Negative Activism

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NEGATIVE ACTIVISM

BARBARA A. BLISS, PETER MOLK & FRANK PARTNOY

ABSTRACT

Shareholder activism has become one of the most important and widely studied topics in law and finance. To date, popular and academic accounts have focused on what we call “positive activism,” where activists seek to profit from positive changes in the share prices of targeted firms. In this Article, we undertake the first comprehensive study of positive activism’s mirror image, which we term “negative activism.” Whereas positive activists focus on increasing share prices, negative activists take short positions to profit from decreasing share prices.

We develop a descriptive typology of three categories of negative activism and use a private database of activist activity and other hand-collected information to provide empirical evidence about the frequency and manner with which each category occurs. First, informational negative activism seeks to uncover and then communicate the truth about companies whose shares the activists believe are overvalued. We show that the announcement of this kind of activism is associated with a statistically significant abnormal decline in share prices. Second, operational negative

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activism involves dismantling or disabling sources of value at companies. We document a range of actual and potential instances of operational negative activism and associated abnormal share price declines. Third, unintentionally negative activists are failed positive activists: their announcements of ownership stakes in companies they target are met with immediate negative abnormal returns.

Using this typology and the related evidence, we explore the policy and regulatory implications for each category of negative activism. We show a range of areas where policy and regulatory goals either conflict with or seemingly ignore the effects from negative activism. We also offer several ways that existing regulatory approaches could be improved to account for negative activism. In general, we advocate less regulation, and even subsidization, of informational negative activism; tighter regulation of operational negative activism; and a more nuanced approach to unintentional negative activism.
INTRODUCTION

On the morning of December 17, 2019, Muddy Waters, an investment fund, released a statement that it had bet against shares of NMC Health, a United Arab Emirates-based healthcare company, based on “serious doubts about the company’s financial statements, including its asset values, cash balance, reported profits, and reported debt levels.” NMC Health’s share price fell by more than one-fourth that morning.1

On June 17, 2018, Elon Musk announced that a Tesla employee had sabotaged the car company’s operations, changing its computer code, and exporting sensitive data to third parties. Musk wrote: “We need to figure out if he was acting alone or with others at Tesla and if he was working with any outside organizations.”2

On April 11, 2017, three roadside bombs exploded while the German soccer team Borussia Dortmund drove by on its way to a tournament

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2. See id.
quarterfinal match. The bombs sent metal pins through the bus, injuring one of the players, but miraculously sparing the others. Unlike most sports teams, Borussia Dortmund had publicly traded shares.4

On July 15, 2016, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) announced a settlement in which Herbalife, the nutritional supplement company, agreed to pay $200 million in consumer relief, hire an external monitor, and substantially change some of its business practices. 5 FTC officials previously had been pressured by various parties, including members of Congress, to find that Herbalife misled investors by failing to disclose that most of its sales were generated from recruiting new distributors, not from selling to customers.6

On February 10, 2015, an inter partes review was filed with the U.S. Patent Trial and Appeal Board, challenging a patent held by Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., a pharmaceutical company whose shares were traded on NASDAQ.7 The media reported the news of the filing the same day.8

On May 15, 2014, Jim Chanos, the head of Kynikos Associates, appeared on CNBC and criticized Keurig Green Mountain and SodaStream, two manufacturers of single-serve beverages. Chanos expressed skepticism about efforts by both companies to expand into single-serve cold products.9

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Year after year, shareholder activism dominates both media headlines and legal scholarship. Hundreds of times per year, a hedge fund activist announces that it has acquired a significant stake in a company and then demands reform. The targeted company’s stock price typically increases during the time surrounding the announcement, and often a vicious battle ensues. Shareholder activists say they are trying to improve companies


and increase share prices by persuading management to improve operations, or sell off underperforming units, or reveal new information to the public. We refer to this well-known kind of shareholder activism as positive activism, because its goal is to make money through interventions that positively affect share prices.

Although positive activism has received extensive attention, it is not the only form of activism. The six examples cited above also involve activists who are attempting to influence companies. However, in these examples, the activists are trying to destroy their targets, often in unorthodox or undesirable ways. We label activism that seeks to make money through interventions that decrease company’s stock price as negative activism.

In this Article, we identify and systematically address, for the first time in the literature, the concept of negative activism, which is in many ways the mirror image of positive activism. In negative activism, the activist typically sells short a company’s shares instead of buying them. A negative activist thereby seeks to profit from, and has incentives to cause, a decline in share prices—the opposite of a positive activist, who profits when share prices rise.

The above six examples illustrate what we mean by negative activism. Muddy Waters, the firm that disclosed skepticism about NMC Health, is run by Carson Block, a leading short seller. Elon Musk asserted that the Tesla employee-saboteur might have been involved with short sellers. The perpetrator of the soccer team bombing was a German citizen who had

Although scholarship on activism typically focuses on activists’ efforts to impact share prices, activists also on occasion intervene in debt markets. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Hedge Fund Activism in the Enforcement of Bondholder Rights, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 281 (2009) (studying this phenomenon).

14. In a classic short sale, the seller borrows shares of stock that she does not yet own and sells those shares at current market prices; the short seller later “covers” this short position by purchasing the share at a future date and then returns the borrowed shares. The short seller therefore profits when share prices decrease between her sale and subsequent purchase. Short Sales, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Apr. 13, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/answers/shortsale.htm [https://perma.cc/M7UL-ZV77].

15. Our concept of negative activists therefore encompasses a larger group than activists who profit from short positions. In addition to, or instead of, shorting, activists might hold derivative instruments that function like shorted shares, which we consider later in the Article. Activists might also hold certain debt instruments that increase in value when share prices decline, such as when those debt instruments are drafted so that share price declines trigger default in those debt instruments. See, e.g., Shaun J. Mathew & Daniel E. Wolf, Shareholder Activism: Evolving Tactics, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Aug. 23, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/08/23/shareholder-activism-evolving-tactics/ [https://perma.cc/RU7X-QXAX] (describing bondholders acquiring shareholder voting rights to trigger company insolvency). But see Vincent S.J. Buccola et al., The Myth of Creditor Sabotage, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (arguing that this problem is overstated). For convenience, we focus in the Article on activists who profit from shorting company positions, as that method currently appears to be the most common form of negative activism. However, our implications apply to the broader set of negative activists who hold instruments that pay off upon share price declines.


17. CNBC obtained a copy of the email, see Kolodny, supra note 3.
borrowed money to bet $45,000 against the soccer team’s shares on the day of the attack, seeking potential profits of up to $600,000. The campaign against Herbalife was orchestrated by Pershing Square Capital Management, a hedge fund with a $1 billion short position in the company. The Acorda Therapeutics *inter partes* patent challenge was filed by the Coalition for Affordable Drugs, a group of hedge funds managed by Kyle Bass, who had taken a short position in the company. Jim Chanos had sold short shares of Keurig Green Mountain and SodaStream before he disclosed those positions.

As we show, negative activism is important and surprisingly common, with hundreds of examples in recent years. Some instances involve large public companies, such as Herbalife, that are embroiled in controversy. Other examples involve claims of corporate mismanagement or misleading disclosures, in many ways providing a quasi-regulatory function traditionally served by shareholder class actions, the SEC, and other bodies. Some negative activism is by firms that hold long positions in some companies, but short positions in others. Yet the literature on shareholder activism currently focuses on positive activism and ignores negative activism, even though negative activism is a significant portion of activist activity.

Moreover, negative activism presents crucial policy challenges. As the word “activism” implies, negative activists do not sit back and wait passively for stock prices to decline so that their short positions will gain value. Instead, many actively attempt to induce a decrease in share prices.

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18. Although the team’s stock price instantly fell by 2% after the bombing was announced, it quickly recovered. The perpetrator later testified that he had set the bombs to traumatize the players, disrupt their performance, and tank the stock. See Rogers, supra note 4.


20. Although Acorda Therapeutics’s stock price fell approximately 10% on the day of the announcement, subsequent similar patent challenges by the same group were not as profitable. See Sidak & Skog, supra note 8, at 123 n.8.


25. See infra Part I for discussion of the literature on positive activism.
value destruction, negative activism may strike many as troubling or manipulative.

In this Article, we have two primary goals. First, we set forth an analytic framework for assessing different types of negative activism. Like positive activism, negative activism exhibits a range of characteristics, and it is important not to paint all of negative activism with a single broad brush. A saboteur at Tesla or a roadside bomber are different from an anti-corporate campaigner or a patent challenger or a skeptic about a company’s profitability. We present a rubric for distinguishing among these, and other, examples.

Second, and relatedly, we address potential policy responses to negative activism. We argue that responses should be tailored to the characteristics of the different types of negative activism. The introductory six examples of negative activism do not all deserve the same regulatory response. We show several ways that our analysis of negative activism can be applied to improve business and financial regulation. In the process, we show how scholars and policymakers might adopt and apply our framework to business and financial regulation of various types.

This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides background on positive activism. We describe the conditions that have led to activist investing’s rapid rise from a small slice of all investments to a significant force today. We also summarize the law and finance literature on activist investing, and demonstrate its focus on positive activism.

In Part II, we develop an analytic framework for studying and assessing negative activism. We split negative activism into three categories. First, informational negative activism seeks to uncover and then communicate the truth about companies whose shares the activists believe are overvalued. Jim Chanos’s short selling of beverage companies fits this category, as does the campaign against General Electric (GE) and certain aspects of the campaign against Herbalife. We collect data regarding instances of informational negative activism from 2009 through 2016 and show that the public announcement of this kind of activism is associated with a statistically significant decline in prices surrounding the announcement date. In other words, negative activism appears to accomplish the activist’s objectives, at least in the short term.

Second, and in contrast, operational negative activism involves dismantling or disabling fundamental sources of value at companies. Operational negative activists do more than simply communicate information. They actually undertake to change, and even damage, the

26. See, e.g., ACTIVIST INVESTING, supra note 12 (discussing several new, larger activist positions taken in 2018).
companies they target. The Dortmund soccer team bombing falls into this category, as would the Tesla saboteur if there were proof of a connection to short selling. Patent challengers and “hacktivists,” who disrupt company information technology systems, present more difficult cases, which we discuss in detail. Our discussion of operational negative activism documents a range of actual and potential instances of operational negative activism.

Third, and most unusual, unintentional negative activism involves failed attempts at positive activism. Positive activists take long ownership positions in companies they target, not short positions, and they seek to increase share prices, not decrease them. On average, these positions are associated with a 7% cumulative abnormal positive return surrounding announcement.\(^\text{27}\) However, not all positive activist interventions are greeted with such enthusiasm. In some cases, the market reaction to the announcement of positive activist interventions is negative, sometimes due to apparent deep skepticism about the activist’s potential interventions. We view these instances where the positive activist unintentionally brings about a negative response as unintentional negative activism. Unintentional negative activism is a fascinating, yet not previously studied, phenomenon. We also briefly discuss unintentional positive activism, which is failed attempts at negative activism: in other words, unintentional positive activism involves negative activists, who are seeking stock price declines, whereas unintentional negative activism involves positive activists, who are seeking stock price increases.

Part III turns to regulation and policy. We summarize the policy goals of activist regulation and the current regulatory approach, which largely focuses on positive activism. We consider the gaps that this focus has generated for regulating negative activism, and we propose ways that regulatory policy could and should be improved to account for the increasingly prevalent phenomenon of negative activism.

Our proposals vary depending on the category of negative activism. We view informational negative activism, in light of existing antifraud laws, as presenting minimal additional policy concerns; in fact, a case can be made for subsidizing this form of negative activism. We see operational negative activism very differently: it is often, but not always, deleterious or potentially dangerous. We suggest a new regulatory framework aimed directly at operational negative activism, and we explore the line-drawing questions of informational versus operational negative activism that such a system would require. How we think about operational activism depends both on its objectives and the extent to which it generates informational benefits. Finally, we suggest that policymakers, including courts, view

\(^{27}\) Krishnan, Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 13, at 297.
unintentional negative activism more skeptically than they view general positive activism. Although in many ways the market reaction will provide all the deterrent that is needed for unintentional negative activism, a negative market reaction is an important piece of information that could justify a defensive approach by company management. For example, courts might take into account a negative market reaction when reviewing anti-takeover responses by a targeted company.

We then conclude.

I. POSITIVE ACTIVISM

We begin by briefly describing the practice of positive shareholder activism as well as the academic research it has generated. This Part sets up our focus on negative activism, which we turn to in Part II.

Positive activism has been driven by hedge funds, which rely on exemptions from the Securities Act and the Investment Company Act to operate as essentially private, pooled investment vehicles for sophisticated investors.\(^{28}\) As hedge funds have become more powerful and influential—managing some $3 trillion in assets today—so too has their proclivity for activism.\(^{29}\) Although there are thousands of hedge funds, with a wide range of investment approaches, a significant subset of hedge funds has developed strategies that target underperforming companies and then seek a variety of operational or financial reforms aimed at increasing shareholder value. Positive activists often seek to change company management,\(^{30}\) encourage or discourage a potential merger or acquisition,\(^{31}\) change executive
compensation practices, \(^{32}\) reform corporate governance, \(^{33}\) and reveal private company-specific information to the public. \(^{34}\) Each of these strategies is designed to add value for shareholders and increase share prices.

Law and finance scholars responded eagerly to the emergence of positive activism. Early studies of hedge funds highlighted the funds’ ability to earn significant positive returns, even when adjusted for hedge funds’ comparatively high levels of investing risk. \(^{35}\) These early studies, however, did not focus on positive activism as a strategy unto itself. Then, in 2007, two law professors published a book chapter describing a hand-collected dataset of positive activist interventions, \(^{36}\) and during the following years several more comprehensive studies were published, consistently showing that announcements of positive activism were associated with statistically significant increases in targeted firms’ share prices. \(^{37}\) Scholars also began examining the characteristics of positive activism, including its varied objectives and strategies. \(^{38}\)

For more than a decade, legal scholars and practitioners also have debated a range of policy issues related to positive activism. \(^{39}\) Proponents of positive activism argue that it helps reduce the shareholder apathy and agency cost problems that inflict publicly held firms, pointing to the positive

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\(^{32}\) Id. at 46–47 (summarizing efforts by asset managers to influence executive compensation practices).

\(^{33}\) Id. at 8 (noting that 38% of public activist demands of large firms were related to corporate governance issues).

\(^{34}\) See, e.g., Shen, supra note 19 (discussing efforts to affect Herbalife’s share price).


\(^{36}\) See Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 28.


shareholder returns associated with positive activism. Critics question whether positive activism generates long-term value or instead sacrifices these gains for fleeting short-term profits. Several leading scholars have written comprehensive assessments and critiques of various aspects of positive activism.

In sum, positive activism has become a central topic in corporate and securities law, perhaps the central topic. Given the predominance of debate about positive activism, it is striking how little attention has been paid to its mirror counterpart, negative activism, which we turn to now.

