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Colliding Worlds: Visual Culture in France and Colonial Algeria (1918-1962)

by

Lacy Murphy

A dissertation presented to
Washington University in St. Louis
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy

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List of Terms

<i>Béni-Oui-Oui</i>	Derogatory name given to an Arab caïd collaborating with the French
<i>bey</i>	the governor of a district or province of the Ottoman Empire
<i>bidonville</i>	shanty town
<i>caïd</i>	a leader, tribal representative or administrator
Caliph	the title of the Prophet Muhammad's immediate successors who were the political and spiritual leaders of the Muslim community
<i>colon</i>	European settler
<i>dey</i>	title given to the rulers of the Regency of Algeria under the Ottoman Empire
<i>djebel</i>	mountain
<i>djounoud</i>	An Algerian Muslim soldier fighting for independence during the Algerian War
<i>douar</i>	hill village
<i>élu</i>	member of the Fédération des élus indigènes
<i>évolué</i>	a colonial subject that has received a European-style education, often employed as a government clerk or junior official
<i>fellah</i>	peasant farmer
<i>fellagha</i>	an Arabic word literally meaning "bandits," refers to groups of armed militants affiliated with anti-colonial movements in French North Africa
Hadj	Title given to Muslims who have completed the pilgrimage to Mecca
<i>haik</i>	veil covering a woman's face
<i>harki</i>	Algerian soldier fighting for France
<i>indigène</i>	term used to broadly describe the "natives" of French Algeria
<i>indigénat</i>	the Code de l'indigénat were a diverse and fluctuating sets of laws and regulations that created an inferior legal status for Arab and indigenous subjects of French Algeria beginning in 1881
<i>khalifa</i>	a caïd's representative
<i>maquis (pl. maquisards)</i>	FLN guerrillas
<i>mechta</i>	neighborhood of a village
<i>Moudjahid (f. moudjahidat, pl. moudjahiddine)</i>	FLN soldier
<i>oued</i>	dry river bed
<i>pied noir</i>	"black foot," European settler in Algeria
<i>qadi (cadi)</i>	A magistrate or judge of Shari'ia Law
<i>razzia</i>	raid
<i>sheikh</i>	an honorific usually used to describe respected elder such as village leaders and family patriarchs
<i>spahi</i>	French North African cavalry of the Armée d'Afrique
<i>Tirailleurs</i>	Literally, riflemen. Usually applied to colonial infantry
<i>ulama</i>	A recognized Qur'anic teacher
<i>Ulema</i>	The Association of Algerian Muslim Ulama, an Islamist and Arab nationalist cultural and religious movement in French Algeria led by

Wilaya
zouaves

Abdelhamid Ben Badis
one of the six FLN commands in Algeria
French infantry units serving in North Africa

List of Abbreviations

ALN	Armée de libération nationale
AML	Amis du manifeste et de la liberté
BG	Compagnie des chemins de fer de Bône-Guelma
CFA	Chemins de fer algériens
CGTU	Confédération générale du travail unitaire
CHPT	Compagnie des haut-parleurs et de tracts
CNRA	Conseil nationale de la Révolution algérienne
CRUA	Comité révolutionnaire d'unité et d'action
EA	Compagnie de l'Est algérien
ENA	Etoile Nord-Africaine
FLN	Front de libération nationale
GPRA	Gouvernement provisoire de la République algérienne
MNA	Mouvement nationaliste algérienne
MTLD	Mouvement pour le triomphe des libertés démocratique
OAS	Organisation armée secrete
PCA	Parti communiste algériens
PCF	Parti communiste français
PLM	Chemins de fer de Paris à Lyon et à la Méditerranée
PPA	Parti du peuple algérien
SAPIND	Service d'action psychologique et d'information de la Défense nationale
SAS	Section administrative spécialisé
SCA	Service cinématographique des armées
SFIO	Section française de l'internationale ouvrière
SVHNA	Société des hôtels et des voyages Nord-Africaine
UDMA	Union démocratique pour le Manifeste algérien
UFNA	Union française Nord-Africaine
UGTA	Union generale des travailleurs algériens
UGEMA	Union générale des étudiants musulmans algérien
ZAA	Zone autonome d'Alger

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Washington University in St. Louis

May 2024

Dedicated to Rue and Gage.

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Colliding Worlds: Visual Culture in France and Colonial Algeria (1918-1962)

by

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The decline of French colonialism in Algeria and the Algerian War lay at the fault line of several tectonic forces. World War I, World War II, and the Cold War challenged France's global stature, destabilized the colonial apparatus, and fostered unprecedented intercolonial intellectual exchange. These events provided the global context for Algeria's national revolution, a prolonged period of conflict that was all in one a civil war that redefined Algerian identity, a political and military scandal that led to the downfall of the French Fourth Republic in 1958, influenced Cold War politics, and continues to shape national identity in both countries today. Focused on this complicated milieu, this dissertation uses Algeria as a vantage point and visual culture as a lens to examine the phenomena of decolonization, nationalism, Pan-Arabism, African unity, and Third World internationalism, and demonstrates that, in the instance of Algerian independence, national sovereignty and visual sovereignty were correlated concepts.

Introduction

While stuck in traffic one balmy afternoon in the El Biar district of Algiers in September 2023 coming back from a visit to the *Musée national du moudjahid*, a large museum dedicated to the martyrs of Algeria's war of independence (1954-1962), I reflected upon what I had just seen and experienced.¹ Before entering the main galleries, I walked along a dimly lit corridor lined with the photographic portraits of men who had laid down their lives in the names of those who walked alongside me. Initially, the appearance of the museum was exactly what I expected: vitrines of historical documents, paintings of revered leaders both past and present, numerous artifacts, and didactic models explaining famous military operations. The exhibition is arranged chronologically, and viewers move through the different phases of Algerian resistance starting with the French conquest of Algiers in 1830 and ending with the Revolution as they advance through the galleries. The layout of the exhibit is circular, and visitors must walk in a counterclockwise direction, the same journey that pilgrims to Mecca take as they complete Tawaf (طواف) around the Holy Ka'aba.² In addition to rendering the study and appreciation of Algerian revolutionary history an act of devotion and making martyrs figures of reverence, this layout also limits the viewer's line of sight, making it difficult to see what comes next.

Rounding a bend about halfway through the exhibition, I could not see what lay ahead, making the impact of the next display all the more visceral: a small, dimly lit room where

¹ A Moudjahid or moudjahidine (feminine), in its broadest sense, is a Muslim who fights on behalf of the faith or the Muslim community (ummah). It is also sometimes transliterated as mujahid/mujahideen.

² One floor below the exhibition is a dimly lit, ornate *dôme de recueillement*, a contemplative space with a large rock enshrined at its center and golden Qur'anic verses on the walls that undeniably resembles the Dome of the Rock in the Old City of Jerusalem. According to a 2022 article in the Algérie Presse Service, the rock symbolizes the mountains and deserts of Algeria, where much of the important fighting took place during the war. See "Musée du moudjahid: Un livre ouvert sur l'histoire de l'offensive du Nord-Constantinois et du Congrès de la Soummam," *Algérie Presse Service* (Algiers, Algeria) August 19, 2022, <https://www.aps.dz/algerie/143910-musee-national-du-moudjahid-un-livre-ouvert-sur-l-histoire-de-l-offensive-du-nord-constantinois-1955-et-du-congres-de-la-soummam-1956>.

mannequins of French soldiers conducted torture on mannequins of Armée de libération nationale (ALN) combatants. Without going into unnecessary detail, the scene is shocking and presents the main torture techniques that the French used on Algerian prisoners, including electrocution, water torture, and mutilation, in gory detail. The gut-wrenching display of the revolution's violence, and the atrocities that the French committed against Algerians, did not end with the torture chamber. There was also a life-size display of the guillotine used on militants during the Algerian War at the Barberousse prison in Algiers and one of the no-man's land created by the Morice Line with replicas of corpses suspended over faux barbed wire.³

It was not because these displays were hyperbolic that this memory stands out. They were not hyperbolic at all. The Algerian Revolution was a war of attrition, characterized by guerrilla warfare, ruthless counterinsurgency operations, urban terrorism, summary executions, and torture that incriminated both sides. These displays stand out in my memory because I was unaccustomed to seeing the brutality of war animated so uncompromisingly *and* I was unaccustomed to seeing how Algerians learned about their own history. Of course, I had seen the harsh realities of the revolution before, even of torture, but mainly through old photographs. They were two-dimensional, small, and black and white reproductions of times long since passed, now only discoverable through English- and French-language books or found in the musty archival folders, digital collections, or microfilms of French bibliothèques and archives. The phenomenology of the photograph created some historical (and emotional) distance for me, I realized. The three-dimensional display, however, in full color and in life-size, reanimated the terrors of the war, closing that historical distance for me. These visceral displays also made it

³ The Morice Line was a defensive line of electrified fencing, barbed wire, and land mines that the French constructed in 1957 on the border of Algeria and Tunisia. It was named after the Minister of Defense, André Morice. The line was meant to prevent Armée de libération fighters from entering Algeria from neighboring Tunisia. Its construction totally interrupted the lives and activities of the people who lived near that line, and resulted in the resettlement of those populations into refugee camps where disease and hunger were rampant.

clear that the Algerian government did not wish for the revolution to fade into the past and become just another chapter in the annals of their centuries-long history. They want it to remain very much a part of the present day cultural and political fabric of the country.

During that trip, I also visited the *Musée national du moudjahid* in Sétif and Oran. Out of each of the three museums (Algiers, Sétif and Oran), I was only permitted to take photographs in Oran, which is a newer museum that is not fully complete. Still, the galleries that I saw were equally revealing of the Algerian government's narrative of the revolution. A didactic wall-text outlining the key military operations that the ALN enacted in Northern Constantine early in the war (figure 0.0) explains that an assault on August 20, 1955, was carried out against French infrastructure. An accompanying illustration shows ALN insurgents fighting heroically and winning against French soldiers. In the background, a French flag is engulfed in smoke from the flames of burning buildings. I was surprised to see these events described as strictly an attack on French infrastructure that engaged only French soldiers since it is a well-accepted fact that the operations carried out that day by the ALN targeted both European and Arab and indigenous civilians. What actually happened on August 20, 1955, was the massacre of 171 European settlers living in the regions between the port of Philippeville and Guelma, a massacre carried out by ALN insurgents using farming tools, axes, knives, and clubs. The poster also does not mention that twenty-one Muslims whose political loyalties belonged to rival parties were also massacred that day.⁴

The "history lessons" from both museums demonstrated to me that the legacy of the revolution is still an immensely sensitive and urgent political issue in Algeria. This is true in present-day France too. It is no longer controversial to say that the French routinely concealed,

⁴ Anthony Clayton, *The Wars of French Decolonization* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 118.

censored, and obscured aspects of the war that they deemed unsavory or morally questionable. It was only in 2018, for example, that the French government officially admitted to the systematic use of torture during the war. The French government also latently admitted to the summary executions of French mathematician and communist dissident Maurice Audin (1932-1957) and of FLN-leader Larbi Ben M'hidi (1923-1957). And although certain admissions have now been made, the French government continues to be cagey about the continued fallout from nuclear tests conducted in the Sahara starting in 1960.

On October 7, 2023, a few weeks after I had left Algeria, Hamas terrorists conducted an attack on Israel during which armed Hamas fighters breached the Iron Dome and gunned down Israeli civilians and soldiers taken off guard. Some Hamas fighters took Israelis hostage, many of whom have not been seen or heard from again. In other cases, Israeli families identified the desecrated corpses of their deceased loved ones on horrifying videos posted later to social media. In the ensuing weeks, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rained hell's fury down on the people of Gaza in military actions that supposedly targeted leaders of Hamas.⁵ By that point, I was in France, writing the fifth chapter of this dissertation which addresses photobooks and government reports that are illustrated by scores of photographs of wartime atrocities. Meanwhile, I watched the ensuing chaos on the news as reports came in about the mass displacement of Gazans who were forced to flee for their lives as the Israeli military began its counterassault. Horrifying images of the injured and dead, some Israeli, some Gazan, circulated on the news and social media. I felt like I had fallen down a rabbit hole of human suffering in

⁵ Netanyahu's attacks on Gaza, during which thousands of civilians were killed indiscriminately in an effort to target Hamas leaders, is also reminiscent of the Battle of Algiers during which French paratroopers cordoned off whole neighborhoods, arrested and detained civilians without cause, and corralled and questioned them, sometimes using torture to try and root out FLN cells. The process, which led to the deaths of countless innocent Algerians, did not yield the desired results. Few of the individuals that the paratroops interrogated played any meaningful role in the FLN. Still fewer were terrorists. Netanyahu's strategy has failed similarly. Israel said on December 1, 2023, that it has killed five of Hamas' leaders. Meanwhile, the death toll of Palestinian civilians has surpassed 17,000.

which mangled bodies from two separate times and two distinct conflicts became increasingly indiscernible.

There were other parallels between the research I was conducting on the Algerian War and the Israeli-Hamas conflict. The August 20, 1955, massacre of French settlers eerily echoed Hamas's attacks on Israeli *kibbutzim* near the border of Gaza. The ensuing reprisal, for which the death count of Palestinians civilians is now over 22,000, mirrors the collective punishment visited upon Algerians in 1955 for which the French gave an official death toll of 1,237 Algerians killed during punitive operations, although US consultants in North Africa reported that an estimated six to eight thousand Algerian civilians were killed, and the FLN declared the actual number was 12,000.⁶ The enormous number of civilian casualties was part of the FLN's plan, however. The FLN knew from experience that the attacks that they planned and carried out in northern Constantine in 1955 would provoke an asymmetrical response. In doing so, the FLN hoped to unify Arab and indigenous Algerians, and ignite widespread, popular support for their revolutionary cause. They knowingly engineered a point-of-no-return. Hamas' attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, seems to have been precisely that as well.

These two vignettes—of visiting Algeria's *Musée national du moudjahid* and of watching the Israeli-Hamas conflict unfold on the news—emphasize my positionality as a U.S. researcher studying conflict in the Arab world and bespeak the context in which this dissertation was written. My experience at the *Musée national du moudjahid* in Algiers reaffirmed my status as a perpetual outsider, someone who is looking in at a historical moment that did not involve me or

⁶ Thomas, *Fight or Flight: Britain, France, and the Roads from Empire*, 302–3. James Gannon, *Military Occupations in the Age of Self-Determination: The History Neocons Neglected* (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2008), 48. I have had to update this number multiple times since I began drafting the introduction chapter of this dissertation. Each time, the number has gone up by several thousands. This number reflects the official count as of January 9, 2024.

anyone that I know.⁷ The display also seemed to insinuate that my perspective, which was at the same time sympathetic toward Algerians, but also at odds with Algeria's official historical narrative in certain cases, was not necessarily welcome. Yet, while being quite "outside" of the historical moment of the Algerian War, I still feel very much a part of the current historical moment which bears many similarities. Much like French subjects mainly learned about the Algerian War from French news sources and government reports, so too are European and American viewers learning about the ongoing Israeli-Hamas conflict mainly from European and American news sources and government reports. Much like the defining images of the Algerian War have been and are still of its civilian casualties, so too are the defining images of the Israeli-Hamas conflict. And much like international opinion weighed into the outcome of the Algerian War, so too will international opinion weigh into the outcome of the Israeli-Hamas conflict, an event that has emphasized once more that understanding how conflict in the Arab world has been mediated, construed, circulated, and consumed abroad continues to be an imperative.

Misinformation, disinformation, and information overload, as this dissertation demonstrates, are not recently developed politico-military strategies, nor is the problem of media illiteracy. In essence, this dissertation takes part in the work of studying the motivations and intentions behind state-sponsored reproductive media, and how that media is used to advance ideologies and political agendas, specifically in regard to the representation of conflict in the Arab world.

⁷ That being said, I encounter the descendants of both Algerian revolutionaries and European settlers all the time while researching in France and Algeria. One of my Bed and Breakfast hosts during my first research trip for this dissertation was born in Algeria. She told me stories about the violence that she witnessed as a child over tea one afternoon at her cottage in Blois. Her ancestors were poor Italians who had immigrated following French promises of free land to those who settled Algeria. On my first research trip to Algeria, I struck up a conversation with a young doctor while waiting on a plane in the Timimoun airport. He told me that he completed his medical training in the same building where his grandfather had been tortured by French paratroopers during the war. On my last research trip in France, I randomly encountered the nephew of a photographer whose work I discuss in chapter four of this dissertation, France Vilar (née Angèle Risser). I was invited to see Vilar's private archives, and even held the camera that she used while working as a propagandist for the French Army during the war.

When French troops landed at Sidi-Ferruch, Algeria in 1830, they were unconscious of the fact that Charles X had no grand design in mind. The official justification that Charles X gave the National Assembly was “national honor.” The “fly whisk incident” of 1827, during which Hussein Dey infamously struck a French consul with his fly swatter for refusing to repay loans that the Regency of Algiers, then, part of the Ottoman Empire, had made to the French during the Napoleonic wars, erupted into a major diplomatic crisis. Initially, the French blockaded Algiers for three years, hoping to bring the Dey to his knees with an economic crisis. With his blockade unsuccessful and growing increasingly unpopular among his countrymen, Charles X reasoned that an invasion of Algiers would help distract from his domestic unpopularity. Essentially, Charles X sought the prestige of military victory in hopes of salvaging his reign. His plan failed, and he was deposed during the July Revolution of 1830.⁸ Although national pride and prestige might have been the pretext for the invasion, it was the fear of overpopulation in Europe, revolutionary political strife, and the destabilizing impact of industrialization and urbanization that drove the subsequent colonial enterprise. Algeria was seen as a kind of “blank slate” and a land mass suitable for European-style agriculture, both of which offered a solution to deeply felt domestic social problems.⁹

By 1914, France’s global empire was one of the greatest that the modern western world had ever seen, outpaced only by the British Empire, and Algeria was its crown jewel. Following the destruction of World War I, a mood of triumphalism spread throughout French Algeria and

⁸ There are several concise summaries of this historical moment in the anglophone literature. See Charles Ageron, *Modern Algeria: A History from 1830 to the Present*, trans. Michael Brett (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1991), 5-8; Martin Evans, *Algeria: France’s Undeclared War* (OUP Oxford, 2012), 7-9; Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962* (New York Review of Books, 2006), 28-30.

⁹ Jennifer E. Sessions, *By Sword and Plow: France and the Conquest of Algeria* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2017). In part two of her extensive and authoritative text, Sessions argues that the colonization of Algeria was part of a mid-eighteenth-century shift in colonial ideology toward settler colonialism. Algeria was envisioned as a province of France, an extension of her soil, rather than an exclusively commercial regime that depended on slave labor and colonial crops like tobacco, coffee, sugar, and spices, which had been the former colonial paradigm.

among colonists. The Gouvernement Général of Algeria revitalized its tourism industry and began preparing for the centennial anniversary of the conquest of Algiers in 1830. By 1930, the “civilizing mission” that France began one hundred years prior was envisioned as a *fait accompli* and French colonists in Algeria endeavored to present a new, modern image of the colony to the mainland and the rest of the world. But after the fall of France to Germany during World War II, the self-assuredness felt among French colonial elites and government officials was under threat. Following the war, France’s empire began to slowly unravel and its rupture with French Algeria, France’s greatest imperial achievement, was its bloodiest and most tedious war of decolonization.

No text or exhibition devoted to the visual culture of these two countries has fully addressed this period of the apogee, deterioration, and conclusion of French hegemony in Algeria. Although some scholars have discussed the visual culture of the French colonial world broadly, and other researchers have examined a single medium of visual culture in Algeria, a wide-ranging study of Franco-Algerian visual culture from the interwar period to the collapse of French Algeria has yet to be written. In addition to the presentation of images and ephemera never before discussed in the literature on colonial Algeria, this dissertation will be the first to do so.

Before laying out the broader objectives of this dissertation, I want to provide a brief explanation of some terms. I refer to Algeria between 1830 and 1962 consistently as a colony throughout this dissertation even though Algeria’s legal status during that time made it an extension of the mainland that was integrated with the metropole’s other departments. However, these differences were more or less semantic ones for the colonized and, furthermore, Algeria was ruled in a radically different way than the rest of France, making the term “colony” though

officially inaccurate, most apt. Assigning labels to the peoples inhabiting Algeria during this period has also proved a somewhat tricky venture. The term “algérien,” after 1900, would have been used to describe any person of European descent born in or emigrated to the colony. However, I have opted for *colon* when referring to a lifelong European resident of the colony to avoid confusion since in the final chapters of this dissertation in which I use “Algerian” to refer to the Arab and indigenous people whom we would now simply refer to as Algerians anyway. Throughout most of this dissertation, I also avoid the term “pied noir” to describe settlers of European descent since it did not come into popular use until the Algerian War. Frequently, I refer to the colonized as the “Arab and indigenous population” of Algeria. While colonizers referred to these groups simply as *indigènes*, another term that I use at times, I think it is most accurate to delineate the Arab population from the Imazighen who are the natives of the country, many of whom are still seeking their own sovereignty. Although “Arab and indigenous” only describes part of the colonized population since there were also Jews and other minority groups living in Algeria during the period, these two descriptors are sufficient for my purposes since I am discussing resistance movements led mainly by Arabs and Imazighen. Finally, I avoid saying “Muslim Algerian” since using “Muslim” as the antonym of “European” would be considered shortsighted these days.¹⁰ I do use “Muslim,” however, when I know that the person or group that I am discussing specifically wished to be identified as such or when the criteria of religious observance is relevant.

The purpose of this dissertation is two-fold. One objective is to identify the various ways that the French state used visual media to advance colonial ambitions in Algeria and how these media registered, mediated, or narrativized the major cultural, political, and social

¹⁰ Seth Graebner, *History's Place: Nostalgia and the City in French Algerian Literature* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2007), 3. I benefit from Graebner's thoughts and council about terms that I provide here.

transformations of this crucial period of French colonial history. The visual media explored here include reproductive media such as photography, posters, advertisements, pamphlets, and postcards. This aspect of the dissertation explores the ways that French colonial authorities asserted a new, modern *image* of the colony – one of economic strength, cultural vitality, and strategic importance – a true extension of France. However, this new image also pigeonholed Arab and indigenous Algerians as “primitive” – allegedly unchanged by this one-hundred-year mission of civilization that supposedly introduced modern European politics, culture, governance, medicine, infrastructure, agriculture, and education to them. *Indigènes* continued to be portrayed as uncivilized, lazy, in need of French guidance, and little more than a colonial good best suited for manual labor or other servile roles. Meanwhile, Arab and indigenous culture continued to be commodified and consumed by colonial tourists seeking an exotic escape from the standardizing effects of modern European industrialism in the metropole.

My second objective is to reconstitute a visual history of Algerian resistance. While French colonists in Algeria certainly sought to perpetuate the notion that the interwar period was the pinnacle of French colonialism, the period also saw the unprecedented emergence of Algerian nationalist parties that threatened French hegemony both in the metropole and colony. This aspect of the dissertation explores the visual strategies deployed by Algerian nationalist parties including the Étoile nord-africaine (ENA), Parti du peuple algérien (PPA), Mouvement pour le triomphe des libertés démocratiques (MTLD), Mouvement national algérien (MNA), Fédération des élus indigènes, and Front de libération nationale (FLN). Admittedly, in the first three chapters of this dissertation, visual examples of resistance are sparse. However, chapters four and five demonstrate that Algerian nationalist groups strategically adopted and deployed many of the same approaches used by the French colonial administration. In service of the

revolution, Algerians mainly used the press and photography to spread their messages of resistance, and to construct and convey a national Algerian identity that was distinctively modern and Islamic.

My critical approach employs three complementary and intersecting methods, the first of which, visual culture studies, might be thought of as a field of inquiry.¹¹ The study of visual culture directs the critical lens away from formal viewing settings like the art museum or gallery to everyday settings like the sidewalk.¹² Interdisciplinary in approach, the use of visual culture studies complements post-colonial theory, the second critical method upon which this dissertation will draw.¹³ Post-colonial theory first and foremost contests Western knowledge systems that support imperial authority through the study of the economic, aesthetic, political, historical, and social impacts of colonization.¹⁴ My third method is social art history, an approach that examines the social conditions of the production and consumption of an artwork.¹⁵ This method complements my use of visual culture studies as well since artifacts of visual

¹¹ Visual culture studies are sometimes referred to as visual studies or *Bildwissenschaft*, a German term which has no English equivalent. *Bildwissenschaft* can mean image, picture, figure, and illustration. Advertisements, photography, non-art mass photography, film, video, and political iconography are the regular subjects of the field. For more information on *bildwissenschaft*, see Horst Bredekamp's article, "A Neglected Tradition? Art History as *Bildwissenschaft*," in *Critical Inquiry*, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Spring 2003): 418-428.

¹² Nicholas Mirzoeff, ed., *An Introduction to Visual Culture* (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), 3. In this essay, Mirzoeff emphasizes the role of the consumer – a stance which he later revises as the producer-consumer interface in his later descriptions of the parameters of visual culture studies.

¹³ Visual culture studies itself has been described as post-colonial in nature in that it diversified the applications of a previously euro-centric art history.

¹⁴ Importantly, post-colonial theory is deeply indebted to the anti-colonial thought that emerged in the first half of the twentieth century in Africa, Asia, Latin and South America, and the Caribbean. Anti-colonial thought, the philosophical and theoretical writings of colonized intellectuals, is often considered to have begun with Martiniquais revolutionary Frantz Fanon (1925-1961). Fanon joined the FLN in Algeria during the revolution and published his well-known book, *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961), shortly thereafter. In the book, Fanon describes the processes of the decolonization movement that spread throughout the colonial world following World War II. The scholars frequently regarded as essential to post-colonial studies, and who shape my own thoughts, are Edward Said, Homi Bhabha, and Gayatri Spivak. Said's book, *Orientalism* (1978) marked a watershed moment in critical theory and led to the development of a rich theoretical discourse in which Bhabha and Spivak participated and refined.

¹⁵ T.J. Clark is credited with defining the theoretical parameters of the method. In lieu of examining the artist as a social being, Clark maintains that within the social history of art, the art itself is social. For more on Clark's discussion of the method, see "On the Social History of Art," in *Modern Art and Modernism: A Critical Anthology*, edited by Francis Frascina, London and New York: Routledge, 2018.

culture, such as propaganda posters, are usually mass-produced and are intended specifically for widespread consumption.

The scholarship on this period has tended to focus on either the visual culture of the French Empire broadly or on one specific facet of Franco-Algerian visual culture. Zeynep Çelik, certainly among the most accomplished art historians in the field of Franco-Algerian visual culture, has published multiple studies including her book *Urban Forms and Colonial Confrontations: Algiers Under French Rule* (1997) and the edited compendium of essays, *Walls of Algiers: Narratives of the City Through Text and Image* (2009).¹⁶ While Çelik's work mostly pertains to French colonial urbanism through the study of colonial architecture, she has also addressed colonial photography in her article "Framing the Colony: Houses of Algiers Photographed" (2004) and in a book chapter entitled "Commemorating the Empire: From Algiers to Damascus" (2008).¹⁷

A rich variety of publications already exists on colonial photography in the field of Franco-Algerian visual culture studies. French historians Benjamin Stora, Laurent Gervereau, and Marie Chominot are widely regarded as the foundational scholars of this subfield. Benjamin Stora's *La gangrène et l'oubli* (1991), is considered a pioneering study on the French collective memory of the Algerian War.¹⁸ In it, Stora argued that the French suffered "amnesia" of the conflicts in Algeria due to failures of the educational system in France, the lack of familial transmission about memories of the war, and, most relevant to this dissertation, the failure of the media in constructing a collective memory of the war.

¹⁶ Zeynep Çelik, "Framing the Colony: Houses of Algiers Photographed," *Art History* 27, no. 3 (May 2004).

¹⁷ Zeynep Çelik, *Urban Forms and Colonial Confrontations: Algiers Under French Rule* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Zeynep Çelik, Julia Ann Clancy-Smith, and Frances Terpak, eds., *Walls of Algiers: Narratives of the City Through Text and Image* (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 2009). Jocelyn Hackforth-Jones and Mary Roberts, *Edges of Empire: Orientalism and Visual Culture* (Malden, MA; Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2005.).

¹⁸ Benjamin Stora, *La gangrène et l'oubli* (Paris: La Découverte, 1991).

Subsequently, Stora collaborated with Gervereau to organize the exhibition, *Photographier la Guerre d'Algérie* (2004), which took place at the Jeu de Paume in Paris.¹⁹ Stora's student, Marie Chominot, has since carried on her predecessor's important work with her dissertation, "L'Image photographique, une source pour écrire l'histoire de la Guerre d'Algérie," in *Image, mémoire, histoire: Les représentations iconographiques en Algérie et au Maghreb* (2007).²⁰ Hannah Feldman is also worthy of recognition here. Her book chapter, "Flash Forward: Pictures at War" found in *Photography's Orientalisms: New Essays on Colonial Representation*, (2013), and her book, *From a Nation Torn: Decolonizing Art and Representation in France* (2014), improved our understanding of the role of photography in both the making and unmaking of the French Empire in Algeria.²¹

Deborah Cherry is another important scholar of colonial photography in Algeria. Cherry's book chapter, "Algeria in and Out of the Frame: Visuality and Cultural Tourism in the Nineteenth Century," homes in on the medium of photography specifically in Algeria.²² More recently, scholar of French studies Jennifer Howell has also focused on photography in her article "Decoding Marc Garanger's Photographic Message in *La Guerre d'Algérie vue par un appelé du contingent*" (2010).²³ Her article has improved our understanding of the agency of Algerian women and the role of photography in their lives.²⁴

¹⁹ Benjamin Stora and Laurent Gervereau, *Photographier la Guerre d'Algérie* (Paris: Marvel, 2004).

²⁰ Marie Chominot, "L'Image Photographique, une source pour écrire l'histoire de la Guerre d'Algérie," in *Image, Mémoire, Histoire: Les représentations iconographiques en Algérie et au Maghreb* (Oran: Centre de recherche en anthropologie sociale et culturelle, 2007), 75–88.

²¹ Hannah Feldman, *From a Nation Torn: Decolonizing Art and Representation in France, 1945-1962* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014); Hannah Feldman, "Flash Forward: Pictures at War," in *Photography's Orientalism: New Essays on Colonial Representation*, ed. Ali Behdad and Luke Gartlan (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 2013), 153–70.

²² Deborah Cherry, "Algeria In and Out of the Frame: Visuality and Cultural Tourism in the Nineteenth Century," in *Visual Culture and Tourism*, ed. David Crouch and Nina Lubben (Oxford: Berg, 2003), 41–58.

²³ Jennifer Howell, "Decoding Marc Garanger's Photographic Message in *La Guerre d'Algérie vue par un appelé du contingent*," *Dalhousie French Studies* 92 (Fall 2010): 85–95. Another noteworthy publication by Howell is her text *The Algerian War in French-Language Comics: Postcolonial Memory, History, and Subjectivity* (Lanham, MD:

Mohammed Djehiche and Abdelkrim Djilali's exhibition, *Les Photographes de guerre, les djounoud du noir et blanc*, which took place at the Musée public national d'art moderne et contemporain d'Alger in 2013, importantly complicated the longstanding narrative that the definition of the war's visual legacy was nearly completely monopolized by the French (perpetuated in part by Stora and Gervereau's 2004 exhibition) by revealing the broader networks of image production during the war.²⁵ Additionally, Chominot's recent article, "À la recherche de Mohamed Kouaci, artisan de la révolution par l'image. Plongée dans une archive inédite de la guerre d'indépendance algérienne (1954-1962)," (2020), helped give a face to Algerian photographic documentation of the war, a practice that had initially been characterized as both rare and anonymous.²⁶ Chominot built on her work about Kouaci through another recent and thought-provoking article, "Une famille au maquis (Algérie 1956)," for the *Encyclopédie d'histoire numérique de l'Europe* through the Sorbonne University's ongoing project called "Guerre, traces, mémoires." An important contribution to the scholarship on Kouaci has also recently been made by Katarzyna Fałęcka. Her article, "Archiving the Algerian Revolution in Zineb Sedira's Gardiennes d'images," (2022) provides valuable new insights on Kouaci's role in the war.²⁷ Finally, Algerian curator and historian of modern culture and media, Adel ben Bella, staged a thorough and captivating exhibition and panel discussion about Kouaci's work recently

Lexington Books, 2015). This text should be celebrated for extending the study of Franco-Algerian visual culture outside of photography to include the less-favored area of comics.

²⁴ Other scholarly works devoted to photography and Franco-Algeria visual culture include Rebecca De Roo's work on Algerian post cards in her text "Colonial Collecting: French Women and Algerian Cartes Postales" in *Colonialist Photography: Imag(in)ing Race and Place* (London: Routledge, 2002), 159-171. In addition, Edward Welch and Joseph McGonagle's text, *Contesting Views: The Visual Economy of France and Algeria* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2013) sought to extend the reach of the field by taking into consideration photojournalism, book displays, book covers, posters, and more. However, their text deals mostly with contemporary views of Algeria.

²⁵ Musée public national d'art moderne et contemporain d'Alger, *Les photographes de guerre, les Djounoud du noir et blanc* (Algiers: MAMA éditions, 2013).

²⁶ Marie Chominot, "À la recherche de Mohamed Kouaci, artisan de la Révolution par l'image. Plongée dans une archive inédite de la guerre d'indépendance algérienne (1954-1962)," *Continents manuscrits. Génétique des textes littéraires – Afrique, Caraïbe, diaspora*, no. 14 (2020): 1–19, <https://doi.org/10.4000/coma.5349>.

²⁷ Katarzyna Fałęcka, "Archiving the Algerian Revolution in Zineb Sedira's Gardiennes d'images," *African Arts* 55, no. 3 (Autumn 2022): 38–53.

at Brown and Columbia University in November 2022 called “Algeria at 60: Images from a Revolution.”²⁸

Another area of scholarship that has been well-researched is the practice of state-sponsored international, national, and colonial exhibitions. Scholars have thoroughly addressed a range of events across the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the exhibitions held in Paris are among the most researched. Patricia Morton, Robert Rydell, Yael Simpson Fletcher, and Dana S. Hale have all published on the colonial expositions held in France during the twentieth century.²⁹ Morton’s analysis deals mostly with exhibition architecture while Rydell’s broad text devotes only one chapter to colonial expositions across Europe. More specific than Rydell’s text, Fletcher’s work focuses on colonial expositions held in Marseille in the early twentieth century, yet she primarily discusses the French city as an exposition site, rather than discussing the visual culture that emerged during the expositions. Looking at official propaganda and commercial representations in France during the Third Republic, Hale has explored the way the French used propaganda and commercial advertisements to reify racial hierarchies.

Finally, Roger Benjamin has made enormous contributions to our understanding of artmaking in North Africa during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. His text, *Orientalist Aesthetics: Art, Colonialism, and French North Africa* not only deepened our knowledge of important yet latently acknowledged Algerian artists such as Mohamed and Omar Racim, but also brilliantly reconstructed the broader artworld in Algeria through his work on the Villa Abd-

²⁸ The photographs displayed at the exhibition were not published in a catalog or anywhere else yet as Ben Bella is currently penning an article about them which has not yet been published.

²⁹ The texts referenced above include the following: Patricia Morton, *Hybrid Modernities: Architecture and Representation at the 1931 Colonial Exposition, Paris* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003); Robert W. Rydell, *World of Fairs: The Century-of-Progress Expositions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); Yael Simpson Fletcher, “‘Capital of the Colonies:’ Real and Imagined Boundaries between Metropole and Empire in 1920s Marseille,” in *Imperial Cities: Landscape, Display and Identity*, eds. Felix Driver and David Gilbert, 136–53 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003); Dana S. Hale, *Races on Display: French Representations of Colonized Peoples, 1886-1940* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008).

el-Tif and the Orientalist Society for French Painters.³⁰ His work is especially pertinent to the first chapter of my dissertation.

I root my study of the changing visual discourse of French Algeria in the first chapter in which I discuss travel posters released in France to a French audience in the 1920s. After World War I, travel agencies, transportation companies, and the French government combined efforts to revitalize the tourism industry in Algeria. My target of investigation is travel posters that government agencies and railways commissioned from artists who were part of a new and distinct generation of Orientalists living in the colony. In my analysis of these posters, I argue that in keeping with the long-standing French Orientalist tradition, these artists eliminated all signs of European-style modernity in Algeria and marketed the colony to the French visitor as a place of natural bounty, seduction, intrigue, and sensorial delight. However, they did so through distinctly modern idioms demonstrating not only the interconnectedness of French and Algerian artistic spheres, but also how French colonists in Algeria harnessed European modern art to convey the cultural maturity of the colony, an essential component of Algeria's new modern image.

Following chronologically, the second chapter of this dissertation examines the Exposition générale du centenaire de l'Algérie, held from January to June of 1930 in the coastal city of Oran, Algeria.³¹ Although the concept of a nationalistic exhibition was an established tradition by the time of the centenary, exhibition organizers, who were primarily colonial officials of French descent, used the auspicious occasion to depict French Algeria as a country of economic strength, peaceful collaboration, and cultural maturity. While Algeria remained a culturally distant place of camels and cavalcades, dancing women, and Arab chiefs in the

³⁰ Roger Benjamin, *Orientalist Aesthetics: Art, Colonialism, and French North Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).

³¹ Not to be confused with the Exposition coloniale internationale held in Paris in 1931.

collective imaginary of French citizens in the metropole, the centenary exhibition in Oran emphasized the colony's modernity, characterizing French Algeria as an extension of France rather than a distant, "primitive" place. Nevertheless, the colony's Arab and indigenous inhabitants were excluded from this narrative. As in previous international and colonial exhibitions, they were overwhelmingly characterized as uncivilized and in need of French guidance, and their contributions to Algeria's modernity were marginalized. In limiting Arab and indigenous Algerians to service roles or performing in cultural spectacles, the centenary exhibition upheld long enduring colonial traditions of ethnographic colonial voyeurism which rendered visible gender and racial stereotypes, including the objectification and sexualization of colonized subjects. Although the centenary was meant to celebrate the apogee of French colonialism in Algeria, there are a few documented cases of resistance. While mostly textual, not visual, nevertheless, I argue that these examples reveal fissures in the exhibition's presentation of French Algeria as the crown jewel of French colonialism and preface the eventual deterioration of French hegemony.

In chapter 3, I discuss propaganda posters, reproductive media, and other ephemera from World War II. Given French Algeria's close geographic location to Europe, its natural resources, multiple naval ports, and colonial troops, the colony was of enormous strategic value during World War II. Aware of Algeria's importance, the Allied forces, including Free France, the exiled provisional government led by Charles de Gaulle (1890-1970), the Vichy Regime, and Nazi Germany fought for supremacy in the region. These examples emphasize an under acknowledged fact about France's relationship to Algeria during World War II: that the opinion of Muslim civilians in the colony was also incredibly important to all sides during the war.

Several politico-military issues shaped Vichy propaganda making for a visual battleground with multiple fronts. First, after 1940, Germany sought to increase its influence in the region by instituting a sophisticated radio-propaganda campaign. Second, an examination of photographs and cartoons found in the indigenous political press of the late-1930s, suggest that France already had grave cause for concern regarding the rising efficacy of pro-independence nationalist movements by the start of World War II. As a result, while much Vichy propaganda released between 1940 and 1942 certainly appealed to colonial settlers, and played on pre-existing antisemitic sentiment among that population, some posters from the era also catered to Muslim viewers. Propaganda posters released in Algeria after the fall of the Vichy regime in 1942 chronicle the power struggle between political leaders in France (namely Charles de Gaulle and Henri Giraud), but also between France, America, and Great Britain, allies that might have perceived France's questioned authority in the region as a time to act in their own interests. These posters covertly engaged Muslim and indigenous Algerians who desired independence from France, and further demonstrate the value placed on French Algeria and its Muslim inhabitants during World War II, a conflict that ultimately had the effect of unifying and emboldening anti-colonial nationalist movements in France and the colony. Although scholars have generally framed Algerian nationalism as inactive during World War II, cartoons and illustrations from the early post-war indigenous political press indicate that the period was actually an extremely formative context in which Algerian nationalism reached a strong, emergent stage.

In chapter 4, I begin my analysis of the visual culture of the Algerian War (1954-1962) and turn from posters and the press to photography, a system of representation upon which both sides of the war heavily relied for shaping international opinion. During the conflict, the French

state implemented a complex civil and military information system wherein the control of information, particularly the visual, was a key strategy in forming an official, state-sanctioned image of the war. An important component of that strategy was the Service cinématographique des armées (SCA), the branch of the French army responsible for photographing and filming the Algerian War. The SCA archives offer a nearly inexhaustible cache of photographs taken by amateur soldier-photographers who documented the main politico-military phases of the war. SCA photographers documented meetings, speeches, special social occasions, and military “pacification” operations in the field. I argue that while in the hands of many SCA photographers, the camera functioned as a tool of oppression, Algerian revolutionaries were at times able to infiltrate the French military’s dominant system of representation to express their enduring agency and to convey counter-hegemonic narratives.

I also discuss the work of photographers who had access to the inner workings of the Gouvernement provisoire de la République de l’Algérie (GPRA), the provisional government based in Tunisia, and the Front de libération nationale (FLN), the principal Algerian nationalist movement of the time. I primarily address the work of Mohamed Kouaci (1929-1996), official photographer of the GPRA, and whose work was featured on the FLN’s mouthpiece, *El Moudjahid*. The photographs published in *El Moudjahid* emphasize the integrality of photography in forming a national Algerian identity, an identity that was distinctively modern and Islamic. I also address the work of international photographers, some of whom were affiliated with Magnum Photo, and whose work supplements that of Kouaci’s in providing imagery of the war that went against the French colonial state’s official narrative.

In chapter 5, I explore six photobooks (although some might better be described as photo-illustrated texts), distinct in mission and appearance, placing them in conversation with each

other and situating them in the broader image environment of the Algerian War. While scholars have long identified photography as a crucial medium in capturing, creating, circulating, and preserving a visual narrative of the Algerian Revolution, the existence of photobooks is rarely acknowledged in the literature. Some of these photobooks were designed and published by French military officials or paramilitary groups and framed Algerian revolutionaries as terrorists. Those photobooks provided justification for and negotiated the level of violence used during subsequent reprisals. My study of them therefore helps us elaborate the ways that vision became militarized during the Algerian War. Others were projects by international photojournalists who were sympathetic to the liberation cause and sought to reveal to the world the atrocities that the French committed against Algeria's Muslim and indigenous populations. Those photobooks, I argue, lend insight into the visualization of the "Algerian Question" internationally.³²

I owe a content warning and discussion of my aims to the reader of this dissertation regarding the subject matter of chapters four and five specifically. In those chapters, there are images of gender-based and sexual violence, mutilated bodies, torture, summary executions, and other obscene and disturbing scenes. There are many compelling arguments that images of atrocities should be restricted, one being that such images cannot be viewed without further dehumanizing the subject. Thanks to the growing influence behind the Black Lives Matter movement, there is also a more nuanced understanding of the damage that can be done when the predominant way that marginalized people are able to view themselves and see themselves being viewed is as the victim of prejudice and violence. Others have argued convincingly that the mass

³² Martin Thomas, "France Accused: French North Africa before the United Nations, 1952-1962," *Contemporary European History* 10, no. 1 (March 2001): 92. Thomas writes that the flood of new member states, especially those of former colonial territories to the United Nations, the consolidation of the non-aligned movement, the increased cohesion of the Arab bloc on anti-colonial questions, and the mounting importance of the Third World periphery within the East/West conflict made for a volatile atmosphere in global politics. Thomas pinpoints 1952 as a turning point in this arena during which the UN became a principal menace to French efforts to prevent the internationalization of the revolution in Algeria.

circulation of atrocity images makes it easier to ignore them – that viewers become desensitized over time.³³ However, images of wartime atrocities continue to permeate social media and the news, and are being circulated in the name of inciting a public response and in the pursuit of justice, and therefore demonstrate, at least to me, that there is much to be gained in better understanding the intent in producing these images and the effects of looking at them. My aim is not to retraumatize nor to dehumanize, and I agree that these photographs have the power to do so. My intent is to approach these images as sites that constitute political and cultural space. Avoiding these images, albeit of grave human suffering, would mean avoiding the realities that led to their creation. These histories, painful as they are, must be faced.

The Algerian War and its build-up lay at the fault line of several tectonic forces. Not only was it a war of independence, but it was also a civil war that redefined Algerian identity, a political and military scandal that led to the downfall of the Fourth Republic in 1958, nearly caused a civil war in France, made a global impact during the Cold War, and shaped the world that we live in today. Focused on this complicated milieu, this dissertation therefore aspires to reveal a new understanding of the foundations of the Fifth Republic of France and the role of the ephemera and reproductive media that emerged in this pivotal moment of decolonization.

³³ Susan Sontag, *On Photography* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1977), 21.

Chapter 1 – Poster Culture and Colonial Tourism in Algeria during the Interwar Period

The social practice of travel was integral to the experience of modern life in France during the interwar period (1918-1939), a time of economic growth, widespread prosperity, and a crucial turning point in French colonial history.³⁴ After World War I, travel agencies, transportation companies, and the French government combined efforts to revitalize the tourism industry in Algeria, France's largest, closest, and most lucrative colony. To do so, these groups commissioned and circulated exoticizing and primitivizing illustrated posters that were designed and often printed in Algeria before being transported to France for display. These posters constitute a site of confluence wherein three major forces – French colonialism, the tourism industry, and artistic life in Algeria – converged. An analysis of these illustrated posters yields insight into the particular and inextricable relationship between colonial violence, colonial economies, the tastes and practices of French tourists, and the artistic practices of a new generation of French Orientalist painters working in Algeria during the interwar period.

Bourgeois women posing precariously on a cliff's edge seem rather out of place to the present-day viewer of Gustave Auguste Debat's (1861 – 1940) painting *Les Gorges du Rhumel* (figure 1 – c. 1895). Elegantly dressed and bedecked with decorated hats, several of these bourgeois tourists wander along the 2.5-kilometer walkway known as the “chemin des touristes,” a well-known tourist activity located in Constantine's famous Rhumel Gorges.³⁵ The woman in the foreground has just traversed a small wooden bridge and placed her hand on a rather untrustworthy looking metal railing. Other women, one of whom has her child in tow, and a man in full suit and top hat, round the corner. A small ruin with several arches that practically blend

³⁴ All translations are mine henceforth unless otherwise stated.

³⁵ The *chemin* was designed by French engineer Frédéric Remes and inaugurated in 1895. The pathway remained active until the 1950s when it was closed due to disrepair.

into the rocky cliffside can be seen at the foot of the gorge's archway, a vestige of times past and a strong visual counterpoint to the modern French women and men enjoying the outlook. Absent from Debat's painting are the local inhabitants, Arab and indigenous Algerians. The painting raises several questions: How did these French men and women come to be here and why? What systems of transport facilitated their journey and what drew them to this place? What did it cost the average French traveler and what efforts were made to ensure comfort and accessibility? What role did the local inhabitants play in this industry and how did it affect their lives?

To fully appreciate how the tourism industry in French Algeria changed following World War I, it is necessary to obtain a grasp of its foundations. Algeria's tourism industry emerged in the mid-nineteenth century seemingly in tandem with the rest of the colonial enterprise. To render the colony profitable, French colonists believed that a large European population would be needed to oversee the cultivation of rural land and fill the demand for urban labor.³⁶ Transporting a large enough European population to Algeria as well as the importation and exportation of agricultural products and natural resources, however, required a modern transportation system. Modern European technology, initially introduced to facilitate this process, also propelled colonial tourism, an industry that French companies easily monopolized. Hence, from the very nascent stages of the French occupation of Algeria, tourism and settler colonialism were closely intertwined.³⁷

³⁶ Barthélémy-Prosper Enfantin, *Colonisation de l'Algérie* (Paris: P. Bertrand, Libraire, 1843), 8. Writing in 1843, French social reformer and explorer Barthélémy-Prosper Enfantin declared: "I believe that the colonization of Algeria is only possible under the condition that a rather considerable European population is transported there." ("Je crois que la colonisation de l'Algérie n'est possible qu'à la condition d'y transporter une population européenne assez considérable.")

³⁷ The terms colonial tourism, and by extension colonial tourists, have a different meaning than settler colonialism. Colonial tourism is the sector of tourism that was facilitated and enabled by colonization. Colonial tourists were French citizens living in the metropole who travelled to Algeria for leisure. Settler colonists were individuals who emigrated to the colony in search of work, not leisure.

To entice settlers and to promote agricultural colonization Marshal Thomas Bugeaud (1784-1849), Gouverneur Général of Algeria, appropriated the land of the Arab and indigenous population which disrupted pre-colonial economic systems.³⁸ Prior to French occupation, private property in the European sense did not exist in Algeria. Land ownership was categorized primarily as *melk* (al-milkiyya, الملكية) or *arch* (‘ašīraī, عشيرة).³⁹ Melk lands, located mainly in the mountainous region of the Aurès inhabited by the Chaoui people (indigenous Algerians), were owned by individual families, and could be bought and sold in a fashion similar to the European practice. Arch lands, however, were tribal lands and shared communally.⁴⁰ These vast swaths of territory were often left fallow or used for grazing. The ambiguous nature of arch lands made them easier for the French to confiscate under new ordinances passed between 1844 and 1846 which allowed the provisional government in Algeria to seize lands considered “*inculte*” or “*sans maître*” (uncultivated or unowned) and transfer them to the state.⁴¹

Bugeaud’s campaign was an unequivocal success albeit an incredibly brutal process. He was notorious for the hostile *razzias* (raids) he ordered on Arab and indigenous Algerians during which his forces systematically destroyed villages, burned fields, seized livestock, and separated families.⁴² In one particularly violent episode in 1845, Colonel Aimable Pélissier (1794-1864), one of Bugeaud’s subordinates, massacred upwards of 500 men, women, and children from the

³⁸ Charles Ageron, *Modern Algeria: A History from 1830 to the Present*, trans. Michael Brett (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1991), 19.

³⁹ Didier Guignard, “Les inventeurs de la tradition ‘melk’ et ‘arch’ en Algérie,” in *Les acteurs des transformations foncières autour de la Méditerranée au XIXe Siècle*, ed. Didier Guignard and Vanessa Guéno (Paris: Éditions Karthala, 2013), 50. John Ruedy, *Land Policy in Colonial Algeria: The Origins of the Rural Public Domain* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), 3.

⁴⁰ Menouba Hamani, “Lorsqu’une collection de cartes raconte l’histoire agraire de l’est Algérien,” *Mappemonde* 85, no. 30 (1993): 35.

⁴¹ Robert Estoublon and Adolphe Lefébure, *Code de l’Algérie annoté* (Algiers: Adolphe Jourdan, 1896), 62. Under the ordinance of July 21, 1846, any land judged as vacant or without an owner would be immediately conceded to colonial administration and be used however the state saw fit. The Minister of War would appraise and declare land fit for expropriation.

⁴² Antony T. Sullivan, “Thomas-Robert Bugeaud, France and Algeria, 1784-1849: Politics, Power, and the Good Society,” *Proceedings of the Meeting of the French Colonial Historical Society* 8 (1985): 152.

Ouled Riah tribe of northwestern Algeria in a cave by setting a fire at its mouth and asphyxiating all those inside. Although Pélissier's actions were scrutinized in the metropole, Bugeaud defended the colonel's actions and argued that the event would certainly force the rest of the region to submit to French domination peacefully.⁴³ The Dahra Affair, as the *enfumade* came to be known, incited political outrage both in Algeria and France on all sides of the political spectrum. Eventually, Bugeaud was forced to apologize, and Pélissier was relocated to Crimea.⁴⁴

Through the dispossession of tribal lands, whether for "public good" or as retribution for resisting occupation, the French colonial apparatus transformed Algeria's pre-colonial agriculture economy based on subsistence farming and pastoralism to an export-oriented one. To give an example of the rate of dispossession that Arab and indigenous Algerians experienced, only 11,500 hectares remained in Arab ownership out of the 168,000 hectares of land investigated in Algiers alone between 1844 and 1846. The rest of the land went to the state or to European immigrants drawn by promises of free land.⁴⁵ Arab and indigenous farmers retained only enough land to barely sustain themselves while European settlers cultivated cash crops for export to the colonial cities and to the metropole.⁴⁶

Settlers not only owned and cultivated land that had been expropriated from Arab and indigenous Algerians, but they occupied urban locales as well. Colonial urban environments created a demand for workers that was generally met by Europeans, and that pushed out indigenous workers who had previously fulfilled those roles.⁴⁷ Urban segregation became

⁴³ See Abdelmajid Hannoum, *Violent Modernity: France in Algeria* (Cambridge: Center for Middle Eastern Studies of Harvard University Press, 2010), 23.

⁴⁴ Jennifer Sessions, "'Unfortunate Necessities': Violence and Civilization in the Conquest of Algeria," in *France and Its Spaces of War: Experience, Memory, Image*, ed. Patricia Lorcin and Daniel Brewer (Palgrave MacMillan US, 2009), 29–44.

⁴⁵ Ageron, *Modern Algeria*, 26. Ageron notes that the French also consolidated estates left by those who had fled the country or fought colonization.

⁴⁶ Prochaska, *Making Algeria French*, 23.

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, 23.

increasingly pronounced over the years. In Algiers, for example, roughly seventy-five percent of the urban population was European by 1881.⁴⁸ The European settler community generally performed commercial, financial, industrial, and artisanal labor while indigenous workers fulfilled “unskilled” and domestic occupations.⁴⁹

The new export-based agricultural economy established in French Algeria required a modern infrastructure, which was certainly limited in the first few decades of colonization. Road construction in Algeria began in the 1840s, and stoneworkers, woodworkers, masons, and iron workers were offered free passage and high wages, attracting waves of European settlers to the colony. These workers were also afforded free medical care and choice land concessions upon arrival.⁵⁰ The development of a modern railway system was also central to the colonial project. Prior to 1850, railway travel had been limited and disorganized. But in 1857, an imperial decree announced the construction of a railroad line between Algiers and Blida, a project that was completed in 1862, and then extended to include a railway to Oran in 1871.⁵¹ By 1880, there were a half-dozen railways from the coastal port cities leading to the interior of Algeria. These were operated by six different companies and covered a total of 700 miles.⁵²

The development of a modern railway system in Algeria especially assisted in the growth of the tourism industry. Initially, the Compagnie des chemins de fer algérien (CFA) was the sole company operating in Algeria. The CFA was soon joined by other railway companies including Chemins de fer de Paris à Lyon et à la Méditerranée (PLM), la Compagnie des chemins de fer

⁴⁸ Ibid, 22.

⁴⁹ Ibid, 21.

⁵⁰ Sessions, *By Sword and Plow*, 284.

⁵¹ Louis Hamel, *Les chemins de fer algériens: étude historique sur la constitution du réseau. Le classement de 1857* (Algeria: Adolphe Jourdan, 1885), 7. Colette Zytnicki, *L'Algérie, terre de tourisme. Histoire d'un loisir colonial*. (Paris: Vendémiaire, 2016), 17. Prior to these improvements, travelers in Algeria depended on buses for transportation.

⁵² Benjamin E. Thomas, “The Railways of French North Africa,” *Economic Geography* 29, no. 2 (1953): 96.

Bône-Guelma (BG), la Compagnie de l'Est algérien (EA), la Compagnie de l'Ouest algérien (OA), and la Compagnie franco-algérienne, all of which were founded before 1880.⁵³ The price of travel was between 18 and 40 centimes, about twice as much as a train ticket in France at that time, during the first years of its construction.⁵⁴ By 1872, some companies, such as PLM, dropped their rates to compete with railway prices in the metropole.⁵⁵

Several private maritime transportation companies also appeared during this period, which offered the French tourist more choice and flexibility. Travelers could book passage to Algeria through Bazin, a private transportation company, as early as 1831, the year after France invaded Algiers. A public option appeared in 1835 and allowed voyagers access to accommodations initially reserved for transporting troops, government representatives, and the post.⁵⁶ In these early years, however, tourists were limited to second- and third-class options. Even with these limitations, only white and wealthy people could afford the cost of maritime passage, which was 100 and 75 francs roundtrip respectively – a price out of reach for working-class people.⁵⁷ Eventually, private companies like Bazin, la Société Abeille, la Compagnie Touache, and la Compagnie Valéry competed for business, in turn driving down the price of the roundtrip fare.⁵⁸ In 1860, first class passage cost 95 francs, second class cost 71 francs, and third class was 27 francs.⁵⁹

It would be several years, however, before large-scale commercial travel to Algeria was made possible. In 1879, the French shipping company, the Compagnie générale transatlantique (CGT), won a government contract that allowed the company to expand their fleet of steamships.

⁵³ Maurice Antoine Bernard, *Les chemins de fer algériens* (Algiers: Adolphe Jourdan, 1913), 12–19.

⁵⁴ Bernard, *Les chemins de fer algériens*, 84.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 90.

⁵⁶ Zytnicki, *L'Algérie, terre de tourisme*, 12–13.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 12–13.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 15.

Unlike previous maritime companies, the CGT was the first to utilize ocean liners that could transport passengers *en masse*. In 1880, the company inaugurated a schedule of two weekly services from Marseille to Algiers and Skikda and one weekly service from Marseille to Bône.⁶⁰

After 1860, colonial tourists to Algeria could enjoy a number of accommodations from elite, first-class urban establishments to more rudimentary, rugged lodgings in rural locations. In Algiers, *La Régence* and *L'Orient*, provided accommodations for wealthy elites. In Mustapha, there was the *Continental*, opened in 1887, and *L'Alexandra*. French, British, and American tourists alike patronized such establishments. There were also a dozen more modest hotels in addition to the *hôtels de luxe*, or tourists could rent a house in the prestigious quartier Saint-Eugène or any number of mauresque homes or newer villas inspired by local styles.⁶¹ To the south, such as at the oasis of Biskra, the European traveler could indulge in an array of seasonal hotels, open from October to February or March, and closed during the summer's hottest months. Much like in the coastal urban centers, oasis hotels also catered to a diverse array of European clients. As Roger Benjamin's research has revealed, l'Hôtel Victoria was operated in *le goût anglais* while French hotels such as l'Hôtel de l'Oasis catered to French nationals who, of course, preferred *la manière française*.⁶² According to travel notes of Sir Alfred Edward Pease, who traveled to Algeria in the late nineteenth century and made a study of Biskra hotels, the main difference between *le goût anglaise* and *la manière française* was whether the hotel staff

⁶⁰ Kenneth J. Perkins, "The Compagnie Générale Transatlantique and the Development of Saharan Tourism in North Africa," in *The Business of Tourism: Place, Faith, and History*, ed. Philip Scranton and Janet F. Davidson (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 40.

⁶¹ Zytnecki, 39.

⁶² Roger Benjamin, "Le tourisme," in *Biskra: Sortilèges d'une Oasis* (Paris: Institut du monde arabe, 2016), 69.

was able to accommodate and cater to British tastes. Pease likely meant the style of cuisine, the ability to use British currency, and access to English-speaking guides.⁶³

Hence, it was during the fin-de-siècle that French Algeria came to possess all the adequate services needed (train, steamship, autoroutes, hotels, etc.) to transport and host tourists, who were most likely upper-class, to and around the colony. But what did they do once they got there and who was involved in facilitating their experiences? Another painting by Debat (figure 1.2 – c. 1895) provides insight into the various experiences to be had by French colonial tourists and the role that colonists and local inhabitants played. In *Bains et piscines dans les Gorges du Rhumel*, several tourists enjoy open air baths available at the base of Constantine’s gorges. As was seen in *Les Gorges du Rhumel* (figure 1.1), several tourists can also be seen making their way down the gorges using the manmade walkway in the background. In the left foreground, European men have discarded their suits and dress shoes to take a refreshing dip in the *piscine de César*. Further right, a couple is served refreshments by an Arab or indigenous attendant. Baths for families and for women are indicated to the right of the dining area and several more tourists are seen coming and going. Apart from the servers, two Arab men observe the scene from atop a rock in the background, clearly removed from the touristic activities taking place in the foreground.

As Debat’s painting reminds us, like other Mediterranean locales that became tourist centers during the nineteenth century, many of Algeria’s earliest visitors traveled there for their health. Doctors commonly prescribed Algeria’s warm, dry climate for patients with pulmonary

⁶³ Alfred Edward Pease, *Biskra and the Oases and Desert of the Zibans with Information for Travellers* (London: Edward Stanton, 1893), 23.

issues and other diseases that were believed to be remediated by a therapeutic winter visit.⁶⁴

Historian Eric T. Jennings has shown that, throughout the colonial empire, *villes d'eaux* (water towns) were widely believed to serve vital therapeutic and curative purposes that were seen as critical to the well-being of tourists and colonizers alike. The Ministry of Colonies even published bulletins and specialized guidebooks of endorsed colonial spas across the empire.⁶⁵

These guides detailed the various ailments that Algeria's waters could cure: diseases that they are supposed to cure: skin diseases, rheumatism, throat, uterine, and digestive tract conditions, constipation, dysentery, war wounds, and tuberculosis.⁶⁶ The prevalence of colonial spas in Algeria suggests that while tourists went there in search of the exotic, they also craved familiar sites of leisure and medicine created in the image of European cities like Aix-les-Bains or Bath.

Also demonstrated by Debat's work, these leisurely activities were facilitated by Arab and indigenous Algerians who were not business owners but relegated to servile positions. Hotels and other tourist amenities were owned exclusively by Europeans who employed Arab and indigenous men to serve French tourists as guides, carriage drivers, cameleers, and stable hands. Souvenir shops were also almost exclusively managed by Europeans; however, some Muslim Algerians did own marketplace stalls and sold a range of goods including leather products, antique objects, and other commodities.⁶⁷

The written word was almost the exclusive method of advertising Algeria's many attractions during the first decades of colonial tourism in Algeria. The first travel guides

⁶⁴ Kenneth J. Perkins, "The Compagnie Générale Transatlantique and the Development of Saharan Tourism in North Africa," in *The Business of Tourism: Place, Faith, and History*, ed. Philip Scranton and Janet F. Davidson (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 34–35.

⁶⁵ Eric T. Jennings, *Curing the Colonizers: Hydrotherapy, Climatology, and French Colonial Spas* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 1–2. Jennings' analysis is mainly devoted to Tunisia, Guadeloupe, and Réunion Island, although Madagascar and Algeria, both popular sites for French colonial spas, are also mentioned.

⁶⁶ Benjamin, "Le tourisme," 64.

⁶⁷ *Ibid*, 39.

appeared in the 1840s, many of which were geared toward the *colon* interested in emigrating to Algeria and were not designed for pleasure-seeking tourists.⁶⁸ Soon after, however, in the 1850s, Hachette guides became the preferred and most trusted guide for colonial leisure, until it was eventually unseated by Michelin, which published its first guide to Algeria in 1907.⁶⁹

Although travel guides had their practical applications, non-fictional and fictional accounts of Algeria supplied exciting content for French consumers as well in these early years of tourism. The *récit de voyage*, which furnished information about the history, geography, and politics of Algeria and provided a portrait of the tourist experience, played an especially important role in encouraging travel to the colony. Most of these texts, some of which included illustrations, were written by men and women of letters, government officials, artists, and fiction writers. One artist-writer in particular, Eugène Fromentin (1820-1876), received considerable acclaim for his epistolary novels, *Un été dans le Sahara* (1857) and *Une année dans le Sahel* (1859). French readers also loved French naval officer and author Pierre Loti's (1850-1923) romance novel, *Le roman d'un spahi* (1881). These texts cultivated a popular image of Algeria as a timeless place of cavalcades, fantasias, date palms, and dunes.

During the fin-de-siècle, however, another medium was on the rise in Western Europe: the illustrated poster.⁷⁰ Although commercial posters had long been in use, the illustrated poster was elevated to the category of fine art when designers such as Jules Chéret and Henri de Toulouse-Lautrec aestheticized the previously text-based commercial poster through the introduction of images, artistic typography, color, line, and composition, and the sophisticated use of color lithography. These new, more innovative and artistic posters were referred to as *les*

⁶⁸ Zytnicki, *L'Algérie, terre de tourisme. Histoire d'un loisir colonial.*, 21.

⁶⁹ Ibid, 24.

⁷⁰ Ernest Maindron, *Les affiches illustrées (1886-1895)* (Paris: G. Boudet, 1896), 1. In his publication, French historian Ernest Maindron (1838-1907) declared that in the last decade of the nineteenth century, all other forms of publicity had become obsolete.

affiches artistiques.⁷¹ As modern advertisement developed in France, the illustrated poster became the central method of promoting tourism in Algeria. Artists were hired to design attractive posters that would entice potential tourists who would come across his work in the principal Parisian train stations.⁷²

These posters were heavily influenced by European fine arts movements, which can be observed in a poster of 1891 (figure 1.3) by French-Romanian artist and illustrator Hugo d'Alési (1849-1906) for Chemins de fer Paris à Lyon et à la Méditerranée (PLM). The poster, which pictures the El Kantara gorges near Biskra, treats viewers to a striking landscape of cacti, aloe plants, and palm trees in which an Arab horseman raises his firearm as if saluting. He is dressed in the ornate garb of a caid or *grand chef arabe*, as the French often called them, and his cape billows behind him majestically. In a vignette in the lower left portion of the poster, Alési depicts people who are likely meant to be Bedouin or Arab desert nomads who are travelling by horse. At the time, El Kantara served as the “entrée du désert” for tourists, and the atmospheric vignette entices tourists to come spend a “nuit sous la tente” in the Sahara.

Alési's poster demonstrates the close and particular relationship between French Orientalist artistic practices and colonial tourism during the late nineteenth century. Long before Alési received the commission for the poster, El Kantara, and other desert oases such as Biskra, Bou Sâada, and Laghouat, had fascinated and inspired French Orientalist painters like Eugène Fromentin (1820-1876), who traveled to and spent a considerable amount of time in the “plein

⁷¹ Ruth Iskin, *The Poster: Art, Advertising, Design, and Collecting, 1860s-1900s* (Hanover, NH: Dartmouth College Press, 2014), 6.

⁷² Armand Dayot, ed., “Les gares de Paris,” in *L'art et les artistes (tome V)* (Paris, 1 April 1907), 312. According to Dayot, Alési's posters would have been displayed at major train stations such as the Gare Saint Lazare, Gare des Invalides, and Gare d'Orléans.

sud” searching for artistic inspiration.⁷³ Fromentin found the harsh, otherworldly landscape of the desert, whose luminosity “inverted everything,” provided him with new pictorial challenges.⁷⁴ His description of his journey through El Kantara in *Un été dans le Sahara* (1857) provides insight into his initial exposure to the harsh climes of the Algerian south: “Five days later, on February 28, I arrived at El-Kantara, at the limit of the Tell of Constantine, exhausted, transfixed, pierced through to my heart; but still resolved to keep going in the face of the indubitable southern sun.”⁷⁵ The severity of the south all at once enticed, consumed, and defied the artist.

In 1853, Fromentin travelled further south to Laghouat which became the subject of several of his paintings, the most celebrated of which, *Une rue à El-Laghouat* (figure 1.4 – 1859), highlights the desert’s paradoxical place in the French imagination during the mid-nineteenth century. Several barefooted Arab men, whose bodies swim in their white robes, gather in the shade to escape the bold desert sun. Some lean against the wall of a mudbrick domicile while others are collapsed, seemingly asleep on a nearby step. The absence of succor and the “indubitable southern sun” come to the forefront here. Birds, perhaps in search of carrion, fly above.⁷⁶ The rest of the street is desolate save for a woman who escapes into one of the many houses that line the street, and a stray dog.

Although there is a sense of persistent danger and unquenchable thirst in the painting due to the penetrating heat and light of the desert, this scene still would have catered to the exotic

⁷³ Stéphane Guégan, “Plein Sud,” in *De Delacroix à Renoir: L’Algérie des peintres* (Paris: Editions Hazan; Institut du monde arabe, 2003), 178.

⁷⁴ Roger Benjamin, “The Oriental Mirage,” in *Orientalism: Delacroix to Klee*, ed. Roger Benjamin (Victoria: The Art Gallery of New South Wales; Thames and hudson, 1997), 12. See Fromentin’s full quote in Benjamin.

⁷⁵ Eugène Fromentin, *Un été dans le Sahara* (Paris: A. Lemerre, 1874), 9. “Cinq jours après, le 28 février, j’arrivais à El-Kantara, sur la limite du Tell de Constantine, harassé, transi, traversé jusqu’au cœur, mais bien résolu à ne plus m’arrêter qu’en face du soleil indubitable du sud.”

⁷⁶ John Zarobell has compellingly argued that the birds might be a sign of the recent siege that had taken place in Laghouat, although signs of conquest are eliminated otherwise.

tastes of contemporary French viewers. After viewing the painting at the Salon of 1859, French art critic Charles Baudelaire declared, “I am surprised to envy the sort of man who lies under blue shadows and whose eyes, neither wakeful nor sleeping, only express, if they express anything, a love of rest and a sentiment of well-being inspired by immense light.”⁷⁷ While Baudelaire’s comments reflected the Orientalist assumption that the Arabs were an atavistic race in decline, they also reflect the desire to travel to such places, and to sample what he perceived to be the slow, languid pace of desert life.

Baudelaire’s desire for such an escape reflects the feelings of alienation and fragmentation that in part defined France in the late-nineteenth century. These feelings were the consequence of an over-industrialized and over-civilized modern world. Antimodernism, as defined by Lynda Jessup, was “a broad, international reaction to the onslaught of the modern world that swept industrialized Western Europe, North America, and Japan in the decades around the turn of the century [...]”⁷⁸ Historian Jackson Lears has argued that antimodern sentiment led to a turn toward “more intense forms of physical or spiritual existence.”⁷⁹ Late-nineteenth century orientalist paintings and travel posters, such as the one by Alési, visualized and catered to this desire for escape and rejuvenation. Devoid of all the signs of European modernity and of French colonialism, Alési’s poster offers El Kantara as an exotic getaway from the overstimulating and encumbering effects of mass production, capitalism, and the cult of science that pervaded fin-de-siècle France, and as a site where both intense physical and spiritual experiences could be obtained.

⁷⁷ John Zarobell, *Empire of Landscape: Space and Ideology in French Colonial Algeria* (Penn State Press, 2010), 75.

⁷⁸ Lynda Lee Jessup, *Antimodernism and Artistic Experience: Policing the Boundaries of Modernity* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 1.

⁷⁹ Jackson Lears, *No Place of Grace* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), xv.

The antimodernism that defined the end of the nineteenth century was full of contradictions, however. This can be observed in another poster by Alési from 1898 that pictures the capital city of Algiers (figure 1.5). Designed for PLM and CGT in conjunction, Alési's stylistic approach is unchanged after seven years. Working in the Orientalist genre, the artist maintains an academic representation of his subject, featuring a Jewish-Algerian woman leaning leisurely on a banister against an ornate and vibrant red rug. Behind her, the white city of Algiers, also called *la ville blanche*, stretches along the coast. Cacti, aloe, and other desert shrubs and grasses frame the scene. The old *kasbah* is shown untouched by Western civilization. Even though the city's demography by the late-nineteenth century was around seventy-five percent European, there is no sense that Algiers has been Europeanized. Much as in the artist's previous work, none of the hallmark signs of European modernity are present except for one prominent detail that penetrates Alési's otherwise orientalist scene. In a vignette in the lower left portion of the poster, Alési pictures a massive steamship of the kind commissioned by the PLM, which would have been in use by this time to transport wealthy tourists *en masse* to Algeria. Another steamship is shown docked in the bay in the background as well. Algeria is clearly figured as a place to be visited by the modern tourist.

