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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS

Department of Classics

*IEphesos* Ia, no. 4: Mortgages and Shortages During the Ephesian Debt Crisis  
of the Early Third Century BC

by

Jake Neil Pawlusch

A thesis presented to  
Washington University in St. Louis  
in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree  
of Master of Arts

May 2024

St. Louis, Missouri

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# Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations .....	iv
Acknowledgements.....	v
Preface.....	vi
Chapter 1: Introduction.....	1
1.1 <i>IEphesos</i> Ia, no. 4’s Scholarly Scarcity .....	2
1.2 Content and the Issues Presented by <i>IEphesos</i> Ia, no. 4 .....	4
1.3 Ephesos’ Subjugation By Antigonos .....	6
1.4 Demetrios’ <i>κοινὸς πόλεμος</i> .....	7
1.5 Ephesos’ Subjugation via Prepelaos.....	11
1.6 Ephesos’ Age of Strife.....	13
1.7 Arsinoeia’s Subjugation via Lysimachos .....	17
1.8 Findspot, Orientation, and Script of the Inscription.....	19
1.9 The <i>ἔδεθλον</i> and the Artemision.....	21
1.10 Original Location of the Inscription.....	24
1.11 Conclusions .....	26
Chapter 2: Commentary .....	28
2.1 Description .....	28
2.2 Editions .....	29
2.3 Bibliography.....	29
2.4 <i>IEphesos</i> Ia, no. 4 – Text.....	31
2.5 Translation.....	33
2.6 Commentary.....	39

2.7 Conclusions .....	66
Chapter 3: <i>IEphesos</i> Ia, no. 4 and Ephesian Real Estate .....	67
3.1 Land Ownership in Ephesos .....	68
3.2 The <i>georgoi</i> .....	70
3.3 Public and Sacred Borrowers .....	74
3.4 The <i>tokistai</i> .....	77
3.5 Public and Sacred Creditors .....	80
3.6 Loans, Interest Rates, Properties, and <i>Horoi</i> in Ephesos .....	81
3.7 The Need for Loans with Interest at Ephesos .....	88
3.8 Conclusions .....	92
Chapter 4: <i>IEphesos</i> Ia, no. 4 and the Artemision .....	94
4.1 Walser Against the Artemision .....	95
4.2 Financial Structure and Operation in Other Temples .....	96
4.3 The Financial Officials and Structure of the Artemision .....	98
4.4 The Funds and the Properties of Artemis in the Fourth Century BC .....	103
4.5 Artemision and the Sacred Economic Sphere .....	114
4.6 The Motives for Artemis to Make Loans .....	112
4.7 Conclusions .....	115
Conclusion .....	117
Bibliography .....	123
Figures .....	129

# **List of Abbreviations**

All abbreviations used in this MA Thesis, except for Figures 4 and 5 on page 133, adhere to the same formatting used in *Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum*, *Liddell-Scott-Jones Greek-English Lexicon*, Ninth edition, and *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, Fourth edition. In addition, all translations in this text are my own unless otherwise stated.

The abbreviations in Figures 4 and 5 on page 133 adhere to the formatting used by the Classical Numismatic Group website.

# Acknowledgements

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Dr. William Bubelis, my thesis advisor, for his excellent guidance, advice, and instruction on this thesis. He has helped me immensely to understand better the fourth-century BC Greek economy, its public, private, and sacred spheres, and how they interacted with one another. Our long discussions on the topics within this thesis as well as others on the ancient Mediterranean economy have been wonderful and left me with some answers and even more questions which I hope to work on with him in the future.

I owe much thanks to my other committee members as well, Dr. Nicola Aravecchia and Dr. Roger Bagnall, for their essential edits on this thesis, particularly their valuable guidance on formatting different sections of this work such as the epigraphic information and text of *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 in Chapter 2. My committee members also helped immensely during the defense of this thesis in advising on what extraneous sections of this work I should cut, arguments I should add, and evidence I should revisit with a different perspective. I would also like to thank the British Museum and its staff for permitting me to examine and photograph Group A of *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4. My thanks as well to Dr. Hans Taeuber for providing the picture of Group C from the 2005 Austrian excavation at Ephesos.

I am deeply grateful for my family, loved ones, and friends who supported, encouraged, and were there for me through every difficulty I experienced in composing this work.

Jake Neil Pawlush

*Washington University in St. Louis*

*May 2024*

# Preface

*IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 is a third-century BC Greek inscription from Ephesos.<sup>1</sup> The 112-line inscription details how foreign judges and the Ephesian *polis* resolved loans which had been provided by *tokistai* (creditors) to *georgoi* (farmers) who defaulted on such loans. These loans carried interest and used as security the properties of the *georgoi* destroyed during a conflict in Ephesos that occurred during the 290s BC and which the inscription refers to as the *κοινὸς πόλεμος* (common war). The inscription provides proof of a significant instance in the late Classical to early Hellenistic era where a Greek *polis* directly intervened in private lending. Since its discovery during the excavation of Ephesos conducted by architect J. T. Wood from 1863 to 1874, *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 has mainly been studied, translated, or cited in the context of larger epigraphic works and has only once been the primary subject matter discussed, specifically in the 2008 monograph by A. V. Walser. There are, accordingly, significant aspects of the inscription that require more in-depth examination and study. This study re-examines why Walser dated the inscription to 299 BC, why he placed the inscription in the Artemision, and his analysis of the constitutional, judicial, and economic figures and processes involved in the law. This study uses contemporary inscriptions from Ephesos, Ionia, and other Greek *poleis* such as Athens, as well as the wealth of secondary scholarship on the phenomenon of using foreign judges to decide internal matters, in order to better understand the actions of *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4's foreign judges, local Ephesian magistrates, and Ephesian legal processes. An analysis of the foreign judges and how they worked with local Ephesian officials will contribute to an understanding of how foreign judges formally operated at a relatively early point in their existence. Furthermore, this analysis helps to distinguish previously

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<sup>1</sup> *Inschriften von Ephesos* Ia, no. 4 is part of the most recent and comprehensive corpus on Ephesian inscriptions which this work will use when referring to Ephesian inscriptions.



established Ephesian constitutional and legal practices from those which the Ephesian *polis* and the foreign judges developed and established in this law.

