. We must

\textsuperscript{35} JÜRGEN HABERMAS, FRIEDEN DURCH RECHT 12 (Matthias Lutz-Bachmann & James Bormann eds., 1996).

\textsuperscript{36} Carl von Clausewitz was an influential Prussian general and military theorist. In his treatise VOM KRIEGE (ON WAR), he stated his well known theory: “Der Krieg ist eine bloße Fortsetzung der Politik mit anderen Mitteln.” (“War is merely a continuation of politics by different means.”) VOM KRIEGE, Book 1, Ch. 1, No. 24, available at www.clausewitz.com/cwzhome/vomkriege2/onwartoc2.html; see also ANDREAS HERBERT-ROTHE, DAS RÄTSEL CLAUSEWITZ (2001).
build a kind of United States of Europe. In this way only will hundreds of millions of toilers be able to regain the simple joys and hopes which make life worth living. The process is simple. All that is needed is the resolve of hundreds of millions of men and women to do right instead of wrong and to gain as their reward blessing instead of cursing.  

And Europe indeed embarked on this mission. To heal their wounds and prevent a similar outbreak in the future, the main European powers decided to establish a network of contracts and to create a system of mutual dependency. This was done in a twofold way: first economically by the foundation of the European Communities (EC), and second, with regards to human rights, by the foundation of the Council of Europe and the ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights.

The success of the EC, which was later founded as the European Union, is, in my estimation, due to two factors: first, the general will of the member states to grow together while giving no preference to state sovereignty, and second, the mandatory judiciary. The first President of the European Commission, Walter Hallstein, expressed this sentiment when emphasising the role of the rule of law as the basis for European integration. The European Union has thus been called a “Rechtsgemeinschaft,” or a “legal community.” The European Court of Justice rather quickly turned into the driving force for European

40. The treaty establishing the Council of Europe was signed by ten states: Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. See Statute of the Council of Europe, supra note 38. Germany became the fourteenth member state to the Council of Europe on July 13, 1950.
41. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. This was the first international legal instrument safeguarding human rights.
42. Neither institution counted the U.K. as a member of the European states.
45. ARMIN VON BOGDANDY, SUPRANATIONALER FÖDERALISMUS ALS WIRKLICHKEIT UND IDEE EINER NEUEN HERRSCHAFTSFORM 53 (1999).
integration. It took the role of watchdog, enforcing and fulfilling the obligations of the member states. The Court is one of the most important European institutions, and the most progressive in terms of its innovativeness and anticipation of the political will. This engine of integration, however, is dependent on the restrictions of state sovereignty tolerated by the member states. Such restrictions are the oil without which the engine would soon stop functioning.

A similar story can be told of the Council of Europe; the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) is integrated into a supra-national system of cooperation and supervision for the protection of human rights. The ECHR hands down judgments which are accepted as legally binding on member states. Considering the importance and the quantity of its cases, the ECHR has turned into an “ordinary” constitutional court. Again, we can observe a judiciary that is accepted as binding on member states and thus cuts back the sovereignty of the nation state. Without this, the recognition and success of the ECHR would not have been achieved.

The European Union, which has already formally established one Union citizenship, was initially eager to create one political entity, one United States of Europe, as it were. However, the dream of one state under one constitution has come to a halt. The European train, which seemed to be at full speed, suddenly met a red signal when it came time to ratify the Draft Constitution, which failed to be approved by several member states. The European Union had to accept that the political will to tie the member states closer together has not yet reached a majority within Europe. At the same time, the Federal Constitutional Court in Germany, among other courts in Europe, declared the European arrest warrant

47. “The Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance, each within its jurisdiction, shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is observed.” See EC Treaty, supra note 39, art. 220. Nevertheless, development of the law is generally accepted as one of the main aims of European jurisprudence.
49. MARK JANIS, ET AL., EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 2000); see also KAI AMBOS, INTERNATIONALES STRAFRECHT (2006).
50. The concept of Union citizenship was introduced in 1992. See STEFAN KADELBACH, DIE UNIONSBÜRGERRECHTE, IN EUROPÄISCHE GRUNDRECHTE UND GRUNDREIHEITEN 467 (Dirk Ehlers ed., 2002).
53. The difficulties with the European Unity have been described in ETIENNE BALIBAR, SIND WIR BÜRGER EUROPAS? 253–90 (2003).
unconstitutional and void, finding that it disregards national tradition and legal culture. The European unification process has been too quick, too un-democratic, and has thus lost contact with the sentiment of its citizens. “Time-out for a unified Europe,” one might say. Yet, this pause provides precious time to reflect and stabilize the process as it is.