The presence of the ocean liner in the poster captures the contradictory essence of late-nineteenth century anti-modernism. Here, the experiences of tourists who traveled to Algeria in search of an authentic, utopian paradise free from the over-regulation of modernity were facilitated by modern technology and inextricable from a modern capitalist economy. Although Algeria is imagined as an alternative to modern life defined by rationality, commodity, mass reproduction, and capitalism, the touristic enterprise embodied all of the above. Touristic travel to Algeria involved multiple points of sale and forms of consumption: booking train and

steamship passage, reserving hotels, paying porters, paying for leisure activities, and buying souvenirs. Algeria itself as an idea and setting for tourism was commodified through its imaging, the sustained act of looking, and, ultimately, its purchase as an exotic experience.

Although the French Algerian travel industry was undoubtedly affected by World War I and the subsequent economic downturn of 1929, the interwar years also bore witness to a new, more mindful approach to tourism as a form of empire-building. Jean Mélia, former *chef du cabinet* of the Gouverneur Général, wrote of the role of tourism in this new colonial paradigm:

It is necessary, in fact, that every young Frenchman knows the admirable work of his fathers, that he learns that wherever the flag of his homeland flies, he is as in his own and very dear family, and that in contemplation of so many wonders already accomplished, he has the justified pride of his country, and that he has, like his ancestors, enthusiasm for the great works to be undertaken, and for the reputation of his race to spread everywhere [...]. Thus, on these North African shores, tourism rises to the noble height of a national and patriotic enterprise.⁸⁰

By the interwar period, tourism was thus understood as a patriotic activity and a means of fashioning Algeria as an integrated part of France – not just a colony, but part of the homeland.

Tourism was also considered a means of expressing political and military power. In a report to Algeria's financial delegation in 1917, Gouverneur Général Charles Lutaud admitted that while speaking of tourism in times of war might seem paradoxical, or even insensitive, he proposed that such prospective thinking in fact radically proclaimed faith in the future and that establishing tourist sites in remote locations such the Aurès mountains could even be understood as part of the war effort:

The Germans remembered that the Aurès is the irreducible citadel from which the hardworking but invincibly rebellious population saw all the conquerors, Romans,

⁸⁰ Zytnicki, *L'Algérie, terre de tourisme*, 120. Mélia quoted in Zytnicki. "Il faut, en effet, que chaque jeune Français connaisse l'oeuvre admirable de ses pères, qu'il apprenne que, partout où flotte le drapeau de sa patrie, il est comme dans sa propre et très chère famille, afin que dans la contemplation de tant de merveilles déjà réalisées, il ait la fierté justifiée de son pays, il ait, lui aussi, comme ses ancêtres, l'exaltation des grands travaux à entreprendre, du renom de sa race à propager partout [...]. Ainsi, sur ces bords nord-africains, le tourisme s'élève à la noble hauteur d'une entreprise nationale et patriotique."

Byzantines, Vandals, Arabs, Turks, escape from their yoke. [...] It seemed to us that we had to put an end to the rumors of insubordination from Aurès and the venomous predictions from Germany. While Germany awaits the uprising of the Aurès, we organize tourism there.⁸¹

To conduct tourism in the Aurès, a site that for millennia had never been fully subjugated, would be the ultimate display of French colonial power. Tourism, the maintenance of colonial order, and the war effort, were then, at least for Lutaud, all a common project.⁸²

To develop tourism in these remote locales, the Gouvernement Général de l'Algérie multiplied its efforts in the interwar years. The Congrès général du tourisme d'Afrique du Nord reunited for the first time after World War I in 1919 in Algiers. The congress was comprised of financial delegates, mayors from the larger cities of the colonies, government representatives, and representatives from transportation companies. In hopes of revitalizing the tourism industry in Algeria, which had understandably become stagnant during the war, the congress discussed ways to increase revenue, including the refurbishment of hotels.⁸³ As a result of the congress's meeting, a special commission was created in 1919 to help support the renewal of the hotel industry. 40,000 francs were accorded to the renovation and construction of hotels.⁸⁴ By the end of the 1920s, the Société des voyages et des hôtels nord-africains (SVHNA), created in 1925 by John Dal Piaz, director of the CGT, in hopes of studying and improving Franco-Algerian

⁸¹ Charles Lutaud, *Délégations financières algériennes* (Algiers: Imprimerie administrative, 1917), 19-21. "Les Allemands se rappelaient que l'Aurès est l'irréductible citadelle d'où la population laborieuse mais invinciblement rétive a vu passer en échappant à leur joug tous les conquérants, romains, byzantins, vandales, arabes, turcs. [...] Il nous a semblé qu'il fallait couper court aux bruits d'insoumission de l'Aurès et aux prédictions venimeuses de l'Allemagne. Pendant que l'Allemagne attend le soulèvement de l'Aurès, nous y organisons le tourisme."

⁸² C.M. Andrew and A.S. Kanya-Forstner, "France, Africa, and the First World War," *The Journal of African History* 19, no. 1 (1978): 14–16. That colonial order and the war effort went hand-in-hand was true in more than one way. The colony also furnished manpower for the war as well, providing as many as 85,000 Algerian troops to support the French war effort in 1914 followed by at least 50,000 more in 1918. There were widespread riots in 1916 in revolt against the number of Arab and indigenous conscriptions for the war effort.

⁸³ Zytnicki, *L'Algérie, terre de tourisme. Histoire d'un loisir colonial.*, 120.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 121.

transportation enterprises, boasted 44 hotels which offered a total of 1400 rooms across Algeria.⁸⁵

The revitalization of the tourism industry also extended to infrastructure and transportation. Between 1920 and 1922, the French government financed an overhaul of French Algerian infrastructure by furnishing loans to expand and modernize the already sizeable network of railways that connected the three departments of Algiers, Oran, and Constantine.⁸⁶ In addition to steamship and railway travel, the Société des auto-circuits nord-africains revamped Algeria's already massive network of roadways which were utilized largely by tourists, not locals. By the end of the 1920s, the SVHNA had a total of 285 vehicles at their disposal for transporting tourists on excursions around the country.⁸⁷ Many of the vehicles were all-terrain and serviced twenty-two different itineraries.⁸⁸ Some of the vehicles could seat as many as ten guests who enjoyed comfortable, roomy armchairs. Multi-lingual guides led these excursions and, as business grew, the excursions extended to more and more remote locations.⁸⁹

These new, government-driven developments are registered in a 1926 poster by Swiss artist Édouard Herzig (1860-1926) featuring a Chaoui village (figure 1.6). The Chaoui are an indigenous people (members of the Amazigh or "Berber" ethnicity) whose ancestral homeland is the Aurès mountains. Traditionally, they built fortified stone granaries called *guelâas*, pictured in the background, where they stored sorghum, grains, and vegetables. Herzig's poster places the

⁸⁵ Perkins, "The Compagnie Générale Transatlantique and the Development of Saharan Tourism in North Africa," 45.

⁸⁶ Ageron, *Modern Algeria*, 80. Loans for a series of public works programs were provided for in the *Code de l'indigénat* in both 1920 and 1922. The loans amounted to 1.6 million francs, the majority of which was earmarked for railway construction, according to Ageron.

⁸⁷ Habib Kazdaghli, "L'Entrée du maghreb dans les circuits du tourisme international: Le rôle précurseur de la compagnie générale transatlantique," in *Le Tourisme dans l'empire français: politiques, pratiques, et imaginaires (XIXe - XXe Siècles)* (Paris: Publications de la Société française d'histoire d'outre-mer, 2009), 209.

⁸⁸ Perkins, "The Compagnie Générale Transatlantique and the Development of Saharan Tourism in North Africa," 45.

⁸⁹ *Ibid*, 45. For more on auto-circuits, see Alison Murray, "Le tourisme Citroën au Sahara (1924-1925)," *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire*, no. 68 (2000): 95–107.

viewer inside one of these traditional stone structures, embedding the ostensibly Parisian viewer directly into this “primitive” context. Even the Chaoui people of Herzig’s poster blend into the rocky mountainside, appearing as unchanged by time as is the landscape itself.

Herzig’s poster responded to the tastes of colonial tourists who, as in previous years, sought out “primitive” experiences such as these. The perceived cultural purity of remote tourist locations like the Aurès was an attractive notion to colonial tourists who could even stay in hotels constructed in an allegedly traditional indigenous style, according to contemporary travel literature.⁹⁰ Writing in 1930 for the upcoming centenary celebrations in Oran (see chapter 2), journalist Georges Rozet’s (1871-1962) highly romanticized description of the trek into the ancient and massive Aurès mountain range encapsulates the urge to escape Western modernity:

This singular massif, through which a road will soon pass, will always be more exciting to cross by following the bed of its canyons, Oued Abiod or Oued Abdi, at the slow pace of the mules. The rugged pass of Tighanimine, the crushing cliffs of Roufi, the vertiginous guelâas of Baniane, the ardent crescendo of the climate upon departing Arris, under the snows of Chelia to the underground oases of the Abiod, and to the burnished golden gorges set ablaze by the suns of M’Chounèche, villages with thousand-year-old mœurs and costumes, a color film of caravans which, in the spring, go up incessantly towards the north, by the corridor of the flowered canyon of pink laurels: this trajectory across the Aurès is undoubtedly the most dazzling way to discover the Sahara.⁹¹

Rozet’s description of the Algerian mountains invites the reader to journey backward in time. He even encourages the traveler to opt for the “old-fashioned” form of transportation via mule, although, as the author indicated, the Aurès would not remain out of reach of French colonialism for long.

⁹⁰ *Algérie: Alger, Oran, Constantine* (Paris: Imprimerie J. Barreau, 1918), 9.

⁹¹ Georges Rozet, “Pourquoi visiter l’Algérie,” (Algiers: Baconnier-Hélio, 1930). Original French: “Ce singulier massif qu’une route franchira bientôt mais qu’il sera toujours plus passionnant de traverser en suivant le lit de ses canyons, oued Abiod ou oued Abdi, au pas lent des mules. Défilé rugueux de Tighanimine, à-pic écrasant de Roufi, vertigineuses guelaas de Baniane, ardent crescendo de climats depuis Arris, sous les neiges du Chelia jusqu’aux oasis souterraines de l’Abiod et aux gorges d’or bruni incendiées de soleils de M’Chounèche, villages aux mœurs et aux costumes millénaires, film en couleurs des caravanes qui, au printemps, remontent incessamment vers le nord, par le couloir du canyon fleuri de lauriers-roses: cette diagonale à travers l’Aurès est sans doute la façon la plus éblouissante de découvrir le Sahara.”

Rozet's longing for the supposed purity of indigenous culture reflected colonial ideals of the era. Gouverneur Général Charles Jonnart, Lutaud's predecessor, was greatly concerned with preserving indigenous handicraft traditions, which he and others worried were disappearing. In 1908, Jonnart established the Office of Indigenous Arts, which was coordinated by Prosper Ricard (1874-1952), the author of many French guides to North African architecture, decorative art, and cultural geography.⁹² Under his supervision, several artists were hired to document traditional artwork from the country by photograph and drawing, copies of which were sent to workshops as models. Herzig worked for the Office as a copyist, but also as a designer who specialized in arabesque patterns and illuminated pages (see figure 1.7, for example). In this capacity, Herzig created master copies for decorative work to be executed in native workshops revealing the patronizing role that those European artists had "in teaching the Arabs their own art," as Benjamin points out.⁹³

Herzig's interest in indigenous crafts is reflected in his travel poster designs. In a poster from roughly the period when Herzig began working as a copyist (figure 1.8 – c. 1910), two women gaze longingly from the terrace of a mudbrick building in a *kasbah*, likely that of Algiers. One plays a *saz*, a Turkish instrument similar to a lute, while the other holds a tambourine. Their jewelry of ornate fibulae, hoop earrings, and richly patterned clothing indicate that the women are likely *nailiyat*, female performers and courtesans belonging to the Ouled Nail people of Bou Saâda, an oasis in southern Algeria west of Biskra. These women, who play the role of North African sirens here, seem rather out of place high up in the *kasbah* and gazing down at the Bay of Algiers below. Two small vignettes, one of the desert oasis of Biskra and the other of the Andalusian city of Tlemcen, contribute to Algeria's depiction as an otherworldly

⁹² Roger Benjamin, "Advancing the Indigenous Decorative Arts," in *Orientalist Aesthetics: Art, Colonialism, and French North Africa, 1880-1930* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 198.

⁹³ *Ibid*, 199.

place. Herzig's familiarity with Islamic art can be observed in multiple aspects of the poster: the horseshow archway formed by vibrant, intertwined arabesques, the hand-painted *faïence* (ceramic tiles) on the side of the building, the women's traditional jewelry and clothes, and the brightly patterned rug upon which the women await their European clientele.

As Herzig's posters suggest, depictions of Algeria as a primitive, culturally distant place continued to entice colonial tourists during the twentieth century. A comparison of Herzig's posters also demonstrates that his interwar designs featured significant stylistic departures. While Herzig worked within the academic tradition in his earlier poster design of 1910, later, he opted for a flatter, less naturalistic style and limited color palette that reflected newer artistic currents, such as impressionism or even divisionism, which were traversing the mainland.

Similar stylistic departures are taken in Léon Carré's (1878-1942) poster of 1921 (figure 1.9) in which a barefooted shepherd in a *burnous* and *fez* rests peacefully with a goat from his flock in the cool shade of an oasis populated by palm and fig trees and an oleander with vibrant pink blossoms. A *kasbah* of bright shades of orange rises out of the scorching desert in the distance, starkly contrasting the serenity and shaded abundance of the foreground composed in cool blues and greens. A crumbling mudbrick village is nestled below the *kasbah*. The scene suggests to tourists that Algeria had apparently remained unchanged by nearly a century of colonialism. Much like fin-de-siècle posters, these Orientalist tropes, which characterized Algeria as a culturally distant, pre-industrial utopia, were meant to seduce tourists who were in search of an exotic refuge and escape. In comparison to his predecessors, however, Carré's poster is rendered in starkly different artistic terms. His use of flat areas of pure, non-naturalistic colors and emphasis on pattern and line place the poster outside the academic conventions of the French orientalist tradition.

Carré was part of a new generation of French Orientalists that took shape in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, during which time art historian Roger Benjamin identifies a “dramatic shift in the consciousness of practitioners.”⁹⁴ Crucial to this shift, Benjamin argues, was the foundation of an Orientalist Society for French Painters, which French painter Alphonse Étienne Dinet (1861-1929) and French art historian Léonce Bénédicté (1859-1925) established in 1893 to promote French Orientalist painting and encourage other artists to travel to Algeria.⁹⁵ An official society for French Orientalist painters working in France was formed in 1894, followed shortly thereafter by the establishment of the Villa Abd-el-Tif in 1907, a *maison des artistes* located in Algiers in the Jardin d’essai.⁹⁶

Over time, the Villa Abd-el-Tif cultivated a veritable artistic community in Algeria. Home initially to two French artists per year who received a scholarship called the Prix Abd-el-Tif, by 1910, the scholarships were extended to a period of two years so that four artists occupied the villa at a time.⁹⁷ Carré, winner of the Prix Abd-el-Tif in 1909, and his contemporaries reaped the benefits of infrastructural expansion and stronger institutional support to travel to and around the Maghreb far more easily than their predecessors. Unlike older Orientalists like Delacroix, Ingres, or Gérôme, who worked independently and, in the case of Ingres, for example, never even traveled to North Africa, twentieth-century colonial artists living in Algeria enjoyed far more community and exchange among themselves.⁹⁸

⁹⁴ Roger Benjamin, “A Society for Orientalists” in *Orientalist Aesthetics: Art, Colonialism, and French North Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 57.

⁹⁵ Benjamin, “A Society for Orientalists,” 57–58.

⁹⁶ Benjamin, “Travelling Scholarships and the Academic Exoticism,” in *Orientalist Aesthetics: Art, Colonialism, and French North Africa, 1880-1930* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 145.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ François Pouillon and Amy Jacobs-Colas, “150 Years of Algerian Painting: Relevance for Understanding the Postcolonial Situation,” *French Politics, Culture & Society* 20, no. 2 (2002): 144. These advantages, French anthropologist François Pouillon has argued, produced a large enough discrepancy between these two groups of artists that it would be more accurate to refer to this older garde as “orientalists” while calling the newer garde of the twentieth century “colonial painters.”

The foundation of the Villa Abd-el-Tif and its scholarship program were part of a broader effort on the part of French colonists to nurture a cultural identity of their own, and one that drew enormously on the metropole.⁹⁹ Jonnart spearheaded these efforts. In a speech of 1900, Jonnart declared, “Algeria is a second France, it is full-grown, it does not wish to be merely a land of merchants preoccupied with the price of wine, sheep, and cereals ... It is France, and as a consequence should...be the prolongation of the image of ‘la douce patrie’ that has remained the queen of taste, of letters, and the arts.”¹⁰⁰ During its existence, eighty-seven artists from the metropole, official protégés of the colonial administration, came to Algiers as *boursiers*, receiving 3,000 francs annually each.¹⁰¹ Abd-el-Tifians played a vital role in this state-sponsored directive. Generally, graduates of Parisian art schools, these artists often became professional Orientalists after winning the Prix Abd-el-Tif. Some even remained in Algeria for the duration of their lives. Carré, born in Brittany and trained under Léon Bonnat (1833-1922) and Luc-Olivier Merson (1846-1920), both academically trained Parisian artists, is a prime example. Carré remained in Algeria until his death in 1942. Thus, for many Abd-el-Tifians, the Orient was not a detached, faraway place. It was their home.

A brief survey of Carré’s oeuvre shows how the artist melded his academic training with Orientalist themes, and how his style developed over time. Carré left for his first trip to Algeria nearing the end of 1905 and remained there until 1906. He stayed in the Hôtel de l’Oasis in the El Biar district of Algiers, a popular lodging for colonial tourists, where he completed several

⁹⁹ Roger Benjamin, “Travelling Scholarships and the Academic Exoticism,” 147. Seth Graebner, “‘Unknown and Unloved’: The Politics of French Ignorance in Algeria, 1860-1930,” in *Algeria and France, 1800-2000: Identity, Memory, Nostalgia* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2006), 49–62; Seth Graebner, “Contains Preservatives: Architecture and Memory in Colonial Algiers,” *Historical Reflections / Réflexions Historiques* 33, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 257–76. I find Graebner’s work, which focuses on literature and architecture, to be particularly informative on this subject.

¹⁰⁰ Quoted in Benjamin, “Advancing the Indigenous Decorative Arts,” 194.

¹⁰¹ Elisabeth Cazenave, “La Villa Abd-el-Tif, 1907-1962,” in *L’école d’Alger, 1870-1962: Collection du Musée national des beaux-arts d’Alger*, ed. Musée des Beaux-Arts de Bordeaux (Bouscat: Imprimerie Pujol, 2003), 69.

paintings of the port and traveled further south to the Sahara where he visited Ghardaïa, Ouargala, and Touggourt, and even to the Sahel.¹⁰² An oil painting completed during or just after this first visit, *Villas du Sahel* (figure 1.10 – c. 1905-1906), evinces the ways that artistic currents in the metropole, namely Japonism and Fauvism, shaped Carré’s early Algerian pictures. The flat planes of color, horizon line, and tree that bisects the work, all related to the new aesthetics that Japanese prints introduced to the French avant garde in the 1880s while the vivid, non-naturalist colors recalled the Fauvist works of Henri Matisse and André Derain, whose first Fauvist paintings were shown at the Salon d’Automne in Paris in 1905.

During his early career in Algeria, Carré also focused on labor and working-class subjects, a favorite theme of French realist artists, but transposed into an Oriental setting. In *The Muleteer* (figure 1.11) of 1910, the artist sympathetically portrays a Spanish mule-driver who has paused his work to lean against one of his hardworking mules for a respite. In the background, cacti and aloe plants decorate the otherwise barren landscape and Arab laborers go about their own work. The choice of a muleteer was certainly a departure from the romantic subjects of Delacroix and Fromentin, the preferred subjects of whom were Arab horsemen partaking in *fantasias*, hunts, and lavishly decorated interiors where odalisques luxuriated among incense burners and *narghiles*.

Carré also appropriated Islamic modes of representation, which can be observed in *Breasts, Eyes, and Feeling* (النهود والعيون والشعور), an illustration for *Le Jardin des Caresses*, a French translation by Franz Toussaint (1879-1955) of tenth-century Moorish love poems, published in 1913 (figure 1.12 – 1912). Medieval Islamic art, especially the miniature in illuminated manuscripts, clearly inspired Carré’s illustration. The lack of three-dimensionality

¹⁰² Marion Vidal-Bué, “Léon Carré (1878-1942): Peintre de l’Algérie et des Mille et une nuits,” in *L’Algérie des Peintres, 1830-1960* (Paris: Edisud, 20003), 92–93.

and perspective, attention to surface, and a concern for geometry and decoration, especially in the ornamentation of the architecture and richly patterned garments, textiles, and ceramics, all correspond to Islamic art. Yet Carré does not break with French orientalist tradition altogether either. Rather, Carré filters recognizable orientalist tropes, like the odalisque figure, whose sensuality is indicated by the title, through the visual vocabulary of Islamic decoration. However, there does seem to be a greater preoccupation with authenticity as demonstrated by the presence of Arabic calligraphy at the bottom. Carré's use of Arabic script likely derived from a preexisting admiration of the aesthetic qualities of Arabic script shared among mid-nineteenth century orientalist artists who included pseudo-scripts for decorative purposes, a paradigmatic example of which would be Jean-Léon Gérôme *Snake Charmer* (figure 1.13 – c. 1879) wherein faux Arabic script is seen all over the blue-tiled walls.

In 1925, Abd-el-Tif artists, including Carré, were conferred the decoration of several public edifices in Algeria, including the Palais d'été, le Palais des délégations financières, and several lycées and collèges among others.¹⁰³ Carré's mural, *Muslim Life*, situated in the Presidential Antechambers of the Gouverneur Général's *Palais d'été* in Algiers (figures 1.14-1.16 – ca. 1923), demonstrates that the new state-sponsored artistic vernacular articulated the visual signs of the colony through modern European artistic movements and techniques. The scene depicts a group of two Moorish women, an elderly Arab patriarch, and a veiled Muslim woman. This multi-ethnic and multi-generational group represents only some of Algeria's population. Noticeably absent are the French colonist and European settler, figures that would have spoiled the untroubled, pre-colonial paradise pictured in the mural. The passive postures of each of the figures also convey the prevailing colonial myth that the indigenous population were

¹⁰³ Cazenave, "La Villa Abd-el-Tif, 1907-1962," 69.

comprised of non-actors – that they possessed very little agency of their own. Carré’s characterization of these Moorish and Arab figures was thus congruent with those constructed by his predecessors whose oeuvres were saturated with images of reclining odalisques and Arabs lounging in the shade.

The fertility of the landscape featured in the mural also engaged with the long-held belief that Algeria was the granary of Ancient Rome. At the feet of the women are a ewe and her lamb and a hen with her brood. Alongside the ample foliage, these bucolic details signify Algeria’s mythic abundance and fertility: a nostalgic representation of a pre-colonial paradise. Nineteenth- and twentieth-century French literati were avid readers of the classics and were very aware of writings by ancient Greek historian Herodotus, ancient Roman geographer Strabo, Pliny the Elder, and Ptolemy – all of whom wrote about the abundance of Algeria.¹⁰⁴ Of course, as François Pouillon has already pointed out, this scene by the 1920s would have been mostly a fiction. Nomads and pastoralists would have existed only on the fringes of cities or in the Saharan periphery.¹⁰⁵

Carré’s mural demonstrates that he remained in intellectual and visual conversation with European fine arts movements. Writing in *Art et décoration* in 1923, art historian and future director of the Musée national des Beaux Arts d’Alger, Jean Alazard, praised the mural for its depiction of Muslim life “à une stylisation décorative.” The term “decorative” described the mode in which Carré painted the scene – a mode of painting that blurred the line between art and design. During the era, decorative painting was understood as a subset of painting that was scenic, historical, or mythological. As a mural, the painting was subordinated to an architectural

¹⁰⁴ Davis, *Resurrecting the Granary of Rome: Environmental History and French Colonial Expansion in North Africa*, 16.

¹⁰⁵ François Pouillon, “La Peinture monumentale en Algérie: Un art pédagogique (Monumental Paintings in Algeria: A Pedagogical Genre),” *Cahiers d’Études Africaines* 36, no. 141/142 (1996): 192.

space, in this case, a state setting. The flattened pictorial space, vivid colors, and the ornate patterning on the pantaloons, jewelry, and headscarves of the female figures also place *Muslim Life* “à une stylisation décorative,” to use Alazard’s term.

Returning to Carré’s *Hivernage* poster of 1921 (figure 1.9), it is now clear that the poster falls within this emerging colonial vernacular that merged modern European artistry with the exotic content of academic orientalism. The flat planes of non-naturalistic color, flattened pictorial space, high horizon line, and attention to the natural world in the poster are reminiscent of Carré’s exploration of Fauvism and Japonism, as was seen in *Villas du Sahel* (figure 1.10). However, while he is stylistically *au courant* with European fine arts movements, Carré’s selection of a bucolic, pastoral scene corresponds with the subjects and themes of academic Orientalism. These nostalgic representations of a pre-colonial Algeria remained the expectation of European tourists who went there in search of an exotic and primitive escape from western modernity.

While there was clearly a premium placed on depicting Algeria as an exotic, primitive utopia of abundance, fertility, and cultural purity, signs of modern European industry and technology still crept into some travel posters. As is the case in Léon Cauvy’s (1874-1933) poster of 1930 advertising wintering tourism in Algeria (figure 1.17) that depicts the port of Algiers, the premier point of entry to the country. Like Carré, Cauvy was an academically trained artist who was also an Abd-el-Tif prize winner.¹⁰⁶ The *cloissonist* style seen here registers Cauvy’s indebtedness to French post-impressionists. Compared to Carré’s idyllic, mono-ethnic scene, free from modernity, though, Cauvy’s poster emphasizes the cultural heterogeneity of interwar Algeria and the modernity of its major cities.

¹⁰⁶ François Pouillon and Amy Jacobs-Colas, “150 Years of Algerian Painting: Relevance for Understanding the Postcolonial Situation,” *French Politics, Culture & Society* 20, no. 2 (2002): 150.

During the interwar period, the port of Algiers, according to René Lespès (1870-1944), a French geographer and historian who made a close study of Algiers in the 1920s, was above all else a gateway for tourists to Algeria by the 1920s, secondarily, a “port of war” and the seat of command of Algerian contingent of the French navy, and finally, Algeria’s center for trade.¹⁰⁷ The importation of food products such as sugar, rice, coffee, potatoes, butter, and cheese from France, gasoline from the United States and Russia, and fruit from Spain and Italy all made their way to Algeria via the port.¹⁰⁸ The biggest import to Algiers was, unsurprisingly, coal – most of which went directly to the railroads.¹⁰⁹ Other raw materials of all kinds such as rock, marble, iron, steel, wood, plaster, cement, and lime were also common imports, construction materials that were greatly needed in the capital city of Algiers where modernization was rapidly underway.¹¹⁰ While French imports dominated port traffic, Algeria also exported several products, most of which were natural resources or agricultural products including coal, coal byproducts, cereals like wheat, oats, and barley, fruits, vegetables, wool, and wine – most of which was sent directly to France.¹¹¹ These products are in the process of being exported to France via the large steamships in Cauvy’s poster.

One export seen in Cauvy’s poster especially embodies the effects of French colonialism. Baskets of clementines, a novel fruit hybrid invented in 1902 in Algeria by French Missionary Brother Clément Rodier, take front and center in the poster.¹¹² This fruit – made possible solely through colonialism – expressly demonstrates that one of the main goals of the French colonial

¹⁰⁷ René Lespès, “Le Port d’Alger,” *Annales de Géographie* 30, no. 165 (1921): 204.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 207.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 205.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 206.

¹¹¹ Lespès, “Le Port d’Alger,” 209–11.

¹¹² . J.L. Trabut, “L’hybridation des citrus: une nouvelle tangerine ‘la clémentine’” *Revue Horticole* 10 (1902): 232–34. According to Trabut, between twelve to fifteen million kilograms of citrus fruits on average were exported every year from Algeria, according to agricultural records. See also Pierre Laszlo, *Citrus: A History* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2007), 35.

mission, profit, had come to fruition, and it had done so thanks not only to French entrepreneurship but through the introduction of western, modern agricultural practices. Notice, however, that while the trade system, infrastructure, and products embody western modernity, the Algerian dock workers remain pastoral in appearance, crouched among livestock and in traditional garb.

The effects of French colonialism and European modernity are also embraced in the work of Paul Jobert (1863-1942), an artist who, unlike Carré and Cauvy, was born and died in Algeria. In his poster of 1930 advertising the city of Constantine for PLM, Jobert obliquely references the effects of French colonialism and European modernity (figure 1.18). He frames two Algerian men in traditional garb under an arch with the city and mountains in the background. One of the men even appears to be kneeling to perform *salah* or the Muslim practice of reciting passages of the Qur'an in prayer. Several storks fly through the arch toward their nest situated in a minaret. Jobert's reference to storks demonstrates his deep knowledge of Algeria where storks were (and continue to be) considered good omens and permitted to build nests in religious edifices.

These figures echo the familiar formulas of Orientalist paintings such as Gérôme's *Prayer in the Mosque* (Figure 1.19 – 1874). Evidence of the French colonial presence is recorded through Jobert's inclusion of two of Constantine's six famous bridges. The more ornate bridge, El Kantara, was originally constructed by the Romans as an aqueduct and then renovated by the French in 1860 and 1863.¹¹³ The other, Sidi-M'Cid, was opened to traffic in 1912 and was the highest bridge in the world until 1929, its depiction thus a clear reference to the prowess of French engineers. In comparison to El Kantara, Sidi-M'Cid looks thoroughly modern with its

¹¹³ Benjamin E. Thomas, "Fortress City of Constantine, Algeria," *The Scientific Monthly* 81, no. 3 (1955): 130.

suspension cable design; it is a testament to the work of Émile Morinaud, who served as mayor of Constantine from 1898 to 1934 and devoted much time and effort to modernizing the city.

The pairing of these two bridges might have been a strategic choice by Jobert, who would have known them well since he served as the conservator at the Museum of Fine Arts of Constantine, the city where he finished his life. In pairing the old, El Kantara, with the new, Sidi-M'Cid, Jobert captures the hybridity of Constantine as a city shaped by ancient Romans, Arabs, and the French alike. In comparing Jobert's poster to a painting created by the artist the same year, it is rather easy to believe that he made this pairing consciously. In *Port d'Alger* of 1930-1931 (figure 1.20), he demonstrates his full awareness and embrace of the mixed nature of French Algerian culture and society through the inclusion of several steamships that belch smoke into the blue sky. As in Cauvy's poster, the maritime scene encapsulates the hybridity of the colony: workers are of diverse backgrounds and appear to be of both Arab, indigenous, and European descent.

Generally, as demonstrated throughout this chapter, interwar travel posters depicted *indigènes* as non-participants in the political structures of the French empire, figures who were contentedly sequestered in remote locations of Algeria's countryside, with the exception of Cauvy's example. However, these depictions were not faithful representations of the political landscape of interwar French Algeria. The 1920s actually saw an acceleration in the political engagement of Algeria's Arab and indigenous population. In spite of their recent contributions during World War I, Arab and indigenous Algerians were still formally considered French subjects and not citizens during the interwar period.¹¹⁴ Unlike their Jewish counterparts, who

¹¹⁴ Goebel, *Anti-Imperial Metropolis*, 64. Although Algerian Muslims could be naturalized in France, in Metropolitan France in 1931, statistics on the North African population showed that 85,568 were non-citizens and 463 were citizens. For most Algerian Muslims, their faith was a major roadblock to accessing French citizenship. The Senatus Consultum of 1865 required that any Algerian Muslim wishing to become a French citizen had to

were naturalized under the Crémieux Decree of 1870, their legal status made it more difficult to seek effective representation of their interests and to shape the laws and decrees that regulated their lives in both France and Algeria.¹¹⁵ After sacrificing much during World War I, Algerians were dissatisfied with their marginal political status, which contributed to the rapid growth of Algerian nationalist and anti-imperial movements, the foundations of which were laid before World War I by a generation of young, educated Arab and indigenous Algerians. This movement, called the *Mouvement Jeune-Algérien*, began in the late nineteenth century and continued to develop during the first years of the twentieth century.

Algerian nationalists were propelled forward in their agenda when France adopted the law of February 4, 1919, which sought to increase the number of eligible Arab and indigenous voters. The law ensured that Arab and indigenous Algerians would be granted rights equivalent to those of a French citizen if certain conditions were met. The list of conditions was exhaustive and limited eligibility for most Arab and indigenous Algerians. Article 2 of the law required that the individual must be at least twenty-five years old, had never been convicted of a felony or misdemeanor, had never undergone any disciplinary action for being hostile toward France, and must have spent at least two years in the same residence in a municipality of Algeria or France. In addition, the individual needed to meet one of a variety of “special” conditions such as having served in the military or owning land.¹¹⁶ The reforms mainly functioned to fend off an armed liberation movement and to maintain the status quo. The number of native voters only increased from 57,000 to 90,000, a low number given that there were about 5 million *indigènes* at the

renounce their previous status as an indigene, which subjected them to a more religiously regulated way of life that differed from the French civil code that prioritized equality, liberty, and laïcité.”

¹¹⁵ Ibid, 45.

¹¹⁶ “Partie Officielle: Loi sur l’accession des indigènes de l’Algérie aux droits politiques,” *Journal Officiel de la République Française*, February 6, 1919.

time.¹¹⁷ Moreover, most Algerians remained unaffected by the reforms as they applied only to men with a French education, who were war veterans, or who owned property.¹¹⁸

Furthermore, the Algerian immigrants to whom metropolitan viewers would have been exposed were nothing like those shown in the posters. Although many Arab and indigenous Algerians were repatriated after the armistice, World War I introduced their lasting presence in France. Due to the enormous number of casualties, France lacked the vital and youthful workforce it had prior to the conflict. Algerians, along with other African immigrants, flocked to the metropole to replace members of the working class killed or rendered unable to work by the war.¹¹⁹ Roughly one-third of all unskilled Algerian laborers remained in Paris while others flocked to the other industrialized cities of northern France.¹²⁰ The Algerians living in Paris were nothing like the *burnous* and *fez*-clad natives represented in the tourism posters. By the 1920s, the rustic peasant *indigène* existed only on the margins of colonial society. As a roughly contemporary photograph demonstrates (figure 1.21 – 1936), many Arab and indigenous Algerians living in the metropole wore the same clothes as their European counterparts.

Many of the Arab and indigenous Algerians living in Paris, which had become a haven for intercultural and intellectual exchange, were politically active due to the dire circumstances that they faced. While the majority of foreigners born outside of France were socially marginalized, Africans were nearly twice as likely to be arrested in comparison to Italians, and about three times more likely to receive a criminal conviction.¹²¹ The lived realities of Arab and

¹¹⁷ Lizabeth Zack, “Early Origins of Islamic Activism in Algeria: The Case of Khaled in Post-World War I Algiers,” *Journal of North African Studies* 11, no. 2 (2006): 210.

¹¹⁸ Zack, 211.

¹¹⁹ Stora, *Algeria, 1830-2000*, 12–13.

¹²⁰ Michael Goebel, *Anti-Imperial Metropolis: Interwar Paris and the Seeds of Third World Nationalism*, Global and International History (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 25.

¹²¹ Goebel, *Anti-Imperial Metropolis*, 61.

indigenous Algerian immigrants in Paris fomented tension and fueled social conflict which in turn provided a milieu in which leaders of Algerian nationalism readily emerged.

As a crossroads for many non-European thinkers who would eventually play crucial roles in post-World War II decolonization efforts, the city of Paris was one of several Western breeding grounds for what would become known as Third World nationalism.¹²² One of the “founding fathers” of Algerian nationalism, Messali Hadj (1898-1974), arguably began his career in politics while living in Paris during this time.¹²³ In 1926, Messali founded the *Étoile Nord-Africaine* (ENA), an early Algerian nationalist party, and two years later, he published “Fight Against French Imperialism!” an open declaration in which Messali repudiated colonialism in Algeria and accused the French government of depravity and moral bankruptcy. His words are worth quoting at length:

[...] There was the conquest. There was the massacre of women and children, the torching of villages and harvests, the theft of riches by an army avid for blood and pillage. Stolen from the natives during the 15 years of the conquest were: 18 million lambs, three million oxen, almost a million dromedaries and, during the expedition in Kabylia, 300 villages were burned. We only relate here a few facts among thousands. But it must be noted that while the massacres are done, the work of brigandage continues with the ferocity characteristic of French imperialism. Since the conquest, 11 million hectares of the best lands have been stolen, while the natives are pushed to the arid south and are decimated by periodic famines. Collective fines hit entire villages, sequestrations complete the ruin of the Algerian people, which is plunged into poverty. In a few words, these are the results of the conquest. In order to prevent us from crying out: “Thief! Assassin!” imperialism gags us with the *Code de l'Indigénat*, a vestige of the darkest barbarism. By virtue of this code, all the violence carried out on the natives by the colonists is legitimated in advance. Theft, torture, and murder are openly encouraged, and the guilty assured of impunity. No political rights, no freedom to assemble or to speak.¹²⁴

¹²² Goebel, *Anti-Imperial Metropolis*, 3. Goebel argues that Paris offered a vantage point that helped clarify the contours of a global anti-imperial movement. Ho Chi Minh, Aimé Césaire, and Léopold Sédar Senghor also travelled to and created intellectual networks in Paris during the interwar period.

¹²³ Ibid, 4. Celebrated Algerian independence leader Ferhat Abbas also spent time in France after World War I.

¹²⁴ Hadj Messali, “Fight Against French Imperialism!,” trans. Mitch Abidor, Marxist Internet Archive, 1928, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/messali-hadj/1928/fight-french.htm>.

The colonial legacy of which Messali speaks, unsurprisingly, is the dark mirror image of the one extolled in colonial tourism posters.

With the broader context of Jonnart's cultural directive and the nascent Algerian nationalist movement of the interwar years in mind, it is clear that these posters served a role far greater than that of advertising colonial leisure, which was certainly an economic priority of the Gouvernement Général. First, they also served to export a new, culturally mature image of the colony to the metropole. Although French colonists in Algeria wished for the colony to be perceived as modern, and desired recognition as an economic and cultural extension of France, these posters reveal the paradoxes inherent to this phase of the colonial enterprise. While poster designers drew on an undeniably modern visual language, the tropes of academic orientalism more or less remained. Second, the posters also papered over the growing political agency of Algeria's Arab and indigenous subjects. The dominant depiction of Algeria's colonized population as passive mountain- and desert-dwellers living blissfully under the administration of the empire was incongruent with reality. The postwar rise of Algerian nationalist movements in both the colony and the metropole made it clear that the Orient was a dynamic and changing place whose peoples yearned for self-determination. Regardless of the changing political landscape, Jonnart's "modern image" of French Algeria, as will be seen in the next chapter, would continue to persist throughout the interwar years.

Chapter 2 – French Algeria in Retrospect: The General Centenary Exhibition of Algeria (1930)

The Exposition générale du centenaire de l'Algérie, held from January to June of 1930 in the coastal city of Oran, Algeria, and organized primarily by colonial officials of French descent, triumphantly celebrated the auspicious one-hundred-year anniversary of France's conquest of Algiers in 1830.¹²⁵ This major exposition, the first and only major retrospective that the colony received, lends insight into how French colonists in Algeria envisioned the colony and how they wanted it to be viewed in the Metropole: as a country of economic strength, peaceful collaboration, and cultural maturity. As cultural historian Seth Graebner has written, the enduring sentiment among French colonists at the time was that their country was “unknown and unloved” – that no one knew or appreciated the “real” Algeria beyond the fantasias and exotic oases described in travel literature.¹²⁶ The centenary exhibition afforded French colonists an opportunity to address this gap between popular perception based on orientalist fantasy and what they professed was the reality of French Algeria.

This chapter is organized in three parts. In part one, I establish the historical context by discussing the presentation of Algeria at previous French international and colonial exhibitions in the nineteenth century and the first third of the twentieth century. Through this process, I

¹²⁵ The centenary exhibition was one of only a few centennial colonial exhibitions that took place in a European colony. A similar exhibition was held in Sydney in 1888 and another in British New Zealand in 1940. For more on Algeria's appearance at other colonial and international expositions, especially in the twentieth century, see for example, Patricia Morton, *Hybrid Modernities: Architecture and Representation at the 1931 Colonial Exposition, Paris* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003); Alexander Geppert, *Fleeting Cities: Imperial Expositions in Fin-de-Siècle Europe* (Basingstoke: Springer, 2010); Steven Ungar and Pascal Blanchard's chapters, "The Colonial Exposition (1931)" and "National Unity: The Right and Left 'Meet' around the Colonial Exhibition (1931)" respectively, in *Colonial Culture in France since the Revolution* (Indiana University Press, 2013), eds. Blanchard, Sandrine Lemaire, Nicolas Bancel, and Dominic Thomas; Bancel and Blanchard's chapter "Colonial Exhibitions," in *Postcolonial Realms of Memory: Sites and Symbols in Modern France*, eds. Etienne Achille, Charles Forsdick, and Lydie Moudileno, (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2020), 269–89.

¹²⁶ Seth Graebner, "Unknown and Unloved: The Politics of French Ignorance in Algeria, 1860-1930," in *Algeria and France, 1800-2000: Identity, Memory, Nostalgia*, ed. Patricia Lorcin (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2006), 49-50.

establish a precedent for the depiction of Algeria at large, state-sanctioned exhibitions. During these years, the French colonial government largely characterized Algeria as a culturally distant, but fully pacified and submissive colony. Several tropes shored up racial hierarchies that reified France's hegemony and justified the colonization of Algeria: that the women were sexually available, that the men, perhaps once fearsome warriors, were now submitted in defeat, and that although once a fertile land, the Arabs had rendered Algeria a wasteland through misuse and laziness.

In part two, I discuss the centenary celebrations held both in Paris and Oran in 1930. The celebrations in Paris, as will be seen, presented French Algeria in a similar fashion to previous exhibitions. I focus on an exhibition at the Petit Palais that recirculated several of the tropes discussed above through the exhibition of mid-nineteenth-century French orientalist paintings. The prominence of mid-nineteenth century imagery, I argue, evinces that in the collective imaginary of Parisians, at least, Algeria remained a culturally distanced place of camels and cavalcades, dancing women, and Arab chieftains. This was a view to which French colonists in Algeria were diametrically opposed. In stark contrast, the centenary exhibition in Oran emphasized the colony's modernity, characterizing French Algeria as an extension of France itself, rather than as a distant, primitive place. However, as will become clear, primitivizing stereotypes were not altogether eliminated either.

In the third and final part of this chapter, I discuss the role of Arab and indigenous Algerians, as well as resistance to the proceedings at the Centenary Exposition, although both were limited. Arab and indigenous Algerians were overwhelmingly marginalized and either worked as servers or porters or performed an ethnographic role in welcoming ceremonies and other spectacles. I focus mainly on the participation of artists and artisans at the centenary and

how exhibition organizers framed indigenous creativity. Finally, while there are only a few documented cases of resistance, and they are mostly textual, not visual, I argue, nevertheless, that these examples reveal important contradictions to the exhibition's presentation of French Algeria as the crown jewel of French colonialism.

A Short History of Algeria at International and Colonial Exhibitions

During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Algeria consistently participated in a system of exhibitions known as international, colonial, or universal exhibitions or World's Fairs, a practice that began in London in 1851. More than ninety exhibitions of a similar nature have taken place globally since then, with the most recent exhibition occurring in Shanghai in 2010. After briefly foregrounding Algeria's presentation at these exhibitions in the nineteenth century, I focus my analysis on Algeria's appearance in the visual culture from exhibitions in the first twenty-nine years of the twentieth century in France, or those immediately preceding the Centenary Exposition in Oran.

During the nineteenth century, Algeria figured prominently in several international exhibitions.¹²⁷ After 1867, Algeria was always accorded its own space in the form of a unitary pavilion, and in 1878, the Algerian Pavilion was the first colonial pavilion to be made a permanent construction.¹²⁸ The Algerian pavilions were also often granted a central space that was meant to elevate the colony's importance in the eyes of the public.¹²⁹ The pavilions were

¹²⁷ Sami Boufassa, "Le pavillon de l'Algérie à travers les expositions coloniales, internationales, et universelles," *Diacronie* 19.3 (2014): 2. Since 1851, Algeria participated, in some form or another, in dozens of exhibitions that took place all over Europe. The exhibitions that featured Algeria were as follows: Paris (1855, 1867, 1900, 1907, 1925, 1931, and 1937), Lyon (1894 and 1914), Rouen (1896), Arras (1904), Liège (1905), Marseille (1906, 1922), London (1908), Brussels (1910), Roubaix (1911), and Ghent (1913). Algeria also appeared in smaller, but comparable events held in Bordeaux in 1850, 1854, 1859, and 1865.

¹²⁸ Bancel and Blanchard, "Colonial Exhibitions," 272.

¹²⁹ Boufassa, "Le pavillon de l'Algérie à travers les expositions coloniales, internationales, et universelles," 7.

frequently accompanied by installations such as Moorish coffee houses where spectacles of dance and music could be enjoyed, marketplaces known as *souks*, which displayed indigenous products, and reconstructions of various Algerian regions – the mountain habitations of Kabylia, streets in the *kasbah* of Algiers, Touareg tents, etc.¹³⁰ These immersive installations were multi-sensorial experiences that enabled the viewer to “travel” to the colony from the metropole, and to consume its culture through easily apprehended and commercialized systems of representations.

An avalanche of ephemera was circulated to attract and educate viewers about France’s colonial possessions. Reproductive media such as posters, stamps, postcards, illustrated guides, brochures, journals, and other publications circulated imagery and information about the colonies and served several political and social purposes: to shore up racial hierarchies, to emphasize the colonies’ economic benefit to France, and to educate citizens on their position and role within the colonial enterprise.¹³¹

The visual culture of early twentieth-century expositions in France advanced several primitivizing and exoticizing stereotypes about Algeria’s Arab and Berber inhabitants.¹³² One of the dominant stereotypes was the eroticized Ouled Naïl dancer. This theme can be observed in a poster designed by Étienne Nasreddine Dinét that was released for the colonial exposition in Marseille in 1906. In the poster, a beautiful Ouled Naïl woman, clothed in vibrant and ornately patterned drapery and adorned with silver cuff bracelets and fibulae, holds the tri-colored French flag above her head. Dinét emphasizes her otherness through her physical attributes and costume.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹³¹ For more on the role of visual culture in forming French national identity within the colonial context see Dana S. Hale, *Races on Display: French Representations of Colonized Peoples, 1886-1940* (Indiana University Press, 2008).

¹³² I use the word “primitive” to describe how Europeans viewed inhabitants of cultures previously unknown to them from Asia, Africa, the Americas, and Oceania. I owe my definition of the term to Hal Foster. In his essay, “The ‘Primitive’ Unconscious of Modern Art,” *October* 34 (Autumn 1985): 45–70, Foster writes that the concept of “primitive” is articulated by the West as a society without history or cultural complexity. Foster argues that the “primitive” involves the misconstruction of the Other through racist and evolutionist myths and is a concept used to camouflage the savagery of imperialism itself.

Her head covering, brown skin, heavy brow bone, broad nose, and prominent jawline would have visually indicated her difference to French viewers. An ornate textile also appears draped over the side of the boat in the lower right. The recognizable *ville blanche* of Algiers and its *kasbah* provide the backdrop for this display of patriotism. A steamship in the background, perhaps filled with French tourists, also reminds the viewer of the colony's availability as site of pleasure.

For the contemporary French viewer, the Ouled Naïl dancer would have been immediately associated with prostitution, although the women themselves did not identify themselves to be so in the western understanding of the term. In pre-colonial Algeria, Ouled Naïl women served as professional dancers, concubines, and courtesans. Dancers typically performed fully clothed in exchange for money which would be used as a dowry upon retirement.¹³³ Under French colonialism, however, the Nailiyat (women belonging to the Ouled Naïl tribe) were officially classified as prostitutes and segregated from the population. Their movement and activities were also restricted. In 1898, the Gouverneur Général proposed the creation of special neighborhoods for them.¹³⁴ La rue des Ouled Naïl, where one could find *les filles publiques*, was the most animated part of the town and became a main site of sexual tourism during the interwar period.¹³⁵ As the dance changed locales from the desert to urban centers to eventually the expositions universelles throughout French colonization, it became increasingly eroticized.¹³⁶

¹³³ Peter J. Bloom, *French Colonial Documentary: Mythologies of Humanitarianism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 80.

¹³⁴ Stephanie Limoncelli, "International Bureau Reformers and the French Movement," in *The Politics of Trafficking: The First International Movement to Combat the Sexual Exploitation of Women* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 124–25.

¹³⁵ Barkahoum Ferhati, "La danseuse prostituée dite 'Ouled Naïl,' entre mythe et réalité (1830-1962). Des rapports sociaux et des pratiques concrètes," *Clio. Femmes, genre, histoire*, no. 17 (2003): 17.

¹³⁶ Zeynep Çelik and Leila Kinney, "Ethnography and Exhibitionism at the Expositions Universelles," *Assemblage*, no. 13 (December 1990): 13.

Dinet's poster registers the eroticism associated with the Ouled Naïl, a figure to whom the artist devoted much attention throughout his career. Although, as art historian Roger Benjamin has pointed out, Dinet sometimes diminished the sexual aspect of the figure, here, her exposed shoulders and barely concealed breasts (which a gust of wind might at any time reveal to the viewer), certainly evoke the eroticism associated with the Ouled Naïl dancer.¹³⁷ In the poster, the woman's friendly gaze and open posture render her, and by extension, Algeria, "ready and available" to the French viewer for consumption.

Not only the inhabitants, but also the landscape of Algeria was depicted as a primitive, distant place. These depictions played on preexisting tropes that the Arabs had destroyed the land, rendering it infertile and unproductive.¹³⁸ In a postcard sold in Marseille at the Colonial Exposition of 1906 (figure 2.2), French artist Auguste Vimar (1851-1916) portrays Algeria as a desolate desert wasteland. The postcard also served to uphold racial hierarchies by comparing Arabs to animals. A man in robes holding a staff with a snake wrapped around it (no doubt a reference to the prevailing orientalist myth of the snake charmer) and a lion walking improbably on its hind legs lead a ragtag caravan of other exotic animals (a chameleon, hyena, ostrich, and tiger to name only a few). The lead animals carry colonial products: dates, ceramics, and musical instruments. This portrayal, which conflates humans and animals, and is meant to be humorous, renders Algeria as a place of spectacle and entertainment, rather than a real, politicized place.

¹³⁷ Roger Benjamin, *Orientalist Aesthetics: Art, Colonialism, and French North Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 100.

¹³⁸ Diana K. Davis has published extensively on the French colonial environmentalist narratives which blamed local North Africans, especially pastoralists, for the deforestation and desertification of what was erroneously believed to have been a fertile, forested landscape. See Diana K. Davis, "Eco-Governance in French Algeria: Environmental History, Policy and Colonial Administration," *Proceedings of the Western Society for French History* 32 (2004), <http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.0642292.0032.019>; Diana Davis, "Desert 'wastes' of the Maghreb: Desertification Narratives in French Colonial Environmental History of North Africa," *Cultural Geographies* 11, no. 4 (October 2004): 359–87; Diana Davis, *Resurrecting the Granary of Rome: Environmental History and French Colonial Expansion in North Africa* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007).

The domination and submission of Algeria's indigenous inhabitants constituted another important theme at international and colonial exhibitions. This was achieved in part through the display of human beings from across the empire. At the Exposition coloniale nationale of 1907 in Paris, for example, members of the Touareg people, an expansive nomadic ethnic group from the Sahara, were brought to the capital, and exhibited in the Bois de Vincennes. Auguste Terrier, reporter for *Le Journal des voyages et des aventures de terre et de mer*, detailed the arrival of the Touaregs in Paris in an article: "There is a lesson to be learned in the simple fact that our old enemies from the Sahara are now on display at the doors of Paris."¹³⁹ The lesson to which Terrier alludes was that French imperial power was so great that even the Touaregs, reputed as fierce warriors who had long resisted French rule, had been conquered and rendered docile to the point that members of the tribe were now displayed as harmless, inert living trophies in France.

For the French visitor to the colonial exhibition in the Bois de Vincennes, the displays of the Touaregs and other colonial subjects were not only meant to inform the viewer about France's colonial possessions, but also to shore up racial hierarchies. The displays were part of a broader effort to inculcate the French viewer with imperialist doctrine and to dispel any doubt about the strength and superiority of the empire, and by extension, its citizens. Exhibiting human beings as trophies neutralized any doubts about the empire's dominance and provided a space where French subjects could witness firsthand the otherness of their colonial counterparts. In doing so, the colonial government sought to shape public opinion and to gain support for its agenda.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁹ Auguste Terrier, "Les Touaregs du Sahara," *Journal des voyages et des aventures de terre et de mer*, May 19, 1907, 410. "Il y a déjà toute une leçon dans ce simple fait que nos vieux ennemis du Sahara sont maintenant en exhibition aux portes de Paris."

¹⁴⁰ For more on the European practice of displaying humans, see Charles Fordick et al., eds., *Human Zoos: Science and Spectacle in the Age of Colonial Empires*, trans. Teresa Bridgeman (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2008). For an even earlier example of Algerians on display in France, see Elizabeth C. Childs, "Les Turcos au camp

The pacification of the Touaregs especially captured the attention of French metropolitans. On a cover page of *Le Journal des Voyages*, devoted to advertising the Exposition coloniale nationale in Nogent of 1907, French illustrator Georges Conrad (1874-1936) depicted the defeat of the Touaregs (figure 2.3 – 1907). In the illustration, Touareg chief Kenan ag Tissi, who had been injured and captured by the French, is being led by a French soldier who carries his pistol slightly lifted in anticipation of its potential need for use. Although the French officer's readiness characterizes ag Tissi as violent and dangerous, the Touareg chief is shown in a humbled posture seated upon his dromedary with his head slightly bowed. In the lower right of the composition, an indigenous soldier with modern arms helps lead the cavalcade, a Touareg shield and two spears are in his possession. The inclusion of this individual bridges the gap between the French soldier and ag Tissi. Perhaps once resistant to French domination, like ag Tissi, the colonial soldier now serves the empire.

Colonial imagery was also used to demonstrate the economic benefit of the colonial enterprise. In the official poster for the colonial exhibition held in Marseille in 1922 (figure 2.4 – 1922), the patriotic figure of Marianne, the personification of the French Republic, dressed in the French tricolor, accepts offerings from colonial figures. A female representative from French Indochina offers silks while another representative offers an olive branch in peace and wheat. This figure likely personifies North Africa, from which France imported large quantities of olive oil. A woman with darker skin, likely representing the tropical colonies, offers cotton and citrus fruits, both of which were main exports. The difference and exoticism of the colonial representatives are emphasized through costume and physiognomy, but despite the otherness of the colonial subjects, each is clearly submissive to French administration.

de Saint Maur" in *Daumier and Exoticism: Satirizing the French and the Foreign* (New York: Peter Lang, 2004), 82–91.

International exhibitions, upon which the French government of the Third Republic placed a premium, functioned to impress the importance of the colonies upon the French public and to manage public opinion. Ephemeral media such as posters, postcards, and illustrated journals, promoted the idea of French dominance over her colonial possessions. This media was meant to instruct French viewers about the economic benefits of colonialism and to indoctrinate them with imperial ideology. As demonstrated, Algeria was presented as an object of desire that could be consumed in many forms: through the sexualized and available female body, the humiliated, defeated warrior, and valued exports such as wheat and olive oil.

Celebrating One Hundred Years of French Algeria

Paris 1930

The centenary celebrations in Paris reproduced several of the tropes that were seen at previous international and colonial exhibitions, demonstrating that, at least in the metropole, orientalist fantasies endured in the imaginations of French citizens living in Paris who viewed the Orient as a place of excitement, adventure, sensuality, and fulfilled fantasies. Additionally, much like at previous colonial exhibitions, organizers of the centenary celebrations in Paris presented Algeria as a culturally distant place that was fully pacified and loyal to France. However, as will be seen, there were subtle signs that French hegemony in Algeria was indeed being challenged both at home and abroad.

There were many reasons to host centenary celebrations in Paris. The primary reason, according to René Weiss (1875-1951), the cabinet director at the prefecture of the Seine at the time, was to build solidarity with Arab and indigenous Algerians. The service of North Africans and the recent trauma of the war, according to Weiss, encouraged the French government to devote considerable time and expense to recognize the contributions that Arab and indigenous

Algerians had made to the war effort. Weiss points out that, after the war, Paris had already made efforts to forge new links with its North African inhabitants by building the Paris Mosque and Institut Musulman.¹⁴¹ Furthermore, Paris was now a home to a large number of Arab and indigenous Algerian immigrants who came to the city in search of work. These facts, in addition to being the capital of the French Empire, made Paris a logical location for centenary celebrations since there were already many Algerians living there.¹⁴²

Although Weiss claimed the centenary celebrations were, at least in part, an homage to the Algerian immigrants living and working in the metropole, the organization and content of the Paris celebrations indicated otherwise. Part of the celebrations included a major exhibition curated by Camille Gronkowski (1873-1943), director of the Petit Palais in Paris. The exhibition of mostly fine art had a strong historical imperative: to reconstitute a history of the conquest of Algiers and the subsequent colonization of Algeria. Gronkowski made this clear in his own writing about the exhibition: “Our role consisted therefore of researching paintings, drawings, and engravings, which retraced the different events of the conquest, the different aspects of the country, and its great military and civil leaders, without omitting the memories that are attached to it: documents, weapons, uniforms, autographs, etc.”¹⁴³ The centenary celebrations, then, were about exalting the conquest of Algiers, rather than honoring Arab and indigenous Algerians who had fought in the war.

¹⁴¹ René Weiss, *Le centenaire de l'Algérie française* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1930), 94–95. For more on French efforts to build solidarity with Muslims living in Paris see Naomi Davidson, “Muslim Bodies in the Metropole: Social Assistance and ‘Religious’ Practice in Interwar Paris,” in *Muslims in Interwar Europe: A Transcultural Historical Perspective*, ed. Bekim Agai, Umar Ryad, and Mehdi Sajid (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2016), 105–24.

¹⁴² Weiss, *Le centenaire de l'Algérie française*, 95.

¹⁴³ Camille Gronkowski, *L'Exposition du centenaire de la conquête de l'Algérie* (Paris: Frazier Soye - Imprimeur, 1930), ii–iii. Original French: “Notre rôle consistait donc à rechercher les tableaux, dessins, gravures, qui retracent les différentes péripéties de la Conquête, les aspects du pays, les portraits des grands chefs militaires et civils, sans omettre les souvenirs qui s’y rattachent : documents, armes, insignes, uniformes, autographes, etc.”

According to Gronkowski, one of the main narratives communicated at the exhibition were the success of the colonization of Algeria and the sacrifices made in rescuing the colony's inhabitants from the anarchy that had dilapidated the otherwise promising country since antiquity.¹⁴⁴ The works exhibited, according to Gronkowski, were meant to be both documentary and artistic.¹⁴⁵ Historical figures that had wreaked havoc in Algeria in the early days of colonialism were featured as heroes and their portraits were proudly displayed, including Charles X, Marshal Thomas Robert Bugeaud (also the former Gouverneur Général of Algeria), and Marshal Aimable Pélissier – the last two of whom, as was detailed in the previous chapter, were French military leaders who committed terrible atrocities against Arab and indigenous Algerians. Pélissier had been especially reviled by his contemporaries who knew of his murderous conduct in Algeria. His heroization at the Petit Palais demonstrates an effort to overlook if not overwrite the unpalatable memories of the brutal atrocities that the French committed during the conquest of Algeria.

To bring his vision of a conquered Algeria to life, Gronkowski depended mainly on works by nineteenth-century French orientalist: Eugène Delacroix, Théodore Chassériau, Eugène Fromentin, Jean-Auguste-Dominique Ingres, Horace Vernet, Alfred Dehodencq, and Adrien Dauzats.¹⁴⁶ The three most important artists of the exhibition, according to Gronkowski, were Delacroix, Fromentin, and Chassériau, all of whom had actually visited Algeria during their careers and who had done so during the first decades of the conquest: Delacroix went in 1832 at the invitation of the Comte de Mornay, Fromentin went three times (1846, 1847-1848, and 1852-

¹⁴⁴ Gronkowski, vii. Gronkowski wrote, “Nous avons cherché à rendre aussi vivante que possible l'évocation de notre grande colonie, envisagée dans la beauté de ses sites, la curiosité de ses mœurs et de son art, à propos de la lutte héroïque qui permit à la France de l'arracher à l'anarchie où se débattait cette contrée si riche et si délabrée depuis l'antiquité.”

¹⁴⁵ Gronkowski, 440.

¹⁴⁶ The work of many other well-known (in addition to lesser known) French Orientalists were also displayed including Pierre-Auguste Renoir, Henri Regnault, and Gustave-Achille Guillaumet.

1852), and Chassériau from May to July 1846. Gronkowski displayed a total of 23 works by Delacroix, 29 by Fromentin, and Chassériau was the most exhibited with 53 total works on display, 12 of which were paintings.¹⁴⁷ These works were arranged in the central salle. Dinet, who had died the previous year, was also amply represented with forty-four total works exhibited in a room devoted solely to him.¹⁴⁸ Gronkowski considered the artist, who spent most of his life in Algeria, wore a burnous, and even converted to Islam and completed a pilgrimage to Mecca, the symbol of the franco-Muslim union incarnate.¹⁴⁹

These works, which reproduced the long-enduring stereotypes, myths, and fantasies about Algeria and the rest of North Africa, were displayed didactically. The works were arranged chronologically beginning with those that depicted the landing of the French army at Sidi Ferruch, the battle of Staouéli, the victorious capture of Algiers, the subsequent campaign to Mascara and expedition to Médéa, and ending with the conquests of Constantine, Guelma, Blida, and Tlemcen.¹⁵⁰ The paintings, drawings, prints, and objects displayed at the exhibition were corroborated with letters of correspondence between French government officials and *emirs* and *deys* of the Ottoman empire, which were displayed as “historical evidence” in vitrines.¹⁵¹ Thus, the exhibition functioned to entertain viewers, tantalizing them with opulent scenes of a

¹⁴⁷ Works by Delacroix included *L'empereur du Maroc*, *Le prince Mahmoud ben Ayad*, *Aline la mulatresse*, *La fantasia*, *Les cavaliers arabes*, *L'emir Mahmoud Ben Ayad*, and *Les femmes d'Alger dans leur intérieur* (including both watercolor sketches). Among Fromentin's works there was *La chasse au faucon* plus several sketches of cavaliers, Arab women, and a view of Laghouat.

¹⁴⁸ Roger Benjamin, “Colonial Museology in Algiers,” in *Orientalist Aesthetics: Art, Colonialism, and French North Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 250–51. Although he was well-represented at the exhibition at the Petit Palais, Dinet actually spoke out against the centenary proceedings. In a letter to his sister, quoted in Benjamin, Dinet quite prophetically insisted, “As for the centenary itself . . . I am certain that no honest reform in favor of the Muslims will be made. Success in the eyes of the world is assured (except in its treatment of the Muslims) because France has realized an admirable work, but all the hearts of truly honest Muslims will be profoundly sickened. . . The centenary should be the occasion for reforms cementing the union of the French colonists' Muslim brothers by the blood that all these heroes shed side by side during the war. . . If it is not, Bolshevism will conquer the ten to fifteen million Muslims in North Africa.”

¹⁴⁹ Gronkowski, *L'Exposition du centenaire de la conquête de l'Algérie*, 4.

¹⁵⁰ Weiss, *Le centenaire de l'Algérie Française*, 444–46.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 446.

fantastical, faraway place, but also to inform them of the French colonial project and its many victories.

A dominant theme of the exhibition, French military prowess, was aptly conveyed in reduced-scale reproductions of three well-known battle scene paintings by Horace Vernet: *Les colonnes d'assaut se mettent en mouvement lors du siège de Constantine, 13 octobre 1837* (figures 2.5 – 1838), *Assaut de Constantine, le 23 octobre 1837* (figure 2.6 – 1838-1839), and *Prise de la smalah d'Abd-el-Kader, le 10 mai 1843* (figure 2.7 – 1843-1845).¹⁵² These reproductions were much smaller in size than Vernet's original works, all of which had been commissioned by King Louis-Philippe and resided in the collections of the Château de Versailles. The originals were presumably not made available to Gronkowski for his Petit Palais exhibition given their enormous worth to the French state or perhaps because the Petit Palais might not have been able to accommodate such large works anyway – the *Prise de la smalah d'Abd-el-Kader* alone was almost twenty-two meters in length – within the parameters of the exhibition. Nonetheless, evoking these celebrated paintings of exciting, epic, and heroic battles that marked important French victories in the conquest of Algeria commemorated and exalted French military prowess. In each, French troops move in tight formation, overwhelming the enemies' disorganized and poorly armed forces. The reproductions were supplemented by the display of booty from the conquest: weapons, costumes, decorative objects, and metalwork,

¹⁵² Gronkowski does not provide much information about these reproductions, but all of them came from the collection of the Duc de Guise who was, in 1930, Jean of Orléans (1874-1940), whom Orléanists supporters recognized as the titular King of France. Due to the loi d'exil de 1886, which forbade the leaders of formerly royal families from entering France, the Duc lived near Rabat, Morocco. The exhibition catalog confirms that at least *Les colonnes d'assaut se mettent en mouvement lors du siège de Constantine, 13 octobre 1837* and *La prise de la smalah d'Abd-el-Kader*, both originally by Vernet, were reproduced in oil on canvas by French academic painter Léon Perrault (1832-1908). The reproduction of *Les colonnes d'assaut se mettent en mouvement lors du siège de Constantine, 13 octobre 1837*, completed by Perrault in 1865, measured 78.5 x 162 cm – much smaller in comparison to the original which measured 512 x 1039 cm. Perrault's reproduction of *La prise de la smalah d'Abd-el-Kader*, probably completed around the same time as the other reproduction, measured 50 x 214 cm in comparison to the original which measured over twenty-two meters in length.

displays that constituted the main source of representation of Arab and indigenous Algerians in the exhibition, and limiting their portrayal to signs of their defeat.¹⁵³

The fantasy of the harem was also a theme of the exhibition and evoked through the inclusion of Chassériau's *Jeune fille maure assise dans un riche intérieur* (figure 2.8 – 1853) and *Intérieur de harem* (figure 2.9 – 1849-1856) and Delacroix's second tableau of *Les femmes d'Alger dans leur appartement* (figure 2.10 – 1847-1849), loaned to the exhibition from the Musée Fabre in Montpellier. Perhaps not as beloved or celebrated as Delacroix's original harem scene created in 1834, these paintings still contain the key tropes that nineteenth-century French artists circulated regarding the sexuality of Muslim women, although, of course, it is well known now that the women that these artists had access to were most likely Jewish, and that these scenes were studio creations and inventions of the artists' imaginations.¹⁵⁴

Shown cloistered within opulent interiors, Chassériau and Delacroix's paintings reified the Orientalist myth that Islam was a uniquely sexist religion. The propagation of this myth, which emphasized the mistreatment of Muslim women, lent the colonial project an air of nobility. The sensuality of the scene and the passive availability of the women also register the sexual desire intrinsic to French colonialism, a process of conquest and domination that mapped quite neatly onto the sexual pursuit and obtainment of Muslim woman. Here, Delacroix quite

¹⁵³ Weiss, 448. Notably, there were two photographs and a painted portrait of Emir Abd-el-Kader included in the exhibition. A photograph of the Emir on his horse in his regalia is reproduced in the catalogue, demonstrating that depictions of Arab and indigenous Algerians were not completely ones of humiliation or references to their submission in battle. However, Abd-el-Kader represents an exception to the general rule. He was allotted more respect by French military leaders due to how long he was able to evade them. Nevertheless, items retrieved after the capture of his Smalah alongside the reproduction of Vernet's painting make it clear that the narrative here was still one about the domination and submission of Algeria's Arab and indigenous inhabitants.

¹⁵⁴ Albert Boime, "Delacroix's Invitation to the Jewish Wedding in Morocco," in *Orientalism, Eroticism and Modern Visuality in Global Cultures* (London and New York: Routledge, 2016), 55–82. Boime's extensive discussion on the artist's prevalent use of Jewish models is quite informative, although the author himself admits that Delacroix might have succeeded in entering a harem (although that of a Jewish convert to Islam). More importantly, Boime also points out that even if Delacroix had been successfully in gaining entry to a harem, harem-dwellers could have belonged to any number of ethnic and religious groups, including Christian.

literally lifts the veil on the harem through the servant figure who pulls back the curtain to reveal multiple sexually available women, one of whom is already in a reclined position on a pallet, the milky, soft skin of her chest exposed, and her inviting gaze welcoming the viewer. Paintings such as this partially fulfilled desires that viewers were not able to act on in reality.

But why was Chassériau, an artist whose contemporaries routinely characterized him as a less accomplished synthesis (or perhaps derivation) of Ingres and Delacroix, displayed so prominently?¹⁵⁵ And why choose *Deux cavaliers arabes devant une fontaine de Constantine romaine* (figure 2.11 – 1851) for the exhibition’s official poster (figure 2.12 – 1930)? The prevalence and prominence of Chassériau’s work in the exhibition was likely due to the influence of Baron Arthur Chassériau, a descendant of the artist. The Baron was an ardent supporter of the arts and devoted to keeping Chassériau’s memory alive. The artist’s work, including *Deux cavaliers*, lined the walls of his Paris home and he spent much of his fortune tracking down the artist’s painting and drawings as well as his former models. His labors culminated in multiple donations to the French state throughout the first third of the twentieth century.¹⁵⁶

The Baron also had another familial connection to Algeria, and one of considerably more prestige. His father, Frédéric (cousin to the artist), had been appointed chief architect of Algiers in 1849. Frédéric’s most lauded accomplishment was the Boulevard de l’Impératrice, a sea-front avenue still existent today (although it is now called the Boulevard Che Guevara), that radically transformed the city from an enclosed, Turkish citadel into a Europeanized city. The first stones were laid in 1860 in the presence of Napoléon III and the Empress Eugénie. More than any other architectural transformation, the arcades of the new avenue framed and displayed

¹⁵⁵ Stéphane Guégan, Vincent Pomarède, and Louis-Antoine Prat, *Théodore Chassériau (1819-1856): The Unknown Romantic* (New York, New Haven, and London: Metropolitan Museum of Art and Yale University Press, 2002), 14.

¹⁵⁶ Guégan, Pomarède, and Prat, 17–18.

Algiers as conquered.¹⁵⁷ This was a considerable point of pride for the Baron, who provided three views to the exhibition of the boulevard prior to and after its construction, two of which were sketched by his father.¹⁵⁸

Due to his father's position as chief architect, the Baron lived much of his youth and early adulthood in Algeria. He was born in Algiers in 1850, and after attending elementary school in Paris, he returned to Algeria to complete his secondary studies. He then served, like many of his family members before him (his grandfather had served Napoléon at Waterloo) in the military, fighting for the empire in Kabylia in 1861. After his military service, he returned to Paris where he worked for the Compagnie Algérienne, a major bank with vast holdings in Algeria, beginning in 1868.¹⁵⁹

The Baron was thus, in more than one way, intimately bound to the early years of the French conquest of Algeria. Gronkowski acknowledged this in the exhibition catalogue: "In closing, I would like to particularly thank personalities from the world of arts and science, who very kindly and cordially gave us help in our effort. I will cite in particular Monsieur le Baron Chassériau who, not content with opening to us so liberally his magnificent collections, gave us advice from his experience of all things Algerian."¹⁶⁰ Gronkowski's comments underline that it was the Baron's vision of Algeria that in large part shaped the appearance of the Paris centenary celebrations.

¹⁵⁷ Federico Cresti, "The Boulevard de l'Impératrice in Colonial Algiers (1860-1866)," ed. Attilo Petruccioli, *Environmental Design: Journal of the Islamic Environmental Design Research Centre 1*, 1985, 54–59.