This study expands on and yet critiques Walser's analyses on the relevant parties which the provisions of *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 affected as a law concerning the private sphere of the Ephesian economy. This study agrees with Walser that the *georgoi* and *tokistai* mentioned in the law encompassed citizens and non-citizens who were given the right to own property. The analysis of the *georgoi* and *tokistai*, however, augments Walser's arguments and asserts that the terms included bankers and professional money-lenders (*prodaneistai*) present at Ephesos as well. There will also be an analysis of comparable crises and laws involving debt at other *poleis* such as Athens, Tegea, and Delphi to examine the capacity in which Artemis Ephesia and the Ephesian *polis* may have been involved in the debt crisis. Based on this analysis, this study will tentatively reason that *polis* would have enacted additional laws or decrees concerning the public and sacred economic spheres similar to *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 and the private sphere. These analyses and arguments on the lending and borrowing practices of the Ephesian *polis* and Artemis are difficult to substantiate because of the limited evidence available which attests to interest-bearing loans with property used as security in the public and sacred economic spheres at Ephesos. However, given the germane examples in Classical- to Hellenistic-era legal texts which account for public and sacred loans in addition to private ones, it is reasonable to assume that Ephesos similarly separated its mitigation of debt between legal inscriptions concerning the public, private, and sacred spheres. In arguing who was affected by *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, as well as analyzing the interest-bearing loans with property used as security and the credit structure at play in Ephesos, this study will thereby provide an updated study and examination of the evolving public, private, and sacred Ephesian real estate market as it responded to the strife the *polis* experienced in the early Hellenistic era.

# Chapter 1: Introduction

In terms of its historical context and an accurate date, it is important to note that prior to the enactment of *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, Antigonos Monophthalmus, Prepelaos (the general of Cassander), and Antigonos' son Demetrios Poliorcetes all conquered, garrisoned, and requisitioned supplies (primarily grain) from Ephesos between 319 and 294 BC. The historical record, however, does not report that any of these actions caused damage significant enough to warrant the enactment of *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4. Additionally, contrary to Walser, Ephesos would likely not have fought a *κοινὸς πόλεμος* as part of Antigonos and Demetrios' Hellenic League against Cassander and the other Successors, ending with the Battle of Ipsos in 301 BC.<sup>1</sup> Instead, Ephesos was more likely a member of the Ionian League and fighting a *κοινὸς πόλεμος* (300-297 BC) against the tyrant Hieron of Priene, who seems to have retaliated by attacking the city and destroying farmland in the Ephesian *polis*. Contrary to Walser who dates the enactment of the law to 299 BC, Ephesos likely experienced its debt crisis in 297 BC and, as a result, enacted *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 in 297/6 BC.<sup>2</sup>

Regarding where the Ephesians set up the law and its significance, Walser's discussion of *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 states only that he believes it was set up in the temple of Artemis at Ephesos, the Artemision, but provides little rationale for his conclusion. The only indication of where the Ephesians may have set up *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 is in line 21 of the inscription where temple caretakers, the *neopoiiai*, were instructed to set up the whitened tablets with the new divisions of property inscribed in the temple precinct. Walser's conclusion may, however, be supported by the fact that the Ephesian *polis* set up legal decrees at the Artemision and that Artemis Ephesia was the most significant goddess in Ephesos by the fourth century BC. Specifically, the shape, size,

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<sup>1</sup> Walser (2008), 99-103.

<sup>2</sup> Walser (2008), 103-104.

and preserved nature of the text imply that *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 was not a self-standing *stele* in the Artemision, but the law was, instead, a wall inscription inset into the sanctuary's stoa. Therefore, the Ephesian *polis* might well have set up the law in the same location as the whitened tablets with the final determinations of the divisions of property at the Artemision so that the goddess might protect the sanctity of both documents, Ephesian citizens could compare them against the copies of the tablets given to the copying-clerks, and so that the temple preserved the law for future reference.

### **1.1 *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4's Scholarly Scarcity**

After Wood discovered Group A (defined in this study as the first three blocks) of *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, he published the text of the inscription as no. 1 in the Appendix (*Inscriptions from the City and the Suburbs*) of his 1877 work, *Discoveries at Ephesus*, along with a translation and a brief comment opining that the inscription dated to the end of the fifth century BC.<sup>3</sup> In R. Dareste's *Séances et travaux de l'Académie des sciences morales et politiques. Compte rendu 108* (703-718), also published in 1877, Dareste likewise included the text, a translation, and a commentary that incorrectly dates the inscription to the first century BC after the first Mithridatic War, 86/5 BC.<sup>4</sup> Using the date provided by Dareste, W. Dittenberger added the inscription in the first edition of *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum* (1883, no. 344) as did Th. Thalheim in the third edition of *Lehrbuches des Griechischen Rechtsaltertümer* (1884, 134-149), which includes a German translation of the text and a partial consideration of Dittenburger's suggestions for the reconstruction of the fragmented parts of the inscription.<sup>5</sup> In 1890, E. L. Hicks included a copy of the majuscule and miniscule text of the inscription with the 86/5 BC date in *Collections of Ancient*

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<sup>3</sup> Walser (2008), 15.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Walser (2008), 16.

*Greek Inscriptions in the British Museum* (no. 477). Two years later, R. Dareste, B. Haussoullier, and Th. Reinach then translated the inscription into French in their work, *Recueil des inscriptions juridiques grecques* (1892, no. 5), with a corresponding commentary and discussion using, again, the 86/5 BC date. In the fourth edition of *Rechtaltertümer* (1895, 152-168) and second edition of *SIG* (1900, no. 510), Thalheim and Dittenberger, respectively, re-examined the majuscule and miniscule text highlighted by Hicks.