II. NEGATIVE ACTIVISM

Our treatment of negative activism contrasts sharply with scholarship on positive activism, for the straightforward reason mentioned above: Negative activism profits when share prices decline. In contrast, positive activism involves activists’ efforts to increase the value of target company shares. Although commentators have disagreed about the impact of positive shareholder activists, the widespread assumption has been that positive activists are at least attempting to add value to share prices, hence the adjective “positive.”

Instead, the analysis of negative activism necessarily begins with the proposition that successful negative activism is bad for shareholders of the targeted firm. Thus, unlike positive activism, which often carries a powerful and positive normative presumption from increasing stock prices, negative activism faces an uphill normative battle, the presumption being that it destroys shareholder value.

As we show in this Part, negative activism is an even more complex and varied phenomenon than positive activism. The motivations and techniques of negative activists vary widely. Accordingly, we begin by presenting a taxonomy of three categories of negative activism, based on whether it is primarily informational, operational, or unintentional. Then we demonstrate

43. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 11.
some of the characteristics associated with each of these three categories of negative activism by considering a range of data, both statistical and anecdotal. Much of this analysis focuses on the behavior of hedge funds, which are the primary players in this space. In other work, we develop the case for how other types of institutional players beyond hedge funds could engage in negative activism as part of a broader strategy of short selling.  

A. Three Categories of Negative Activism

To capture negative activism’s nuances, we split it into three categories. First, we characterize as informational negative activism behavior that seeks to uncover and then communicate the truth about companies whose shares the activists believe are overvalued. Examples include recent short sellers at Herbalife, Valeant, and numerous financial institutions, who have undertaken investigations that they believed established the companies’ public share prices overstated their actual value. Enron is another prominent example, where negative activists uncovered and disclosed information about accounting fraud in 2001.  

Informational negative activism can be backwards-looking, focused on past disclosures by companies and typically involving allegations of misstatements or omissions, or forward-looking, focused on future expectations about a company’s prospects.  

Second, operational negative activism seeks to change the operations of a company, by dismantling or disabling sources of earnings or cash flow. For example, operational negative activists have taken short positions in a company and then argued that its patents were invalid, attempting to reduce that company’s value. Other operational negative activists have attempted to influence the likelihood of mergers or recapitalizations, again in an attempt to reduce share prices. Unlike informational negative activism, operational negative activism typically is focused on the future, rather than the past, except to the extent past facts are helpful in assisting the activist campaign to harm the company’s future prospects.  

Third, unintentional negative activism involves attempts at positive activism that instead are associated with a reduction in share value. Studies of positive shareholder activism have provided overwhelming evidence that stock prices usually react positively during the period surrounding the

public announcement of activist intervention. However, recent studies have demonstrated significant variance in the individual stock price reactions. Although the mean announcement returns are positive, some attempted positive shareholder activism is associated with a negative market reaction. It is this subset of attempted positive interventions that we label unintentional negative activism.

Although negative activism has negative connotations and can result in harm to firms and society, certain forms of negative activism also can generate substantial benefits. Informational negative activism can be desirable when it generates and discloses valuable information, thereby enhancing the informational efficiency of markets and helping to move stock prices closer to their fundamental value. Even operational negative activism can be desirable, if it eliminates company value that never should have been present, such as by unwinding patents that turn out to have been improvidently granted.

When addressing shareholder activism, social policy should take into account these potential benefits. We leave the detailed analysis of these policy questions to Part III. Our present goal in the remainder of this Part is to contribute to scholarship on shareholder activism by gathering and analyzing data related to each of the three categories of negative activism.

B. Empirical Evidence of Negative Activism

In this section, we report a range of empirical evidence for each category of negative activism. We use a combination of data analysis and anecdotal evidence. The evidence not only establishes that negative activism is widespread and influential, but also illuminates the important distinctions among the three categories of negative activism. These distinctions are helpful when considering optimal regulatory and policy treatments of each form of negative activism.

1. Informational Negative Activism

There is abundant anecdotal evidence of informational negative activism. Harry Markopolos’s recent campaign against General Electric provides a recent controversial example. Immediately following his accusation that the company was engaged in accounting fraud, GE’s value declined by 11%, its largest decline in over a decade, eliminating $9 billion in GE’s market

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47. See Brav, Jiang, Partnoy & Thomas, *Hedge Fund Activism*, supra note 37; Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 28.
48. See Krishnan, Partnoy & Thomas, * supra note 13.*
Numerous analysts were skeptical of Markopolos’s claim, and GE’s share price later recovered. Depending on when and how one analyzed the Markopolos-General Electric example, a wide range of conclusions might seem reasonable. Such anecdotal evidence is often unhelpful; anecdotes can be marshalled to support virtually any position. There has been significantly less comprehensive study of informational negative activism. Studying negative activism, of any type, presents challenges that are absent when studying positive activism. Most importantly, positive activists must publicly disclose their ownership stake through a Schedule 13D filing within ten days of crossing the 5% ownership threshold. There are no analogous disclosure rules in place for short positions, of any size. Also, institutions with more than $100 million under management must publicly disclose their long positions in quarterly Form 13F filings; these requirements do not apply to short positions. Accordingly, the two most important and reliable data sources for studying positive activism do not exist for the study of negative activism.

In the absence of disclosure mandates, empirical analysis of short selling must rely on self-reporting. There are strong incentives for selection bias in self-reported incidents of negative activism, for both obvious and non-obvious reasons. Negative activists have incentives to report their most persuasive positions in the most favorable light, and their unpersuasive positions not at all. Disclosures also can be made at any short selling threshold: someone who is short only a handful of shares with little money at risk can post a report online and then selectively boast about a subsequent stock price decrease.

Less obviously, short sellers are generally reluctant to report their positions publicly. Many fund managers believe that disclosing positions can lead to “copycat investing,” making them reluctant to give away their informational advantages. Additionally, evidence from Owen Lamont...
shows firms take legal and regulatory actions against disclosed short sellers by alleging criminal conduct, suing them, hiring private investigators, asking public authorities to investigate them, and manipulating securities markets to impede short selling.55

Notwithstanding these difficulties, there have been some attempts to analyze informational negative activism. In a 2016 article, Alexander Ljungqvist and Wenlan Qian reported on a study of 358 short-seller reports targeting 124 companies from 2006 to 2011.56 They find these reports have a significant impact on various forms of market activity. Short-seller reports are associated with more frequent trading and widen the bid-offer spreads for the targeted stocks, creating order imbalances and increasing volatility while significantly decreasing share prices.57

In another 2016 article, Lei Chen considered 443 similar types of short-selling reports from 2007 to 2014; these reports identified problems at several dozen Chinese firms listed on U.S. exchanges.58 This study found share prices of the targeted firms declined in reaction to these reports, as did prices at peer firms with the same auditor.59 Chen’s study reinforces the notion from Ljungqvist and Qian that self-reporting by informational negative activists can have a significant impact on markets.

In a more comprehensive 2020 working paper, Wuyang Zhao reported results from a collection of more than 6,000 reports on negative activist events in Seeking Alpha, an online crowd-sourced investor reporting platform, as well as in Activist Shorts Research, a newsletter that tracks incidents of negative activism.60 Zhao confirmed that negative activism was associated with a statistically significant negative market reaction.61 Zhao and Yu Ting Forester Wong used the same data sources to confirm that

55. Owen A. Lamont, Go Down Fighting: Short Sellers vs. Firms, 2 REV. ASSET PRICING STUD. 1 (2012). These costs of disclosure generate a separating equilibrium between a group of aggressive, less risk averse negative activists, who are willing to expose themselves to the potential risks associated with a public short position, and more conservative negative activists, who prefer to avoid those costs and instead reap the benefits of their information over time as it gradually disseminates into the market. This distinction between aggressive and conservative informational negative activists introduces additional bias into any study based on voluntary public announcements.


57. Id.

58. Id. at 1467.


61. Id. at 3.
companies targeted by negative activists suffered decreases in investing, financing, and payout activities.\textsuperscript{62}

Most recently, Joshua Mitts analyzed a set of almost 3,000 anonymous negative activist reports in Seeking Alpha and found that reports are associated with significant, but short-term, decreases in the prices of targeted stocks.\textsuperscript{63} Mitts characterized the results as consistent with misstatement manipulation, with the authors fabricating negative information to drive down stock prices.\textsuperscript{64} Authors also reportedly adopted new anonymous profiles once their credibility had been exhausted by the fabricated reports.\textsuperscript{65}

Finally, in a current working paper, Ian Appel, Jordan Bulka, and Vyacheslav Fos used a sample of 252 publicly disclosed short positions culled from Factiva’s media coverage from 1996 through 2015 to show these campaigns result in an average -7% abnormal return to the target.\textsuperscript{66} The authors provide detailed findings broken down by allegation and several other factors and conclude that much of the abnormal return is driven by “active” allegations, rather than allegations about general firm overvaluation.\textsuperscript{67}

However, even as this interest in negative activism has increased, previous studies have not seriously examined important issues about the nature and categories of negative activism. We turn to these issues in the remainder of this section, beginning with a description of our efforts to contribute to scholarly understanding in this area.

First, we developed a dataset of informational negative activism based on Activist Shorts Research reports from 2009 to 2016.\textsuperscript{68} We collected 825 reports of negative activism and, following the coding methodology of Activist Shorts Research, we labeled each negative activist intervention as involving primary allegations of the following categories: accounting fraud; competitive pressure/industry issues; an upcoming dividend cut; an ineffective roll-up; major business fraud; questioning medical effectiveness;

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\textsuperscript{64} Id. at 39–40.

\textsuperscript{65} Id. at 29.


\textsuperscript{67} Id. at 23.

\textsuperscript{68} Activist Shorts Research functioned as an aggregator of disclosed short campaigns. It has since been sold to Activist Insight. See ACTIVIST INSIGHT, https://www.activistinsight.com/.
misleading accounting; overvaluation; over-levered; ineffective product; fraudulent stock promotion; upcoming earnings miss; and other allegations of illegality. While we know the alleging party, we do not know the extent of the alleging party’s short position.

We found a mean cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for targeted securities from one day before the negative activist’s public announcement through one day after the announcement of -6.99%. This finding is robust to other specifications of event windows: the CAR from three days before through three days after announcement is -7.20%, and from ten days before through one day after the return is -5.65%.70 Table 1 dissects the announcement returns by primary allegation type. Allegations of major business fraud are associated with significant negative returns (-15.58%), as are allegations related to accounting fraud (-10.41%), ineffective products (-9.21%), and fraudulent stock promotion (-11.64%).

As mentioned above, informational negative activism can involve either forward- or backwards-looking information. Table 1 therefore also categorizes the allegations into forward and backwards looking. The average CAR associated with backwards-looking allegations is -8.77%, while the average CAR associated with forward-looking allegations is -4.15%.71 The results are sorted by aggregate market cap loss within backwards- and forward-looking allegations.

Table 1 – Returns to Informational Negative Activism by Primary Allegation Category

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>-6.99%</td>
<td>-7.20%</td>
<td>-5.65%</td>
<td>$ (116.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All backwards-looking:</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>-8.77%</td>
<td>-9.75%</td>
<td>-8.53%</td>
<td>$ (104.53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ineffective roll-up</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>-5.01%</td>
<td>-6.99%</td>
<td>-4.33%</td>
<td>$ (196.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounting fraud</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>-10.41%</td>
<td>-13.71%</td>
<td>-17.00%</td>
<td>$ (175.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Product ineffective</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>-9.21%</td>
<td>-8.70%</td>
<td>-2.02%</td>
<td>$ (135.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misleading accounting</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>-3.94%</td>
<td>-4.55%</td>
<td>-6.13%</td>
<td>$ (114.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over-levered</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>-8.79%</td>
<td>-11.98%</td>
<td>-6.50%</td>
<td>$ (109.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major business fraud</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>-15.58%</td>
<td>-17.88%</td>
<td>-21.73%</td>
<td>$ (82.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical effectiveness</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>-5.82%</td>
<td>-3.60%</td>
<td>-0.12%</td>
<td>$ (81.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other illegal</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>-7.01%</td>
<td>-9.91%</td>
<td>-8.47%</td>
<td>$ (65.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stock promotion</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>-11.64%</td>
<td>-9.99%</td>
<td>-3.83%</td>
<td>$ (18.57)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

69. CARs are calculated as the abnormal stock return relative to the value-weighted Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) index return surrounding the announcement period.
70. The median numbers are slightly lower, but comparable.
71. The difference in CAR between forward- and backwards-looking allegations is statistically significant at the one percent level.
Of course, because activists voluntarily choose to make these reports, our sample of self-reported activism is expected to be biased towards statistical significance. It is likely that many short sellers do not disclose their positions. There are two important points about such undisclosed short selling. First, to the extent undisclosed informational negative activism occurs, the aggregate amount of all informational negative activism obviously is higher than reported in our tables. Second, it is likely that undisclosed informational negative activism would, if it were disclosed, result in comparatively lower cumulative abnormal returns than the negative activism in our sample. Public disclosure brings the increased likelihood of litigation, regulatory costs, and reputational costs, leading activists to disclose instances that promise the largest expected stock movements. But with no disclosure mandate, self-reported activism provides the best source of study.

To determine activists’ success when braving these costs through public disclosure, we next examined how shorting success varies by individual activist. We identified fifty-one separate informational negative activists with at least three activist events. The list includes a wide range of short sellers, encompassing dedicated short-only activists and activists that implement strategies other than shorting. The complete list, along with associated mean cumulative abnormal returns, is set forth in Table 2.