¹⁵⁸ Gronkowski, *L'Exposition du centenaire de la conquête de l'Algérie*, 6.

¹⁵⁹ Guégan, Pomarède, and Prat, 16.

¹⁶⁰ Gronkowski, *L'Exposition du centenaire de la conquête de l'Algérie*, 9. "En terminant, je tiens à remercier tout particulièrement les personnalités du monde des arts et de la science, qui nous ont très aimablement et cordialement aidés dans notre effort. Je citerai notamment M. le baron Chassériau qui, non content de nous ouvrir si Libéralement ses magnifiques collections, nous prodigua les conseils de son expérience des choses algériennes."

Although Chassériau's prominence can be explained by nepotism, an even more important question remains: Why was *Deux cavaliers*, a work that received little attention when it was first shown at the Salon of 1851 in Bordeaux, chosen as the face of the exhibition? Why not, for example, a more notable work like the celebrated *Ali-Ben-Hamet, Caliph of Constantine and Chief of the Haractas followed by his Escort* (figure 2.13 – 1845) which, although commissioned by the sitter, truly evoked French colonial ideology of the mid-nineteenth century. Chassériau painted the portrait after meeting the caliph (خليفة) in Paris in 1844 when several Arab chiefs visited France for diplomatic purposes. The caliph's city, Constantine, had been under French control since 1837, and it was due to chieftains like Ali-Ben-Hamet, who allied themselves with the French, that Abd-el-Kader's rebellion ultimately failed. *L'Illustration* reported that, despite Abd-el-Kader's continued resistance, "we at least can take satisfaction in having some Arab chiefs, our allies, in Paris at this time, who have come to contemplate this civilization that it is our duty to transplant in Africa."¹⁶¹ To the French then, the caliph as well as his visit to France, embodied French colonial success and signaled that the French presence was desired by the Arab inhabitants of Algeria.

Moreover, submitting to being painted itself was also understood as an act of submission. *L'Illustration* declared that in "disregarding the old prejudices of Muslim orthodoxy, [the Arab chieftains] obligingly consented to pose at the home of one of our contributors, just a day after they arrived. [...] These Muslims, devoted to the interests of our nation, and compromised in the eyes of their coreligionists for having embraced our cause, deserve the reception given them."¹⁶² The portrait of Ali-Ben-Hamet, which was by far the more well-known painting, and which had

¹⁶¹ "Histoire de la semaine," in *L'Illustration*, 4, no. 95 (December 24, 1844) : 1-2. Quoted in Guégan, Pomarède, and Prat, *Théodore Chassériau (1819-1856): The Unknown Romantic*, 234.

¹⁶² "Les Chefs arabes," in *L'Illustration*, 4, no. 97 (January 4, 1845) : 1-2. Quoted in Guégan, Pomarède, and Prat, 234.

represented in the minds of the French, an act of Arab submission to France, would have seemingly been far more appropriate at the occasion of the centenary. It was also available given that it was already included in the exhibition having been loaned to the Petit Palais by the Musée National de Versailles. The institution had received it as a gift from the Baron in 1882.¹⁶³

An understanding of the history of how France administrated Algeria at the time these two paintings were made, in the 1840s and 1850s, versus how it administrated the colony at the time of the centenary in 1930 is needed to explain this decision. When Chassériau painted *Deux cavaliers* and the portrait of Ali-Ben-Hamet, General Bugeaud (Gouverneur Général of Algeria 1841-1847) used an indirect government system entrusted to Arab chiefs of military or religious nobility who still retained influence over the local population.¹⁶⁴ In other words, the French military overtook the system that was in place when they instituted themselves in Algeria. Local *bureaux arabes* were established which were run by both French and Arab and indigenous personnel. These French officers spoke Arabic and familiarized themselves with Muslim life.¹⁶⁵ Under the Second Empire of Napoléon III, Algeria's indigenous habitants were governed similarly. However, European settlers began to push back against the *bureaux arabes*, especially after Napoléon referred to Algeria as an Arab kingdom, making settlers feel that their presence and accomplishments were neither acknowledged nor appreciated. With the collapse of the Second Empire in 1871, the influence of the *bureaux arabes* dissipated rapidly and a new civil regime that prioritized the needs of settlers was instituted. The Arab chiefs who had enjoyed the

¹⁶³ Guégan, Pomarède, and Prat, 234.

¹⁶⁴ Charles Ageron, *Modern Algeria: A History from 1830 to the Present*, trans. Michael Brett (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1991), 22.

¹⁶⁵ Ageron, 23.

favor of Napoléon III despaired at what the outcome might be and instituted a mass uprising which some 800,000 Arabs and Berbers joined but which was inevitably quashed.¹⁶⁶

Their defeat spelled victory for the settlers and was a turning point in administrative relations between French colonial authorities and the colonized subjects of Algeria. Admiral de Gueyon, governor from 1871 to 1873, was sympathetic toward the *colons* and vigorously opposed the maintenance of Algeria's Arab character. In contrast to his predecessors who worked closely with Arab chieftains, Gueyon conversely sought to break down any remaining resistance.¹⁶⁷ In 1881, the Code de l'indigénat came into effect, allowing for the administration to imprison or fine any indigenous person without trial for any offense that supposedly subverted law and order. By 1900, the *grands chefs* of the Muslim aristocracy upon whom the French had relied in the early days had lost much of their influence. Instead of the *bureaux arabes*, Algeria came increasingly under a civil administration that was biased in favor of settlers.¹⁶⁸

The deterioration between formerly valued Arab chieftains and French colonial officials worsened when France entered the Rif War in Morocco (1921-1926), an armed liberation struggle in Morocco led by Riffian leader Abd el-Krim (1882-1963) against the Spanish protectorate of Morocco (1912-1956), in 1924. Within those five years, Abd-el-Krim succeeded in organizing a large army, recruiting guerilla fighters, and founding a fully independent (though short-lived) Islamic republic that was strong enough to threaten French imperial interests in Morocco and even in neighboring Algeria.¹⁶⁹ The Rif administration had a functioning central bureaucracy, a Muslim legal code, a prison system, and an international supply network. Riffian forces also had an effective offensive capacity. They were mobile and equipped with repeat-

¹⁶⁶ Ageron, 50–52.

¹⁶⁷ Ageron, 47.

¹⁶⁸ Ageron, 65.

¹⁶⁹ David H. Slavin, "The French Left and the Rif War, 1924-1925: Racism and the Limits of Internationalism," *Journal of Contemporary History* 26, no. 1 (1991): 5.

firing rifles that had been captured from Spanish army units.¹⁷⁰ The initial attacks that the Rif army mounted against French troops resulted in French casualties exceeding 1,000 dead and 3,700 injured.¹⁷¹

At first, the moderate Resident General of France in Morocco, Louis Hubert Lyautey (1854-1934) sought a more diplomatic solution to the conflict and engaged only in light military action. He sought to cut off Abd-el-Krim's local support by exploiting intelligence about tribal allegiances and distributed funds and favors to pacify dissident local leaders. However, Lyautey's strategy was too much of a slow-burn for politicians in the metropole who criticized the mounting financial cost of the war. Eventually, Abd-el-Krim's rebellion was crushed by Marshal Pétain, who joined Spanish forces (led by the young Colonel Francisco Franco amongst others) to direct a ruthless offensive backed by artillery and air power.¹⁷² Lyautey was then replaced as Resident General by Théodore Steeg who multiplied the number of French officials, placing them even in lower positions that were formerly held by Moroccans.¹⁷³ In sum, political unrest in Morocco undermined faith in France's supposed aptitude as a ruler of Muslim societies in the 1920s and brought about a major change in French political and military strategy. While the French government in Algeria and Morocco had formerly relied on complex formulas of indirect control that relied on collaboration with local elites and tribal leaders, these relations eventually broke down and the colonial state ultimately adopted a strategy of direct administration.

¹⁷⁰ Martin Thomas, *The French Empire Between the Wars: Imperialism, Politics and Society* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 214.

¹⁷¹ Thomas, 212.

¹⁷² Thomas, 215–16.

¹⁷³ John Damis, "Developments in Morocco under the French Protectorate, 1925-1943," *Middle East Journal* 24, no. 1 (Winter 1970): 76.

On the heels of the Rif War in Morocco, the French colonial state also received a challenge in the imperial capital itself: the emergence of an Algerian nationalist movement in Paris. Following World War I, Muslim Algerians living in the metropole saw the urgent need to organize political parties that promoted their cause. Messali Hadj founded the Étoile Nord-Africain (ENA) in Paris in 1926.¹⁷⁴ The ENA, which envisioned itself as a party of Muslim proletariats, was steadfastly supportive of Algerian independence from France and even circulated its own journal called *El Ouma*. The contents of the journal were considered so dangerous by French authorities that it had to be smuggled into Algeria secretly.¹⁷⁵ As the party grew, the French colonial administration began to fear the ENA so deeply that it forced it to dissolve in 1929; by then, planning for the centenary celebrations was well underway.¹⁷⁶

Returning to Chassériau's portrait of Ali-Ben-Hamet, it is now clear why this painting would not have been selected for the exhibition's poster. Chassériau's flattering portrait of Ali-Ben-Hamet portrays him as a stalwart military leader followed by an impressive entourage. The broad shoulders of the caliph eclipse his subordinates and he appears as a confident and proud leader with a calm, unquestioned authority. The rifles of his escort, who are fearsome in their own right, frame the caliph's intimidating form. Although his horse froths from the mouth, the caliph exudes control, holding the reins unperturbed in his left hand. Both the artist and his painting were celebrated at the Salon of 1845. Some critics said that the work even rivaled Delacroix's *Sultan of Morocco* of the same year.¹⁷⁷ Of course, this warm reception is

¹⁷⁴ Nedjib Sidi Moussa, "Les Messalistes et la gauche française : alliances, ruptures et transactions dans l'entre-deux-guerres," *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire*, no. 131 (2016): 72.

¹⁷⁵ Moussa, 74.

¹⁷⁶ Marisa Fois, "Algerian Nationalism: From the Origins to Algerian War of Independence," *Oriente Moderno* 97, no. 1 (2017): 93.

¹⁷⁷ "Europe 1700- 1900," *The Metropolitan Museum of Art Bulletin*, Recent Acquisitions: A Selection 1996-1997, 55, no. 2 (Autumn 1997): 46.

unsurprising given the comparatively more favorable political status of a caliph in the 1840s during which time he was regarded as an ally and important collaborator.

However, this certainly would not work in 1930, with the frustrations of the Rif War still in mind and the importance of the *grands chefs* a thing of the past in Algeria, making *Deux cavaliers* the more politically agreeable picture for the centenary exhibition. In this decidedly less grand depiction of an Arab horseman (figure 2.12), every detail from the horseman's costume to his disposition, to the scene itself is rendered in less impressive terms. Instead of the athletic, imposing horse seen in the portrait of Ali-Ben-Hamet, the horse in *Deux cavaliers* drinks languidly from a trough with his rider slightly slumped in the saddle. Next to Ali-Ben-Hamet, these cavaliers are quite unremarkable. The humble origins of the riders, whose features, according to Chassériau's notes, were based on an Arab groom that he saw while in Constantine, are implied through the bare feet of the cavalier on the white horse.¹⁷⁸

The poster reproduction of *Deux cavaliers* used for the exhibition, although fairly faithful to Chassériau in design, is even more flaccid. Rendered in mostly black and white, the ornate saddle bags, reins, and firearms of the two cavaliers, appear schematic and even uninteresting. The creators of the poster chose to present not a confident Arab leader, or even any of Chassériau's (many) more purposeful horsemen, but a slouching, sluggish figure. These changes further enhanced Chassériau's already stereotypical portrayal of Muslims as atavistic inhabitants of a land mired in backwardness and fallen from its formerly prestigious place in the Roman Empire (referenced by the Roman fountain from which the horses drink).

Two main conclusions can be drawn from Gronkowski's centenary exhibition in Paris. First, French Algeria, at least in the French metropolitan imagination, remained an orientalist

¹⁷⁸ Guégan, Pomarède, and Prat, *Théodore Chassériau (1819-1856): The Unknown Romantic*, 313.

fantasy of camels, dunes, and harems – a depiction that, as will be seen, settlers in Algeria considered a major misconception.¹⁷⁹ Second, while Weiss acknowledged the large Algerian population living in the metropole and situated the centenary celebrations as part of a broader effort to forge better relations with them, the exclusion of their point of view from the centenary celebrations demonstrates that equal partnership among colonial subjects and French citizens was still far from realized.

Oran 1930

Approaching the centenary exhibition, visitors would have first seen its large entrance formed by two enormous minarets joined by an archway ornately decorated with fanciful arabesques (figure 2.14). The walls encircling the exhibition were reminiscent of the old citadels of Oran and nearby Algiers. Visitors might have been surprised by what they saw on the other side of this undoubtedly monumental Islamic portal (although inauthentic since minarets are traditionally an architectural element of a mosque): a wide boulevard lined on either side with pavilions whose architecture was a strange mixture of classical and modern elements that made them simultaneously reminiscent of modern factories and French bureaucratic buildings (figure 2.15). These structures were dedicated to Algeria's major exports, agriculture (figure 2.16), and its major imports, automobiles (figure 2.17), furniture (figure 2.18), and transportation. Opposite the portal and at the other end of the avenue was the Grand Palais, its imposing façade comprised of a classical colonnade and quadrangular dome (see figure 2.14). The interior of the Grand

¹⁷⁹ Gautier traveled to Algeria in 1845 and visited Algiers, Kabylia, Blida, Cherchell, Oran, and the Constantinois. He was familiar with the work of Delacroix and Chassériau. *Voyage en Algérie* was published in 1845.

Palais was richly decorated with handmade rugs made by indigenous girls and boys from Oran, Chelalla, Mostaganem, Bougie, Miliana, and Tlemcen.¹⁸⁰

The exhibition's architectural and decorative program, which merged Islamic, Classical, and Modern design elements, was part and parcel of the approach that the organizing committee took to presenting French Algeria at the centenary exhibition, the first and only major retrospective that the colony received, and a direct means of tackling what organizers saw as a public relations problem. The organizers, most of whom were colonial government officials of French descent, resented that most French citizens in the mainland had a shallow knowledge of French Algeria. As the Grand Commissioner of the exhibition, Gustave Mercier (1871-1953), wrote, French citizens had been "bored by the banality of tourist circuits and hotels," and the centenary would "allow all French people who are still unaware of it to touch this emerging empire, to realize it in their minds, to finally understand that the Fatherland is no longer just the reunion of small provinces united by history over the ages around Capetian royalty, but something truly global, planetary."¹⁸¹ Exhibition organizers sought to make of the centenary an object lesson in all things Algerian and demonstrate to visitors that Algeria had progressed from a colonial experiment to an extension of France herself. However, while the organizers emphasized the modernity of Algeria's industries and the innovation of the colonists, they were careful to continue characterizing the Arab and indigenous population as primitive and as the foil to the figure of the colonist who was shown as innovative, industrious, and culturally mature.

¹⁸⁰ Gustave Mercier, *Le centenaire de l'Algérie. Exposé d'ensemble. Tome 2.* (Algiers: Éditions P. and G. Soubiron, 1931), 21.

¹⁸¹ Gustave Mercier, *Le centenaire de l'Algérie. Exposé d'ensemble. Tome 1.* (Algiers: Éditions P. and G. Soubiron, 1931), 9–10. "...permettre à tous les Français qui l'ignorent encore de toucher du doigt cet empire naissant, de le réaliser dans leur esprit, de comprendre enfin que la Patrie n'est plus seulement la réunion des petites provinces soudées par l'histoire au cours des âges autour de la royauté capétienne, mais quelque chose de vraiment mondial, de planétaire."

Oran was mindfully chosen as the locale best suited for this propagandistic venture. In a carefully worded interview with Eugène Cruck, a reporter for *Le monde colonial illustré*,

Mercier explained the thinking behind this choice:

The economic richness of Algeria and her agricultural production will be spread before the eye of the visitor to the general exposition that we are installing in Oran, in this city which was, in 1830, only a small village, and which counts today more than 170,000 inhabitants. One could not find a more evocative setting, a more striking example of the splendid flourishing of a once uncultivated country, torn from barbarism by the fruitful work of the Mediterranean races, thanks to the genius leadership of the mother country. Oran, which has become one of France's largest ports, will present, in a very beautiful exposition, a showcase of Algerian products, and also an ensemble of metropolitan objects sold and consumed in Algeria because, do not forget, Algeria remains France's greatest client.¹⁸²

Oran, according to Mercier, best showcased the economic and industrial success of French colonialism, a process that had transformed what had formerly been an unproductive, primitive trading post. Mercier's claims, however, were patently false. Oran had served as a major port since the Spanish period (1509–1708, 1732–1792).

In addition to Mercier, the planning of the centenary was overseen by the Superior Council, which comprised an elite group of French colonial officials, military leaders, and businessmen, including but not limited to the mayor of Algiers, Charles Brunel, as well as the President of Public Work, Trains, and Mines, the director of the Bank of Algeria, and the President of the Chamber of Commerce.¹⁸³ Among the twenty-two men who made up the Superior Council, there were also two Arab delegates, Benchenane Sisbane and Mustapha

¹⁸² Eugène Cruck, "L'Exposition générale d'Oran," *Le monde colonial illustré: Revue mensuelle, commerciale, économique, financière et de défense des intérêts coloniaux*, January 1930, 77^e édition, 93. "La richesse économique de l'Algérie, sa production agricole, seront étalées sous les yeux du visiteur dans une exposition générale que l'on installe à Oran, dans cette ville qui n'était, en 1830, qu'une bourgade, et qui compte aujourd'hui plus de 170,000 habitants. On ne pouvait trouver un cadre plus évocateur, un exemple plus frappant de l'épanouissement splendide d'une contrée jadis inculte, arrachée à la barbarie par le travail fécond des races méditerranéennes, grâce au génie animateur de la mère patrie. Oran, qui devient des plus grands ports français, présentera dans une très belle exposition le tableau de tous les produits de l'activité algérienne, et aussi l'ensemble des objets métropolitains vendus et consommés en Algérie, car, ne l'oublions pas, l'Algérie reste la meilleure cliente de la France."

¹⁸³ Mercier, *Le centenaire de l'Algérie. Exposé d'ensemble. Tome 1.*, 41.

Mouley, and one Kabyle delegate, Smail Si Salah. The composition of the exhibition's leadership demonstrates that Arab and indigenous Algerians were by far the minority voice.¹⁸⁴

The Superior Council oversaw a multitude of special commissions, the most important of which to the discussion here was the Commission of Publicity and Propaganda. This commission was tasked with attracting visitors to the exhibition and, most importantly, communicating the platform of the colonial administration to the general public.¹⁸⁵ The Commission worked in conjunction with the Metropolitan Committee of Propaganda, which was overseen by the Minister of the Interior, André Tardieu.¹⁸⁶ The Metropolitan Committee was seated in Paris and tasked with shaping public opinion in the mainland about France's continued presence in Algeria.

A large portion of the exhibition's budget was spent on propaganda which was broadcast far and wide. Of the nearly 94 million francs spent on the exhibition, propaganda accounted for 11.85 million of the budget. 2.45 million francs were spent on propaganda by the metropolitan committee, 3.65 million francs were spent on disseminating propaganda in the press, 3.25 million francs were spent on books, posters, conferences, postcards, film, stamps, and medallions, and 2.5 million francs were spent on radio advertisements.¹⁸⁷ Mercier reports that in addition to circulating propaganda in France and Algeria, propaganda was also disseminated to Canada, the United States, England, Germany, Holland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Spain, and Italy.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁴ Mercier, *Le centenaire de l'Algérie. Exposé d'ensemble. Tome 1.*, 34.

¹⁸⁵ Weiss, *Le centenaire de l'Algérie Française*, 85.

¹⁸⁶ Weiss, 80.

¹⁸⁷ Gustave Mercier, *Le centenaire de l'Algérie. Exposé d'ensemble. Tome 1.*, 112. Mercier reports that a total of 93,078,500 francs were allotted for the centenary.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid*, 124.

Three main guiding forces drove the exhibition's propaganda: 1) Attract the world to Algeria in 1930; 2) Instruct the world on France's achievements in Algeria over the last one hundred years; and 3) Shape a positive view on French Algeria in the mainland. Tardieu charged the Metropolitan Commission of Propaganda with this work on June 5, 1929. His address is worth quoting at length:

Your commission has a special objective. When, in arriving here, I studied the program of the celebrations of the centenary for the first time, I believed it indispensable that the French opinion was associated with it in a large and direct manner. The French are, unfortunately, too little informed on our colonial empire. They too often ignore its material and moral value to us. The Centennial celebrations should not take place overseas without the people of the Metropole realizing their full significance. This is why we have established in Paris the body that you constitute and whose specific task will be to inform the French precisely of France's work in Algeria. We want to organize a system of conferences in our schools, and alongside the school system, use wireless communication, the cinema, the poster, the stamp, all the processes of which modern publicity is composed. The Centenary will be a manifestation of civilizing force, a material and moral work, a demonstration of our ability to lay deep roots overseas, an affirmation of French vigor.¹⁸⁹

Weiss was equally forthcoming about this objective in his text, *Le centenaire de l'Algérie française* (1930). Like Tardieu, Weiss emphasized the "moral work" that France was doing in Algeria:

To create a lasting movement of opinion in mainland France in favor of French Algeria; to demonstrate that, in the past, the work of the Mère-Patrie was for our empire and particularly for the constitution of the French African school of thought wherein our doctrines of gentleness, humanity, and progress in colonial matters were formed and confirmed by the experience of all; to shed light on the

¹⁸⁹ Weiss, *Le centenaire de l'Algérie française*, 83–85. Tardieu's address is quoted by Weiss: "Votre commission a un objet spéciale. Quand, en arrivant ici, j'ai étudié pour la première fois le programme des fêtes du centenaire, j'ai cru indispensable que l'opinion française y fut associée d'une façon large et directe. Les Français sont, malheureusement, trop peu renseignés sur notre empire colonial. Il ne fallait pas que les fêtes du Centenaire se déroulassent outre-mer sans que le peuple de la Métropole en sentît la pleine signification. C'est pourquoi nous avons institué à Paris l'organisme que vous constituez et dont la tâche propre sera d'informer exactement la France de l'œuvre française en Algérie. [...] Nous voulons organiser un système de conférences à l'école et, à côté de l'école, utiliser la T.S.F., le cinéma, l'affiche ; le timbre, tous les procédés enfin dont se compose la publicité moderne. [...] Le Centenaire sera une manifestation de force civilisatrice, une œuvre matérielle et morale, une démonstration de notre capacité de jeter outre-mer des racines profondes, une affirmation d'énergie française."

links which unite the Sahara to all of our Mediterranean possessions and make it possible to affirm that France extends from the North Sea to the Congo.”¹⁹⁰

The Commission of Publicity and Propaganda in Oran relied in part on the circulation of large, vibrant, and visually attractive artistic posters, several of which were primarily shown in Paris. Eight posters were commissioned from various artists, five of which were general advertisements and three brought attention to more specific celebrations. 125,000 prints were made of the five general models, which will be the center of focus here, and were circulated broadly throughout France, the rest of Europe, and North America.¹⁹¹ While it is reasonable to assume that these posters were likely displayed in public venues in Paris, Mercier does not note the extent to which the posters were actually displayed anywhere else.

French artist Henri Dormoy designed the most widely printed of the eight (figure 2.19 – 1930). The poster was reserved specifically for the metropole and, according to Mercier, shown principally in schools throughout France.¹⁹² In the poster, the figure of a colonizer, wearing a pith helmet and jodhpurs, appears to be in conversation with a *grand chef arab*. The colonizer stands authoritatively with one hand on his hip and the other paternalistically around the *grand chef*. The entire scene is foregrounded by a display of agricultural exports including grapes, lemons, oranges, olives, tomatoes, and wheat, symbolizing that the colonial project has come to beautiful fruition. In the background, we see the metaphorical harvest of one hundred years of colonization. A sliver of coastline subtly reminds the French viewer that these products were in turn exported to the metropole.

¹⁹⁰ Weiss, 85–86: “Créer un mouvement d’opinion durable dans la France métropolitaine en faveur de la France algérienne; démontrer que, dans le passé, l’œuvre de la Mère-Patrie fut pour notre empire et particulièrement pour la constitution de l’Afrique française école où se formèrent et où furent confirmées par l’expérience toutes nos doctrines de douceur, d’humanité, et de progrès en matière coloniale; mettre en lumière les liens qui rattachent le Sahara à l’ensemble de nos possessions méditerranéennes et permettent d’affirmer que la France s’étend de la mer du Nord au Congo, tels étaient les buts à atteindre.”

¹⁹¹ Mercier, *Le Centenaire de l’Algérie. Exposé d’ensemble. Tome 1.*, 142.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*

Although the visual parity of the *colon* and *grand chef* in the poster allot the colonized more respect than was given to them at previous colonial exhibitions, and also evokes the politics of “association” that the French were promoting at the time, Dormoy still carefully differentiates the two figures. Dormoy has rendered the teeth of the *grand chef* somewhat sharp and animal-like. In stark contrast, the French *colon* is given a classical jawline and stands in an elegant *contrapposto* stance, illuminated by the sun. While the *grand chef* is portrayed as comparatively crude and unlearned, the *colon* is shown as generous, knowledgeable, fashionable, and civilized. Furthermore, while the relationship between colonizer and colonized is presented as peaceful and collaborative, a clear delineation is made between who had architected the agricultural success of Algeria and who provided the manpower.

This collaborative relationship in which the role of colonizer and colonized are unmistakably defined can also be observed in S.M. Salgé’s poster for the centenary as well (figure 2.20 – 1930). The poster, which features the Oran port, was specially reserved for circulation in the city of Oran, according to Mercier.¹⁹³ Another *grand chef*, carrying perhaps a rod or baton of command, gazes into the distance to which a French colon gestures, symbolically ushering the *indigène* into the future. As in Dormoy’s poster, a clear division between the two figures is made. The Arab man is placed among symbols of agricultural success, such as citrus fruits, wheat, grapes, and a ram, suggesting that he too is a *faire-valoir* of the colony, whereas the colonist is placed among symbols of European industrialism: a large crane, tractor, and several massive steamships. The Oran crest of arms at the bottom of the poster reproduces these divisions. It bears several symbols of France, the fleurs de lis and the Gallic rooster, as well as multiple symbols of Oran’s Barbary past, red barbary lions and a ship with billowing sails. One

¹⁹³ Mercier, 144.

section of the crest represents the city's Islamic character: a white crescent and star on a green background.

As Dormoy and Salgé's posters demonstrate, French settlers clearly viewed themselves as the architects of Algeria's agricultural and industrial progress. This was a reality that, as Jean Mélia (who, by the way, was by that time's standards, a leftist indigène-sympathizer), said even the colonial subjects of Algeria knew and accepted:

Without doubt, all of this is the work of the common effort, of colons, of industrial and factory workers, of functionaries and of indigenes, but the part of the colons is the most important; and it's in this sense that, to the Financial Delegation of Algeria, M. le Bach-acha Ben Siam, on June 23, 1918, spoke these words to which we subscribe, 'It's the French colon who rendered this country prosperous, don't forget it.'¹⁹⁴

By implying that even indigènes know that it was the French colons to thank for Algeria's success, Mélia subtly ribs metropolitan viewers whom he, like many other settlers, felt were ignorant about the "real" Algeria.

Like Salgé, Léon Cauvy, an artist whose work we saw in chapter 1, also selected a bustling port as the setting for his poster, although, based on the colonnade of the Boulevard de l'Impératrice, the white casbah, and the Mosquée de la pêcheurie seen in the background, this port was that of Algiers (figure 2.21 – 1930). 30,000 copies were circulated in France, Algeria, and internationally.¹⁹⁵ Unlike Salgé, however, Cauvy excludes pictorial reference to the French *colon*. Embedded in everyday life in the colony, where he lived and worked as an artist for most of his life, Cauvy's composition explores the cultural heterogeneity of the port more fully than Salgé. The artist's familiarity with Algerian culture is exemplified by the figure in the

¹⁹⁴ Jean Mélia, *Le centenaire de la conquête de l'Algérie et les réformes indigènes* (Paris: Imprimerie Graphique, 1930), 10–11. "Sans doute, tout cela est l'œuvre de l'effort commun, des colons, des industriels et des ouvriers, des fonctionnaires et des indigènes, mais la part des colons est la plus importantes ; et c'est en ce sens qu'aux Délégations Financières de l'Algérie, le 23 juin 1918, M. le Bach-acha Ben Siam prononce ces paroles auxquelles nous souscrivons : 'C'est le colon français qui a rendu ce pays prospère, ne l'oublions pas.'"

¹⁹⁵ Mercier, *Le centenaire de l'Algérie. Exposé d'ensemble. Tome I.*, 143.

foreground who wears a *mdal*, a traditional hat usually made of alfalfa from the region of Oran. Much like Salgé and Dormoy, Cauvy creates a strong association between the dockworkers and the products staged for exportation among which they are crouched. However, while Cauvy focuses more on Algeria's ethnographic makeup, he has still included tell-tale signs of French colonialism through the inclusion of the crane and the steamships.

Another poster for the centenary, designed by an artist using the moniker of Santos, features similar themes of peace and collaboration (figure 2.22 – 1930). Again, the poster includes the recognizable forms of two figures: a French colon with his arm wrapped amiably around the shoulders of a Muslim Algerian. Unlike Dormoy and Salgé's posters, however, Santos does not include any pictorial reference to agriculture or Algerian exports and the indigenous man is not a young agricultural laborer, but an older, distinguished looking elder of the Muslim community that Mercier describes as having an "upright and loyal" expression.¹⁹⁶ Santos has also included one important detail: a French legion d'honneur medal pinned on the Muslim man's robes. The indigenous man seen in Santos poster is surely a "grand chef indigène," whose role had been visually diminished at the centenary exhibition at the Petit Palais, but was apparently still an important figure at the centenary exhibition in Oran. Several grands chefs were sent to Paris as Algerian dignitaries to take part in a grand parade that traveled down the grand Avenue de l'Opéra, the Champs Elysées, the Rue du Rivoli, and ended at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier where the grands chefs lit the commemorative flame.¹⁹⁷ Afterward, Mercier and Pierre Bordes, Gouverneur Général of Algeria, "strongly affirmed the loyalty of the indigenous populations, working in a perfect communion of ideas with the European population

¹⁹⁶ Mercier, *Le centenaire de l'Algérie. Exposé d'ensemble. Tome 1.*, 142–43.

¹⁹⁷ *Le Livre d'or du centenaire de l'Algérie française. L'Algérie - son histoire. L'Oeuvre française d'un siècle. Les manifestations du centenaire.*, 377.

for the greatness of France.”¹⁹⁸ While the status of the Arab nobility of old was now troubled, Santo’s inclusion of this *chef indigène* implies that the figure could still function to assure the French viewer of the cooperation of all Muslim Algerians in strengthening the French Empire.

In the fifth general poster for the exhibition, 10,000 copies of which were reserved exclusively for the metropole, artist Louis Marie Eude situates a large bundle of wheat on the backdrop of a clear blue sky (figure 2.23 – 1930).¹⁹⁹ Below the bundle of wheat, which Mercier says symbolizes the hour of harvest and the richness of Algerian soil, Eude included a small cityscape of traditional mudbrick houses. While the least elaborate of all the general posters for the exhibition, Eude still communicates the official narrative of the exhibition: one hundred years after conquest, the French were now harvesting the fruits of what they had sown.

The fraternal image of the French colon and indigène was reiterated elsewhere in centenary visual culture. The Propaganda Commission authorized two commemorative medallions as souvenirs for the centenary which, according to Mercier, were strongly associated with the Ancien Régime but were nonetheless useful objects in disseminating propaganda. Durable, luxurious, easily circulated, and unalterable, the commemorative medallion seemed the perfect item of memorabilia to bring back into style at the auspicious occasion of the centenary.²⁰⁰ The first was fashioned by George Béguet (1884-1952), a sculptor from Algiers of European descent who had made a name for himself after winning the coveted Grand Prix artistique de l’Algérie.²⁰¹ The medallion, of which 1,000 were produced, featured colon and indigène walking side-by-side carrying agricultural tools across a vast field of wheat (figure 2.24

¹⁹⁸ Ibid, 383. Original French: “[...] affirma hautement le loyalisme des populations indigènes, travaillant en une parfaite communion d’idées, avec la population européenne, à la grandeur de la France.”

¹⁹⁹ Mercier, *Le centenaire de l’Algérie. Exposé d’ensemble. Tome I.*, 143. The highest quality reproduction that I have located appears a greyish hue. Originally, the poster’s background featured a light, sky blue. The reproduction provided here has faded.

²⁰⁰ Mercier, 147.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

– 1930). According to Mercier, the medallion captured the “happy and prosperous work” taking place in Algeria. The French sculptor Pierre Poisson (1876-1953), an alumnus of the Villa Abd-el-Tif, designed the second medallion of which only 500 bronze copies were fashioned. On the front of the medallion, Poisson sculpted two powerfully masculine figures, a French colon and chef indigène shaking hands before a fasces topped with a bonnet rouge, a symbol of the French Revolution of 1789, and the capital letters R.F. (République Française), which Mercier said evoked the humanitarian efforts of the French conquest of Algeria (figure 2.25 – 1930). The bonnet rouge is rooted in classical history and served as an overt symbol of resistance when donned by French revolutionaries in the eighteenth century.²⁰² These references to Antiquity are heightened by the classicized robes of the indigenous man. An olive branch symbolizing peace rests at their feet and the two exchange, as Mercier wrote, “a look that says that they know what they each owe each other.”²⁰³ A wing of the Palais d’Été, residence of the Gouverneur Général de l’Algérie, and a cornucopia of Algeria’s main exports, a common symbol at the centenary, is seen on the other side of the medallion.

Although the visual culture of the centenary characterized Arab and indigenous Algerians as willing collaborators who were loyal and grateful to the French, this image was a heavily idealized version of the contemporary reality. Several events leading to the centenary had further strained relations between the colonizer and colonized. The cost of World War I among Algeria’s Arab and indigenous populations was enormous. In addition to the 150,000 to 160,000 Arab and indigenous Algerians soldiers that France conscripted, France also benefited from 78,556 recorded Algerian laborers who immigrated to the metropole during wartime.²⁰⁴ Despite

²⁰² Benjamin, “Colonial Museology in Algiers,” 232.

²⁰³ Mercier, *Le centenaire de l’Algérie. Exposé d’ensemble. Tome 1.*, 148.

²⁰⁴ Yvan Gastaut, Naïma Yah, and Pascal Blanchard, “La Grande Guerre des soldats et travailleurs coloniaux maghrébins,” *Centre d’Information et d’Études sur les migrations internationales*, Migrations Société, 6, no. 156

the enormous contributions that Arab and indigenous Algerians made to the war effort, World War I actually increased French anxieties about the security of her colonial possessions in Algeria. When the Ottoman Turks joined the Central Powers in 1914, colonial administrators worried that some Algerians might retain sympathies given Algeria's recent past as an Ottoman territory. Although these suspicions were preposterous at best, French officials imposed strict censorship laws on the Algerian press and even imprisoned some Islamic leaders who opposed the war.²⁰⁵

Arab and indigenous Algerians staged a revolt in the garrison town and rural center of Batna (in the Aurès) in 1916. Anti-colonial militants began attacking European-owned farms and administrative archives, burning them to the ground. These farms were explicit symbols of colonial domination and, to the colonized, represented the theft of their land. Although the precise goals of these insurgents are not known (since they left no explicit record), the resources and materials that they destroyed at European-owned farms hamstrung wartime efforts. They also made their opposition to heavy recruitment practices of Arab and indigenous Algerians known by targeting administrative offices and destroying conscription records.²⁰⁶

French political relations with Algeria went from bad to worse in the years after the armistice. Despite legislation passed in 1914 that guaranteed free circulation between France and Algeria, which would allow Arab and indigenous Algerians to travel to the metropole more

(2014): 123. Colonial troops were often sent to the most dangerous battle scenarios. This was part of a long tradition in the French Empire. Thomas, *The French Empire Between the Wars*, 17. In her article, Chantal Antier, "Le Recrutement dans l'empire colonial français, 1914-1918," *Presses Universitaires de France*, *Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains*, 2, no. 230 (2008): 27, Chantal Antier discusses a particularly brutal scenario early in the hostilities of the war in which two Algerian battalions were sent to Belgium where they were decimated. They were then replaced by the tirailleurs sénégalais who were also completely annihilated.

²⁰⁵ Thomas, *The French Empire Between the Wars*, 22. Thomas revealed through his research that Algerians often sang pro-German songs and believed that the Kaiser would protect Islam, thus these concerns were not entirely unfounded. Some Algerians also referred to the German leader as Hadj Kaiser, although, records suggest this was more so to frustrate the French and sow anxiety.

²⁰⁶ Jonathan Krause, "Islam and Anti-Colonial Rebellions in North and West Africa, 1914-1918," *The Historical Journal* 64, no. 3 (June 2021): 674–95, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0018246X20000357>.

easily in search of work, Algerian residency in France was severely limited at the end of the war. Considered too ethnographically distinct from the majority ethnic group, many Arab and indigenous Algerians were repatriated to their home country while France recruited workers from other European nations.²⁰⁷ Arab and indigenous Algerians returned home feeling rejected by the country to which many of their brethren had sacrificed their bodies and lives.

To make matters worse, poor harvests in 1917 and 1920 resulted in massive internal migrations from rural Algeria to the northern, industrialized cities of the coast such as Oran, Constantine, and Algiers where the Spanish Flu and typhus ravaged the inhabitants.²⁰⁸ Indigenous farmers were forced to sell their small plots of land to middle-class French farmers and to large, wealthy landowners.²⁰⁹ Farmers in Oran, the locale for the Centenary Exhibition, were among the most affected. Additionally, a new law was instituted in 1928 that further liquidated *arch* lands (عشيرة, *‘ašīraī*) and parceled them out to French landowners.²¹⁰ Arab and indigenous Algerians were pushed onto ever-decreasing plots of land that were overworked and underproductive.²¹¹ Only a quarter of this population was able to sustain themselves through subsistence farming and, over time, malnourishment became an endemic so grave that 64% of Arab and indigenous men called up for military service later in the decade were declared medically unfit to serve.²¹² Eude’s poster, featuring a giant bundle of wheat, would have appeared especially fraudulent and cruel to Arab and indigenous farmers who had suffered from perpetual famine had it been shown

²⁰⁷ Mary Dewhurst Lewis, *The Boundaries of the Republic: Migrant Rights and the Limits of Universalism in France* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 190.

²⁰⁸ Gilbert Meynier, *L’Algérie révélée: La Guerre de 1914-1918 et le premier quart du XXe siècle* (Geneva, Switzerland: Librairie Droz, 1981), 649.

²⁰⁹ James McDougall, *A History of Algeria* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 142.

²¹⁰ Didier Guignard, “Les inventeurs de la tradition ‘melk’ et ‘arch’ en Algérie,” in *Les acteurs des transformations foncières autour de la Méditerranée au XIXe Siècle*, ed. Didier Guignard and Vanessa Guéno, 2013, 50, <https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01401394>. John Ruedy, *Land Policy in Colonial Algeria: The Origins of the Rural Public Domain* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), 3.

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² Ibid.

in the colony. But French viewers, aside from those who paid close attention to the colonies, would likely not have known of the poster's cruel implication.

On the heels of a decade of hardship, the plight of Arab and indigenous Algerians was an enduring cause for concern in 1930 and a topic of private discussion at the centenary. In a report to the Congrès de la colonisation rurale, M. Charles Lévy (1870-1959), a financial delegate from Sétif, explained that the economic and social conditions of the *indigène* were deplorable and pointed out that many *indigènes* had taken to living in small, fortified villages near oases where they were unprotected from the elements in rudimentary stone constructions covered by canvas. In these small abodes, Lévy informed congressional members, animals and humans lived together in unhygienic quarters where malaria decimated entire communities. The plight of the *indigène* was multi-fold: famine, drought, destitution, joblessness, and homelessness.²¹³

However, Lévy argued that the victim was to blame, and that indigenous atavism was the true source of their unhappiness. He held that the *indigènes* were nomadic by tradition, used to living in tents, guided by war chiefs, and accustomed to perpetual war, and therefore not attached to the land. Therefore, French guidance had only been able to do so much good, according to Lévy, since *indigènes* did not have the patience for western modern agricultural practices and defected to the city in search of work.²¹⁴ In reality, the French expropriation of lands from rural colonial subjects had been the cause.

While exhibition organizers recognized that the quality of life for the Arab and indigenous population was abysmal in private, the situation was of course never addressed in the official imagery of the centenary, which characterized French colonialism as a system of collaboration and mentorship, and which was circulated broadly through the posters and

²¹³ Congrès de la colonisation rurale, 130.

²¹⁴ Ibid, 10. In a report to the Congrès de la colonisation rurale.

medallions. This was not the only strategy that exhibition organizers deployed, however. Elsewhere at the exhibition, organizers reproduced primitivizing myths about the colony and its pre-colonial inhabitants, especially in centenary literature. Most of the texts published for the centenary were geared toward instructing the public on the history and geography of Algeria.²¹⁵ These texts presented a simple, overarching, state-sponsored narrative on the conquest and colonization of Algeria. This narrative began with pre-colonial Algeria, characterized as a barbarous place, condemned to a never-ending cycle of war, and ended with a thorough explanation of the moral and material good France had achieved there.

This narrative can be observed in Georges Rozet's publication, simply titled *L'Algérie*, which was commissioned specifically for the centenary and published in 1929. Éditions des Horizons de France printed 10,000 copies in the French language and 3,000 copies in English.²¹⁶ In the first several pages of his text, Rozet apprises readers of Algeria's barbarous past. Algeria, according to Rozet, was fragmented, illogical, and completely oppressed by the Ottoman Turks.²¹⁷ He then proceeds to compliment the current state of the colony, transformed by France into "la seconde France":

After only a century, Second France, truly already has her great men, her martyrs, her painters, her literature, and her own traditions. Second France, to which we are attached, like to the other, for her variety of landscapes and, despite some harsh weather, for the indescribable sweetness of living there. Settlers, officials, and simple tourists who might have believed that they were only passing through, remain linked to her forever by an exquisite feeling. This feeling - among French people at least - certainly does not imply forgetting the metropolis. It is still love of the homeland, but of a fortified homeland, rejuvenated with new blood. It is the pride of belonging to a country of light and beauty,

²¹⁵ Seth Graebner, "Unknown and Unloved: The Politics of French Ignorance in Algeria, 1860-1930," in *Algeria and France, 1800-2000: Identity, Memory, Nostalgia*, ed. Patricia Lorcin (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2006), 49-62. There is much about the centenary literature that cannot be feasibly addressed in this chapter devoted to visual culture. While I will dwell on one or two literary examples, I do so to discuss the relationship between text and image in these publications. For more specifics on centenary literature, see Graebner's important book chapter.

²¹⁶ Mercier, *Le centenaire de l'Algérie. Exposé d'ensemble. Tome 1.*, 127. Much of the centenary literature was published in multiple languages, ostensibly to communicate the successes of the French African school to the global community.

²¹⁷ Rozet, *L'Algérie* (Paris: Éditions des Horizons de France, 1929), 2-7.

of fertile energy, of a vast future, of which a hundred years of valor and toil have already made it something more and better than a colony, a powerful and magnificent extension of France.²¹⁸

Rozet suggests that France and Algeria had become so thoroughly intertwined that French citizens naturally felt the same patriotic love for Algeria as they did for France.

And why not love France for all that it had done in Algeria, asked Rozet? After all, it was France that had civilized North Africa, ended anarchy, and brought peace, justice, and liberty to the people of Algeria, a feat that even the Romans had not accomplished. Instead of the *pax romana*, Rozet declared that France had ushered in the *pax gallica*.²¹⁹ And now, according to Rozet, Algeria was a melting pot of “bons français,”²²⁰ a “race that was mixed yesterday, today melted, who admires and loves her metropolitan homeland with a feeling of her own force.”²²¹ Not only did the French love Algeria, but the inhabitants of Algeria also loved France. And yet the photographs used to illustrate Rozet’s publication presented a vastly different view of Algeria, a place inhabited by people who seemed completely unchanged by a century of French colonization (see figure 2.26 for example). In these images, Algeria does not appear as an extension of the “homeland” as Rozet described. The photographs that illustrate the book instead primarily featured rural locations and peoples, not the unified, modernized, and gallicized “bons français.” Instead, the contemporary viewer was inundated with images of an undeveloped, Algerian countryside, populated by veiled women and impoverished farmers.

²¹⁸ Rozet, 160. “Seconde France, en vérité, qui a déjà ses grands hommes, ses martyrs, ses peintres et sa littérature, ses traditions, en un mot, après un siècle seulement. Seconde France, à laquelle on s’attache, comme à l’autre, pour la variété de ses paysages et, malgré quelques duretés de climat, pour je ne sais quelle douceur d’y vivre. Des colons ; des fonctionnaires, de simples touristes croyaient y passer seulement, qui lui restent liés à jamais par un sentiment exquis. Ce sentiment – chez des Français du moins – n’impliquent certes pas l’oubli de la métropole. C’est toujours l’amour de la patrie, mais d’une patrie fortifiée, rajeunie par un sang neuf. C’est l’orgueil d’appartenir à un pays de lumière et de beauté, d’énergie féconde, de vaste avenir, dont cent ans de vaillance et de labeur ont déjà fait plus et mieux qu’une colonie, un puissant et magnifique prolongement de la France.”

²¹⁹ Ibid, 157.

²²⁰ Ibid, 158.

²²¹ Ibid, 10.

Rozet's writing not only functioned to shape public opinion, but also sought to drum up business for the tourism industry, for which the proceedings of the exhibition were hugely beneficial. By 1930, maritime transportation of visitors to and within the colony was greatly streamlined. From Paris, the Algerian capital of Algiers was less than forty-eight hours away. Two ports, Marseille and Port-Vendres, facilitated maritime travel, offering services to Algiers, Oran, Philippeville, and Bône, providing travelers with a range of travel options. Two companies oversaw these routes, the Compagnie générale transatlantique (CGT) and the Compagnie de navigation mixte. Travelers leaving from Marseille to Algiers, a service offered three times a day by rapid steamship, could arrive in the colony in twenty-five hours. For those leaving from Port-Vendres, the journey took as little as twenty-two hours.²²² After arriving in Algeria, tourists could take advantage of over 5,000 kilometers of railways facilitated by Chemins de fer de Paris à Lyon et à la Méditerranée (PLM) and the Compagnie de chemins de fer algériens de l'état (CFA).²²³

In addition to *L'Algérie* (1929), Rozet also composed a series of seven brochures promoting tourism in the colony that the General Centenary Commission released the year before the centenary. The Paris-based publishing house, Horizons de France, circulated 25,000 copies of each brochure (20,000 were printed in French and 5,000 were printed in English).²²⁴ Each one describes the principal regions of the colony, illustrated with photographs of its places and inhabitants. In *Alger, Blida, et la Vallée du Chéelif* (1929), the first text in the series, Rozet

²²² Léon Paul Marie Deshayes de Bonneval, *L'Algérie touristique* (Paris: Publications du comité national métropolitain du centenaire de l'Algérie, 1930), 60–61. Commissioned by exhibition organizers, Bonneval's text was meant to attract French visitors to Algeria, if not for the exhibition itself, then for future holidays in the colony. Bonneval provides precise information about the various trajectories offered. Alongside the trajectories described above, there was also a direct route between Marseille and Oran that took thirty-four hours, a route from Marseille to either Philippeville or Bône that took twenty-four hours, and a route from Port-Vendres to Oran that took thirty-one hours. The quickest and most frequently-offered courses, however, were the trajectories from Marseille or Port-Vendres to Algiers.

²²³ Bonneval, 62.

²²⁴ Mercier, *Le centenaire de l'Algérie. Exposé d'ensemble. Tome 1.*, 128.

regales the reader about the modernity of the capital city of Algiers, which he refers to as “the Paris of Second France.”²²⁵ To build his concept of Algiers as a second Paris, Rozet discusses the modernization of the city since the nineteenth century: the expansion of the port, the city’s industrialization, and the Haussmannization of its streets.²²⁶ However, the images directly accompanying the text (figure 2.27 – 1929), show the opposite: daily life in the narrow streets of the old kasbah that picture Arab and indigenous Algerians in traditional garb perhaps going to the market or on their way to the mosque for afternoon prayers. There is no sign of the modern, second Paris to which Rozet referred. While Rozet sought to characterize the colony as a thoroughly modernized place, its capital only second to Paris itself, the pictures used certainly evoke a pre-colonial Algeria. Why? Either this was the image that attracted readers, or perhaps the claims being made about Algeria’s modernity did not faithfully reflect the reality of the colony.

In addition to close collaboration between the centenary organizers and the tourism industry, schools were a centerpiece of centenary propaganda in the metropole.²²⁷ The Minister of Public Education ordered that the texts published at the time of the centenary be disseminated to institutions of all levels of education from primary to university-level. According to Mercier, over 70,000 copies of publications and brochures made their way into university libraries alone, although it is impossible to confirm this number now. The Minister of Public Education invited instructors and professors to use centenary publications for special informational lessons on Algeria too. In addition, the Minister of Colonies ensured that this propaganda also entered into

²²⁵ Georges Rozet, *Alger, Blida et la Vallée du Chélif*, Publication du Centenaire de l’Algérie (Paris: Le commissariat générale du centenaire, Horizons de France, 1929), 3.

²²⁶ Georges Rozet, *Alger, Blida et la Vallée du Chélif*, 3.

²²⁷ Mercier, *Le centenaire de l’Algérie. Exposé d’ensemble. Tome 1.*, 84. Mercier provided a transcript of the length of Tardieu’s speech in his text. “[...] Nous voulons organiser un système de conférences à l’école et, à côté de l’école, utiliser la T.S.F., le cinéma, l’affiche, le timbre, tous les procédés enfin dont se compose la publicité moderne.”

colonial schools.²²⁸ After use in the classroom, these publications were conserved in libraries at home and abroad and remained available to teachers, students, and researchers as, according to Mercier, “a permanent instrument of propaganda.”²²⁹ Even elementary school students were recipients of French imperial propaganda. Short illustrated storybooks, published through the widely read *Les livres roses pour la jeunesse* series, provided children with a simplified historical narrative of the French conquest of Algeria. These texts encouraged French children to see colonialism as a process of exploration and adventure rather than of domination and subjugation. They also encouraged readers to view Algeria as an extension of France and part of their birthright (see figure 2.28 for example).

Postcards and stamps were also a means of spreading colonialist propaganda. 5,000 copies of 280 different postcards featuring photographs of various subjects were printed and grouped into 14 “pochettes” of 20 postcards each. 70,000 pochettes were manufactured meaning that 1.4 million postcards total were created. On the back of each postcard was an inscription: “Algeria, welcoming land of unforgettable sites and an ideal climate invites you to the celebrations of her centenary in 1930.”²³⁰ While a few of these postcards featured photographs of the modern cities of Algiers, Constantine, and Oran, the overwhelming majority of the 280 postcards used images of the rugged landscape of the Algerian South, ancient Roman vestiges, desert caravans and nomadic tribes, and the crumbling, brick-houses of Arab and indigenous Algerians living far from western civilization.

These postcards generally represented the cultural “other” and the colony in a way that conformed to the clichés of exoticism. A centenary postcard featuring the familiar figure of the highly eroticized Ouled Naïl dancer (figure 2.29) demonstrates this strategy. The woman’s left

²²⁸ Ibid, 487.

²²⁹ Ibid, 488.

²³⁰ Mercier, *Le centenaire de l’Algérie. Exposé d’ensemble. Tome 1.*, 145.

breast is exposed as she stretches her torso to reveal the curves of her body. In another, an indigenous man, perhaps a Touareg, in traditional garb reinforced the trope of the atavistic *indigène* (figure 2.30). The man featured in the postcard is draped in robes with only his fierce and intense eyes visible, to a French viewer, the epitome of an uncivilized, culturally distant Other. Centenary postcards presented simple, easy-to-understand scenes that taxonomized Muslim inhabitants of Algeria into pictorial categories with which contemporary viewers would have already been familiar.

To accompany these postcards, the Commissariat Général authorized the production of 100,000 copies of a series of thirteen postage-stamps in addition to 50,000 copies of a unique stamp designed specifically for the occasion of the Exposition philatélique internationale de l’Afrique du Nord which took place in Algiers from May 4-11, 1930.²³¹ Although small in size, subtle, and seemingly banal, these stamps also fulfilled a propagandistic function and provide insight into what kinds of imagery that received the government’s official “stamp” of approval. Much like the postcards, most of the stamps designed for the centenary featured Ancient Roman ruins, nomadic Berbers, crumbling casbahs, and faraway, exotic oases, and therefore adhered to primitivizing clichés. Other stamps reaffirmed France’s self-proclaimed benevolent role in rescuing the colonized from their backward ways.

A stamp featuring the old port of Algiers (figure 2.31) contrasts sharply with another stamp from the collection that depicts the new, modern port of Algiers (figure 2.32). The old port is presented as an archaic vestige, visibly Islamic in style. A sixteenth-century lighthouse and a domed building, perhaps a small palace featuring the recognizable horseshoe arch popular in Islamic architecture, are all on view. While the old port is not empty of activity, it certainly

²³¹ Mercier, *Le centenaire de l’Algérie. Exposé d’ensemble. Tome 1.*, 166.

cannot compare to the productivity of the new, modern port (figure 2.32) which features a modernized waterfront and Haussmann-style architecture, including a broad boulevard running along the port. Not only is the new port Europeanized, larger, and clearly modern, the scene is more organized. The buildings and the boats in the harbor are arranged rationally, unlike the boats and architecture of the old port, which seem to infringe upon each other. The stamp picturing the new port, which also cost ten centimes more than that of the old port, certainly advances the narrative that the French colonial project had increased the colony's economic productivity and refined its most major port.

The sheer volume of centenary posters, medallions, illustrated texts, tourism brochures, postcards, and stamps circulated in Algeria, France, and around the world is difficult to fathom. Thousands upon thousands of pieces of propaganda transmitted the French colonial government's official platform. The central image of the centenary, of a French colon leading and guiding the *indigène* toward the common goal of building a strong French Empire, provided viewers with a nationalist notion of what had been achieved in French Algeria after one hundred years of French occupation. However, this conception of French Algeria was the particular vision of an elite class of colonists of French-descent who held positions of power in politics, business, and the military. This was a vision of the colony that depicted the colonizer as innovative and industrious and the colonized as naïve, unchanged, and more like a colonial good or resource than as an equal collaborator.

Participation, Criticism, and Resistance

There were three ways that Arab and indigenous Algerians could participate in the Oran exhibition: as laborers, performers, or artisans. As laborers, *indigènes* were relegated to servile positions, such as hotel staff and porters. They were also called on to perform at welcoming

ceremonies or other spectacles like fantasias. In this final portion of the chapter, I focus on the third role, that of *l'artisanat indigène*, whose works were displayed at an exhibition in the Maison Indigène in Algiers and situate their participation within the *mise en scène* of these six months of triumphalism. I also discuss the criticism of and resistance to the centenary in Oran. While the participation of the colonized was limited and their point of view largely absent from the proceedings, there were still open calls for reform.

Centenary discourse framed the revitalization of indigenous handicraft as one of the triumphs of French colonialism. Mercier emphasized this point in his recollections of the centenary:

Until the arrival of France, the great mass of the natives of Algeria lived in a state of almost complete abandonment. The insecurity and internal struggles which were, throughout the Middle Ages and Modern Times, the normal regime of this country, had little by little ruined the traditions of order and work, bequeathed by antiquity and even those which made the Berber kingdoms, prior to the arrival of the Turks, shine with a certain brilliance. Nomadism has exerted its ordinary, ruinous, and devastating effects here for too long. The Natives have lost the taste and the habit of work. The action of the French, in particular the fertile and creative energy of the colonists, tends to instill them in them again.²³²

Mercier's commentary reproduced racial hierarchies that characterized *indigènes* as culturally stagnant people who had become indolent under the Turks, and French *colons* as a force of artistic revitalization. With their culture in decline and lacking initiative, the colonized *needed* the guidance of the French to reinvigorate their artisanal production.

Of course, the deterioration of indigenous craft in Algeria was much more complicated than Mercier let on. French colonialism severely hampered pre-colonial handicraft. Decades of

²³² Mercier, 343. "La grande masse des indigènes d'Algérie a vécu, jusqu'à l'arrivée de la France, dans un état d'abandon à peu près complet. L'insécurité et les luttes intestines qui furent, durant tout le Moyen Age et les Temps Modernes, le régime normal de ce pays, avaient peu à peu ruiné les traditions d'ordre et de travail, léguées par l'antiquité et celles même qui firent briller les royaumes berbères, antérieurs à la venue des Turcs, d'un certain éclat. Le nomadisme a exercé ici, pendant trop longtemps, ses effets ordinaires, ruineux et dévastateurs. Les Indigènes ont perdu le goût et l'habitude du travail. L'action des français, en particulier l'énergie féconde et créatrice des colons, tendent à les leur inculquer à nouveau."

brutal military violence, the introduction of capitalism and the disruption of the local economy, land seizure from nomadic and pastoral tribes, and the immigration of European settlers all undermined the traditional handicraft sector. As pastoral-nomadic life became disrupted, raw materials grew increasingly scarce in towns and cities. Additionally, new tastes, materials, and techniques poured into Algeria as well as new markets, trade networks, and clientele. These changes deprived many artisans of customers.²³³ In sum, French industrial products ousted traditional craft manufacturers.

The exhibition's emphasis on indigenous artisans was part of a larger colonial drive to codify and promote traditional crafts in Algeria. In the years leading up to the centenary, French colonial officials sought to address the growing concern that Algerian traditional crafts would soon disappear. Under Gouverneur Général Jonnart (1900-1901 and 1903-1913), there was a brief cultural renaissance in which neo-Moorish architectural vocabularies became popularized, resulting in, for example, buildings like a new prefecture on the waterfront, the offices of the newspaper *La Dépêche Algérienne*, and the massive Central Post Office in downtown Algiers. Jonnart also oversaw the construction of new public monuments and schools using Moorish styles. This style of architecture became known as the *style Jonnart*, which his contemporaries described as an Arabization of imported European architectures.²³⁴ As was discussed in the preceding chapter, in 1908, Jonnart established the Office of Indigenous Arts in Algiers coordinated by Prosper Ricard, who was, at the time, considered the utmost authority on North African craft tradition. The Office's task was to document traditional craft technique around the country, especially architectural details and fine quality handicrafts through photography and

²³³ Julia Clancy-Smith, "A Woman Without Her Distaff: Gender, Work, and Handicraft Production in Colonial North Africa," in *A Social History of Women and Gender in the Modern Middle East*, ed. Margaret Lee Meriwether (Abingdon: Taylor & Francis Ltd, 1999), 29.

²³⁴ Roger Benjamin, "Advancing the Indigenous Decorative Arts," in *Orientalist Aesthetics*, 194.

drawing. These recordings were then distributed to workshops as ideal models.²³⁵ All of these efforts gave agents of colonial authority a great deal of power over the direction of the craft industries in Algeria.

Above all, Mercier lauded the progressive reforms of Gouverneur Général Charles Lutaud, Jonnart's successor, who in the 1920s led a state-sponsored initiative to offer apprenticeships and training to indigenous workers in various trades including carpentry, iron working, and electricity. Several trade schools were formed, one each in Algiers, Oran, and Constantine. In 1930, the Institut industriel d'Algérie (also called the Institut Charles Lutaud), opened in Algiers in 1926, was preparing to graduate its first cohort. These students, as well as graduates from other trade institutes and schools from over the years, were invited to display works of their own creation at the exhibition.²³⁶

An analysis of the exhibition of traditional handicraft at the centenary elaborates the anxieties colonists harbored about cultural miscegenation. While framed as one of the triumphs of French colonialism at the centenary, indigenous handicraft was kept almost entirely separate from settler industries that were displayed in large pavilions in Oran. The exhibition of indigenous artisans and ouvriers took place at the Maison Indigène in Algiers, far from the center of centenary celebrations. Charles Brunel, the Mayor of Algiers, and Léon Claro, architect and professor at the École des Beaux Arts, were in charge of the construction of the maison which was purportedly constructed in the style of indigenous homes of 1830, the year the French conquest began (figure 2.33 – 1930).²³⁷ Alongside Claro, French mason Paul Picquot and indigenous carpenter Mustapha Marsali also participated in the construction of the maison.

Record of Marsali's participation is notable considering that very few Arab or indigenous

²³⁵ Benjamin, 198–99.

²³⁶ Mercier, *Le centenaire de l'Algérie. Exposé d'ensemble. Tome 1.*, 344–45.

²³⁷ Mercier, *Le centenaire de l'Algérie. Exposé d'ensemble. Tome 2.*, 166.

Algerians are named in Mercier's official documentation of the centenary. Mercier reports that the architects and builders closely observed the practices of the Arab "maâlem" (معلم) (master artisan) to recreate as authentically as possible the traditional Muslim home. The maison included several typical characteristics of a casbah domicile: a *sqifa* (a square, covered vestibule serving as the entrance), painted tiles, arched doorways, an open courtyard in the center of the home, marbled flooring, and even small details like peepholes typical of homes in northern Algeria that were commonly used to peer out into the street.²³⁸

The style of architecture chosen for the Maison Indigène, which differed greatly from the Maisons d'Automobile and d'Agriculture seen at the beginning of this section, conveyed the prevailing colonist belief that while the *colons* of Algeria were modern, the *indigène* remained stymied in tradition. Mercier described the architecture of the Maison Indigène as eccentric, asymmetrical, and irregular, descriptors that reflected the position of the colonized as the inverse of colonial order which was highly rational and logical.²³⁹ His commentary is congruent with the broader discourse at the time which defined Arab art, architecture, and craft against those of Europe. In a treatise on the art of antiquity and Islam published as official, state-sponsored exhibition literature, Auguste-Eugène Berque, an "Islamologue" and later, Directeur des affaires musulmanes et des territoires du sud en Algérie, placed a clear boundary line between occidental and Arab art. "Occidental art searches life. It tends toward realism. It will be naturalist, material, and innovative. Arab art seeks alibis in dreams. It will be idealist, abstract, traditional. One registers the present. The other is dedicated to the past."²⁴⁰ Berque's definition of western versus eastern forms of visual expression reproduced one of the grand narratives of French colonialism

²³⁸ Mercier, 266–67.

²³⁹ Mercier, 268.

²⁴⁰ Augustin-Eugène Berque, *Art antique et art musulman en Algérie* (Orléans: Imprimerie A. Pigelet et Cie, 1930), 44. "L'art occidental cherche la vie. Il tend au réalisme. Il sera naturaliste, matériel, novateur. L'art arabe cherche des alibis dans le rêve. Il sera idéaliste, abstrait, traditionnel. L'un enregistre le présent. L'autre se voue au passé."

in Algeria: that Arab and indigenous Algerians were in a holding pattern, stymied by the ways of Arab civilization.

How did Arab and indigenous Algerians respond to their portrayal at the centenary? Speaking with the utmost confidence, Mercier declared, “Anyone who knows the natives had no doubt of the fervor with which they would associate themselves with our demonstrations. In fact, not a discordant note, not a reservation has arisen from this population of five million souls whose hearts, during these six months of commemoration, beat in unison with ours.”²⁴¹ However, this statement was far from the truth. Even before the exhibition opened in 1930, indigenous voices rallied to call for greater political equity. In an opinion column on the front page of *La Voix indigène*, a journal in support of assimilationist policies and Franco-Muslim unification, a Muslim businessman called for greater political and economic enfranchisement at the time of the centenary. In addition to asking for representation in the French Parliament, the author also calls for the creation of better schools for Muslim girls and boys, free secondary schools for those who wish it, and access to professional training. Thinking of his agricultural counterparts, the author also asks for better roads in rural Algeria and greater respect for indigenous lands.²⁴² As time drew nearer to the inauguration of the centenary, vocal criticism became more specific and direct. In another opinion column in *La Voix indigène*, an author referred to simply as a “taleb” (the Arabic word for a theological student), wrote that the right to vote, access to instruction, and liberty of the press were basic freedoms that should be expected

²⁴¹ Mercier, *Le centenaire de l'Algérie. Exposé d'ensemble. Tome 2.*, 271–72. “De fait, pas une note discordante, pas une réserve ne s'est élevée de cette population de cinq millions d'âmes dont les cœurs, au cours de ces six mois de commémoration, battaient à l'unisson des nôtres.”

²⁴² “Le Centenaire: Opinion d'un commerçant musulman pratiquant,” *La Voix indigène*, December 19, 1929, 28 édition.

by any who lived under the tricolor flag, especially, as the author writes, by a people who had been governed for one hundred years and who had suffered a “Grande Tourmente.”²⁴³

The centenary also provided occasion for *indigènes* to testify to the racist administrative practices that put them at a disadvantage economically. In a short text published at the time of the centenary, Omar ben Aïssa ben Brahim, President of the Fédération des élus Mozabites auprès des pouvoirs publics français, wrote a defense of the Mozabite people, an Amazigh group living in the northern region of the Sahara. The Mozabites were members of the Ibadite religious minority and had always been influential traders from their famous five-city base known as the M'Zab. Brahim spoke of the suffering of his people, in particular the agricultural laborers, the long days they worked, and their many sacrifices to France. With his community faced with poor harvests and financial deficits, Brahim argues that the military service imposed upon the Mozabite youth had brought his community to the brink of complete ruin as recruitment robbed the workforce of its strength.²⁴⁴ Brahim's claims provided a counterpoint to the exhibition's celebration of the supposed productive relationship between *colon* and *indigène* and flew in the face of the gilded image that the French colonial empire sought to communicate regarding its ministrations in Algeria.

There was also criticism from leftist opponents of French colonialism. Communist pamphleteer Victor Spielmann published his scathing critique of French colonialism, *En Algérie: Le centenaire au point du vue indigène* (1930), just in time for the celebrations in Oran. In his text, Spielmann informs readers of indigenous living conditions and argues that political reforms in Algeria have only served to “better dupe” Muslim Algerians and make them more docile in

²⁴³ “Le Centenaire: Opinion d'un taleb illettré en français,” *La Voix indigène*, January 2, 1930, 30 édition.

²⁴⁴ Omar Ben Aïssa ben Brahim, *Question Mozabite: Le service militaire obligatoire* (Algiers: La typographie d'art, 1930), 13–14.

the face of colonization.²⁴⁵ Spielmann points to the unjust expropriation of land, high rates of incarceration, disproportionately cruel punishments for imprisoned indigènes, and excessive conscription rates of Muslim Algerians as cause for discontent.²⁴⁶ In the final pages of the pamphlet, Spielmann warns the French of the precarious nature of colonial Algeria. He reminds readers of what took place in Haiti and how the European settlers were either expelled or massacred, bringing an end to the French occupation. Spielmann cautions the French public that such an outcome is likely to take place in Algeria.²⁴⁷

The image of a deeply divided and tumultuous colony that Spielmann created in his text can be viewed in a poster (figure 2.34 – 1930) circulated by the Part communiste français (PCF) and the Confédération générale du travail unitaire (CGTU). A dark blue triangle bisects a composition featuring the toil and poverty of indigenous workers seen on the left contrasted against the lives of leisure and wealth led by French colonizers seen on the right. Dividing the composition is an indigenous man whose body is shackled to a post with heavy chains. At his feet are the products exported to the metropole, including grains, minerals, wine, fruits, and petrol. The poster reads, “To some, misery ... to others, riches.” It is unknown whether this poster could be seen in Algeria, but it was almost certainly circulated in France. At the bottom of the poster, the PCF and CGTU called for the viewer to “stand for the independence of colonized people” under the flag of communism.

In the final pages of Mercier’s massive two-tome recitation of all that transpired in the planning of the execution of the Centenary Exhibition of Oran, the general commissioner reflects on the overall effect that (he hoped) the event had:

²⁴⁵ Victor Spielmann, *En Algérie: Le centenaire au point de vue indigène* (Algiers: Villa Francisco Ferrer, 1930), 5.

²⁴⁶ Spielmann, 9–20.

²⁴⁷ Spielmann, 29.

Algeria, seen as part of and because of France, appeared during these six months as truly beautiful, great, and worthy of adoration. Never has its civilizing mission, its human action, and the overflowing activity of its children been adorned with more seductive and lively colors. Preconceptions fell away, unspoken regrets vanished in the face of triumphant reality, and the most closed hearts were moved.

Mercier's thoughts get at the heart of the exhibition's purpose as defined by its organizers: to define Algeria's place in the French Empire and shed the stereotypes that made colonists feel misunderstood. Colonists wanted recognition for their labors in Algeria. They sought to define for themselves a position of elevated status within the greater French Empire by putting on display and exalting their many good works. The camels, palm trees, and dancing women represented the colonized. Not the colonizers. His discourse continued:

The evocation of great memories could be realized without raising any friction, protest, or reservation. There is always, in these confrontations between the past and the present, something deeply moving, which goes beyond the scope of everyday visions and radiates an invigorating light onto the future. Here, the confrontation was coupled with a communion between the two Frances, and in this mutual recognition, the reality went beyond the dream. It seemed that each found the other even more attractive than she had imagined.²⁴⁸

Either Mercier was ignorant of the negative sentiments shared among dissidents, or he ignored them. Not only was there indeed criticism of and resistance to the centenary, among both leftists and the colonized, but the triumphalism of the centenary, which reenacted the submission of Algeria's Arab and indigenous inhabitants for six months, likely created the conditions that gave way to the emergence of the Algerian nationalist movements of the 1930s. Ahmad Tawfiq Al-Madanî, a prominent figure of the Ulema (a body of Muslim scholars) declared "The French

²⁴⁸ Mercier, *Le centenaire de l'Algérie. Exposé d'ensemble. Tome 2.*, 514–15. "C'est que la France, vue en Algérie, apparut, au cours de ces six mois, comme vraiment belle, grande et digne d'adoration. Jamais sa mission civilisatrice, son action humaine, l'activité débordante de ses enfants ne se parèrent de couleurs plus séduisantes et plus vives. Les préventions tombèrent, les regrets informulés s'évanouirent devant la réalité triomphante et les cœurs les plus fermés furent remués. L'évocation des grands souvenirs put être réalisée sans soulever ni froissement, ni protestation, ni réserve. Il y a toujours, dans ces confrontations entre le passé et le présent, quelque chose de profondément émouvant, qui dépasse la portée des visions quotidiennes et irradie sur l'avenir une lumière vivifiante. Ici, la confrontation se doublait d'une communion entre les deux Frances, et dans cette reconnaissance mutuelle, la réalité dépassait le rêve. Il semblait que chacune trouvât l'autre plus séduisante encore qu'elle ne l'avait imaginée."

celebration of a century of occupation in Algeria has advanced the ‘Algeria Question’ by twenty years.”²⁴⁹ Although there is no way of knowing if Al-Madani’s appraisal of the situation was true or not, his statement suggests that at least for the Ulema, a group that in the next year would found an association of Muslim thinkers who would profoundly shape early notions of Algerian national identity, the centenary exhibition in Oran was a pivotal turning point. Unsurprisingly, relations between the colonizer and colonized certainly would not improve in the next decade. In ten years, Algeria would cease, albeit only temporarily, to be a part of the triumphant Republic that colonists had glorified so proudly at the centenary.

²⁴⁹ Cited by Charles-Robert Ageron, *Histoire de l’Algérie contemporaine, Tome II. De l’insurrection de 1871 au déclenchement de la Guerre de Libération (1954)* (Paris: P.U.F., 1979), 411. “...la célébration par les Français d’un siècle d’occupation de l’Algérie a avancé d’au moins vingt ans la question algérienne.”