R. Heberdey's publication of the text and a copy of Group B (defined here as the fourth block) in the second volume of *Forschungen in Ephesos* (1912, no. 17), with a corresponding commentary that connects Group B with Group A, finally and correctly resolved the date of the inscriptions. Heberdey subsequently dated *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 to 297/6 BC based on its connection to *IEphesos* V, no. 2001 (*FiE* II no. 1) and the tyranny of Hieron in Priene.<sup>6</sup> For the first time in 1915, F. Freiherr Hiller von Gaertringen published Groups A and B together in the third edition of *SIG* (no. 364) based on Hick's and Heberdey's editions, and more specifically Heberdey's discussion on the date of the text. David Asheri presented the text of *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 Groups A and B with a translation of Blocks 1A-3A in his Appendix as well as a short discussion on its date and content in his 1969 work *Leggi Greche sul Problema dei Debiti*.<sup>7</sup> The text of the inscription, a translation, and a commentary were published again in H. Wankel's 1979 work, *Inschriften von Ephesos* Ia (no. 4), which also included a concise description of each Block, Heberdey's discussion on the date, a listing of where the inscription and a translation of it had been published to date, and an updated *Apparatus Criticus*, along with photographs of Blocks 1A and 2A. *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 was first translated into English by Roger Bagnall and Peter Derow, *The Hellenistic Period:*

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<sup>6</sup> See the discussion below on page 13-17, for the discussion on the date of the inscription.

<sup>7</sup> See Asheri (1969), 42-47, for discussion, 108-114 for the text and translation.

*Historical Sources in Translation*, published first in 1981 with a new edition published in 2004.<sup>8</sup> Julie Velissaropoulos-Karakostas also presented, translated into French, and discussed sections of *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 in both volumes of her 2011 work, *Droit grec d'Alexandre à Auguste (323 av. J.-C. - 14 ap. J.-C.)*.<sup>9</sup> Most recently, A. V. Walser's 2008 monograph presented a thorough study and examination of *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4. Walser's work includes the inscription's text, a translation, and a commentary along with chapters that include discussions on subjects such as *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4's date, its context in the chronology of early Hellenistic Ephesos, the inscription's content, and the economic state of Ephesos during that period. It is the *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 edition of the text that will be presented and commented upon in Chapter 2 of this work.

## **1.2 Content and the Issues Presented by *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4**

*IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, however, has been referred to or briefly discussed in even more scholarly works due to the significance of its legal stipulations and figures.<sup>10</sup> For example, Moses Finley often cited *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 as an exception to his rule that the *poleis* of ancient Greek *poleis* did not interfere or create laws regulating the private economy because the inscription was borne out of a debt crisis.<sup>11</sup> This and other scholarly works referring to *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, however, only discuss parts of the law's content, its general historical implications, and the role of the foreign judges present in the law. While Walser similarly discusses and examines features of the inscription's content, implications, and issues, there are still gaps in his arguments that require reexamination, elaboration, and an update based on scholarly works concerning Ephesos published after Walser's monograph.

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<sup>8</sup> Bagnall and Derow (2004), 19-23.

<sup>9</sup> Velissaropoulos-Karakostas (2011), (vol. I) 226, 227-228; (vol. II) 55-56, 63-64, 137, 182, 201, 216-217, 259, 467-468, 512.

<sup>10</sup> See Chapter 2 for an updated Bibliography.

<sup>11</sup> Finley (1968), 548 n. 28, 555 n. 39; Finley (1951), 236-237 n. 16, 296-297 n. 20; Finley (1999), 143, 240 n. 44.

Therefore, this introductory chapter will re-examine Ephesos' place in the chronology of events during the early Hellenistic era, from the death of Alexander to the death of Lysimachos (i.e. 323-281 BC), *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4's status as a wall inscription, and whether the inscription was set up in the *polis*' major temple of Artemis, the Artemision. In addition, the sections on the chronology of early Hellenistic Ephesian history will argue against Walser's date for *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 and in favor of the view that Ephesos' *κοινὸς πόλεμος* was, instead, the *polis*' conflict with Hieron of Priene on behalf of the Ionian League. Chapter 2 will then include an updated genetical lemmata for the law, a Bibliography, *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4's Greek text in miniscule, a translation, and a selective commentary on essential terms within the text. The commentary will specifically examine how the inscription presents the damage wrought by the *κοινὸς πόλεμος*, the resulting debt crisis, the legal statuses of the *tokistai* and the *georgoi*, the legal provisions for those affected, and the magistracies and judges involved in resolving the debt crisis and developing the provisions of *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4.

Chapter 3 will commence with a discussion concerning land ownership in late fourth- to early third-century BC Ephesos as presented in the inscription and the nature of the loans involved in *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, as well as the financial impact of both the resolution set out in the inscription for the debt crisis and Ephesos' subsequent subjugation by Lysimachos ca. 294 BC. Chapter 3 will also include a re-examination of Walser's arguments as to whom the terms *tokistes* and the *georgos* might apply at Ephesos, including citizens and non-citizen residents and, additionally, whether and how the Ephesian *polis* and the deities of temples such as the Artemision were involved in the crisis. Since neither Artemis nor the Artemision are specifically named in *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, Chapter 4 will more closely examine the temple's potential role in the debt mitigation, beginning with a discussion of its structure, its capacity for banking activities, and the temple's shifting

financial, religious, and political status in Ephesos and Ionia during the fourth century BC. The chapter will then move on to a discussion of whether factors such as the Artemision's destruction in 356 BC, later reconstruction efforts, and prevailing economic factors would have warranted the sanctuary to provide interest-bearing loans to *georgoi* prior to the *κοινὸς πόλεμος* and the enactment of *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4. Finally, the conclusions of the main arguments from the previous chapters will be presented along with a brief discussion as to what further research may need to be conducted based on the findings of this work.

### **1.3 Ephesos' Subjugation By Antigonos**

The historical record in literature, inscriptions, and coins pertaining to the era are clear as to which of the successors of Alexander the Great subjugated Ephesos and in what year, but the timeline of events is, admittedly, dependent on Diodoros Siculus' account. The impact of events that occurred in Ephesos, however, including the destruction that was caused and the economic strain on Ephesos between each subjugation, is more difficult to ascertain. Leading up to the death of Perdikkas, which occurred during a mutiny of his own troops in 320 BC after a failed attempt to invade Ptolemaic Egypt, Macedonian influence and control was present in Ephesos. Upon the death of Perdikkas, Antipater became the regent of Asia, Antigonos the general, Asander as satrap of Caria, and Kleitos the White a satrap of Lydia.<sup>12</sup> Due to the Macedonian presence in Ephesos, the *polis'* governing body attempted to maintain a neutral state by honoring different members of the new Macedonian regime, including Perdikkas' brother, Alcetas, Hagnon of Teos, and Kleitos the White.<sup>13</sup> Antipater's death and the succession of Polyperchon as supreme commander and guardian of the kings in 319 BC (Diod. Sic. 18.48.4) afforded Antigonos the opportunity to begin gathering

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<sup>12</sup> Diod. Sic. 18.39; Nudell (2023), 166-167.