We sorted the data in Table 2 by average market capitalization loss to illustrate the relative economic impact of individual informational negative activists. The results are consistent with examples such as the Muddy Waters-NMC Health announcement that began this article regarding the success of informational negative activism, with some activists earning stunning returns. Many of the negative activists in the first rows of the chart are those with the most publicized reputations as short sellers. Out of the fifty-one negative activists, forty-eight have average CARs that are less than zero, in the negative activist’s desired direction. Overall, the announcement of negative information activism is associated with negative returns, although there is significant variation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All forward-looking:</th>
<th>318</th>
<th>-4.15%</th>
<th>-3.13%</th>
<th>-1.06%</th>
<th>$ (135.44)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Competitive pressures</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>-3.43%</td>
<td>-3.87%</td>
<td>-3.52%</td>
<td>$ (155.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overvalued</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>-4.57%</td>
<td>-1.60%</td>
<td>1.87%</td>
<td>$ (129.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dividend cut coming</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-12.80%</td>
<td>-16.90%</td>
<td>-16.14%</td>
<td>$ (91.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upcoming earnings miss</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-1.28%</td>
<td>-3.60%</td>
<td>-1.19%</td>
<td>$ (81.59)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2 – Returns to Individual Informational Negative Activists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greenlight Capital</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-9.97%</td>
<td>-15.51%</td>
<td>-20.15%</td>
<td>$(839.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dialectic Capital</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-1.17%</td>
<td>-0.03%</td>
<td>1.95%</td>
<td>$(451.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kynikos Associates</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>-1.84%</td>
<td>-2.50%</td>
<td>-5.45%</td>
<td>$(388.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prescience Point</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-13.88%</td>
<td>-21.11%</td>
<td>-26.40%</td>
<td>$(356.85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muddy Waters</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-18.60%</td>
<td>-22.45%</td>
<td>-22.52%</td>
<td>$(299.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infotialis</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-5.97%</td>
<td>-6.20%</td>
<td>-8.99%</td>
<td>$(278.97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gotham City Research</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-19.30%</td>
<td>-16.08%</td>
<td>-15.64%</td>
<td>$(261.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citron Research</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>-10.16%</td>
<td>-7.66%</td>
<td>-4.09%</td>
<td>$(258.78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J Capital Research</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-1.32%</td>
<td>-4.33%</td>
<td>-4.27%</td>
<td>$(253.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronte Capital</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>-10.79%</td>
<td>-13.61%</td>
<td>-18.20%</td>
<td>$(217.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BlueMountain Capital</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-9.32%</td>
<td>-15.55%</td>
<td>-20.69%</td>
<td>$(217.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whitney Tilson</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>-4.47%</td>
<td>-4.92%</td>
<td>-0.73%</td>
<td>$(203.89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinity Research</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-18.03%</td>
<td>-7.62%</td>
<td>-35.19%</td>
<td>$(172.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anonymous Analytics</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-3.51%</td>
<td>-2.75%</td>
<td>-7.51%</td>
<td>$(149.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greenwich Research</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-8.72%</td>
<td>-13.62%</td>
<td>-3.27%</td>
<td>$(142.89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spotlight Research</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-4.23%</td>
<td>-9.04%</td>
<td>-5.56%</td>
<td>$(137.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friendly Bear</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-9.44%</td>
<td>-5.01%</td>
<td>-3.17%</td>
<td>$(133.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asensio</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.97%</td>
<td>2.04%</td>
<td>1.63%</td>
<td>$ (96.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerrisdale Capital</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>-8.80%</td>
<td>-8.11%</td>
<td>-11.37%</td>
<td>$(72.65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gravity Research</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-11.36%</td>
<td>-15.10%</td>
<td>-5.93%</td>
<td>$(71.72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suhail Capital</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-2.97%</td>
<td>-1.44%</td>
<td>-1.28%</td>
<td>$(70.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spruce Point Capital</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-4.79%</td>
<td>-5.11%</td>
<td>-8.58%</td>
<td>$(70.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name of Firm</td>
<td>Shares</td>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>Current Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shareholder Watchdog</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-10.44%</td>
<td>-2.68%</td>
<td>-9.35%</td>
<td>$ (62.98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forensic Factor</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-18.67%</td>
<td>-11.66%</td>
<td>-15.05%</td>
<td>$ (62.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannell Capital</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-3.20%</td>
<td>4.03%</td>
<td>4.74%</td>
<td>$ (60.89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cliffside Research</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-14.10%</td>
<td>-14.65%</td>
<td>-28.79%</td>
<td>$ (51.85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lemelson Capital</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-1.39%</td>
<td>-0.98%</td>
<td>8.84%</td>
<td>$ (50.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glaucus Research</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-7.08%</td>
<td>-8.40%</td>
<td>-16.19%</td>
<td>$ (47.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alfred Little</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-12.43%</td>
<td>-17.00%</td>
<td>-23.58%</td>
<td>$ (45.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GeolInvesting</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>-7.07%</td>
<td>-11.02%</td>
<td>-11.96%</td>
<td>$ (42.53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xuhua Zhou</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-1.28%</td>
<td>-1.73%</td>
<td>1.32%</td>
<td>$ (36.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alecto Research</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-4.03%</td>
<td>-3.32%</td>
<td>5.71%</td>
<td>$ (35.99)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SkyTides</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-8.68%</td>
<td>-9.45%</td>
<td>-40.85%</td>
<td>$ (35.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bleecker Street Research</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-12.48%</td>
<td>-8.56%</td>
<td>8.67%</td>
<td>$ (34.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prescience Investment</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-9.75%</td>
<td>-13.33%</td>
<td>-14.06%</td>
<td>$ (31.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pump Stopper</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>-14.90%</td>
<td>-13.05%</td>
<td>-7.18%</td>
<td>$ (30.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin Shkreli</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-8.67%</td>
<td>-7.76%</td>
<td>-13.92%</td>
<td>$ (27.62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absaroka Capital</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-17.21%</td>
<td>-10.24%</td>
<td>-6.01%</td>
<td>$ (26.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Talk Investments</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-3.55%</td>
<td>-2.51%</td>
<td>-8.04%</td>
<td>$ (22.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alpha Exposure</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-5.95%</td>
<td>-8.69%</td>
<td>-12.72%</td>
<td>$ (18.53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Street Sweeper</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>-3.99%</td>
<td>-2.60%</td>
<td>6.76%</td>
<td>$ (13.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melissa Davis</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-6.20%</td>
<td>-5.96%</td>
<td>-11.35%</td>
<td>$ (11.65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Off Wall Street</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-0.58%</td>
<td>-0.28%</td>
<td>-1.31%</td>
<td>$ (6.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mako Research</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-2.38%</td>
<td>-6.54%</td>
<td>-2.79%</td>
<td>$ (5.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Pearson</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>-7.11%</td>
<td>-6.73%</td>
<td>0.51%</td>
<td>$ (1.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lakewood Capital</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>-1.81%</td>
<td>-1.67%</td>
<td>-1.70%</td>
<td>$ 1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aristides Capital</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-3.10%</td>
<td>3.57%</td>
<td>-2.67%</td>
<td>$ 8.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copperfield Research</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-5.65%</td>
<td>-8.15%</td>
<td>-7.08%</td>
<td>$ 41.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marc Cohodes</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.06%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>-2.12%</td>
<td>$ 42.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Next, we examine long-run returns of the firms targeted by informational negative activists to determine if the market reaction is temporary or persists over the long term. Figure 1 plots the mean and median buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) from thirty trading days prior to the negative activist’s campaign to three hundred trading days afterwards. The negative market reaction at the activist’s announcement is not fleeting. Target firms’ poor performance persists after the initial revelation. These results are robust to various asset-pricing models. In unreported tests, we conduct formal long-term return analyses using calendar-time portfolio regressions. We form a portfolio by holding all target firms for twelve months after the activists’ announcement, and we estimate a regression of the portfolio’s excess returns on the Fama-French three-factor model as well as the momentum factor. The monthly alphas for the three- and four-factor models range from -1.959% to -1.734% for equal-weighted portfolios and are statistically significant at the one percent level.

Table 3 shows long-run returns by allegation type for the one-year period after the announcement. For consistency, we report the allegations in the same order as in Table 1. For the full sample, the average (median) buy-and-hold abnormal return is -22.43% (-29.51%). The magnitude of the abnormal long-run returns is slightly larger for backwards-looking
allegations versus forward-looking allegations. Out of the 825 campaigns, 593, or 71.88%, have abnormal long-run returns that are negative.

Table 3 – Buy-And-Hold Abnormal Return by Allegation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Allegation</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>One-Year Average Buy-And-Hold Abnormal Return</th>
<th>One-Year Median Buy-And-Hold Abnormal Return</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>-22.43%</td>
<td>-29.51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Backwards-looking:</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>-24.27%</td>
<td>-36.61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stock promotion</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>-46.64%</td>
<td>-56.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Product ineffective</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>-44.58%</td>
<td>-43.32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major business fraud</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>-34.90%</td>
<td>-47.51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical effectiveness</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>-20.50%</td>
<td>-38.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other illegal</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>-17.26%</td>
<td>-28.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounting fraud</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>-15.70%</td>
<td>-33.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misleading accounting</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>-13.84%</td>
<td>-16.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ineffective roll-up</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>-13.42%</td>
<td>-15.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over-levered</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>-10.28%</td>
<td>-33.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forward-looking:</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>-19.49%</td>
<td>-20.83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dividend cut coming</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-27.68%</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upcoming earnings miss</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-6.60%</td>
<td>-1.90%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 3 shows, the announcement of informational negative activism is associated with significant and negative cumulative abnormal returns, which persist during the subsequent one-year holding period. In other words, informational negative activism occurs in a variety of ways, with different types of allegations, but is consistently associated with long-run negative returns.

2. Operational Negative Activism

What we label operational negative activism is distinguished from informational negative activism in that it tries to change the operational aspects of a company’s business in some substantive way. Whereas informational negative activism seeks to inform the markets about the true valuation of a company, based on the assumption that the current prices reflect an inflated valuation, operational negative activism seeks to change the underlying state of the company and, hence, its valuation.
It is worth noting up front that the line between informational and operational negative activism may not be clear in every instance. We suggest that one way to delineate between the two is to consider whether the activist does more than merely revealing information to the marketplace. Thus, publishing a report stating that a patent is invalid would be informational; filing an action to challenge the patent’s validity would be operational. The two types of activism can, of course, be linked in circumstances like these.

We are not aware of any databases that systematically collect instances of operational negative activism. Accordingly, our examination of operational negative activism must necessarily be anecdotal. Nevertheless, it is apparent that, as with informational negative activism, there is a wide range of behavior that constitutes operational negative activism, and this behavior yields a wide range of effects.

We are aware of two prominent categories of operational negative activism for which some data are available. The first involves challenging a firm’s patents. In 2015, a group of hedge funds managed by Kyle Bass shorted shares in pharmaceutical companies and then filed more than two dozen challenges to those companies’ patents using the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office inter partes review process. This review process enables a party to “request to cancel as unpatentable 1 or more claims of a patent” based on doctrines of novelty and obviousness. Bass’s strategy of attempting to disable patents held by targeted firms was controversial and received extensive media attention.

Bass’s initial challenges coincided with statistically significant declines in the stock prices of targeted firms. The first challenge, on February 10, 2015, was associated with abnormal returns of -11.94%, and subsequent
challenges imposed movements of -4.63% and -2.59%. These patent challenges are an example of operational negative activism: they seek to profit by disabling a company’s patents and harming that company’s future profits.

However, in Bass’s case, the ultimate success of the strategy was mixed at best. Over time, market reactions to his challenges grew less predictable, perhaps reflecting a market perception that the strategy was unlikely to impact the targeted companies’ values. In all, only 26% of his challenges were met with favorable rulings from the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB). A second well-documented category of operational negative activism involves the practice of coupling a short position with voting shares associated with long positions, giving rise to what has been described as “empty voting” or “encumbered shares.” For example, Mason Capital took a long position in Telus voting shares and a countervailing short position in Telus non-voting shares, and then attempted to deter Telus from undertaking a desirable recapitalization in which its voting and non-voting shares would collapse into a single class. Another example involved a group of hedge funds accused of shorting shares in a Henderson Land subsidiary. The funds acquired significant voting rights while maintaining a net short position and used their voting right to block the favorable acquisition of the subsidiary. A final prominent example is the case of activist Perry Corporation’s failed attempt to push through Mylan Laboratories’ takeover of King Pharmaceuticals. Mylan had proposed an acquisition of King on terms that were favorable to King, which would have led to an increase in King’s stock price and a decrease in Mylan’s. Perry held a long interest of five million shares in King and a short interest of approximately four million shares in Mylan; both positions would have paid off if the acquisition went through. In an attempt to force the transaction against mounting Mylan shareholder resistance, Perry acquired the right to vote 9.89% of Mylan’s

77. See id. at 136–37 tbl.2. These negative returns quickly dissipated, and many of the later challenges were associated with positive abnormal returns, perhaps because Bass’s initial challenges were later denied by the PTAB. Id. at 138–42, 147–48.
78. Id. at 138–42, 147–48.
80. Id.
82. Hu & Black, supra note 11, at 834–35.
83. Id.
shares, while still maintaining a net short position in Mylan, and then used those votes to encourage the transaction.

In addition to these two situations of operational negative activism, there is some anecdotal evidence regarding other strategies. Two events from the introduction provide examples: the employee-saboteur at Tesla,\textsuperscript{85} and the soccer team bus bomber.\textsuperscript{86} There are other examples as well, such as Andrew Auernheimer, a “hacktivist” known as “weev.” He had been convicted for revealing a privacy flaw in an AT&T server, but the conviction was later reversed and vacated. He then announced plans to start a hedge fund that would profit from taking short positions in companies and then targeting their technological vulnerabilities.\textsuperscript{87}

In the extreme, operational negative activism can be obviously detrimental to a company, and is socially deleterious as well. Consider, for example, the potential effects of terrorist activities on stock prices.\textsuperscript{88} In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in New York, investigations were made into whether terrorists, or related individuals or entities, took short positions in shares of American and United Airlines, the two companies whose planes were involved in the terrorists incidents.\textsuperscript{89} Note the perhaps obvious point. Terrorist attacks negatively impact stock prices by doing more than simply revealing negative information: they actually negatively impact the operations of the target company, both by destroying corporate assets and potentially increasing future costs and risks.

More generally, an individual or organization could seek to profit from actions that damage a company by taking a short position in advance of those actions. Short sellers can use corporate espionage and industry warfare to harm the operations of a company. Existing concerns include cyberattacks and bioterrorism, which have raised fears about targeting a wide range of vulnerable potential corporate victims, particularly including

\textsuperscript{85} See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{86} See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{87} John Biggs, Weev Talks About Life in Prison and His Plans to Open a Hedge Fund, TRO LLC, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 15, 2014, 11:00 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2014/04/15/weev-talks-about-life-in-prison-and-his-plans-to-open-a-hedge-fund-tro-llc/ [https://perma.cc/6UPY-TGH3]. It does not appear that TRO LLC, weev’s fund, has yet been successful in raising significant amounts of money.
\textsuperscript{89} The events of 9/11 clearly impacted many stocks, bonds, and commodities. Studies of the potential link between the attacks and the increased trading in put options of American and United Airlines were inconclusive. See, e.g., Neil A. Doherty et al., Insuring September 11th: Market Recovery and Transparency, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 179, 187 (2003).
the transportation and food industries. Or hedge funds might short companies and then publicly push those companies to engage in costly socially responsible behavior, so the hedge fund can profit from subsequent share price declines.

Employees are another potential example of operational negative activism, especially when they leave their employment. Numerous companies report employees engaging in sabotage and other criminal conduct when they are fired from their jobs. Many such activities have the potential to impact a company’s stock price.

Historically, labor unions have been activists in a range of ways, involving both social and economic issues; David Webber recently has described how labor unions do, and might, use their power as shareholders to pursue various activist goals. But labor unions also could take the opposite approach and implement an interesting version of operational negative activism by recognizing one simple fact: labor strikes cause stock price declines. The reason is that strikes disrupt company operations and the expectation of those disruptions is reflected in stock prices, often immediately. For example, shares of General Motors fell 5% between September 15 and October 25, 2019, the start and end of the recent labor strike; at one point during the strike they were down over 12%.

Might labor unions engage in negative operational activism to capture some of the profits associated with related share price declines? If labor unions had shorted shares of General Motors before striking, they could

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have made significant gains. Labor unions potentially could use profits from the share price declines associated with the announcement of strikes to fund not only the strikes themselves, but potentially other operations or expenses.

Finally, one could foresee that investment funds that have sold their investment position between a company’s record date and its voting date would have reason to engage in operational negative activism. Since the fund no longer has an economic stake in the company, it can vote its shares without experiencing any of the economic ramifications from the vote. Engaging in operational negative activism by voting those shares to harm the company can actually benefit the fund, if competitor funds hold shares in that company.