Chapter 3 – A Visual Battleground with Multiple Fronts: World War II Propaganda and the Indigenous Press

To the shock of the entire western world, the French Third Republic, which had endured seventy years, fell in 1940 following the invasion of Nazi Germany. As part of the ceasefire, French Algeria officially became a part of the Vichy Regime (1940-1944), the independent, Nazi-collaborationist government led by Marshal Philippe Pétain (1856-1951) that administered southern France and the French colonial empire while Nazi Germany remained in control of northern France. Given French Algeria's close geographic location to Europe, its natural resources, multiple naval ports, and colonial troops, the colony was of enormous strategic value during World War II. Aware of Algeria's importance, the Vichy Regime, the Allied forces, (including Free France, the exiled provisional government led by Charles de Gaulle (1890-1970)), and the Nazis fought for supremacy in the region. An analysis of propaganda posters, reproductive media, and other ephemera from this period emphasizes an under-acknowledged fact about Algeria during World War II: that the opinion of its Muslim civilians was important to each of these groups during the war.²⁵⁰ But why?

To answer this question, I examine the indigenous political press of the late 1930s, which flourished during the interwar period and constituted a major political site wherein elite Arab and indigenous intellectuals shaped the "opinion publique musulmane." According to Zahir Ihaddaden, an Algerian scholar of the indigenous press, fifty-one new journals appeared between

²⁵⁰ Historical accounts of World War II in Algeria tend to emphasize two outcomes: 1) That the Fall of France and multiple changes in leadership over the course of the war (throughout this chapter, we will see control handed over from Philippe Pétain and Admiral François Darlan, to Henri Giraud, then to Charles de Gaulle...) seriously undermined French colonial authority in the colony; 2) That Giraud's dismissal of Ferhat Abbas' attempts to introduce new reforms that would improve Arab and indigenous living conditions directly resulted in the radicalization of formerly moderate Algerian politicians.

1930 and 1940, an unprecedented rate that demonstrates its vitality during the interwar period.²⁵¹ Sometimes printed in French, sometimes Arabic, and sometimes in both languages, these journals captured the plurality of the Arab and indigenous political landscape which was comprised of reformists, assimilationists, nationalists, socialists, and communists. The most important journals of the “presse indigène” during this period were *La Défense, Alger républicain, La Voix des humbles, La Voix indigène, Egalité, and L’Algérie libre*. These journals were frequently referenced in colonial administrative surveillance records from the interwar period as being menaces to the French empire.²⁵² While indigenous journals were banned or placed under strict censure during World War II, the photographs and cartoons found in these periodicals leading up to the war years shed light on the visual strategies and organizational techniques of Arab and indigenous political leaders like Messali Hadj, leader of the Parti du peuple algérien (PPA), and Mohammed Saleh Bendjelloul, co-founder of the moderate party, the Fédération des élus indigènes (referred to from here on as the *élus*).

My analysis of the indigenous press in the late 1930s in the first section of this chapter provides the context for the second section, in which I discuss the installation of the Vichy Regime in Algeria and introduce and analyze several propaganda posters from the period. I argue that while much of the propaganda certainly appealed to colonial settlers, many of whom already harbored deeply seated anti-Semitic beliefs, some posters from the era also catered to Muslim viewers. These posters, I argue, demonstrate that the Vichy Regime clearly valued Arab and indigenous political opinion, and that the regime sought to gain their support during the war. In addition, I argue these posters register a response to the increasingly sophisticated anti-colonial nationalist movement in the years leading up to the war which, in addition to German efforts to

²⁵¹ Zahir Ihaddaden, “La presse nationaliste avant 1954,” *Revue algérienne de la communication*, 1991: 42.

²⁵² Philipp Zessin, “Presse et journalistes ‘indigènes’ en Algérie coloniale (années 1890-années 1950),” *Le Mouvement social*, no. 236 (July-September 2011): 35.

spark indigenous revolt against the French, worsened French anxieties about the vulnerability of her empire.

In section three, I address the Allied invasion of French North Africa in 1942 and discuss several propaganda posters released by the Allied forces after the colony's liberation from the Vichy Regime. These propaganda posters, I argue, not only chronicle the power struggle between political leaders in France (namely Charles de Gaulle and Henri Giraud), but also between France, America, and Great Britain. Allied posters, I argue, demonstrate a highly sophisticated and subtle political approach to addressing the Muslim subjects of Algeria which enabled them to both encourage resistance to France while also appearing unthreatening to French interests. These posters collectively further demonstrate the importance of French Algeria and its Arab and indigenous inhabitants during World War II and also emphasize that World War II was a colonial war in addition to a conflict between the Allied and Axis powers.

In the fourth and final section, I discuss the effects of World War II on Algerian nationalist movements as well as the first mass insurrection against French colonialism in Algeria during the post-war era on May 8, 1945, the same day that Nazi Germany surrendered. What began as a victory celebration in which Arab and indigenous Algerians paraded through the city of Sétif turned into a violent rebellion and ended in the deaths of dozens of French settlers and gendarmes and thousands of Muslims. Although some scholars have framed Algerian nationalism as inactive during World War II, in this final section, I demonstrate that the war years constituted an extremely formative context in which Algerian nationalism reached a strong, emergent stage.²⁵³

²⁵³ Charles Ageron, *Modern Algeria: A History from 1830 to the Present*, trans. Michael Brett (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1991), 98. Ageron writes, "The war with Nazi Germany and the defeat of France had no immediate effect on the Muslim population."

The “Watan” and its “Cha’b”: Building a National Algerian Identity

For those seeking independence from France, such as Étoile Nord-Africaine (ENA) leader Messali Hadj, certain ideological questions needed definitive answers. What constituted the Algerian nation? What was its history? Who were its people? What were their values? Ibn Ben Badis (1889-1940), leader of the Ulemas, composed largely of Koranic school teachers who wanted reforms based on Islam, had been formulating this concept since the mid-1920s through the organization’s publications, *Al-Chihab* (*cha’b* or “the people”), *Al-Baçair* (clairvoyance), and *Al-Maghrib al-Arabi* (Arab Maghreb) among others. As indicated by the titles of these publications, Ben Badis envisioned an Algerian nation based on Muslim and Arab values and consciously emphasized terms such as *cha’b* (people) and *watan* (nation) to strengthen the case for independence. He believed that Algerians must present a unified religious, organizational, and ideological front to win independence from France.²⁵⁴ Ben Badis’ ideas would become the ideological foundations of an independent Algerian nation.²⁵⁵

In the late 1930s, two important political figures, Bendjelloul Mohammed Saleh (1893-1985), co-founder of the moderate party, the Fédération des élus indigènes (alongside Ferhat Abbas (1899-1985)), and Messali Hadj (1898-1974), strategically used the press to accomplish a variety of goals: 1) To advance their own political candidacies and agendas; 2) To restore dignity to Algeria and its indigenous inhabitants; 3) To better define a concept of Algerian nationhood; and finally 4) To encourage widespread participation in the political process.²⁵⁶ Bendjelloul and Messali each established and helped direct journals geared toward an indigenous readership. *Al-*

²⁵⁴ Martin Evans, *Algeria: France’s Undeclared War* (OUP Oxford, 2012), 55.

²⁵⁵ Evans, 52.

²⁵⁶ For more on Bendjelloul, see Julien Fromage, “Le Docteur Bendjelloul et la Fédération des élus musulmans,” in *Histoire de l’Algérie à la période coloniale*, ed. Abderrahmane Bouchène et al. (Paris and Algiers: Éditions La Découverte and Éditions Barzakh, 2014), 398–401.

Maydân (الميدان or "The Arena") was Bendjelloul's moderate periodical printed in Arabic between 1937 and 1938. Messali Hadj had several publications with which he was associated. *El Ouma* (الامة or "Islamic Community") was his first foray into journalism. It was founded in Paris in 1927 and ran off and on in Paris and Algiers until 1939. Following a failed attempt to establish an Arabic language newspaper, Messali eventually created *Le Parlement algérien*, a pro-independence journal printed in French.²⁵⁷ These three publications will be the focus of this section.

Al-Maydân is especially remarkable because it was exceedingly rare for most arabophone journals of the time to use any imagery whatsoever.²⁵⁸ Bendjelloul, a doctor from Constantine, was a moderate politician who espoused the assimilationist and reformist ideas put forth by Emir Khaled in the previous decade. Bendjelloul cleverly used the media to place himself within a patrilineage of respected indigenous leadership. To accomplish this goal, Bendjelloul, who directed *Al-Maydân*, placed pictures of himself alongside these notable leaders. On the front page of the July 11, 1937, issue of the paper, as part of an article titled, "Biography of Glory and Covenant of Pride," Bendjelloul placed his photograph (figure 3.1) next to a portrait of Emir Khaled (figure 3.2), drawing a clear parallel between himself and the other who was not only an

²⁵⁷ Of course, there were other indigenous newspapers during these key years of nationalist movement including *L'Ikdam: organe de défense des intérêts politiques et économiques des Musulmans de l'Afrique du Nord* founded in 1919 and in print until 1923 and again from 1931-1935. Between 1926-1927, the ENA reprised *L'Ikdam* and printed it in both French and Arabic. However, images were exceedingly rare as was the general rule for most of the indigenous press during the interwar period.

²⁵⁸ Out of all the journals from this period that I encountered in my research, *Al-Maydân* is the only to use photographs and other images. Some other Arabic-language journals from this period that I have investigated include *L'Action algérienne* (*Algerian Action*, clandestine PPA journal, 1944-1945), *Çaout al-Ahrar* (*Şawt al-Ahrar*) (*La Voix des hommes libres*, *The Voice of Free Men*, clandestine PPA journal, 1943-1944), *El Chaab* (*Aš Ša'b*) (*Le Peuple*, *The People*, weekly PPA journal, 1937), and *Ech Chihâb* (*Aš-Šihâb*) (*Le Météore*, *The Metero*, weekly and then monthly organ of the reformist Ulemas). There were indeed a number of other Arabic-language journals at the time as well as those from before and after the 1930s. To my knowledge, a thorough assessment of the use of visual media in these journals has not yet been accomplished. Furthermore, Arabic-language journals were subjected to higher rates of censorship during these years. Out of the fifty-one titles that Ihaddaden identified as having appeared between 1930 and 1940 in his article, "La presse nationaliste avant 1954," the French colonial authorities censored thirty-eight, thirty-one of which were in Arabic.

esteemed figure in his own right, but also the grandson of Abd-el-Kader, the first Muslim revolutionary in Algeria following the French invasion.

As suggested by the title of the piece, Bendjelloul sought to restore a sense of dignity to Algerian identity while also advancing his own candidacy and political ideology. Below the portrait featuring Emir Khaled is a caption that reads, “Dear Algeria, the late Emir Khaled, grandson of Sultan Abdelkader, speaks to the Algerian nation from the afterlife. ‘My dear country. My people for whom I sacrificed, born Algerian Muslims, and lived under the skies of Muslim Algeria. Live and die as Algerian Muslim.’”²⁵⁹ With his own picture next to Emir Khaled’s, who spoke from beyond the grave, and the evocation of Abdelkader, Bendjelloul sought to solidify his own legacy and place himself in a lineage of Algerian forefathers, all of whom, importantly, were defenders of a Muslim state.

Along with his claim on the legacy of Emir Khaled and, by extension, Abd-el-Kader, the Arab chieftain whose forces even commanded the respect of the French, the caption next to his photograph clearly characterized Bendjelloul as a masculine and courageous leader and defender of the people: “The intrepid leader who buried the cowardice and blocked it with a rock: Dr. Bendjelloul, vanquisher of riotous enemies and the bearer of the banner in defense of the [illegible] Algerian Muslim people, whose rights and dignity are trampled upon, says the nation.”²⁶⁰ This description is certainly at odds with the diplomatic image of Bendjelloul who does not look at all the type to vanquish riotous enemies. Bendjelloul’s dress and appearance in

²⁵⁹ “سيرة العز و عهد الشمم” (Biography of Glory and Covenant of Pride), الميدان (*Al-Maydân*), July 11, 1937, 1.

Original Arabic:

عزيز الجزائر المرحوم الامير خالد حفيد السلطان عبد القادر يكلم الامة الجزائرية من جنة النعي.
وطني العزيز. شعبي الذي فديته، ان من ولد مسلما جزائريا. وعاش تحت سماء الجزائر المسلمة. يجب ان يعيش ويموت
مسلمًا جزائريا.

²⁶⁰ “سيرة العز و عهد الشمم” (Biography of Glory and Covenant of Pride),” 1.

Original Arabic:

الزعيم المقدم الذي قبر الجين وسد عليه بالصخرة. الدكتور بن جلول قارع الاعداء المشاغبيين. وحامل لواء الدفاع عن الامي الجزائرية المسلمة الحقوق
[illegible] المداسة الكرامة يقول الامة

his own portrait is noticeably and emphatically modern in comparison to Emir Khaled's. Unlike some of his other contemporaries, such as Ben Badis, who always appeared bearded and clothed in the traditional *gandoura*, *burnous*, and headdress, Bendjelloul presented himself in a western style with a suit and tie, a small, manicured moustache, and a *fez*, the recognizable garb of an *élu*. These conscious choices in self-presentation differentiated him from the past, making him the candidate of the present. Furthermore, his appearance communicated that he was familiar with French culture and thus would be a strong diplomat between the Muslim public and the French colonial administration, and therefore a better advocate. Nevertheless, while acknowledging the existence of an Algerian nation, Muslim in character, Bendjelloul never endorsed independence.

Yet, Bendjelloul's emphasis on Algeria's Muslim character did involve some legitimate risk to himself, primarily of reprisal from the French colonial administration. Fearing the unifying force of Islam, the French colonial government began to restrict the influence of Ben Badis and other Muslim reformists. In 1938, the Ulemas were barred from preaching in mosques, Koranic schools were closed, and the Arabic-language presses were banned. So pointed were these religious restrictions that Algerians claimed that the French had declared war on the Muslim religion.²⁶¹ Any attempt to resist French colonial repression of any form could result in prison time and a hefty fine under the newly passed Régnier Decree of 1935 which stipulated prison times of up to two years and fines of up to 5,000 francs for demonstrating against French rule.²⁶²

²⁶¹ 'Udi Sattar, "Algeria. Jam'iyat al-'Ulama al-Muslimin," in *Muslim Organisations in the Twentieth Century: Entries from the Encyclopedia of the World of Islam*, ed. Gholamali Haddad Adel, Mohammed Jafar Elmi, and Hassan Taromi-Rad (London: EWI Press Ltd., 2012), 16. The law of March 8, 1939 prohibited the teaching and learning of Arabic and establishment of private Islamic schools without procuring permission from colonial authorities. The same year, the French government formed a committee to deal with Algeria's religious affairs, and surveilled the activities of the Ulema. The French government also closed several koranic schools that were administered by the Ulemas.

²⁶² Drew, 86.

In this era of colonial policing, the French authorities began to crack down on Muslim religious expression. Law enforcement officials were trained in an ultra-conservative atmosphere that espoused anti-communist, anti-Semitic, and xenophobic ideology.²⁶³ Already subjected to a harsh indigenous tax code and the *Statut musulman*, which forbade the naturalization of any indigenous Algerian who would not abandon Islamic law and accept the French *code civil*, Muslim Algerians faced the full power and authority of a deeply xenophobic municipal police that did not hesitate to resort to brutality. With extreme hostility, police officers and gendarmes defended and maintained the colonial system, and by extension, a strident racial hierarchy. They functioned as a paramilitary unit that targeted nationalists and leftists alike.²⁶⁴

These political realities, however, had the opposite of the intended effect. Islam soon became a unifying force around which Arab and indigenous Algerians would rally. Muslim Algerians who had moved to the cities kept in close contact with their families still living in rural Algeria, linking the cities and rural parts of Algeria. In the cities, young Algerians, both those who had a formal French education and the self-taught, congregated in Moorish cafés, barbershops, shoemakers' stalls, cinemas, and meeting halls to exchange ideas and talk politics.²⁶⁵ The concept of the modern nation-state, imported from the West, but nursed and shaped by thought leaders like Ben Badis, took hold in these discussions and the dream of a unified, Algerian national identity began to take shape.

The desire for unity and for resistance to the severely xenophobic legislation of the era can be observed in Messali's publications, *Le Parlement algérien* and *El Ouma. Le Parlement*

²⁶³ Samuel Kalman, "Avec une brutalité toute particulière: Fascist Sympathies, Racial Violence, and the Municipal Police and Gendarmerie in Oran, 1936-1937," in *The French Right Between the Wars: Political and Intellectual Movements from Conservatism to Fascism*, ed. Samuel Kalman and Sean Kennedy (New York and Oxford: Berfahn Books, 2014), 49.

²⁶⁴ Kalman, 53.

²⁶⁵ Drew, "'This Land Is Not for Sale': Communists, Nationalists, and the Popular Front," 81.

algérien was one of the many journals that Messali and his cohort established in pursuit of Algerian independence. Based in Algiers, the paper was meant to take the place of Messali's previous attempt to establish an Arabic-language news source in Algeria, *Al-Chaab* (Le peuple or The People), which was first released in 1937 before being immediately banned the same year.²⁶⁶ On the front cover of an issue of *Le Parlement algérien* released May 19, 1939, an illustration (figure 3.3 – 1939) that features Messali as both the leader and instructor of Muslim Algerians lends insight into the early machinations of the PPA, the nationalist party that replaced the ENA after its second dissolution in 1937. Standing before a group of Muslim men (and even a few women), Messali conducts a class at the “École du peuple algérien.” Roughly three times larger than his students in size, Messali's stern expression, scholarly appearance, and resolute posture make it clear who the respected leader of the “peuple algérien” is meant to be. Subordinated to Messali in the lower left are other political figures resembling Ben Badis, Lamine Lamoudi (a close associate of Ben Badis), and Bendjelloul, who are rendered as Messali's students in this cartoon.

The cartoon also indicates the political agenda of the PPA at the time. Holding a weighty volume with the initials “PPA” on the bridge, Messali motions to the chalkboard next to him. A list of reforms is crossed out on the top of the board, including the infamous failed *Projet Blum-Viollette*. The *Projet Blum-Viollette* was named after its legislators, Léon Blum, France's first socialist Prime Minister, and Maurice Viollette, the *Gouverneur Général* of Algeria at the time. In 1936, the pair proposed a series of reforms meant to enfranchise Muslim Algerians. The bill would grant French citizenship to upwards of 20,000-25,000 Muslims without losing their Muslim status and would allow for the representation of Arab and indigenous Algerians in the

²⁶⁶ Charles-Robert Ageron, “Regards sur la presse politique musulmane dans l'Algérie « française »,” in *Genèse de l'Algérie algérienne* (Saint Denis: Éditions Bouchène, 2005), 343.

French parliament.²⁶⁷ The bill, as demonstrated by its parameters, was an assimilationist policy and was popular among Muslim political figures like Abbas and Bendjelloul, but it was greatly disfavored by liberationists like Messali who saw it as a form of political placation with the purpose of derailing his growing movement toward independence from France.²⁶⁸

Messali's countenance in the illustration captures his frustration and complete rejection of reformist policies and the whole of the French left. Messali initially allied himself with the Popular Front, a coalition of leftist political parties, hoping that his allegiance would pay off in the future once a progressive government was established. However, Messali's hopes were soon dashed. Although the Popular Front experienced electoral success in January 1936 in France, the opposite occurred in Algeria where the right-wing nationalist party, the Croix de Feu, won the majority of seats.²⁶⁹ As the political tides turned in favor of the right, the Blum-Viollette reforms never even made it to the French Chamber of Deputies. The illustration, instead, suggests an alternative route: "organise-toi." Messali encouraged readers of *Le Parlement algérien* to quit seeking political support from the French, even those sympathetic to their plight, and instead opt for a political program that was self-defined.

Like Bendjelloul, Messali used the press to encourage other indigenous political leaders to endorse his political platform and to advance his own political career. On the front page of the July 1, 1939, edition of *Le Parlement algérien*, an illustration (figure 3.4 – 1939) featuring four of the most mainstream Muslim politicians of the time are shown hand-in-hand with a caption that reads, "Is this not what the Algerian people want?" On closer inspection, it is clear that

²⁶⁷ Natalya Vince, *The Algerian War, The Algerian Revolution* (Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2020), 38.

²⁶⁸ Salah el Din el Zein el Tayeb, "The Europeanized Algerians and the Emancipation of Algeria," *Middle Eastern Studies* 22, no. 2 (April 1986): 212.

²⁶⁹ Martin Evans, "The Making of Algerian Nationalism 1930-1945," in *Algeria: France's Undeclared War* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 66.

Messali has taken the opportunity to put himself forth as the most desirable candidate. Not only is he much bigger than the others featured in the picture, again including Bendjelloul, Lamine Lamoudi, and Ben Badis, but all of the other figures also look up to him with admiration and as if for guidance which, Messali, sturdy and sure in appearance, is ready to supply.

The indigenous press also afforded occasion to directly critique the corrupt practices of the French government in Algeria. In a cartoon published on the front page in *Le Parlement algérien* on June 9, 1939 (figure 3.5), the falsified results of the elections for the council to the prefecture are openly condemned.²⁷⁰ On the right, the candidate of the PPA, Douar Mohammed, is seated rightfully in the place of the Conseil Général surrounded by his supporters, including Messali himself. On the left, two colons inflate Zerrouk Mahieddine, the French government's puppet, using an air pump. Portly and "full of air," Mahieddine "the fat" floats in the air, plumped by the favor of the French colonial government while his Muslim brothers continue to suffer.

El Ouma was another of the few journals in which Algerian liberationists could promote their belief system. Although *El Ouma* generally produced concise and stylistically minimalistic editions, photography was occasionally used to supplement the journal's political and news reporting. These photographs demonstrate that even before the start of World War II, Algerian nationalists had become more decisive and brazen in their pursuit of independence. These few yet remarkable photographs also provide insight into the protest strategies of Algerian nationalists from the period. For example, a rare photograph (figure 3.6 – 1938) shows several Muslim Algerians gathered around and exaggeratedly pointing to a slogan hastily graffitied on a

²⁷⁰ Jacques Jurquet, *La Révolution nationale algérienne et le Parti communiste français, tome 3* (Paris: Éditions du centenaire, 1974), 15. Jurquet discusses the specific election referenced in the cartoon in his text. For more on French efforts to institute an indigenous "elite" class that helped maintain colonial order, see Guy Pervillé, "La notion d'élite dans la politique indigène de la France en Algérie," in *Les élites fins de siècles: XIX-XX siècles [online]* (Pessac: Maison des sciences de l'homme d'aquitane, 1992), <http://books.openedition.org/msha/19501>.

wall. Although the identity of the individuals pictured here, the location of the photograph, and the name of the photographer are not provided, this image captures the sentiments of political and social unity shared among Muslim Algerians during this period. The graffiti, written in bold letters and in French, reads “Libérez Messali (liberate Messali). Messali and other PPA leaders had been arrested for inciting sedition in August 1937.²⁷¹ Surrounding the inscription are several Muslim Algerians who wear the traditional *fez*, generally worn for conferences and lectures on the Islamic day of prayer. Wearing the *fez* was a political statement during these years. It communicated to viewers that the person wearing it remained steadfastly devout to Islam and refused to abdicate his Muslim status to be naturalized.²⁷² The star and crescent shapes, seen above the text, also referenced Islam, and would later be used in the Algerian national flag.²⁷³ The group has also gathered several small children under the flag, undoubtedly a reference to the future and to remind viewers that the fight for independence is a fight to better the lives of future generations.

El Ouma provided a platform to celebrate revolutionary militancy and even encourage arrest as a form of resistance and badge of honor. In a photograph accompanying a short article titled, “The Heroes of the Algerian Cause,” eight men pose proudly, just months before Germany invaded Poland, initiating World War II (figure 3.7 – 1939). The article explains that these men, recently released from prison, want to show that colonialism had not broken them. The author writes, “These recent examples should mitigate any influence or intimidation and remove any of

²⁷¹ Martin Thomas, *The French Empire Between the Wars: Imperialism, Politics and Society* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 299.

²⁷² Robert Malley, *The Call from Algeria: Third Worldism, Revolution, and the Turn to Islam* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996), 46.

²⁷³ Marisa Fois, “Algerian Nationalism: From the Origins to Algerian War of Independence,” *Oriente Moderno* 97, no. 1 (2017): 100.

your hesitation in putting everything on the line for the conquest of your rights.”²⁷⁴ The men in the photograph look directly in the camera’s lens and communicate a quiet but powerful and unapologetic challenge to colonial authority. To be pictured and, moreover, named in an article such as this would have been considered extremely brazen during this period, a time that was intolerant of any act that threatened French sovereignty or incited civil disorder.²⁷⁵ The militancy displayed here was not just performative. Arab and indigenous Algerians were taking real action clandestinely as well. During this time, there were documented cases of Algerians purchasing firearms obtained from smugglers. Some Algerians stole weapons, detonators, and explosives from armories, mines, and construction sites as well. One could even find bullets and gunpowder sold in secret at local markets.²⁷⁶

The photographs and cartoons of the indigenous political press demonstrate the intensity of the Algerian independence movement on the eve of global war. Although the failures of the Blum-Viollette reforms had been a huge disappointment and increased political and religious oppression by the French colonial authorities had made political expression riskier, these journals evince that Arab and indigenous political leaders were not deterred from their fight for equality. Likely sensing the growing influence of the indigenous political press, most journals that Arab and indigenous Algerians directed and consumed came under strict government censure in 1939 before being done away with altogether in 1940.²⁷⁷ Under Vichy, there was no

²⁷⁴ “Les héros de la cause algérienne,” *El Ouma*, March 1939, 70^e édition, 1. “Ces exemples tout frais doivent anéantir en vous l’influence et l’intimidation et vous sortir de l’hésitation de vous mettre tous en avant pour la conquête de vos droits.” All translations are my own henceforth unless otherwise stated.

²⁷⁵ John Douglas Ruedy, *Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 140.

²⁷⁶ Samuel Kalman, “Unlawful Acts or Strategies of Resistance? Crime and the Disruption of Colonial Order in Interwar French Algeria,” *French Historical Studies* 43, no. 1 (February 2020): 93–94.

²⁷⁷ Ageron, “Regards sur la presse politique musulmane dans l’Algérie « française »,” 345. As Ageron reports, there were some indigenous periodicals that were published and circulated clandestinely. The PCA secretly published several editions of *La Lutte sociale* between 1939 and 1941. After July 1943, the PCA and PCF published a

toleration of political dissent. However, as will be seen in the next section, there would be a visible effort to win over the Muslim inhabitants of French Algeria.

Vichy Algeria – A Visual Battleground with Multiple Fronts

Nazi Germany defeated the French in the staggeringly short period of six weeks between May and June of 1940. Strategically, the fall of France was a foreboding event for the Allied powers. If the Germans were able to seize France's ports and fleets, including in the French colonies, England and even the United States could be in danger of invasion.²⁷⁸ The Allies sought to intervene immediately to prevent the Axis powers from appropriating the French navy. Two naval operations in particular shaped the wartime experience of North Africans during this period: British-led attacks on the port cities of Mers el-Kébir, Algeria and Dakar, Senegal, known as Operations Catapult (July 30, 1940) and Menace (September 23-25, 1940) respectively. These two operations are considered to have been abysmal failures and diplomatic snafus that only sowed discord among the previously allied French and British.

In this section of chapter 3, I introduce and interpret propaganda posters that the Vichy Regime subsequently released in Algeria following these botched naval operations. It is well documented that Pétain and the colonial administration in Algeria relied heavily on the support of settler colonists, many of whom already harbored anti-Semitic sentiment.²⁷⁹ However, in

periodical called *Liberté* (25,000 copies in July and 60,000 in December). Messali Hadj's PPA, which itself had been outlawed, also successfully printed several clandestine journals. *Sawt al-Ahrar (La Voix des hommes libres) (The Voice of Free Men)*, an Arabic-language journal, appeared from June 1943 to January 1944 after which *Al-Watan (La Patrie) (The Nation)* appeared. At least 5,000 examples are thought to have circulated. From February 1944 to March 1945, the PPA also published a monthly journal called *L'Action algérienne* "organe clandestin de la jeunesse anti-impérialiste"

²⁷⁸ Michael Neiberg, *When France Fell: The Vichy Crisis and the Fate of the Anglo-American Alliance* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2021), 2.

²⁷⁹ Some texts that address Algeria's settler population and far-right political proclivities include Samuel Kalman and Sean Kennedy, eds., *The French Right Between the Wars: Political and Intellectual Movements from Conservatism to Fascism* (New York and Oxford: Berhahn Books, 2014); Dónal Hassett, *Mobilizing Memory: The Great War and the Language of Politics in Colonial Algeria, 1918-39* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019); Samuel Kalman's *The Extreme Right in Interwar France: The Faisceau and the Croix de Feu* (Aldershot, England

addition to colonial settlers, the Vichy administration turned its attention to Arab and indigenous Algerians as well. While Pétain ultimately ignored the requests of Algerian nationalists for reform, several propaganda posters from this era suggest that the Vichy Regime also recognized and sought to win the political support of Arab and indigenous Algerians and encourage their participation in the war effort, a fact that has remained relatively unacknowledged in the literature on Algeria's role during World War II.²⁸⁰

Steps to disseminate Vichy propaganda in French Algeria were taken immediately. To do so, the Vichy Regime created the Légion algéroise (later changed to the Légion algérienne), an organ that communicated with the Légion française des combattants (LFC) in the metropole, the embodiment of Pétainiste ideology.²⁸¹ The Légion algéroise played the same role, but in French Algeria. One of its stated goals was to inculcate Muslims with Vichyist ideology. To draw Muslim support, the Légion sought to characterize the relationship between *colon* and *fellah* (Arab or indigenous peasants) as fraternal. To engender feelings of solidarity and belonging, the

and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008); Sean Kennedy, *Reconciling France Against Democracy: The Croix de Feu and the Parti Social Français, 1929–1935* (Montreal and Ithaca: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007); Brian Jenkins, *France in the Era of Fascism* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005); Samuel Kalman's *French Colonial Fascism: The Extreme Right in Algeria, 1919–1939* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013); Sophie Roberts, "Rupture: Vichy, State Antisemitism, and the Crémieux Decree," in *Citizenship and Antisemitism in French Colonial Algeria, 1870–1962* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 250–96; Daniel J. Schroeter, "Between Metropole and French North Africa: Vichy's Anti-Semitic Legislation and Colonialism's Racial Hierarchies," in *The Holocaust and North Africa*, ed. Aomar Boum and Sarah Abrevaya Stein (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2019), 19–49; and Reeva Spector Simon, *The Jews of the Middle East and North Africa: The Impact of World War II* (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2020). These texts stress the predisposition of Algeria's settler population toward radical right politics since from the outset of French rule, the colonial state paved the way for far-right extremism given that the colonial project was predicated on political violence, brutality, and racial hierarchy.

²⁸⁰ While the role of colonial troops to the French war effort and colonial wartime experiences has been discussed (see, for example, Claire Miot, "The Officer for Muslim Military Affairs in the First French Army, 1944–1945: An Agent of Control or an Intermediary?," in *Combatants of Muslim Origin in European Armies in the Twentieth Century: Far from Jihad*, ed. Xavier Bougarel, Raphaëlle Branche, and Cloé Drieu (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017), 161–82; Martin S. Alexander, "Colonial Minds Confounded: French Colonial Troops in the Battle of France, 1940," in *The French Colonial Mind: Violence, Military Encounters, and Colonialism (Volume 2)*, ed. Martin Thomas (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2011), 248–82.), the value that the French placed on Arab and indigenous Algerian political opinion in World War II is an area in the historiography of French North Africa during World War II that has rarely been addressed.

²⁸¹ For more on the LFC, see Jean-Marie Guillon, "La Légion française des combattants, ou comment comprendre la France de Vichy," *Annales du Midi*, Voyage dans la France de Vichy, 116, no. 245 (2004): 5–24.

légion organized a special day of celebration for its Muslim section on August 19, 1941, which marched before city hall to zouave music and then shared a couscous among several thousand Muslims who shouted “Vive Pétain! Vive la France!”²⁸² Bulletins were also distributed to propagandists that included messages from François Valentin, leader of the Légion française, and encouraged them to go to different events, conferences, ceremonies, and patriotic festivals to spread propaganda. The organization even provided a dialogue rubric for discussing politics at social gatherings.²⁸³

Efforts to sway Arab and indigenous Algerians toward Vichy’s cause were initially successful. Some Algerians were optimistic that their treatment would improve and that they would finally be equals of the French.²⁸⁴ By June of 1942, the Légion algéroise boasted a total membership of 45,880 French men, 7,142 French women, and (if Vichy Regime reports are to be believed) 83,856 Muslim Algerians. According to the légion’s bulletin of June 1, 1942, propaganda toward Algeria’s Muslim inhabitants had two primary vehicles: the journal “El-Djezaïri” (the Algerian), which was printed in Arabic and communicated legionnaire propaganda, and over 2,000 “slogans” in Arabic that were distributed to each department in Algeria.²⁸⁵ These “slogans,” which are not described in detail, suggest the importance of chanting and word-of-mouth communication. This was an acknowledged fact among legionnaires. In the August 1, 1942, bulletin, the President of the Rouïba section of the Légion was quoted saying, “I conclude that there is an absolute necessity for intensely spoken

²⁸² Alfred Salinas, “Le loyalisme musulman et le défi nationaliste,” in *Pétain, l’Algérie et la revanche* (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2018), 347.

²⁸³ “La légion algéroise. Bulletin de propagande. Organe de liaison entre propagandistes. No. 5.” (Imprimerie Nord Africaine (Algiers), May 1, 1942).

²⁸⁴ Pierre Darmon, *L’Algérie de Pétain: Les populations algériennes ont la parole (Septembre 1939 - Novembre 1942)* (Paris: Perrin, 2014), 230.

²⁸⁵ “La légion algéroise. Bulletin de propagande. Organe de liaison entre propagandistes. No. 6.” (Imprimerie Nord Africaine (Algiers), June 1, 1942).

propaganda campaign in Muslim circles, either by conferences or by word-of-mouth conversations, talks in Moorish cafés, etc., etc. No propaganda other than spoken propaganda can succeed in indigenous circles.”²⁸⁶ Nonetheless, visual media were also deployed by Vichy propagandists in French Algeria for which the failed Operations Catapult and Menace became quick fodder. Although the Vichy Regime understood the necessity of spoken propaganda as a means of appealing to the Muslim population of Algeria, these posters indicate that an effort was made through visual media as well.

The French found Operation Catapult, during which the British Navy attacked Port Mers el-Kébir in Oran, Algeria, needlessly inflammatory. French Admiral Marcel-Bruno Gensoul (1880-1973) and his fleet were stationed in Mers el-Kébir following the German invasion of France. The British were wary that Gensoul’s force might be turned over to the Axis powers and sought to demilitarize and demobilize the ships or, in a worst-case scenario, scuttle them. When British Admiral Cedric Holland (1889-1950) offered these terms to Gensoul, the French were understandably resentful since the British had been close allies during World War I.²⁸⁷ Gensoul informed Holland that while he did not intend to give his ships to the Axis powers, he also would not abandon or surrender them to the British. Gensoul told Holland that, if attacked, the French would return fire in kind.²⁸⁸ Gensoul was concerned that surrendering the ships to the British might affect the terms of the armistice and result in the German invasion of Vichy France. He decided to try and flee.²⁸⁹

²⁸⁶ “La légion algéroise. Bulletin de propagande. Organe de liaison entre propagandistes. No. 8.” (Imprimerie Nord Africaine (Algiers), August 1, 1942). “Je conclus à la nécessité absolue d’une propagande parlée intense dans les milieux musulmans, soit par des conférences, soit par des conversations de bouche à oreille, des causeries dans les café-maures, etc., etc... Aucune autre propagande que la propagande parlée ne peut réussir dans les milieux indigènes.”

²⁸⁷ George E. Melton, *From Versailles to Mers El-Kébir: The Promise of Anglo-French Naval Cooperation, 1919-40* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2015), 190.

²⁸⁸ Melton, 190.

²⁸⁹ Melton, 191.

After negotiations failed, the British opened fire on the French fleet. French casualties were enormous. 1,297 French officers and crewmembers were killed, 1,000 of whom were on the *Bretagne*, an outdated battleship that exploded and capsized so quickly that few aboard survived.²⁹⁰ The Mers el-Kébir debacle only served to alienate the French. As a result, France severed diplomatic relations with the British and, in retaliation, French bombers executed a raid on Gibraltar.²⁹¹ The Allies' failed naval operation served to reveal and firm up the loyalties of France's colonies. Prior to Operation Catapult, the loyalty of the Algerian colonial government was unclear and could best be described as an uneasy neutrality. Unfortunately for the Allies, the enormous loss of life fostered anti-British sentiment throughout France and the colonies, resulting in an undeclared Franco-British war that was playing out in the North African theater of World War II.²⁹²

The anti-British mood among Vichyists is registered in a poster featuring a caricatural figure of Winston Churchill, who ominously looks down over the smoking ships destroyed during the attacks on Mers el-Kébir (figure 3.8 – 1940). A graveyard of ships is matched by a graveyard of fallen soldiers. A hyperbolically large Churchill gleefully surveys the destruction he has enacted while smoking his trademark stogie. Churchill's grotesque and villainous appearance sends a clear message to French and Algerian viewers: he is the repugnant enemy and is responsible for the loss of French life. This poster is meant to evoke sympathy for those who died, but more importantly, to also foment hatred toward the Allied forces.

Such a poster would have appealed to both French settlers and Muslim Algerians. Right-wing politics had firmly taken root in the preceding century. The right made their power known

²⁹⁰ Melton, 196.

²⁹¹ Melton, 199. Martin Thomas, *The French Empire at War, 1940-1945* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1998), 51.

²⁹² Melton, *From Versailles to Mers El-Kébir: The Promise of Anglo-French Naval Cooperation, 1919-40*, 203.

to the entire country on February 6, 1934, the year after Adolf Hitler was elected Chancellor of Germany, when a coalition of rioters, comprised of right-wing leagues and nationalist veterans, stormed the Chamber of Deputies in Paris.²⁹³ The political left was outraged and concerned that the threat of a fascist takeover in France was not only real, but imminent. Seeking to challenge the growing power of the political right, a coalition of radicals, socialists, and communists consolidated their strength to form the leftist coalition that became known as the Popular Front.²⁹⁴ However, the Popular Front, as was discussed in the preceding chapter, faced a heavy opposition, including on the other side of the Mediterranean. Fascist sympathies and racial violence flourished in Algeria. Extreme right-wing leagues and parties had considerable traction in the colony and Jewish and Muslim Algerians were characterized as anti-European.²⁹⁵ Thus, it is unsurprising that this negative portrayal of Churchill, perceived as a defender of the Jews and a merciless murderer of the French, his former allies, would have appealed to French settlers in Algeria.

Perhaps more surprising, however, is that this poster would have also appealed to certain Muslim Algerian viewers. Churchill was a controversial figure in the Arab world. The Muslims of Algeria viewed Churchill as yet another figure of European imperialism and felt solidarity toward Palestinians who suffered under the British mandate.²⁹⁶ In vilifying the British Prime Minister in propaganda, the Vichy administration sought to play on these preexisting sentiments among Muslim Algerians. More generally, some of Algeria's Arab and indigenous inhabitants

²⁹³ Samuel Kalman and Sean Kennedy, "Introduction," in *The French Right Between the Wars: Political and Intellectual Movements from Conservatism to Fascism*, ed. Samuel Kalman and Sean Kennedy (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2014), 4. Kevin Passmore, "Crowd Psychology, Anti-Southern Prejudice, and Constitutional Reform in 1930s France: The Stavisky Affair and the Riots of 6 February 1932," in *The French Right Between the Wars: Political and Intellectual Movements from Conservatism to Fascism*, ed. Samuel Kalman and Sean Kennedy (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2014), 25. The Chamber of Deputies was controlled at this point by Radical-Socialist Édouard Daladier. Daladier, fearing for his life, tendered his resignation the next day.

²⁹⁴ Kalman and Kennedy, "Introduction," 5.

²⁹⁵ Samuel Kalman, "Avec une brutalité toute particulière," 49.

²⁹⁶ Pierre Darmon, *L'Algérie de Pétain*, 423.

also harbored anti-Semitic beliefs. This was an aspect of Muslim politics that the Nazis were aware of and tried to exploit. Nazi propagandists collaborated with pro-Nazi Arab exiles from Palestine and Iraq living in Berlin to strengthen their knowledge of and, in turn, to craft propaganda that would appeal to Muslim viewers in the Middle East and North Africa.²⁹⁷ Haj Amin el-Husseini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, served as the main mouthpiece of Nazi ideology in the Arab world. In radio transmissions broadcast to North Africa and the Middle East, Husseini declared that only traitors to Islam would support Great Britain and that Churchill was no more than a puppet for the Jews. He warned that a new Jewish state would wipe out Arab civilization if nothing was done.²⁹⁸

Tensions between the Muslim and Jewish populations of Algeria had been fomenting for years. Some Muslim Algerians viewed Jews as at least complacent, if not as the outright beneficiaries of the colonial system that had oppressed Muslims for over a century. Muslim Algerians were resentful of their Jewish counterparts who had been naturalized French citizens since the Crémieux Decree was passed in 1870, legislation that did not extend citizenship to Arab and indigenous Algerians who had instead been living under the Code de l'indigénat since 1881. The indigénat made it unlawful for Muslims to meet in large groups, to travel without permission, and severely punished any “disrespectful” acts under a harsh judicial regime.²⁹⁹ Furthermore, the economic hardship, political turmoil, and the number of unemployed Arab and indigenous Algerians concentrated in urban locales during the interwar period resulted in the kind of fear and desperation that eventually leads to rioting. The Great Depression hit Arab and

²⁹⁷ Jeffrey Herf, “Nazi Germany’s Propaganda Aimed at Arabs and Muslims during World War II and the Holocaust: Old Themes, New Archival Findings,” *Central European History* 42, no. 4 (2009): 710.

²⁹⁸ Herf, 723. As Herf points out, Palestinian Muslims had suffered greatly under British colonialism and had seen much of their land expropriated and given to Jewish settlers. The Nazis strategically exploited the pre-existing anger toward the British in Palestine.

²⁹⁹ Joshua Cole, *Lethal Provocation: The Constantine Murders and the Politics of French Algeria* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2019), 29.

indigenous Algerians hardest. Whereas settlers directed huge enterprises and held massive parcels of land that were farmed using the latest techniques, Arab and indigenous peasants had been forced into subsistence farming due to the expropriation of their land during the initial conquest and settlement of Algeria.³⁰⁰ Rural peasants could not afford the cost of living, which led to a mass rural exodus.³⁰¹ The number of Arab and indigenous Algerians living in urban centers in Algeria rose from 355,000 in 1926 to 708,000 in 1936.³⁰²

Arab and indigenous peasants in Algeria directed some of their ire toward the Jews. On August 5, 1934, in Constantine, Muslim Algerians attacked Jewish property and Jewish Algerians. When the riots were over, twenty-three Jews and four Muslims were dead.³⁰³ The Croix de feu blamed the Crémieux Decree for Jewish-Muslim violence and even sought to recruit Muslims to its cause by exploiting antisemitic sentiment among Muslims. Thus, by World War II, there was already a precedent for ultra-right-wing groups to try and benefit from the anti-Semitism that existed in some Muslim communities in Algeria. By World War II, some Muslims welcomed anti-Jewish laws implemented by the Vichy Regime. They believed that the lowering of the status of Jews might improve the outlook of Muslims, although the main Muslim political leaders of the time (Messali and Abbas), were critical of Vichy's racial hierarchy.³⁰⁴

Aside from exploiting pre-existing anti-Semitic sentiment, Vichy propagandists (perhaps misguidedly) sought to evoke feelings of patriotism toward France or at least sympathy toward Muslim conscripts from Muslim Algerians. In another poster (figure 3.9 – 1940) that reads

³⁰⁰ Martin Evans and John Phillips, *Algeria: Anger of the Dispossessed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 38.

³⁰¹ Evans, "The Making of Algerian Nationalism 1930-1945," 62.

³⁰² Jacques Cantier, *L'Algérie sous le régime de Vichy* (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2002), 19.

³⁰³ Evans, "The Making of Algerian Nationalism 1930-1945," 63.

³⁰⁴ Daniel J. Schroeter, "Between Metropole and French North Africa: Vichy's Anti-Semitic Legislation and Colonialism's Racial Hierarchies," in *The Holocaust and North Africa*, ed. Aomar Boum and Sarah Abrevaya Stein (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2019), 34.

“Remember Oran,” a bloodied sailor breaks the surface of turbulent waters, raising the French flag defiantly as battleships approach in the distance. For a poster that is rather simplistic in composition, a variety of meanings can be excavated, mainly due to the ambiguous race and ethnicity of the soldier depicted. A comparison to a recruitment poster from the 1930s geared toward young Muslim men is instructive here. In the poster by the colonial painter Géo-Michel (figure 3.10), a Muslim man wearing a sailor’s uniform appears to be in discussion with Muslim Algerians about the benefits of serving in the French navy. He motions proudly to the French battleships in the harbor behind the group as they listen intently. A seated man of a younger, more impressionable age gazes up at the sailor, perhaps envisioning his future as a sailor in the French navy. The conscription of young Arab and indigenous men to the French navy was commonplace. They were recruited with promises of a better and respectable life. The text at the bottom of the poster promises viewers the chance to travel, learn a trade, and earn a pension. Returning to the “Remember Oran” poster, it now becomes clear that the man pictured there was meant to be racially ambiguous. His darker skin, mustache, and beard make him, perhaps for the Muslim viewer, plausibly Arab. The “Remember Oran” poster thus allows viewers, whatever their ethnic background, to identify with the sailor’s emotional plea without regard to his particular race or religion. Given the primacy of the French flag in the image, the poster instructs viewers, whether they be Christian or Muslim, that their loyalty above all is to France.

The effort to evoke feelings of patriotism toward France among Muslim viewers, or at least feelings of solidarity during difficult times, registers the Vichy administration’s wariness of outside influence. Although the Vichy Regime had an armistice with Germany, the Germans still sought to incite rebellion against the French colonial empire. In addition to the propaganda discussed earlier, another part of the Nazi’s strategy to cause disorder in French North Africa

was to “re-educate” colonial prisoners of war with the intention of releasing these newly sympathetic soldiers back to France to act as anti-colonial agitators. Between May and June of 1940, during which time France tried to rebuff German advances, the German army captured nearly 100,000 colonial soldiers, predominantly North Africans, who were transferred to Germany. Hitler himself ordered the transfer.³⁰⁵ To win over their support, the Nazis gave colonial prisoners of war posts of trust, fed and dressed them well, and generally treated them much better than other prisoners.³⁰⁶ After 1940, Muslim Algerians reportedly were known to refer to Hitler as the “protégé de Dieu,” the “imam el Mehdi,”³⁰⁷ and was also called “Cheikh” or “Hadj” Hitler.³⁰⁸

Of course, the Vichy Regime wanted to be sure that Algeria’s Muslims were wise to Hitler’s games. To do so, the regime co-opted some journals of the indigenous press.³⁰⁹ In an edition of *La Voix indigène* from the month after the official start of World War II, an author going by the name of Hassan wrote that all Islamic countries knew that Hitler and his accomplices coveted the many natural resources found in the Middle East. In an open criticism of Christianity, Hassan writes, “There is, among the people of Islam, an unanimity against violence that we regret cannot be observed among Christian people. [...] If Christianity comported itself like Islam, Hitler would have been speedily annihilated.”³¹⁰ This rhetoric clearly demonstrates that the Vichy Regime cleverly appealed to Muslims through their religion and through flattery as well.

³⁰⁵ Raffael Scheck, “French Colonial Prisoners in Germany and France during the Second World War,” in *Colonial Soldiers in Europe, 1914-1945*, ed. Eric Storm and Ali Al Tuma (New York and London: Routledge, 2016), 42–43.

³⁰⁶ Lahoueld Badra, “Germany’s Psychological War Against France (1939-1945),” *Revue Française d’histoire d’outre Mer* 82, no. 306 (1995): 67.

³⁰⁷ The Imam el Mehdi was the last of the twelve Imams who are understood as the political and religious successors of the Prophet Muhammed. In the Islamic faith, it is believed that the Imam el Mehdi will appear in the end of time to establish peace and justice and redeem Islam.

³⁰⁸ Darmon, 8.

³⁰⁹ Ageron, “Regards sur la presse politique musulmane dans l’Algérie ‘française’,” 345.

³¹⁰ Hassan, “Les craintes de l’Islam,” *La Voix indigène*, October 10, 1939, 488 edition, 1.

This propaganda war between Germany and Vichy France emphasizes the premium placed on winning Muslim popular support. For the Vichy Regime, it would be counterproductive to be dealing with an uprising in Algeria while also fighting a war in the mainland. For Germany, which wanted North Africa to itself to ensure a tactical advantage and extend the “Final Solution” to the region’s Jews, it would be all too convenient to incite a rebellion in North Africa. Many North African soldiers felt that they had fought harder than their French counterparts during the German invasion and suffered greater losses.³¹¹ This made some Arab and indigenous Algerian soldiers more susceptible to Nazi propaganda. The Vichy administration was wary of the Nazi’s desire to turn its colonial subjects against France and instituted other efforts to quell discontent among Muslim Algerian veterans. Any colonial soldier believed to be biased toward the Germans was placed under close surveillance. The French colonial government even hired itinerant storytellers to spread rumors about the mistreatment of North African prisoners of the Nazis during the war.³¹²

In a more overt effort to assuage Muslim Algerians, the Vichy government released another, far more decorative poster (figure 3.11 – 1940) which featured a photograph of Pétain and Admiral Jean Abrial who served as Gouverneur Général of Algeria from 1940 to 1941. The photographs are accompanied by text in which Pétain directly addresses the Algerian people:

Until now, I’ve spoken to you as a father. Today, I speak to you as your leader. I will put all of my force, all of my energy, to the service of the grandeur of Algeria and of France. May God protect from all misfortune those who have never known fear in the middle of torment and all whom He entrusted the Government of Algeria.³¹³

³¹¹ Scheck, “French Colonial Prisoners in Germany and France during the Second World War,” 42–43.

³¹² Badra, “Germany’s Psychological War Against France (1939-1945),” 71.

³¹³ “Je vous ai tenu jusqu’ici le langage d’un père. Je vous tiens aujourd’hui le langage d’un chef. Je mettrai toutes mes forces, toute mon énergie au service de la grandeur de l’Algérie et de la France. Que Dieu protège de tout malheur celui qui n’a pas connu la peur au milieu des tourmentes et ce qui Il a confié le Gouvernement de l’Algérie.”

In the poster, Pétain is characterized as a stalwart war hero. His contributions to France during World War I are alluded to through pictorial reference of the Battle of Verdun in the upper left which is juxtaposed to pictorial reference to the Battle of Dunkirk, a shameful event for the British navy (upper right). Through this juxtaposition, Pétain's long service to France is emphasized. Abrial, pictured below Pétain, was a logical choice for Gouverneur Général. He shared uncompromisingly in Pétain's vision of France's revitalization as a more conservative and Catholic nation.³¹⁴

This poster was clearly designed to appeal to Muslim viewers in addition to colonial settlers. While Pétain's image is framed by patriotic colors and images, the entire poster is bordered by a geometric pattern that evokes Islamic decorative modes. These decorative motifs, in addition to the prominent presence of Arabic script, which are direct translations of the French captions, suggest that Pétain was interested in winning the support of Muslim Algerians. The inclusion of Arabic text is worth a second glance since, even on the eve of independence, only 10 percent of the total native Algerian population was literate.³¹⁵ Thus, only elite members of indigenous society would have been able to read the poster. These elite individuals, such as the *élus*, were among those who might have seen the new administration as an opportunity to pass political reformations, an aspect of the Vichy Regime in Algeria that I will discuss at greater length momentarily. These elite groups valorized, as was shown in Bendjelloul's publication, *Al-Maydân*, the Arabic language and Muslim religion, and sought to advance Algeria's Muslim character politically. Crucially, the text itself is also ambiguous. Pétain references God but does not clarify if the God whom he references is the Christian God or Allah. This religious ambiguity allows the viewer, Christian or Muslim, to openly interpret the meaning of his statement per their

³¹⁴ Darmon, 114.

³¹⁵ Ouarda Merrouche, "The Long-Term Impact of French Settlement on Education in Algeria," Working Paper Series, 2006, 2, <https://doi.org/10.1920/wp.cem.2006.1406>.

individual credo. Each of these considerations is remarkable since, as I demonstrated in the first two chapters of this dissertation, French colonial poster culture and propaganda did not commonly feature Arabic text or try to appeal to Muslim viewers. Moreover, these design choices are significant given that the French colonial government had banned Koranic schools and the teaching of Arabic only a few years prior.

Furthermore, the inclusion of palm leaves framing the Arabic script on the middle right portion of the poster would have also been familiar iconography to Muslim viewers, because palm trees have important symbolic value in Islam. In some Islamic traditions, it is said that the Dome of the Rock, which houses the Foundation Stone, the place where the Prophet began his Night Journey (a spiritual pilgrimage in which Muhammad ascended to heaven), will stand on palm trees that line one of the rivers of Paradise on the Day of Judgement.³¹⁶ More generally, in Islamic culture, palm trees have often been associated with oases, paradise, success, and abundance.³¹⁷ In a propaganda poster calling viewers to rally to France and its new leadership, evoking such symbols renders patriotic duty a religious prerogative. These additions to the poster make it clear that the Vichy Regime made a distinctive effort to appeal to Muslim Algerian viewers.

And if the French Empire could not coax Muslim viewers onto their side with promises of abundance and appeals to their tastes and values, the Vichy Regime would use intimidation. Two posters (figures 3.12 and 3.13, c. 1940-1942), similar in appearance, feature photographs of Algeria populated with Muslim men and women. Superimposed in the sky, the visage of Pétain floats ominously above the unsuspecting subjects of the French Empire. “The Marshal watches over the Empire,” each poster reads. The text suggests that Pétain, like any good ruler would,

³¹⁶ Nerina Rustomji, *The Garden and the Fire: Heaven and Hell in Islamic Culture* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 132.

³¹⁷ Rustomji, 65–66.

intends to protect his subjects. However, Pétain's spectral appearance and serious countenance could equally be interpreted as intimidation and a reminder to Arab and indigenous Algerians that they were being carefully surveilled and therefore should take care to remain faithful subjects impervious to external influence. Furthermore, with anti-colonial sentiment gaining traction in the years just before World War II began, Pétain's message could be meant specifically for revolutionary militants.³¹⁸

Although the reception of these posters by Muslim Algerians was not documented, what is certain is that some Muslim Algerians saw the installation of the Vichy administration and France's overall weakened state as an opening for real reform, at least initially. Following the arrest and imprisonment of Messali Hadj in 1937, the moderate politician Ferhat Abbas, an *élu* like Bendjelloul, emerged as the de facto thought leader of Algerian nationalism. He was vehemently in support of assimilation and did not endorse Messali's pro-independence movement. Hoping to catalyze change, Abbas sent a lengthy report of the state of Algeria's Muslim population to Pétain and signaled his support of the "ordre nouveau."³¹⁹

Abbas initially sought to appeal to Pétain's stated goals of National Revolution, a social and spiritual regeneration that centered family, community, and national belonging. Mirroring some of Nazism's goals, the National Revolution also hoped to achieve a "return to the soil" and heroized the rustic honesty of rural peasant life. Also, like Nazism, the French National Revolution prioritized the physical health and moral well-being of France's children, and women were expected to fulfill their domestic roles as mothers and caregivers. This return to traditional,

³¹⁸ I have not been able to locate any information about where these posters would have been posted. However, both photographs feature rural locations, including the desert. I speculate that they might have been meant for rural Arabs and Berbers who would have certainly been less cosmopolitan and informed than their urban counterparts about the complex political landscape that emerged after the fall of France in 1940.

³¹⁹ Jeremy F. Lane, "Ferhat Abbas, Vichy's National Revolution, and the Memory of the 'Royaume Arabe,'" *L'Esprit Créateur* 47, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 21.

conservative family values, which also occurred in the wake of World War I, was an attempt to restore and reinvigorate the nation of France.³²⁰ However, the National Revolution that Pétain and his cohort envisioned, while sharing in some of the ideology of German Nazism, primarily its anti-Semitism, xenophobia, and conservatism, was specific to France. The movement responded to pre-existing political discord, especially the French Empire's perceived fall from power following World War I due to American mass production and Soviet statism. The French viewed the American and Soviet ways of life, although entirely different from each other, as rising empires of regimented uniformity.³²¹ This political program sought to usher in a new era defined by movement away from France's current parliamentary system, a return to a Catholic moral order in which social hierarchy and authority were the rule, and the revival of a pre-industrial world.³²² In addition, this new paradigm was characterized by rampant anti-Semitism. In France, Jews were purged from legislative bodies and positions of civil service and interned in special camps. In Algeria, the Crémieux Decree of 1870, which in the inclusive spirit of Third Republic politics, granted French citizenship to indigenous Jews, was repealed in October 1940.³²³

Throughout his report to the Maréchal, Abbas mirrored these ideological points in hopes of advancing the platform of Algerian nationalists. Abbas appealed to the doctrine of the National Revolution by highlighting the important role of the Muslim peasant class. He argued that Arab and indigenous Algerians were "paysans déracinés," (uprooted peasants) who had once lived in harmony with nature, but were now beleaguered by the symptoms of modern decadence: epidemics, alcoholism, and prostitution. Like the French citizen, Abbas argued, the Muslim

³²⁰ Lane, 23.

³²¹ Robert O. Paxton, *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 146.

³²² Paxton, 141–42.

³²³ Paxton, 174.

Algerian was prey to the same moral decline that the Vichy Regime sought to remediate.³²⁴

Abbas attempted to convince Pétain that once freed from subservience, Muslim Algerians would rediscover their initiative and self-reliance.³²⁵

Abbas' plea fell on deaf ears. Pétain did not initially respond to Abbas, and only after considerable delay did he reply in vague, non-committal terms.³²⁶ Thus, while the propaganda posters discussed here demonstrate that the Vichy Regime recognized that turning Muslim Algerians against the Allies and Nazi Germany was crucial to the war effort, Pétain's refusal to respond to Abbas' report demonstrates that winning Muslim support was not more important than maintaining imperial hegemony. Unable to exploit the regime change, Abbas publicly renounced the Vichy Regime in 1942. This was a crucial moment in Abbas' political career. Although he had been a moderate reformer prior to the war, Pétain's indifference was the last straw. In addition, seeing Jewish Algerians have their citizenship revoked extinguished Abbas' hope for political reform. Even if Muslim Algerians were able to become naturalized, the reversal of the Crémieux Decree demonstrated that any newfound rights that they might win could clearly be rescinded at any time. As a result, Abbas joined Messali outright in calling for Algerian independence to create a new political coalition of élus and radical leftists.³²⁷

With this political context in mind, it is clear that at least among the mainstream leaders of the various Arab and indigenous political fronts (and, arguably, by extension, their followers), Vichy propaganda posters that sought to entice Muslim viewers to their side would have had little long-term efficacy. This revelation suggests that Vichy political iconography geared toward Muslims likely did not play an influential role in shaping Muslim political opinion, and

³²⁴ Ferhat Abbas, *De la colonie vers la province: Le jeune algérien (1930) Suivi du rapport au Maréchal Pétain (1941)* (Paris: Editions Garnier, 1981), 180–81.

³²⁵ Lane, "Ferhat Abbas, Vichy's National Revolution, and the Memory of the 'Royaume Arabe,'" 24.

³²⁶ Ferhat Abbas, *Guerre et Révolution d'Algérie, Tome 1. La Nuit Coloniale* (Paris: Juillard, 1962), 128.

³²⁷ Lane, "Ferhat Abbas, Vichy's National Revolution, and the Memory of the 'Royaume Arabe,'" 28–29.

ultimately might have even proved detrimental to the ongoing ideological battle that the Vichy Regime was fighting on three separate fronts (against Free France, the Nazis, and Algerian nationalists). While Vichy propaganda made visual appeals to a Muslim viewership, the Vichy Regime could not afford any real political concessions to them. For the Vichy Regime, then, the visual functioned more or less to gloss over political strife and keep Muslim reformists placated for the time being. Walking this narrow path between representation and reality, Pétain's refusal to introduce reforms, however, ultimately contributed to the unification of formerly ideologically distinct factions within the movement of Algerian nationalism, an aspect of the war that I will detail in the final section of this chapter.

British and American Influence on Algerian Nationalism

The Allied Forces occupied French Algeria after a massive military endeavor called Operation Torch in November 1942. A power struggle between the United States, Great Britain, and France ensued almost immediately to decide who should rightfully be placed in charge of the armed forces in North Africa. Muslim Algerians were greatly impressed by the swagger of the American military and admired both President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Commander-in-Chief Dwight D. Eisenhower. This was an edge that the Americans hoped to exploit. On shakier footing after Mers el-Kébir, the British sought to rehabilitate their image and win the support of Algerians as well. The French, especially de Gaulle, were highly suspicious of their British and American allies and did their utmost to keep them out of France's internal affairs. Propaganda from the era registers the complexity of this historical moment and, much like propaganda from the Vichy Regime, suggests that the Allies recognized the value of Muslim Algerian support.

Anticipating that the French forces in Algeria would be unwelcoming of a British-led invasion, the Allies determined that it made most sense to present Operation Torch, the Allied-

led invasion of North Africa in 1942, as an American-led endeavor.³²⁸ Upon arrival, a leaflet with a message from United States President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, communicated through his mouthpiece, Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower, was circulated throughout the entirety of North Africa (figure 3.14 –1942). The leaflet, which featured a small photograph of Roosevelt and a large American flag, called for the compliance of inhabitants of North Africa after invasion. The message was printed side-by-side in French and in Arabic, unifying the message to construct them as a single community of French settlers and Muslim Algerians living side-by-side.

In the leaflet, Eisenhower declared that the US military was devoted to returning the liberties and democratic rights of *all* people who lived under the tricolor flag of France. Furthermore, Eisenhower promised the following: “We come to you to free you from the conquerors who only wish to deprive you forever of your sovereign rights, of your right to freedom of worship, of your right to lead your life in peace.”³²⁹ But whom did he mean by “conquerors” and to which religion was he referring? Read perhaps by a French settler, it might be easily assumed that Eisenhower referenced the Vichy Regime or the Nazis as “conquerors” and endeavored to liberate the Jews. However, in Arabic, and in the eyes of Muslims, Eisenhower’s statement had a dual meaning. The conquerors could be either the Vichy Regime or Germany, or the conquerors could be the French colonial state itself, under whom they had suffered for over a century. With the repression of Islam becoming more severe (the ban on preaching in mosques, closing of Koranic schools, and censorship of Arabic-language journals in addition to the Régnier Decree of 1935, for example), Eisenhower’s reference to religious

³²⁸ Barbara Baer, “The British View of the Importance of French Africa to the Allied War Effort, 1940-1944,” *Proceedings of the Meeting of the French Colonial Historical Society 2* (1977): 17.

³²⁹ “Nous venons chez vous pour vous libérer des conquérants qui ne désirent que vous priver à tout jamais de vos droits souverains, de votre droit à la liberté du culte, de votre droit de vous mener train de vie en paix.”

freedom could be interpreted as an explicit allusion to the increased repression that Muslims had faced in Algeria leading up to World War II.

Such an insinuation would not have been misplaced among Algerian nationalists, for whom Roosevelt was a popular figure. Abbas even had a picture of the American president proudly displayed in his shop in Sétif. The Atlantic Charter, released by Roosevelt and Churchill on August 14, 1941, and declared the right of all peoples to choose their own form of government, received a warm reception among Arab and indigenous Algerians, similar to Wilson's Fourteen Points in 1918.³³⁰ The Charter was a global declaration that asserted a set of democratic ideals and the right of all people to choose their own form of government. Thus, by the time the Allies arrived in North Africa, Muslim Algerians already viewed Americans as protectors of democracy and religious freedom.

This was concerning to the French, who by no means wanted their allies involved in their internal affairs, regardless of their dependence on British and American forces in liberating France from Vichy and the Nazis. A power struggle to determine who should command the French troops and govern civilians in North Africa immediately ensued. There were three candidates: 1) French Admiral François Darlan, who commanded the French Navy under Vichy and undeniably had the most influence in the region at the time; 2) French General Henri Giraud, whom United States Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower hoped to place in charge; and 3) French General Charles de Gaulle, a leader who had embodied the heart and soul of the French resistance since the fall of France to the Germans.³³¹ However, de Gaulle was extremely

³³⁰ Martin Evans, *Algeria: France's Undeclared War* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 77–78.

³³¹ Martin Thomas, "Giraud and the Foundation of the French Committee of National Liberation," *French History* 10, no. 1 (1996): 86.

unpopular among the French forces in North Africa, and was still considered a traitor for leading the navy operation in Dakar that had gone terribly awry.³³²

The Americans viewed Giraud as the more pliable option. He was a military man, not a politician, and therefore was thought to be more vulnerable to political persuasion.³³³ However, Darlan and his senior officers did not accept Giraud. They were extremely loyal to Pétain.³³⁴ Darlan's obstruction ceased to be an issue, however, when he was assassinated by a royalist opponent of the Vichy government in December of 1942. After Darlan's assassination, Giraud seemed to ruffle fewer feathers than de Gaulle among the Vichyists in North Africa, giving him a political advantage.³³⁵ Yet Giraud lacked the ability to inspire a coalition of supporters to join his side. He did not have a clear vision for France post-liberation, and in the American and British view, he was not critical enough of the Vichy Regime despite being outspoken against the Axis powers.³³⁶

Like his Vichy predecessors, Giraud also sought the support of Algeria's Arab and indigenous population. Much like Pétain, the Allies worried that Algerians were vulnerable to Nazi influence; moreover, France still needed colonial soldiers. To win the support of Algerians, however, Giraud would have to overcome a disappointing track record in his negotiations with Muslim reformers. In his dealings with a committee of Muslim reformers in 1943, for example, Giraud denied all possibility of reform stating, "I wage war, not politics. No reforms. Period. I

³³² Thomas, 88. In addition, the Americans viewed de Gaulle as a general only in title. De Gaulle had not proven himself in combat against the Axis powers, and for that, he was greatly penalized by the French and Americans alike who worried that he was a political opportunist.

³³³ Kwang-Yew See, "The Downfall of General Giraud: A Study of American Wartime Politics," *Penn History Review* 18, no. 1 (2010): 44–46.

³³⁴ Gelb, *Desperate Venture: The Story of Operation Torch, The Allied Invasion of North Africa*, 242–43.

³³⁵ Thomas, "Giraud and the Foundation of the French Committee of National Liberation," 87.

³³⁶ See, "The Downfall of General Giraud: A Study of American Wartime Politics," 41.

want soldiers.”³³⁷ Such a statement illustrates Giraud’s incapacity for diplomacy and politics. As a general, he was used to having his commands obeyed and was unaccustomed to compromise.

Giraud’s desire to conscript Arab and indigenous soldiers without yielding to reformers is captured in a poster that targeted Muslim viewers specifically (figure 3.14 – 1943). Giraud’s portrait is accompanied by a series of vignettes that portray him in various scenarios in North Africa. In addition to Arabic calligraphy, the vignettes are arranged and numbered in a way that facilitates reading from right-to-left, as Arabic would be read, rather than left-to-right, as French would be read. The visual elements of this poster indicate that French propagandists also carefully took Islamic aesthetics into purposeful consideration. Much like the tradition of the Persian miniature, an artform created across the breadth of the Islamic world between the 9th and 19th centuries, multiple timeframes are included within a single field. The rich colors, patterned borders, and minimal perspectival depth featured in the poster are also characteristic of the Persian miniature.

Visual reference to Persian miniatures, which were a form of courtly and aristocratic art usually commissioned by royal patrons, rendered Giraud a figure closer to royalty himself. This makes the deeds that are pictured in the poster something even more illustrious; or at least that might have been the intention. The poster advances the narrative that Giraud was a political and military leader of renown through nine captions and vignettes that begin in the top right with his early career in North Africa, ending in the bottom left with his present responsibilities. Moving left across the poster, the upper-middle vignette shows Giraud heroically leading colonial troops against the Germans in World War I. His wartime achievements are then followed by his military service in North Africa. The upper left vignette addresses his efforts during the Rif War in

³³⁷ Robert Aron, *Les origines de la Guerre d’Algérie* (Paris: Fayard, 1962), 81.

Morocco. The caption reads: “In 1926, he completed a mission to secure northern Morocco as colonel and revealed his political and military skill.”³³⁸ For a poster seeking to convince Muslim Algerians to join his cause, it is curious that this part of his military career would be included. The Rif War, as was demonstrated in the previous chapter, inflamed the already fraught political situation in Algeria during the 1920s and only came to an end when Pétain led a ruthless offensive against the Riffians backed by artillery and air power. If Giraud wished to win Muslim Algerians to his side, why would he antagonize them with a reminder that the French had violently quashed Abd-el-Krim’s rebellion, which had established an independent Islamic state for a short while in Morocco?

Giraud’s role in pacifying Morocco is further emphasized elsewhere in the poster. In the vignette seen in the middle-right portion of the poster, Giraud is shown once more engaging with the Muslim inhabitants of Morocco. However, this time, the crumpled corpse of a bull lies between the two parties in a pool of its own blood. One Muslim man looks down at the body of the deceased animal while he passively cradles his rifle in his hands. The rifles of the rest of the Muslims are scattered on the ground as Giraud calmly stands by, taking in the scene before him. The caption that describes this portion of the poster places the scene in 1932 and claims that Giraud pacified the peasants of al-Maghrib al-Aqsa (in Arabic, this simply refers to Morocco) and the Djebel Saghro.³³⁹ Given the date, it is probable that this section of the poster references Giraud’s role in pacifying indigenous dissidents in Morocco in the rural mountain regions near

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Original Arabic:
سنة ١٩٢٦

عسكرية و سياسة فائقة مهارة ابرى و كولونيل بصفة الاقط المغرب شمل في الامن توظيف بمهمة قام

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Original text:
سنة ١٩٣٢

أفلح كل الفلاح وهو جنرال في توظيف الامن العام في كامل المغرب الاقصى وبجبال صغرو

the border with Algeria.³⁴⁰ The bull was one of many sacrificed in the rite of submission in addition to the laying down of arms.³⁴¹ With this scene from 1932 combined with that in the previous vignette, it seems a strong likelihood that the goal here was to disenfranchise Muslim Algerians from seeking reforms or independence and to encourage loyalty to the French state since, as had been shown in Morocco, resistance was futile.

In the lower left quadrant of the poster, we see an episode from Giraud's more recent military career, an episode that garnered him much celebrity. Giraud is pictured climbing down from a tower using a rope. This depicts an actual event from World War II in which Giraud escaped German captivity from the Koenigstein fortress. The escape was highly publicized, and the ruse angered the Germans greatly.³⁴² Such a tale provided a basis for Giraud's mythology and spiced up his backstory. He had made a mockery of the enemy. Shown escaping without assistance, and with machine guns stationed on the battlements above him, the image suggests that Giraud had relied only on his wile, courage, and resourcefulness – qualities that the leader of the French would need in the fight against Germany. Making a mockery of the Germans was important in rehabilitating France's image, which had greatly been tarnished by the nation's submission to the Nazis in 1940.

In the final scene at the bottom of the poster, Giraud is shown as a caïd. This word, (قايد) which would have had a particular resonance in a Muslim community, is also seen below Giraud's portrait at the top of the poster. The sun rises, metaphorically ushering in the dawn, as Giraud quite literally rides in on a white steed to save the day while leading the Allied forces, including tanks and fighter, across North Africa. The heroizing depiction of Giraud is accompanied by the following text: "And after all these roles, we see General Giraud in

³⁴⁰ "La carrière du Général Giraud," *Le Monde*, March 14, 1949, 4.

³⁴¹ René Pinon, "La soumission du Maroc s'achève," *Revue des Deux Mondes* 17, no. 4 (October 15, 1933): 769.