<sup>13</sup> *IEphesos* IV, nos. 1435 (322/1 BC), 1437 (322/1BC); Nudell (2023), 166-167; Walser (2008), 49-55.

troops and defeating his opposition in Asia Minor, including Eumenes in Cappadocia as well as Alcetas and Attalus in Psidia.<sup>14</sup> Meanwhile, Kleitos established garrisons in *poleis* within his territories, including Ephesos, then crossed the Aegean to denounce Antigonos to Polyperchon.<sup>15</sup> With Kleitos too far away to mount a counterattack, Antigonos took control of Ephesos in 319 BC by assault.<sup>16</sup> Antigonos appears to have stayed in Ephesos at least until the winter of 318 BC when he seized 600 talents on four ships captained by Aeschylus of Rhodes sailing from Kilikia and bound for the two kings of Macedonia at the time, Philip III and Alexander IV.<sup>17</sup> Diodorus Siculus records that the initial assault by Antigonos caused some damage to the *polis*, but the extent of the damage is unclear. It is equally unclear whether Antigonos installed a garrison at Ephesos when he left the *polis*. Antigonos' campaign in Asia Minor and short assault on Ephesos, however, seems insufficient to have constituted Ephesos' *κοινὸς πόλεμος* and the damage referred to in *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4.<sup>18</sup>

## 1.4 Demetrios' *κοινὸς πόλεμος*

While Antigonos was solidifying his position on the Western coast of Asia Minor, he had his son, Demetrios, focus on campaigning and consolidating Antigonid power in mainland Greece during the 310s BC. Demetrios first sailed from Ephesos, which appears to have remained under Antigonid control, in 308 BC with a strong land and sea force as well as supplies for carrying out sieges.<sup>19</sup> Whether Demetrios took supplies from the Ephesians is unclear, but an army of the size that Diodorus described likely required local Ephesian resources to be diverted to the assembled

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<sup>14</sup> Diod. Sic. 18.50.

<sup>15</sup> Nudell (2023), 167.

<sup>16</sup> Diod. Sic. 18.52.7.

<sup>17</sup> Diod. Sic. *ibid.*; Boehm (2018), 33 n. 25.

<sup>18</sup> *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, ll. 67-69.

<sup>19</sup> Diod. Sic. 20.45.1: ἐπὶ δὲ τούτων Δημήτριος μὲν ὁ Ἀντιγόνου παραλαβὼν παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς δύναμιν ἀδρὰν πεζικὴν τε καὶ ναυτικὴν, ἔτι δὲ βελῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν εἰς πολιορκίαν χρησίμων τὴν ἀρμόζουσαν παρασκευὴν ἐξέπλευσεν ἐκ τῆς Ἐφέσου.



army until it left the *polis*. Ephesos was then left in peace until 304 BC while Demetrios campaigned at different sites in the eastern Mediterranean, starting with the liberation of the Piraeus and Athens in 308/7 BC (Diod. Sic. 20.45) and continuing with the siege of Rhodes in 304 BC established due to Rhodes' preference for Ptolemy over Demetrios (Diod. Sic. 20.98-100). Demetrios then broke off this siege in compliance with an order from his father to return and campaign in mainland Greece in order to compel the Boeotians to rescind their alliance to Cassander of Macedon and to free Khalkis from the Boeotians.<sup>20</sup> In 303 BC, Demetrios was determined to destroy Cassander's generals, starting with Prepelaos in Corinth.<sup>21</sup> Demetrios proceeded to take Sikyon in order to remove their Ptolemaic garrison, free Corinth from Prepelaos (who withdrew to Cassander), and then capture other cities in the Peloponnese.<sup>22</sup>

The result of Demetrios' campaigns in mainland Greece was the assembly of Greeks loyal to the Antigonids whom Demetrios called to the Isthmus of Corinth in spring 302 BC to revive Philip II's League of Corinth, now the Hellenic League, with Demetrios and Antigonos as kings.<sup>23</sup> Based on the structure of Philip II's League, membership in the league included *poleis* from the Peloponnese as well as most of mainland Greece, including Athens, Delphi, and Eretria.<sup>24</sup> While Philip II's League did not include Anatolian *poleis* since they were still controlled by the Persian Empire, it is unclear whether Antigonos and Demetrios included all the *poleis* under their control or just those in mainland Greece. A preserved portion of the league's charter, *IG IV<sup>2</sup> I*, no. 68 (302 BC) found at Epidauros, granted representatives of the kings (i.e. Antigonos and Demetrios) the right to exercise the presidency until the *κοινὸς πόλεμος* against Cassander ended (*l.* 91).<sup>25</sup> The

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<sup>20</sup> Diod. Sic. 20.100.5-6.

<sup>21</sup> Diod. Sic. 20.102.1.

<sup>22</sup> Diod. Sic. 20.103.

<sup>23</sup> *IG IV<sup>2</sup> I*, no. 68 = *Staatsvert III*, no. 446; Plut. *Vit. Demetr.* 25.2-3.

<sup>24</sup> Walser (2008), 101; Billows (1990), 230.

<sup>25</sup> ἕως ἂν ὁ κοινὸς πόλεμος λυθῆι, προεδρεύειν [ἀεὶ τοὺς π]αρ[ὰ] τῶν βασιλ[έων].

charter also required members of the League to send whatever military contingents that each *polis* was instructed to send or to face a fine based on however many troops they failed to send.<sup>26</sup> The Antigonids seem to have created the Hellenic League to consolidate their control over Greek *poleis*, especially during periods of conflict. The charter also implies that the Antigonids wished to slowly convert the Greek *poleis* into semi-autonomous client states. Specifically, Antigonid-controlled *poleis* managed their own affairs with little royal interference in exchange for either an annual tribute, aid during Antigonid conflicts, or both.