In all, operational negative activism encompasses a hodgepodge of strategies. Some of these strategies might seem unlikely to occur in practice; others have already occurred, in limited ways.

3. Unintentional Negative Activism

Our third category of negative activism involves attempts at positive activism that are nevertheless associated with negative announcement returns. This unintentional negative activism is therefore attempted positive activism that is regarded negatively in the market. In these situations, a positive shareholder activist taking a long position in a targeted company’s shares does not intend (and loses from) a negative market reaction: hence, our use of the term unintentional.95

Unintentional negative activism is a phenomenon that has not been addressed in the literature on hedge fund activism. Empirical studies of positive activism have recognized that there is a range of announcement returns, but the distribution of those returns has received little attention.96 For example, in a recent study, C.N.V. Krishnan, Frank Partnoy, and Randall Thomas examined the announcement returns for hedge fund activists from 2008 through 2014 to determine which hedge fund characteristics and behavior were associated with positive announcement returns.97 They found that measures of clout and expertise were associated with higher returns, whereas frequency of intervention was not.98 They did

95. Analogously, we might think of the concept of unintentional positive activists: activists taking short positions whose efforts instead produce increases in share prices. Table 2, supra pp. 20–22, reveals several of these unintentional positive activists, which we discuss later in this section.
96. For example, Brav, Jiang, Partnoy & Thomas, Hedge Fund Activism, supra note 37; Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 28.
97. Krishnan, Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 13.
98. Id.
not, however, examine specifically those interventions in their data that produced negative announcement returns.\textsuperscript{99}

We obtained data from Krishnan, Partnoy, and Thomas to examine how positive activist interventions were associated with negative announcement returns. We found that a significant number of attempted positive interventions were associated with abnormal negative returns.\textsuperscript{100} As shown in Figure 2 and Table 4, roughly one third of interventions had announcement returns that were negative. For the subgroup of positive activism campaigns that resulted in an initial negative market reaction, the average CAR[-10,1] was -7.26%, compared to 11.26% for the subgroup of campaigns that resulted in an initial positive market reaction.

![Figure 2 – Histogram of Positive Activism CAR](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Returns</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>% Negative</th>
<th>P25</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>P75</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAR[-10,1]</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>29.22%</td>
<td>-0.68%</td>
<td>3.95%</td>
<td>5.86%</td>
<td>11.72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR[-1,1]</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>26.94%</td>
<td>-0.15%</td>
<td>2.32%</td>
<td>3.62%</td>
<td>6.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR[-3,3]</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>29.68%</td>
<td>-0.75%</td>
<td>2.63%</td>
<td>3.84%</td>
<td>7.96%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The incidence of negative returns varied across the population of positive activist hedge funds. Numerous funds had at least one intervention during the sample period that was associated with negative returns upon announcement. Measuring the return from ten days before announcement to

\textsuperscript{99} Id.\textsuperscript{100} Because the data come from filings required when the activist acquires at least 5% of a voting share, it is typically assumed that these activists attempt positive changes. Id. An alternative explanation could be that these activists have significant, undisclosed short interests that outweigh their positive stake, and are actually operational negative activists.
one day after, several activists had negative announcement returns for half or more of their interventions. 101

We report the twenty lowest announcement returns in the sample in Table 5. We are not suggesting any particular reason for the market reaction in any specific instance. Each example is associated with a unique set of facts.

Table 5 – Top 20 Worst Announcement Returns of Positive Activists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>CAR [-10.1]</th>
<th>Hedge Fund</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2/23/2011</td>
<td>LECG CORP</td>
<td>-81.26%</td>
<td>T2 Partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/22/2011</td>
<td>ALLIANCE HEALTHCARE</td>
<td>-36.05%</td>
<td>Discovery Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/13/2012</td>
<td>HORIZON PHARMA PLC</td>
<td>-32.61%</td>
<td>Discovery Capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/7/2011</td>
<td>AMBASSADORS GROUP INC</td>
<td>-25.25%</td>
<td>Lane Five Capital Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/27/2011</td>
<td>CHINA CERAMICS CO LTD</td>
<td>-25.12%</td>
<td>James Dunning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/18/2011</td>
<td>INDUSTRIAL SERVICES AM</td>
<td>-25.04%</td>
<td>David Russell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/2/2013</td>
<td>GOLDEN MINERALS CO AM</td>
<td>-21.89%</td>
<td>Trishield Special Situations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/4/2013</td>
<td>VOLCANO CORP</td>
<td>-20.95%</td>
<td>Engaged Capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/26/2011</td>
<td>CELSION CORP</td>
<td>-20.68%</td>
<td>Mangrove Partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/20/2014</td>
<td>NOVATEL WIRELESS INC</td>
<td>-20.25%</td>
<td>Novatel Shareholders for Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/9/2013</td>
<td>PENNEY (J C) CO</td>
<td>-19.20%</td>
<td>Perry Corp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/7/2014</td>
<td>CARBONITE INC</td>
<td>-18.68%</td>
<td>Discovery Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/18/2013</td>
<td>US AUTO PARTS NETWORK</td>
<td>-18.36%</td>
<td>Maguire Asset Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/23/2011</td>
<td>SILICON GRAPHICS INTL</td>
<td>-18.11%</td>
<td>Wasatch Advisors, Inc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/22/2013</td>
<td>BLOUNT INTL INC</td>
<td>-17.30%</td>
<td>P2 Capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/12/2012</td>
<td>LIVEDEAL INC</td>
<td>-16.74%</td>
<td>Isaac Capital Group LLC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/16/2013</td>
<td>JAVELIN MORTGAGE</td>
<td>-16.43%</td>
<td>Bulldog Investors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/13/2012</td>
<td>BRINKS CO</td>
<td>-16.40%</td>
<td>GAMCO Investors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

101. These funds include Clover Partners, Red Mountain Capital, Gregory Schneider, Meson Capital Partners, Mill Road Capital, Western Investment, Discovery Capital, and GAMCO Partners. There are, of course, a range of explanations for the market reactions to each of these interventions.
These negative returns can be categorized into two groups. One category includes negative reactions that occur for reasons independent of the activist’s disclosure and impending activism. These are the situations where independent negative developments coincide with the activist’s disclosure. Given the number of activist campaigns, sheer chance dictates that the positive activist will occasionally be unlucky in this way. Some of the events in Table 5 fall into this category; since we selected for the most significant negative returns, this finding is unsurprising. For example, just after T2 Partners acquired its stake in LECG with a “belief that the [s]hares, when purchased, were undervalued,” LECG announced a credit event and, within the month, was liquidated. While T2’s investment thesis may not have worked out, it can hardly be said that they caused LECG’s credit event; T2’s negative return might therefore be better attributed to bad luck, rather than unintentional negative activism.

The other category of negative returns, and the one that we view as unintentional negative activism, encompasses instances where the activist’s disclosure of her stake leads to a share price decline. The market sees the activist as bad for the company’s future performance. For example, the activist might have, in the market’s opinion, bad plans for the target’s future business. Or, in the market’s opinion, the activist activities might impose costs on the company’s capable management, perhaps by distracting management by waging a costly proxy contest.

Bill Ackman’s activism at Target provides an example. Although he and his fund have had several successful investments, his long stake in Target was not one of them. Fresh off a successful engagement with Wendy’s restaurant chain, Ackman acquired a 9.6% ownership stake in Target in July 2007. Target’s price increased leading up to Ackman’s public disclosure on July 16, but upon his actual disclosure, the stock traded sharply lower, down 2% on the announcement date. Investors were disappointed that the bulk of Ackman’s investment took the form of call options, rather than traditional long stakes, leading to his later being derided as a “short-term

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speculator.105 Others were puzzled at the lack of specificity in Ackman’s plans for Target: He disclosed only his belief that Target’s common stock “is undervalued and [his] intent to discuss with management ways in which this undervaluation can be corrected.”106 The lack of specificity led investors to speculate fairly widely about Ackman’s future plans. Some thought he might increase Target’s leverage or spin off its real estate holdings.107 Others believed he would increase Target’s credit card business, while still others believed he would instead spin off its credit card business.108 Finally, several thought Ackman would provide little positive change. An analyst at HSBC summed up this position by noting, “I don’t see how you can make this company perform significantly better.”109 By the end of the month, Target’s share price had dropped well below the levels leading up to Ackman’s announcement.

During the following two years, Ackman pushed for various reforms at Target, but his efforts were met with little success from Target’s board.110 Finally, he waged a proxy contest in 2009 to get five of his nominees elected to Target’s board. None of his nominees were ultimately elected; indeed, none received more than 20% of the vote.111 The proxy contest cost Ackman approximately $9 million and Target $11 million, in addition to the distraction from running their respective businesses.112 Ackman finally


111. Id.


GAMCO Investors provides another useful perspective into how attempted positive activism can instead result in negative returns. Our rationale for focusing on GAMCO is twofold. First, GAMCO is not a typical positive shareholder activist. Founded by Mario Gabelli in 1977, GAMCO was for decades a fundamental value investor, only later forming an activist fund.\footnote{See, e.g., Andy Kern, *A Private Market Value Primer from Mario Gabelli*, SEEKING ALPHA (Apr. 27, 2007, 4:00 PM), https://seekingalpha.com/article/33657-a-private-market-value-primer-from-mario-gabelli [https://perma.cc/A4WV-5BGD]; *Activist Gabelli Value Plus Trust Raises £101M at Launch*, WEALTH MANAGER, http://www.gabelli.co.uk/activist-gabelli-value-plus-trust-raises-101m-at-launch/ [https://perma.cc/R8VY-UBXN].} Unlike most U.S. activists, GAMCO is not located in Manhattan; instead, its $36 billion is managed from the suburb of Rye, New York. Moreover, GAMCO holds many of its investments in mutual and closed-end funds, not hedge funds, and its average holding period for activist investments is over nine years.\footnote{See Sheeraz Raza, *Gamco Investors’ First Proxy Access Nomination to the Board of National Fuel Gas*, VALUE WALK (Nov. 11, 2016, 10:13 AM), https://www.valuewalk.com/2016/11/gamco-proxy-access/ [https://perma.cc/X22Q-JBXP].}

Second, GAMCO generally does not engage in activist tactics that have been found to be associated with the highest announcement returns.\footnote{See Krishna, Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 13 (finding that high announcement returns are associated with the willingness to engage in proxy fights and litigation, among other variables demonstrating clout and expertise).} GAMCO favors precatory, non-binding proposals, and it avoids mounting expensive proxy fights, instead relying on advisors or other shareholders to propose how a company might accommodate GAMCO.\footnote{See 13D Filings: Gamco Gets Active, BARRON’S (Apr. 24, 2015, 11:50 PM), http://www.barrons.com/articles/13d-filings-gamco-gets-active-1429933831 [https://perma.cc/74TW-BD2S]. Indeed, GAMCO’s general counsel has cited the appeal of reduced-cost activism, saying “you can piggyback on someone else’s proxy.” Raza, supra note 115.}

We selected a random sample window from January 2016 to September 2018 to examine GAMCO’s 13D filings. During this period, GAMCO regularly filed a new 13D every few weeks, forty-eight in all during the thirty-three-month window.\footnote{The average lag between filing dates during the sample period was twenty days, with a minimum time between filing dates of eight days and a maximum of thirty-four days.}

We find that the average [-10,1] CAR for the forty-eight GAMCO 13D filings was 1.98%, well below the 7% average CAR for positive activists that has been widely documented in the literature. The returns are highly variable: of the forty-eight filings, twenty-six had negative CARs (54% of the announcements). These data are set forth in Table 6 below.

\footnote{116. See Krishna, Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 13 (finding that high announcement returns are associated with the willingness to engage in proxy fights and litigation, among other variables demonstrating clout and expertise).}
\footnote{117. See 13D Filings: Gamco Gets Active, BARRON’S (Apr. 24, 2015, 11:50 PM), http://www.barrons.com/articles/13d-filings-gamco-gets-active-1429933831 [https://perma.cc/74TW-BD2S]. Indeed, GAMCO’s general counsel has cited the appeal of reduced-cost activism, saying “you can piggyback on someone else’s proxy.” Raza, supra note 115.}
\footnote{118. The average lag between filing dates during the sample period was twenty days, with a minimum time between filing dates of eight days and a maximum of thirty-four days.}
Table 6 – GAMCO PositiveActivism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ticker</th>
<th>Event Date</th>
<th>Filing Date</th>
<th>CAR[-10.1]</th>
<th>CAR[-1.1]</th>
<th>CAR[-3.3]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OCAT</td>
<td>12/31/2015</td>
<td>1/6/2016</td>
<td>2.35%</td>
<td>4.41%</td>
<td>7.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GYRO</td>
<td>1/12/2016</td>
<td>1/21/2016</td>
<td>9.33%</td>
<td>-3.87%</td>
<td>0.42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLNK</td>
<td>2/8/2016</td>
<td>2/18/2016</td>
<td>-7.58%</td>
<td>4.19%</td>
<td>-14.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POWR</td>
<td>3/8/2016</td>
<td>3/17/2016</td>
<td>-3.55%</td>
<td>-2.18%</td>
<td>-1.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNAK</td>
<td>3/30/2016</td>
<td>4/4/2016</td>
<td>-3.57%</td>
<td>-0.96%</td>
<td>-1.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFOP</td>
<td>4/25/2016</td>
<td>5/5/2016</td>
<td>2.26%</td>
<td>0.43%</td>
<td>-0.59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPC</td>
<td>5/20/2016</td>
<td>5/25/2016</td>
<td>-0.53%</td>
<td>-0.97%</td>
<td>-0.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CST</td>
<td>6/2/2016</td>
<td>6/2/2016</td>
<td>16.71%</td>
<td>15.56%</td>
<td>16.51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LORL</td>
<td>6/29/2016</td>
<td>7/6/2016</td>
<td>-10.55%</td>
<td>-4.72%</td>
<td>-3.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDL</td>
<td>2/8/2016</td>
<td>7/18/2016</td>
<td>-2.76%</td>
<td>-0.06%</td>
<td>-0.85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGI</td>
<td>8/12/2016</td>
<td>8/22/2016</td>
<td>33.27%</td>
<td>-0.08%</td>
<td>0.16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLTX</td>
<td>8/31/2016</td>
<td>9/8/2016</td>
<td>2.34%</td>
<td>2.70%</td>
<td>1.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GI</td>
<td>10/13/2016</td>
<td>10/20/2016</td>
<td>1.18%</td>
<td>0.51%</td>
<td>-0.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HTZ</td>
<td>1/3/2017</td>
<td>1/4/2017</td>
<td>2.75%</td>
<td>7.07%</td>
<td>5.63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPPL</td>
<td>12/28/2016</td>
<td>1/4/2017</td>
<td>-1.24%</td>
<td>-1.88%</td>
<td>-1.07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VASC</td>
<td>1/23/2017</td>
<td>1/31/2017</td>
<td>-0.16%</td>
<td>0.79%</td>
<td>0.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLC</td>
<td>1/26/2017</td>
<td>2/2/2017</td>
<td>-1.28%</td>
<td>-0.84%</td>
<td>0.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLCD</td>
<td>1/27/2017</td>
<td>2/2/2017</td>
<td>-0.98%</td>
<td>-0.66%</td>
<td>0.52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RLJE</td>
<td>1/27/2017</td>
<td>2/6/2017</td>
<td>15.79%</td>
<td>2.50%</td>
<td>7.34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFI</td>
<td>3/7/2017</td>
<td>3/17/2017</td>
<td>-12.38%</td>
<td>3.37%</td>
<td>-0.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSOL</td>
<td>3/17/2017</td>
<td>3/27/2017</td>
<td>-6.18%</td>
<td>-7.12%</td>
<td>-6.53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INNL</td>
<td>4/11/2017</td>
<td>4/20/2017</td>
<td>15.78%</td>
<td>-3.44%</td>
<td>6.32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MWA</td>
<td>5/16/2017</td>
<td>5/17/2017</td>
<td>0.18%</td>
<td>0.39%</td>
<td>0.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENC</td>
<td>5/23/2017</td>
<td>6/1/2017</td>
<td>-0.51%</td>
<td>-0.26%</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUTR</td>
<td>6/12/2017</td>
<td>6/21/2017</td>
<td>-0.31%</td>
<td>0.63%</td>
<td>-0.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMCA</td>
<td>6/15/2017</td>
<td>6/23/2017</td>
<td>-1.30%</td>
<td>2.34%</td>
<td>7.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TISI</td>
<td>7/1/2017</td>
<td>7/28/2017</td>
<td>-41.12%</td>
<td>-1.96%</td>
<td>-45.53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVDQ</td>
<td>8/4/2017</td>
<td>8/16/2017</td>
<td>0.91%</td>
<td>1.25%</td>
<td>0.31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUID</td>
<td>8/30/2017</td>
<td>9/7/2017</td>
<td>-0.69%</td>
<td>-0.31%</td>
<td>-0.95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMIT</td>
<td>10/11/2017</td>
<td>10/20/2017</td>
<td>5.99%</td>
<td>5.07%</td>
<td>18.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXA</td>
<td>10/20/2017</td>
<td>10/25/2017</td>
<td>-0.28%</td>
<td>0.35%</td>
<td>-0.29%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The point of singling out GAMCO is not criticism. The data illustrate the significant variation in market reactions to announcements of attempted positive activism. It was not apparent from our analysis of GAMCO’s announcements that there is an easily discernible pattern to predict which announced interventions will be associated with negative market reactions. Market reactions vary widely for different interventions, and for different activists, and sometimes occur for reasons entirely independent of the activist’s announcement.