³⁴² Thomas, "Giraud and the Foundation of the French Committee of National Liberation," 89.

command of all the French and Islamic forces with the help of allies to chase the brutal forces of Germany and Italy from the homeland of North Africa and other nations whose ambitions target them. Pray for victory for him and his allies.”³⁴³ It bears mentioning that Abd-el-Kader was frequently portrayed riding a white horse into battle, leading his troops with his rifle in hand. Perhaps Giraud sought to liken himself to the beloved emir.

Giraud and his supporters were right to target Algeria’s Muslim population, although their tactics were risky. The growing frustrations among Muslim Algerians seeking reform was understandable and undeniable. But Giraud had made a critical error. He delayed the dismantling of the Vichy legal system, and unwisely kept several Vichy officials in power, including Marcel Peyrouton, who was made Gouverneur Général of Algeria even though he had been the Secretary of State when Vichy’s anti-Semitic legislation went into effect.³⁴⁴ Thus, Muslim and, moreover, Jewish Algerians would have regarded Giraud’s leadership as a continuation of the Vichy Regime rather than a liberating force.

Giraud also remained an unpopular candidate among the French to command the French and Allied forces in North Africa. Although after Darlan’s assassination, he was for all intents and purposes the commander of these forces, neither the French forces nor North Africans really viewed him as Darlan’s legitimate successor. His only supporters at the time were President Roosevelt and the Vichy governors who had backed him instead of de Gaulle.³⁴⁵ The French felt that to allow Giraud to lead would be to admit that the British and Americans had powerful

³⁴³

Original Arabic:
و بعد كل هذه الادوار نرى الجنرال جبرو في قيادة جميع القوات الفرنسية والاسلامية يوجهها مرّة اخرى بمساعدة الحلفاء لمطاردة قوتي المانيا و
ابطالبا الغاشمتين من وطن الشمال الافريقي و سائر الاوطان التي هدفا لمطامعهما
الدعاء بالفوز له و لخلفائه

³⁴⁴ Thomas, “Giraud and the Foundation of the French Committee of National Liberation,” 103-104.

³⁴⁵ Arthur Funk, “Giraud and de Gaulle: A Backward Glance,” *Current History* 23, no. 135 (1952): 318.

influence over France.³⁴⁶ Little by little, Giraud was disempowered, and de Gaulle eventually became the sole leader of the French Committee of National Liberation in 1944.

These power struggles among the French created a kind of ambiguity of which other countries could take advantage. Not only did the Nazis seek to influence Muslims in North Africa, but so did the Americans and the British. This was the first time that the colony had actually been invaded by other western imperial forces since the French conquest, opening Algeria up to international influence as never before and making it a haven for inter-political thought. The influence that the Americans and British had on the political situation in Algeria was concerning to the French. The Americans were especially suspected of encouraging disloyalty to the French empire among Muslims. Robert Murphy, who was President Roosevelt's personal representative as Minister to French North Africa, reportedly openly stated on numerous occasions that ending colonialism in Algeria was an American war aim.³⁴⁷ The British also sought to convince Muslims that they were a more benevolent, less tyrannical colonizer. French reports regarding British propaganda toward Muslims in 1943 stated that the English presented their colonial rulership as more liberal than French since the British did not concern themselves with the internal government in an occupied country.³⁴⁸

The desire to encourage trust between colonizer and colonized can be observed in a poster released in 1943 (figure 3.16). A French colon and a Muslim subject each raises a finger to their lips to remind viewers to keep quiet. "Tais-toi" – the informal French for "Be quiet!" is accompanied by an Arabic translation (اسكت انت). This nearly side-by-side arrangement of both figures encourages solidarity, but also invites comparison. The Muslim Algerian is shown in

³⁴⁶ Thomas, "Giraud and the Foundation of the French Committee of National Liberation," 97.

³⁴⁷ Kettle, 29.

³⁴⁸ Khenouf and Brett, "Algerian Nationalism and the Allied Military Strategy and Propaganda during the Second World War: The Background to Sétif," 270–71.

traditional garb while the French colon is shown wearing a pith helmet, a hat worn exclusively by European colonizers and symbolic of conquest and domination. Yet the faces and gestures of the two figures are strikingly similar and, moreover, although the Muslim figure is positioned above the colonizer, the *colon* is still placed in front creating compositional balance. Such a configuration starkly contrasts the relationship that centenary ephemera espoused about a decade prior in which the colonizer was always given visual prominence.

Allied propaganda meant to influence Muslims was also necessarily subtle, a point that has already been demonstrated by Eisenhower's leaflet (figure 3.14) which was distributed after Operation Torch. While Allied propaganda in Algeria was mostly textual or conveyed via the radio, at least two posters survive (figures 3.17 and 3.18).³⁴⁹ The first features a portrait of Churchill, his trademark intense gaze boring straight into the viewer of the poster. The caricatural, war-mongering version of the British commander seen in Vichy propaganda (figure 3.18) is long gone. Instead, Churchill appears as a thoughtful and stoic leader, committed to the cause of liberation and democratic values. The image is based on a photograph and an inscription reads: "Justice must be done, she will be merciless." The second features Roosevelt. With the United States' stars and stripes behind him, the poster posits him as the embodiment of the "free world," a world to which Algerian nationalists hope to soon belong. The inscription reads, "Our victory is the victory of liberty," a clear reference to republican ideals. While there is no overt sign that such messages were meant to stir opposition to French colonialism, Churchill and Roosevelt's simple references to justice and liberty would have resonated differently with

³⁴⁹ Fayçal Cherif, "La Propagande arabe anglaise vers le Maghreb pendant la Seconde Guerre Mondiale (1939-1943)," *Littérature, Histoire des Idées, Images et Sociétés du Monde Anglophone* 4, no. 3 (2006): 91–108. Cherif discusses the establishment of an Arab-language journal called *Akhbar al Ousbou* (News of the Week) which apparently showed photographs of British and American leaders and the heroic deeds of the Allied troops. Much like the leaflet dropped by the Americans explaining their intentions in North Africa, the British did the same, hoping to influence the inhabitants of the region to their cause and to improve their image after the Mers el-Kébir debacle.

Muslim viewers who were aware of the Atlantic Charter and reviled the continued repression of the PPA, communists, and Ulemas throughout the war.³⁵⁰

Muslim Algerians were seeking justice. They had been ignored by Pétain, Darlan, and Giraud alike, and yet were still called upon to serve France in the war. Pétain and Giraud had even gone so far as to indirectly threaten Muslims in the posters targeting the Arabic-speaking population described above. Before the end of the war, there would be some progress for indigenous Algerians. In January 1943, Gouverneur Général Peyrouton and U.S. Minister to French North Africa Robert Murphy conferred with Muslim leadership. In February, Abbas produced *Le Manifeste du peuple algérien* which was presented to Peyrouton at the end of March and accepted as a basis for discussion. In April, a commission was set up for this purpose. In May, Abbas produced an addition to the manifest that called for eventual separation of Algeria from France. The Algerians, on a global stage, on the heels of an international armed conflict, dared to call for independence.³⁵¹

Placation, Pacification, and Resistance

In a last-ditch effort to pacify Algerian nationalists, de Gaulle consented to reforms. He promised full citizenship to hundreds of thousands of Muslims and promised to increase Muslim representation in local government and administration. These reforms were ratified by the French

³⁵⁰ Mahfoud Kaddache, *Histoire du nationalisme algérien. Tome II. 1939-1951* (Paris: Editions Paris-Méditerranée, 2003), 570–72. Messali was sentenced to 10 to 16 years imprisonment for conspiracy against the sovereignty of France.

³⁵¹ Ferhat Abbas, *Le Manifeste du peuple algérien (1943) suivi du Rappel au peuple algérien (1976)* (Paris: Orientis Editions, 2013). In the manifesto, Abbas advocated for the following: total abolition of colonialism, the right of self-determination, the provision of its own constitution that guaranteed absolute liberty and equality without regard to race or religion, agricultural reform to benefit the rural proletariat, that Arabic become the official language, liberty of the press, free education for all children, religious freedom and separation of the Church and State. He also demanded that Algerian people be given full participation in their government and, finally, the liberation of all political prisoners.

National Liberation Committee the following spring in March 1944.³⁵² The Algerian nationalists, who had called for nothing less than independence, were not satisfied. In this final section, I discuss Algerian strategies of resistance during the final years of World War II, from the rebellions and subsequent massacres in Sétif and Guelma in 1945 to the years directly following this period. During this time, I argue, the indigenous press re-established itself as a vital medium of resistance.

The cartoons and photographs included in these journals, particularly in *L'Algérie libre*, overseen by the Mouvement pour le triomphe des libertés démocratiques (MTLD, formerly the PPA) and *Égalité*, Abbas and the AML's organ, achieved multiple objectives. First, these journals provided a bold counter-narrative to that of the French colonial administration, which of course, as seen in previous chapters, emphasized solidarity and fraternity among colons and the indigenous and the "fruits" of the *mission civilisatrice*. Second, it allowed for the indigenous to degrade, to poke fun at, and to ultimately undermine French colonial leaders, subjecting the French to a degradation similar to that the indigenous had experienced under French rule. Third, it encouraged solidarity with other French colonies. Fourth, and finally, these images allowed Muslim Algerians to display themselves as a unified entity with an authentic national identity.

During the final two years of the war, methods of indigenous resistance were initially covert. After the indigenous press had been essentially annihilated before World War II began, Muslim militants had to opt for clandestine expressions of opposition. A week after de Gaulle announced his intentions to enfranchise Muslim Algerians through reform in March 1944, Abbas founded the Association des amis du manifeste et de la liberté (AML), a populist, pro-

³⁵² Kettle, *De Gaulle and Algeria, 1940-1960: From Mers El-Kébir to the Algiers Barracades*, 29.

independence organization.³⁵³ Gaining popularity quickly, Abbas and the AML were devoted to securing independence. By that summer, the grass roots organization had over 100,000 members.³⁵⁴ Muslim liberationists took action but maintained anonymity. The Biskra police commission recorded that soon after the AML formed, they found graffiti written in green paint calling on Muslims to prepare for the impending revolution. The graffiti, according to municipal archives read: “Muslim Brothers, Prepare Yourselves for H. Hour” and “Prepare for Revolution.” A Biskra shopkeeper also reported that he found a typed copy of Abbas’ manifesto on his counter.³⁵⁵

The creation of the AML allowed Muslim Algerians to feel bonded culturally and politically. Its members carried official membership cards and to not be a card-carrying member of the AML meant social excommunication. The AML successfully unified Muslim Algerians under one cultural identity, but also increased participation in political life among Muslim Algerians. The AML was able, for the first time since perhaps Abd-el-Kader, to truly organize widespread direct action that threatened French hegemony. Under the AML, Muslims boycotted French boutiques and stores, hoping to put pressure on the colons.³⁵⁶

During the years immediately prior to the end of the war, the AML’s newspaper, *Égalité*, served to evoke outrage among Arab and indigenous Algerians and to define the association’s goals. For instance, as seen in an illustration on the front page of the November 24, 1944, edition of *Égalité*, the AML sought to call attention to the poor quality of life that Muslims suffered under the colonial yoke (figure 3.19 – 1944). The inscription reads, “The wormy fruits of the

³⁵³ Khenouf and Brett, “Algerian Nationalism and the Allied Military Strategy and Propaganda during the Second World War: The Background to Sétif,” 263.

³⁵⁴ Evans, *Algeria: France’s Undeclared War*, 79.

³⁵⁵ Evans, 80. Evans did not include the original translations for these graffiti slogans. H-Hour (redundant acronym of hour) was the name given to the airborne assault during the Normandy landings of World War II on June 6, 1944.

³⁵⁶ Annie Rey-Goldzeiguer, *Aux origines de la guerre d’Algérie, 1940-1945, de Mers El-Kébir aux massacres du Nord-Constantinois* (Paris: La Découverte, 2002), 223.

Algerian colonization. The slums of Mahieddine city. At the foot of the flowered hillsides of Mustapha, further enlivened by the many pleasure villas, is a degrading promiscuity: ignorance, misery, and vice.”³⁵⁷ Men, women, and children walk or sit among heaps of refuse and a backdrop of shanty houses stretch into the background. Large rocks hold down the makeshift roofs of the unstable abodes. An emaciated man and several women seen in the foreground stare at the viewer pleadingly. Unlike the images that the French circulated, of a productive Algeria replete with abundance, this version tells the truth of the indigenous plight: hunger, scarcity, and joblessness.

Images such as these could function either to agitate the public into taking action, to encourage sympathy and play on the viewer’s emotions, or to shame the colonial oppressor. A photograph reproduced in the September 22, 1944, edition of *Égalité* demonstrates this point (figure 3.20). The photograph is simply of a young, unnamed peasant boy with a caption that reads, “The son of a peasant who does not know school.” An accompanying article, the title of which asks, “Is the era of the street-urchin over?” discusses the poor rates of inscription among the indigenous working poor. The article’s author points out that in all “modern” nations, a free, obligatory, and secular education is afforded, but not in Algeria where only 100,000 out of 1 million indigenous school-aged children have access to school.³⁵⁸ The photograph and the statistic published here indicts the French colonial empire and the false narratives that it perpetuated.

Starting in February 1945, the AML produced leaflets and posted them on the walls all over the cities of Algeria. These tracts reminded viewers of the direction and mission of the AML: the creation of an Algerian nationality and the critique of antidemocratic and colonialist

³⁵⁷ “Au pied des coteaux fleuris de Mustapha encore égayés par les Villas de Plaisance s’étalent, dans une promiscuité dégradante, l’ignorance, la Misère, et le Vice.”

³⁵⁸ “L’ère du Yaouled sera-t-elle close?,” *Égalité*, September 22, 1944, 1.

legislation. Muslim Algerians had far greater access to revolutionary literature than before. Copies of Abbas' "J'accuse l'Europe," an anti-colonialist exegesis published first in 1944, were sold in Sétif during a large AML meeting that took place on April 29, 1945.³⁵⁹ More overt and violent expressions of resistance soon followed. By 1945, a poor harvest, a long winter, and subsequent food shortages heightened the likelihood of insurrection. Production of grains fell considerably from 20 million quintals in 1941 to 10 in 1944 and 3.6 in 1945.³⁶⁰ Stones were thrown at French school children and reports of conflict between *indigène* and French settlers on public transport, markets, and other public venues became more common.³⁶¹ Arab and indigenous Algerians also displayed British, American, Soviet, and Algerian flags as signs of resistance. They also began occupying public space while holding placards that said, "Long Live Messali!", "Down with colonialism!", and similar expressions.³⁶²

Opposition to French colonialism also increased in rural Algeria among Muslim peasants. Since rural indigenous Algerians were often far flung and difficult to find, the marketplace became an urban center for political radicalization. For rural peasants travelling to the interior, market day was an important weekly endeavor. In town, they could carry out their business, hear and exchange news, discuss politics, and meet up at Arab cafés with likeminded individuals. Suspicious of Muslim Algerian clandestine revolutionary plots, the French authorities began blockading roads leading to the market to surveil arriving Algerians. They also sent informers into Arab cafés to collect intelligence.³⁶³

³⁵⁹ Rey-Goldzeiguer, *Aux origines de la Guerre d'Algérie, 1940-1945, de Mers El-Kébir Aux Massacres Du Nord-Constantinois*, 224.

³⁶⁰ Chantal Metzger, "8 Mai en Algérie: 'Troubles' ou 'mouvements insurrectionnels'?" in *Le Maghreb dans la Guerre* (Malakoff: Armand Colin, 2018), 282.

³⁶¹ Marcel Reggui, "Le rapport du Général Paul Tubert," in *Les massacres de Guelma* (Paris: La Découverte, 2006), 142–43.

³⁶² Evans, *Algeria*, 85.

³⁶³ MacMaster, *War in the Mountains: Peasant Society and Counterinsurgency in Algeria, 1918-1958*, 158.

Ultimately, it was in a Sétif marketplace that Muslim Algerians revolted *en masse*. On May 8, 1945, the day after Germany's official surrender, people across the French empire celebrated the end of the war. But May 8 also happened to be a market day when thousands of rural peasants would be flooding into the city to do business. Only this time, 8,000 Algerian protesters met in front of the main mosque that morning carrying posters with nationalist slogans and armed with knives, axes, and even pistols.³⁶⁴ The May 8 manifestations were a continuation of violent protests that had taken place a week prior on May 1 in eighteen cities across Algeria. At those protests, the demonstrators had demanded the liberation of Messali, called for France to recognize the existence of an Algerian nationality, and demanded independence. The protests turned violent. One protester was killed in Oran and at least two were killed, twenty-three were injured, and thirty were arrested in Algiers where protests also turned violent.³⁶⁵

On May 8, protesters across Algeria assembled once more, but this time also in celebration of the end of the war. Many Arab and indigenous Algerians believed that France would honor their requests for independence after so many colonial soldiers had died in the war effort. Protesters carried independence flags that read “long live free and independent Algeria” and “liberate Messali.” The French authorities stopped the march and demanded that the Algerian flags be lowered. A young Muslim man named Bouzid Saâl refused to do so, and a police officer shot and killed him which in turn incited an immediate violent backlash.³⁶⁶ The crowd in Sétif responded by killing any European in its path. The douars (Muslim rural

³⁶⁴ Evans, *Algeria*, 85–86. See also Annie Rey-Goldzeiguer, *Aux origines de la guerre d'Algérie, 1940-1945, de Mers El-Kébir aux massacres du Nord-Constantinois* (Paris: La Découverte, 2002), 278.

³⁶⁵ Metzger, “8 Mai En Algérie: ‘Troubles’ Ou ‘mouvements insurrectionnels?’,” 238. See also Rey-Goldzeiguer, *Aux origines de la Guerre d'Algérie, 1940-1945, de Mers El-Kébir aux massacres du Nord-Constantinois*, 245.

³⁶⁶ Metzger, 238.

communities) in the area also learned of Saâl's murder and began attacking European agrarian villages. By the end of the day, protesters had killed 73 Europeans.³⁶⁷

But that was only the beginning of a cycle of reprisal and counter-reprisal. What would ensue would be one of the worst massacres inflicted upon any indigenous population by colonizers in the twentieth century. The European colons formed militias to defend themselves and seek retribution against the indigenous. The army, commanded by Generals Henry Martin and Raymond Duval, also responded.³⁶⁸ The full weight of the counter-reprisals that these two groups inflicted upon the Arab and indigenous population in the weeks that ensued, in the name of reestablishing order, cannot be clearly estimated given the inconsistency of the reports regarding the dead and injured. The official death toll by June 30, 1945, furnished by the state, accounted for 86 dead and 110 injured European civilians. The Arab and indigenous inhabitants suffered far greater casualties. Andre Tixier, Minister of the Interior at the time, claimed that the death toll among that population did not exceed more than 1,500. The General Governor, Yves Cataigneau, and General Duval, both claimed 1,165 Arab and indigenous had been killed in the upheaval.³⁶⁹ However, many Arab and indigenous Algerians did not report their dead and the militias and military also burned many of the bodies before they could be counted. Sources sympathetic to Algerians have claimed that the death toll could be anywhere between 6,000 and 20,000. The PPA estimated that at least 35,000 Arab and indigenous lives were lost.³⁷⁰ In addition to the countless Muslim lives lost, 4,560 arrests were made, the majority of which were in the department of Constantine where Sétif is located. By November, the military judiciary passed down a series of judgements. According to the numbers that they provided, 1,868 Arab

³⁶⁷ Ibid.

³⁶⁸ Ibid, 239.

³⁶⁹ Ibid, 239.

³⁷⁰ Charles-Robert Ageron, "Mai 1945 en Algérie: Enjeu de mémoire et histoire," *La Contemporaine*, Matériaux pour l'histoire de notre temps, no. 108 (2012): 70.

and indigenous Algerians were sentenced to hard physical labor, 157 were condemned to death of which 33 sentences were carried out. By March 1, 1946, most of the imprisoned were set free.³⁷¹

The release of these political prisoners gave way to another wave of anti-colonial organizing during which time the press played a similar role to that of the pre-war years when *El Ouma*, *Le Parlement algérien*, and *Al-Maydân* had provided a platform for resistance. *Égalité* continued to function as the mouthpiece for the AML and critical device of colonialism. In its pages, Arab and indigenous readers were exposed to caricatures of French colonial officials which undermined the empire's authority and subjected the French to the same degradation that the indigenous had endured. General Giraud was an easy target for such mockery. In a cartoon featured in the September 9, 1946, issue of *Égalité* (figure 3.21), a thin and feeble looking Giraud is shown riding a toy pony with an antique double-headed axe in hand. His overly large mustache gives him a comical appearance. Such a depiction strongly contrasts the heroic and intensely serious images that the French provisional government had circulated on poster propaganda only a few years before (see figure 3.15).

Giraud was figured in another cartoon (figure 3.22) published in *Égalité* on August 30, 1946, alongside François Quilici, a French Deputy in Oran. Both men are featured as marionettes that a clownish figure representing colonialism manipulates from "behind the scenes," as the caption reads. Giraud, worry-stricken and very much unlike the brave military hero he touted himself to be, holds an unthreatening, childish wooden sword, while Quilici and his foolish grin place him in the role of court jester. These caricatural and demeaning depictions rob both men, official representatives of the French colonial empire, of any pride and prestige. The illustration

³⁷¹ Ageron, 71.

also demonstrates the knowledge of French culture that this cartoonist had in referencing the French penchant for puppet theaters which were a staple of the French caricatural tradition, a tradition that frequently lampooned politicians.

In the cartoon, the figures are apparently shaken by what is transpiring at the Palais Bourbon, where the French Constituent Assembly was meeting in 1946 to draft and vote on a new constitution. Part of the debates involved deciding how overseas deputies such as Quilici would be decided. This in part depended on determining the voting rights for Arab and indigenous Algerians. Quilici was especially opposed to enfranchising the indigenous population, fearing that deputies such as himself would be replaced by *indigènes*.³⁷² Like Quilici, Giraud was also a deputy of the Constituent Assembly at the time, and a representative of the Parti républicain de la liberté, a right-wing political party.³⁷³ In 1946, Abbas's followers would have no doubt still remembered Giraud's Vichyist sympathies and their frustrations at his refusal to accept their proposed reforms. Unfamiliar with the intricacies and procedures of French politics, Giraud, who had spent his entire career in the military, floundered in his newfound political position, as did many other military officers who entered politics after the war.³⁷⁴ Revisiting the cartoon with this in mind, it is now clear that Abbas's followers were poking fun at Giraud for his ineptitude as a politician which, of course, they were already intimately aware of from their efforts to work with him while he was the civilian and military Commander-in-Chief during the war.

³⁷² Frank Cooper, "Defining Citizenship, 1946-1956," in *Citizenship Between Empire and Nation Remaking France and French Africa, 1945-1960* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 134-35.

³⁷³ Éric Duhamel, "De l'épée à la toge (Les officiers au Palais Bourbon de 1945 à 1962)," in *Militaires en République, 1870-1962: Les officiers, le pouvoir et la vie publique en France* (Paris: Éditions de la Sorbonne, 1999), 341.

³⁷⁴ Duhamel, "De l'épée à la toge (Les officiers au Palais Bourbon de 1945 à 1962)," 357.

A similar cartoon (figure 3.23) was featured in the December 15, 1949, issue of *L'Algérie libre*, the political organ of Messali's latest political party, the Mouvement pour la triomphe des libertés démocratique (MTLD). This time, however, the image critiques the "Béni-oui-oui" or Muslim "yes men" who were viewed as the collaborators of their French oppressors.³⁷⁵ This particular cartoon addresses the violent repression that took place in the rural village community of Sidi Ali Bounab in the mountains of Kabyle. The incident took place between September 27 and October 1, 1949, when a troop of gendarmes who were purportedly searching for a "bandit" inflicted a collective punishment upon a *douar* that they alleged had aided and abetted the suspect. The gendarmes killed the village's livestock, burned down their homes, burned down the oil mill, destroyed a nearby mosque, raped the women and girls, and forced the men to march naked through the town.³⁷⁶ In the cartoon, a Béni-oui-oui is shown sending a telegram requesting no investigation of the violent episode. In spite of French efforts to censor the affair from public knowledge, delegates of the MTLD were eventually able to call for an investigation in the Algerian Assembly but were unsurprisingly met with significant resistance. They were never actually able to secure an investigation or any form of justice or restitution for the Sidi Ali Bounab community.³⁷⁷ Cartoons such as this therefore not only called attention to and recorded events that might otherwise be swept under the rug by the French, but also openly critiqued the system, including its indigenous collaborators, that allowed such events to pass unchecked.

³⁷⁵ Elizabeth Perego, "Side-Splitting While Nation-Forming, 1914 to the 1980s," in *Humor and Power in Algeria, 1920 to 2021* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2023), 45. The Béni-oui-oui figure had long been a lampooned figure in the Algerian popular entertainment scene. In the interwar period, celebrated Algerian playwright Mahieddine Bachtarzi devoted an entire theatrical work to the figure. For more on the use of humor as decolonial praxis, see the rest of Perego's recent publication.

³⁷⁶ Ouarda Tengour, "L'affaire Sidi Ali Bounab ou les avatars de Mohamed Cherchar - Septembre 1949," ed. Chantal Chanson-Jabeur (*Colonisations et répressions coloniales, XIX^e et XX^e siècles*, Université Paris VII: SEDET/CNRS, 2007), 55-56.

³⁷⁷ Tengour, "L'affaire Sidi Ali Bounab ou les avatars de Mohamed Cherchar - Septembre 1949," 63-64.

The indigenous press was also mobilized to encourage solidarity with other French colonies. In the January 16, 1947, issue of *Égalité*, a cartoon addressed the fraught and violent situation in French Indochina which was even more disastrous for the French than Algeria during the post-war years (figure 3.24). Much like in Algeria, World War II had taken an enormous toll on the rural dwellers of Indochina.³⁷⁸ Then, on March 9, 1945, Japan took control, destroying the French imperial forces there.³⁷⁹ When the French regained control, Vietnam had already declared independence and began a guerilla warfare campaign. In retaliation, French troops swept through Indochina, killing indiscriminately.³⁸⁰ The Việt Minh weathered two years of warfare with the French, but in 1947, could no longer hold out, in part due to preexisting ethnic violence and civil discord.³⁸¹ In the cartoon, we see a Vietnamese agrarian worker (signaled by the conical Nón Lá hat) crushed under the weight of the *guerre coloniale*, an experience equally shared by Arab and indigenous Algerians.

In addition to encouraging solidarity with other French colonies, the indigenous press also allowed nationalist leaders to encourage unity among formerly disparate political factions. An illustration published on the front page of the February 6, 1947, edition of *Égalité*, demonstrates the importance of unity during the post-war years (figure 3.25). A cortege of Muslims walk toward an Algerian Parliament building in various attire, some wearing the traditional *burnous*, others the *fez*, indicating that followers of the religious group, the Ulema, and those considered part of the *evolués* and *élus* had joined together against the shared cause of

³⁷⁸ Shawn F. McHale, *The First Vietnam War: Violence, Sovereignty, and the Fracture of the South, 1945-1956* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 34.

³⁷⁹ For general background on the Sino-French conflict in Indochina in 1945, see Arthur J. Dommen, *The Indochinese Experience of the French and the Americans: Nationalism and Communism in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002). David G. Marr, *Vietnam 1945: The Quest for Power* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).

³⁸⁰ McHale, *The First Vietnam War: Violence, Sovereignty, and the Fracture of the South, 1945-1956*, 37.

³⁸¹ McHale, 110.

defeating French colonialism and establishing an independent Algerian state. As demonstrated by the excerpt from Abbas' manifesto, which reads, "The hour is passed that a Muslim Algerian will ask to be something other than a Muslim Algerian," the character of the movement, which had now reached a fully emergent stage, and its unifying force was undeniably the religion of Islam.

Photography played an equally important role in enabling the critique in a public forum of the violent realities of life under colonialism. In the December 1, 1949, issue of *L'Algérie libre*, a shocking photograph (figure 3.26) of an unclothed, emaciated boy calls attention to the deplorable condition in which many indigenous Algerians lived. The photograph is accompanied by a short article titled, "Where they have sown misery with both hands, they say they have given prosperity."³⁸² The skeletal appearance of the boy, laid bare before the camera lens, calls the viewer to action with the "naked truth." In an equally disturbing photograph reproduced in the February 1, 1950, edition of *L'Algérie libre*, an indigenous man bares his mangled back for the camera (figure 3.27). According to the accompanying article, this man, named Tidjani Mohammed, a town councilor in Bône, was beaten by police officers in February 1948. The incident, for the journalists at *L'Algérie libre*, was part and parcel of the intrinsically cruel and racist nature of French colonialism: "It's true that we are in Algeria where racism is master. These heinous crimes are inscribed in the little black book of French colonialism. They are an illustration of the 'work of civilization' and of 'French generosity' toward Algerians. Our readers will judge for themselves!"³⁸³ The stomach-churning image, which only provided a glimpse into

³⁸² "Où ils ont semé la misère à pleines mains, ils disent avoir donné la prospérité."

³⁸³ "...sur les procédés de la police française en Algérie," *L'Algérie libre* (Algiers, Algeria), February 1, 1950, 1. "Il est vrai que nous sommes en Algérie où le racisme est maître ! Ces forfaits s'inscrivent dans le livre noir du colonialisme français. Ils sont une illustration de 'l'œuvre civilisatrice et de la générosité françaises' à l'égard des Algériens. Que nos lecteurs jugent eux-mêmes !"

the racist practices of colonial policing, certainly indicted French imperialism to the highest degree.

Placed in conversation with each other, the photographs and illustrations of the indigenous press and wartime propaganda discussed in this chapter provide valuable insight into the status of colonial authority and Arab and indigenous insurgency in the years leading up to, during, and just after World War II. Prior to the war, the indigenous political press was a means of defining Algerian statehood, its history, its people, and its values. It was also a means of consolidating political support. Meanwhile, French propagandists (Vichy and Free French) employed visual media in an attempt to gain Arab and indigenous political support while simultaneously trying to silence colonial dissidents through the censorship of the indigenous political press. The proliferation of visual imagery in the form of cartoons and photographs in the post-war indigenous political press indicates that these efforts only achieved the complete opposite of the intended effect, unifying formerly disparate political factions and setting Algerians on a path toward all-out revolution. The cartoons and illustrations contained within these periodicals evince the growing importance of visual imagery in refining revolutionary ideology and praxis which, in the post-war era, centered on degrading and critiquing colonial officials (and collaborators) and furnishing photographic evidence of the malevolence of French colonialism. Although the repressions that followed the demonstrations of May 8, 1945, stalled any further widespread rebellion for nearly a decade, the increased ability among Arab and indigenous Algerians to self-represent and to self-fashion through visual media is a trajectory that would continue to develop meaningfully throughout the course of the Algerian War.

Chapter 4 – Behind Enemy Lines: Military Photography during the Algerian War

Photography played a critical role in the documentation and circulation of imagery and information about the Algerian War, an eight-year war of independence defined by guerrilla warfare and torture that officially began on November 1, 1954, and ended on March 19, 1962.³⁸⁴ The photographers documenting the war were from a variety of backgrounds. Some were French, some were from other European nations, and we know of at least one Muslim Algerian photographer. Likewise, the photographs themselves served a variety of purposes. In this chapter, we will see photography used as a weapon of psychological warfare, as a tool of power and domination, as a method of registering the experiences and attitudes of individual soldiers, as a medium capable of constructing false social realities, and in the hands of some, as a means of subverting colonial authority.

While I seek in this chapter to engage the work of a wide variety of photographers, an examination of the entire collective body of photographs taken during the Algerian War is not possible for many reasons. First, the volume of photographs related to the conflict is nearly inexhaustible. The archive that holds the French army's collection of photographs from the conflict alone has over 163,474 images.³⁸⁵ Second, but of equal importance, is access. The French government sought to censor any information or imagery that reflected negatively upon itself.³⁸⁶ Therefore, it stands to reason that many important moments are lost to history or reside only in the memory of those who survived the war and are still living today. Third is the

³⁸⁴ November 1, 1954, was the day that FLN activists broadcast their first official call for independence. Algerian journalist and militant Mohamed Aïchaoui wrote the declaration.

³⁸⁵ "Algérie," L'Établissement de communication et de production audiovisuelle de la Défense (ECPAD), accessed November 8, 2022, <https://www.ecpad.fr/collections/algerie/>. The collection covers the period between 1945, when widespread protest erupted across Algeria following the end of World War II, and 1962.

³⁸⁶ "Loi N° 55-385 du 3 Avril 1955 instituant d'urgence et en déclarant l'application en Algérie," *Journal officiel de la République Française*, no. 85 (April 7, 1955): 3480. Under the Loi N° 55-385 du 3 Avril 1955, the French government declared its right to control the press and any other publication.

asymmetry of production. Photography was a dominant means of representation during the war by and for the French, and Algerians had far less access to it. Nevertheless, in addition to the work of Muslim Algerian photographer Mohamed Kouaci, I will discuss the work of a few other colonized photographers, some of whom remain anonymous, whose work has been recently rediscovered by scholars.³⁸⁷ There is much anticipation that others await discovery as well. Art historian Katarzyna Fałęcka, for example, recently unearthed several intimate portraits at the French military archives in Paris that were taken by Algerians and later intercepted by the French who then used them to identify members of the FLN. There is great potential that more photographs of this nature will emerge as scholars continue to excavate them from French archives.³⁸⁸

This chapter is organized in two main sections. In the first section, I discuss images taken by photographers working for the Service cinématographique des armées (SCA), the branch of the French army responsible for photographing and filming the Algerian War. These photographers produced thousands of images for the purposes of strategy and intelligence, mapmaking, and to document historic moments. In the second section, I discuss the work of photographers who had access to the inner workings of the Gouvernement provisoire de la République algérienne (GPRA), the provisional government based in Tunisia, and the Front de libération nationale (FLN), the principal Algerian nationalist movement of the time. My selection of military photography is intentional. Although much has already been written regarding the practice and role of documentary photography during the Algerian War, SCA photographers

³⁸⁷ While much has been accomplished in Algeria to document knowledge about the revolution, the country has gone through several periods of instability since then rendering the country less navigable as a research location for western scholars. Furthermore, Algerian institutions sometimes lack the financial support and resources to make their records accessible.

³⁸⁸ Fałęcka discussed these photographs at a recent panel at the annual meeting of the Middle East Studies Association. Her research will be published in her upcoming book, *Archival Excavations: The Algerian War of Independence and the Afterlives of Images* (forthcoming).

have gone especially under-examined with many receiving no scholarly engagement whatsoever.³⁸⁹ Furthermore, a targeted comparison between military photography on both sides of the conflict has yet to be accomplished. For the purposes of this chapter, I consider military photography to encompass any photograph taken by military personnel, about, or intended for the use of the military, either for the French army or the Armée de libération nationale (ALN).

The Service cinématographique des armées

The focus of this section is the Service cinématographique des armées (SCA), the branch of the French military that was primarily responsible for film, audio-visual, and photographic documentation of the Algerian war.³⁹⁰ Although founded during World War I, the French Army

³⁸⁹ French historians Benjamin Stora, Laurent Gervereau, and Marie Chominot are widely regarded as the leading scholars in this subfield. Some publications that influence my own thinking about the subject and engage with photographs from the war are as follows: Benjamin Stora, *La gangrène et l'oubli* (Paris: La Découverte, 1991); Benjamin Stora and Laurent Gervereau, *Photographier la Guerre d'Algérie* (Paris: Marvel, 2004); Marie Chominot, "L'Image photographique, une source pour écrire l'histoire de la Guerre d'Algérie," in *Image, mémoire, histoire: Les Représentations iconographiques en Algérie et au Maghreb* (Oran: Centre de recherche en anthropologie sociale et culturelle, 2007), 75–88; Chominot specifically addressed the SCA in a more recent text, *Regards sur l'Algérie: 1954-1962* (Paris: Gallimard, Ministère de la Défense, 2016). Her text hones in on the careers of four SCA photographers, some of whom I mention in this chapter (or in the fifth chapter): Arthur Smet, Marc Flament, Claude Roudeau, and Dominique Mestrallet. In particular, Stora's text, *La gangrène et l'oubli*, was particularly influential at its time of publication. Stora argued that the French suffered amnesia of the conflicts in Algeria due to the lack of iconic images of the war. Subsequently, Stora collaborated with Gervereau to organize the exhibition "Photographier la Guerre d'Algérie" which took place at the Jeu de Paume in Paris in 2004. The exhibition included 158 photographs which were accompanied by contemporary posters, journals, and civil and military documents. Other important exhibitions include Mohammed Djehiche and Abdelkrim Djilali's *Les photographes de guerre: Les djounoud du noir et blanc* which took place at the Musée public national d'art moderne et contemporain d'Alger in 2013. Chominot, whose unpublished dissertation "Guerre des images, guerre sans image? : Pratiques et usages de la photographie pendant la Guerre d'indépendance Algérienne: 1954-1962" (Thèse de doctorat en histoire, Paris, Paris 8, 2008), and advised by Stora, has taken the helm and published significant research since defending her dissertation. Her dissertation was the first comprehensive study on the role of photography on both sides of the war. Most recently, she published a groundbreaking article on FLN photographer Mohammed Kouaci, "À la recherche de Mohamed Kouaci, artisan de la Révolution par l'image. Plongée dans une archive inédite de la guerre d'indépendance algérienne (1954-1962)," *Continents manuscrits. Génétique des textes littéraires – Afrique, Caraïbe, diaspora*, no. 14 (2020): 1–19, <https://doi.org/10.4000/coma.5349>. Finally, an important contribution to the scholarship on Kouaci has recently been made by Katarzyna Fałęcka. Her article, "Archiving the Algerian Revolution in Zineb Sedira's Gardiennes d'images," *African Arts* 55, no. 3 (Autumn 2022): 38–53, provides valuable new insights on Kouaci's role in the war and the broader production of images during the Algerian War.

³⁹⁰ For more on the creation and background of the SCA, see Violaine Challéat, "Le Service cinéma des armées," *1895. Mille huit cent quatre-vingt-quinze*, no. 55 (2008): 174–80. For more on the SCA office in Algiers, see Bastien Chastagner and Damien Vitry, "La Guerre d'Algérie vue par trois photographes amateurs" (L'Établissement de communication et de production audiovisuelle de la Défense (ECPAD)), 4, accessed September 5, 2022,

created the first SCA satellite in Algiers in 1942 with subsections in Oran and Constantine. Between 1954 and 1962, the years of the war, the SCA generated an enormous archive of photographs, and each military unit had an assigned photographer.³⁹¹ Generally speaking, military photographers were charged with documenting meetings, battles, speeches, and special social occasions. However, the French military mobilized photography for more than record-keeping purposes. It was also a means of domination and a powerful weapon of psychological warfare. In this section, we will see that the camera was an important tool for knowledge production about the revolution and abetted the construction of false social realities that the French military sought to advance both locally and internationally to varying degrees of success.

The stated goal of the SCA was to monopolize the photographic and cinematographic coverage of the war, to reflect the work of pacification, and to make these images available to the national and international press for broad distribution.³⁹² Such images were destined to engineer a psychological effect on the multiple populations of the metropole, colony, and international community. For this reason, the SCA was attached both to the Service d'information and the Service d'action psychologique et d'information de la défense nationale (SAPIDN).³⁹³ Extant documentation of the French military's psychological strategy reveals the details of the approach taken: emphasize favorable trends and deemphasize unfavorable trends that may already be rooted in the psyche of the propaganda's target audience and tailor that propaganda to engage with the tastes, ambitions, and sensibilities of individual ethnic groups and regions of Algeria.³⁹⁴

https://imagesdefense.gouv.fr/media/pdf/dossiers_thema/dossier-la-guerre-d-Algerie-vue-par-trois-photographes-amateurs.pdf.

³⁹¹ Hannah Feldman, "Flash Forward: Pictures at War," in *Photography's Orientalism: New Essays on Colonial Representation*, ed. Ali Behdad and Luke Gartlan (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 2013), 156.

³⁹² Chastagner and Vitry, "La Guerre d'Algérie vue par trois photographes amateurs," 4.

³⁹³ Irchene Abdelghani, "Service cinématographique des armées et la guerre de libération nationale. Idéologie d'une représentation," *Revue el-bahith en des sciences humaine et sciences sociales* 12, no. 02 (2021): 534.

³⁹⁴ "Cabinet du ministère résidant en Algérie, Note d'information N°2 concernant la technique de l'action psychologique," 1956, 1.

The processes that the French military would use to pursue this intent were equally well defined. First and foremost, the propaganda must “use images that speak and words that evoke images” to create an association of ideas and to condition a reflexive response within the viewer. To do so, French propagandists relied on two techniques: a “choc physiologique” and a “choc psychologique.”³⁹⁵

The physiological shock generally referred to the creation of a memorable physical experience that was achieved using music and sometimes even humor to engender a welcoming atmosphere. Care was also taken regarding the placement of propaganda posters, their color and design, and their language so that the posters would appear attractive to the eye, be seen by a broad population, and be easily understood (see figure 4.1 for example).³⁹⁶ The “choc psychologique” referred to rousing the interest of and leaving a favorable and memorable impression upon the viewer. The military depended on a variety of strategies including the use of surprises, repetition to condition reflexive thought, and playfulness and humor to “débanaliser” interactions. This approach was designed to create unexpected and unforgettable moments.³⁹⁷

Pivotal to the French propaganda strategy was the Compagnie de haut-parleurs et de tracts (CHPT), a section of the French military devoted to circulating pro-French propaganda. Each company of the CHPT was equipped with a vehicle, tape recorders, speakers, and telephones, and tasked, with the aid of tracts, photographs, films, and other materials in both Arabic and French, to win the heart and minds of the colonized.³⁹⁸ Often, as showcased in

³⁹⁵ “Cabinet du ministère résidant en Algérie,” 3.

³⁹⁶ Ibid. For more on French propaganda posters, see Benjamin Sparks, “The War Without a Name: The Use of Propaganda in the Decolonization War of Algeria” (Master of Arts, Provo, Utah, Brigham-Young University, 2011).

³⁹⁷ “Cabinet du ministère résidant en Algérie,” 4.

³⁹⁸ Marie-Catherine Villatoux and Paul Villatoux, “Le 5e bureau en Algérie,” in *Militaires et guérilla dans la guerre d’algérie*, ed. Jean-Charles Jauffred and Maurice Vaisse (Paris: Editions Complexe, 2001), 403–4.

footage taken of CHPT psychological actions, Algerians were drawn by the promise of medical assistance, and then they were exposed to French propaganda.³⁹⁹

SCA photographers also recorded the séances that the CHPT planned and executed, and their documentation reveals insight into the means used to achieve the desired “choc physiologique” described above. Such an effect can be seen in an SCA photograph taken in Bou Saâda, a small town south of Algiers (figure 4.2 – 1958). In the image, children race each other, plucking propaganda tracts off the ground and out of the air as a French soldier, who is ostensibly the one who has thrown them into the air, stands by watching. In the foreground, a small child scurries to collect an illustrated poster. The poster (similar in design to figure 4.3 – 1957) encouraged Arab and indigenous Algerians to collaborate with the French military by turning in *maquis*. In the upper portion of the poster, a *maquisard* is shown in tattered fatigues and moon and crescent arm band receiving money from another Arab or indigenous man while partaking in a couscous, their nefarious expressions making them clearly the “bad guys.” In the lower right, these two men are subsequently shown handcuffed and under the control of a French soldier. The frenetic energy captured in the photograph provides an idea of the physiological effect that the French army sought to create. One can imagine the attention that the shouting and laughing children would garner from passersby.

SCA photographs also provide insight into what issues the propaganda addressed. As seen in a photograph taken in Gallieni, a district of Constantine, the threat of communism was one theme (figure 4.4 – 1956). In the photo, an Algerian man holds a copy of a political tract that the CHPT disseminated. The headline is in Arabic and reads: “The door to red colonization,” no doubt a reference to Soviet Russia. On the right-side of the tract, there is a hammer and sickle

³⁹⁹ *Journée d'action psychologique au douar de Mazouna, dans le département d'Oran.*, 35 mm (Mazouna, Oran, Algeria, 1957), <https://imagesdefense.gouv.fr/fr/journee-d-action-psychologique-au-douar-de-mazouna-dans-le-departement-d-oran.html#>.

bisecting a map of Hungary. The same year as this photograph, the Soviets had quashed a rebellion there. Droplets of blood drip from the country's border. This photograph and what it depicts underscore French colonial anxieties about international communism and the growing influence of the Soviets in Algeria. In the district where this photograph was taken in 1954, concern was so great that railway night services were cut, flights over Constantinois were prohibited, and certain political parties were banned. House-to-house searches and widespread arrests were also common.⁴⁰⁰ French propaganda distributed to Algeria's Arab and indigenous inhabitants thus not only educated them about the benefits of French colonialism, but also warned and inoculated them against other threats to the empire as well. The man's furrowed brow and uneasy demeanor suggest that these psychological actions were not only about inculcating Arab and indigenous Algerians with French colonial ideology, but also part of the broader effort to disincentivize behaviors that were deemed unfavorable.

Another image from the séance taken by SCA photographer France Vilar reveals the intimacy and mentorship that the French army sought to encourage, or perhaps more truthfully, stage, between themselves and Algerians (figure 4.5 – 1956). In the photograph, two French soldiers in army fatigues sit on the ground on either side of an Algerian boy. The boy holds a book, *La France et l'Union française*, in his hands and seems to perhaps be reading the pages aloud. One of the soldiers places his hand on the boy's shoulder in a paternal display of affection and approval. The photograph's message is clear. The French were stewards and guardians of Algerian wellbeing, and under their guidance, France would educate and civilize Algeria's Arab and indigenous population.

⁴⁰⁰ Allison Drew, *We Are No Longer in France: Communists in Colonial Algeria* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 183.

Another of Vilar's photographs, in which a group of Algerian boys and men can be seen crowded around a diorama illustrated with pictures, captures the didactic approaches taken by the CHPT (figure 4.6 – 1956). The mostly obscured photos, no doubt provided by the SCA, are clearly intended to visualize the text provided on the panels. The words “La France est Présente” (France is present), also translated into Arabic calligraphy, is figured in bold letters at the top of the diorama. Several of the spectators applaud as CHPT members stand by, ready to promote French ideology and answer questions. The group is packed in closely, evidencing the convivial spirit of these meetings and the physical closeness with which the French soldiers approached their target audience thereby fostering association, trust, and intimacy.

Not only did CHPT propaganda seek to idealize French colonialism, it also sought to demonize the FLN. In another panel on view at CHPT psychological actions (figure 4.7 – 1957), two Algerian men view a diorama that reads: “Fellagha signifie,” (The fellagha signifies) “haine,” (hate) and “destruction.” The Fellagha was the term used to describe anti-colonial militants in French North Africa and in Arabic, literally means “bandits.” The use of the term was a conscious effort to eliminate the revolutionary idea that FLN militants fought for the sovereignty of Algeria, and to encourage the association between the FLN and criminality. As seen here, SCA photographs were used to present these claims and forge this correlation.

The SCA also used photography to emphasize that even though the war had started, some colonial subjects remained loyal to and even were willing to lay down their lives for the empire, such as the harkis, armed mobile auxiliaries to the French military comprised entirely of Muslims. The first *harka* served in the Aurès region of Algeria beginning in 1955 and eventually

became central to French contre-guérilla tactics.⁴⁰¹ The creation of the harkis not only subtracted potential combatants from fighting for the rebels, but also ensured that locals, who were better informed about the character and politics of local communities and knew the terrain as well as France's enemies, could more effectively maintain order.⁴⁰² Of course, there was also a psychological imperative. France wanted to show both the international community and other Algerians that the majority of the Muslims in the colony were fighting with the French, and that FLN fighters comprised but a small fraction of the overall population. The French military committed itself to increasing the number of harkis in the service of France and between January and September of 1957, increasing the ranks from 2,186 to 10,430.⁴⁰³ Harkis had their own reasons for serving the French Army. Benefits included regular pay, being on the side of the likely winners, obeying the orders of their *bachaga* (village chief), and sometimes because they had been (often purposefully) compromised by the French Army.⁴⁰⁴ Thus, while harkis were framed as being strongly pro-French, this was not necessarily the deciding factor that motivated Arab and indigenous Algerians to join. The French military seems to have understood this. After Algeria's independence in 1962, de Gaulle referred to the Harkis as "soldiers of fortune" and decidedly not French.⁴⁰⁵

Although it is clear that the French government completely abandoned the harkis after the war in Algeria, it is not altogether well understood how French soldiers perceived them during the conflict itself. SCA photographs, such as those that Jacques Durr took during Opération

⁴⁰¹ Charles-Robert Ageron, "Les Supplétifs algériens dans l'armée française pendant la Guerre d'Algérie," *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire*, no. 48 (December 1995): 5–6.

⁴⁰² François-Xavier Hautreux, "L'Engagement des harkis (1954-1962)," *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire*, no. 90 (2006): 34.

⁴⁰³ Hautreux, 36.

⁴⁰⁴ Homer Sutton, "Postcolonial Voices: Vindicating the Harkis," *Contemporary French Civilization* 20, no. 2 (1996): 231–32.

⁴⁰⁵ Géraldine Enjelvin and Nada Korac-Kakabadse, "France and the Memories of 'Others': The Case of the Harkis," *History and Memory* 24, no. 1 (2012): 160.

Espérance in 1956 (figures 4.8 and 4.9), give us a glimpse. Opération Espérance was a five-day, torrid battle during which the French army sought to dismantle an FLN stronghold in the mountains of Kabylia outside of Algiers.⁴⁰⁶ Outnumbered and outgunned, over two hundred *fellaghas* were killed and over a hundred more were captured for interrogation.⁴⁰⁷ Similar to many operations in Kabylia, the harkis participated in the pacification. Durr captured several images of the battle itself including preparation scenes and confiscated weaponry. He also took several portraits of harkis, Muslim Algerian auxiliaries of the French army. In these photographs, Durr allowed his subject time to pose and often took the portrait from several distances and angles. These decisions on Durr's part, which allowed for more agency on his subject's part, imply that he respected the autonomy and dignity of the harkis.

In two photographs featuring the same harki, we can see Durr's nuanced approach. In one of them (figure 4.8 – 1956), Durr takes the portrait from several feet away from his subject. The harki gazes straight into the camera. His facial expression and body language are relaxed, indicating that the harki is comfortable with Durr taking his photograph and suggesting even that he is consciously posing for the shot. The comfort that the harki expressed also suggests that he was at least familiar with and trusting of Durr. There is no sign that this photograph was taken without permission, and unlike photographs taken of FLN captives, which I will discuss momentarily, Durr allows the harki to set his own pose, and thus to assert some authority over the making of the picture. In the other (figure 4.9 – 1956), Durr has zoomed in on his subject as the harki stares into the distance. The pose and the framing of the photograph give the man a

⁴⁰⁶ Drew, *We Are No Longer in France*, 180. Drew writes that Kabylia was the country's poorest region and suffered a sharp decline in living conditions over the previous fifteen years. The region also made sense as the center for insurrection since the rocky landscape lent itself well to guerrilla warfare.

⁴⁰⁷ "Plus de deux cents rebelles tués au cours d'un des combats les plus importants depuis le début de la rébellion," *Le Monde*, June 4, 1956, https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1956/06/04/plus-de-deux-cents-rebelles-tues-au-cours-d-un-des-combats-les-plus-importants-depuis-le-debut-de-la-rebellion_2258238_1819218.html.

heroic air. Staring off into the distance, the harki appears vigilant, steadfast, and brave.

Additionally, the photographs demonstrate Durr's careful consideration of *who* the harki was and what he represented in his capacity in the French armed forces. Each photograph embeds the harki in the landscape seen in the background. He becomes part of the rolling hills of Kabylia's rugged terrain. This emphasizes that the harki's greatest utility to the French army was in this precise environment – it was the harki's knowledge of the landscape, the people that inhabited it, and the languages spoken there that were useful to the French. This portrait indicates that at least Durr acknowledged and appreciated that fact.

Another photograph taken by Durr during Opération Espérance (figure 4.10 – 1956) features a rare scene in which French soldiers and a harki are pictured together. The existence of this photograph fundamentally indicates that at least some soldiers viewed harkis as comrades. It is unclear in what phase during Opération Espérance this photograph was taken, but the mood is relaxed and informal. Nevertheless, although they are pictured together, there is a clear visual distinction between the French soldiers and the harki. The two French soldiers appear to be joking around with each other, and their fraternity is evident. While the French soldiers are turned toward each other, the harki, although physically close, stands apart. The body language of the harki is also more rigid, as if on guard, and he does not seem to be included in the humorous exchange between the French soldiers. Furthermore, the harki lacks a uniform, making him appear even more visually distinct from the French.

A photograph taken by a soldier known only as Choupin further underscores this distinction (figure 4.11 – 1956) by playing on the academic tradition of Orientalist painting. In the photograph, a *spahi* (member of a calvary regiment, generally recruited from the Algerian population) is seen on patrol in the rugged terrain outside of Saïda south of Oran. The horse upon

which the *spahi* rides is at a trot, the outline of the creature crisply contrasting with the sun-bleached, rocky landscape. The rider appears to be in traditional garb complete with turban and rifle. He steers his mount toward another horseman seen in the middle distance to the left, their proportionately small appearance emphasizing the vastness of the landscape. While it is a bland fact that horses were still needed in military operations in Algeria, such an image also plays on several tropes about North Africa that were deeply entrenched in the French imagination. The photograph itself immediately recalls the avalanche of paintings made of Arab horsemen by artists such as Eugène Delacroix (1798 – 1863) and Eugène Fromentin (1820-1876) whose work, as has been seen in previous chapters, continued to remain important visual references to Algeria throughout the twentieth century. Choupin's perspective on the *spahi* demonstrates the enduring nostalgia for an untouched, pre-colonial (and therefore pre-revolutionary) society, registering indirectly, perhaps, the photographer's desire to escape the trials and tribulations of his current context.

Viewed together, Durr and Choupin's photographs suggest several conclusions. First, the *harki*'s knowledge of the land and loyalty to the French seems to have been appreciated. As seen in the group photograph, it also seems plausible that while there was a divide between French and Algerian soldiers, there was still association and at least a modicum of respect shared between the two groups as well. Nevertheless, as seen in the individual portraits, the close association of the *harki* with the land, and persistently enduring orientalist conceptions, meant that the *harki* and the *spahi* were decidedly not French. At best, *harkis* and *spahis* were *français musulmans* who played significant roles both in the military and political strategies of the French.

In addition to highlighting the “loyalty” of France’s Arab population, the SCA also relied upon photography to document the “good works” that the French were doing in Algeria. Some of the “evidence” that SCA photographers captured is set in the *camps de regroupement* to which at least 2.4 million Algerian peasants were forcibly relocated between 1954 and 1962. None of the individuals in these camps had been convicted of any crimes and thus were not incarcerated in the traditional sense, but they were effectively confined to neutralize their political agency.⁴⁰⁸ The French opened the first internment camp (although they referred to these camps as “centers” to avoid the obvious correlation to the Nazi’s concentration camps) in early 1955 in the Aurès Mountains, home to many rural Algerians whom the French had never managed to fully subjugate.⁴⁰⁹ Those who remained living in evacuated zones and who refused to relocate to the regroupment camps could be shot on sight.⁴¹⁰ The camps themselves were not a much better alternative. Algerians suffered extremely harsh living conditions there with limited access to resources and nutrition in turn making them vulnerable to illness and higher mortality rates.⁴¹¹

To present a palatable image of the camps to the public, one SCA photographer, Arthur Smet, relied on a “bird’s eye view” perspective of the camps. As seen in an aerial photograph that Smet took of a regroupment center near Saïda south of Oran (figure 4.12 – 1960), the camps do not reflect the harsh conditions that its inhabitants, confined there, actually experienced. Instead, from above, the camp seems well-organized and maintained, revealing the intent behind Smet’s aerial perspective. This far-removed view allows for both physical and emotional

⁴⁰⁸ Benjamin Clude Brower, “Regroupment Camps and Shantytowns in Late-Colonial Algeria” 20 (2019): 93.

⁴⁰⁹ Emma Kuby, *Political Survivors: The Resistance, the Cold War, and the Fight against Concentration Camps after 1945* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019), 197. For more on the perpetual resistance of rural Algerians, see Neil MacMaster’s, *War in the Mountains: Peasant Society and Counterinsurgency in Algeria, 1918-1958* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020).

⁴¹⁰ Jean-Philippe Talbot-Bernigaud, “Zones Interdites,” *Temps Modernes* 16, no. 177 (January 1961): 708.

⁴¹¹ Fabien Sacriste, “Le Corps, Enjeu de La Guerre d’indépendance Algérienne. La Question sanitaire dans les camps de regroupement (1954-1962),” *Les Cahiers de Framespa* 22 (2016): n.p. [online]. Accessed September 27, 2022.

distance and obscures signs of poverty and scarcity. However, upon further inspection, certain distressing details emerge. First, the camp seems to be located in an isolated, arid, and sparsely vegetated landscape. In other words, escape from such a site would be difficult. Second, while the aerial view provides a neat and tidy appearance, a close examination reveals the dilapidation of the settlement. The structures seen here are called *khaimas*, tent-like structures used mainly by nomadic peoples of the Sahara. The presence of such improvised structures is indicative of the little assistance offered to these relocated Algerians by the French.⁴¹² Curiously, no Algerians populate the scene. Their absence is significant. Removing the inhabitants of the camp from the official images removes the possibility that viewers might see them as political prisoners.

In another photograph (figure 4.13 – 1960), Smet captures an example of the benevolence that the French sought to emphasize. In the image, an indigenous woman is seen receiving a vaccine from a French soldier in her arm. The photograph allows a rare entry into one of the *khaimas* where a nomadic woman from the environs of Aïn Skhouna is pictured in a crouched position, perhaps sitting on a cushion or stool, barefoot on the dirt floor. The short sleeve of her left arm is lifted, allowing the soldier, who holds a syringe, access. The woman consents to the medical care that she is receiving. Even by the time of the revolution, large swaths of Algeria had little to no contact with the French state. In certain rural zones, such as Aïn Skhouna, there were no schools, no doctors, no infrastructure, and no gas or electricity. Many rural Algerians embraced the care offered and the French military emphasized that fact in their propaganda, exemplified here by Smet's photograph.⁴¹³

Efforts to document the “positive” effects of colonialism were part of a broader agenda that Interior Minister François Mitterand and Jacques Soustelle, the Gouverneur Générale at the

⁴¹² For a contemporary assessment of the camps, see Marcel Lesne's “Une expérience de déplacement de population: les centres de regroupement en Algérie,” *Annales de géographie* 71, no. 3888 (1962): 567–603.

⁴¹³ Johnson, 41.

time, sought to implement. To combat the general mood of support for decolonization spreading throughout Europe and the pan-Arab propaganda steadily making its way into Algeria from Cairo, which was the epicenter of the Third World and anti-colonial politics at the time, Mitterand and Soustelle were committed to refuting anti-French statements and making positive arguments for keeping Algeria French.⁴¹⁴ Soon after the revolution began, Mitterand announced plans to begin a series of public works to improve roads, post offices, and town halls in these remote parts of Algeria. The strategy was to diminish support for independence by tackling poverty and inequality.⁴¹⁵

In Algeria, Soustelle's approach to nullifying criticism was to call attention to France's humanitarianism and his plans for serious reform. Although, as we have seen in previous chapters, economic, political, and social reform had been attempted in previous years, Soustelle realized that real change would have to come quickly if France was to maintain control.⁴¹⁶ After traveling through Algeria in his first official visit in 1955, he witnessed firsthand the dire conditions of the Algerian people's everyday lives. He went on to develop the Section Administratives Spécialisées (SAS), which was devoted to elevating the quality of life of the Algerian population to disincentivize Algerians from joining the FLN. The SAS built roads, bridges, conducted censuses, repaired schools, enrolled students, constructed homes, oversaw local elections, and built work camps for men.⁴¹⁷ Another critical component of the SAS program was medical care. Teams of doctors, nurses, and medical assistants were sent into rural

⁴¹⁴ Elizabeth H. Murphrey, "Colonial Propaganda: Jacques Soustelle in Defense of French Algeria, 1955-1962," *Proceedings of the Meeting of the French Colonial Historical Society* 6/7 (1982): 76-77.

⁴¹⁵ Natalya Vince, *The Algerian War, The Algerian Revolution* (Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2020), 71.

⁴¹⁶ Murphrey, "Colonial Propaganda: Jacques Soustelle in Defense of French Algeria, 1955-1962," 78.

⁴¹⁷ Jennifer Johnson, *The Battle for Algeria: Sovereignty, Health Care, and Humanitarianism* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 40.

Algeria to provide free care, teach hygiene, and offer vaccinations.⁴¹⁸ The idea was to conquer the hearts and minds of Algerians with medicine rather than force submission through violence. The medical relief provided through the SAS was momentous. For over a century, medical and social institutions were not readily accessible to Algerians, especially those in rural locations, and the SAS was the first real effort to provide them with health care.⁴¹⁹

In addition to their capacity as part of France's wartime propaganda machine, SCA photographers also recorded the day-to-day experiences of French soldiers, whom they often accompanied on missions of pacification. These photographs lend insight into the relationships between SCA photographers and their fellow soldiers as well as with the local inhabitants of the regions in which they worked. They also emphasize the role of the camera in recording individual and group wartime experiences. The experiences of one photographer in particular stands out: France Vilar, whose work has already been discussed in the pages preceding. Although the gender of the first name is ambiguous, Vilar was actually a woman photographer. The name France Vilar functioned as a sort of *nom de guerre*. Her given name was Angèle Risser. In a photograph of Vilar alongside the soldiers with whom she served, her uniqueness as a woman certainly stands out (figure 4.14 – c. 1956-1957). Clad in army fatigues and boots, the key item that sets her apart from her peers is her Rolleiflex camera. The photograph documents the camaraderie that SCA photographers shared with their fellow soldiers. Vilar was well respected among the ranks and a frequent contributor to *Le Bled*, the periodical that the French military circulated to its troops. She even received a commendation from a captain (figure 4.15 – c. 1956-1957) while photographing in Taourirt, deep in the rugged terrain of Kabylia. The commendation read:

⁴¹⁸ Johnson, 40–41.

⁴¹⁹ Johnson, 41.

Mademoiselle France Vilar is a true journalist in the noble sense of the term: she only writes what she sees, and she constantly sacrifices herself to search for information on site, not hesitating to participate in our operations, painful though they may be. Some of us who did not know Miss France Vilar were a little surprised to see her, on March 15, 1957, around 4:30 a.m., leaving with us on an operation towards Abrares. We are therefore happy to send her in this modest post of Taourirt Said Arab (Douar des Ait Garets) our tributes of admiration for the beautiful mission she has entrusted to herself, and we wish her a good stay among us.⁴²⁰

The captain's words make clear the place of prestige that Vilar held in the minds of her companions. Her determination and perseverance had earned their respect.

Her rare perspective (that of a woman), captured through her photography, also nuances our understanding of the interactions that SCA photographers had with their Arab and indigenous subjects. Vilar seems to have been particularly interested in the lives of the children and women she encountered while on assignment. Although these photographs remain outside of the official archives, they nonetheless provide a glimpse into the kinds of exchanges that photographers had with civilians. In two photographs found in her private archives (figure 4.16 and 4.17 – c. 1956-1957), Vilar poses with several women and children living ostensibly in Kabylia who appear to be consensual participants in the making of the image; some are even smiling. In one of the images (figure 4.16), Vilar, who is the second woman from the left, even drapes her arm tenderly around the shoulders of a young girl. These photographs bespeak the ways that making photographs blurred the lines between military and civilian life and, in the case of Vilar, how photography also registered her private experiences in Algeria.

⁴²⁰ “Mademoiselle France Vilar est un vrai journaliste dans le sens noble du terme : elle n'écrit que ce qu'elle voit et elle paie sans arrêt de sa personne pour rechercher sur place l'information, n'hésitant pas à participer à nos opérations si pénibles soient-elles. Quelques-uns parmi nous qui ne connaissaient pas Melle France Vilar ont été un peu surpris de la voir, le 15 Mars 1957 vers 4 H 30, partir avec nous en opération vers l'Abrares. Nous sommes donc heureux de lui adresser dans ce modeste poste de Taourirt Said Arab (Douar des Ait Garets) nos hommages d'admiration pour la belle mission qu'elle s'est confiée et nous lui souhaitons un bon séjour parmi nous.”

Some SCA official records have a different, less wholesome story to tell about the relationship between SCA photographers and Algerians, however. A group of six photographs that SCA photographer Jacques Fatio captured during the same operation records the search, interrogation, and, evidently, the summary executions of two Arab men. Fatio took the photos during a pacification mission that the 9th Zouave regiment, an order of elite army infantrymen, carried out in the rugged environs of Kabylia in 1954. If my interpretation is correct, Fatio's photographs provide rare photographic evidence of the atrocities that some French soldiers committed during the war. They also suggest that SCA photographers helped facilitate masculine socialization and gender performance wherein brutality and mercilessness were valorized.⁴²¹ A quick content warning regarding the upcoming photographs: these are scenes of military violence that could be disturbing to some readers.

One photograph from this group (figure 4.18 – 1954) features an Arab man, to whom I will refer as captive one, surrounded by French soldiers. On the left side of the photograph, a soldier rifles through captive one's pocket with his pistol in hand and at the ready. In the background, there are two additional soldiers who appear to have their rifles slightly raised and pointed at the captive, who raises his hands in submission and appears to be weighing the seriousness of the situation that he is now in, his expression one of disbelief and unease. In another photo (figure 4.19 – 1954), the search is more invasive, and Fatio has captured a significant moment in which captive one looks defiantly into the face of his captor who has turned his attentions to the inner pockets of the man's coats.

Dressed humbly and rather thin in build, captive one looks almost as though he has been randomly selected off the street. Aside from the combat boots laced up to his knee, he wears a

⁴²¹ The outlawing of summary executions, during which a person is accused of a crime and immediately killed without the benefit of a fair trial, had recently been strictly prohibited during the Geneva Convention of 1949.

simple costume of a thin, baggy coat layered over a button-down shirt, a plain pair of trousers, and beret. Aside from his boots, his appearance is decidedly pedestrian – not that of a battle-tested guerrilla. Captive one’s appearance here reminds the viewer of the sheer desperation of the Arab and indigenous population’s situation, one of utter desperation and poverty, which provoked average individuals, like the man in this photograph, to venture into the mountains and to take on one of the greatest militaries in the world with woefully fewer resources and less formal training.

These details make what is taking place in another photograph even more striking. In a third picture (figure 4.20 – 1954), Fatio captures captive one’s interrogation. At the center of the image, the man from the other two photographs, recognizable by his boots and the profile of his face, is subjected to intimidation as he undergoes interrogation. A French soldier stands menacingly over captive one who, under duress, lifts his hands in submission. Captive one is crouched on the ground and appears to cower before the interrogator. The rifle of the interrogator and other French soldiers are pointed in the general direction of captive one as well, lending to the threatening atmosphere.

In another photograph (figure 4.21 – 1954), we leave captive one and are confronted with an equally distressing scene. A second Arab man, whom I will refer to as captive two, is shown crumpled on the ground with his leg turned at a grotesque angle. The fear and pain that the man is experiencing is evident on his face. Leaned against the outcropping of rock from the mountainous landscape, the man wears an expression of defeat, desperation, and terror. His hand is halfheartedly lifted, perhaps in self-defense, perhaps in search of assistance. Like captive one, his dress is casual, somewhat shabby, and decidedly not militaristic. The rifle of a nearby soldier is pointed menacingly in captive two’s direction.

In another photograph (figure 4.22 – 1954), captive two is pictured in the same position, his leg still twisted at an abnormal angle. Compositionally, the photography is highly organized, indicating the importance of recording this moment. In this photograph, the French soldiers pose with their prisoner, some even smiling at their accomplishment as if they were hunters posing with a recent kill as their trophy. All are engaging the camera's lens directly. Fatio has centered the captive so that the viewer is immediately drawn to the prisoner's grim, humiliated, and hopeless expression. Fatio has clearly collaborated with his fellow soldiers for this shot. In this sense, photography becomes a ritualized way of fostering closeness between soldiers, a process in which the photographer and his camera have played a critical role.

In what must be a photograph taken later during this operation (figure 4.23 – 1954), Fatio provides a wholly new perspective on the scene. Taken from a higher vantage point so that the viewer looks down onto the heads of the French soldiers, we now see the lifeless corpse of captive two, identifiable by his face and clothes. The foot of another dead captive, presumably captive one, is barely discernible at the center of the photograph, his body mostly hidden by the figures of several French soldiers. The aesthetic of this photograph, in stark contrast to the others which seek to close the distance between the viewer and the event, is more distanced and disinterested. Perhaps this is why the image was able to escape censure. While searches and interrogations would have been commonplace during military operations, the existence of this photograph within French military archives is notable since the French government explicitly banned all images and evidence of unsavory, morally questionable behavior, a category to which a summary execution would have certainly belonged.⁴²² This group of photographs demonstrates

⁴²² Barbara Vignaux, "L'Agence France-Presse en Guerre d'Algérie," *Presses de Sciences Po* 3, no. 83 (2004): 122.

how the SCA archives offer unexpected opportunities to reconstitute histories that were intentionally erased from the official record.

Although there is no publication record for Fatio's photographs, there were rare instances in which similar crimes were documented and even sometimes circulated. On December 29, 1955, a series of five photographs (for an example, see figure 4.24), which were apparently frames taken from a foreign news agency's newsreel, were published in *L'Express*, a center-left publication in the metropole, with the accompanying headline "Des faits terribles qu'il faut connaître" ("Terrible Facts That Must be Known"). The series showed a French soldier aim his rifle at an unarmed Algerian civilian whose back is turned and appears to be walking or running away. Then the soldier shoots the man, lowers and reloads the rifle, and shoots him again.⁴²³ The images deeply humiliated the French government, which scrambled to cover up the incident, claiming that an American journalist had instigated and bribed the French gendarme into committing the summary execution. These accusations built on World War II anxieties about the American government and military influence in Algeria and the reverence for American democracy that Algerian dissidents maintained, a concern which was discussed at length in the previous chapter. The French press, curiously, initially accepted the explanation that a treacherous American sought to thwart the French government, but eventually, the story collapsed.⁴²⁴

While in the hands of most SCA photographers, the camera was used as a tool of subjugation, revolutionaries often subverted these intentions in more than one way. Thus, French military photography in the context of the Algerian war also became an unintended matrix for acts of resistance. In a photograph taken during Opération Basque on June 11, 1956 (figure 4.25

⁴²³ Emma Kuby, "A War of Words over an Image of War: The Fox Movietone Scandal and the Portrayal of French Violence in Algeria, 1955-1956," *French Politics, Culture & Society* 30, no. 1 (Spring 2012): 46.

⁴²⁴ Kuby, 55-56.

– 1956), a pacification mission in Kabylia, two captured ALN fighters are displayed before a group of French soldiers. Presumably, these captured ALN fighters were not given a choice as to whether or not they would have their photograph taken. This alone evidences an imbalance of power. Outnumbered, the two captives stand before their subjugators, weaponless, exposed, and, at first glance, docile—the ideal colonial subject. Initially, it appears that the act of photographing is a means of documenting the faces and identities of these two men. However, the smirks seen on some of the faces of the French soldiers as they crowd around their captives convey an ulterior intention behind the taking of such a photograph: humiliation and domination.