*IG IV<sup>2</sup> I*, no. 68 is also significant, however, in connection to *IEphesos Ia*, no. 4 since it refers to Antigonos, Demetrios, and the Hellenic League's conflict with Cassander as a *κοινὸς πόλεμος*. Walser associates the *κοινὸς πόλεμος* in the charter of the Hellenic League with the *κοινὸς πόλεμος* of *IEphesos Ia*, no. 4, claiming that Ephesos, since it was under Antigonid control at the time, was a member within the Hellenic League and that the League was meant to encompass all of the *poleis* under Antigonid control, not just mainland Greece.<sup>27</sup> In the context of other primary sources where the term *κοινός πόλεμος* appears, such as in *IG IV<sup>2</sup> I*, no. 68, the term refers to a war within which allied *poleis* fight together with one party as the principal adversary against a common enemy.<sup>28</sup> For example, Isokrates in his *Panegyricus* (380 BC) describes how Athens did not wait for her allies to begin their *κοινὸς πόλεμος* against Darius when the Persians landed in Attica.<sup>29</sup> In *On the Peace* (346 BC), Demosthenes urges the Athenians to avoid giving the

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<sup>26</sup> *IG IV<sup>2</sup> I*, no. 68, ll. 95-99: καὶ ἂν τις πόλις μὴ ἀποστεύῃ τὴν δύναμιν τὴν συντεταγμένην, [ὅταν παραγγελῆται] ἢ [παραγγεῖται], ἀπ[ο]τινέτω ἐκάστης ἡμέρας [- κατὰ μὲν] τὸν ἰπέα ἡμ[ι]ναῖον - κατὰ δὲ τὸν ὀπλί[την] εἴκοσι δραχμάς - κατὰ [δὲ τὸν ψιλὸν] δέκα δραχμά[ς] - καὶ κατὰ τὸν ναύτην [δέκα?] δραχμάς, ἕως ἂν π[ᾶσιν] ἐξέλθῃ ὁ χρόνος τῆς στρα[τείας] το[ῖς] ἄλλοις Ἑ[λλησιν].

<sup>27</sup> Walser (2008), 99-103.

<sup>28</sup> Walser (2008), 98, "Krieg verbündeter Staaten."

<sup>29</sup> Isoc. *Paneg.* 86: ἀποβάντων γὰρ αὐτῶν εἰς τὴν Ἀττικὴν οἱ μὲν οὐ περιέμειναν τοὺς συμμάχους, ἀλλὰ τὸν κοινὸν πόλεμον ἴδιον ποιησάμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἀπάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος καταφρονήσαντας ἀπὴντων τὴν οἰκείαν δύναμιν ἔχοντες. See also Walser (2008), 98.

assembled Amphictyons any reason to begin a *κοινὸς πόλεμος* against Athens.<sup>30</sup> Based on his claim that Ephesos was indeed a member in the Hellenic League, Walser then dates *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 to 299 BC, after Demetrios and Antigonos' *κοινὸς πόλεμος* against the other Macedonian successors ended at the Battle of Ipsos in 301 BC.<sup>31</sup> His assertion is that Ephesos established the law 25 months after Prepelaos took Ephesos in 302 BC, specifically in the month of Lenaion, January/February, 299 BC.<sup>32</sup> The difficulty of *IG IV<sup>2</sup> I*, no. 68 is that, while it is tempting to connect its reference of a *κοινὸς πόλεμος* with that of Ephesos', neither the text, as it survives today, nor any other historical evidence expressly state that Ephesos was, indeed, a Hellenic League member.

While Ephesos was part of a league under Antigonid supervision, the *polis* was more likely part of the Ionian League, which Antigonos also revived prior to 303 BC.<sup>33</sup> Although the date at which Antigonos revived the Ionian League is unclear, the earliest possible date would have been in 319 BC when Antigonos first took the Ionian *poleis*. The earliest reference, however, to the resurgence of the Ionian League lies in the first lines of the two letters of Antigonos to Teos concerning its projected *synoecism* with Lebedos (*RC*, no. 3 [303/2 BC], *ll.* 1-4). Antigonos stipulates that, in the future, the two cities will send joint representatives to the Panionion, a sanctuary and the meeting place of the Ionian League just north of both Priene and, more specifically, the slopes of Mt. Mykale.<sup>34</sup> While there is no surviving charter from this revival of

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<sup>30</sup> Dem. 5.14: δεύτερον δ', ὁρᾶν ὅπως μὴ προαξόμεθ', ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοὺς συνεληλυθότας τούτους καὶ φάσκοντας Ἀμφικτύονας νῦν εἶναι εἰς ἀνάγκην καὶ πρόφασιν κοινοῦ πολέμου πρὸς ἡμᾶς. See also Walser (2008), 98.

<sup>31</sup> Walser (2008), 103-104.

<sup>32</sup> Walser (2008), *ibid.* See below on page 11-13, for Prepelaos' capture of Ephesos.

<sup>33</sup> Billows (1990), 217; Boehm (2018), 180.

<sup>34</sup> [—]ντε πε[—] | [— ὅστις δ' ἄν] εἰς τὸ τὸ Πανιώνιον ἀποστέ[λληται, ὠϊό]μεθα δεῖν [πράττειν πάντα τὰ] | [κο]ινὰ τὸν ἴσον χρόνον, σκηνοῦν δὲ τοῦτον καὶ πανηγυράζειν μετὰ τῶν παρ' [ὑμῶν ἀπεσταλμέ] | νων καὶ καλεῖσθαι Τηϊόν. See also Billows (1990), 217-218, for his discussion on the dating to the time of Antigonos of *RC*, no. 3 and *IErythrai und Klazomenai*, no. 16, two other fragmentary inscriptions from the late fourth century BC, as well as the Hellenic League's festival in honor of Alexander.

the Ionian League, it was presumably similar to the charter of the Hellenic League and required its members to provide either troops, or money in the form of fines as punishment or incentives, when requested by Antigonos and Demetrios until their *κοινὸς πόλεμος* concluded. Therefore, while Walser is incorrect about the league to which Ephesos belonged at the time, Walser's association of the *κοινὸς πόλεμος* with that of the Antigonid's and *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4's date of enactment may still hold, even though it would have been the Ionian League instead who declared a *κοινὸς πόλεμος* against the Antigonid's enemies. As the subsequent sections will show, however, the Ionian League's enemies were not the Diadochi, but the tyrant of Priene, Hieron.