In sum, although positive activism is associated with positive returns on average, that conclusion does not always hold. Many interventions, and many funds, are associated with negative announcement returns. It is these interventions that we label as unintentional negative activism.

Finally, we briefly assess the mirror of unintentional negative activism: unintentional positive activism. Of the examples of informational negative activism in our database, approximately one quarter were associated with positive CARs. In other words, the market reaction to the short seller’s...
announcement was positive, leading to losses for the short seller. The data are summarized in Figure 3 and Table 7.119

Figure 3 – Histogram of Negative Activism [-1,1] and [-10,1] CARs

Table 7 – Unintentional Positive Activism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Returns</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%Positive</th>
<th>P25</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>P75</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAR[-10,1]</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>38.66%</td>
<td>-19.15%</td>
<td>-4.97%</td>
<td>-5.63%</td>
<td>7.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR[-1,1]</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>27.52%</td>
<td>-11.53%</td>
<td>-4.36%</td>
<td>-6.98%</td>
<td>0.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR[-3,3]</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>29.09%</td>
<td>-14.12%</td>
<td>-5.15%</td>
<td>-7.20%</td>
<td>0.94%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As with unintentional negative activism, we find that the incidence of unintentional positive activism varies across the sample of negative activists. Out of the 825 observations, 319 campaigns were associated with a positive market reaction, with a mean (median) CAR[-10,1] of 18.06% (11.05%). Numerous funds have at least one event during the sample period that was associated with positive returns upon announcement, with several having positive announcement returns for half or more of their short allegations.120 Since disclosure of short positions is voluntary and costly, finding so many failed yet disclosed investments is striking.

III. REGULATING NEGATIVE ACTIVISM

As the prior Part reveals, negative activism not only comprises a significant portion of activism as a whole, but also can be grouped into three

119. The fact that the percentage of failed short activism matches the percentage of failed positive activism may suggest minimal bias from the short dataset’s reliance on self-reporting.

120. As measured by [-10,1] CARs, these funds include Dialectic Capital, Lemelson Capital, Matt Berry, Bleeker Street Research, Cannell Capital, Street Sweeper, Asensio, GeoInvesting, Gravity Research Group, and Mako Research. There are, of course, a range of explanations for the market reactions to each of these announcements.
distinct categories. Before turning to the policy implications from this analysis, we review the current state of activism regulation.

Financial markets are governed by several significant regulatory regimes. Although hedge funds and other activist investors commonly use exemptions to escape many of them, this is not to say that activist investing is an entirely unregulated space. In addition to certain provisions that directly affect either positive or negative activism, activism of any sort is governed by general securities antifraud statutes. The Exchange Act’s section 10(b) general antifraud provision attaches to deceptive conduct in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. With no direct disclosure mechanism, section 10(b) is instead primarily aimed at deterring undesirable behavior.

Section 10(b) encompasses securities manipulation (deceptive conduct that controls or artificially affects the market for a security), securities fraud (deceptive or false statements, often made by company management, that affect a security’s price), and insider trading (trading based on nonpublic information when facing a duty to disclose that information). Activism can potentially fall within any of these three groups. For example, activists with an investment stake might want to engage in market manipulation by spreading false rumors to raise that security’s price, and

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121. For example, the Securities Act’s registration requirements for the offer and sale of securities exempts private offerings to accredited investors; consequently, activist investment funds avoid registration and disclosure requirements by having exclusively accredited investors. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2) (2018); Rule 506, 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2018) (Rule 506’s accredited investor safe harbor for meeting section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act). The Securities Exchange Act requires registration of broker-dealers as well as issuers of more than $10 million of securities to more than 2,000 shareholders of record; hedge funds and individual activist investors, however, are traditionally not treated as broker-dealers, and they limit their holders of record to fewer than 2,000 shareholders of record. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 12(g), 15(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l(g), 78o(b) (2018); U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS; STAFF REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 18 (2003) [hereinafter U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IMPLICATIONS], https://www.sec.gov/files/implications-growth-hedge-funds-09292003.pdf (distinguishing between “dealers,” which are required to register, and “traders,” which are not).


123. Although section 10(b) does not require disclosure, it may indirectly lead to disclosure as a means of defeating its deceptive conduct element. See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 655 (1997) (“[I]f the fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans to trade on the nonpublic information, there is no ‘deceptive device’ and thus no § 10(b) violation . . . .”).

124. See, e.g., ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 101 (2d Cir. 2007) (analyzing securities manipulation claim).


then sell the stake before the false information is corrected. Another activist might acquire seats on the board of a company and want to use that position to make deceptive statements about that company’s operations, engaging in securities fraud to prop up the stock price and the activist’s investment returns. Or finally, an activist might acquire private inside information about a company and want to use that information to trade profitably in that company’s shares. Consequences from violating section 10(b) antifraud prohibitions range from a variety of monetary damages measures to criminal imprisonment.

Beyond these general antifraud prohibitions, we review below the regulatory framework that specifically applies to positive activism and negative activism.

A. Current Regulation of Positive Activism

Even though much of positive activism may occur through entities designed to avoid most federal regulation, positive activism is still subject to important regulatory provisions. Several of these are aimed at disclosure. Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires any entity, including positive activist funds and individual investors, to disclose any


129. Insider trading cases commonly result in disgorgement damages, while other section 10(b) violations result in financial damages loosely tied to the impact that the violation had on the securities market. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e) (2018) (private securities litigation reform act damage measure for private section 10(b) causes of action); SEC v. Contorinis, 743 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 2014) (disgorgement in civil insider trading context); United States v. Contorinis, 692 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2012) (disgorgement in criminal insider trading context).

130. See, e.g., Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139.

131. We consider here only federal regulation. Although states have adopted “blue sky” laws that regulate the offer and sale of securities, and also often regulate investment advisors, federal preemption and other exemption typically renders this regulation inapplicable to hedge funds. See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IMPLICATIONS, supra note 121, at 31 (“Because of federal preemption and the availability of exemptions from adviser registration, only some states exercise regulatory authority over some hedge fund advisers, and most do not regulate the offer and sale of interests in hedge funds.”). In addition, depending on activists’ operations, they may find themselves potentially subject to other bodies of federal law that we do not consider here, such as ERISA or the Commodities Exchange Act. See Scott J. Lederman, HEDGE FUND REGULATION §§ 4.5, 6:13, 7:2 (2006 & Supp. 2009) (considering regulations related to these areas). Finally, external legal constraints are not the sole means of shaping activist investor behavior. Hedge funds in particular adopt a variety of organizational constraints to align investors’ incentives with management’s. See, e.g., LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 228–31 (2010) (describing the organizational tools used by hedge funds and similar entities to achieve this alignment); Peter Molk, How Do LLC Owners Contract Around Default Statutory Protections?, 42 J. CORP. L. 503 (2017) (analyzing how private companies use these organizational tools to align management and investor incentives).
beneficial ownership interests that exceed 5% of any class of public voting shares. These disclosures must be made within ten days of acquiring the 5% position and are publicly available for inspection. It also requires disclosing the purpose in accumulating a 5% stake, to help regulate the market for corporate control of public companies. Although section 13(d) is not aimed directly at activists, it applies any time activists accumulate a sufficiently sizable long position in voting shares, often a precondition of engaging in activism.

Section 13(d) applies to 5% long holdings of publicly traded voting equity shares, equity options, shares of closed-end investment funds, and certain convertible debt securities. It therefore covers a wide swath of positive activism. Because positive activists seek to increase share prices, they adopt long share positions and equity options, since these are the positions that pay off from increased prices.

Nevertheless, many other instances of positive activism fall outside section 13(d)’s disclosure requirement. In particular, holdings under 5% of voting shares, holdings of non-public companies, holdings of non-voting shares, and holdings of certain financial derivative instruments all fall outside section 13(d)’s disclosure obligation, yet all can be used to accomplish positive activism.


134 Rule 13d–1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(a) (2018); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 22–25 (1977) (discussing the history of section 13(d)’s attempt to impose disclosure requirements on cash tender offers for control); Houman B. Shadab, The Law and Economics of Hedge Funds: Financial Innovation and Investor Protection, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 240, 260 (2009) (noting that the section is designed “[t]o regulate the market for control of public companies”).

135 More precisely, “call” options that are exercisable within sixty days count towards section 13(d)’s 5% number. “Put” options that provide the right to sell securities, but not acquire them, do not count towards the threshold. Neither do call options that cannot be exercised within sixty days. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(d)(1)(i).

136 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1); Rule 13d-1(i), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(i) (removing non-voting securities from section 13(d)’s purview).

137 See supra Part I; Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 28 (noting how funds might purchase options, rather than shares, to profit from price changes).

Section 13(d) is not the sole disclosure provision. Section 13(f) of the Exchange Act fills in some of the remaining gaps. Passed to enhance public disclosure of institutional investor holdings, the section requires investment managers of more than $100 million to file quarterly reports of their holdings within forty-five days of the quarter’s close.139 Not all holdings fall within section 13(f)’s disclosure requirement; the disclosure requirement includes the same securities as section 13(d), without the 5% requirement.140 Again, this means that many long positions constituting positive activism will be disclosed, but activism built on holdings of non-public companies, holdings of non-voting shares, or holdings of certain financial derivatives need not be reported pursuant to section 13(f). And, of course, section 13(f) requirements do not apply to individual investors, or to investment managers with under $100 million in assets under management.141

In addition to disclosure required by sections 13(d) and 13(f) of the Exchange Act, investment managers of all types, including hedge funds, must register as investment managers with the SEC under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and make additional periodic required disclosures.142 These disclosures occur through Forms ADV and PF. Form ADV requires investment managers to disclose basic information about management strategy, organizational and operational characteristics of the managed funds, the size of assets under management, the services that the advisor provides, and whether managed funds use certain types of service providers.143 Much of this information is then made available to the public, although certain sensitive advisor-specific information is disclosed only to

139. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f); Rule 13f-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13f-1 (forty-five-day filing window); see generally Kahan & Rock, supra note 38, at 1063 (discussing the scope of section 13(f)’s application). In addition, the SEC has raised concerns about compliance with section 13(f)’s reporting requirement. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REP. NO. 480, REVIEW OF THE SEC’S SECTION 13(F) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS, at vi (Sept. 27, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/files/480.pdf [https://perma.cc/PH24-HZ8E] (finding that no SEC division audits section 13(f) filings; the SEC does not systematically use the data disclosed in section 13(f) filings; and that section 13(f) filings often contain significant errors or omissions).

140. 15 U.S.C. § 78m; 17 C.F.R. § 240.13f-1(c) (defining 13(f) securities and cross-referencing 15 U.S.C. § 78d(m)).

141. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f).

142. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 203, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (2018). The Act was amended in 2010 to remove the “private adviser” exemption that hedge funds had traditionally used to avoid registration. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 403, 124 Stat. 1376, 1571 (2010) (eliminating the exemption); Kahan & Rock, supra note 38, at 1050 n.152 (noting that hedge funds were “typically exempt from registration” under the private adviser exemption). A limited exemption was enacted for investment advisors with under $150 million in assets under management. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 203(m), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(m); Dodd-Frank § 408, 124 Stat. at 1575.

the SEC. Detailed information about fund holdings need not be filed pursuant to Form ADV.

Form PF, on the other hand, requires hedge funds and other private investment funds with at least $150 million in assets under management to submit non-public annual reports about these funds and their trading strategies. Although the SEC provides summary reports based on Form PF data, the underlying data are not themselves publicly available. Form PF requires managers to disclose the aggregate value of long positions across different asset types, although the individual holdings need not be identified.

Most recently, the Dodd-Frank Act added swap market reporting requirements via Regulation SBSR. Activists may use derivative instruments to gain disproportionate voting clout relative to their shareholdings. As a result of Regulation SBSR, the SEC requires that certain information about security-based swaps be reported, including contractual information about the swaps being traded, the date, time, quantity, and price of trades, counterparty identities, information about the clearing process, and more. Most of this information is reported only to the SEC; only limited information about trading prices and the transaction, without identifying information about traders, is subject to public disclosure requirements.

B. Current Regulation of Negative Activism

Negative activism is, in principle, subject to both the same regulations that apply to positive activism as well as certain rules that specifically govern negative activism through their regulation of short selling. Among these short-specific rules, Regulation SHO prohibits “naked” short selling.
serving, in which the short seller sells securities that she does not own or has not arranged to borrow. 152 Broker-dealers are also prohibited from executing customers’ short sales if a short selling client has failed to deliver shares within three days of the sale. 153 Problems from naked short selling can occur when the short seller is unable to deliver the shorted shares, leaving the purchaser unable to vote the shares she thought she purchased and leaving the short seller subject to large financial exposure. 154 Others have raised concerns about naked short selling’s potential to manipulate securities downward. 155 Because of the concerns, Regulation SHO prohibits the practice.