Unlike the French soldiers, who appear relaxed and maybe even joyful after the successful capturing of two enemy soldiers, the ALN fighters wear a much more complex expression. The man on the right is the larger, more physically imposing figure of the two captured ALN soldiers. However, his face communicates an air of uncertainty, and, upon further inspection, signs of war weariness, malnutrition, and poverty emerge. The man's trousers are baggy, and his shirt and jacket hang on his frame. His clothes are tattered, and the toe of his right foot protrudes from his boot. Given his scruffy appearance, a viewer of this photograph might have initially believed that this man was an impoverished subsistence farmer or wage laborer as many Algerian men were at the time, not part of Algeria's revolutionary fighting force.⁴²⁵

The ALN soldier on the left is the more outwardly defiant of the two. His facial expression shows no weakness or submission. In a separate close-up photograph of the man on the left (figure 4.26 – 1956), the details of his stalwart expression are even more severe. The

⁴²⁵ Diana Davis, *Resurrecting the Granary of Rome: Environmental History and French Colonial Expansion in North Africa* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007), 133–34. According to Davis, two-thirds of Algerians in rural areas such as those living in the location of this photograph lived in extreme poverty. During the initial conquest and colonization of Algeria, the best farmland (as was seen in chapter 1) was seized from Algerians. Some turned to subsistence farming and others became wage laborers at settler-owned agricultural estates. Although statistics vary, Davis estimates that half a million to a million rural Algerians, such as the men pictured here, were unemployed. Out of 8.5 million Algerians, only 112,000 had permanent employment in 1954.

close-up reveals deep lines and several scars on his face, heightening his intimidating appearance. He stares directly into the camera defiantly. Taken at a slightly upward angle, the man appears to look down on the viewer literally, but also figuratively. This might be due to the use of a Rolleiflex camera which would have rested on the photographer's sternum on the end of a strap, facilitating a lower angle for the shot. While on display almost as if a trophy of the war and surrounded by the mocking expressions of the French soldiers, this ALN soldier does not bow his head or cower. He stares down and confronts his captors. Thus, any motive of photographing these men as a form of humiliation is rendered moot by the subject of the photograph itself and the photograph becomes an unexpected conduit of Algerian agency and endurance.⁴²⁶

Algerian defiance is a recurring theme in SCA photographs of captives. When a member of the resistance was caught, the French would often “present” the captive to the public – both to make an example of the captive, but also to demonstrate French military prowess and superiority. A photograph of Yacef Saadi (figure 4.27 – 1957), who had long been a proponent of Algerian independence and served as the FLN's military chief of the Zone Autonome d'Alger (ZAA) during the revolution, shows the enduring defiance of pro-independence fighters. Saadi does not carry himself as a defeated prisoner, however. He appears quite debonaire, charismatic, and confident—the opposite of the ideal passive, defeated colonial subject. His arms are resolutely crossed in front as he poses for the camera. The smiles on the lips of some of the men surrounding him set the tone of the moment as one of conspicuous presentation rather than a fulfillment of duty: a “photo op.” Even so, and with a French soldier pointing his rifle at him,

⁴²⁶ Jennifer Howell, “Decoding Marc Garanger’s Photographic Message in La Guerre d’Algérie Vue Par Un Appelé Du Contingent,” *Dalhousie French Studies* 92 (Fall 2010): 85–95. My thinking here was greatly shaped by Howell’s essay on Marc Garanger, who took photographs of unveiled Algerian women for identity cards under the orders of the French government.

Saadi pays his captors no mind. With his slight smile and assertively crossed arms, one would think he is a celebrity rather than a war prisoner.⁴²⁷

Arrested at the same time as Saadi, mujahidat Zohra Drif (b. 1934) was photographed at her presentation to the press as well (figure 4.28 – 1957). The SCA has few photographs of women mujahidin, so this picture is especially notable.⁴²⁸ Drif looks boldly into the camera, but her body language tells a different story. While her eyes are devoid of patience for this PR stunt, she folds her hands innocently in front of her, her left hand holding on to the index finger of her right hand in almost an infantile or naïve fashion. A single woman in her early twenties, Zohra appears youthful, attractive, petite, and so decidedly unthreatening that the viewer might not realize that she was a militant who planned and executed bombings, most notably, the Milk Bar Café bombing of 1956 in Algiers that killed at least three French youths and injured dozens.⁴²⁹

What is conspicuously absent from Drif’s appearance is the veil. If Drif’s own account of her arrest is to be believed, this was a conscious choice. In her memoir, she writes, “I wanted to swap my Algiers housewife outfit for more businesslike attire to represent my position as an ALN fighter – and proud of it, come what may.”⁴³⁰ The decision not to wear the veil is worthy of consideration since, according to French-educated Martiniquais psychiatrist, political philosopher, and decolonial activist Frantz Fanon (1925-1961) in his treatise “Algeria Unveiled

⁴²⁷ Unsurprisingly, Saadi did end up having a career in show business after the war ended and he was released from prison. He even played a character based on himself in the celebrated film, *La Bataille d’Alger* (1966). Drif, who we shall hear about in the next paragraph, wrote in her memoirs that Saadi was extremely ill at the time of his capture and had been suffering from fevers and headaches that left him in a semi-comatose state. If her account is true, then that makes his powerful pose here even more impressive.

⁴²⁸ Meredith Turschen, “Algerian Women in the Liberation Struggle and the Civil War: From Active Participants to Passive Victims?,” *Social Research* 9, no. 3 (Fall 2002): 890. Turschen writes that approximately 11,000 Algerian women, or about 3% of all mujahidin, fought in the revolution. This is the number reported by the Algerian Ministry of Veteran Affairs in 1974, although some scholars think this number is an underestimation. I propose that one reason women mujahidat are not frequently pictured is simply due to the fact that they made up only a fraction of the FLN’s fighting force.

⁴²⁹ Paige Whaley Eager, “Women and Wars,” in *From Freedom Fighters to Terrorists: Women and Political Violence* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008), 109.

⁴³⁰ Zohra Drif-Bitat, *Inside the Battle of Algiers: Memoir of a Woman Freedom Fighter*, trans. Andrew Farrand (Charlottesville: Just World Books, n.d.), 319.

(1959),” the veil demarcated both Algerian society and its feminine component.⁴³¹ Fanon claimed, “The woman seen in her white veil unifies the perception that one has of Algerian feminine society. Obviously, what we have here is a uniform which tolerates no modification, no variant.”⁴³² Drif’s decision to appear in western fashion is therefore sharply pointed since, as Fanon wrote, colonial society reacted to the veil in a “homogenous” way as a symbol of the inferior status of Algerian woman.⁴³³ According to Fanon, the colonial administration’s strategy to disintegrate Algerian society hinged on “conquering” the women by finding them “behind the veil where they hide themselves and in the houses where the men keep them out of sight.” The notion was that in defending the “humiliated, sequestered, cloistered” Algerian woman and in denouncing Algerian men as medieval and barbaric, the French colonial state could “destructure” Algerian society and present the colonial project as one with noble, humanitarian motivations.⁴³⁴

But here we have Drif, without the veil, highly individualized and intentional in her self-presentation and apparently unrestricted by the “archaic patriarchy” of Muslim society (as per the French imagination, anyway), on the day of her arrest as an alleged terrorist. In this moment, Drif’s appearance flies in the face of one of France’s main indictments of Algerian society. Drif was but one of multiple *françaises musulmanes*, Algerian women who dressed in a European manner, spoke fluent French, and for all intents and purposes, were ideal assimilated Muslim subjects, that stunned European audiences for their militancy during the war. Other women,

⁴³¹ Frantz Fanon, “Algeria Unveiled,” in *A Dying Colonialism* (New York City: Grove/Atlantic, Inc., 1994), 35–36.

⁴³² Fanon, 36.

⁴³³ *Ibid.*, 37.

⁴³⁴ Fanon, 38–39.

such as Djamila Bouhired (b. 1935) and Hassiba Ben Bouali (1938-1957), also made powerful contributions to the independence effort.⁴³⁵

The French had a difficult time accepting that Europeanized Muslim women like Drif could and did turn against them. This was understood and acted upon by the FLN, and this photograph is a testament to that fact. Drif's father was a local *qadi* (judge of indigenous affairs) and she enjoyed relative material comfort throughout her life. In social status and appearance, she was as "French Muslim" as a colonial government could desire of its subjects. French Colonel Yves Godard, who took part in capturing Drif, later recounted that he could not understand how Drif, who in his eyes could have easily passed for the "the daughter of a colonist," had gotten involved with the FLN's "bandits." The FLN knowingly exploited the stereotype of the "pro-French emancipated Muslim woman" that Godard describes for its own gain.⁴³⁶

Photographs of Algerian mujahideen, like those of Saadi and Drif, also demonstrate that revolutionaries understood that photography allowed one to fashion oneself. As Barthes wrote, "Now, once I feel myself observed by the lens, everything changes: I constitute myself in the process of 'posing.' I instantaneously make another body for myself, I transform myself in advance into an image."⁴³⁷ In her memoirs, Drif describes this exact process of transformation during the moment that her photograph was taken:

Suddenly, from amid the human gauntlet the soldiers formed around us, a bright light blinded me and left me blinking. After a few seconds, I realized that these were flashes from photographers and journalists. The photo of Si Mohamed handcuffed leapt directly to my mind: I had to face them with dignity. I stood

⁴³⁵ For a deeper analysis of the role of françaises musulmanes like Drif, Bouhired, and Bouali, see Natalya Vince, "Transgressing Boundaries: Gender, Race, Religion, and "Françaises Musulmanes" during the Algerian War of Independence," *French Historical Studies* 33, no. 3 (2010): 445-474.

⁴³⁶ Natalya Vince, "Colonial and Post-Colonial Identities: Women Veterans of the 'Battle of Algiers,'" *French History and Civilization* 2 (2009): 156-57.

⁴³⁷ Barthes, *Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography*, 10.

straight upright and looked them up and down, trying to send a message: ‘We are fighters from the ALN and proud of it. We are the enemies of your arrogant world. Your brute force will not diminish us. Free and independent Algeria will live, despite everything!’⁴³⁸

Although Drif’s actual appearance in the photograph does not necessarily match up with her memories of the event, her words are an important record of the role that photography played in the war as a tool of humiliation and condemnation, but also commemoration and inspiration.

When Drif refers to “Si Mohamed” in the passage above, she is referencing resistance leader Mohamed Larbi Ben M’hidi (commonly referred to as Si Larbi or Ben M’hidi) who was arrested, interrogated, likely tortured, and executed (although the French claimed that he hanged himself at the time) the previous February.⁴³⁹

Drif recalled the moment she read about Ben M’hidi’s capture and her experience of his arrest photograph that came to mind during her own presentation to the press. Her words are worth quoting at length:

On February 23, the front page of every paper announced the news, with the photo to prove it. I stared, incredulous, at the newspapers, refusing to believe the disaster that had befallen us. But it was surely him. He looked straight ahead calmly, his face lit by an imperceptible smile. His whole demeanor expressed the serene confidence of a leader, a man convinced that the case for which he fought would triumph. I focused on that look I knew so well, and I cried. [...] I understood that at that very moment, as the photographers’ flashes bombarded him, he had wanted to send one final message to us, to our people. He used the enemy’s own photo to speak to us and guide us one final time by communicating a serene confidence through the cheerful light of his eyes and the slight smile that illuminated his face. His message was clear and compelling: brute force will never triumph over moral force. With their strength and composure, his eyes told us that no force in the world could break a people’s will to be free.⁴⁴⁰

⁴³⁸ Drif-Bitat, *Inside the Battle of Algiers: Memoir of a Woman Freedom Fighter*, 323–24.

⁴³⁹ In 2007, General Paul Aussaresses admitted in an interview with *Le Monde* that Ben M’hidi was executed by hanging to make it look like a suicide. His book of memoirs, *Services Spéciaux: Algérie, 1955-1957* was published in 2001 and contained admissions to the torture and murder of Algerians suspected of working for the FLN, confirming the systematic and routine practice of torture by French military and security forces throughout the revolution.

⁴⁴⁰ Drif-Bitat, *Inside the Battle of Algiers: Memoir of a Woman Freedom Fighter*, 233–34.

The photograph of Ben M'hidi (figure 4.29 – 1957), taken by SCA photographer Marc Flament, is just as Drif described. Ben M'hidi does not cower or show shame as he is presented to the press. Even with a French soldier at his side, smiling and looking down upon him with a cord of some kind (and for what purpose, who knows) wrapped around his hands, Ben M'hidi squares his shoulders and looks directly into the camera unphased. His appearance is neat and tidy, and he is well-groomed. If not for the metal handcuffs placed around his wrists, one would never assume that he was one of Algeria's most-wanted revolutionaries. In attempting to channel Ben M'hidi's dignified, confident, and even cheerful mood, Drif's arrest photograph and her testimony demonstrate the subversive strategies that Algerian resistance fighters adopted during the revolution which, as seen here, involved infiltrating the colonizer's dominant tool of documentation and representation.

Black cultural critic bell hooks' words on photography and representation come to mind here: "All colonized and subjugated people who, by way of resistance, create an oppositional subculture within the framework of domination recognize that the field of representation (how we see ourselves, how others see us) is a site of ongoing struggle."⁴⁴¹ Drif and Ben M'hidi, at least, seemed to understand this. Returning to hooks:

Photography has been, and is, central to that aspect of decolonization that calls us back to the past and offers a way to reclaim and renew life-affirming bonds. Using images, we connect ourselves to a recuperative, redemptive memory that enables us to construct radical identities, images of ourselves that transcend the limits of the colonizing eye.⁴⁴²

Much indeed transcends the limits of the colonizing eye in the photographs of Ben M'hidi and Drif. Although this moment can only be reconstructed from Drif's memories, her writings suggest an important conclusion about the role of French military photography in the Algerian

⁴⁴¹ bell hooks, "In Our Glory: Photography and Black Life," in *Art on My Mind: Visual Politics* (New York: The New Press, 1995), 57.

⁴⁴² hooks, 64.

War. At least Drif, if not other revolutionaries, assumed that their peers may see such an image of them, perhaps even their last pictured moment, and that they could use that picture to convey a message that passed undetected through the scopic regime of the colonizer. When Drif looked at the photograph of Ben M'hidi, she claims to have received a message that she felt was meant entirely for her and her cohort of liberationists—that the fight for freedom must go on, that a single image could constitute a site of struggle. Knowing the “life affirming” bond shared between the two mujahideen, one can no longer look at the photograph of Ben M'hidi without seeing the photograph as an intentional act of love and solidarity. These themes are then carried forward when Drif tries to take up Ben M'hidi's demeanor in her own arrest photograph.

Although the maltreatment of captives, which prisoners of war like Ben M'hidi more than likely endured, is not readily visible in the images discussed thus far, it certainly was a reality of the Algerian War, making the open defiance seen in these images all the more extraordinary. War captives were often tortured and mutilated as punishment for their resistance to French authority and to extract information. Excesses of this nature have since come to be imprinted upon the French consciousness. However, during the war itself, it was taboo to speak of the torture and other atrocities committed by the French army in Algeria.⁴⁴³ Nevertheless, the use of excessive force was a well-known secret at the time, resulting in several publications such as Pierre-Henri Simon's book *Contre la torture* (1957) and Henri Alleg's *La question* (1958). Several newspapers addressed the issue as well, including *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro*.⁴⁴⁴

Throughout this section, we have seen how SCA photographs served to reinforce French colonial authority in Algeria, emphasize the humanitarian goals of French colonialism, and, ultimately, promote images of a constructed social reality. These photographs were then

⁴⁴³ Stora, *La gangrène et l'oubli*, 31.

⁴⁴⁴ Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962* (New York Review of Books, 2006), 232–33.

circulated broadly to monopolize the photographic documentation of the war, control the official narrative, and enact psychological warfare upon viewers in the metropole, colony, and international community. However, as seen in several of the photographs, Algerian militants often stymied these efforts and co-opted the camera to express indigenous resilience. In the next section, we will see how and to what ends the FLN consciously harnessed the power of photography for its own purposes.

In the Service of the Revolution: Algerian Nation-Building and the Photograph

The camera was not only the tool of the oppressor, but also of the oppressed.⁴⁴⁵ In this section, I argue that the Front de libération nationale (FLN) mobilized photography in service of the revolution in myriad ways: 1) To present a notion of Algerian nationhood that was distinctly Arabo-Islamic, highly organized, and capable of governing itself; 2) To defend against the narrative that the Armée de libération nationale was a terrorist organization and humanize its mujahidin; 3) To encourage pan-Arab, pan-African, and Third World solidarity; 4) To commemorate and venerate; 5) To construct, as the French did, its own false social realities; and 6) To record individual experiences and private moments. That photography fulfilled these diverse and myriad roles in service to the revolution goes to show that not only did Algerian revolutionaries have a highly sophisticated relationship with the camera, but a profoundly personal one too.

The Algerian War began as most revolutions do—with bloodshed. Seven *pieds noirs* were dead and eleven were wounded by the morning of November 1, 1954, All Saint’s Day and

⁴⁴⁵ Matthew Fox-Amato makes a similar argument in *Exposing Slavery: Photography, Human Bondage, and the Birth of Modern Visual Politics in America*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019. In his work, Fox-Amato discusses how photography was used both to envision racist hierarchies but also to portray the humanity and dignity of enslaved people during the American Civil War.

the first day of the Algerian Revolution. Although French losses were minimal in comparison to the blood that would be spilled over the next nearly eight years of war, the day would still come to be known as “Toussaint Rouge” or “Bloody All Saint’s Day.” The choice of All Saint’s Day, a solemn Catholic holiday observed by the French, was intentional. The FLN knew that Algeria’s settler population would be distracted with celebrations and that policing would be minimal. It was also a symbolic choice since it is a day to celebrate Christian martyrs. These details, FLN leaders realized, were guaranteed to maximize propaganda benefits.⁴⁴⁶

Six men are credited with coordinating and launching the revolution with these attacks. A photograph featuring all six (figure 4.30 – 1954), taken just before that significant date of November 1, 1954, helps unpack how FLN leaders conceived of themselves and their cause, and lends insight into this pivotal historic moment. The organization of the photograph, gesture, facial expression, and dress combine to communicate an array of meanings. Pictured in a formal, dignified arrangement are Rabah Bitat (1925-2000), Mustapha Ben Boulaïd (1917-1956), Mourad Didouche (1927-1955), Mohammed Boudiaf (1919-1992), Krim Belkacem (1922-1970), and Larbi Ben M’Hidi (1923-1957). The overall effect is that of a studio portrait: official, carefully crafted, and devoid of distraction. The photograph is about these men, their vision of a free Algeria, the historic moment that they planned and executed, and how they wished to remember it. It is also an acknowledgment of their status as official leaders and commitment to the cause. Although this photo was not likely made for broad dissemination since it would have endangered those pictured, this image was certainly captured with a desire to commemorate this turning point in Algerian history, and to ensure an enduring legacy for these revolutionary leaders.

⁴⁴⁶ Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 83.

The men, dressed elegantly in suits and ties and neatly coiffed, express their individuality and character through gesture and facial expression. Bitat, in the upper left, stands with squared shoulders and his hands behind his back. His eye seems to be caught by something in the background. To the right of Bitat, Ben Boulaïd looks directly into the camera, a subtle smile on his lips. Mourad also looks directly into the lens, his chin slightly down, giving him a look of resolve. Mourad places both of his hands gently on the shoulders of his comrade, Ben M'hidi, seated at the bottom right of the photograph. Ben M'hidi's brows are knit together, perhaps with concern. His socks hang loosely around his ankles, and he is the only one without a necktie, perhaps suggesting that he was less concerned with his self-presentation than the others, or perhaps less willing to present himself as Europeanized. His hands are placed on his knees in a resolute position. Above Ben M'hidi is Boudiaf. Much like Bitat, he stands taller than the rest of his comrades with squared shoulders and his hands folded behind his back. His facial expression is much more like Ben Boulaïd's, relaxed and untroubled. Seated on the left is Belkacem whose aura matches that of Ben M'hidi's, the gravity of the occasion made evident by the strain in his facial expression.

These are not the terrorists or bandits that the French colonial government would label them, but statesmen, intellectuals, and gentlemen united in a common cause. The photograph exudes the pride, potential, and promise of the first days of revolution as well as the uncertainty and fear that must have also cast a shadow over their lives for what was to be done could never be undone and would leave an indelible impact on the history of two countries and the world forever. Such an image, made at the outset of the war, is a testament to the significant role that the camera played in the Algerian War.

This image stands as an early example of the keen awareness that Algerian revolutionaries had that a single image could speak volumes since its every detail unravels France's official narrative about the war in Algeria. Jacques Soustelle, who was appointed Gouveneur Général during the Algerian War, regularly referred to Algerian revolutionaries as bandits, religious zealots, criminals, and terrorists who were part of a highly contained minority.⁴⁴⁷ This stately photograph and its subjects punch holes in such a narrative and demonstrate how images could be used to intervene in the war of words.

Photography, however, was certainly not a natural forte of anti-colonial Algerians, who used it sparingly prior to the war in their political press. However, during the war, the efficacy of the camera was paramount to the revolution. As will be seen later, there was at least one Algerian photographer, Mohamed Kouaci, and some evidence that there were other amateur Algerian photographers, that played an important role in the photographic documentation and representation of the war. The FLN also occasionally allowed foreign photographers and journalists to visit the ALN ranks and to record the lives and works of *maquisards*.

Photographs taken by Dutch photographer, Kryn Taconis, who was working for the photography cooperative, Magnum Photo Agency, at the time, demonstrate the kind of intimate access that the FLN allotted these international photographers. The photographs that Taconis took, however, were considered so controversial at Magnum, which feared retribution from the French government toward its Paris office, that the editors chose to censor his photo essay. This decision, which has become a landmark in Magnum history as its first case of self-censorship, ultimately prompted Taconis' resignation from the cooperative in 1960.⁴⁴⁸

⁴⁴⁷ Jacques Soustelle, "Soustelle: Speech to the Algerian Assembly, 23 February 1955," in *Aimée et Souffrante Algérie*, trans. Molly Clever (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1956).

⁴⁴⁸ Nadya Bair, "Shooting for Corporations," in *Magnum Photos and the Postwar Image Market* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2020), 175.

Taconis' photographs were likely deemed politically dangerous since several served to communicate the strength of the movement, and that Algerian nationalists were unified, organized, and capable of governing themselves. A photograph of an ALN camp (figure 4.31 – 1957) shows several dozen *maquisards* saluting the Algerian flag. Two ALN soldiers raise the flag, which is being held open for full display, on a rudimentary flagpole. Taconis has taken the photograph from behind the flag, placing it in the foreground and garnering the viewer's attention immediately as daylight streams through the fabric, heightening the contrast of the crescent and star motif. In the background, the soldiers stand in a neat formation, holding their firearms in identical poses in salutation and reverence for the flag. It is a patriotic scene and impresses upon the viewer the steadfast resolution and sophistication of ALN forces.

Another photograph by Taconis (figure 4.32 – c. 1957) achieves a similar end. Taconis encounters a troop of ALN soldiers as they march in the general direction of the lens. The soldiers are performing a marching drill in this shot, and a young ALN fighter leads the way with the Algerian flag now attached to the tip of his rifle. What this photograph offers that the previous one does not is specificity. As the soldiers march toward the camera, the viewer is able to discern their faces. These men are young, but their expressions bear the weight of their mission. Furthermore, a drill sergeant is seen walking alongside the troops, surveying them with a discriminating eye. This suggests to the viewer that revolutionaries were organized and guided by leaders with experience. As with the previous photograph, the viewer is given to understand that the ALN is not a small minority. The frame is absolutely brimming with activity as other troops engaging in the same exercise. The fullness of the photograph, with soldiers marching this

way and that, leaves a lasting impression of the ALN's force. In 1958, the year after this photograph was taken, ALN forces numbered to 46,000.⁴⁴⁹

Taconis' work also captured the movement's distinctly Arabo-Islamic nature. In another image, Taconis photographed the troops partaking in the Muslim *salat*, or daily prayer (figure 4.33 – 1957). The soldiers, dressed in fatigues, kneel in unison on the ground in a forest clearing instead of the usual prayer mat inside a mosque. A soldier is seen standing in the background surveying the skies for French fighter planes. The men, aside from the soldier closest to the viewer in the foreground, appear to each wear a *taqiyah*, which is the hat believed to have been worn by the Prophet Muhammed and traditionally donned by those of Islamic faith during the five daily prayers. The man closest to the lens wears a hat reminiscent of the one that had been worn by Youcef Zighoud (1921-1956), a founding member of the Conseil national de la révolution algérienne (CRNA), who was killed during an ambush in 1956.

Taconis' photographs also reveal the strategies that the FLN used to win support from rural Algerians who often remained more isolated from French colonialism. Beginning in 1956, FLN units penetrated into the Algerian wilderness and went from village to village, led by local mountain guides. Troops would call assemblies and instruct locals from an ALN handbook with readings from the Qur'an that emphasized the FLN's Islamic character and characterized the fight against France as part of a broader fight against infidels, a fight that was shared among Arab states. Meetings were often closed with readings from the *surah 'An-Nisa,* verses that discuss jihad and martyrdom. The emphasis on Islam was an intentional, propagandistic choice. The FLN believed that a religious dimension to revolution would best appeal to rural populations, whereas a greater emphasis on international politics was made when conversing

⁴⁴⁹ Frédéric Médard, "The Military Aspects of the Algerian War," *Chemins de mémoire* (blog), accessed December 8, 2022, <https://www.cheminsdememoire.gouv.fr/en/military-aspects-algerian-war>.

with urban Algerians.⁴⁵⁰ These historical facts go to show that the role of Islam in the Algerian War was a mobilizing ideology that was more political than ideological.

Also included in Taconis' oeuvre is an image of an ALN patrol passing through a local mountain village (figure 4.34 – c. 1957). Taconis captures the soldiers walking past a class of schoolboys who are taking part in a Qur'anic lesson outdoors. The boys are seated cross-legged in the shade of a tree and bent over their slates, practicing Arabic calligraphy and no doubt learning passages. None of them even look up as the patrol approaches, suggesting that the presence of ALN soldiers was an everyday component of life. Furthermore, Taconis implies a throughline between generations. The young boys will either inherit a free and sovereign Algeria, or they will become the next generation of revolutionaries.

Taconis' work demonstrated that there was widespread, popular support among Muslims for the revolution, unlike Soustelle's claims that the movement was comprised of a small group of radicals. Taconis took photographs of the support that ALN fighters received from local community members. In one (figure 4.35 – c. 1957), a young Algerian boy offers an ALN soldier water. The small boy, who also wears a *taqiyah*, smiles at his exchange with the soldier as he holds the large jug. In another (figure 4.36 – c. 1957), community elders shake hands with them. The boy and the men appear star-struck by the presence of the two men, who are large and imposing in comparison to the child. The FLN set high standards for ALN soldiers and built them up to be community role models. ALN soldiers were expected to show respect to the local community, to dress and present themselves in a neat manner, to abstain from activities such as

⁴⁵⁰ MacMaster, *War in the Mountains: Peasant Society and Counterinsurgency in Algeria, 1918-1958*, 298.

smoking, and to treat women with the utmost respect. These soldiers were living examples of Algeria's promising future.⁴⁵¹

Taconis' work also humanized the *maquisards*. In a photograph of two ALN soldiers greeting each other (figure 4.37 – c. 1957), the viewer is afforded a rare opportunity to see a common, everyday exchange between two Algerian men. The soldiers, who still wear their army fatigues and carry rifles, shake hands and lean toward each other to exchange a kiss on the cheek in a traditional greeting and embrace. The capturing of this trivial but private and intimate moment not only contributes our current understanding of the individual experiences of ALN soldiers during the war, but its unposed, unfiltered nature lends authenticity to the scene. Momentarily, the viewer can forget that these men are engaged in warfare and see them as two human beings, perhaps brothers, or old classmates reuniting for the first time.

Taconis certainly offers us one perspective on the revolution, mainly how the FLN wished for the ALN to be perceived internationally. Algerian photographer Mohamed Kouaci, official photographer for the GPRA who also played a critical role in refuting French claims about the moral nature and ideological character of the Algerian front, allows us to view the war through the lens of a true "insider." Born in Blida, Algeria, near Algiers, in 1922, Kouaci had received his early education in a French école. He began practicing amateur photography in 1940. Kouaci had been a militant of nationalist leader Messali Hadj's PPA and its subsequent incarnation, the MTLD.

In 1946, he and his wife, Safia, moved to Paris where he continued to develop his photography skills by taking night classes and frequenting photo-clubs after he finished working

⁴⁵¹ MacMaster, 300.

at a factory during the day.⁴⁵² Kouaci had been in Paris for seven years when the revolution began. Kouaci joined the Union générale des étudiants musulmans algériens (General Union of Muslim Algerian Students) (UGEMA) in July of 1955 where he and his wife participated in the political and cultural life of Algerian militants living in France.⁴⁵³ His first photographic subjects were gatherings of the Union générale des travailleurs algériens (General Union of Algerian Workers) (UGTA) and of the UGEMA. He also photographed performances put on by the FLN's theater group of which his wife was a part.⁴⁵⁴

Kouaci's photographs of Algerian cultural events also provide insight into the interpersonal relationships and personal experiences of FLN members. These photographs importantly record moments that existed outside of the brutality and austerity of war. A photograph that Kouaci took of the FLN's theater group (figure 4.38 – c. 1958-1962) captures the unabashedly celebratory and patriotic mood shared among several of the troupe members. Some of the members hold flowers and a man on the right holds a balloon indicating that this photograph was taken perhaps after a performance. The performers, who all appear to be youthful and lively, stand close together, suggesting their closeness as political allies but also as artists and collaborators. Two of the women in the center of the photograph hold hands. The actors are mostly in western attire save for a few details. The women, including Safia, Kouaci's wife (seen on the far right), seem to mix European and Algerian costume. The Algerian flag is, of course, on prominent display. The man on the far left, whose sheer joy radiates through the image, appears to be holding the flag open to better display the crescent moon and star symbols.

⁴⁵² Chominot, "À la recherche de Mohamed Kouaci, artisan de la Révolution par l'image. Plongée dans une archive inédite de la guerre d'indépendance algérienne (1954-1962)," 2.

⁴⁵³ Chominot, 3.

⁴⁵⁴ Falęcka, "Archiving the Algerian Revolution in Zineb Sedira's *Gardiennes d'images*," 41.

Much like the photograph depicting the six leaders of the revolution, this photograph challenged the official French colonial narrative that the FLN was comprised of fringe religious fanatics. These young men and women do not look like religious zealots, bandits, or terrorists. They appear friendly, convivial, and proud. The women, markedly, also appear without the veil. They are well-groomed, modern, artistic, and intellectual. Why should these individuals not be allowed to express their political beliefs? Is that not congruent with the ideology that the French government so strongly espoused? Such a photograph would certainly have lent credibility to the FLN, which the French colonial government sought to undermine at all costs.

In 1958, the Ministry of Information of the recently founded *Gouvernement provisoire de la République algérienne* (GPRA) called on Kouaci and his camera skills. The GPRA named Kouaci the director of their photographic services, which was based in Tunis with the exiled provisional government.⁴⁵⁵ Kouaci's practice was unfortunately limited by the *ligne Morice*, which was a defensive line that went into effect in September 1957 to prevent Algerian guerrillas from entering Algeria from Tunisia. He was thus restricted to documenting the lives and activities of ALN soldiers from the Tunisian frontier.⁴⁵⁶

Many of Kouaci's photographs were featured in the FLN's journal, *El Moujahid* (The Holy Warrior). Before addressing his photographic oeuvre, however, some background information on this important periodical is due. The FLN began publishing the periodical as the official journal of the revolution in June 1956. The journal followed the exploits of the ALN and featured a range of stories, including those by foreign journalists that were given access to the inner workings of the Algerian army. The journal also included interviews with various ALN/FLN leaders and even published witness statements that deserters of the French army

⁴⁵⁵ Chominot, "À la recherche de Mohamed Kouaci, artisan de la Révolution par l'image. Plongée dans une archive inédite de la guerre d'indépendance algérienne (1954-1962)," 4.

⁴⁵⁶ Chominot, 6.

gave.⁴⁵⁷ The journal's goal had three stated objectives, each of which functioned as propagandistic counter-balances to pro-colonial propaganda: 1) To make the fight of the Algerian people known to the world and to show the true face of her government and the true character of Algeria; 2) To form a core of young journalists of the Algeria of tomorrow; and 3) To allow for the development of an authentic national press.⁴⁵⁸

El Moujahid was one answer to a variety of problems that the revolution leaders faced in the early years of the conflict. The first two years of the war were chaotic and lacked widespread support. Several members of the FLN were killed during guerrilla skirmishes and French counterattacks, making leadership ill defined as well. There were also several personality and ideological clashes that rendered the revolutionary cause unfocused and in conflict. *El Moujahid* was a vehicle for the dissemination of revolutionary ideology, a means of building national and international support, and a way to unify the various political factions that were each working toward independence, but were sometimes at war with one another, in Algeria and France.

Internal conflict was a primary concern in the first few years of the revolution. Messali Hadj had been the de facto face of Algerian nationalism since the 1920s, but he and his party, the MTLD, had not anticipated the events of November 1, 1954, although Messali soon endorsed the actions of revolutionaries in Algeria. His endorsement led to the ban of the MTLD, which Messali reinvented soon after as the Mouvement national algérien (MNA).⁴⁵⁹ The MNA and FLN were often at odds regarding praxis. The MNA preferred strikes and demonstrations to place pressure on the French government while the FLN emphasized armed action. The conflict

⁴⁵⁷ Mouloud Aouimeur, "Propagande et diplomatie au service de la Guerre de libération nationale," *المصادر*, no. 2 (2004): 31.

⁴⁵⁸ Aouimeur, 32.

⁴⁵⁹ Rabah Aissaoui, "Fratricidal War: The Conflict between the Mouvement national algérien (MNA) and the Front de libération nationale (FLN) in France during the Algerian War (1954-1962)," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 39, no. 2 (August 2012): 228–29.

between followers of the MNA and FLN eventually became so heated that blood was shed in 1956 in Paris during a series of bombings and assassinations that took place in cafés, thereby earning the name the “café wars.” In 1957, hostilities reached new heights when a troop of ALN soldiers massacred a village that was accused of aiding and abetting MNA efforts in Mélouza, a small community in Kabylia.⁴⁶⁰

The FLN needed a clear organizational hierarchy. A major conference, now referred to as the Soummam Conference since it took place in the Soummam valley, called all current leadership as well as representatives from each wilaya together on August 20, 1956. It was at this meeting that leaders concluded that propaganda to shape domestic and international opinion should be emphasized in the revolutionary cause. After the conference, the profile of *El Moudjahid*, which had debuted only two months earlier, became heightened within the revolutionary cause.⁴⁶¹ It is within this political context that we return to Kouaci’s photographs. He photographed FLN leaders, international allies, cultural events, the lives of the *maquisards* (rural guerrilla fighters), his work life at the main media outlet for *El Moudjahid*, and Algerian refugees living in camps on the western border of Tunisia. These photographs were then placed prominently on the cover of *El Moudjahid*.

Many of his photographs, or at least photographs that were taken and collected under Kouaci’s auspices, were used to encourage pan-Arab, pan-African, and Third World solidarity. As seen on the cover for the July 22, 1958, edition of *El Moudjahid* (figure 4.39), pan-Arabism was an important component of the revolutionary strategy. Two images are included: one representing the Arabs of the Middle East and the other the Arabs of North Africa. Arabism provided Algerians, some of whom, like Ferhat Abbas, struggled to locate a distinctive Algerian

⁴⁶⁰ Aissaoui, 234.

⁴⁶¹ Andrea Stanton, “The Changing Face of El Moudjahid during the Algerian War of Independence,” *Journal of North African Studies* 16, no. 1 (2011): 60.

national identity before the revolution began, a salient set of symbolic resources that could be mobilized in the revolutionary cause. Through a deep association with Islam and Arab culture, Algerians could retrieve a sense of collective identity and association with each other but also with the pan-Arab world.⁴⁶²

Photographs that encouraged pan-African solidarity were also placed on the covers of *El Moudjahid*, as exemplified by the January 5, 1960, cover page (figure 4.40) which is devoted entirely to a photograph of Malians joyously celebrating their independence from France in the streets. The subtitle for the image reads, “The ‘perturbors’ of September 1956 have triumphed in December 1959.” Mali, formerly French Sudan, which supported the Algerian cause, gained its independence from France in 1960. Mali, of course, sharing not only a border with Algeria, making it close in proximity, but sharing in the struggle against the French Empire, would have provided Algerians with hope for their own cause. Additionally, the selection of a photograph of common people celebrating in the streets would have resonated with Algerian civilians reading the journal and promoted the ideological underpinning of the revolution which was stated on the cover of every copy of *El Moudjahid*: “The Revolution by the People and for the People.”

El Moudjahid also promoted the Algerian revolutionary principle of a shared struggle across the Third World as seen on the May 12, 1961, cover page (figure 4.41). Two photographs are provided here: one of an ALN detachment and another of a Cuban militia. Cuba provided both military and civilian assistance to Algerian rebels and recognized the GPRA as the rightful government of Algeria. Cuba’s support of Algeria certainly complicated matters in the context of the Cold War and the ongoing strain between the island nation and the U.S. The U.S. had been, at the very least, neutral toward the Algerian situation, and France was willing to continue

⁴⁶² James McDougall, “Dream of Exile, Promise of Home: Language, Education, and Arabism in Algeria,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Relocating Arab Nationalism, 43, no. 2 (May 2011): 253.

normal relations with Cuba regardless of France's vested interest in maintaining good relations with the U.S. Thus, both Cuba and Algeria had something to lose with their close relationship. Cuba could lose its standing with France and Algeria could lose its standing with the U.S. However, the feelings of kinship between both Third World countries were certainly a political priority, as demonstrated here.⁴⁶³ The coupling of the photographs strengthens the two country's association, cultivates solidarity among citizens of the Third World, and also encourages armed struggle.

The pages of *El Moudjahid* were also used for commemoration and veneration. The cover page of an early edition, dated August 20, 1957 (figure 4.42), celebrates the revolutionary actions of three deceased members of the CNRA: Mustapha ben Boulaïd, Youcef Zighoud, and Larbi Ben M'hidi. Boulaïd's picture seems to be clipped directly from the group portrait of the six initial revolutionary leaders discussed previously (figure 4.30). The public commemoration not only encouraged others to follow the examples of these three and martyr themselves for the cause of independence, but also allows for the veneration of revolutionary heroes. This emphasis on martyrdom is also intrinsically linked with Islam, although the FLN allowed for this link to be left vague on the pages of *El Moudjahid*. This ambiguity allowed for conservative rural readers and cosmopolitan urban readers to identify with the revolutionary movement and its heroes.

Much like the French, the FLN used photography to construct false social realities as well. For example, in the May 29, 1958, issue of the journal, the front page was consecrated to Abbane Ramdane (1920-1957), a well-known and foundational leader of the FLN who is often credited with organizing the important Soummam Conference (figure 4.43). It is now well-accepted that FLN leaders who feared and resented Ramdane's influence had him assassinated in

⁴⁶³ Piero Gleijeses, "Cuba's First Venture in Africa: Algeria, 1961-1965," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 28, no. 1 (February 1996): 160-61.

1957 in Tetouan, Morocco.⁴⁶⁴ However, this sordid truth would have threatened the legitimacy of the FLN as representatives of the people, a legitimacy that hinged on trust and respect. So instead, the journal memorialized Ramdane, referred to him as brave, noble, and well-liked by all, and celebrated his many contributions to the war efforts while claiming that he was killed during an exchange between the ALN and French troops.⁴⁶⁵ Ironically, Ramdane had been a major proponent of increasing the FLN's propaganda efforts.⁴⁶⁶

Whereas Kouaci is often considered the sole and official Algerian photographer of the conflict, there is some evidence that revolutionaries themselves used the camera to record their individual experiences and express their patriotism.⁴⁶⁷ A rare photograph of the family of *maquis* Abdelmalek Kitouni provides some insight into the role of vernacular photography during the revolution. The photograph (figure 4.44 – 1956) features the six-person family somewhere in the Algerian backcountry of Aïn Kharma and was, according to the family, taken during a family visit to see the patriarch near the start of the war. Kitouni and his family were accompanied by other *maquis*, one of whom, Abderrhamane Khaznadar, took the photograph. The negative was then entrusted to Khaznadar's brother, Tewfik, who apparently had a clandestine network of small photography studios set up in nearby Constantine.⁴⁶⁸

⁴⁶⁴ Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 227.

⁴⁶⁵ "Abbane Ramdane est mort au champ d'honneur," *El Moudjahid*, May 29, 1958, 24 edition.

⁴⁶⁶ Stanton, "The Changing Face of El Moudjahid during the Algerian War of Independence," 63.

⁴⁶⁷ Adel ben Balla, a curator and scholar of visual culture during the Algerian Revolution, recently showed and discussed several photographs at an event held by the Maison Française at Columbia University. The photographs feature his family members and family friends among whom were key revolution figures like Ahmed ben Bella, the first president of the free and independent Algeria. Ben Bella has opted not to share those photographs with me as he works toward the completion of his own dissertation on the role of photography during the Algerian War which will also address vernacular Algerian photography.

⁴⁶⁸ Marie Chominot, "Une famille au maquis (Algérie 1956)." Encyclopédie d'histoire numérique de l'Europe. Guerre, traces, mémoires. Accessed December 8, 2022. <https://ehne.fr/fr/encyclopedie/thematiques/guerres-traces-memoires/<%C2%A0la-guerre-d'algerie%C2%A0-prise-de-vues%C2%A0>/une-famille-au-maquis-algerie-1956>.

The organization of the photograph and its content demonstrates the thought and care that the image was given. Kitouni was a political commissar in the FLN and to represent his work, a radio has been placed at his feet. He is joined by his wife, Djouhra, and their four children (left to right) Hosni, Nadjib, Naïma, and Malika. The location of the photograph is non-descript – likely an intentional choice to conceal the whereabouts of FLN activities if the image were to fall into the wrong hands. Although the stakes of Kitouni’s work were incredibly high, making the photograph anything but banal, this is a family portrait in every sense. The photograph is divided by gender: the two girls stand with the mother and the two boys stand with the father. The two girls are wearing dresses made from matching material, likely made by the mother. Djouhra affectionately and gently caresses the cheek of her youngest daughter. On the left side of the photograph, Kitouni stands with his two sons, the oldest of which, Hosni, puffs out his chest and lifts his shoulders in masculine bravado as he poses with his father’s rifle. Hosni must have felt a great sense of self-importance to be allowed to pose with the weapon. The firearm looks comically large in his arms. The youngest son stands in front of his father, too young to appreciate that his photograph is being taken and that he must stand still. The stern father stands proudly with his brood.

A comparison of this portrait to a family photograph from the previous year (figure 4.45 – 1955) makes clear the transformations that the revolution wrought on the family. In the earlier photograph, Malika, the eldest daughter, smiles broadly and holds the hand of her little sister, Naïma, who shyly leans into the side of her trusted older sister. Naïma clasps the hand of her elder brother, Hosni, whose machismo from the “portrait au maquis” is nowhere to be seen. He looks barely more than an infant here. The patriarch of the family holds the youngest, Nadjib, in his arms. His expression is lighthearted, and his fatherly nature is on full display as he tenderly

wraps both arms around his son. This photograph provides a glimpse into the Kitouni family dynamic before the revolution upended the lives that they had known which, as demonstrated by this image, included family outings in the city.

In another photograph taken in the spring of 1956 (figure 4.46), perhaps from the same outing given the presence of the radio at her feet and the similarity of her surroundings, is Malika, singular and posing with her father's rifle. She is now wearing a *kachabia*, a traditional Berber cloak often worn by the maquis. Malika looks somewhat unsure of herself but determined to express her pride for her father and the revolutionary cause. Her schoolgirl appearance, complete with braided pigtails and glasses, make the rifle look out of place to the present-day viewer. However, women fighters called *mujahidat* played a critical role in the revolution, and this photograph suggests that her future participation was not only encouraged but expected.

Viewing Malika's portrait alongside one of her father invites a close comparison. In the photograph of her father, taken some time the same year (figure 4.47), Kitouni's feet are firmly planted in a wide stance as if he is preparing to advance on some unseen enemy, his firearm at the ready. The visual similarities between the two photographs are difficult to ignore. Kitouni had apparently sent the photograph of himself to his family. Perhaps Malika saw the photograph and, when it was her turn to be photographed, sought to emulate her father. The younger, naïve version of Malika that we saw in the family portrait in Constantine is decidedly gone. Yet, Malika's inexperience, youthfulness, and pride still emanate in this portrait of her, holding her father's gun and standing near his radio in the outskirts of Algeria.

Kitouni, sadly, was later killed in a French ambush. The family learned of his death in the newspaper (figure 4.48). The French military, according to the family, also fixed posters with a

photograph of Kitouni on the city walls and boasted that they had killed a dangerous terrorist.⁴⁶⁹ In this context, these family photographs must have become even more precious than they had been prior to Kitouni's death. They capture their father, who was clearly a true believer in the cause of Algerian independence and memorialize him forever. They also document Kitouni as a doting and proud father and husband who cared deeply for his family, so much so that he risked having them visit him in the rugged backcountry of Algeria during a bloody war, a moment when he thought to have one final family portrait made. Walking the streets of Constantine, the Kitouni family would have seen their father's photograph next to the word terrorist. But at home, looking at these photographs, they would have remembered him as a husband and father, and as a martyr to be revered.

The making of photographs and the making of war have gone hand-in-hand since the inception of the medium. At times, and as demonstrated in this chapter, photography itself has been used as a weapon of war. Throughout the Algerian War, the French and Algerian militaries relied on photography for more than record-keeping. For the French, the camera was also a means of asserting dominance. It was also a means of creating and circulating its own narrative about the conflict, portraying Algerian mujahidin as little more than terrorists disrupting an otherwise peaceful and mutually beneficial colonial relationship. But the Algerians also used the camera to their own ends, calling upon the reproductive and indexical nature of the medium to fashion propaganda that counter-balanced the French narrative. These images presented the world with a cohesive image of Algerian nationhood that was distinctly Arabo-Islamic, sophisticated, and capable of governing itself. *El Moudjahid* was particularly important to the Algerian revolutionary strategy. The photographs taken by Mohamed Kouaci and placed in the

⁴⁶⁹ Chominot.

journal's pages expressed the movement's pan-Arab, pan-African, and Third World internationalist ideological underpinnings. Photography also functioned to commemorate and to venerate revolutionary martyrs and to express the individual experiences of *maquisards* and their families.

Yet on both sides, photography was also used to construct false realities. The French called upon the medium to provide evidence to its citizens and to the world that the work of French colonialism had been beneficial to Arab and indigenous Algerians. In turn, the Algerians, aware of the photograph's power to seem utterly real, used the photograph to create a martyr out of Abbane, an ambitious young politician who had consolidated too much power and influence too quickly. Deeming him a threat, his trusted compatriots had him assassinated. It is this particular dimension of photography, its inherent ability to convey seemingly incontestable "truths," to evade and sometimes overwrite the original contexts in which they were made by adopting new rhetorics, that shall be further discussed in the next and final chapter.

Chapter 5 – The Photobook and the Politics of Suffering during the Algerian War⁴⁷⁰

This chapter addresses six photobooks that were published during the course of the Algerian War: *Le martyre de l'Algérie française* (1955), *Aspects véritables de la rébellion algérienne* (1957), *Sans fin* (1957), *Aucune bête au monde* (1959), *Algeria* (1960), and *Algeria Torturata* (1961).⁴⁷¹ Some of these photobooks were designed and published by the French government, military, and settler paramilitary groups who sought to characterize the FLN as religious fanatics and terrorists. Others were projects by international photographers, journalists, and writers who were sympathetic toward the liberation cause, and sought to reveal the atrocities that the French had committed against Algeria's Arab and indigenous populations to an international audience.⁴⁷² The photobooks I discuss vary greatly in size, design, and length. Despite their different origins and designs, which I will elaborate in the following pages, they all have one critical commonality. Each photobook contains images or at least signs of wartime atrocities that convey the brutality of this war of attrition and its defining characteristics:

⁴⁷⁰ I will include a longer content warning at the end of this introduction section; however, I still want to place one here immediately. There are violent and obscene images of atrocities that both the French military and ALN committed during the war. This imagery could be triggering or traumatizing for certain readers. I recommend that readers take care using the best means for them.

⁴⁷¹ There is another photobook by Dominique Darbois and Philippe Vigneau, *Les Algériens en Guerre* (Milan: Giangiacomo Feltrinelli Editore, 1961). Although I have viewed this work, unfortunately I could not include it within the scope of this chapter. Darbois and Vigneau's text importantly includes several first-person testimonies as well as scores of images. It is the only anti-French photobook from the perspective of French citizens that I have located so far in my studies. I hope to incorporate it into a future publication. Facsimiles and original editions of each of these texts can be seen in French libraries and archives. A copy of *Le martyre de l'Algérie française* (1955) resides in the Centre de documentation historique sur l'Algérie (CDHA) in Aix-en-Provence. A facsimile of *Aspects véritables de la rébellion algérienne* (1957) resides in the Bibliothèque Nationale de France (BNF) (Notice n°: FRBNF41263896) and an original edition in the CDHA (Cote: 965.5 ASP). An original edition of *Sans fin* (1957) resides in the BNF (Notice n°: FRBNF31816077) as does *Aucune bête au monde* (1959) (Notice n°: FRBNF36277748). *Sans fin* also resides in the Archives nationales d'outre-mer (ANOM) in Aix-en-Provence (BIB AOM//4912) as does *Aucune bête au monde* (BIB SOM d2476).

⁴⁷² A facsimile of *Algeria* (1960) can be seen in Martin Parr, ed., *The Protest Box* (Göttingen, Germany: Steidle, 2010). It is also available for purchase online through several retailers. *Algeria Torturata* (1961) is more difficult to acquire. I purchased a copy from an online bookstore.

guerrilla warfare, civilian massacres, mass internment, summary executions, torture, and other crimes against humanity.

In this chapter, I use the term “photobook” loosely as a catch-all term to describe these works, although some of them, whose authors do not come from a fine arts background, might better be described as photo-illustrated texts. In their authoritative study of the photobook tradition, photographers Martin Parr and Gerry Badger define the photobook as “a book – with or without text – where the work’s primary message is carried by photographs.”⁴⁷³ However, as the authors admit themselves, it is not that simple. There are many different types of photobooks, but what all photobooks seem to share is the way that, as Dutch photography critic Ralph Prins puts it, “The photographs lose their own photographic character as things ‘in themselves’ and become parts, translated into printing ink, of a dramatic event called a book.”⁴⁷⁴ The photobooks discussed in this chapter more or less fit this description. While I sometimes discuss the images contained within these texts in isolation, it is essential to consider them as integral parts of an object – an object that creates a specific phenomenological experience. Viewing the images that I discuss in this chapter through the format of a book is different than viewing a single photograph. Holding a book and turning its pages requires intimate contact with these scenes of trauma thereby facilitating a more physical experience.

That the mere existence of these photobooks is rarely acknowledged in the literature on the Algerian War is quite surprising given their violent and obscene contents, although generally speaking, the photobook is an especially under-acknowledged subfield in the literature on the war. The best-known (and most criticized) photobooks to have emerged from the conflict are Marc Garanger’s *La guerre d’Algérie vue par un appelé du contingent* (1984) and *Femmes*

⁴⁷³ Martin Parr and Gerry Badger, *The Photobook: A History* (London and New York: Phaidon Press, 2004), 6.

⁴⁷⁴ Gossage and Prins both quoted in Parr and Badger, 7.

algériennes 1960 (2002).⁴⁷⁵ Although Garanger took the photographs that appear in the book in 1960 while serving in the French Army in Algeria, the photobooks were not published until later. Benjamin Stora and Laurent Gervereaux dedicated a section of their exhibition *Photographier la Guerre d'Algérie* (2004) to discussing photobooks but address only publications released post-revolution.⁴⁷⁶ Of the photobooks discussed in this chapter, a few have received mention or have been given limited attention. Raphaëlle Branche references *Aspects véritables de la rébellion algérienne* (1957) in a footnote of her 1999 article, “La Commission de sauvegarde pendant la Guerre d'Algérie: Chronique d'un échec annoncé.”⁴⁷⁷ Nicolas Hubert briefly discusses *Sans fin* (1957) and *Aspects véritables de la rébellion algérienne* (1957) in his chapter, “L'Algérie à la tribune de l'actualité” in his valuable text, *Éditeurs et éditions en France pendant la Guerre d'Algérie*, (2012).⁴⁷⁸ Dirk Alvermann's photobook, *Algeria* (1960) is mentioned fleetingly in the third volume of Martin Parr and Gerry Badger's comprehensive study of the photobook medium, *The Photobook: A History*, and the authors also reproduced a copy of Alvermann's work in a curated collection of wartime photobooks called *The Protest Box* (2010).⁴⁷⁹ Parr has taken special interest in Alvermann, including interview the photographer himself. He published his findings in a short article, “Dirk Alvermann,” for *Aperture* in 2008.⁴⁸⁰ *Algeria Torturata* is mainly addressed in Italian-language scholarship, notably in Romain Rainero's history of Italian-

⁴⁷⁵ Marc Garanger, *La guerre d'Algérie vue par un appelé du contingent* (Paris: Seuil, 1984). Marc Garanger, *Femmes Algériennes 1960* (Biarritz: Atlantica, 2002).

⁴⁷⁶ Benjamin Stora, “Les livres, les photographies, la guerre,” in *Photographier la Guerre d'Algérie*, ed. Laurent Gervereau and Benjamin Stora (Paris: Marval, 2004), 133–49.

⁴⁷⁷ Raphaëlle Branche, “La commission de sauvegarde pendant la Guerre d'Algérie: Chronique d'un échec annoncé,” *Vingtième siècle. Revue d'histoire*, no. 61 (1999): 14–29. See footnote 4.

⁴⁷⁸ Nicolas Hubert, “L'Algérie à la tribune de l'actualité,” in *Éditeurs et Éditions en France pendant la Guerre d'Algérie* (Saint-Denis: Éditions Bouchène, 2012), 217–66.

⁴⁷⁹ Martin Parr and Gerry Badger, “Killing Fields: Conflict and the Photobook,” in *The Photobook: A History (Volume 3)* (London; New York: Phaidon, 2004), 190–91. Martin Parr, ed., *The Protest Box* (Göttingen, Germany: Steidle, 2010).

⁴⁸⁰ Martin Parr, “Dirk Alvermann,” *Aperture*, no. 193 (Winter 2008): 84–85.

Algerian relations.⁴⁸¹ None of these authors, however, conduct a complete visual analysis of the contents of these photobooks or seek to situate them within the broader image environment of the Algerian War.

Although some record of the reception of state-sponsored photobooks remains, those critical of French colonialism are more or less absent from the collective memory and mainstream historical account of the Algerian War. This is ostensibly due to the draconian censorship policies in place at the time of their publication.⁴⁸² Nevertheless, while a complete understanding of the visual power of these photobooks might be lost due to the French government's intentional erasure, an analysis of these photobooks aids in recuperating some histories that have been and continue to be obscured by both the French and Algerian governments.⁴⁸³

⁴⁸¹ Romain Rainero, *Italia e Algeria: Aspetti Storici Di Un'amicizia Mediterranea* (Milan: Marzorati, 1982).

⁴⁸² Martin Evans, "Algeria: Algerian War," in *Censorship: A World Encyclopedia*, ed. Derek Jones (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 38–40. On April 3, 1955, The French National Assembly passed legislature that enabled the government to ban press, radio, theater, or cinema that was critical of the role of the French Army in Algeria. After 1956, the Mollet government in Algeria frequently seized and censored any press that articulated a pro-FLN point-of-view. Famously, Henri Alleg's *La Question* (1958), which provided a detail account of his torture at the hands of French paratroops, was banned in 1958. The effort to censor negative portrayals of the French military even continued post-war. Gillo Pontecorvo's film *Bataille d'Alger* (1966), for example, was banned in France until 1971.

⁴⁸³ This is an area that I cannot fully address within the scope of this chapter, but I will indicate one or two examples of how these photobooks and their contents might do so. It is no controversy to say that the French have sought to bury the past. However, what has received less attention, is the extent to which the Algerians have done the same. Recently, I had the occasion to visit several Musée du Moudjahid in Algiers, Oran, and Sétif. These institutions have a particularly important place in constructing and preserving a national memory of the revolution. Dedicated to the war's martyrs, the photographs, paintings, and models displayed in them focus exclusively on the atrocities committed by the French (the use of napalm, massacres against civilians, torture, sexual violence, internment, summary executions, and the guillotining of revolutionaries at the Barberousse prison in Algiers). However, there is abundant and compelling evidence that the FLN and ALN were responsible for their own atrocities, many of which I discuss in the pages below. Reference to these politically sensitive events is always avoided or edited. An event that stands out related to one of the photobooks discussed below is the massacre in Northern Constantine on August 20, 1955, which was directed by ALN militant Zighoud Youcef during which 171 European settlers, including ten children, were slain. Additionally, several Muslims who were considered political rivals were killed. At the Musée du Moudjahid in Oran, a wall text describes the ALN-led massacre as an attack on French infrastructure while an accompanying illustration shows ALN-soldiers fighting the French. No reference to civilian casualties, French or Algerian, is made. This demonstrates how the Algerian government continues to obscure some of the facts of its own wrongdoing to maintain a more simplified and sanitized narrative of the war wherein the people overthrew a tyrannical foreign government.

Given that these photobooks remain largely unknown to the scholarly community, my main objective in this chapter is to first enter these photobooks into the historical literature on the Algerian War.⁴⁸⁴ In a series of short essays, I introduce their authors and photographers, describe, analyze the photographs and texts of each book, and discuss (where possible) a history of their publication and reception. Due to the vast amount of content, an exhaustive analysis of each photobook is outside the scope of what can be accomplished in this chapter. However, these essays do provide new avenues for future work, especially in the area of memory studies and perhaps even military science.

First, the reader is owed a content warning and a quick note on my aims in writing about these photobooks. Since I have already addressed this issue at length in the introduction, I will only provide a brief comment here. In the pages below, I discuss and reproduce images of sexual violence, excessive gore, torture, and other atrocities committed during the war. Some might judge these images to be too crude, horrific, or vulgar, or in other words, too painful and shocking, to view, research, and write about. My position is as follows: art historical research cannot limit itself to innocuous or only mildly troubling material. In denying this imagery, albeit of grave human suffering, comprehensive analytical reflection, art historians would fail to consider why people wanted to take, reproduce, view, and keep images such as these. I consider it imperative to analyze the visual record of some of humanity's most immoral actions, knowing that someone saw fit to create such a record, which should compel us to investigate why.

Le martyre de l'Algérie française: Le massacre d'el Elia, 20 Août 1955 (1955)

⁴⁸⁴ I only happened to come across them while browsing the catalogue of an online used bookstore. Until then, I had never seen any of these texts mentioned in the literature on the Algerian War.

Perhaps the earliest photobook to come out of the Algerian War was called *Le martyr de l'Algérie française: Le massacre d'el Elia, 20 Août 1955* (The Martyr of French Algeria: The Massacre of el Elia, August 20, 1955, hereafter referred to as *Le martyr*). This photobook, published in Algiers and then sent to mayors in mainland France, provides insight into right-wing representations of the war, specifically that of a settler paramilitary group called the Union Française Nord-Africaine (UFNA).⁴⁸⁵ The UFNA harnessed the medium of the photobook to provoke outrage against the FLN, mobilize political and military action, and justify the extreme levels of violence enacted upon Muslim and indigenous Algerians in subsequent reprisals through the depiction of grave human suffering. This evidence, as will be seen, was at times manipulated to further provoke an emotional response from the viewer. *Le martyr* goes to show that the act of looking itself played a critical role in the cycle of reprisal and counter-reprisal that often define wars of attrition like the Algerian War.

Le martyr responds to a specific incident: the massacre of El Elia, which took place on August 20, 1955. Beginning at midday, FLN militants massacred 171 European settlers living in northern Constantine between the port of Philippeville and Guelma, thirty-seven of whom were killed in el Elia, a small mining town inhabited by about 2,000 Muslim peasants and 130 European settlers.⁴⁸⁶ The events that took place in el Elia constituted the single worst episode of the massacre. FLN insurgents used farming tools, axes, knives, and clubs to carry out an attack on the women and children of el Elia. FLN militants reportedly raped, disemboweled, and decapitated the town's women. Out of the thirty-seven victims, ten were children. The children had their throats slit or died of blunt force trauma to the head.⁴⁸⁷

⁴⁸⁵ Martin Evans, *Algeria: France's Undeclared War* (OUP Oxford, 2012), 140.

⁴⁸⁶ Anthony Clayton, *The Wars of French Decolonization* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 118.

⁴⁸⁷ Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962* (New York Review of Books, 2006), 120.

Le martyre, which measures 13.5 x 21 cm, the size of a small brochure or political pamphlet, opens with an image of the most sickening aspect of the massacre that took place at el Elia: the murder of children. In the black-and-white photograph (figure 5.1 – 1955), the corpse of a single child is seen strewn and abandoned like detritus on the ground. He is nude from the waist down and has gruesome injuries to the neck and head. His stiffened legs, covered in dirt, are awkwardly bent and his left arm is curled toward his face in an unnatural manner. Accompanying the image is a short caption that consecrates the photobook, “To the painful duty of disseminating these revealing documents which, we hope, will make all French people in North Africa and the metropole understand where their duty lies.”⁴⁸⁸ The disturbing image of this boy and the accompanying text convey the intentions of the author(s): to provide powerful, irrefutable photographic evidence of the atrocities that the FLN committed in el Elia and to call supporters of French Algeria to arms.

Other photographs in the photobook function similarly. A second photograph shows the bodies of seven children of various ages, some of which are infants, lined up in a row on strips of cloths (figure 5.2 – 1955). Some of the children are face down, their hair gnarled and plastered across their faces. The same image, although slightly cropped, was used in a poster that the Front national des combattants (FNC), founded by right-wing extremist Jean-Marie Le Pen in 1957 and a precursor to the Front National, circulated in Paris (figure 5.3 – 1957). The image is paired with bold red text that reads, “Are you an accomplice? Save French Algeria.” Like in the photobook, the photograph is deployed by the FNC to instigate action by implying that

⁴⁸⁸ Union Française Nord-Africaine, *Le martyre de l’Algérie française: Le massacre d’El-Elia 20 Aout 1955* (Algiers: Prestige français, 1955), n.p. Original French: “À le pénible devoir de diffuser ces documents révélateurs qui, nous l’espérons, feront comprendre à tous les Français de l’Afrique du Nord et de la Métropole où est leur devoir.”

complacency about the conflict in Algeria is akin to being an accessory to atrocities committed against the French.

However, the line between “evidence” and “artifice” becomes blurred in *Le martyre*. Another image shows the cadaver of a woman with her dress pulled above her hips to expose her genitalia, waist, and bra (figure 5.4 – 1955). Her hand rests awkwardly on her hip, calling further attention to her bare sex. The woman’s nudity seems to provide evidence in support of the caption (that of rape), but ample visual evidence suggests that this is likely a posed photograph meant to stir a heightened emotional response from the viewer. As other images in the photobook reveal, most of the bodies of the victims had been gathered and lined up on white sheets before any photograph was taken. The presence of the white sheet in the lower right part of this photograph means that this cadaver has likely been moved at least once. This calls into question several aspects that increase the emotional affect of this photo, namely the position of her hand and her exposed genitals. Additionally, this extra sheet, lying just next to the victim, suggests that this woman was initially covered, and that the cloth was intentionally removed for the picture. The other giveaway is that she is exposed at all. Every other female victim pictured throughout the book is entirely clothed and covered. This does not mean that she has not been violated, but that this photograph has likely been staged to provoke increased emotional affect.

My goal here is not to disprove whether this particular woman was raped, but rather to examine how such atrocities committed during the war—in the case of el Elia, the cold-blooded murder of innocent children and the rape of women—were visually documented and circulated during the Algerian War and to what ends. The visual evidence in this picture supports the conclusion that the photographer sought to evoke as much righteous indignation as possible to secure support for the UFNA, to escalate tensions, and to justify violent reprisal. For the UFNA,

the ends (the instigation and legitimation of violence against the FLN) justified the means (the undignified treatment of a corpse).

Since the precise date of publication for *Le martyre* is unknown, only that it was sometime in 1955 after the massacre, and moreover, because the French government systematically obscured the state's repression against Algerians following the massacres in el Elia, the extent to which the photobook influenced the French government's retaliation cannot be quantitatively measured.⁴⁸⁹ What is more certain, however, is that the photobook unquestionably participated in and maintained a racialized discourse that at the very least justified the violence that was visited upon Algerian civilians throughout the Algerian War. Accompanying the photograph is a short text that reads, "Can we speak of civilization? Can we compare these savage beasts, who slit the throats, rape, and pillage the French population? Are these assassins worthy of being French citizens?"⁴⁹⁰ The text makes a clear divide between *indigènes* (uncivilized) and *colons* (civilized), and suggests *all* Algerians are predisposed to violence, not just those who perpetrated the crimes documented in *Le martyre*.

What is also certain is that the UFNA sought to use *Le martyre* to strengthen support for its cause, which in turn enabled them to commit further acts of violence. By 1956, the UFNA's network had grown to nearly 10,000, no doubt in part due to publications such as *Le martyre* in addition to its weekly organ, *Prestige français*.⁴⁹¹ The widespread support for the UFNA enabled the group to later assist André Achiary in bombing the rue de Thèbes in the casbah of Algiers on

⁴⁸⁹ Benjamin Stora, "Le massacre du 20 Août 1955: Récit historique, bilan historiographique," *Historical Reflections / Réflexions historiques*, 81-91, 36, no. 2 (Summer 2010): 86. Stora also identifies the intentional imprecision of colonial bureaucracy as a factor for the inability to establish a "bilan" of the civilian toll of the French reprisals of August 20, 1955.

⁴⁹⁰ *Le martyre*, n.p. "Peut-on parler de civilisation? Peut-on comparer ces bêtes fauves, qui égorgent, violent, pillent, aux populations françaises ? Ces assassins sont-ils dignes de la qualité de citoyens français ?"

⁴⁹¹ I have not yet seen an edition of *Prestige français* although there appears to be two editions in the CDHA archives. The editions appear to be rather short (6 pages) and include black and white illustrations. A deeper look at *Le martyre* in any future research should certainly take the UFNA's main organ into account.

August 10, 1956, an attack that killed at least sixty, including women and children.⁴⁹² While the images of *Le martyre* admonished the FLN for its indiscriminate killing of settler women and children, the UFNA then went on to do the same.

Although unintentionally, the UFNA's publication of *Le martyre* played right into the FLN's political and military strategy, the cornerstone of which was sowing animosity between Muslims and settlers to bring about large-scale revolution. The attacks in el Elia were meant as revenge for the French repression of the uprisings that took place in the same region a decade prior in 1945, when Algerian demonstrators killed 103 Europeans and injured 100 more.⁴⁹³ In hopes of quashing a larger rebellion, the French colonial government killed Algerians indiscriminately in reponse. Afterward, the French administration admitted to killing 1,500 Algerians, although some scholars estimate the true figure was likely four to five times higher.⁴⁹⁴

But the events of 1955 were more than a simple payback or spontaneous act of violence. This was the first act of largescale revolutionary terrorism that the FLN would execute, and it changed the course of the war. The FLN knew from experience that the attacks that they planned and carried out in northern Constantine in 1955 would evoke a similar, asymmetrical response to the reprisals against Algerians in 1945. Algerian civilians living in the vicinity of the mining town were summarily shot, suspects were gathered on the football pitch in Philippeville and executed without trial, and settler vigilantes engaged in revenge killings with impunity. The French gave an official death toll of 1,237 Algerians killed during punitive operations which lasted several months. US consults in North Africa reported that an estimated six to eight

⁴⁹² Sung-Eun Choi, *Decolonization and the French of Algeria: Bringing the Settler Colony Home* (Springer, 2016); James McDougall, *A History of Algeria* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 229.

⁴⁹³ Martin Thomas, *Fight or Flight: Britain, France, and the Roads from Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 301.

⁴⁹⁴ Charles Ageron, *Modern Algeria: A History from 1830 to the Present*, trans. Michael Brett (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1991), 102.

thousand Algerian civilians were killed.⁴⁹⁵ The FLN declared the actual number was 12,000.⁴⁹⁶ No matter the number, for the FLN, the ends (inciting largescale revolution), justified the means (intentionally provoking retribution against Algerians).

In executing the massacres in northern Constantine, the FLN wanted to show it was not just a fringe group of radicals, but an organized and determined independence movement. It also sought to encourage (or, perhaps more accurately, intimidate) Algerian moderates to join its cause and drive an even deeper wedge between the Arab and indigenous and the settler population.⁴⁹⁷ Prior to the massacre, the FLN distributed tracts that called Union démocratique du manifeste algérien (UDMA) members traitors. One such “traitor” was Allaoua Abbas, the nephew of Ferhat Abbas, author of the Manifeste du peuple algérien. Out of the 123 who died on August 20, 1955, Allaoua Abbas was one of them. In fact, twenty-one Algerians were killed in the ALN attacks in northern Constantine, victims who were neither characterized as martyrs nor mourned in *Le martyre*.⁴⁹⁸

The absence of the Muslim victims is telling. Clearly, the UFNA’s constituency was European settlers, and it was their lives that were accorded value. This is of course consistent with the broader environment of image control that the French practiced during the Algerian War. To picture Muslim victims would muddle the straightforward narrative that *Le martyre* advanced, which incited violence against Muslims. In doing so, *Le martyre* thus became a part of

⁴⁹⁵ Thomas, *Fight or Flight: Britain, France, and the Roads from Empire*, 302–3.

⁴⁹⁶ James Gannon, *Military Occupations in the Age of Self-Determination: The History Neocons Neglected* (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2008), 48.

⁴⁹⁷ Evans, 216–17. Nearly 4,000 died in a string of bombings in the metropole called the café wars during which FLN and MNA supporters engaged in fratricidal warfare. The FLN also notoriously massacred an entire village of MNA-supporters in Mélouza in 1957, an event that I will further discuss in my analysis of *Aspects véritables de la rébellion algérienne* (1957).

⁴⁹⁸ Evans, 140.

the escalatory dynamics of reprisal and counter-reprisal that the FLN sought to engender, and the photobook stands as a visual remnant of a point-of-no-return during the Algerian War.⁴⁹⁹

Sans Fin... (1957) and Aucune bête au monde (1959)

Sans fin (Without End) and *Aucune bête au monde* (No Beast in the World, hereafter referred to as *Aucune bête*), published in 1957 and 1959, respectively, are collaborations between Lieutenant-Colonel Marcel Bigeard (1916-2010), one of the best known French officers of the Algerian War, and Sergeant Marc Flament (1929-1991), a photographer in the Service cinématographique des armées (SCA) who spent his early military career photographing French paratroops during two tours in Indochina.⁵⁰⁰ Much like *Le martyre*, *Sans fin* and *Aucune bête* provide insight into right-wing representations of the Algerian War, but this time those of the French military. Each text provides insight into the changing identity and doctrine of the French military brought about by the war. These two texts, however, are much larger: 24 x 30 cm each. These measurements render the book closer to the artistic photobooks that proliferated during the period.

Sans fin and *Aucune bête* are first and foremost attempts to rehabilitate the French Army's image through the figure of the paratrooper. With the Fall of France in 1940 and the even more recent defeat of France in Indochina in 1954 a not-so-distant memory, the French Army's entry into Algeria was a redemptive mission to restore its former greatness.⁵⁰¹ To do so,

⁴⁹⁹ Martin Thomas, "Violence in the Algerian War of Independence: Terror, Counter-Terror, and Compliance," in *The Routledge History of Terrorism* (Abingdon, Oxon, New York: Routledge, 2015), 227–28.

⁵⁰⁰ Bastien Chastagner and Damien Vitry, "La Guerre d'Algérie vue par trois photographes amateurs" (L'Établissement de communication et de production audiovisuelle de la Défense (ECPAD)), 12, accessed September 5, 2022, https://imagesdefense.gouv.fr/media/pdf/dossiers_thema/dossier-la-guerre-d-Algerie-vue-par-trois-photographes-amateurs.pdf. Bigeard's celebrity was in part due to his fictionalized portrayal in *The Battle of Algiers* (1966) through the villainous character of Colonel Philippe Mathieu, a composite character of Bigeard and other French officers (Massu and Aussaresses), but also because his outspokenness made him a favorite among newsmen.