## 1.5 Ephesos' Subjugation via Prepelaos

In order for Walser's argument on why 299 BC must be the date for the enactment of *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 to still hold merit, the historical record must show that Prepelaos wrought enough damage to the Ephesian countryside to warrant the enactment of the law. In 302 BC, Cassander, having formed a coalition with Lysimachos, Seleucus I, and Ptolemy Soter, sent Lysimachos to take Hellenistic Phrygia and Synnada while Prepelaos, as Lysimachos' general, took Aeolis and much of Ionia, including Ephesos.<sup>35</sup> Diodorus Siculus reported that, once Prepelaos besieged Ephesos, the inhabitants were frightened and surrendered the city.<sup>36</sup> Prepelaos – presumably on the orders of Lysimachos – proceeded to free the 300 hundred Rhodian hostages kept at Ephesos and left the city 'free,' but burned all the ships in the harbor because the Antigonids controlled the seas.<sup>37</sup> The ships destroyed in the harbor may have included those carrying grain and, as a result of a need for imported grain, Ephesos afterward honored Archestratos, Demetrios' commander in

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<sup>35</sup> Diod. Sic. 20.106-107; Nudell (2023), 171-172; Lund (1992), 125.

<sup>36</sup> Diod. Sic. 20.107.4.

<sup>37</sup> Diod. Sic. 20.107.4: καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐγκαταληφθέντας τῶν Ῥοδίων ἑκατὸν ὀμήρους ἀπέστειλεν εἰς τὴν πατρίδα, τοὺς δ' Ἐφεσίους ἀφῆκε, τὰς δὲ ναῦς τὰς ἐν τῷ λιμένι πάσας ἐνέπρησε διὰ τὸ θαλασσοκρατεῖν τοὺς πολεμίους.

Klazomenai, with citizenship for preserving ships carrying grain to the *polis*.<sup>38</sup> Although it is unclear whether Arcestratos protected grain ships in-transit or those among the ships in the harbor Prepelaos burned, Ephesos seems to have had a significant demand for grain after Prepelaos took the *polis*.<sup>39</sup> While Prepelaos left a garrison stationed at Ephesos, Demetrios ultimately made terms with the garrison to remove themselves and reportedly “forced the city to return to its former status” upon his return from Greece in 302/1 BC, having made terms with Cassander to temporarily cease their conflict.<sup>40</sup> The current consensus among scholars is that the forced return of Ephesos to its former status means that Prepelaos’ conquest had previously divided the city into factions, caused a domestic revolution among the elites, and temporarily allowed the oligarchic instead of the democratic faction to be in charge until Demetrios returned control to the democratic faction.<sup>41</sup> During the oligarchic faction’s short-lived supremacy, the faction successfully ensured that Prepelaos and his officers maintained and safeguarded the Artemision’s right to *ateleia* and its holy *stathmos* (a temple’s right to refuse to billet soldiers) when the issue of the temple’s tax exemption status (*ateleia*) and the billeting of troops in the sanctuary arose.<sup>42</sup>

While Diodorus and *IEphesos* V, no. 1449 reports that Prepelaos damaged the harbor, caused political strife, and that his garrison drained food and resources from the Ephesians, neither source reports that Prepelaos damaged the Ephesian countryside to such an extent that it warranted the Ephesian *polis* to enact *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4. Therefore, the new date Walser proposes, 299 BC, for the inscription must instead be pushed later into the 290s BC given that the inscription does not refer to Prepelaos’ capture of and damage to Ephesos. Between 302 and 299 BC, however,

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<sup>38</sup> *IEphesos* V, no. 1452 (302/1 BC).

<sup>39</sup> Davies (2011), 187-188. See Walser (2008), 65-66, on the dating of *IEphesos* V, no. 1452.

<sup>40</sup> Diod. Sic. 20.111.3.

<sup>41</sup> Lund (1992), 125; Nudell (2023), 171-172; Davies (2011), 191; Rogers (2012), 46, 72-74.

<sup>42</sup> *IEphesos* V, no. 1449 (302 BC); Rogers (2012), 46-47; Davies (2011), *ibid.* See also Chapter 4 for a longer discussion on *IEphesos* V, no. 1449, the Artemision’s relationship with Prepelaos, and the temple’s rights as a sanctuary in the late fourth to early third century BC.

Ephesos' local resources were likely further drained by the garrison Demetrios reestablished at Ephesos' acropolis when he re-took the *polis* before moving on to the Hellespont.<sup>43</sup> The costs of each successive garrison installed at Ephesos by Antigonos, Prepelaos, and then Demetrios seemed to have put such a strain on the *polis*' distribution of domestic resources that the Ephesian *polis* gave rights of citizenship for those safeguarding grain imports needed by Ephesos to feed the people.<sup>44</sup>

## 1.6 Ephesos' Age of Strife

The point at which Ephesos began to sustain extensive damage to its countryside came when the *κοινὸς πόλεμος* was fought on behalf of the Antigonid-controlled Ionian League after the Battle of Ipsos in 301 BC and Demetrios' short visit in 301/0 BC. The Battle of Ipsos in 301 BC resulted in the defeat of the Antigonids, the death of Antigonos, and the retreat of Demetrios to Ephesos.<sup>45</sup> According to Plutarch, while at Ephesos, Demetrios and his men were tempted to plunder the Artemision due to his army's significant lack of funds, but Demetrios instead left with his army to ensure that it did not happen.<sup>46</sup> Plutarch's account that Demetrios, as well as Prepelaos before him, did not choose to plunder the Artemision, even when in severe need of funds, exhibits the value Demetrios and Prepelaos placed on the military and political cooperation of the Ephesians and the religious sanctity of the Artemision. Demetrios, in particular, likely wanted the cooperation of Ephesos in order to also continue to have a *polis* and a reliable mint from which to collect resources and strike coins in his own name.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> Diod. Sic. 20.111.3.

<sup>44</sup> *IEphesos* V, no. 1452; *IEphesos* V, no. 1455 (ca. 301-294 BC). See also Chapter 3, 88-91, on the economic scarcity Ephesos endured during the 290's BC.

<sup>45</sup> Plut. *Vit. Demetr.* 28-30.

<sup>46</sup> Plut. *Vit. Demetr.* 30.