In addition, section 16 of the Exchange Act prohibits statutory insiders from selling shares of their company stock short. 156 Statutory insiders include key company executives as well as any holder of a 10% long position, conceivably limiting some forms of negative activism. 157

Other rules govern the margins that short sellers must satisfy when selling shares short. Short sales are executed on margin—the seller effectively borrows shares that she does not yet own—making them subject to margin regulations. These regulations require the short seller to post 125% to 150% of the short position’s value as collateral, with the short seller required to make up any shortfalls that emerge over time. 158 Many brokers


154. See, e.g., Hu, supra note 11, at 1690. The worry is that without a predetermined ability to cover short positions, the shorter may have to pay an extraordinarily high price ultimately to buy them. This financial exposure concern, of course, could be addressed by margin or other requirements, could do not disproportionately restrict certain types of behavior like naked shorting.

155. See generally id. Some argue that naked short selling also brings market benefits, such as higher liquidity and greater pricing efficiency of the shorted securities. Veljko Fotak et al., Fails-to-Deliver, Short Selling, and Market Quality, 114 J. Fin. Econ. 493, 504 (2014).


158. Regulation T requires short sellers to post collateral equal to 150% of the initial market value of the shorted shares. Regulation T, 12 C.F.R. § 220.12(a) (2018). Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), an organization governing the behavior of most brokers and dealers, requires shorts to be funded by at least 125% of the shorted amount on an ongoing basis, after the trade has already been executed. 4210. Margin Requirements, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/fi nra-rules/4210 [https://perma.cc/2Q3S-RRM8]; see also Order Approving FINRA Rule 4210, Exchange Act Release No. 62,482, 75 Fed. Reg. 41,562 (July 16, 2010).

Short sales are also subject to an “alternative uptick rule.” Through 2007,\footnote{Amendments to Regulation SHO, Exchange Act Release No. 59,748, 74 Fed. Reg. 18,042, 18,042 (Apr. 20, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242). The uptick rule had been enacted seventy years before, in 1938. \textit{Id.} at 18,044.} the SEC employed the original “uptick rule,” which imposed no restrictions on short selling when prices were rising but which prohibited short sales when prices were falling.\footnote{See generally Jonathan R. Macey et al., Restrictions on Short Sales: An Analysis of the Uptick Rule and Its Role in View of the October 1987 Stock Market Crash, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 799, 803–04 (1989) (summarizing the uptick rule).} The original uptick rule was replaced by the alternative uptick rule in early 2010, which imposes restrictions on shorting securities only when prices have declined by at least 10% relative to the prior day’s closing price.\footnote{Id. at 1694. The last time short selling experienced blanket bans in the United States was in 1931. \textit{Id.}} Prohibiting short sales during falling markets is meant to slow down price declines and remove incentives to manipulate prices downward.\footnote{Regulation SBSR, 17 C.F.R. § 242.901(b) (2018); see also supra notes 148–150 and accompanying text (discussing Regulation SBSR reporting requirements).}

Occasionally, short sales are banned in their entirety. During the dramatic stock market fall in September 2008, for example, short selling was banned in financial firms’ securities.\footnote{Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d), (f), (g), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d), (f), (g) (2018).}

Forms ADV and PF also require investment managers to disclose certain information about their activities to the SEC, irrespective of whether those activities involve long or short positions. Regulation SBSR, which requires disclosure to the SEC (and limited public disclosure) of information related to security-based swap transactions, also applies to derivative instruments that give negative activists, or others, a net short position.\footnote{Id. at 1694. The last time short selling experienced blanket bans in the United States was in 1931. \textit{Id.}} Notably, however, other disclosure obligations for positive activism—principally sections 13(d), 13(f), and 13(g)—are triggered only by long holdings of securities.\footnote{See, e.g., Hu, supra note 11, at 1690.} In other words, negative activists can adopt negative positions of any amount, far in excess of sections 13(d) and 13(g)’s 5% long threshold, without giving rise to disclosure requirements. In other
parts of the world, such as the European Union, funds are required to disclose short positions of 0.5% or more of a firm’s share value, but no analogue is present in U.S. securities markets.

C. Rationalizing Negative Versus Positive Activism Regulation

As the prior discussion shows, positive and negative activism are regulated rather differently. Positive activism regulation relies principally upon disclosure rules, while negative activism instead adopts rules to govern the manner in which short sales occur. The two approaches share the similar trait of invariance based on the type of positive or negative activism, however.

Here, we analyze whether these regulatory techniques make sense from a policy perspective. Since positive and negative activism involve taking long and short positions, respectively, the optimal regulatory techniques for each could reasonably differ. Moreover, since the type of activism can also vary within each of positive and negative activism, optimal regulation could differ even further. We therefore discuss optimal approaches across operational, informational, and unintentional negative activism—the framework developed in Part II—as comparisons to current policy.

At first blush, negative activism might appear to present straightforward and simple questions. If social welfare is enhanced by maximizing shareholder value, then surely activities that reduce shareholder value, and negative activism, are socially deleterious. Indeed, short selling is often criticized as involving controversial, generally undesirable trading practices. But a closer examination reveals that negative activists can play an important, and indeed helpful, role in financial markets. These costs and benefits vary based on the category of negative activism.

Before we turn to how public policy might address this variation, we pause briefly to consider the costs borne by short sellers as a result of the current regulatory regime. These costs are important and considerable, and typically do not apply to positive activism.

First, the risk-return profile of a short position differs significantly from that of a long position. By selling short, the investor profits only when the stock price decreases. Thus, the maximum profit from a short position per


shorted share is the price of the stock (stock price falling to zero), whereas the potential loss is infinite (stock price rising indefinitely). Moreover, the asset pricing literature suggests that long positions in equity earn a risk premium over time.\textsuperscript{169} The short seller, therefore, starts from behind and must overcome the expected market rate of return before expecting a profit on the shorted shares.\textsuperscript{170} In other words, absent some advantage associated with a particular short position, short selling is a risky proposition that expects to lose money. Positive activists can ride the winds of the market; negative activists must fight against them.

Second, short selling’s margin requirements tie up the short seller’s assets as collateral.\textsuperscript{171} These assets could otherwise be put to other uses. The opportunity cost of posting collateral, especially if that collateral is cash, adds to the difficulty and expense of short selling as a strategy.

Third, while short positions are open, short sellers must reimburse the stock lender for any dividends or distributions paid to the shareholder of the shorted stock, representing a real cost to the short seller.\textsuperscript{172} Moreover, depending on the requirements of particular brokers, short sellers can be required to pay an additional “special” premium for shares that are difficult to borrow.

\begin{enumerate}
\item For example, one recent survey suggests that the equity risk premiums are in the range of 4%, meaning that the return on a diversified index of stocks was expected to outperform risk-free yields by approximately 4%. See John R. Graham & Campbell R. Harvey, The Equity Risk Premium in 2018 (Apr. 2, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3151162 [https://perma.cc/EBF9-UFB2] (reporting an average equity risk premium of 4.42%). The average short position, then, is expected to cost the short seller the equity premium plus the risk-free rate, or approximately the market rate of return, over time. See, e.g., Bill Barker, How Have Stocks Fared the Past 50 Years? You’ll Be Surprised., MOTLEY FOOL (Apr. 22, 2016, 9:07 AM), https://www.fool.com/investing/general/2016/04/22/how-have-stocks-fared-the-last-50-years-youll-be-s.aspx [https://perma.cc/2PTY-NNML]; see generally PK, S&P 500 Return Calculator, with Dividend Reinvestment, DON’T QUIT YOUR DAY JOB (Dec. 31, 2019), https://dqydj.com/sp-500-return-calculator/ [https://perma.cc/F6VG-C4RD] (allowing for calculation of average annualized S&P 500 returns over various periods of time, and showing historical nominal stock market returns of approximately 9%).
\item However, by shorting shares, the short seller typically gains some funds that she could invest in a market basket of securities to earn the market rate of return, although this offset will be limited by the degree and type of collateral (such as cash) that the activist uses to satisfy margin requirements as well as any particular margin agreement terms, both initially and over time.
\item See, e.g., Dan Caplinger, Dividends Paid on Short Sales, MOTLEY FOOL (Jan. 15, 2015, 6:00 PM), https://www.fool.com/taxes/2015/01/15/dividends-paid-on-short-sales.aspx [https://perma.cc/MA P4-CR55]. This situation can lead to short squeezes from creative uses of dividends, as when Overstock announced a special dividend of “Digital Voting Series A-1 Preferred Stock” that would trade only on Overstock’s proprietary platform. Matt Levine, Overstock Has Had a Wild Week, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 19, 2019, 11:15 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-09-19/overstock-has-had-a-wild-week [https://perma.cc/8WR4-473S].
\end{enumerate}
Fourth, short sellers are required to repay the stock loan on demand, exposing them to the risk of a short squeeze.\footnote{173} If a short seller is unable to find an alternative lender, then the short seller must purchase the shares on the open market to repay the loan, effectively closing the position prematurely at whatever current market prices happen to be.

Fifth, public short sellers risk invoking the ire of regulators and private companies when engaging in short selling. As mentioned earlier, public disclosures of short interests have brought allegations of criminal conduct, investigations by public and private parties, and the threat of legal action.\footnote{174} Taking long positions and attempting to raise stock prices typically, absent fraud, does not invoke these responses, particularly from the target of those long positions, again making shorting disproportionately costly.

Finally, the tax treatment of gains from short selling is less favorable than gains on long positions. Long positions that are held for more than one year are eligible for favorable long-term capital gain tax rates, which are less than ordinary income tax rates.\footnote{175} The tax treatment for call options, which can be used for positive activism,\footnote{176} follows a similar rule, where the holding period is measured from the date that the option is exercised.\footnote{177} In comparison, any profits from short positions are taxed at higher short-term ordinary income rates, regardless of the period for which the activist maintained the short position.\footnote{178}
In sum, short sellers face significant costs and barriers.\textsuperscript{179} In our view, the assessment of these costs and barriers when short sellers are engaging in negative activism depends on the type of negative activism. We now turn to a policy analysis that assesses negative activism in light of these comparative costs. We generally see informational negative activism as normatively desirable, presenting little need for additional regulation; operational negative activism as normatively undesirable, in need of additional regulation; and unintentional negative activism as normatively neutral with no need for additional regulation.

1. Informational Negative Activism

Informational activism seeks to profit from share price movements after the activist releases new information into the marketplace. Typically we associate this behavior with activists’ promulgating good information about a company; informational negative activism, however, decreases stock prices by revealing bad information about a company.

We begin our analysis with the widely-accepted view among finance researchers that revealing negative truthful information is socially valuable and that the skewed incentive structure naturally encourages the discovery and release of positive information, but discourages the discovery and release of negative information. We then analyze the regulatory approach to informational negative activism and suggest reforms.

Regardless of whether the information is positive or negative in nature, scholars typically view new accurate information about securities as a good thing.\textsuperscript{180} When more information is available in the marketplace, securities prices are better indicators of fundamental company values, and price discovery is enhanced.\textsuperscript{181} Accurate securities prices are instrumental in making sure that limited funds are put towards their most valued uses. Firms whose shares are inaccurately overvalued attract too much capital relative to their economic contributions; firms whose shares are inaccurately

\textsuperscript{179}. To some extent, it is possible to use derivatives, including swaps and options, to avoid some of these costs, although derivatives also pose unique challenges of their own.


undervalued attract too little.\textsuperscript{182} To ensure capital is efficiently deployed, securities prices should reflect the fundamental value of their respective enterprises, which relies on information entering the securities markets.

Importantly, both positive and negative information must enter the securities markets for prices to be accurate. If only positive information were reflected in prices, the worry is that securities would be systematically overpriced. Investors might add a market-wide “unrevealed negative information” discount, but then some securities would be more overpriced than others, depending on their underlying firms’ relative ratios of unrevealed negative information to public positive information. This mispricing leads to misallocation of capital, which securities market regulators actively seek to avoid.\textsuperscript{183}

Therefore, informational negative activism is desirable simply to the extent it introduces new information about securities into securities markets. But even the threat of discovering and disclosing negative information can be valuable. The disciplining hypothesis set forth by Massa, Zhang, and Zhang states that as short sellers increase price information and attack the misconduct of firms, their presence, by increasing the probability and speed with which the market uncovers earnings management, reduces managers’ incentives to manipulate earnings.\textsuperscript{184} Consistent with the disciplining hypothesis, Fang, Huang, and Karpoff find evidence that short selling, or its prospect, reduces firms’ manipulation of earnings numbers, helps detect fraud, and improves asset pricing efficiency.\textsuperscript{185} The mere potential for uncovering and disclosing negative information can therefore align manager and shareholder interests.

Uncovering and disclosing negative information is therefore valuable, but the need is even greater once we consider companies’ disparate incentives for voluntary disclosure of positive but not negative information. Positive news boosts share prices. Increasing one’s share price not only makes raising future capital easier,\textsuperscript{186} but also makes management of those companies look like they are successful at their stewardship. A higher share price also means that any management performance-based compensation is

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{182} See, e.g., Fox & Haeberle, supra note 180, at 895–904.
\item \textsuperscript{184} See Massimo Massa, Bohui Zhang & Hong Zhang, The Invisible Hand of Short Selling: Does Short Selling Discipline Earnings Management?, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 1701 (2015).
\item \textsuperscript{185} See generally Vivian W. Fang, Allen H. Huang & Jonathan M. Karpoff, Short Selling and Earnings Management: A Controlled Experiment, 71 J. FIN. 1251 (2016).
\item \textsuperscript{186} Higher share prices in secondary markets mean the company can raise relatively more funds from later selling new securities into those secondary markets.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
higher, making these individuals financially better off by releasing positive news.

On the other hand, companies have little financial incentive to release negative information voluntarily. In fact, companies have reason to devote efforts to prevent or obfuscate this information from the public. To the extent negative information reduces share prices, the same forces that act to encourage management to release positive information encourage them to keep the negative information under wraps. Of course, companies’ ability to hide negative information is limited in some respects. Periodic disclosure rules require public companies to release information that falls within enumerated categories, whether that information is positive, negative, or neutral. Antifraud rules also prohibit companies from releasing false or misleading information when those companies choose to communicate voluntarily. But the resulting downward pressure on share prices from releasing negative information means that management has little reason to go beyond required disclosures.