⁵⁰¹ Evans, *Algeria*, 134.

Sans fin further romanticized the already glamorous figure of the paratrooper, whose mythos first formed during World War II, and more specifically that of Bigeard, who already enjoyed a place of prominence in the French imagination.⁵⁰²

Sans fin is replete with heroic images of tenacious paratroopers on mission in the *bled*, Algeria's rugged countryside (figures 5.5 and 5.6 – 1957). Some of the images capture the grandiose and unforgiving landscape in which the gritty paratroopers fought while others are portraits of individual soldiers. These portraits, accompanied by text written by Bigeard, emphasize the exclusivity, self-discipline, endurance, and bravery of the paratroops. In the case of one youthful paratrooper seen in *Sans Fin*, Bigeard wrote, "18 years old, maybe. God make it so that death is not on the path today." The young soldier gazes heroically into the distance (figure 5.7 – 1957), seemingly unafraid of what Bigeard implies might lie ahead of him. Bigeard also emphasizes the unique identity of the paratroops as a militant sect that could not only endure suffering and the threat of death but enjoyed it. In the photograph juxtaposed against the youthful soldier described above (see also figure 5.7), an older, more war-wearied soldier with a broken nose appears alongside a more foreboding commentary: "You have nothing more to hope for... The battlefield keeps you to better reject you." The photograph and commentary perfectly capture the paratroop's ideology of asceticism. The paratroop's patron saint was, after all, the Archangel Michael, and their own prayer included phrases such as "I want insecurity and restlessness, I want torment and brawling."⁵⁰³

The photographs and text in *Sans fin* and *Aucune bête* were part and parcel of the mythos of the paratroops as an exclusive lot who did not waver in the face of poor odds and unforgiving locales. Established by the Free French in London during World War II, the paratroops escaped

⁵⁰² John Talbott, "The Myth and Reality of the Paratrooper in the Algerian War," *Armed Forces & Society* 3, no. 1 (Fall 1976): 73–74.

⁵⁰³ Talbott, 75.

association with the Vichy regime, and went on to earn their reputation for being a school of self-discipline during the war in Indochina. At the battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954, the death knell of French colonialism in Indochina, Vietminh forces besieged French paratroopers for weeks without reprieve. Images of haggard, weary soldiers, all but completely abandoned to the Vietminh, proliferated in the French press, and inspired sympathy and respect across the political spectrum.⁵⁰⁴ The valor that the paratroops displayed in Indochina, matched by their suffering, neutralized the shock and shame of the paratrooper's defeat at Dien Bien Phu. As historian Philip Dine described it in his book, *Images of the Algerian War: French Fiction and Film, 1954-1992 Indochina* (1994), Indochina was lost, but not their honor, and a historic defeat became a source of pride.⁵⁰⁵

Sans fin and *Aucune bête* are also testaments to the French military's changing doctrine. Both texts are overwhelmingly comprised of action shots of the paratrooper engaged in combat. Yet, despite frequent signs of an armed and dangerous enemy, the FLN is never named nor pictured, and adversaries rarely appear. Instead, images of the rugged landscape, devoid of civilization (figure 5.8 – 1957), are intermingled with paratroopers, injured, dying, and dead on the battlefield. In a series of two photographs of the same scene (figures 5.9 and 5.10 – 1957), injured paratroopers are seen sprawled on the ground while others render comfort and medical care. In the first of the series (figure 5.9, in the background), one soldier holds the hand of an injured paratrooper who stares into Flament's lens, returning the viewer's gaze as well.

⁵⁰⁴ Talbott, 70.

⁵⁰⁵ Philip Dine, "The Myth of the Paratrooper," in *Images of the Algerian War: French Fiction and Film, 1954-1992* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press and Clarendon Press, 1994), 25. Eckard Michels, "From One Crisis to Another: The Morale of the French Foreign Legion during the Algerian War," in *The Algerian War and the French Army, 1954-62: Experiences, Images, Testimonies*, ed. Martin S. Alexander, Martin Evans, and J.F.V. Keiger (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), 89–90. According to Michels, the feelings of individual paratroopers, however, were quite at odds with their public image. Many of the paratroopers that served in Indochina were relocated to North Africa where the memory of defeat at Dien Bien Phu resulted in low morale, distrust in the French government, lower enlistment rates, and higher rates of desertion among all the troops of France's foreign legion.

Accompanying the image is the promise, “Battlefield of suffering. You know well... We’ll be back.” Bigeard implies that while those soldiers might have lost the battle, they would not lose the war, and it would be the paratroop’s determination that that would carry them to victory. Bigeard also solicits sympathy from the viewer. On the next page (see figure 5.10), the same soldier, apparently lifelessly, stares blankly toward the sky, his hand now limply hanging in the hand of the other. Bigeard’s accompanying text implores the viewer to remember the paratrooper’s ultimate sacrifice: “Don’t leave us. Stay with us on the battlefield.” Avoiding all reference, pictorial or textual, to the FLN is unsurprising. Although a state-of-emergency was declared in 1955, the French state’s official stance on the ongoing conflict in Algeria was one of calculated vagueness that branded the authors of the revolution as religious fanatics and terrorists.⁵⁰⁶ The political motivations of the revolution were frequently obscured in the press and French government officials made no mention of the FLN in their addresses.⁵⁰⁷

Sans fin replicates the French government’s approach of calculated vagueness, but it also, although perhaps unintentionally, visually conveys the main issue facing the French military at the start of the war: an enemy whose military strategy was elusiveness. These challenges were highlighted in French Colonel David Galula’s monograph on the theory and practice of counter-revolutionary warfare, *Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958* (1963):

Instead of a mass uprising with large and loosely organized bands attacking European centers head-on, we had to cope with small groups of rebels who avoided encounters with our forces, operated in too diffuse a manner, and concentrated their efforts on mobilizing the population through persuasion and terrorism. There was no enemy that could be identified, to whom we could give battle, except in the Aurès Mountains. This is where our units first went to work. But what with the apocalyptic terrain, its rocks, its caves, its abrupt changes of altitude, we vainly played hide-and-seek with the guerrillas. We encircled, we combed, we raided, with little result.⁵⁰⁸

⁵⁰⁶ Evans, *Algeria*, 123.

⁵⁰⁷ Evans, 124.

⁵⁰⁸ David Galula, *Pacification in Algeria* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2006), 23.

Many of the photographs in *Sans fin*, such as those discussed above (see figure 5.6), seem to document this futile process.

The difficulty of the terrain was a major factor for the French Army in effectively suppressing the revolution. In *Aucune bête*, Bigeard devotes considerable attention to the paratroop's experience in the harsh desert climate of the Sahara. The title of the photobook comes from a passage in *Terre des hommes* (1939) (known to anglophone readers as *Wind, Sand, and Stars*), a memoir written by French writer and aviator Antoine Saint-Exupéry that details his famous plane crash in the Libyan Sahara in 1935. Saint-Exupéry and an accompanying mechanic survived the crash only to almost die of thirst before being discovered and saved by a Bedouin.

On the opening page of *Aucune bête*, Bigeard strings together several quotes from the novel:

If my wife still believes I am alive, she must believe that I am on my feet. My comrades all think I am on my feet. They have faith in me. And I am a bastard if I don't go on... What saves a man is to take a step. Then another step. It is always the same step, but you have to take it... What I've done, I swear to you, no beast could have done...⁵⁰⁹

Bigeard's appropriated text prefaces the photographs included in *Aucune bête*, many of which are of paratroopers scrambling over towering dunes. Enormous in size, its population itinerant and impossible to bring under French administration, the Sahara epitomized a timeless past, free from modernity and civilization – a perfect setting for Bigeard's *paras* who saw themselves as the most elite sect of the military.⁵¹⁰ Yet the hostile conditions of the Sahara proved difficult even for the hardened *paras*.

⁵⁰⁹ Marcel Bigeard and Marc Flament, *Aucune bête au monde* (Paris: Éditions de la pensée moderne, 1959), n.p. Original French: "...Mais je me disais : ma femme, si elle croit que je vis, croit que je marche. Mes camarades croient que je marche. Ils ont tous confiance en moi. Et je suis un salaud si je ne marche pas... Ce qui sauve, c'est de faire un pas. Encore un pas. C'est tous le même pas que l'on recommence... Ce que j'ai fait, je le jure, jamais aucune bête ne l'aurait fait..."

⁵¹⁰ Abd-el-Kader, who led the first major resistance to French colonization between 1830 and 1847, often retreated into the Sahara after conducting raids against the French military, for example.

In one scene (figure 5.11 – 1959), Bigeard and Flament emphasize the disorienting and humbling nature of the massive dunes and oppressive heat: “We contemplated our pathetic shadows,” Bigeard writes. Alongside Bigeard’s prose is a photograph of one paratrooper indeed contemplating his shadow. Taken from slightly above where the paratroop stands, the dunes fill the entire image. Discarded rucksacks seem to float weightlessly in the background while other paratroopers either wander aimlessly or find a moment’s repose in the background. The ungroundedness of the photograph and the soldiers in isolation convey the desert’s indomitable nature. This is an unknown world that was difficult to travel through and impossible to conquer. Even the absence of the soldier’s gun in his shadow hints at this: no manmade weapon can subjugate desert sand.

The elusiveness of the enemy is also reprised in *Aucune bête*. “We often believed to have shot at mirages, born of the blinding reflections of the desert,” Bigeard wrote. A paratrooper is pictured elongated on the ground with his rifle at hand, pointing toward an unidentified mass in the distance (figure 5.12 – 1959) as two others approach from the left portion of the composition. The trope of the desert mirage is a fixture of Orientalist literature and art that is perhaps the most succinct expression of the desert’s cruelty. In this sense, *Aucune bête* reveals a psychological dimension to the warfare that Bigeard and his troops experienced, one in which the visual field toyed with the minds of soldiers. In doing so, Bigeard personifies the Sahara as an enemy itself.

The military’s inability to engage the enemy forced the army to shift the focus from the FLN to the civilian population. Galula writes, “It soon became obvious that military operations alone could not defeat the rebels. The population had to be protected, controlled, won over, and thus isolated from the rebels.”⁵¹¹ This new paradigm, in which the army focused its efforts on

⁵¹¹ Galula, *Pacification in Algeria*, 23.

isolating the people from FLN militants, was part of a broader “hearts and mind” campaign that transformed the role of the soldier, rendering him a social agent as well as military. This new military directive required soldiers to become acquainted with the local civilian population, to supervise them, to gain their confidence, and to obtain their profound and unconditional support.⁵¹²

Sans fin and *Aucune bête* highlight the transformation of the French paratrooper from a purely military figure to one that played both a military and social role. This new social role is pictured in one of the final photographs of the photobook (figure 5.13 – 1957) in which a paratrooper and two young Algerian girls walk down a sunbathed path. The paratrooper holds the hand of one girl as they both stare up at him with devotion. His gentle smile paired with the idyllic scenery characterizes relations between rural Algerians as peaceful, even familial, as if the soldier might be the girls’ older brother. “We follow the same path, then...” Bigeard writes, “Why not love us?” The notion of a naturalized French-Algerian fraternity, as demonstrated in this dissertation, had long been one prong of French propaganda, and it clearly remained in play, at least from the French side, during the war.

This notion of fraternity is also perceptible in *Aucune bête*: “The oak and olive trees of Kabylia remind us of Provence. With our rifles across our shoulders, we felt like we were on a pigeon hunt. At the end of the road, where light and shadow mix, we would have expected an inn with chilled wine and fragrantly spiced meats.” In the accompanying photograph (figure 5.14 – 1959), paratroopers descend on a quiet hamlet of small stone houses with tiled roofs. Bigeard’s close comparison of Kabylia with his homeland expresses a longing for the homeland, yet also reinforces that Algeria was an extension of *la patrie* and the unity of Mediterranean lands.

⁵¹² Samia Henni, “On the Spaces of Guerre Moderne: The French Army in Northern Algeria (1954–1962),” *Footprint: Delft Architecture Theory Journal*, 37-55, no. 19 (Autumn/Winter 2016): 38.

Absent from these idyllic scenes of Kabylia's countryside are its local inhabitants. In another picture (figure 5.15 – 1959), soldiers are depicted wandering through abandoned villages where paratroopers “searched the huts where [they] found cinders still hot from the fire that had rewarmed them at night.” Although Bigeard makes it sound like the paratroops are closely pursuing FLN-rebels, there were myriad reasons for the abandonment of such villages, the most likely of which was the practice of political internment that was integral to counter-insurgency operations in Kabylia. As discussed in the previous chapter, anyone who remained in a *zone interdite* could be shot on site.⁵¹³ Thus, it was incumbent on any civilian to make themselves scarce when the French military was about. Moreover, it would not have been uncommon for entire hamlets to be sparsely populated either, since many of the younger men had already been killed or arrested.⁵¹⁴

Bigeard's maintained focus on the paratroop's mission in the Aurès and Sahara allowed him to obscure the paratroop's other nefarious deeds in Algeria which were the center of much criticism in the metropole. This criticism focused on the paratroop's participation in the Battle of Algiers (1956-1957). With a police force stretched too thin in Algiers, Minister of Algeria Robert Lacoste had to call in the French Army to restore law and order. Beginning in January of 1957, French troops, including Bigeard and his paratroops, conducted sweeps of Algiers with orders to bring an end to FLN terrorism and to snuff out the general strike called for the end of the month.

The paratroopers were the main instruments of repression and soon they acquired a sinister reputation. They closed off the casbah, rounded up its inhabitants, and began interrogations that frequently incorporated torture. The French established torture centers around

⁵¹³ Jean-Philippe Talbot-Bernigaud, “Zones interdites,” *Temps modernes* 16, no. 177 (January 1961): 708.

⁵¹⁴ Marcel Lesne, “Une expérience de déplacement de population: Les centres de regroupement en algérie,” *Annales de géographie* 71, no. 3888 (1962): 591.

the city to create a sort of dragnet for intel.⁵¹⁵ Thousands of men were tortured, killed, and then either incinerated or disposed of in the Bay of Algiers. The corpses that washed up on the shores of Algiers were called “Bigearde’s prawns.”⁵¹⁶ Few of the individuals that the paratroops interrogated played any meaningful role in the FLN. Still fewer were terrorists.⁵¹⁷

Although Flament recorded certain aspects of these events, none of these scenes appear in either publication, perhaps because the photographs are undeniably distressing and would have done more to incite public outrage against rather than admiration for the paratroops. In a photograph taken during a surprise nighttime operation (figure 5.16 – 1957), several Algerian men are lined up against a wall with their hands on their heads. The line is so long that darkness obscures the men who are not caught in Flament’s camera flash. Some of the men are young, barely more than boys. Each looks fearful, confused, and disheveled.

Flament’s photography also documented the staggering numbers of Muslim men who were detained and interrogated. In one such photograph (figure 5.17 – 1957), dozens of men are cordoned off in a small place, standing shoulder to shoulder as French paratroopers surveil them. Flament seems to have somehow caught the men’s attention as most of them look into the camera lens. The crowd is also populated with young boys. One man even holds a child. A man with a crutch appears in the middle ground. A large wedge fixed to his right foot indicates that he was disabled. Still, child or disabled, they were made to stand in what were essentially stockades and wait for their interrogation.

Sans fin and *Aucune bête* are attempts to render a war in which combat more often resembled a vast manhunt than it did traditional “warfare” to the public. This new form of

⁵¹⁵ For a thorough accounting of the use of torture during the Battle of Algiers, see Raphaëlle Branche, “La ‘Bataille d’Alger’ ou le règne de la torture,” in *La torture et l’armée pendant la Guerre d’Algérie: 1954-1962* (Paris: Gallimard, 2001), 115–75.

⁵¹⁶ Evans, *Algeria*, 206.

⁵¹⁷ Talbott, “The Myth and Reality of the Paratrooper in the Algerian War,” 77.

warfare involved harsh, unforgiving terrains wherein the enemy was elusive. This elusiveness is registered, perhaps somewhat intentionally, in *Sans fin* and *Aucune bête* wherein the enemy is rarely pictured or discussed and, in photographs in which Flament did photograph the “enemy,” they appeared to be local shepherds or civilians rather than armed combatants. In those images, Bigeard characterizes the role of the paratroops as a humanitarian one, rather than uniquely militaristic. Therefore, in *Sans fin* and *Aucune bête*, Bigeard and Flament collaborate to strategically focus on safer, less politically controversial events, relying on the glamorous paratroop figure to obscure their true, insidious role in the Algerian War.

Aspects véritables de la rébellion algérienne (1957)

In 1957, the cabinet of the Minister of Algeria, Robert Lacoste, released *Aspects véritables de la rébellion algérienne* (*True Aspects of the Algerian Rebellion*, hereafter referred to as *Aspects véritables*). The paperback booklet (16 x 23 cm) of 155 pages, most of which boast between one and three images, is plain in appearance. The covers are green, and the title printed in bold, giving it the serious appearance of an official report. Its stated goal was to counter the enemy’s propaganda against the French military and provide irrefutable and “verifiable evidence” of the methods used by Algerian rebels who, according to Lacoste’s administration, deceitfully characterized their movement as a humanitarian one defending liberty, Arabism, and Islam.⁵¹⁸ The strategic pairing of crime scene photography, material evidence, and textual commentary in *Aspects véritables* gives this photobook an undeniably forensic character that endows it with heightened evidentiary import. Nevertheless, while the French colonial authorities present a compelling and seemingly indisputable report of the facts, *Aspects*

⁵¹⁸ Ministère de l’Algérie, Cabinet du Ministre, *Aspects véritables de la rébellion algérienne* (Algiers: Société anonyme de l’Imprimerie générale, 1957), 5–6.

véritables is of course a selective account of the war and one that, as will be seen, relies on a set of visual codes that grant its images an additional affective dimension.

Aspects véritables is best described as a form of forensic warfare, a process that Eyal Weizman terms a state-sponsored effort to mobilize forensics to provide hard evidence in support of its own agenda while simultaneously obscuring, censoring, or eliminating evidence of its own wrongdoing.⁵¹⁹ Weizman asserts that state agents call upon science and technology, embodiments of the rational order (here, the colonial government) to confront and overpower the irrational aberration (the FLN/ALN), and reassert the power of the “benevolent state.”⁵²⁰ As in other cases of forensic warfare, the French colonial authorities then used this “evidence,” to conduct and legitimate the very violence that they seemingly opposed.

The photographs in *Aspects véritables*, which are overwhelmingly of corpses and in which evidence markers and placards that provide the name of the victim and the date of their death often appear, bear a striking resemblance to crime scene photography, a technical or applied form of photography that records evidence for the purposes of adjudication.⁵²¹ These images employ the cold, rational gaze of science to produce an authoritative, objective, and seemingly neutral account of the facts.⁵²² Such photographs are not meant to serve an aesthetic purpose but an evidentiary one. They appear “free from higher meaning,” to use Allan Sekula’s words, and their lack of rhetorical structure endows the image with a truth-conferring quality that

⁵¹⁹ Eyal Weizman, “Introduction: Forensics,” in *Forensics: The Architecture of Public Truth* (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2014), 12.

⁵²⁰ Weizman, 10.

⁵²¹ Crime scene photography is an application of photography that has been around since the 1870s when both the criminal justice system and photographic technology were modernizing. John Tagg’s essay, “Evidence, Truth and Order: Photographic Records and the Growth of the State” in *The Burden of Representation: Essays on Photographies and Histories* (1988) lays out this history.

⁵²² Allan Sekula, “On the Invention of Photographic Meaning,” in *Thinking Photography*, ed. Victor Burgin (London: Macmillan, 1982), 94–95. As Allan Sekula points out, not long after the medium’s inception, bureaucratic “rationalism” seized the photograph as a tool. Relevant to this chapter is Sekula’s reminder that the initial documentation of the Communards in Paris was performed by professional photographers whose images were deliberately produced for anti-Communard propaganda.

is strengthened by institutional authority, in this case, that of the Minister of Algeria.⁵²³ Due to the inclusion of identifying information in these photographs, and their extreme gore, I have opted not to include figures for the images that I discuss here out of respect for the victims, many of whom likely still have surviving family members.⁵²⁴

Nonetheless, wrenched from their usual legal context, reframed, and narrativized, the visual codes that govern the politics of these images emerge rather quickly. Many of the photographs are post-mortem close-ups of the victims' faces that blur the line between forensics (scientific, rational) and portraiture (aesthetic). Often, these photographs document the victim's cause-of-death: a slashed throat. In addition to often being taken at what appears to be the "scene of the crime," these images are also taken at an angle that records this injury in shocking detail for evidentiary purposes so that the victim and their cause-of-death can be easily recognized.

However, these photographs hit the viewer with a power that they were never meant to have in their original context as crime scene evidence. The angle of the photographs described above forces the viewer to contemplate the facial contours of the victim, emphasizing their individuality, unlike the anonymized victims in *Le martyre*, whose bodies are pictured in haphazard heaps. Sometimes, the viewer is even forced to encounter the victim's lifeless gaze. These images more than any other arrest the eye of the beholder. They eerily remind the viewer that the victim was once a living, social being and intact, not the inert object of a medical report

⁵²³ Allan Sekula, "The Instrumental Image: Steichen at War," *Art Forum*, December 1975, 28. Sekula's analysis is applied particularly to Edward Steichen's World War I aerial photographs, but I think applies here since these photographs are also made for governmental, militaristic purposes and seek to furnish evidence. Later in the essay, Sekula goes on to criticize Steichen as a sentimental opportunist whose "global vision of life" even in its "humanist" and liberal manifestations, served "only to mask another vision, a vision of global domination."

⁵²⁴ Those who are inclined to see these images, see footnote 2 for the text's location in archives and libraries. I purchased mine from an online used bookstore.

or police investigation. These details thus allow the photograph to behave both as credible evidence and as images that evoke a significant emotional response.

The various locations of the corpses pictured in *Aspects véritables* also modify the effect of the photograph. Some of the photographs show the body at the scene of the crime (next to a car exploded by a landmine, on a street corner where the assassination took place, or abandoned in the rugged backcountry) or in a medical context (at the morgue, on a stretcher, or in the gloved hands of a medical examiner). However, some are of the deceased in their homes. In these photographs especially, the presence of ubiquitous details that would have no place in a juridical context become strikingly eerie as the co-existence of unspeakable violence and the banal contribute an additional affective dimension.

In one such photograph, a young man of sixteen years is shown with his hands and ankles bound.⁵²⁵ He lies face down in a pool of his own blood on a painted tile floor next to a bed. If the viewer remains with the image long enough, they will notice the ordinary, everyday setting: the wooden frame upon which the mattress rests, its many pillows and linens, or the design of the tile. Whereas the chaotic scene of a public assassination or the sterile environment of the morgue distances the violence from the viewer, making it seem elsewhere, the humble quarters of an ordinary family render horror much closer, and death more inevitable.

In another image, an elderly couple is shown lying side-by-side in bed.⁵²⁶ Aside from their bound wrists and the smears of blood around their lips, the scene is otherwise unremarkable. The crisp white sheet covering them is even pulled up neatly to their waists and folded down. The cruelty of reality is amplified by the otherwise quotidian nature of the scene:

⁵²⁵ Ministère de l'Algérie, Cabinet du Ministre, *Aspects véritables de la rébellion algérienne* (Algiers: Société anonyme de l'Imprimerie générale, 1957), 23. The image referenced can be viewed on page 23 of the book.

⁵²⁶ Ministère de l'Algérie, Cabinet du Ministre, *Aspects véritables de la rébellion algérienne* (Algiers: Société anonyme de l'Imprimerie générale, 1957), 134. The image referenced can be viewed on page 134 of the book.

the strange pattern of the wrist ties – were they taken from some ordinary cloth around the house? The woman’s wedding ring on her left hand – how long had they been married? The familiar is brutalized by the aberrant: the seemingly indiscriminate murder of a defenseless elderly couple.

Although the images described here have the appearance of crime scene photographs, they do not behave as such. The role of a forensic photograph is to record, detect, and decipher evidence. This evidence is then pondered within and by multiple spaces and people: the police station, the courtroom, detectives, lawyers, judges, and juries. They are rarely presented to the public, other than perhaps to a jury comprised of civilians, rather they are contained as if pathological. *Aspects véritables*, however, does not contain the crime scene photograph. Instead, the crime scene is made public. It is this characteristic of *Aspects véritables* – the publicization of grave human suffering – that first calls attention to the photobook’s calculating methodology, a methodology that hinged on the photograph’s capacity to evade and sometimes overwrite the original contexts in which they were made and to adopt new rhetorics.

These political machinations are advanced in recounting the massacre of MLN partisans (loyalists of Messali Hadj) at Mélouza in 1957 during which FLN militants massacred 301 men from the surrounding area, an event that Soustelle’s administration made every effort to publicize. After the massacre was discovered, Soustelle quickly sent a delegation of French and international journalists to write up and photograph what they found. The international audience to which this information was transmitted was sickened and turned for a brief time against the FLN.⁵²⁷ How could this be a popular movement when the leaders of said movement brutalized

⁵²⁷ Nicolas Hubert, “L’Algérie à la tribune de l’actualité,” in *Éditeurs et éditions en France pendant la Guerre d’Algérie* (Saint-Denis: Éditions Bouchène, 2012), 219.

their own? Of course, much political nuance is left out of the discourse advanced in *Aspects véritables*.

Although Lacoste's administration framed the massacre in Mélouza as an example of the FLN's excesses, the situation had more to do with local politics and personalities than it did with the FLN's ability to govern. The impetus for the massacre began in 1955 at Guenzet in Kabylia when the FLN wiped out a large group of MNA partisans led by a chieftain called Bellounis. The French troops in the area happily stood by to let the FLN and MNA destroy each other. Only Bellounis and a handful of his five hundred escaped to Mélouza.⁵²⁸ When the FLN tried to treat with him there, Bellounis had several emissaries killed, leading the FLN commander in that *wilaya* to order the massacre in Mélouza.⁵²⁹ Bellounis escaped yet again and was forced to go over completely to the French side afterward.⁵³⁰ The French, however, had difficulty controlling Bellounis, who is remembered now mostly for his megalomania and brutality, and executed him the following year.⁵³¹

While the political clashes between the FLN and MNA should not have resulted in the indiscriminate killing of civilians, no matter where their political affiliations lie, the version of the event recounted in *Aspects véritables* is much more simplified, and of course leaves out several key facts: that the French chose not to intervene at Guenzet in 1955 in hopes of escalating tensions between the FLN and Bellounis' troops, that the French sought to capitalize on this internal conflict, no matter the civilian cost, and finally, that there had been mutual bloodshed before Mélouza. These strategic exemptions simplify the narrative into one of "bad

⁵²⁸ Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 136. Natalya Vince, *The Algerian War, The Algerian Revolution* (Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2020), 81.

⁵²⁹ Wilaya was an Arabic term used by the FLN to describe a geographical division equivalent to a French department; it is still in use in Algeria today.

⁵³⁰ Vince, *The Algerian War, The Algerian Revolution*, 105.

⁵³¹ Horne, 258.

Muslim” versus “less bad Muslim.” It also casts Algeria’s colonized population as inherently criminally inclined, a long-enduring racist myth that had been used to justify French colonialism in Algeria since the beginning of the conquest.

The photographs sandwiched within these pages are some of the most horrifying of the book, the likes of which a contemporary viewer would have had little psychological defense against or little to compare it with save for the photographs that came out of Bergen-Belsen and Dachau, Germany after World War II. Most of these images are of Muslim victims of the FLN who, according to Lacoste’s administration, were victimized for working alongside European settlers, paying taxes to the colonial government, or breaking Islamic law. The deeds documented in these images confront the viewer with a reality that cannot be grasped spontaneously because their brutality is beyond comprehension and reason. There are decapitated heads with severed male genitals placed in their mouths, bodies with sickly contorted arms and legs, mass graves, men whose faces have been disfigured, and even one image of a man whose body has been rendered as a neatly stacked pile of disjointed body parts.

These photographs bespeak what French colons believed was permissible to show the public. While there are certainly horrible pictures of victimized European settlers in the book, they pale in comparison to the number of Muslim victims and the level of violence shown. It was clearly permissible to show Muslim men decapitated and with dismembered genitalia in their mouths, but not permissible to show any French victims in a similar state. In this sense, deceased settlers were entitled a greater right to privacy, dignity, and humanity. Furthermore, the inclusion of Muslim victims was not to persuade Muslim viewers to side with the French colonial government, but to reinforce among European viewers that the FLN was comprised of barbaric terrorists and religious extremists. This characterizes a continued French presence as both

preferable to the “despotic fanaticism” of Muslims, another long enduring Orientalist myth, but also as a requirement if further brutality is to be avoided.

The atrocities depicted in *Aspects véritables* created much controversy in France among its metropolitan population, the publication’s target audience. Released in the form of a “livre vert,” – a report meant to spur public discussion that supposedly represents the extent of the government’s knowledge on a certain topic – *Aspects véritables* received mixed reviews among the metropole’s bureaucrats and intellectuals. Louis Marin, President of the Académie des sciences morales et politiques, wrote Michel Gorlin, who oversaw the publication, to thank him for his “beau travail” on *Aspects véritables* and for revealing the “true” face of the Algerian rebels. Conversely, leftist intellectual Jean-Marie Domenach wrote in the newspaper *Esprit* that the book was a “detestable instrumentalization” of the victims pictured.⁵³²

The Parisian media itself received *Aspects véritables* rather dubiously. Although *Le Monde* reproduced extensive excerpts of the text, the photographs, perhaps deemed too graphic, were excluded altogether and only sparingly described.⁵³³ An editorial comment in *L’Express* declared: “Who could still believe, after having closed this brochure, that there are French people for whom every Muslim is not a cutthroat, and Muslims for whom every French person is not an enemy to be slaughtered?”⁵³⁴ This last comment especially goes to show that the excessive nature of *Aspects véritables* immediately raised suspicions among the French literati.

The grave human suffering and horrifying barbarity of the acts of violence recorded in *Aspects véritables* doubles down on the official narrative that the rebellion was driven by Islamic

⁵³² Cited in Hubert, “L’Algérie à la tribune de l’actualité,” 220.

⁵³³ “ASPECTS VÉRITABLES DE LA REBELLION ALGÉRIENNE: Une Brochure du cabinet de M. Robert Lacoste,” *Le Monde*, December 14, 1957: 10.

⁵³⁴ “Courrier des lecteurs,” *L’Express*, October 31, 1957. Quoted in Hubert, “L’Algérie à la tribune de l’actualité,” 220. “Qui pourrait encore croire, après avoir refermé cette brochure, qu’il existe des Français pour lesquels tout Musulman n’est pas un égorgeur, et des Musulmans pour lesquels tout Français n’est pas un ennemi à abattre ?”

radicalism by combining material evidence, testimony, and crime scene photography to create convincing and legible patterns and relations that appear unimpeachable, but also rely on the effects of shock and disgust to convince the viewer. These strategies evince both a shift toward forensic warfare and the human rights sensibility that structured the way the Algerian War came to be understood and described worldwide: through its civilian victims. However, the stories of the victims in *Aspects véritables* are clearly not the result of actual investigative human rights research, rendering civilians as pawns of government propaganda.

Algeria (1960)

Unlike the photobooks discussed so far, which privilege the settler, French military, and French colonial administration's perspective, German photographer Dirk Alvermann's (1937-2012) *Algeria (1960)* prioritized the experience of Algerian combatants and civilians.⁵³⁵ Also, in stark contrast to the other photobooks discussed so far in this chapter, whose authors relied on the cold "didacticism" of atrocity photographs to increase their political affect, Alvermann is more concerned with aesthetics and the formal presentation of his images. Influenced by Soviet filmmaker and theorist Sergei Eisenstein and New German Cinema, Alvermann used the technique of montage to critique French colonialism while presenting the FLN/ALN as an organized, popularly supported revolution.

Algeria lends insight into how the Algerian War was visualized internationally within a Cold War setting. Deemed too politically controversial in West Germany, Alvermann was forced to publish his photobook in East Germany. This had much to do, as will be seen, with the Cold War climate in which the Algerian War took place. Furthermore, Alvermann's German citizenship, I argue, also shaped the kinds of photographs and association that he makes in the

⁵³⁵ Of the six photobooks I discuss here, two seek to represent the Algerian point-of-view.

book. Many of the photographs contained in its pages echo the images that American War Information Unit distributed in Germany at the conclusion of World War II to show the civilian population the severity of the war crimes that the Nazis committed in concentration camps.⁵³⁶ Alvermann, born in Düsseldorf in 1937, spent his early childhood years enmeshed in World War II and its aftermath, and likely would have been aware of such photographs.⁵³⁷

We owe the bulk of what we know of Alvermann's early career and some of the facts about *Algeria* to photojournalist Martin Parr who visited the German photographer in Lübeck, part of former East Germany, in 2008. After spending his early career as a newspaper photographer, Alvermann crossed the Morice Line from Tunisia to Algeria with an ALN unit into the eastern war zone of Algeria in the 1950s.⁵³⁸ There he documented the lives and activities of ALN soldiers and the sordid conditions in which refugee Algerian civilians were forced to live during the conflict.

Alvermann divides the photographs in *Algeria* into six parts, each with a subtitle. These subtitles are derived from historical documents which Alvermann reproduces in the introduction of the photobook interspersed with his own commentary. The first subtitle is "colonization knows neither humanity nor justice, neither civilization nor progress." The quote comes from a passage of the *Manifesto of the Algerian People*, penned by Ferhat Abbas during World War II, and rendered to Gouverneur Général Peyrouton in 1943. The full passage, which Alvermann provides in the introductory pages of the book, is as follows: "Colonization knows neither humanity nor justice, neither civilization nor progress. It is at its core an imperialist phenomenon. It thus requires for its development and maintenance the simultaneous existence of

⁵³⁶ The iconic *KZ - Bildbericht Aus Fünf Konzentrationslagern* [Photo Report From Five Concentration Camps] featured 44 black-and-white photos by anonymous photographers and was released immediately after the war in 1945. The concentration camps represented were Buchenwald, Belsen, Gardelegen, Nordhausen and Ohrdruf.

⁵³⁷ Martin Parr, "Dirk Alvermann," *Aperture*, no. 193 (Winter 2008): 84.

⁵³⁸ Parr, 84.

two societies, where one is suppressed by the other.”⁵³⁹ The photographs that follow reveal the conditions of squalor in which Algerians lived. The first image (figure 5.18) is of a discarded pair of worn-out shoes, laces missing. The majority of the subsequent photographs show men, women, and children, each of whom wear tattered clothes and hollow expressions, living in tight quarters (figures 5.19 – 5.21). Most of them are barefoot and stand upon a graveled surface. Their clothes are ripped, worn, and hang on their emaciated frames. One cannot help but immediately recall the photographs that emerged after World War II of thousands of pairs of shoes, discarded in piles, taken from Jews on their arrival to concentration camps, and of the skeletal bodies of concentration camp survivors clothed in tattered rags (figures 5.22 and 5.23). These echoes, which seem intentional, function to indict the French colonial government to the highest degree.

Alvermann juxtaposes the poverty of the Algerians against the far better conditions of settlers. A two-page spread is devoted to an Algerian boy who, clothed in rags, raises his hands as if praying (figure 5.24 – 1960). On the next page, Alvermann includes a cropped image of the same child’s left arm, palm open against a dark background. This photograph is situated next to an image of a man’s hand (figure 5.25 – 1960). Also closely cropped, all that is visible of the hand is a large metal ring and a lit cigarette sandwiched between two thick fingers. Although the image is grainy and distorted, it is clear the man lives a more luxurious life. In addition to the ring he wears a suit and tie. His palm, also open, but in a dismissive gesture, enables a close comparison between the two images, and emphasizes the economic disparity of the Muslim and European populations of Algeria.

⁵³⁹ Dirk Alvermann, *Algeria* (Göttingen, Germany: Steidl, 2012), n.p.

These kinds of comparisons unfold continuously in the remainder of the section, and throughout the book. In one, a mass of Muslim children is juxtaposed against a smartly-dressed, bespectacled settler walking amidst French soldiers (figure 5.26 – 1960). Alvermann devotes only a fraction of the page to the children while granting the lion’s share of the double-page spread to the French. This imbalance of space, which becomes symbolic here, connotes the inferior status of Algeria’s Muslims, who were literally forced into overcrowded internment and refugee camps, and criticizes the French, embodied by this man with downcast eyes, for turning a blind eye to the suffering of children, and consciously ignoring “the simultaneous existence of two societies, where one is suppressed by the other.” These photographs bring to mind French-educated Martiniquais psychiatrist, political philosopher, and decolonial activist Frantz Fanon’s (1925-1961) claim in his acclaimed essay on violence in *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961), published before the war’s end, that “The colonial world is a compartmentalized world. [...] The colonized world is a world divided in two.” By stratifying these worlds visually, Alvermann renders the world of the *colon* and that of the *indigène* easily comprehensible to the viewer.⁵⁴⁰

Alvermann has prepared the viewer for seeing it in this light by providing statistics related to the deterioration in the quality of life among Algeria’s Muslim population in the introduction of the photobook, although many of these numbers are produced without citing a source. These numbers explain the intentional pauperization of Arab and indigenous Algerians, now living in a permanent state of scarcity and famine, via the appropriation of their arable land for European settlers. They also detail the cultural and intellectual impoverishment of Algerians as well, proclaiming that schooling has been made accessible only to European settlers and the

⁵⁴⁰ Frantz Fanon, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Homi K. Bhabha, *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Richard Philcox, Reprint edition (New York: Grove Press, 2005), 3.

Arabic language labelled foreign even though is it the mother tongue of 92% of Algeria's population.⁵⁴¹

The next section is the shortest of the six and highlights the self-contradicting nature of French colonialism. These photographs are organized under the subtitle, "They respect the rights of all people..." which is taken from the "Atlantic Charter," signed by France on December 26, 1944, in the final moments of World War II.⁵⁴² The Atlantic Charter importantly declared the right to self-govern, and it revived among Algerians hope for a free and sovereign Algerian nation after the war ended, leading to widespread pro-independence demonstrations in 1945. Instead, the French conducted a largescale repression of the Algerian people, whose precise death toll continues to be an unresolved controversy: the French claimed 1,500 dead; British army sources claimed 6,000; the *New York Times* reported 15,000-20,000; and the Algerians since independence have claimed upwards of 45,000.⁵⁴³ Framed within this context, the French soldiers and settlers who appear in the subsequent pages, some of whom the viewer would recognize from the first section, can be perceived only as morally bankrupt.

In section three, organized under the subtitle, "who have dared rise up,"⁵⁴⁴ Alvermann returns his attention to the Muslim inhabitants of the refugee camps he witnessed in Algeria wherein he continues to make a strong case against French colonialism. Pakistani reporter Nasim Ahmed, who traveled to Algeria in 1960, gives an idea of how these camps came to be and their dire conditions:

Along Algeria's borders with both Tunisia and Morocco, the French have created a no-man's land. These areas are surrounded by barbed wire and through their middle runs an electrified fence. Most of the houses in this no-man's land have

⁵⁴¹ Alvermann, *Algeria*, n.p.

⁵⁴² Alvermann, *Algeria*, n.p.

⁵⁴³ Evans, *Algeria*, 91.

⁵⁴⁴ This line is taken from a hymn sung by French settlers. The full lyric is, "Our soldiers risk their lives fighting against the unbelievers who have dared to rise up. The cross will know to protect them."

been razed to the ground, and with the exception of some nomads living in shabby hovels, there is in it no trace of inhabitants. Algerians previously living in these areas have fled to Tunisia or Morocco. It is estimated that nearly one million Algerians have taken refuge in the neighbouring territories. I visited some of the refugee camps on the Tunisian side, and I can say without hesitation that the refugees in Karachi from India who are now being resettled in Korangi and elsewhere, lived in far better conditions than the Algerian refugees. Most of the Algerian refugees in Tunisia and Morocco are old men, women or children.⁵⁴⁵

The people shown throughout this section, several of whom the viewer encounters in the first section, represent the population that Ahmed describes. An Algerian child, who is seen in section one being carried on the back of his older sister (figure 5.27), is seen again, this time held by his mother's side in their *khaïma* (figure 5.28). Placed above this image, is also a narrowly cropped photograph of the spectacled settler seen in section one. While in his first appearance, the settler man is positioned so that he “ignores” the starving children, in this arrangement, Alvermann forces the man to look and to understand why the Algerians “rise up,” or perhaps implying that settlers had indeed looked, but chose not to *see*. An alternative is that the settler man is made to surveil the *indigènes* which was the point of the internment camps in the first place.

The final three sections of the photobook are devoted to representing the revolution as an organized national struggle with popular support. In section four, Alvermann introduces the viewer to the ALN, the military branch of the FLN under the subtitle, “...an organized revolution and not an anarchistic revolt,” which was derived from the charter authored at the Soummam Conference of 1956 where the ALN was officially founded.⁵⁴⁶ In its pages, we see its fighters as pensive, troubled, and determined through a series of closely cropped portraits (figures 5.29 and 5.30). Mostly, these portraits function to characterize the ALN as average men, to humanize them. These are not the hardened warriors seen in Bigeard's *Sans fin* or *Aucune bête* nor the

⁵⁴⁵ Nasim Ahmed, “The Present Situation in Algeria,” *Pakistan Horizon* 13, no. 2 (1960): 130–31. Korangi was a planned resettlement town created to relieve over-population in Karachi, Pakistan that failed and became a slum.

⁵⁴⁶ Alvermann, *Algeria*, n.p.

terrorists described in *Aspects véritables*, but modest farmers and laborers plucked out of the obscurity to fight for national sovereignty.

Alvermann also uses the section to show the threat that the ALN posed to French hegemony, juxtaposing, as he did in the first three sections, images of French settlers who oppose the ALN soldiers, who Alvermann clearly sees as the heroes of the story. In one such instance, Alvermann places the arrogant smile of a settler, cropped from an image seen previously in the photobook, against a small troop of ALN soldiers (figure 5.31). In this sense, the smile becomes dismissive and an affront, almost a dare to the tough (and heavily armed) group of Algerians above.

Alvermann continues this organization of images throughout the section. For example, on a two-page spread shortly thereafter, a mustached settler (not the man with the ring from section one in figure 5.25), raises his index finger to his lips in a silencing motion (figure 5.32). No doubt Alvermann is criticizing both the harsh censorship policies of the time and the repressive measures that had hitherto been taken against Algerians in revolt. On the opposite page, an unamused machine gunner aims his weapon at the settler's face (figure 5.33). Later, we see calm ALN soldiers loading a bazooka. On the next page, the same mustached settler wears an expression of sheer surprise (figure 5.34). This is the last photograph of any settler that Alvermann uses in his book, a decision that suggests that he endorses the violent and armed struggle against French colonialism and seems to prophesize what he hopes will be an inevitable future: the defeat and eviction of France.

In section five, Alvermann hones the image of the revolution as one with popular support through the depiction of community life. The subtitle for this section is, "The liberation of Algeria will be the shared achievement of all Algerians..." which was also taken from the

Soummam Charter (1956).⁵⁴⁷ Alvermann is insistent on the popular support for the movement, writing in the introduction for the photobook: “The National Liberation Army is the army of the Algerian people. They have faith in this army, they join its ranks, they feed the soldiers, clothe them, arm them, and invite them to their hearth.”⁵⁴⁸ The photographs contained in this section show just that. There are soldiers greeting their families, children running to embrace their heroic fathers, and men and women offering food and drink to the soldiers (figures 5.35 – 5.38).

Section six is organized under the subtitle, “by the people and for the people,” the banner of *El Moudjahid*, the official organ of the FLN. This section brings a sense of finality to the book by picturing the ALN and their families gathered at night around fires, reading, relaxing, telling stories, sharing ideas, completing menial tasks, and sleeping after a hard day’s work (figures 5.39 – 5.41). These photographs are especially sympathetic as they show the Algerians at their least guarded. There is a sense of quiet and pensiveness that permeate these photographs. That, if only for a moment, the war can be set aside, and respite taken.

The juxtaposition of and reiteration of various figures throughout *Algeria* recalls the film technique of montage in which separate sections of film are selected, edited, and pieced together to produce a new whole. According to Parr, who interviewed Alvermann for *Aperture* in 2008, this is due to the influence of Sergei Eisenstein, the Soviet filmmaker and theorist, on Alvermann’s work.⁵⁴⁹ Alvermann likely felt a close political affiliation to Eisenstein who became part of the Red Army during the Russian Revolution after which he studied theater and then began his film career.⁵⁵⁰ In the introduction of his photobook, Alvermann makes clear that

⁵⁴⁷ Alvermann, *Algeria*, n.p.

⁵⁴⁸ Alvermann, *Algeria*, n.p.

⁵⁴⁹ Parr, “Dirk Alvermann,” 84.

⁵⁵⁰ For background on Eisenstein’s participation in the Bolshevik Revolution, see Ron Briley, “Sergei Eisenstein: The Artist in Service of the Revolution,” *The History Teacher* 29, no. 4 (1996): 525–36.

the revolution, in his eyes, was a national and class struggle whose political motivations mirrored those of the Russian Revolution:

The National Liberation Front turns to the peasants and declares its solidarity with their demands for land reform. It appeals to the working class to organize Muslim and European workers in a joint struggle against the collective enemy. It appeals to intellectuals, merchants, and craftsmen, to women and youth, to all segments of the population, to all ethnic groups. It knows no racial discrimination, no religious persecution, and no national superiority.⁵⁵¹

In Alvermann's eyes, the revolution was part of a broader working-class struggle against colonialism and capitalism, intertwined forms of oppression and exploitation.

Alvermann took some artistic cues from Eisenstein, who believed that film should be politically progressive and inspire the masses by affecting them emotionally and intellectually.⁵⁵²

With spectatorial impact as Eisenstein's end, formal organization was his means, and montage had the ability to both attract a viewer and affect them socially. For Eisenstein, each shot was a "stimulant," a "shock" that could attract a viewer and evoke a certain reaction. It was the job of the filmmaker to arrange these "shocks" in a particular order that would lead to the intended effect of, in Eisenstein's words, a "class usefulness."⁵⁵³ Montage, according to Eisenstein, enabled the production of a "third something": "...any two pieces of a film stuck together inevitably combine to create a new concept, a new quality born of that juxtaposition."⁵⁵⁴

Alvermann's appreciation of Eisenstein's theories is unsurprising given that the young German photographer was part of an artistic milieu steeped in the same principles.

In the early 1960s, a new wave of German filmmakers unequivocally critiqued the stabilizing function of genre cinema in post-war, West German society, which, in their

⁵⁵¹ Alvermann, *Algeria*, n.p.

⁵⁵² Sergei Eisenstein, "The Method of Making Workers' Films (USSR, 1925)," in *Film Manifestos and Global Cinema Culture: A Critical Anthology*, ed. Scott MacKenzie (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), 27.

⁵⁵³ Eisenstein, "The Method of Making Workers' Films (USSR, 1925)," 28.

⁵⁵⁴ Sergei Eisenstein, "Montage in 1938," in *Notes of a Film Director*, ed. R. Yurenev and G. Ivanov-Mumjiev, trans. I. Danko (Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1959), 63.

view, had served the National Socialists and now perpetuated the repressive political and social order of the Federal Republic.⁵⁵⁵ Twenty-six young filmmakers released a statement called the Oberhausen Manifesto which declared that German cinema was morally, intellectually, and creatively bankrupt. Alvermann shared in the aims of the “Oberhauseners,” and he later signed the second Oberhausen Manifesto (1965), which reiterated the calls of the first.

While the artistic milieu of West Germany shaped the design of *Algeria*, the politics of the liberal capitalist government might have halted its publication. Initially, Alvermann had approached the West German publisher, Rowohlt (a major and well-known publishing house in German), whose founder, Ernst Rowohlt, had agreed to publish the book. Rowohlt had lived through the Nazi days of censorship which drove him out of business and led to his eventual exile in Brazil. After the war, Ernst returned to Germany with newfound vigor and sought to satisfy the high demand of German readers who had been deprived for many years of international literature.⁵⁵⁶

With few resources in the meager post-war years, Ernst innovated a new format for his books: the Rowohlt-Rotations-Romanes or “rororo” which were printed in small, paperback format. These texts, which represented authors from all over the world, were printed in large volume, upwards of 100,000, and to great success.⁵⁵⁷ *Algeria*, initially conceived of as a “rororo,” would have been part of this post-war effort to revive a democratic publishing industry

⁵⁵⁵ Sabine Hacke, “West German Cinema, 1962-1990,” in *German National Cinema*, Second (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 156.

⁵⁵⁶ Jan-Pieter Barbian, *The Politics of Literature in Nazi Germany Books in the Media Dictatorship* (New York and London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 1943. He had tried to toe the line for as long as possible before his exile, reorienting his business toward apolitical fiction and travel literature. Yet, he did not dismiss his Jewish employees and continued to publish some material considered undesirable which eventually led to his exile.

⁵⁵⁷ Harry Bergholz, “Survey of Book and Music Publishing in Post-War Germany,” *The Modern Language Journal* 34, no. 8 (December 1950): 619.

free from government influence. However, the political climate of the Cold War, shaped profoundly by successive wars of decolonization in the 1950s, turned the tides once again.

The Algerian War was politically complicated for the West Germans who simultaneously sought to reconcile with France following World War II and to forge strong relationships with newly independent states in Africa and the Middle East.⁵⁵⁸ West Germany was initially a place of refuge for FLN organizers, and the Algerian cause one of enthusiastic support among West German youths.⁵⁵⁹ An unofficial FLN delegation had travelled to the provisional capital of Bonn to take part in political discussion with Hans-Jürgen Wischniewski, the leader of the opposition Social Democrat party in the German parliament. While these discussions were taking place, *La Main Rouge*, a foreign section of the French secret service, detonated a car bomb that killed several people.⁵⁶⁰

Meanwhile, Rowohlt retired and was replaced with his son, Heinrich Maria Ledwig-Rowohlt, who took *Algeria* off the publishing list.⁵⁶¹ With tensions mounting between West Germany and France due to the “Algerian Problem,” perhaps Heinrich felt that the situation was now too politically intense to publish *Algeria* without negative repercussions. Alvermann was forced to go to the East German publisher, Rütten & Loenig, although he later recounted that

⁵⁵⁸ Mathilde Von Bülow, “West German Diplomacy and the Algerian War,” in *West Germany, Cold War Europe and the Algerian War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 57.

⁵⁵⁹ Quinn Slobodian, “Bandung in Divided Germany: Managing Non-Aligned Politics in East and West, 1955-1963,” *Journal of Imperial & Commonwealth History* 41, no. 4 (November 1, 2013): 649–50. In April of 1958, Arab students in West Germany led a silent march of 70 protesters in Bonn alongside other African, Asian and German students against the French war, carrying signs reading ‘End the War of Extermination in Algeria’, ‘Algeria Fights for Human Rights’, ‘Self-Determination for Algeria’ and ‘No Ambiguous (zweideutig) Freedom’.

⁵⁶⁰ For a thorough account of the role of La Main Rouge during the Algerian War, see Nicolas Lebourg, “La Main rouge : complots, terrorismes et appareils d’état,” *Matériaux pour l’histoire de notre temps*, no. 139–142 (2021): 8–15.

⁵⁶¹ Alvermann, *Algeria*, n.p.

copies of *Algeria* still made their way into West Germany, given the small, transportable format of the book (measuring 11 x 18.5 cm), where it was very well received.⁵⁶²

Algeria demonstrates that the Cold War and Algerian War were not distinct developments, but rather interwoven aspects of a complex geopolitical setting. This is brought to bear at multiple points within the making, publication, and reception of the photobook. First, in the collaboration between Alvermann and the ALN soldiers who facilitated his journey across the Morice Line and provided incomparable insight into their daily lives. Second, in the influence of Eisenstein's film theories, thoroughly espoused by the Soviets, on Alvermann who was involved in an artistic milieu that critiqued the government for intentionally stagnating artistic expression and rendering it watered down and apolitical. And third, in Rowohlt's cancellation of the book, which seems to stem directly from West German's torn political affiliations.

***Algeria Torturata* (1961)**

Much like Alvermann's *Algeria* (1960), the legacy of World War II is also registered in *Algeria Torturata* (Tortured Algeria, 21 x 18 cm), published in Milan, Italy in 1961. Authored by Aziz Izzet and illustrated with images by anonymous photographers, the photobook is devoted to divulging and critiquing French practices of censorship, torture, sexual violence, summary executions, and internment during the Algerian War.⁵⁶³ In comparison to Alvermann, Izzet even more pointedly structures his discourse on the Algerian War around the recent memory of the Holocaust. Since it is axiomatic (especially these days) to say that not all Nazi comparisons are

⁵⁶² Parr, "Dirk Alvermann," 84.

⁵⁶³ Little is known about the author, Aziz Izzet, other than he was a writer and translator and that the name Aziz suggests some connection to the Arab world. While only speculation, *Algeria Torturata* is potentially the only photobook to emerge from the Algerian War from an Arab perspective. Although the text is both in Italian and French, the photobook was no doubt censored due to its anti-colonial content. However, it was likely well-received in Italy, at least among leftists who were supportive of Algerian independence.

valid, I do not wish to debate whether Izzet's equation of the Holocaust and Algerian War is fair. Rather, I am interested in investigating the political outcomes of analogizing these two different histories of extreme violence in the public sphere.

The theoretical framework for my analysis of this photobook is based on Michael Rothberg's theory of multi-directional memory.⁵⁶⁴ In his theory, Rothberg argues that when different histories confront each other in the public sphere (in this case, the Holocaust and the Algerian War), memory works *productively*. In other words, the result is not that one memory is subordinated to another, but that *more* memory is being created. Additionally, Rothberg argues that the linking of Nazi genocide and colonialism demonstrates how histories of one marginalized social group might help others make claims for recognition and justice.⁵⁶⁵ I argue that *Algeria Torturata* is an example of multi-directional memory-making in that histories and images of World War II contoured the presentation of the text and photographs in *Algeria Torturata*, rendering the Algerian Problem more legible and urgent to European viewers, and that, in turn, some aspects of the photobook might have also served to visualize aspects of World War II that were not visually recorded.

“No, these photographs were not taken from albums illustrating the horrors of Nazi camps. They were taken since the war in Algeria started.”⁵⁶⁶ This is the first line in Izzet's introduction which sets the tone for the rest of his essay, wherein he likens de Gaulle's government to the Third Reich:

A lot of noise has already been made about torture and the so-called ‘shelters,’ as much in France as in Algeria. But I do not believe that it is pointless to talk about it again, especially for those who continue to not believe it and who maintain that

⁵⁶⁴ Michael Rothberg, *Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009).

⁵⁶⁵ Michael Rothberg, *Multidirectional Memory*, 3-7.

⁵⁶⁶ Aziz Izzet, *Algeria Torturata* (Milan: Lerici editori, 1961), 37. “Non: ces photographies ne sont pas tirée d'un album illustrants les horreurs des camps nazis ; elles ont été prises depuis que la Guerre d'Algérie a commencé.”

such horrors could never be committed by the French or in France. These French, who are also good citizens, are in the same situation as a lot of Germans between 1933 and 1945, who could not believe it either; many of whom could not even know: propaganda was made to drive them to accept the necessity, to see the virtue, in these processes.⁵⁶⁷

With such a direct and condemnatory comparison, contemporary viewers, many of whom likely lived through World War II itself or at least in the post-war image environment that was steeped with atrocity photographs, thus encounter the fifteen photographs in the final pages of *Algeria Torturata* through the lens of the Holocaust.

One of the first photographs is of an alleged rape (figure 5.42 – c. 1954-1961). Izzet's accompanying text reads, "Under the menace of machine guns, a Muslim (to the left, his hand covering his eyes) witnesses the outrages that his wife suffers." As Izzet described, two Muslim men stand to the far left while two paratroopers in camouflage fatigues train their guns on them. In the center of the photograph are two figures: one supine, the other prone. The figure on top is also a fatigue-clad soldier. Only the bare right leg of the prone figure is discernible. From the photograph, it is impossible to even confirm whether the individual is alive or dead. Two additional soldiers exit the frame to the right, apparently unconcerned with what is taking place behind them.

This photograph, the only one of its kind in *Algeria Torturata* and one of two photographs of rape seen in the six photobooks discussed here (the other in *Le martyre*, although that photograph is of the aftermath), reveals much about the politics of sexuality and masculinity among French soldiers. Whether the soldier pictured is actually raping or merely simulating the

⁵⁶⁷ Izzet, 37. "Beaucoup de bruit a déjà été fait autour des tortures et des camps dits d'hébergement, autant en France qu'en Algérie. Mais je ne crois pas qu'il soit inutile d'en reparler, surtout pour ceux qui continuent à ne pas y croire et qui maintiennent que pareilles horreurs ne sauraient être commises en France ni par des Français. Ces Français, qui sont aussi de bons citoyens, sont dans la même cas que beaucoup d'Allemands entre 1933 et 1945, qui, eux non plus ne pouvaient y croire ; beaucoup ne pouvaient même pas le savoir : la propagande était faite pour les conduire à accepter un jour la nécessité, voire la vertu, de ces procédés."

act, this photograph qualifies as a “trophy photograph,” a common genre among soldiers across many cultures and historical moments.⁵⁶⁸ The casualness with which the soldiers witness and enable the act suggests that the photographer had received permission to record the scene, if only implicitly, meaning that he (although there were women photographers as well, as we saw in chapter 4) was at the very least considered sympathetic to the French Army, if not a French soldier himself. This fact, and that all French soldiers appear willing participants in the crime, evinces that social cohesion among soldiers was created through sexual violence which was both a vehicle of masculine socialization and gender performance wherein brutality and mercilessness were valorized.⁵⁶⁹

There is significant and compelling evidence, generally collected testimonies from French soldiers who had served in Algeria during the war, but also from survivors, that rapes of this manner, which took place in broad daylight with witnesses unable to intervene, did indeed occur during the Algerian War. While deployed in Grand Kabylie, Rachid Abdelli, an Algerian serving in the Harka (auxiliary) corps, witnessed a serial raping of a young woman by French troops as well as Harka. The woman, according to Abdelli, cried for his help. He did not answer her calls nor did any other witnesses: “everyone closed their eyes on it.”⁵⁷⁰

Rape was a part of the military and cultural strategy of domination that was both enacted spontaneously and systematically against Muslim women.⁵⁷¹ In rural Algeria, French soldiers committed rape with regularity during and after “sweeps” of small towns and villages where,

⁵⁶⁸ Even if it is a simulation of rape, the woman and her husband are still being detained by gunfire and her bodily sovereignty violated.

⁵⁶⁹ Elissa Mailänder, “Making Sense of a Rape Photograph: Sexual Violence as Social Performance on the Eastern Front, 1939-1944,” *Journal of the History of Sexuality*, no. 3 (September 2017): 489–520. I am greatly indebted to Mailänder’s analysis of a similar rape photograph, unearthed recently by Romanian historian Adrian Cioflanca in the National Archives of Romania.

⁵⁷⁰ Marnia Lazreg, *Torture and the Twilight of Empire: From Algiers to Baghdad* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008), 155.

⁵⁷¹ Raphaëlle Branche, “Des viols pendant la Guerre d’Algérie,” *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d’histoire*, no. 75 (March 2002): 123–32.

according to military intelligence (usually outdated), insurgents might be hiding.⁵⁷² In the systematic mass rape of women in the region of the Ouadhias in Kabylia, Algerian author Mouloud Feraoun explained that the Algerian men were separated and executed, and the village turned into a military brothel.⁵⁷³

This photograph visualizes why witnesses to such crimes could not intervene and why so many rapes were never reported or prosecuted. Not only do two soldiers keep the Muslim men from intervening through armed force, but the number of soldiers involved in a case of rape, in this case, at least five soldiers plus the photographer, made it impossible for anyone to fight back or intervene. It also reduced the likelihood of reporting by fellow soldiers who, as seen here, were collectively implicated.⁵⁷⁴ Out of 636 cases prosecuted by the Constantine Permanent Tribunal of the Armed Forces, one of three of its type that disciplined some of the two million soldiers deployed by the French Army in Algeria, only thirteen were rapes.⁵⁷⁵

At the time of Izzet's publication, the fact of rape as a tool of oppression in the Algerian War was well-known among French citizens of the metropole. One case in particular, that of Djamila Boupacha, a member of the FLN who was tortured and raped while in the custody of the French Army, garnered international attention. The scandal became emblematic of the misdeeds that the French committed against Algerians and a key tool in the campaign to discredit France's claims to legitimacy. French intellectuals and politicians spoke out against the inhumane treatment that she endured, and Pablo Picasso even sketched a portrait of her (figure 5.43 –

⁵⁷² Natalya Vince and Stef Scagliola, "The Places, Traces, and Politics of Rape in the Indonesian and the Algerian Wars of Independence," in *Empire's Violent End: Comparing Dutch, British, and French Wars of Decolonization (1945-1962)*, ed. Thijs Brocades Zaalberg and Bart Luttikhuis (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2022), 98–100.

⁵⁷³ Mouloud Feraoun, *Jounal, 1955-1962: Reflections on the French Algerian War*, ed. James D. Le Sueur, trans. Mary Ellen Wolf and Claude Fouillade (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 166.

⁵⁷⁴ Vince and Scagliola, "The Places, Traces, and Politics of Rape in the Indonesian and the Algerian Wars of Independence," 99.

⁵⁷⁵ Vince and Scagliola, 97.

1961). As art historian Amanda Beresford has written, “The artist had a precedent during the Cold War for such activism on behalf of dissidents: portraits of the Greek Communist Nicholas Beloyannis in 1952 and the Americans Julius and Ethel Rosenberg in 1954 were commissioned by the PCF as part of campaigns to prevent or commemorate their execution.”⁵⁷⁶

L’Affaire Boupacha was transmitted and received in Holocaust terms. French philosopher Simone de Beauvoir’s iconic essay in support of Boupacha published in *Le Monde* in 1960 declared, “When those governing a country accept the crimes committed in its name, all citizens belong to a criminal nation. Will we consent to this being ours?”⁵⁷⁷ Beauvoir’s attribution of guilt to all French citizens is reminiscent of the collective blame placed upon Germans after World War II.⁵⁷⁸ Beauvoir’s readers understood the correlation that the philosopher was making. In a letter responding to Beauvoir’s essay, one reader, who described himself as a member of the French resistance during World War II, wrote, “I always thought that Germany and Germans were guilty because they tolerated the famous death camps where torture was the rule. [...] What is unthinkable is the apathy of the masses before such trials and in FRANCE. I do not want to belong to this mass.”⁵⁷⁹ Upon reading of Boupacha’s experiences in *L’Express*, another reader, also a former *résistant*, wrote in to say, “This reminds me too much of Gestapo procedures.”⁵⁸⁰

⁵⁷⁶ Amanda Beresford, “Picasso’s Les Femmes d’Alger Series (1954-55) and the Algerian War of Independence,” *The Journal of the Western Society for French History*, 43 (2015): 107.”

⁵⁷⁷ Simone de Beauvoir, “Pour Djamila Boupacha,” *Le Monde*, June 2, 1960, 6. “Quand les dirigeants d’un pays acceptent que des crimes se commettent en son nom, tous les citoyens appartiennent à une nation criminelle. Consentirons-nous à ce que ce soit le nôtre ? ”

⁵⁷⁸ Jeffrey K. Olick, “The Guilt of Nations?,” *Ethics and International Affairs* 17, no. 2 (2003): 109. Olick’s article discusses the wholesale incrimination of the German people after the fall of the Nazi regime. The occupying forces after the war spread posters that said, “These atrocities: your fault!”

⁵⁷⁹ Sophia Millman, “I Beg You to Tell Me What Has Become of Djamila’: The Political Mobilization of Simone de Beauvoir’s Readers During the Boupacha Affair,” *Chère Simone de Beauvoir: A Bilingual Research Blog* (blog), March 20, 2020, <https://lirecrire.hypotheses.org/2952>. The blog post in which this letter is quoted and translated by Millman is a condensed version of her MA thesis.

⁵⁸⁰ As quoted by Maya Boutaghou in “Trois puissantes femmes : Simone de Beauvoir, Gisèle Halimi, Djamila Boupacha : Entre lutte anticoloniale et combat féministe,” *Dalhousie French Studies* 103 (Fall 2014): 15. My translation from the original French.

Later, Beauvoir and Boupacha's lawyer, Tunisian Gisèle Halimi, further solidified this transcultural and transhistorical comparison in their jointly written text, *Djamila Boupacha* (1962), which disparaged the torture committed during the Algerian War: "Either – despite your willing and facile grief over such past horrors as the Warsaw ghetto or the death of Anne Frank – you align yourselves with our contemporary butchers rather than their victims, and give your unprotesting assent to the martyrdom which thousands of Djamilas and Ahmeds are enduring in your name, almost, indeed, before your very eyes..."⁵⁸¹ Clearly, in the case of Beauvoir and Halimi's defense of Boupacha, the recent history of World War II was activated to prevent French public indifference.

Izzet calls upon photography toward similar ends by using photographs that, he says himself in the introduction, immediately evoked those that emerged from Nazi concentration camps. The photographs that Izzet references were largely taken by the Nazis themselves and often showed them willingly participating in the crimes being pictured. Women and girls huddled together, dressed only in their underclothes or naked, abound in Nazi photography, many of which were taken at the time of mass executions. In Latvia at Liepaja, for example, where 3,000 people were murdered, an extant photograph (see figure 5.44 – 1941) shows fields scattered with clothes and undressed women and girls, rendered utterly powerless and humiliated, forced to pose for the camera.⁵⁸²

A similar photograph of sexual humiliation (figure 5.45 – 1960) appears in *Algeria Torturata*. The photograph shows an older Algerian woman who is naked from the waist up, her breasts exposed to the camera. She appears to be sitting, perhaps among other women as a foot

⁵⁸¹ Simone de Beauvoir, "Introduction," in *Djamila Boupacha: The Story of the Torture of a Young Algerian Girl Which Shocked Liberal French Opinion*, ed. Simone de Beauvoir and Gisèle Halimi, trans. Peter Green (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1962), 20. Beauvoir might be referring to Ahmed Zabana who was guillotined in the Barberousse prison in Algiers in 1956.

⁵⁸² Janina Struk, "Images of Women in Holocaust Photography," *Feminist Review*, no. 88 (2008): 115.

with a woman's flat is seen in the background. It is unclear whether the woman is dressing or undressing or whether she is even aware that the photograph is being taken of her. Izzet's caption reads: "A fully-fledged French woman," a sardonic comment meant to chastise the French government for its stance that Algeria *was* France when clearly the inhabitants of Algeria did not enjoy the same protections that their metropolitan counterparts did.

Not only do these photographs correspond visually to Nazi photographs of atrocities, but their production and eventual transformation into evidence in *Algeria Torturata* reproduced the same processes that unfolded regarding Nazi photography during and after World War II. While many soldiers throughout history have taken photographs of their wartime experiences, none did so as systematically as the Nazis, a process that the invention of the 35 mm camera, with its fast shutter speed and practical size, enabled, and due to Nazi policy, which encouraged soldiers to take personal photographs that might then be published and distributed propagandistically.⁵⁸³ These trophy photographs, including those taken at Liepaja, which previously resided in the private collections of German soldiers and SS men, in turn, became evidence at the Nuremberg trials (1947-1949) and the Stutthof trials in Poland (1946-1947).⁵⁸⁴ Similarly, the impulse to record a personalized experience of the war was clearly shared by French soldiers fighting in Algeria which were then smuggled out of Algeria and given to Izzet (or, at least, this is what Izzet insinuates in the introduction to the photobook) who reproduced the photograph as evidence of French war crimes in *Algeria Torturata*.

Izzet's text also reproduces several photographs of French soldiers torturing Algerian prisoners. Of the four torture photographs in *Algeria Torturata* that clearly document various

⁵⁸³ Mailänder, "Making Sense of a Rape Photograph: Sexual Violence as Social Performance on the Eastern Front, 1939-1944," 508. For a general overview on Nazi photography practices, see also Peter Osborne, *Traveling Light: Photography, Travel, and Visual Culture* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000).

⁵⁸⁴ Struk, "Images of Women in Holocaust Photography," 118.

forms of torture, the first appears to be torture by humiliation and electrocution, commonly practiced in Algeria (figure 46).⁵⁸⁵ A Muslim man is seen splayed out on the ground, his hands bound and secured above his head almost in a crucifix position. Given the poor quality of the photograph, it is not apparent how the legs have been secured, but it is clear that the victim is completely immobilized and rendered powerless. The man's shirt is open, and his chest exposed. Most torture that the French military conducted against Muslims in Algeria first involved stripping the captive of his clothing. This was meant to weaken the prisoner's psychological defense.⁵⁸⁶ Three French paratroopers, one of whom is in a relaxed, reclined position, casually observe. While initially taken to commemorate the rituals of violence that affirmed the power relations between occupier and occupied, within the pages of *Algeria Torturata*, the photograph is transformed into a modern emblem of martyrdom, a restaging of the torture and humiliation of Christ. Although claiming to have the moral high ground (a claim made again and again in *Aspects véritables*), here, the French soldiers are transformed into Christ's Roman persecutors.

Fanon addressed the psychological consequences of torture, both on the torturer and the victim of torture, in the final and harrowing chapter of *The Wretched of the Earth*. His case studies offer insight into the processes taking place in the above photograph. Fanon's interview with a European police inspector, who sought psychiatric evaluation after exhibiting aggression toward his wife and children, provides insight into the mind of the torturer:

In fact, you need to use your head in this kind of work (torture). You need to know when to tighten your grip and when to loosen it. You have to have a feel for it. When the guy is ripe, there's no point continuing to hit him. That's why it's best to do your own work, you can judge better how you're doing. I'm against those who get others to work the guy over and then pop in every so often to see how he's doing. The golden rule is never give the guy the impression he won't get out alive. He'll then wonder what's the use of talking if it won't save his life. In

⁵⁸⁵ Lazreg, *Torture and the Twilight of Empire: From Algiers to Baghdad*, 124.

⁵⁸⁶ Lazreg, 123.

that case you'll have no chance at all of getting anything out of him. He has to go on hoping: It's hope that makes them talk.⁵⁸⁷

Fanon recalled that the inspector had no intention of giving up his job as a torturer, but that he wanted help torturing Algerian patriots without having a guilty conscience and without exhibiting aggression toward his loved ones outside of the torture chamber.⁵⁸⁸

Fanon also wrote about the effects of torture on the mind of the victim. According to Fanon, different types of torture resulted in different types of mental disorders. After studying a group of torture victims who had all been electrocuted, such as the man in the photograph above, he found that many of them shared symptoms. These symptoms included pins and needles sensations, and feeling that their hands were being torn off, their heads were exploding, and that they were swallowing their own tongues. Many of them also exhibited a phobia of electricity, and were afraid of touching a light-switch, a radio, and of using a telephone.⁵⁸⁹ Fanon's work with torturers and torture victims in Algeria ultimately led to his defection from the French Army. He resigned from his post as *chef de service* at the Blida-Joinville Psychiatric Hospital in Algeria in 1956 and joined the FLN. He remained devoted to Algerian liberation until his death in 1961.

Like rape, the torture that the French military frequently inflicted against political dissidents during the Algerian War was also transmitted and understood in Holocaust terms. In *La Question* (1958) by Henri Alleg, which was censored but still broadly circulated and read during the war, the author details his torture at the hands of French parachutists in 1957 during which he endured electroshock, waterboarding, suspension by rope upside down, and injections of sodium pentothal (a psychoactive drug sometimes referred to colloquially as "truth serum").

⁵⁸⁷ Fanon, "Colonial War and Mental Disorders," in *The Wretched of the Earth*, 198.

⁵⁸⁸ Fanon, "Colonial War and Mental Disorders," 199.

⁵⁸⁹ Fanon, "Colonial War and Mental Disorders," 210-211.