<sup>47</sup> Newell (1927), 64-73; Wheatley and Dunn (2020), 271-272.

Lysimachos, on the other hand, took the opportunity after the Battle of Ipsos to continue attempting to subjugate Ephesos. According to Polyaeus' *Stratagemata* (ca. 163 AD), Lysimachos first attempted to bribe Demetrios' garrison captain, Diodorus, with fifty talents during the time Demetrios had sailed on an expedition to Caria.<sup>48</sup> Upon learning about the bribery, Demetrios secretly sailed back to Ephesos with a small contingent of his forces, lured Diodorus to sail on a small vessel toward his ship, and sank Diodorus' vessel, capturing anyone who attempted to swim away.<sup>49</sup> In the few years that followed, however, there does not yet seem to be any evidence concerning Lysimachos' involvement in Ephesian matters until ca. 295 BC when he did succeed in taking the city. Instead, in 300BC, the Ephesian *polis* entered a conflict with the tyrant of Priene, Hieron, the events of which likely constituted the *κοινὸς πόλεμος* noted in *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4.

Hieron had taken power in Priene in 300 BC when Demetrios' new captain of the garrison, Ainetos, was stationed at Ephesos.<sup>50</sup> Hieron was then deposed in 297 BC after a war with Prienian rebels and Ephesos.<sup>51</sup> The rebels had previously retreated, held a fort called Charax on the borders of the Ephesian *polis*, and were supplied armaments that the Ephesian *polis* and Ainetos bought and provided to the rebels through interest-bearing loans and the sale of Ephesian citizenship rights.<sup>52</sup> Based on the inscription, *IEphesos* V, 1450, which confers citizenship to Thras--- of Magnesia for ransoming the freemen and slaves taken captive when a war occurred at Ephesos, it appears that Hieron attacked Ephesos at some time between 300 and 297 BC.<sup>53</sup> While the

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<sup>48</sup> Polyaeus *Strat.* 4.7.4.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>50</sup> Polyaeus *Strat.* 5.19; Asheri (1969), 43; Crowther (1996), 211-212.

<sup>51</sup> *IPriene*, no. 37 (196-192 BC), *ll.* 109-112.

<sup>52</sup> *IEphesos* VI, no. 2001 (299/8 BC), which Heberdey used to date *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4; *IPriene*, no. 37, *ibid.*; Crowther (1996), 211; Asheri (1969), 43.

<sup>53</sup> *IEphesos* V, no. 1450, *ll.* 1-8: [ἔδ]οξ<ε>ν τῆι βουλῆι καὶ τῶι δήμωι Ἀρτέμων Μητρᾶδος εἶπεν· ἐπειδὴ Θρασ[—] | [Π]οσειδωνίου Μάγνης πρότερον διετέλει πρόθυμος καὶ εὐνους ὦν τῶι δήμωι καὶ νῦν | τοῦ πολέμου γενομένου κατὰ τῆμ πόλιν κα[ῖ] ἀλισκομένων σωμάτων π[λείσ]— | των καὶ ἐλευθέρων καὶ οἰκετικῶν πᾶσαν [προθυμίαν παρείχeto περὶ τῆς σωτηρίας] | τῶμ πολιτῶν, καὶ τοὺς μὲν διέσωιζε τῶ[ν ἀλισκομένων λυτρωσάμενος, τοὺς δὲ] | ἀπέστελλεν τοῖς προσήκουσιν βουλόμ[ενος —] | τοῖς παραγινομένοις τῶμ πολιτῶν· [δεδοχθαι τῆι βουλῆι καὶ τῶι

inscription might be referring to, instead, the attempt by Lysimachos to again take the city, an attack on Ephesos by Hieron seems more plausible than one by Lysimachos because of the fact that Ephesos had funded Hieron's enemies. Given that Charax was on the border between Priene and Ephesos, Ainetos and the Ephesians likely supplied the Prienian rebels at the fort so that they might both continue their war against Hieron and also prevent him from encroaching onto Ephesian land. In addition, neither *IEphesos* V, 1450 nor the Prienian inscriptions on the tyranny of Hieron mention the involvement of Lysimachos as either funding Hieron or attacking an Ephesos preoccupied with the conflict against the tyrant.<sup>54</sup> Instead, *IPriene*, nos. 14, 37, and *OGIS*, no. 13, imply that Lysimachos wanted Hieron deposed given that Lysimachos had decreed after the conflict that Priene, and not Samos, owned Charax, that he had favored the people of Priene, and that both he and Demetrios housed Prienian exiles at the time.<sup>55</sup> Therefore, Lysimachos, who hoped to control both Priene and Ephesos, would not have attacked Ephesos due to the *polis'* close alliance with Priene as well as their aid to the Prienian rebels trying to depose Hieron.

As Priene was geographically very close to the meeting place of the newly revived Ionian League, i.e. just south of the Panionian, Ephesos may also have acted on behalf of the League's interests to not only help depose Hieron, but also restore Priene to its people and reinstate the Panionian under the control of the Ionian League, therefore making the conflict a *κοινὸς πόλεμος*. While the Prienian rebels did hold the fort for the three years of Hieron's tyranny, as reported in *IPriene*, no. 37, ll. 109-112, Hieron may have bypassed the fort and Ainetos, who appears to have

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δήμῳι, δοῦναι Θρασ—] | Ποσειδωνίου Μάγνητι πολιτείαν ἐφ' [ἴσηι καὶ ὁμοίῃ αὐτῶι καὶ τοῖς ἐγγόνοις. See also Biemann (1994), 58-60, who claims that a better date for the inscription is likely 302 BC when Prepelaos took Ephesos. However, as previously discussed, Ephesos seemed to have surrendered to Prepelaos without a fight, thereby eliminating a need for the general to have taken any prisoners.

<sup>54</sup> *IPriene*, nos. 11 (297 BC), 14 (285 BC), and 37 (196-192 BC); *OGIS*, no. 13 (285 BC); Crowther (1996), 212.