If having negative information (or the threat of discovering negative information) in the marketplace is valuable, yet companies lack the


189. Filing requirements can be found in Section 13 of the Exchange Act, which applies to companies that are listed on national securities exchanges, large companies with a large number of shareholders, and companies that have made a public offering of their securities under the Securities Act of 1933. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2018) (periodic filing requirements); Exchange Act § 12(a), (g), 15 U.S.C. § 78l(a), (g) (listed on a national securities exchange, or large); Exchange Act § 15(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. 78o(d)(1) (public offering). Even if negative information falls within a required disclosure category, the negative repercussions from disclosing this information suggest the company will delay disclosing this information until required. Positive information, on the other hand, might be expected to be disclosed fairly quickly, because of its positive effect on stock prices. See, e.g., Kristoffel R. Grechenig, Positive and Negative Information – Insider Trading Rethought 10 (Univ. of St. Gallen Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 2007-28, 2009), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1019425 [https://perma.cc/XRB7-6DCQ].


191. Cf. Mints & Talley, supra note 90 (asserting that disclosing cybersecurity vulnerabilities can be undesirable, to the extent that it causes others to tap into these vulnerabilities and expose sensitive information). As a more general matter, we might be concerned to the extent that revealing negative information gives rise to negative operational changes by another. One would hope, of course, that the
incentive to release this information unless required, then another way for this information to become available is through private efforts to discover and release it. Insider trading restrictions keep company insiders from disclosing this information for personal gain,\(^{192}\) and the SEC’s private whistleblower program has been met with only modest success so far,\(^{193}\) so another route must be found for this information to enter the marketplace via private means. Enter informational negative activism. Activists typically face no insider trading restrictions to prevent them from profiting by revealing negative information about a company. As long as the activist is not a statutory insider (an executive of the company or a holder of at least 10\% of the company’s shares)\(^{194}\) and as long as the activist does not inherit fiduciary duties of trust and confidence from the information’s source (which is unlikely to happen in many circumstances),\(^{195}\) the activist is free

increased prospect of negative disclosures would encourage firms to prevent against these vulnerabilities and quickly manage them when exposed. These preventative steps, however, impose costs of their own, although they may also bring collateral benefits, to the extent they deter additional undesirable behavior. For example, the firm that locks sensitive documents in the safe to deter information breaches also deters garden-variety burglars. Cf. id. (discussing the costs of prevention); Darius Lakdawalla & Eric Talley, *Optimal Liability for Terrorism* (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12578, 2006), http://www.nber.org/papers/w12578 [https://perma.cc/TFZ6-Y46S] (discussing the costs of prevention).\(^{192}\)


193. See, e.g., Mengqi Sun, *SEC Whistleblower Program Has Record-Breaking Year*, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 16, 2018, 7:11 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-whistleblower-program-has-record-break-king-year-1542413518 [https://perma.cc/XQT2-2D4Y] (noting that the SEC paid out a record amount of whistleblower rewards in fiscal year 2018, although awards were paid to only thirteen individuals, comprising fewer than ten targets).


195. For the activist to inherit a prohibition against trading based on material nonpublic information, the information’s original source must possess such a duty, that source must pass the information for personal gain, and the activist must be aware of anything regarding the information’s original source grows small, eliminating liability for insider trading. See, e.g., Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 425 n.1 (2016) (declining to rule on this issue); United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 453–54 (2d Cir. 2014). Moreover, if the original source does not breach a fiduciary duty in passing the information, the activist faces no trading restrictions. *Dirks*, 463 U.S. at 665 (requiring the breach of a fiduciary duty for traders to be liable). Finally, if the activist learns of the information independently, the activist faces no insider trading restrictions, which generally do not attach to “outsiders” who acquire and trade on material nonpublic information. See John Reed Stark, Guest Post, *Think the SEC EDGAR Data Breach Involved Insider Trading? Think Again*, D&O DIARY (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.dandodiary.com/2017/10/articles/cyber-liability/guest-post-think-sec-edgar-data-breach-involved-insider-trading-think/ [https://perma.cc/BZ9C-UBLY] (describing SEC attempts to recognize a new “outsider trading” theory).
to profit from selling short a company stock and then revealing the negative information.\footnote{Indeed, the SEC recognizes the value that comes from private shorting of stocks. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Approves Short Selling Restrictions (Feb. 24, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-26.htm [https://perma.cc/3YGL-6NKR] (“Short selling can serve useful market purposes, including providing market liquidity and pricing efficiency.”).}

As we noted at the start of this section, short sellers face substantial additional difficulties and costs unique to taking a short position; these difficulties and costs deter informational negative activism.\footnote{See supra notes 169–178 and accompanying text.} Profiting from price decreases is systematically more difficult and riskier than profiting from price increases, given stock markets’ expected increases over time, and short sellers must shoulder the other financial and regulatory burdens unique to short selling. These disproportionate costs make the returns from investing in negative information discovery comparatively low, discouraging investment in its discovery and dissemination.

For all these reasons, the policy argument in favor of encouraging informational negative activism is a strong one. Informational negative activism is not only valuable, but also arguably more valuable than informational positive activism. The reason is straightforward: firms that seek to maximize their share prices have a disincentive to disclose negative information, thus skewing the pool of information. Thus, private incentives alone will encourage the production of positive information more than negative information. To the extent policymakers want to encourage the dissemination of information associated with informational negative activism, regulation arguably should not impose excessive costs that would deter this kind of activism; indeed, they might even consider subsidizing it.

How does current regulatory policy address these challenges? In many cases, fairly well.

First, informational activism of all types is in some ways lightly regulated, which makes informational activism a comparatively attractive form of activism. One potentially significant regulatory barrier, insider trading restrictions, is easily overcome as long as the trader makes sure she has not inherited disclosure duties from the information’s original source. Most of the other substantive regulation focuses on disclosure obligations. Although disclosure makes it more difficult for traders to acquire shares privately over an extended time period, this should be unproblematic for informational activists, who seek to profit from a relatively quick movement in price following revelation of their information; indeed, the time between entry and exit from a position might be entirely accomplished before the disclosure window comes due. By contrast, the operational activist, who might devote considerable effort to achieving operational reform (and price
movements) over an extended period, suffers a far greater burden from being required to disclose her holdings and intentions early in the process.

In addition to imposing a comparatively light regulatory burden on informational activism, some activist regulation also appears to favor informational negative activism over informational positive activism. Given the greater need for private disclosure of negative information, this balance seems appropriate. The disclosure obligation is fairly manageable for positive informational activism, but it is nonexistent for most informational negative activism. Lowering the regulatory burden to informational negative activism, even if only modestly, not only reduces its costs, but also makes it easier for the activist to amass a greater position that increases her eventual payoff. Even though activism policy may not have been set up with this implicit comparative subsidy for negative activism in mind, its existence is nevertheless an attractive feature of the current regime.

On the other hand, other regulatory aspects—the alternative uptick rule, Regulation SHO, and tax policy—disadvantage informational negative activism relative to positive activism. Some of these relative costs are only slight, and so are perhaps not overly troubling. For instance, negative-activism-specific restrictions from the alternative uptick rule and Regulation SHO likely will not apply to informational negative activism. Informational activism does not typically follow dramatic stock declines, making the alternative uptick rule non-binding and making it comparatively easy to line up covered shorts to comply with Regulation SHO. In addition, tax rules penalize short positions and negative activism relative to long positions and positive activism, but only when the long position is held for

198. See discussion accompanying supra notes 183–196 and accompanying text.

199. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d), (f), (g), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d), (f), (g) (2018); see also supra note 166 and accompanying text.

200. Given the short duration of most informational activists’ holdings, the disclosure regimes may provide little burden for either positive or informational negative activism, since the disclosure obligation might not be triggered until the activist has already exited her position. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (2018); see also supra note 133 and accompanying text (noting that disclosure is required within ten days after acquiring a 5% voting share stake).

201. Notably, this analysis supports continuing the asymmetric disclosure regimes that require 13D and 13F disclosures for long positions, but not short positions. Although some have pushed for mandatory public disclosure of short positions, a system tilted in favor of informational negative activism over positive activism may strike the appropriate balance, given the comparative value of disclosing new negative information over positive information. See, e.g., Hu & Black, supra note 11, at 875–86; Massa, supra note 54 (arguing for disclosure).


203. Regulation SHO, 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.200–242.204 (2018); see also supra note 152 and accompanying text.
a year or longer. Given informational activism’s short holding periods for both positive and negative information, it is likely that the tax treatment will be the same short-term capital gains rate for both positive and negative activism.

Finally, some regulations unquestionably disadvantage informational negative activism. Firms’ ability to employ leverage to short shares is limited by government regulation, making informational negative activism comparatively costly. Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny have pointed to this cost as potentially limiting arbitrage possibilities in stock markets, inefficiently impeding share prices’ movement from reflecting fundamental values. These regulations may be desirable for other reasons, but their presence further reinforces the need to advantage informational negative activism.

Given the potential for informational negative activism to improve market efficiency, policymakers should at least consider efforts to reduce the difficulties and costs associated with short selling. To the extent there are future calls for imposing costs on short sellers, regulators should presumptively resist such calls. Since the evidence supports subsidizing this form of activism, not restricting it, a compelling case must be made to overcome that presumption.

Indeed, regulators might consider implementing new rules designed to subsidize informational negative activism. For example, long-term capital gains taxes from short selling might be substantially reduced, perhaps to zero. Regulators might encourage reforms related to the disparate riskiness and cost of short selling, including reforms related to share lending. Regulation of large institutional investors might be relaxed, to permit or encourage these institutions to invest and engage in informational negative activism, or at least to allocate greater resources to such activists. Securities regulators might create safe harbors for short sellers, to protect them from litigation or enforcement actions as long as they do not take specified deleterious, manipulative actions. Our bottom-line normative conclusion is straightforward: non-manipulative informational negative activism should be encouraged.

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204. See I.R.S. Pub. 550, supra note 177; see also supra note 178 and accompanying text.
205. Tax rules could be changed to provide a means of subsidizing negative versus positive informational activism, but we do not consider the details of that potential change here.
206. See supra notes 158–159 and accompanying text.
208. Molk & Partnoy, supra note 44.
2. Operational Negative Activism

Our recommendation is very different for operational negative activism. Consider the contrasts between operational negative activism and operational positive activism. Recall that in positive operational activism, activists work to change a company’s operations to move asset prices in their desired direction. Whereas positive activists act to increase the value of companies, negative activists try to destroy it. This characteristic leads to a sharp separation between the desirability of positive and negative operational activism.

A case can be made that positive operational activism justifies a regulatory subsidy. It enhances the fundamental value of companies and the economy as a whole, as evidenced by share price returns after activist interventions.\(^\text{209}\) While the private financial returns from positive activism already incentivize this desirable activity, from a policy perspective these rewards arguably are suboptimal low. Positive activists can bear significant expenses to achieve positive change, which are not always reimbursed,\(^\text{210}\) but they typically capture only a portion of the improvements they generate.\(^\text{211}\) This is because the positive activist, like any investor, has only a partial ownership stake in a targeted company; consequently, much of the benefit they generate can be viewed as a positive externality.\(^\text{212}\)

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\(^{209}\) See supra note 27 and accompanying text (noting a 7% average abnormal share response to positive activist interventions). As discussed above, however, not all agree that operational positive activism improves companies over the long term. See, e.g., supra note 42; Coffee, supra note 42 (noting the often divergent goals between activists and other shareholders).

\(^{210}\) For instance, activists’ costs to replace incumbent management through a proxy contest are generally reimbursed only if the activist wins. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 128 N.E.2d 291, 293 (N.Y. 1955) (formulating the typical rule that failed insurgents’ proxy contest expenses are not reimbursable by the company); RANDALL S. THOMAS & CATHERINE T. DIXON, ARANOW & EINHORN ON PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL § 21.01 fig.21-1 (3d ed. 1998) (reporting several insurgent proxy contest expenses that averaged approximately $1.8 million in the 1980s); Carl Icahn, Opinion, We’re Not the Boss of A.I.G., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/29/opinion/29Icahn.html [https://perma.cc/7VKK-UHG2] (noting that proxy contests at large public companies “can run into the millions of dollars”). Shareholders’ attempts to change this reimbursement rule have been unsuccessful. See, e.g., CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 240 (Del. 2008) (allowing board to exclude a shareholder proposal that would have amended the company bylaws to require reimbursing any proxy contest that was successful in electing at least one new director). Less drastic interventions than waging proxy contests, such as lobbying existing management to change without replacing that management, can also involve financial expenses as well as a significant investment of the activist’s time that goes uncompensated.

\(^{211}\) In an important recent working paper, John Coffee raises the concern that activists often settle with firms for private benefits unavailable to other shareholders, which may mitigate these costs. Coffee, supra note 42, at 9–15.

Icahn, for example, spent considerable effort lobbying Apple to change its corporate financial structure in 2013. At the time, he owned only 0.9% of the company’s outstanding shares, meaning 99.1% of the gains generated by his positive activism would have accrued to other owners.  Thus, unless the expected benefits to Apple as a whole were at least one hundred times Icahn’s expected uncompensated cost in obtaining them, we would not expect him to engage in positive activism.

Of course, the positive externalities problem is not unique to activism. In other contexts, legal systems already manage it in various ways. Even in the corporate sphere, the problem also arises elsewhere, such as in convincing individual shareholders to engage in company management or exercise control powers. The typical policy response to positive externalities is to subsidize the activity.

Some current regulation already incentivizes positive operational activism relative to other activities. As noted above, tax policy creates incentives for activists to hold positions for more than one year, and in fact studies show positive activist median holding periods exceed one year. Disclosure requirements associated with positive operational activism also carry minimal cost. Moreover, private ordering solutions can encourage activism.

The arguments that positive operational activism is beneficial usually do not apply to operational negative activism. Operational negative activism typically imposes negative externalities on investors and society, harming companies’ efficiency and profitability solely for the activist’s individual profits. Because of these negative externalities, operational negative activists’ incentives are not aligned with those of shareholders or the public.

who reap only a portion of their positive changes). Activists can increase the comparative magnitude of these gains through leverage or buying call options or other similar financial derivatives. Leverage amounts, however, are limited by Regulation T and by brokers and dealers. Regulation T, 12 C.F.R. § 220.12(a) (2018); see also supra notes 158–159 and accompanying text. Call options include transaction costs and practical volume limitations that limit their usefulness. See generally 12 C.F.R. § 220.122(d) (noting exchange and endorsing firm margin requirements that act to limit the volume of options that are written); Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637 (1973) (developing a model to determine option prices).


214. Some have argued that this situation justifies tolerating limited private tunneling of benefits by controlling shareholders. Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 212.

215. See Brav, Jiang, Partnoy & Thomas, Returns, supra note 37, at 49.

216. As a practical matter, we also doubt whether reducing disclosure requirements would provide much subsidy in this area. Operational activists often publicize their ideas to other shareholders to gain traction for their suggested intervention, effectively disclosing their positions in the process. See, e.g., supra note 213 and accompanying text (discussing Carl Icahn’s operational activism, which he publicized despite not having an ownership stake that had to be disclosed).

However, the current regulatory framework does not directly deter operational negative activism. Moreover, other regulations that potentially affect negative activism do not apply to operational negative activism, raising the worry that operational negative activism is insufficiently deterred.