In the first lines of the preface, French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre evokes the history of Nazi torture in Paris. His poignant words are worth quoting at length:

In 1943, in the Rue Lauriston (the Gestapo headquarters in Paris), Frenchmen were screaming in agony and pain. All of France could hear them. In those days, the outcome of the war was uncertain and the future unthinkable, but one thing seemed impossible in any circumstances: that one day men should be made to scream by those acting in our name. [...] During the war, when the English radio and the clandestine Press spoke of the massacre of Oradour, we watched the German soldiers walking inoffensively down the street and would say to ourselves: ‘They look like us. How can they act as they do?’ And we were proud of ourselves for not understanding.⁵⁹⁰

Implying that French citizens were now playing the role of the Nazis would have certainly hit a nerve among French readers.

There is also evidence that French torturers even compared themselves to the Nazis. Later in the text, Alleg recounted that paratroopers would secretly visit him during rest periods to convey their admiration of his resilience. One trooper even asked him if Alleg had experienced torture already at the hands of the gestapo in World War II, an implicit comparison. If Alleg’s account is to be believed, the French trooper’s statements demonstrates that he clearly understood the moral gravity of the torture they inflicted upon Alleg. Moreover, during one torture session, Alleg claims that his torturer declared, “This is the gestapo here! You know the gestapo?”⁵⁹¹ Although Alleg’s torturer likely sought to sow fear by invoking the gestapo, this comparison, if Alleg’s allegations are true, still suggests that French torturers saw themselves as inheritors of the gestapo’s nefarious reputation.

Sartre’s play *The Condemned of Altona* (1959) offers another example of the *noeud de mémoire* so prevalent during the Algerian War. The setting of the play is post-war Germany and follows the mental breakdown of a Nazi war hero named Frantz who cannot come to terms with

⁵⁹⁰ Henri Alleg, *The Question* (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2006), xxvii–xxviii.

⁵⁹¹ Alleg, 47.

his guilt or Germany's defeat. The play ends by disclosing that Frantz had tortured villagers living on the Eastern Front. Audiences readily grasped the play's allegorical meaning as an indictment of the torture committed by French paratroopers.⁵⁹²

While the rape photograph discussed above visually corresponded to the Nazi trophy photographs that emerged post-1945, the photographs of torture in *Algeria Torturata* cannot be said to make this kind of direct reference. Nazi torture practices, broadly speaking, were of course documented through the photographing of concentration camps where interned Jews were starved, lived in dense quarters, ill-equipped against exposure, and forced to do strenuous labor. However, there are not currently any extant photographs of any German soldier in the process of conducting torture to derive information from a prisoner (although photographs of Nazi atrocities are still being unearthed all the time). In this sense, the flow of multi-directional memory in *Algeria Torturata* is reversed. Instead of Nazi photography being the reference point for viewers, a new reference point for thinking about and remembering the Holocaust is perhaps offered to viewers.

Furthermore, while the photographs in *Algeria Torturata*, drew on a pre-existing visual discourse, these images also brought nuance to these discourses by confronting the French viewer with the undeniably Arab features of the victims. While the early multi-directional memory of the Algerian War was condensed with references to the Holocaust, these references were mainly made by French authors (Beauvoir, Sartre, and Alleg were all French) or French-looking colonial subjects (Djamila Boupacha and Gisèle Halimi wore their hair, clothes, and

⁵⁹² For a deeper analysis of the play and its reception in France, see Debarati Sanyal, "Crabwalk History: Torture, Allegory, and Memory in Sartre," *Yale French Studies*, no. 118/119 (2010): 52–71. Although I cannot fully address this in this chapter, I would be remiss to leave out Jim House's important article, "Memory and the Creation of Solidarity During the Decolonization of Algeria," *Yale French Studies*, Noeuds de mémoire: Multidirectional Memory in Postwar French and Francophone Culture, no. 118/119 (2010): 15–38. House's article reveals that the October 1961 massacre of Algerian protesters by Police in Paris constitutes an important node within this transhistorical discourse.

makeup in a European style) and communicated to ostensibly white French viewers. The eurocentrism of this discourse served as a substitute for explicit reference to previous colonial repression, underscoring that the French had a limited historical understanding of colonial racism.

As historian Jim House has shown, prior to 1945, French Republican anti-racism centered on antisemitism, a byproduct of the Dreyfus Affair. However, anti-racism and anti-colonialism, even on the left, were not the same. To be an anti-colonialist would mean being anti-French Republic. Whereas being anti-racist meant being anti-Fascist (antisemitism being highly correlated to conservative right-wing politics). The concept that there was a plurality of racisms, including colonial racism, did not gain traction until after World War II.⁵⁹³ Hence during the Algerian War, confronting the racialized colonial power relations affecting Algerians was facilitated through an analogy with "noncolonial" forms of racism practiced during the Occupation.

Izzet's photobook, however, shows the Algerians not as Gallicized, *musulman français*, but as Arabs, highlighting the importance of photography in developing a less restrictive definition of racism to which a new component could be added: the colonial system, the colonial state, and colonial society. Through picturing Muslim men in robes and turbans and veiled Algerian women, *Algeria Torturata* thus espouses a more transversal fight against racism, and one that was synonymous with anti-colonialism.

Algeria Torturata reveals the ways that the Holocaust figured in the European conscious at the time of the Algerian War and how the Algerian War figured into the history of France, a country whose identity had quite recently been entirely reforged by World War II. Strategically

⁵⁹³ House, "Memory and the Creation of Solidarity During the Decolonization of Algeria," 16–17.

strong from a discursive point-of-view, the photographs in *Algeria Torturata* that equated French colonialism to Nazi genocide ensured a bold but simple, understandable narrative. It characterized the situation as black-and-white, all-or-nothing, and indicted French colonialism to the highest degree. Furthermore, Nazi parallels were guaranteed to hit nerves and elicit sympathy for the oppressed population too. Activating the recent memory of World War II thus prevented French public indifference. Histories of the Nazi genocide of Jews, a non-colonial form of racism and domination, also offered contemporary viewers an alternative framework for thinking about and confronting the racialized colonial power relations affecting Algerians. Comparing the plight of Algerians with that of the Jews encouraged French metropolitans to engage in various forms of political or humanitarian identification and solidarity with other groups who were experiencing such domination. *Algeria Torturata* did the important work of nuancing this comparison by showing the Arab ethnicities of the victims of French colonial racism.

Coda

The six photobooks in this chapter provide a variety of insights into the role that photobooks played in the broader image environment of the Algerian War on both sides – a field that, as we have seen throughout this dissertation, was expansive. First, these photobooks elaborate the ways that vision became militarized during the Algerian War, not only because each side of the war quite literally used the photobook medium to construct their own narrative of the war, but because many of the photographs featured in these texts were meant to serve as “ethical reference points,” as Susan Sontag has put it.⁵⁹⁴ These images of suffering served to evoke outrage, quicken the conscience, and agitate viewers to take political or armed action. They also helped define what kinds of violence and retribution were permissible. In showing

⁵⁹⁴ Susan Sontag, *On Photography* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1977), 21.

atrocities against European settlers, groups like the UFNA sought to legitimize and justify the atrocities that they in turn committed against Algerians. Therefore, these photobooks also had some influence in the politics of wartime escalation, although to quantify that influence, more information on the publication and circulation of these texts would be needed.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, such an analysis also illustrates the extremely fraught relationship between photography and “truth.” Each photobook evinced a unified creative vision. Each claimed to tell the “whole story.” However, my research revealed that the format of the photobook enabled authors to construct an authoritative narrative through the selection, editing, and sequencing of images, and the addition of text and captions that inscribed images with new or additional meanings, and also allowed authors to emphasize certain “facts” while obscuring others.

The six photobooks presented here also complicate the visual history of the war. Though a political and military exchange between the French Army and the FLN, these photobooks remind us that this was also a civil war in addition to a war of decolonization in which vigilante settlers, French soldiers, and ALN soldiers frequently killed indiscriminately, making no distinction between combatant and civilian. The recurrent appearance of wounded, imprisoned, disfigured, and dead civilians (French and Algerian), demonstrates the multifarious ways that the Algerian War was figured as a humanitarian crisis both domestically and internationally within a multitude of moral communities whose viewers’ beliefs were reaffirmed, shaped, and informed through the picturing of human suffering. This discursive strategy, likely familiar to present-day viewers of these photobooks, enabled the authors of these texts to make a case for the justness and legitimacy of their cause through the picturing of the war’s victims (some of whom were

granted greater degree of dignity and privacy) and the kinds of victimization that occurred to them.

Conclusion

On March 18, 1962, a delegation of eight Algerian men representing the Gouvernement provisoire de la République algérienne stood atop the steps of the Hôtel du Parc in Évian-les-bains, France (figure 6.0 – 1962). Out of these men, only one remained from the photograph of the “groupe de six” (see figure 4.30 – c. 1954), the original founders of the FLN—Krim Belkacem. The rest were dead or in prison. Belkacem served as the sole Algerian signatory of the peace agreement that, at least on paper, brought an end to 132 years of French colonialism in Algeria, although independence officially came after a popular referendum the following July. Much had transpired in the nearly eight years between those two photographs, even more since 1920, the year that the French overseas empire had reached its greatest physical extent.⁵⁹⁵ What happened between 1920 and 1962 that led to this iconic moment when these men paused to have their picture taken before securing their nation’s independence? The visual culture of those forty-two years tells one facet of that history: the deterioration of France’s monopoly on the visual depiction of Algeria’s colonized population. This is of course not to say that Arab and indigenous Algerians never represented themselves through visual media or other means before 1920, but that after 1920, Algerians acquired a stronger, more sophisticated command of ephemeral and reproductive visual media. This enabled the Algerians to better reflect and communicate the needs and cultural identities of their communities among themselves and to France and the international community. It also allowed them to more incisively and directly critique, combat, and reconfigure the dominant, prevailing colonial narrative which had misrepresented and stereotyped them for over a century. In other words, in Algeria, the process

⁵⁹⁵ Martin Thomas, *The French Empire Between the Wars: Imperialism, Politics and Society* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 1.

of political decolonization unfolded alongside a process of visual decolonization, and visual decolonization at times entailed appropriating the colonizer's systems of representation.

At the beginning of this dissertation, Algeria as a political entity remained firmly in the clutches of France. Before World War I had even ended, Gouverneur Général Charles Lutaud envisioned the revitalization of the colony's tourism industry as an overt expression of imperial might. Lutaud set his sights on the parts of Algeria that were not fully integrated into the French colonial administration. In rendering travel feasible to the most remote locations like the Aurès mountains and Sahara Desert, regions that even the Romans had not been able to fully conquer, he sought to ensure France's legacy as one of the most powerful empires to have ever existed and Algeria its crown jewel. To do so, however, meant expanding the pre-existing modern European infrastructures already present in Algeria including autoroutes, steamship services, and railways to facilitate the journeys of colonial tourists. But the increasing prevalence of modern European technologies in Algeria was at odds with what actually enticed tourists there. Algeria, in the minds of French colonial tourists, was Ancient Rome's granary, a mythical place of abundance now inhabited by a decadent Arab population. Its lands stretched from its fertile Mediterranean coasts to the vast Sahara Desert where allegedly many seductive Ouled Naïls dancers performed in oasis villages, and itinerant Bedouins crested massive sand dunes atop camels.

This clash between modern and mythic, civilized and uncivilized played out within the travel posters of the epoch which railways and government congresses commissioned from a new generation of Orientalist artists. Several of these artists traveled to Algeria via the *prix Abdel-Tif*, a scholarship program instituted to develop the colony's cultural maturity and an essential component of Lutaud's vision of a "fully grown" Algeria. These posters were a site where

Lutaud's platform, which heralded Algeria as "la seconde France," collided with colonial nostalgia and desire. Poster designers reproduced Orientalist depictions of Algeria: *burnous*-clad shepherds taking refuge at an exotic oasis, Muslim men saying *salat* amid Ancient Roman ruins, and *chaoui* women living in primitive stone huts, far beyond the reaches of "civilization." Noticeably absent from these depictions, of course, were colonists, settlers, and any sign of the modern European infrastructure that would have facilitated Algeria's modern tourism industry, and the picturing of which would have tainted the fantasy. However, while the content of these posters preserved the enduring image of Algeria as an unspoiled paradise, free from European modernity, the modern visual languages that poster designers used were meant to communicate the colony's cultural maturity. These posters can thus be understood as part of a broader effort on the part of French colonists to nurture a cultural identity of their own, but one that drew enormously on the metropole, and one that pigeonholed Arab and indigenous Algerians as atavistic, unchanged by nearly a century of colonialism.

This new modern image of the colony was further distilled at the Exposition générale de la centenaire de l'Algérie in Oran in 1930. The refrain that Algeria was "la seconde France," no longer a colonial experiment, but an extension of the metropole across the Mediterranean, demarcated the place of prominence that French colonialists believed Algeria deserved in the empire. Claiming that French citizens in the metropole had become bored of exotic tales of camels, mirages, and fantasias, organizers of the centenary exhibition in Oran, most of whom were French colonists with prestigious positions in politics or finance, called attention to Algeria's modern industry and multiple exports. Centenary visual culture characterized the relationship between French *colon* and *indigène* as peaceful, collaborative, and fraternal, in

which the colonizer importantly served as mentor and guide whereas the colonized served as the willing, docile student.

In addition to crediting themselves with having reformed Algeria's lazy and unskilled indigenous population and having made them into productive workers who served France, French colonists also characterized themselves as the patrons of indigenous handicraft. Although relegated mainly to servile positions at the centenary, Arab and indigenous Algerians did exhibit their creative work in a small exhibition at the Maison Indigène in Algiers, far from the center of the celebrations held in Oran. Centenary discourse framed the revitalization of indigenous handicraft as one of the triumphs of French colonialism. Of course, this official discourse did not address that decades of brutal military violence, the introduction of capitalism and the disruption of the local economy, land seizures from nomadic and pastoral tribes, and the immigration of European settlers, all of which had undermined the traditional handicraft sector. Instead, French colonists presented themselves as the conservators of indigenous handicraft, traditions that would have otherwise been lost if not for their watchful eye.

Both the tourism industry and centenary celebrations demonstrate that French colonial officials had a strong control of the visual representation of the processes and consequences of conquest and colonialism, as well as of their relations with Arab and indigenous Algerians during the interwar period. But these representations were deceitful. French colonialism rapidly and violently changed the landscape and demography of Algeria beginning in the mid-nineteenth century. The modern European industries that had been established in Algeria depended on the appropriation of land and the violent subjugation of the people who had formerly lived off that land. Thus, every tourism poster that showed a pre-colonial paradise and every centenary poster that pictured the peaceful collaboration between *colon* and *indigène* papered over countless

razzias (violent raids) and elided the pauperization and acculturation of Algeria's Arab and indigenous inhabitants.

Although a new wave of organized resistance to French hegemony in North Africa was mounting during the interwar years, most notably by the foundation of the first Algerian nationalist organization, the *Étoile Nord-Africain* (ENA), in Paris in 1926, this was by no means a fully realized and unified front. Furthermore, French officials did not tolerate the existence of an oppositional party for long, and the ENA was forced to dissolve in 1929. Messali's early calls for independence were a radical notion at the time, even among his peers. The rhetoric of his movement, which included a blend of Marxist and popular Islamic themes, resonated with the working class, but alienated moderate Algerians who had been assimilated to French culture by the colonial educational system and even served in minor roles in the French administration. They strove for reform, not independence.

While the first two chapters of this dissertation suggest that French colonists largely controlled the image of the colonized population of Algeria during the interwar period, the third chapter indicates two momentous shifts brought about by World War II: one in the consciousness of Algerian nationalists and the other within French colonial discourse. First, Muslim Algerians displayed an increased capacity to take part in their own visual representation through the increased use of photography and cartoons in the indigenous press, and second, the French colonial apparatus displayed an increased concern, if only temporarily, for Muslim political opinion. In the late 1930s, the indigenous political press emerged as an important site where early conceptions of Algerian nationhood (its history, people, culture, values, and religion) came to be defined. The press also functioned as a means of advancing individual political candidacies and agendas, restoring dignity to Algeria's colonized population, and encouraging participation

in acts of political resistance. These journals, which began including photographs and cartoons in their pages, constitute early signs of the growing importance of visual media in establishing a unified and efficacious political front, although the leader of that front was yet to be determined.

My research on World War II propaganda in North Africa revealed the increased importance of Muslim political opinion among French officials. The Fall of France during World War II severely weakened the nation's global standing. Avoiding a rebellion in Algeria was of the utmost importance to the ongoing war effort, especially due to the colony's strategic location and multiple naval ports. Vichy and Free France propagandists therefore sought to evoke feelings of patriotism, or at least feelings of solidarity and loyalty toward France among the colonized. To do so, poster designers drew on Islamic art forms to appeal to the perceived religiosity of those viewers. Yet, the need for Arab and indigenous political support during World War II was not more important than maintaining colonial hegemony. Pétain and then Giraud's refusal to implement reforms was the final push that moderate Algerian politicians needed. With no hope for reform, there was no choice but to set political differences aside and to seek full independence from France. World War II thus unified formerly disparate factions of Algerian nationalists.

After World War II, the indigenous press remained a critical site of self-fashioning. Cartoons, illustrations, and photographs enabled the colonized to brazenly degrade, poke fun at, and ultimately undermine French colonial leaders in the post-war years, subjecting the French to a degradation similar to that which the indigenous had experienced under French rule. Visual imagery was also used to encourage solidarity with other French colonies and allowed Algerian nationalists to represent themselves as a unified entity with an authentic national identity. Thus, World War II ushered in a critical turning point in the revolutionary behavior of Algerian

nationalists. The immediate post-war years saw a turn toward visual media as a means of conveying revolutionary ideology among Algerian nationalists and also connecting their plight to other movements for independence in the Third World.

During the Algerian War, photography was the dominant system of representation on both sides. In chapter four, I discussed the myriad applications of photography as a weapon of psychological warfare, as a tool of power and domination, as a method of registering the experiences and attitudes of individual soldiers, as a medium capable of constructing false social realities, and as a means of subverting colonial authority. My research on the practices of the amateur military photographers working in the French Army's Service cinématographique des armées revealed that while the camera operated as a means of domination and weapon of psychological warfare in the hands of French soldiers, Algerian revolutionaries were at times able to infiltrate the colonizer's systems of representation and to insert counter-hegemonic narratives.

Furthermore, Algerian revolutionaries took the camera into their own hands. Not only was there a clandestine network of photographers working for the GPRA's Ministry of Information, headed by Mohamed Kouaci, whose work was featured prominently in *El Moudjahid*, the FLN's official journal, but revolutionaries also accommodated international photographers, making them their auxiliaries, in a sense. Allowing photographers like Kryn Taconis and, as was seen in chapter five, Dirk Alvermann, intimate access to their inner workings enabled the GPRA to communicate the "Algerian Problem" to an international audience. It also enabled the GPRA to furnish an official image of what an independent Algerian nation would look like, an image that was both modern and distinctly Arabo-Islamic.

One contour of the complex image environment that constituted the Algerian War that had gone under-acknowledged in the literature and to which I have sought to contribute is the existence of multiple photobooks containing photographs of atrocities. The photobook, as demonstrated by the fifth chapter, was a primary means of visually documenting and circulating imagery of the most nefarious, unspeakable, and unpardonable aspects of the war – torture, internment, summary executions, rape, civilian massacres, urban terrorism, and political assassinations. In chapter five, I discussed six photobooks, four of which were pro-French and two of which were pro-independence. Each text varied in size, motivation, appearance, and strategy, but all used photography to carry the photobook’s message.

The photobooks designed and published by the French government, military, and the UFNA sought to characterize the FLN as religious fanatics and terrorists, whereas those designed by international photographers and writers sought to reveal the atrocities that the French had committed against Algeria’s Arab and indigenous populations to an international audience. The Algerian War was thus not only depicted as a war against Islamic fanaticism and despotism by one side and a war of independence by the other, but as a humanitarian crisis by both sides. Although the GPRA did not commission a photobook of its own design, or at least, that work has not yet been discovered, the GPRA did facilitate Dirk Alvermann’s entry to Algeria across the Morice Line and allowed him access to refugee camps and to observe the lives and responsibilities of ALN soldiers. Alvermann’s photobook, *Algeria* (1960), suggests that the GPRA thoroughly understood the importance of neutralizing the distressing imagery within pro-French photobooks with ones that in turn called the morality of the French pacification effort of Algeria into question.

The final two chapters of this dissertation indicate that by the revolution, Algerians had acquired several means of self-representation through visual media, some of which were politically nuanced and subtle, while others were incredibly overt. First, Algerian revolutionaries were also able to infiltrate the SCA's propaganda machine, conveying messages of resistance to each other through the colonizer's lens. Second, the images that Kouaci and other Algerian photographers took and published in *El Moudjahid* were a critical component of visualizing the revolution from the Algerian point-of-view, creating solidarity with other Third World nations, and conveying the "Algerian Problem" to an international audience. Finally, the GPRA's conscription of international photographers who were clearly sympathetic toward their cause aided in this mission as well.

This dissertation has examined the visualization in ephemeral and reproductive media of the apogee, deterioration, and conclusion of French colonialism in Algeria as well as the genesis, fermentation, and apex of Algerian nationalism, two inextricable processes that took place simultaneously. It has shown that political agency went hand-in-hand with the ability to self-represent, to produce and disseminate broadly an image of oneself. These findings therefore suggest that in the instance of Algerian independence, national sovereignty and visual sovereignty were correlated concepts. The Algerian War has been variously called a "savage war of peace," a "diplomatic revolution," and "France's undeclared war."⁵⁹⁶ These are all fitting designations, but my dissertation has also shown that the Algerian War was also a war of images.

⁵⁹⁶ Here, I am referencing the work of three historians of the Algerian War: Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962* (New York Review of Books, 2006); Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Martin Evans, *Algeria: France's Undeclared War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

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Figures

Introduction




Figure 1.0: Poster inside the *Musée national du moudjahid* in Oran, Algeria. September 13, 2023.

Chapter 1



Figure 1.1: Gustave Auguste Debat. *Les Gorges du Rhumel*. Oil on canvas. n.d. Musée national Cirta, Constantine, Algeria.




Figure 1.2: Gustave Auguste Debat. *Les bains et piscines dans les Gorges du Rhumel*. Oil on canvas. n.d. Musée national Cirta, Constantine, Algeria.



Figure 1.3: Hugo d'Alési. *Chemins de fer PLM: Algérie* (PLM Railways: Algeria). Color lithograph. 105 x 75 cm. Paris: Imprimerie H. d'Alési & Lagrange. 1891. Bibliothèque Forney, Paris, France



Figure 1.4: Eugène Fromentin. *Une rue à El-Laghouat*. 142 x 103 cm. Oil on canvas. 1859. Musée de la Chartreuse. Douai, France.



Figure 1.5: Hugo d'Alési. *Compagnie Générale Transatlantique*. Color lithograph. 105 x 75 cm. Paris: Ateliers F. Hugo d'Alési. 1899. Bibliothèque Forney. Paris, France.




Figure 1.6: Édouard Herzig. *L'Algérie pittoresque* (*Picturesque Algeria*). Color lithograph. 105.5 x 74.5 cm. Algiers: Lithographie Baconnier. 1926. Archives nationales d'outre-mer. Aix-en-Provence, France.




Figure 1.7: Édouard Herzig. *Enluminure*. Gouache on paper. 46 x 37 cm. c. 1920. Private collection.



Figure 1.8: Édouard Herzig. *L'Hiver en Algérie*. Color lithography. 130 x 110 cm. Paris: E. Devers & Cie. c. 1910. Bibliothèque nationale de France. Paris, France.




Figure 1.9: Léon Carré. *Hivernage*. Color lithograph. 111 x 81 cm. 1921. Archives nationales d'outre-mer. Aix-en-Provence, France.



Figure 1.10: Léon Carré. *Villas du Sahel*. Oil on canvas. c. 1905-1906. Reproduced from Marion Vidal-Bué, “Léon Carré (1878-1942): Peintre de l’Algérie et des Mille et une nuits.” In *L’Algérie des peintres, 1830-1960* (Paris: Edisud, 2003), 93.



Figure 1.11: Léon Carré. *Le muletier (The Muleteer)*. Oil on canvas. 1910. Reproduced from Roger Benjamin “Travelling Scholarships and the Academic Exoticism” in *Orientalist Aesthetics: Art, Colonialism, and French North Africa, 1880-1930* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 150.




Figure 1.12: Léon Carré. *Breasts, Eyes, and Feeling* from *Le Jardin des Caresses*. Gouache and watercolor. 27 x 21.5 cm. Paris: Editions Germaine Raoult. 1912. Private collection. A copy of *Le Jardin des Caresses* can be found in the Metropolitan Museum of New York.



Figure 1.13: Jean-Léon Gérôme. *Snake Charmer*. Oil on canvas. 82.2 x 121cm. c. 1870. Sterling and Francine Clark Art Institute. Williamstown, Massachusetts.



La vie musulmane

LÉON CARRÉ

Figure 1.14: Léon Carré. *Muslim Life*. Mural in the Palais d'été, Algiers, Algeria. 1923. Reproduced from Jean Alazard, "Le Palais d'été du Gouverneur Général de l'Algérie," *Art et Décoration : Revue Mensuelle d'art Moderne*, July 1, 1923: 92.



Figure 1.15: Léon Carré. Detail of *Muslim Life*. Mural in the Palais d'été. 1923. Reproduced from Roger Benjamin "Travelling Scholarships and the Academic Exoticism" in *Orientalist Aesthetics: Art, Colonialism, and French North Africa, 1880-1930* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 153.



Figure 1.16: Léon Carré. Detail of *Muslim Life*. Mural in the Palais d'été. 1923. Reproduced from Marion Vidal-Bué, "Léon Carré (1878-1942): Peintre de l'Algérie et des Mille et une nuits." In *L'Algérie des peintres, 1830-1960* (Paris: Edisud, 2003), 93.



Figure 1.17: Léon Cauvy. *Hivernage*. Gouvernement Général de l'Algérie. Color lithograph. 104 x 74 cm. Paris: Imprimerie Cornille & Serre. Archives nationales d'outre-mer. 1930. Aix-en-Provence, France.




Figure 1.18: Paul Jobert. *Constantine*. Color lithograph. 100 x 62 cm. c. 1930. Paris: Imprimerie Lucien Serre et Compagnie. Archives nationales d'outre-mer. Aix-en-Provence, France.




Figure 1.19: Jean-Léon Gérôme. *Prayer in the Mosque*. Oil on canvas. 88.9 x 74.9 cm. 1871. Metropolitan Art Museum. New York, New York.



Figure 1.20: Paul Jobert. *Port d'Alger*. Oil on canvas. 149 x 248 cm. 1930. Musée du quai Branly. Paris, France.



Figure 1.21: Marcel Cerf. *Militants de l'Étoile nord-africain*. Gelatin silver print. 29.7 x 23.7 cm. 1936. Bibliothèque Historique de la Ville de Paris. Paris, France.

Chapter 2



Figure 2.1: Étienne Nasreddine Dinet. *Algérie: Exposition Coloniale, Marseille. Avril-Octobre. 1906*. Paris: Imprimerie Charles Verneau. Color lithograph. 129.5 x 92 cm. 1906. Reproduced in Béatrix Baconnier, *Algérie en affiches* (Paris: Éditions Baconnier, 2009), 169.



Figure 2.2: Auguste Vimar. *Exposition Coloniale: Marseille 1906*. Postcard. 8.8 x 14 cm. Marseille: Moullot Fils Ainé, Marseille. Postcard. 1906.

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Prix : 15°

Le Journal des Voyages



Au Jardin Colonial




Figure 2.3: Georges Conrad. *Au Jardin Colonial: Les Touareg du Sahara*. Grand Exhibition organisée par le *Journal des voyages* à l'exposition coloniale de Nogent. As seen on the cover of *Le Journal des voyages*. May 19, 1907. Bibliothèque nationale de France. Paris, France.



Figure 2.4: Leonetto Cappiello. *Exposition Coloniale: Marseille, 1922*. Paris: Atelier d'art Devambez. Color lithograph. 120 x 75cm. 1922. Bibliothèque Forney. Paris, France.



Figure 2.5: Horace Vernet. *Les colonnes d'assaut se mettent en mouvement lors du siège de Constantine, 13 octobre 1837*. Oil on canvas. 512 x 1039 cm. 1838. Collections of the Château de Versailles. Versailles, France.



Figure 2.6: Horace Vernet. *Assaut de Constantine, le 23 octobre 1837*. Oil on canvas. 512 x 518 cm. 1838-1839. Collections of the Château de Versailles. Versailles, France.



Figure 2.7: Horace Vernet. *Prise de la smalah d'Abd-el-Kader, le 10 mai 1843*. Oil on canvas. 489 x 2170 cm. 1843-1847. Collections of the Château de Versailles. Versailles, France.



Figure 2.8: Théodore Chassériau. *Jeune fille maure assise dans un riche intérieur*. Oil on canvas. 41 x 32.3 cm. 1853. Private collection. Paris, France.



Figure 2.9: Théodore Chassériau. *Intérieur de harem*. Oil on canvas. 55 x 66.5 cm. 1856. Musée du Louvre. Paris, France.



Figure 2.10: Eugène Delacroix. *Les Femmes d'Alger dans leur appartement*. Oil on canvas. 85 x 112 cm. 1845-1847. Musée Fabre. Montpellier, France.



Figure 2.11: Théodore Chassériau. *Deux cavaliers arabes devant une fontaine de Constantine romain*. Oil on canvas. 81 x 65 cm. 1851. Musée des Beaux-Arts. Lyons, France.

VILLE DE PARIS
PETIT PALAIS
(CHAMPS-ÉLYSÉES)



EXPOSITION DU CENTENAIRE
DE LA
CONQUÊTE DE L'ALGÉRIE
Mai - Juin 1930

Figure 2.12: Unknown artist. *Exposition du centenaire de la conquête de l'Algérie, Mai – Juin 1930*. Unknown printer, Paris. 1930. Petit palais, Musée des beaux-arts de la Ville de Paris. Paris, France.



Figure 2.13: Théodore Chassériau. *Ali-Ben-Hamet, Caliph of Constantine and Chief of the Haractas followed by his Escort*. Oil on canvas. 325 x 259 cm. 1845. Collections of the Château de Versailles. Versailles, France.




Figure 2.14: Entrance of the Exposition générale du centenaire de l'Algérie with the Grand Palais seen opposite. Pictured in Gustave Mercier, *Le centenaire de l'Algérie. Exposé d'ensemble. Tome 2* (Algiers: Éditions P. and G. Soubiron, 1931), 17.




Figure 2.15: General view of the Exposition générale du centenaire de l'Algérie from the Grand Palais. Pictured in Gustave Mercier, *Le centenaire de l'Algérie. Exposé d'ensemble. Tome 2* (Algiers: Éditions P. and G. Soubiron, 1931), 17.



Figure 2.16: View of the Pavillon de l'Agriculture. Pictured in Gustave Mercier, *Le centenaire de l'Algérie. Exposé d'ensemble. Tome 2* (Algiers: Éditions P. and G. Soubiron, 1931), 37.



Figure 2.17: View of the Pavillon de l'Automobile. Pictured in Gustave Mercier, *Le centenaire de l'Algérie. Exposé d'ensemble. Tome 2* (Algiers: Éditions P. and G. Soubiron, 1931), 37.



Figure 2.18: View of the Pavillon de l'Ameublement. Pictured in Gustave Mercier, *Le centenaire de l'Algérie. Exposé d'ensemble. Tome 2* (Algiers: Éditions P. and G. Soubiron, 1931), 33.



Figure 2.19: Henri Dormoy. *L'Algérie: Pays de grande production agricole*. Color lithograph. 75 x 106 cm. Paris: Édition publicitaire. 1930. Archives nationales d'outre-mer. Aix-en-Provence, France.



Figure 2.20: S.M. Salgé. *Exposition générale du centenaire de l'Algérie, Oran*. Color lithograph. 108.5 x 75.5 cm. Marseille: Imprimerie Moullot. 1930. Archives nationales d'outre-mer. Aix-en-Provence, France.




Figure 2.21: Léon Cauvy. *Centenaire de l'Algérie*. Color lithograph. 73 x 103 cm. Algiers: Imprimerie Baconnier. 1930. Archives nationales d'outre-mer. Aix-en-Provence, France.



Figure 2.22: Santos. *Centenaire de l'Algérie*. Color lithograph. 120 x 80 cm. Algiers: Affiches Jules Carbonel. 1930. Reproduced from Béatrix Baconnier, *Algérie en affiches* (Paris: Editions Baconnier, 2009), 169.




Figure 2.23: Louis Marie Eude. *Centenaire de l'Algérie*. Montrouge: Draeger Imprimerie. Color lithograph. 62 x 100 cm. 1930. Reproduced from Béatrix Baconnier, *Algérie en affiches* (Paris: Editions Baconnier, 2009), 176.



Figure 2.24: George Béguet. *Centenaire de l'Algérie française*. Bronze medallion. 60 mm. 1930. Musée Carnavalet. Paris, France.



Figure 2.25: Pierre Poisson. *Centenaire de l'Algérie française*. Bronze Medallion. 70 mm. 1930. Musée Carnavalet. Paris, France.



Figure 2.26: An image from George Rozet's, *L'Algérie* (Paris: Éditions des Horizons de France, 1929), n.p. Bibliothèque nationale de France. Paris, France.



Figure 2.27: A page from George Rozet's *Alger, Blida, et la Vallée du Chélif* (Paris: Le Commissariat Générale du Centenaire, Horizons de France, 1929), n.p. Bibliothèque nationale de France. Paris, France.




Figure 2.28: M. Toussaint. Cover of Pierre Demousson's *Le centenaire de l'Algérie*. Vol. 488. *Les livres roses pour la jeunesse*. Paris: Librairie Larousse, n.d. Bibliothèque nationale de France. Paris, France.



Figure 2.29: Postcard with photograph of Ouled Naïl dancer. Services photographiques du Gouvernement Général de l'Algérie. 1930. Bibliothèque nationale de France. Paris, France.




Figure 2.30: Postcard with photograph of indigenous man in traditional garb. Services photographiques du Gouvernement Général de l'Algérie. 1930. Bibliothèque nationale de France. Paris, France.



Figure 2.31: Stamp featuring a view of the Admiralty, northern jetty of the Old Port of Algiers. Institut de Gravure. 1930. Reproduced from Gustave Mercier, *Le centenaire de l'Algérie. Exposé d'ensemble. Tome 1* (Algiers: Éditions P. and G. Soubiron, 1931), 170.



Figure 2.32: Stamp featuring a view of the new Port of Algiers. Institut de Gravure. 1930. Reproduced from Gustave Mercier, *Le centenaire de l'Algérie. Exposé d'ensemble. Tome 1* (Algiers: Éditions P. and G. Soubiron, 1931), 170.




Figure 2.33: Photograph of the Maison Indigène picturing architect Léon Claro in suit and tie at the center. 1930. Reproduced from Léon Claro, *La maison indigène* (Paris: Actes Sud, 2020), n.p.



Figure 2.34: Parti français communiste and Confédération générale du travail unitaire. *Cent ans de domination française*. 80 x 60 cm. 1930. Archives nationales d'outre-mer. Aix-en-Provence, France.

Chapter 3



Figure 3.1: Portrait of Doctor Mohammed Saleh Bendjelloul. "Biography of Glory and Covenant Pride." *Al-Maydân*. July 11, 1937, 1. Bibliothèque nationale de France. Paris, France.



Figure 3.2: Portrait of Emir Khaled. "Biography of Glory and Pride." *Al-Maydân*. July 11, 1937, 1. Bibliothèque nationale de France. Paris, France.




Figure 3.3: B. Amor. “École du peuple algérien.” *Le Parlement algérien*. May 18, 1939, 1. Bibliothèque nationale de France. Paris, France.



Figure 3.4: B. Amor. “Union!” *Le Parlement Algérien*. July 1, 1939, 1. Bibliothèque nationale de France. Paris, France.




Figure 3.5: B. Amor. "The Prefecture Council annuls the election of Douar and proclaims Zerrouk Mahieddine elected." *Le Parlement algérien*. June 9, 1939, 1. Bibliothèque nationale de France. Paris, France.



Figure 3.6: Unknown photographer. "Libérez Messali (Liberate Messali)." *El Ouma: organe national de défense des intérêts des musulmans algériens, marocains et tunisiens*. March 11, 1938, 1. Bibliothèque nationale de France. Paris, France.

Les héros de la cause algérienne



(1) FILLALI AMBARCK (2) DJILLANI (3) JELLOUL (4) GUENANECH (5) DJELLOH
(6) BELOSMANE (7) TILLALI ALI et GHERAFA BRAHIM

Vois-tu, peuple algérien, la prison n'altère pas les hommes! L'exemple est retentissant. Voyons nos braves militants qui viennent d'être libérés; ils sont contents de vous montrer que tout à une fin. De ce fait, soyez persuadés que malgré toutes les entraves que mettra devant nous l'impérialisme français, l'Algérie sortira un jour prochain libre et prospère de dessous la botte du colon, à l'instar de ces héros qui connaissent maintenant ce que c'est que la prison et qui, dès leur sortie, n'ont pas hésité un seul instant pour reprendre leur place respective dans la lutte, plus acharnée que jamais, pour notre droit à la vie. Ces exemples tout frais doivent anéantir en vous l'influence de l'intimidation et vous sortir de l'hésitation pour vous mettre tous en avant pour la conquête de vos droits.

O! vous tous! héros de la cause algérienne, nous vous disons: bravo! et le peuple vous en sera reconnaissant.

Et vous, qui vous êtes cachés jusqu'ici... Sortez! N'ayez pas peur et soyez les bienvenus!

EL-OUMA.

Figure 3.7: Unknown photographer. "Les héros de la cause algérienne (The heroes of the Algerian cause)." *El Ouma: organe national de défense des intérêts des musulmans algériens, marocains et tunisiens*. March 1, 1939, 1. Bibliothèque nationale de France. Paris, France.



Figure 3.8: Unknown artist (signed SPK in upper-left). *Dakar – Mers el-Kébir*. 160 x 119 cm. Color lithograph. 1940. Archives nationales d'outre-mer. Aix-en-Provence, France.



Figure 3.9: Unknown artist. *N'oubliez pas Oran!* (*Don't Forget Oran!*). 119 x 86 cm. Color lithograph. 1940. Archives nationales d'outre-mer. Aix-en-Provence, France.




Figure 3.10: Géo-Michel. *Engagez-vous dans la marine (Join the Navy)*. Gouvernement général d'Algérie. 80 x 120 cm. Color lithograph. c. 1930. Archives nationales d'outre-mer. Aix-en-Provence, France.



Figure 3.11: Unknown artist. *Marshal Philippe Pétain and Admiral Jean Abrial, Governor of Algeria*. Algiers: La Typo-LithoCarbonel. 60 x 40 cm. Color lithography. 1940. Archives nationales d'outre-mer. Aix-en-Provence, France.




Figure 3.12: “The Marshal Watches Over the Empire.” 38.5 x 32cm. Color lithography. c. 1940-1942. Archives nationales d’outre-mer. Aix-en-Provence, France.



Figure 3.13: “The Marshal Watches Over the Empire.” 38.5 x 32cm. Color lithography. c. 1940-1942. Archives nationales d’outre-mer, Aix-en-Provence, France.



Figure 3.14: Unknown publisher. Leaflet with message from the President of the United States communicated by Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower distributed in North Africa. 1942. The National World War II Museum. New Orleans, Louisiana.



Figure 3.15: Unknown artist (perhaps signed in the bottom right as برنو which might be a transliteration for “Bruno”). *General Giraud Commanding the Allied Troops*. Color lithography. 57 x 39 cm. 1943. Algiers: Lith. Baconnier. Archives nationales d’outre-mer. Aix-en-Provence, France.



Figure 3.16: Unknown artist. Tais-tois (اسكُتْ اَنْتْ) (Shut up!). Algiers: Imprimerie Baconnier. Color lithography. 61 x 46 cm. 1943. Archives nationales d'outre-mer. Aix-en-Provence, France.



Figure 3.17: Tona. *Justice doit être faite, elle sera implacable, Winston Churchill* (*Justice Must Be Done, She Will Be Merciless, Winston Churchill*). Color lithography. 91 x 56 cm. Algiers: La Typo-LithoCarbonel. 1943. Archives nationales d'outre-mer. Aix-en-Provence, France.



Figure 3.18: Tona. *Notre Victoire est la Victoire de la liberté, Président Roosevelt* (*Our victory is the victory of liberty*). Color lithography. 91 x 56 cm. Algiers: La Typo-LithoCarbonel. 1943. Archives nationales d'outre-mer. Aix-en-Provence, France.



Figure 3.19: Lise Marche. “Les fruits véreux de la colonisation algérienne” (The wormy fruits of Algerian colonisation). *Égalité*. November 24, 1944, 1. Bibliothèque nationale de France. Paris, France.



Figure 3.20: Unknown photographer. “Un fils de fellah qui ne connaît pas l’école” (The son of a peasant who does not know school). *Égalité*. September 22, 1944, 1. Bibliothèque nationale de France. Paris, France.



Figure 3.21: Unknown artist. Caricature of General Henri Giraud. *Égalité*. September 6, 1946, 5. Bibliothèque nationale de France. Paris, France.



Figure 3.22: Flac. Cartoon of General Henri Giraud and Deputy François Quilici. *Égalité*. August 30, 1946, 1. Bibliothèque nationale de France. Paris, France.




Figure 3.23: Hacène, Khlar, Ouahioune & co. "Télégramme Béni-oui-oui et Sidi-Ali-Bounab: No inquiry Sidi-Ali Bouhab. Stop. Our honor at stake. Stop. Solid attachment." *L'Algérie libre*. December 15, 1949, 1. Bibliothèque nationale de France. Paris, France.



Figure 3.24: Unknown artist. "Guerre colonial." *Égalité*. January 16, 1947, 1. Bibliothèque nationale de France. Paris, France.



Figure 3.25: Unknown artist. "Manifeste du peuple algérien." *Égalité*. February 6, 1947, 1. Bibliothèque nationale de France. Paris, France.




Figure 3.26: Unknown photographer. "Où ils ont semé la misère à pleines mains, ils disent avoir donné la prospérité" ("Where they have sown misery with both hands, they say they have given prosperity"). *L'Algérie libre*. December 1, 1949, 1. Bibliothèque nationale de France. Paris, France.




Figure 3.27: Unknown photographer. “Un témoignage accablant” (“An overpowering testimony”). *L’Algérie libre*. February 1, 1950, 1. Bibliothèque nationale de France. Paris, France.

Chapter 4




Figure 4.1: M. Ranem. *Oui : Route de la justice et de la fraternité* (Yes: Route of justice and fraternity). Color lithography. 100x65 cm. 1958. Archives nationales d’outre-mer. Aix-en-Provence, France.



Figure 4.2: Unknown. *Des enfants de Bou-Saâda courent pour attraper les tracts qui volent (The children of Bou-Saâda run to collect the flying tracts)*. Negative, cellulose acetate support. 6 x 6 cm. Service cinématographique des armées en Algérie © ECPAD/Défense. January 21, 1958.




Figure 4.3: Unknown artist. *Les complices des rebelles eux aussi seront punis. Parlons!* (The accomplices of rebels will also be punished. Let's talk!). Color lithography. 64.5 x 50 cm. Algiers: La Typo-Litho. 1957.



Figure 4.4: France Vilar. *Un habitant de Gallieni en tenue traditionnelle pose avec un tract distribué par la compagnie de hauts-parleurs et de tracts (CHPT) (A habitant of Gallieni in traditional garb poses with a tract distributed by the CHPT)*. Negative, cellulose acetate support. 6 x 6 cm. Service cinématographique des armées en Algérie © France Vilar/ECPAD/Défense. November 23, 1956.



Figure 4.5: France Vilar. *Moment de lecture du livre "La France et l'Union française" pour un enfant de Gallieni et des appelés du contingent de la CHPT (A reading moment of the book "France and the French Union" for a child of Gallieni and CHPT conscripts)*. Negative, cellulose acetate support. 6 x 6 cm. Service cinématographique des armées en Algérie © France Vilar/ECPAD/Défense. November 23, 1956.



Figure 4.6: France Vilar. *Un officier de la CHPT et un capitaine légionnaire présentent des panneaux photographiques aux habitants de Gallieni dans le cadre de l'action psychologique (A CHPT officer and a legionnaire captain present photographic panels in the cadre of a psychological action)*. Negative, cellulose acetate support. 6 x 6 cm. Service cinématographique des armées en Algérie © France Vilar/ECPAD/Défense. November 23, 1956.



Figure 4.7: Unknown. *Panneau photographique présenté par une compagnie de haut-parleurs et de tract (CHPT) devant la population masculine algérienne d'un village (Photographic panel presented by the CHPT before a population of Algerian men from a village)*. Negative, cellulose acetate support. 6 x 6 cm. Service cinématographique des armées en Algérie © Unknown/ECPAD/Défense. 1956.




Figure 4.8: Durr, Jacques. *Portrait de harki, participant à l'opération Espérance* (*Portrait of a harki participating in Opération Espérance*). Negative, cellulose acetate support. 6 x 6 cm. Service cinématographique des armées en Algérie © Jacques Durr/ECPAD/Défense. June 3-4, 1956.



Figure 4.9: Durr, Jacques. *Portrait de harki, participant à l'opération Espérance* (*Portrait of a harki participating in Opération Espérance*). Negative, cellulose acetate support. 6 x 6 cm. Service cinématographique des armées en Algérie © Jacques Durr/ECPAD/Défense. June 3-4, 1956.



Figure 4.10: Durr, Jacques. *Soldats et harki participant à l'opération Espérance (Soldiers and a harki participating in Opération Espérance)*. Negative, cellulose acetate support. 6 x 6 cm. Service cinématographique des armées en Algérie © Jacques Durr/ECPAD/Défense. June 3-4, 1956.



Figure 4.11: Choupin. *Une patrouille des spahis du 10e GESA dans les environs de Saïda (A patrol of spahis of the 10th GESA in the environs of Saïda)*. Negative, cellulose acetate support. 6 x 6 cm. Service cinématographique des armées en Algérie © Choupin/ECPAD/Défense. November 20, 1956.



Figure 4.12: Smet, Arthur. *Vue aérienne d'un centre de regroupement constitué de tentes traditionnelles appelées khaimas (Aerial view of a regroupement center constituted of traditional tents called khaimas)*. Negative, cellulose acetate support. 6 x 6 cm. Service cinématographique des armées en Algérie © Arthur Smet/ECPAD/Défense. 1960.



Figure 4.13: Smet, Arthur. *Soldat vaccinant une femme dans une tente traditionnelle de nomades à Ain Skhouna*. Negative (A soldier vaccinates a woman in a traditional nomadic tent at Ain Skhouna), cellulose acetate support. 6 x 6 cm. Service cinématographique des armées en Algérie © Arthur Smet/ECPAD/Défense. 1960.



Figure 4.14: Unknown photographer. France Vilar (née Angèle Risser) pictured (center) alongside French soldiers in Algeria (precise location unknown). c. 1956-1957. Private collection of Robin Risser. Paris, France.




Figure 4.15: Letter of commendation for France Vilar (née Angèle Risser) written by Captain Menuet. March 23, 1957. Private collection of Robin Risser. Paris, France.



Figure 4.16: Unknown photographer. France Vilar (née Angèle Risser) pictured (second woman from the left) among Kabyle women and children (precise location unknown). c. 1956-1957. Private collection of Robin Risser. Paris, France.



Figure 4.17: Unknown photographer. France Vilar (née Angèle Risser) pictured smiling (center) alongside several Kabyle boys and girls in Algeria (precise location unknown). c. 1956-1957. Private collection of Robin Risser. Paris, France.



Figure 4.18: Fatio, Jacques. *Fouille d'un prisonnier par des hommes du 9e RZ (régiment de zouaves), lors d'une opération en Kabylie (Search of a prisoner by the men of the 9th RZ during an operation in Kabylia)*. Negative, cellulose acetate support. 6 x 6 cm. Service cinématographique des armées en Algérie © Jacques Fatio/ECPAD/Défense. December 20-22, 1954.




Figure 4.19: Fatio, Jacques. *Fouille d'un prisonnier par des hommes du 9e RZ (régiment de zouaves), lors d'une opération en Kabylie (Search of a prisoner by the men of the 9th RZ during an operation in Kabylia)*. Negative, cellulose acetate support. 6 x 6 cm. Service cinématographique des armées en Algérie © Jacques Fatio/ECPAD/Défense. December 20-22, 1954.



Figure 4.20: Fatio, Jacques. *Interrogatoire d'un prisonnier sous la menace d'une arme lors d'une opération en Kabylie (Interrogation of a prisoner under the meance of a gun during an operation in Kabylia)*. Negative, cellulose acetate support. 6 x 6 cm. Service cinématographique des armées en Algérie © Jacques Fatio/ECPAD/Défense. December 20-22, 1954.



Figure 4.21: Fatio, Jacques. *Prisonnier blessé encadré par des hommes du 9e RZ (régiment de zouaves) lors d'une opération en Kabylie (An injured prisoner surrounded by men of the 9th RZ during an operation in Kabylia)*. Negative, cellulose acetate support. 6 x 6 cm. Service cinématographique des armées en Algérie © Jacques Fatio/ECPAD/Défense. December 20-22, 1954.



Figure 4.22 – Fatio, Jacques. *Les hommes du 9e RZ (régiment de zouaves) posent avec un prisonnier capturé lors d'une opération en Kabylie (The Men of the 9th RZ pose with a prisoner captured during an operation in Kabylia)*. Negative, cellulose acetate support. 6 x 6 cm. Service cinématographique des armées en Algérie © Jacques Fatio/ECPAD/Défense. December 20-22, 1954.




Figure 4.23: Fatio, Jacques. *Le 9e RZ (régiment de zouaves) autour de deux cadavres lors d'une opération en Kabylie (The 9th RZ around two cadavers during an operation in Kabylia)*. Negative, cellulose acetate support. 6 x 6 cm. Service cinématographique des armées en Algérie © Jacques Fatio/ECPAD/Défense. December 20-22, 1954.




Figure 4.24: Frame from *Cold Massacre of European Settlers Avenged by French*, Producer Edmund Reek, Cameraman Georges Chassagne, Voiceover Joe King (Fox Movietone News: 1955). In the fall and winter of 1955 this image was reproduced, along with others from the same newsreel, in multiple venues including *Life* magazine. This image is reproduced from Emma Kuby's article, "A War of Words over an Image of War: The Fox Movietone Scandal and the Portrayal of French Violence in Algeria, 1955-1956." *French Politics, Culture & Society* 30, no. 1 (Spring 2012): 46–67.



Figure 4.25: Jaillant. *Portrait de deux prisonniers capturés lors de l'opération Basque* (*Portrait of two prisoners during Opération Basque*). Negative, cellulose acetate support. 6 x 6 cm. Service cinématographique des armées en Algérie © Jaillant/ECPAD/Défense. June 11, 1956.



Figure 4.26: Jaillant. *Portrait d'un prisonnier capturé lors de l'opération Basque* (*Portrait of a prisoner captured during Opération Basque*). Negative, cellulose acetate support. 6 x 6 cm. Service cinématographique des armées en Algérie © Jaillant/ECPAD/Défense. June 11, 1956.



Figure 4.27: Vignal, Claude. *Présentation à la presse de Yacef Saadi, responsable du Front de libération nationale (FLN) pour la zone autonome d'Alger (ZAA), arrêté dans la casbah d'Alger le 24 septembre 1957 (Presentation of Yacef Saadi, leader of the Algiers Autonomous Zone for the FLN, arrested in the Casbah of Algiers, September 24, 1957)*. Negative, cellulose acetate support. 6 x 6 cm. Service cinématographique des armées en Algérie © Vignal/ECPAD/Défense. September 24, 1957.



Figure 4.28: Vignal, Claude. *L'arrestation de Zohra Drif par les parachutistes français* (*Arrest of Zohra Drif by French parachutists*). Negative, cellulose acetate support. 6 x 6 cm. Service cinématographique des armées en Algérie © Vignal/ECPAD/Défense. September 24, 1957.




Figure 4.29: Marc Flament. *Portrait de Larbi Ben M'hidi lors de son arrestation par le 3e régiment de parachutistes coloniaux (3e RPC) (Photograph of Larbi Ben M'hidi after his arrest by the 3rd regiment of colonial parachutists)*. February 25, 1957. Negative, cellulose acetate support. 5.5 x 7 cm. Service cinématographique des armées en Algérie © Marc Flament/ECPAD/Défense.



Figure 4.30: Six leaders of the FLN (Top row, left to right: Rabah Bitat, Mostefa Ben Boulaïd, Mourad Didouche, and Mohammed Boudiaf. Bottom row, left to right: Krim Belkacem and Larbi Ben M'Hidi). Taken just before November 1, 1954. Algérie Presse Service. Algiers, Algeria.



Figure 4.31: Kryn Taconis. Members of the 1st Batallion of the Armée de libération nationale in a secret forest hideaway. c. 1957. Noorderlicht – House of Photography. Groningen, Netherlands.



Figure 4.32: Kryn Taconis. ALN soldiers conduct early morning drills. c. 1957. Noorderlicht – House of Photography. Groningen, Netherlands.



Figure 4.33: Kryn Taconis. ALN fighters taking part in daily prayer facing Mecca. c. 1957. Noorderlicht – House of Photography. Groningen, Netherlands.




Figure 4.34: Kryn Taconis. An ALN patrol passes through a local village where a class completes Qur'anic lesson outdoors. c. 1957. Noorderlicht – House of Photography. Groningen, Netherlands.



Figure 4.35: Kryn Taconis. A village boy offers water to ALN soldiers. c. 1957. Noorderlicht – House of Photography. Groningen, Netherlands.



Figure 4.36: Kryn Taconis. Villagers greet a patrol of ALN soldiers. c. 1957. Noorderlicht – House of Photography. Groningen, Netherlands.



Figure 4.37: Kryn Taconis. Two ALN fighters embrace. c. 1957. Noorderlicht – House of Photography. Groningen, Netherlands.



Figure 4.38: Mohamed Kouaci. Photograph of FLN theater group. Reproduced from *Jalālī Khallās*, *Kuwāsī, 1956-1963* (al-Jaza'ir: Dar al-Qaşabah lil-Nashr, 2007), 111. c. 1958-1962.



Figure 4.39: Front de libération nationale. *El Moudjahid*. Cover page. July 22, 1958. Reproduced from *El-Moudjahid*, vol. 1 (nos 1-29), vol. 2 (nos 30-60), vol. 3 (nos 61-91), Belgrade, 1962.

EL MOUDJAHID

ORGANE CENTRAL DU FRONT
DE LIBERATION NATIONALE

N° 59 - 5 Janvier 1960
PRIX : 40 FRANCS

Direction - Rédaction
16 rue de l'Empire - Alger
Téléphone : 25.15.15
BUREAU DE CASABLANCA
11, rue "Moukhtar" - Casablanca

LA REVOLUTION PAR LE PEUPLE ET POUR LE PEUPLE



Les « perturbateurs » de Septembre 1959 ont triomphé en Décembre 1959

**L'INDEPENDANCE DU MALI ET LA
REVOLUTION ALGERIENNE** (lire p. 3)

Figure 4.40: Front de libération nationale. *El Moudjahid*. Cover page. January 5, 1960. Reproduced from *El-Moudjahid*, vol. 1 (nos 1-29), vol. 2 (nos 30-60), vol. 3 (nos 61-91), Belgrade, 1962.

EL MOUDJAHID

ORGAN CENTRAL DU FRONT
DE LIBERATION NATIONALE

N 80 - 12 Mai 1961
PRIX : 40 FRANCS

Direction - Rédaction :
14, Rue des Bénédictins - ALGER
T. 01. 20. 00. 00

DISTRIBUÉ EN FRANCE
5, Rue de la République

LA REVOLUTION PAR LE PEUPLE ET POUR LE PEUPLE



ALGERIE :
un détachement de l'ALN

ALGERIE, ANGOLA, CUBA : UN MEME COMBAT



CUBA :
une milice populaire

Figure 4.41: Front de libération nationale. *El Moudjahid*. Cover page. May 12, 1961. Reproduced from *El-Moudjahid*, vol. 1 (nos 1-29), vol. 2 (nos 30-60), vol. 3 (nos 61-91), Belgrade, 1962.

20 AOUT 1956
20 AOUT 1957

Le 20 août 1956, le jour de la libération de notre pays, est un jour de gloire pour le peuple algérien. Ce jour-là, nous avons vu nos héros tomber pour la liberté de notre pays.

COMMENT se présente la situation dans le Cas de ?

L'INSURRECTION de l'Algérie a été le résultat de la lutte constante du peuple algérien pour la libération de son pays.

Le 20 août 1956, jour de la libération de notre pays, est un jour de gloire pour le peuple algérien.

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LA RÉVOLUTION PAR LE PEUPLE ET POUR LE PEUPLE

EL MOUDJAHID

Organe Central du Front de Libération Nationale Algérienne

Numéro 9 - le 20 août 1957 - 1025 JOUR DE LA RÉVOLUTION ALGÉRIENNE Prix 30 francs

LES MEMBRES DU C. N. R. A. TOMBÉS AU CHAMP D'HONNEUR

BEN BOULAID, ZIROUT, BEN M'HIDI, MELLAH.

Fidèles à leur engagement, ils ont donné leur vie pour l'indépendance nationale



Ben Boulaïd, le Père des Aurès. Zirout, Ben M'hidi. Mella. Nous ne les plurons pas. Nous sommes à leur place. Nous sommes à leur place. Nous sommes à leur place.

Ben Boulaïd, le Père des Aurès. Zirout, Ben M'hidi. Mella. Nous ne les plurons pas. Nous sommes à leur place. Nous sommes à leur place.

NOTRE ARMÉE ET SA STRATÉGIE

Par le Colonel SADDEK (Commandant la Wilaya IV (Algiers))

La stratégie, c'est l'art de diriger les forces armées. Elle est le résultat de la réflexion et de la planification. Elle est le fruit de l'expérience et de la connaissance.

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1.305^{ème}
jour
de la
Révolution
Algérienne

LA RÉVOLUTION PAR LE PEUPLE ET POUR LE PEUPLE

EL MOUDJAHID

Organe Central du Front de Libération Nationale Algérienne

N° 24

29 Mai
1958

Prix :
30 francs

ABBANE RAMDANE EST MORT AU CHAMP D'HONNEUR



Le Front de Libération Nationale a la douleur d'annoncer la mort du frère Abbane Ramdane, décédé sur le sol national des suites de graves blessures reçues au cours d'un accrochage entre une Compagnie de l'Armée de Libération Nationale chargée de sa protection et un groupe motorisé de l'Armée française.

C'est en décembre 1957 que le frère Abbane Ramdane s'était chargé d'une mission importante et urgente de contrôle à l'intérieur du pays. Il réussissait à franchir avec beaucoup de difficultés les barrières de l'ennemi pour parvenir aux

lieux qu'il s'était assignés. Sa mission se déroulait lentement et sûrement. Avec cette conscience et cette minutie que nos djouhadis ont eu si souvent l'occasion d'apprécier. Abbane poursuivait sa tâche jour après jour. Contactant inlassablement l'Armée et les commissaires politiques. Il parcourait les zones dans tous les sens, entouré de l'affection et de l'admiration de tous ses frères. Une compagnie de djouhadis était spécialement chargée de sa protection et rien ne lui était prévu. Facilement brutal qui devait l'arracher à la terre de l'Algérie combattante.

Malheureusement, dans la péninsule

quaraine d'avril, un violent accrochage entre nos troupes et celles de l'ennemi devait mettre la compagnie de protection de notre frère Abbane dans l'obligation de participer à l'engagement. Au cours du combat qui dura plusieurs heures, Abbane fut blessé. Tout laissa espérer que ses blessures étaient sans gravité. Entouré de soins vigilants, nous espérons que la constitution robuste de Abbane lui fait surmonter l'empêchement. Pendant des semaines nous sommes restés sans nouvelles, persuadés cependant qu'il triompherait une fois encore de l'adversité. Hélas ! une grave hémorragie devait lui être fatale.

C'est la triste nouvelle qui vient de nous parvenir.

La belle et noble figure de Abbane Ramdane, son courage et sa volonté ont marqué les phases essentielles de la lutte du peuple algérien.

Né en 1929 ancien élève du collège de Bida, titulaire d'une solide culture, il était, dès 1946, membre du M.T.L.D. Il se distinguait rapidement par ses qualités d'organisateur, devenant membre du comité central et chef de la wilaya de l'Est (à l'époque du Nord-Constantinois). Impliqué dans le « complot » dit du Camstantinois, il était arrêté et condamné à six ans de prison. En 1954, son comportement courageux au cours de sa longue détention devait entraîner pour lui des déplacements continus. Commentant alors un long périple dans les prisons centrales de France et d'Algérie.

Libéré en février 1955, il entra immédiatement au Front de Libération Nationale dans lequel il devenait rapidement un membre dirigeant. A ce titre, il participait à l'organisation du congrès de la Soummam (août 1956). Désigné comme membre du Comité de Coordination et d'Exécution, il s'installait à Alger. Avec les autres frères, il menait « la bataille d'Alger », de décembre 1956 à mars 1957. Échappant de justesse au général Makou, il quittait l'Algérie pour participer à la Conférence de Casablanca en août 1957.

Le Front de Libération Nationale perd un de ses meilleurs organisateurs et l'Algérie combattante un de ses vaillants et plus valeureux.

Nous pleurons un frère de combat dont le souvenir nous servira de guide.

Figure 4.43: Front de libération nationale. *El Moudjahid*. Cover page. May 29, 1958. Reproduced from *El-Moudjahid*, vol. 1 (nos 1-29), vol. 2 (nos 30-60), vol. 3 (nos 61-91), Belgrade, 1962.



Figure 4.44: Khaznadar, Abderrhamane. Abdelmalek Kitouni with his wife Djoughra and their four children (left to right) Hosni, Nadjib, Naïma, and Malika. Spring 1956. Private collection of the Kitouni family.



Figure 4.45: Unknown photographer. Abdelmalek Kitouni holds his youngest son, Nadjib, and poses with his daughters Malika, Naïma, and eldest son Hosni with their friend, Achour Rahmani, at the Place de la Brèche in Constantine. Spring 1955. Private collection of the Kitouni family.



Figure 4.46: Abderrhamane Khaznadar. *Malika Kitouni au maquis*. 1956. Private collection of the Kitouni family.



Figure 4.47: Unknown photographer. *Abdelmalek Kitouni au maquis*. 1956. Private collection of the Kitouni family.



Figure 4.48: Cover page of *La Dépêche de Constantine: Journal de l'est algérien*. October 20-21, 1957. Photo colorized by Omar el Ankaoui.

Chapter 5



Figure 5.1: *Le martyre de l'Algérie française: Le massacre d'el Elia, 20 Août 1955. Algiers: Prestige français, 1955. n.p.*



Figure 5.2: *Le martyre de l'Algérie française: Le massacre d'el Elia, 20 Août 1955. Algiers: Prestige français, 1955. n.p.*




Figure 5.3: Front National des Combattants. *Êtes-vous complice ?* 58.5 x 37 cm. Paris. 1957. Archives nationales d'outre-mer. Aix-en-Provence, France.



Figure 5.4: *Le martyr de l'Algérie française: Le massacre d'el Elia, 20 Août 1955*. Algiers: Prestige Français, 1955. n.p.




Figure 5.5: Marc Flament. *Sans fin*. Algiers: Baconnier Frères, 1957. n.p.




Figure 5.6: Marc Flament. *Sans fin*. Algiers: Baconnier Frères, 1957. n.p.




Figure 5.7: Marc Flament. *Sans Fin*. Algiers: Baconnier Frères, 1957. n.p.




Figure 5.8: Marc Flament. *Sans Fin*. Algiers: Baconnier Frères, 1957. n.p.



Figure 5.9: Marc Flament. *Sans Fin*. Algiers: Baconnier Frères, 1957. n.p.






Figure 5.10: Marc Flament. *Sans fin*. Algiers: Baconnier Frères, 1957. n.p.



Nous avons considéré nos ombres dérisoires ...

Figure 5.11: Marc Flament. *Aucune bête au monde*. Paris: Éditions de la pensée moderne, 1959. n.p.



Nous avons cru souvent tirer sur des mirages,
nés des reflets aveuglants du désert ...

Figure 5.12: Marc Flament. *Aucune bête au monde*. Paris: Éditions de la pensée moderne, 1959. n.p.




Figure 5.13: Marc Flament. *Sans fin*. Algiers: Baconnier Frères, 1957. n.p.




Figure 5.14: Marc Flament. *Aucune bête au monde*. Paris: Éditions de la pensée moderne, 1959. n.p.




Figure 5.15: Marc Flament. *Aucune bête au monde*. Paris: Éditions de la pensée moderne, 1959. n.p.




Figure 5.16: Marc Flament. *Les parachutistes du 3^e régiment de parachutistes coloniaux (3^e RPC) opèrent un bouclage et un contrôle d'identité surprise de nuit, à l'angle de la rue de la Bombe et de la rue Mannol. Les suspects sont placés dos au mur, mains sur la tête.* (The colonial parachutists of the 3rd regiment (3rd RPC) seal off and conduct a surprise, night-time identity check at the corner of the rue de la Bombe and the rue Mannol. Suspects are placed back against the wall, hands on the head). Negative, cellulose acetate support. 6 x 6 cm. Service cinématographique des armées en Algérie © Marc Flament/ECPAD/Défense. February 25, 1957.



Figure 5.17: Marc Flament. *Foule rassemblée sur la place du Gouvernement sous le contrôle des parachutistes du 3e régiment de parachutistes coloniaux (3e RPC)* (Crowd assembled at the Place du Gouvernement under the control of the 3rd regiment of colonial parachutists (3rd RPC)). Negative, cellulose acetate support. 6 x 6 cm. Service cinématographique des armées en Algérie © Marc Flament/ECPAD/Défense. July 29, 1957.



Figure 5.18: Dirk Alvermann. *Algeria*. Göttingen, Germany: Steidl, 2011. Originally published in Berlin, GDR by Rütten & Loening, 1960. n.p.



Figure 5.19: Dirk Alvermann. *Algeria*. Göttingen, Germany: Steidl, 2011. Originally published in Berlin, GDR by Rütten & Loening, 1960. n.p.




Figure 5.20: Dirk Alvermann. *Algeria*. Göttingen, Germany: Steidl, 2011. Originally published in Berlin, GDR by Rütten & Loening, 1960. n.p.



Figure 5.21: Dirk Alvermann. *Algeria*. Göttingen, Germany: Steidl, 2011. Originally published in Berlin, GDR by Rütten & Loening, 1960. n.p.



Figure 5.22: Unknown photographer. *Victims' shoes at Majdanek*. Majdanek, Poland. August 1944. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. Washington D.C.



Figure 5.23 – Unknown photographer. Prisoners in Auschwitz in Poland during liberation by the Soviet Red Army. January 1945. Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum. Oświęcim, Poland.



Figure 5.24: Dirk Alvermann. *Algeria*. Göttingen, Germany: Steidl, 2011. Originally published in Berlin, GDR by Rütten & Loening, 1960. n.p.




Figure 5.25: Dirk Alvermann. *Algeria*. Göttingen, Germany: Steidl, 2011. Originally published in Berlin, GDR by Rütten & Loening, 1960. n.p.



Figure 5.26: Dirk Alvermann. *Algeria*. Göttingen, Germany: Steidl, 2011. Originally published in Berlin, GDR by Rütten & Loening, 1960. n.p.



Figure 5.27: Dirk Alvermann. *Algeria*. Göttingen, Germany: Steidl, 2011. Originally published in Berlin, GDR by Rütten & Loening, 1960. n.p.



Figure 5.28: Dirk Alvermann. *Algeria*. Göttingen, Germany: Steidl, 2011. Originally published in Berlin, GDR by Rütten & Loening, 1960. n.p.




Figure 5.29: Dirk Alvermann. *Algeria*. Göttingen, Germany: Steidl, 2011. Originally published in Berlin, GDR by Rütten & Loening, 1960. n.p.




Figure 5.30: Dirk Alvermann. *Algeria*. Göttingen, Germany: Steidl, 2011. Originally published in Berlin, GDR by Rütten & Loening, 1960. n.p.



Figure 5.31: Dirk Alvermann. *Algeria*. Göttingen, Germany: Steidl, 2011. Originally published in Berlin, GDR by Rütten & Loening, 1960. n.p.




Figure 5.32: Dirk Alvermann. *Algeria*. Göttingen, Germany: Steidl, 2011. Originally published in Berlin, GDR by Rütten & Loening, 1960. n.p.



Figure 5.33: Dirk Alvermann. *Algeria*. Göttingen, Germany: Steidl, 2011. Originally published in Berlin, GDR by Rütten & Loening, 1960. n.p.




Figure 5.34: Dirk Alvermann. *Algeria*. Göttingen, Germany: Steidl, 2011. Originally published in Berlin, GDR by Rütten & Loening, 1960. n.p.



Figure 5.35: Dirk Alvermann. *Algeria*. Göttingen, Germany: Steidl, 2011. Originally published in Berlin, GDR by Rütten & Loening, 1960. n.p.



Figure 5.36: Dirk Alvermann. *Algeria*. Göttingen, Germany: Steidl, 2011. Originally published in Berlin, GDR by Rütten & Loening, 1960. n.p.



Figure 5.37: – Dirk Alvermann. *Algeria*. Göttingen, Germany: Steidl, 2011. Originally published in Berlin, GDR by Rütten & Loening, 1960. n.p.



Figure 5.38: Dirk Alvermann. *Algeria*. Göttingen, Germany: Steidl, 2011. Originally published in Berlin, GDR by Rütten & Loening, 1960. n.p.



Figure 5.39: Dirk Alvermann. *Algeria*. Göttingen, Germany: Steidl, 2011. Originally published in Berlin, GDR by Rütten & Loening, 1960. n.p.




Figure 5.40: Dirk Alvermann. *Algeria*. Göttingen, Germany: Steidl, 2011. Originally published in Berlin, GDR by Rütten & Loening, 1960. n.p.



Figure 5.41: Dirk Alvermann. *Algeria*. Göttingen, Germany: Steidl, 2011. Originally published in Berlin, GDR by Rütten & Loening, 1960. n.p.



Figure 5.42: Unknown photographer. “Sous la menace des mitraillettes un musulman (à gauche, la main devant les yeux) assiste aux outrages que subit sa femme.” (“Under the menace of machine guns, a Muslim man (to the left, his hand before his eyes) witnesses the outrages to which his wife is submitted”). *Algeria Torturata*. Milan: Lerici editori, 1961. n.p.




Figure 5.43: Pablo Picasso. Sketch of Djamila Boupacha. 1961. Private collection. Reproduced as the frontispiece to Simone de Beauvoir and Gisèle Halimi's, *Djamila Boupacha*, (Paris: Gallimard, 1962).



Figure 5.44: Jewish women before their execution in Skede, Latvia, December 15-17, 1941. Yad Vashem. Jerusalem, Israel.



Figure 5.45: Unknown photographer. “Une ‘française’ à part entière” (“A fully-fledged French woman”). *Algeria Torturata*. Milan: Lerici editori, 1961. n.p.



Figure 5.46: Unknown photographer. “Fraternisation” (“Fraternization”). *Algeria Torturata*. Milan: Lerici editori, 1961. n.p.

Conclusion



Figure 6.0: Agence France-Presse. GPRA delegation at the Evian Accords (Left to right: Taïeb Boulahrouf, Saâd Dahlab, Mohamed Seddik Benyahia, Krim Belkacem, Benmostefa Benaouda, Redha Malek, Lakhdar Bentobal, M'Hamed Yazid). Évian-les-Bains, France. March 18, 1962. *Ministre des armées*. Paris, France.