Germany has always been one of the driving forces for European unification, especially after Germany’s own miraculous unification in 1990. German unity can only be lived to its fullest within a strong European Union that is committed to the promotion of basic and human rights and that controls nation states by restricting their sovereignty.

The entire process of European integration, from the 1950s to today, proves the fact that adherence to the rule of law guarantees peace amongst states. Europe as a society, which for centuries fought one war after the other, has experienced sixty years of peace because it has learned that the nation state with full sovereignty can turn into an aggressor against its own people and against its neighboring states. Cooperation with a strict supranational controlling body is a model that has worked well as a basis for peace and security.

I do not want to say that these are all lessons learned from Nürnberg, although much of them are. But the legacy of Nürnberg fits well into the objectives of the European process. Therefore, it does not surprise me that most European member states, and indeed the European Union itself, favor the establishment of the International Criminal Court. International criminal law breaks with the principle of ultimate sovereignty and brushes away the myth of immunity.


56. EU Treaty, supra note 43, pmbl.


IV. TOWARDS A GLOBAL PEACE

Global peace is still a dream; hopes that the end of the East-West conflict would also end wars turned out to be fallacious. Ethnic and religious conflicts continue to rise, and a new form of violence, terrorism, has shown the world its ugly face. I do not have a straight answer to the problem. However, a European view, as I have tried to argue, would be based on three pillars: first, human rights are at the center of democracy; second, state sovereignty is subsidiary to the respect for human and other basic rights; and third, power needs to be controlled by a supra-national judiciary that is generally accepted as capable of issuing binding decisions.

The Nürnberg trial, which we commemorate at this hour, fulfilled all three requirements. Germany was coerced to accept the judgment; the vanquished did not have any other option. And it was hard for the German people to accept the Nürnberg verdict.60 Public opinion in Germany as early as the 1950s disapproved of the prosecution of German nationals by the allied powers.61 Also, for a long time, the German government was cautious not to accept the Nürnberg judgments as “good law,” and it maintained the stance that they constituted a breach of the non-retroactivity principle by issuing a reservation against Article 7, Section 2 of the ECHR – the so-called Nürnberg clause.62 It was only through the red-green coalition under Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and Secretary of State Joschka Fischer that there was a modification of this policy. This change can been observed in the notorious Tadic decision of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY),63 the enormous input at the Rome Conference, the drafting of a modern Code of International Crimes,64 and the rescission of the previous reservation to Article 7, Section 2 of the ECHR.65

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60. For a rather thoughtful critique from the viewpoint of a German defense Counselor at the Nuremberg trial, see Otto Kranzbühler, Rückblick auf Nürnberg (1949).
61. See Albin Eser, The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg from a German Perspective, in The Nuremberg Trials, supra note 21, at 50.
62. See Ambos, supra note 49.
63. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment (July 15, 1999); see Claus Kress, Germany and International Criminal Law: Continuity or Change?, in The Nuremberg Trials, supra note 21, at 210 (arguing that the acceptance of the “second generation” of international criminal law equals an acceptance of the Nürnberg trial).
65. See generally Ambos, supra note 49; Andreas Zimmermann, The Judicial Legacy of Nuremberg—The Statute of the International Limnitary Tribunal of Nuremberg and the International
The German people have learned that it is a dictate of reason for the nation state to subdue itself to the rule of law and to accept supra-national control and intervention. In that, Immanuel Kant was mistaken, because he thought sovereignty was an unalterable principle in international law. Quite the contrary is true: the nation state only discovers the full enjoyment of sovereignty and liberty if it is ready to voluntarily give up a piece of sovereignty for the betterment of the international community as a whole—just as in the words of Justice Udo Di Fabio of the Federal Constitutional Court: “The modern human being conceives him/herself as a sovereign, born as a free individual but conscious to the necessity of voluntary bonding and to the joy in social commitment.”

Criminal Court, in THE NUREMBERG TRIALS, supra note 21, at 247; see also ANNE PETER, EINFÜHRUNG IN DIE EUROPÄISCHEN MENSCHENRECHTSDROKONVENTION 6 (2003).