Consider, for example, the alternative uptick rule, which prohibits shorting securities whose prices have fallen by at least 10% relative to the prior trading day’s closing price.\(^\text{218}\) This rule does little to deter operational negative activism. The quintessential operational negative activist shorts shares before the price begins to fall, later causing the decline through imposing operational changes.\(^\text{219}\) While the alternative uptick rule might limit the activist’s ability to add to her position once the operational changes have begun to take effect, this limitation does not impact earlier profits.

Likewise, securities antifraud provisions do little to deter many instances of operational negative activism. Traditional insider trading restrictions would not apply to operational negative activism, since they apply when the activist faces a duty to disclose her informational advantage.\(^\text{220}\) This duty typically arises when the trader breaches a confidential or fiduciary relationship with the information’s source or the trading partner.\(^\text{221}\) Negative activists, however, generally owe no such duty. They trade on their own information about their operational plans, rather than information acquired confidentially from the company,\(^\text{222}\) and they own short rather than long positions in the company, keeping them from being treated as statutory insiders with disclosure duties.\(^\text{223}\)

Prohibitions against market manipulation also typically would not apply to operational negative activism. Claims of market manipulation require some type of manipulative activity, which “refers generally to practices, such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices, that are intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity.”\(^\text{224}\) A negative activist who spreads false information about her activities might be liable for market manipulation,\(^\text{225}\) but an honest negative activist who did not

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\(^\text{219}\) See supra Part II.B.2.


\(^\text{221}\) Id.

\(^\text{222}\) See supra Part II.B.2 (examples of operational negative activism); cf. Mitts & Talley, supra note 90, at 26–31 (analyzing whether shorting based on cybersecurity breaches could fit within existing insider trading restrictions).

\(^\text{223}\) See supra notes 156–157 and accompanying text.

\(^\text{224}\) Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977); see also Fezzani v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 716 F.3d 18, 22 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting the manipulative act requirement for manipulation claims).

\(^\text{225}\) See, e.g., Mitts, supra note 63, at 38–41 (noting some of the difficulties that can arise in proving market manipulation cases).
mischaracterize any activities, or who just refused to speak, would seemingly avoid this prohibition. Shorting alone does not constitute market manipulation.\textsuperscript{226}

Finally, although statutory insiders are directly prohibited from shorting shares of company’s stock,\textsuperscript{227} this prohibition does little to deter operational negative activism. To be a statutory insider, the operational negative activist would need either to be a key executive of the company or to hold a 10% long position in the company’s stock.\textsuperscript{228} But operational negative activists typically have no formal employment position within a targeted company,\textsuperscript{229} and they seek to profit from short positions, not long positions.

Given that existing restraints do little to deter operational negative activism, and given the negative externalities that usually follow this type of activism, we see a need for more regulation. To be sure, the burden of bearing the costs of conducting operational negative activism will already provide some deterrent, but situations where the negative activist’s potential gains exceed her cost must also be dissuaded. The need for serious regulatory prohibitions, including a meaningful threat of ex post enforcement, is particularly warranted given the comparatively limited ability of company management to respond, especially when (as with most of the examples discussed in Part II.B.2) the activist can achieve her goals without management’s involvement. Management is limited in its ability to deter negative activism, since standard techniques that devalue the activist’s holdings, like poison pills, don’t deter investors with short positions.\textsuperscript{230} Companies potentially could implement negative poison pill “vitamin pills,” which would dilute a short seller’s interest above a particular percentage threshold upon a triggering event, but it is unclear how such devices could be operationalized, and whether the courts would uphold them.\textsuperscript{231}

\textsuperscript{226} ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 101 (2d Cir. 2007) (“In essence, taking a short position is no different than taking a long position. To be actionable as a manipulative act, short selling must be willfully combined with something more to create a false impression of how market participants value a security.”).

\textsuperscript{227} Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(c) (2018); see also supra notes 156–157 and accompanying text.


\textsuperscript{229} For example, Bill Ackman pushed for operational changes at Procter & Gamble despite holding only a 1% ownership stake in the company and no executive position. Chris Isidore, \textit{Ackman Wins, P&G Dumps CEO}, CNN\textsc{Money} (May 24, 2013, 10:25 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/05/24/news/companies/pg-ceo-ackman/index.html [https://perma.cc/3XKM-JBHB].

\textsuperscript{230} Memorandum from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, The Share Purchase Rights Plan (Mar. 1994), in \textsc{The Law and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions} 741 (Ronald J. Gilson & Bernard S. Black eds., 2d ed. 1995) (discussing standard poison pill characteristics).

\textsuperscript{231} An effective response would need to increase the value of company stock, so that share prices increase and reduce the value of the negative activist’s short position. Other than through financial manipulations that may be ineffective in an efficient capital market, we presume that management is already implementing all value-enhancing plans, as is their job. In that case, the analogue of a poison
If operational negative activism is to be deterred but informational negative activism is to be encouraged, the ability to categorize negative activism grows particularly important. There are likely to be “mixed” cases of informational and operational activism. Although operational and informational activism are distinct categories—operational activism seeks to impact a firm’s fundamental value, while informational seeks to impact the public reflection of a firm’s fundamental value—the lines between the two can blur.

For instance, consider the informational negative activist who discloses a firm’s cyber vulnerability, which leads others to disrupt the firm’s operations and impose negative operational changes. On one hand, disclosure of new, accurate negative information is desirable, since it causes securities prices to be better representations of the underlying asset’s value. On the other hand, if that information obviously causes negative operational changes that would not otherwise have occurred, the costs of those negative changes could more than outweigh the value of the initial information.

It would be undesirable for the negative activist to escape consequences of operational negative activism merely by disclosing information and then allowing another to do the operational work. A regulatory framework would therefore need to attribute operational changes to the informational activist when those operational changes would naturally follow from the information disclosure. Current activist policy fails to do so, but this predictive link occurs in other areas of financial regulation, and we think it could be implemented here. Regulation FD, for example, prohibits disclosures by an issuer to holders of that issuer’s securities if it is reasonably foreseeable that the holder would purchase or sell the issuer’s securities based on that information. A similar exercise could attribute later operational changes to an informational activist if it would be reasonably foreseeable that revealing the information would give rise to the negative operational changes. Then, to the extent operational negative activism is penalized, those penalties could be applied to deter the informational negative activist who publicly discloses information that
likely has negative social value. In turn, desirable informational activism that is not likely to lead to negative operational changes, such as disclosing financial fraud, would not be penalized.

In designing a rule that penalizes operational negative activism, we have assumed that operational negative activism is harmful to society. This assumption will not always hold, in which case penalizing operational negative activism means we would lose out on some beneficial cases. Sometimes operational negative activism dismantles illegitimate sources of company value, and penalties unfortunately deter those activities. Kyle Bass’s challenges to what were potentially illegitimate company patents, for example, would be dissuaded under a system that penalized all operational negative activism, even though challenging invalid patents could be a socially desirable way of policing these patents. But given operational negative activism’s potential for abuse, deterring some beneficial activism along with deterring harmful activism could be a favorable regulatory tradeoff. Of course, if we could accurately distinguish ex ante between socially desirable and undesirable operational negative activism, then we should carve the good cases out from the prohibition.

3. Unintentional Negative Activism

Finally, we turn briefly to an assessment of optimal regulatory policy for unintentional negative activism. Recall that this category of activist acquires shares with the hope that she will improve company value but, upon disclosing her position, share prices instead decline. Unintentional negative activism has few redeeming qualities. As with operational negative activism, the unintentional negative activist is not expected to benefit either the targeted company or society overall.

235. Of course, nothing would prevent the activist from disclosing the information to the company privately, or for the company to compensate the activist for doing so. In this scenario, the company gets the first opportunity to address the problem without its necessarily giving rise to negative operational changes. We view this as a desirable outcome.

236. See supra notes 73–83 and accompanying text.

237. The Patent & Trademark Office is widely believed to issue excessive bad patents, making this form of private policing potentially important. See, e.g., Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Irrational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 72 VAND. L. REV. 975, 977 (2019). But if Bass’s mixed success is representative of operational negative activism’s potential, even his challenges might have done more harm than good, given that the challenges were successful only approximately one-quarter of the time. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.

238. At least the activist could say that he or she tried.

239. It is therefore important to distinguish this activist from the activist who is expected to improve company value but unluckily proves unsuccessful down the road. We envision this latter activist as producing a positive (or at least neutral) stock price reaction upon disclosing her position, suggesting that market actors expect her to add value on average.
Fortunately, private market forces may already provide an adequate deterrent. Unintentional negative activists lose money immediately upon the share price decline. Repeated instances will make it hard for them to raise funds from outside investors or to engage in meaningful activism in other companies. As with financial actors generally, market forces will punish those positive activists with poor reputations, as evidenced by empirical evidence linking reputation to investment inflows.  

If needed, an additional deterrent could come from courts, which could empower management to resist unintentional negative activism by tolerating defensive actions broadly, particularly when the announcement of a long intervention is associated with a negative market reaction. Delaware courts’ framework for determining the acceptability of management’s response to a perceived threat has been developed in *Unocal v. Mesa* and *Unitrin v. American General*. This framework often requires assessing whether management’s response falls into the range of reasonableness relative to the threat posed. Although the range of reasonableness is quite expansive, it is even broader when a company faces more severe threats to its value.  

Because unintentional negative activism embodies exactly that type of potential fundamental threat, the range of reasonable responses under the *Unocal* and *Unitrin* frameworks should incorporate an assessment of the market’s reaction to the announcement of an activist intervention. An activist’s prior track record and stock price reactions could be useful ways for courts to identify potential unintentional negative activism, which could warrant a greater defensive response. In contrast, courts should view defensive efforts more skeptically when the activism is associated with a significant positive return upon announcement.

As a final note, consider the opposite of unintentional negative activism: unintentional positive activism. This puzzling form of activism occurs when the announcement by a negative activist is associated with a positive cumulative abnormal return to the targeted company’s shares. What is the appropriate policy response to activist behavior that profits from reduced company value but, unintentionally, might instead improve company value? Perhaps a negative activist’s intervention is expected to leave the company stronger for having countered it; a company’s decisive victory might deter

240. See Krishnan, Partnoy & Thomas, *supra* note 13 (documenting details about funds with the strongest reputations for clout and expertise).
243. *Id.* at 1367, 1373.
244. *Id.* at 1387; *Unocal*, 493 A.2d at 955.
future negative activists, for example, leaving the company more free to pursue value.

Theoretically, this kind of attempted negative activism should be encouraged as a policy matter when it ultimately makes the company’s shares more valuable. But in practice, we think it will be rare. It would also be challenging to identify this type of failed, yet desirable, negative activism ex ante and selectively subsidize it while still deterring operational negative activism. Accordingly, the current regulatory approach, which does not single out this unusual phenomenon, seems appropriate.

CONCLUSION

We have introduced the concept of negative activism, provided a typology of its three main forms, and examined empirically the extent to which it occurs. Using this framework, we have assessed the areas in which current regulation of negative activism is potentially inadequate. In general terms, we favor less regulation of informational negative activism, greater regulation of operational negative activism, and perhaps a more nuanced approach to unintentional negative activism. Our hope is that our framework will prove useful as the field of activist investing continues to evolve.

We conclude by observing that our analysis of negative activism has implications for the ongoing debate about corporate short-termism. On one side of the issue, people like Martin Lipton argue that activists contribute to a “short-term myopic approach to management and investing that promises to impede long-term economic prosperity.”

For these critics, activism is seen as generally sacrificing long-term value for (attempted) short-term profits, such as by disrupting long-term investments, reducing activities with uncertain distant payoffs, and focusing on quarterly profits rather than on long-term growth.

Others see activism as offering positive effects for long-term corporate performance. Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang, for example, find empirical evidence that activist interventions result in immediate positive returns which “are followed by long-term improvements, rather than declines, in performance.” Activists can improve long-term performance


247. Bebchuk, Brav & Jiang, Long-Term Effects, supra note 11, at 1155.
by providing an active check on management, reducing the agency costs that typically exist between management and shareholders.\textsuperscript{248} To take two common examples, reducing inefficient long-term R&D investments improves current value and allows capital to be redeployed to better uses, while increasing leverage imposes debt servicing costs to hold management’s feet to the fire.\textsuperscript{249}

The debate about activism’s impact on long-term value is still relatively new. But both sides in the debate rely on data about positive activism and often disregard negative activism. For example, in their recent study supporting activism’s long-term effects, Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang consider exclusively activism disclosed pursuant to section 13(d) filings,\textsuperscript{250} but these filings capture principally long, or positive, activists, not negative activists.\textsuperscript{251} Critics of activism have relied on the same dataset.\textsuperscript{252} Other important commentators, such as Martin Lipton, also focus primarily on positive activism, not negative activism.\textsuperscript{253} In other words, the debate to date largely revolves around studying only one subset of activism.\textsuperscript{254}

Negative activism adds a new wrinkle to the short-termism debate. Consider arguments by critics of positive activism that there is a disconnect between short-term market reaction and long-term value, with short-term price increases followed by long-term declines. Does this mean short selling will be long-term value enhancing to the extent it causes short-term price declines? Or consider arguments by proponents of positive activism that short-term increases reflect expected increases in future corporate earnings. Does it follow that short selling is long-term value destroying? More generally, how should scholars interpret the distribution of short-term price responses to the announcement of negative activism? How should one measure the potential benefits associated with negative activism that potentially might outweigh the decline in the value of the targeted

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{248} While management’s duty is to act in the company’s interest, that duty is not always diligently pursued. See, e.g., supra note 40 and accompanying text; Robert J. Rhee, \textit{A Legal Theory of Shareholder Primacy}, 102 Minn. L. Rev. 1951 (2018).
  \item \textsuperscript{249} See Brav, Jiang, Partnoy & Thomas, \textit{Hedge Fund Activism}, supra note 37; Coffee & Palia, \textit{The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism}, supra note 42, at 64–65.
  \item \textsuperscript{250} Bebchuk, Brav & Jiang, \textit{Long-Term Effects}, supra note 11, at 1098–1101. Bebchuk, Brav & Jiang discuss their sample of activism in a section titled “The Universe of Hedge Fund Activism.” \textit{Id.}
  \item \textsuperscript{251} Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2018); see supra notes 132–141 and accompanying texts (discussing the scope of section 13(d) requirements).
  \item \textsuperscript{252} See, e.g., Cremers et al., \textit{supra} note 246, at 2.
  \item \textsuperscript{253} See, e.g., Lipton, \textit{supra} note 41 (“[V]oting power is being harnessed by a gaggle of activist hedge funds who troll through SEC filings looking for opportunities to demand a change in a company’s strategy or portfolio that will create a short-term profit without regard to the impact on the company’s long-term prospects.”).
  \item \textsuperscript{254} As noted above, there are some recent exceptions to the focus on positive activism, including a few new and important articles that have focused on certain aspects of negative activism. See, e.g., Appel & Fos, \textit{supra} note 66; Mitts, \textit{supra} note 63. We find these recent efforts encouraging, and applaud them.
\end{itemize}
company’s shares? In other areas of law, such as free speech jurisprudence, instances of individual harm are tolerated in furtherance of a more general principle. Might negative activism be yet another example? We look forward to a robust debate on these and other issues related to negative activism.