<sup>55</sup> *IPriene*, nos. 14, ll. 2-5; 37, ll. 73-77, 90-156; *OGIS*, no. 13, ll. 1-9; Crowther (1996), *ibid.*



been helping to guard the fort, in order to instead launch a successful raid on Ephesian lands.<sup>56</sup> Hieron's purpose for this attack was not to take control of Ephesos, but more likely to prevent the *polis* from providing further funds, armaments, and troops to the Prienien rebels. Although the date of the attack on Ephesos is unclear, the war that occurred within the Ephesian *polis*, as described in *IEphesos* V, no. 1450, was presumably the cause of the damage to the significant number of properties referred to in *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 ll. 65-69.<sup>57</sup> Although *IPriene*, no. 11 (297 BC) does not specifically identify individuals or *poleis* such as Ephesos, the inscription calls for an annual commemoration to honor not only the Prienian citizens who fought against Hieron, but also those foreigners who provided valuable aid and fought in the conflict.<sup>58</sup>

Since *IEphesos* VI, no. 2001 discusses how the Ephesian council in charge of handling the affairs of Priene are to repay the loans advanced to them by Ephesian residents working as professional money-lenders (*prodaneistai*), the decree seems to have been enacted during the tyranny of Hieron, but before the attack on Ephesos.<sup>59</sup> Walser, conversely, dates the decree to 286 BC in order to correlate the inscription to a possible re-capture of Ephesos by Demetrios during his campaign in Asia Minor, where Ainetos funded Prienian rebels against Lysimachos, not Hieron of Priene.<sup>60</sup> However, *IPriene*, no. 37 and *IEphesos* VI, no. 2001 both refer to Prienian rebels in Charax and *IPriene*, no. 37 refers to them in the context of the conflict against Hieron of Priene. Accordingly, Walser's rationale to both date *IEphesos* VI, no. 2001 later, presenting the inscription as proof that Demetrios retook Ephesos in 286 BC, and to claim that Polyaeus' account concerns

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<sup>56</sup> See *IEphesos* VI, no. 2001, ll. 12-13, where the generals and councilors requested that he go to take care of the Prienian rebels at Charax the fort and ensure that the fort does not fall into enemy hands.

<sup>57</sup> *IEphesos* V, no. 1450, ll. 2-3: [...καὶ νῦν] τοῦ πολέμου γενομένου κατὰ τὴν πόλιν. See Chapter 2, 58-59, for the discussion on the extent of damage inflicted upon Ephesos during the *κοινὸς πόλεμος*.

<sup>58</sup> See *IPriene*, no. 11, ll. 17-19: τῆς | [θ' ἢ] μέρας ὑπάρχῃ κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν ἀεὶ τ[οῖς τε ἐνδημοῦσι τῶμ] | πολιτῶν καὶ τοῖς παραγινομένοις τ[ῶν ξένων ὑπόμνημα.

<sup>59</sup> *IEphesos* VI, no. 2001, ll. 9-11. See Chapters 2 and 3 on the type of creditors present at Ephesos during the beginning of the third century BC.

<sup>60</sup> Walser (2008), 76-87.

Lysimachos' re-capture of the *polis* (rather than the initial capture in ca. 295 BC) seem to be inaccurate.<sup>61</sup> In addition, the damage to Ephesian farmland because of the conflict with Hieron likely occurred after the initial advancement of funds to Prienian rebels, as creditors and Ephesos were unlikely to have continued providing funds to the rebels while the *polis* was enduring a domestic debt crisis. Furthermore, since Ephesos did not experience any significant physical damage caused by the campaigns of Prepelaos or Demetrios, Ephesian residents likely still had the capability to cultivate farmland, produce and sell goods, and conduct commerce until the time of attack by Hieron. Therefore, the loans and sale of citizenship rights to fund Prienian rebels discussed in *IEphesos* VI, no. 2001 are more accurately dated between 299 and early 298 BC. Then, in the month of Posideon (December/January) during the *prytaneia* of Demagoras in 298 to 297 BC, the raid referred to in *IEphesos* V, 1450 occurred within Ephesian lands, which led to the capture of Ephesian citizens and residents, as well as damage to the city and the farmland of the Ephesian *polis*.<sup>62</sup> The end of Ephesos' and the Ionian League's *κοινὸς πόλεμος* came when Hieron was deposed in 297 BC, but Ephesos, in the same year, experienced the debt crisis which *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 attempts later to mitigate in 297/6 BC.

## 1.7 Arsinoeia's Subjugation via Lysimachos

Lysimachos, taking advantage of post-conflict Ephesos, had subjugated both the *polis* and Ionia by 294 BC.<sup>63</sup> Control of Ephesos was accomplished by bribing the men of a pirate chief (Andron, according to Polyaeus, or Mandro, according to Frontinus) sheltered by Ainetos, the Antigonid

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<sup>61</sup> See below on Polyaeus and Frontinus' account of Lysimachos' capture of Ephesos.

<sup>62</sup> *IEphesos* V, no. 1450, ll. 1-7; Trümper (1997), 6, 99.

<sup>63</sup> Plut. *Vit. Demetr.* 35.3.

garrison commander at Ephesos.<sup>64</sup> The pirates, secretly bribed by Lysimachos' general, Lycus, opened the gates of Ephesos so that Lycus might take the city and Ainetos as a prisoner.<sup>65</sup>

Once Lysimachos gained control of Ephesos, he ordered major construction projects at Ephesos and eventually, by 288 BC, renamed the new *polis* Arsinoeia after his third wife.<sup>66</sup> Lysimachos first moved the city 0.81 miles (1.3 kilometers) from near the Artemision in the low-lying floodplain closer to the sea on the western base of Mt. Panayurdağ (Mt. Pion) and the northern base of Mt. Bülbüdağ (Mt. Preon) because the silting of Kayster River delta cut off the city's access to the sea.<sup>67</sup> The Ephesians, though, seem to have started moving the city prior to their subjugation under Lysimachos, whether due to the flooding or not, but Lysimachos solidified the new borders of the city at a higher ground level upon conquering the *polis*.<sup>68</sup> It was not only Ephesos' flooding issues, but also the *polis*' vulnerability to naval attacks that caused Lysimachos to also order the construction of the new 5.5 mile long (8.9 kilometers) city fortification walls around the new settlement after 294 BC, enclosing a space of around 400 hectares (988 acres) in total.<sup>69</sup> Interestingly, though, allies of Demetrios may have placed the blame on Lysimachos for a flood, which occurred in the old city in or after 294 BC and forced the residents living there to move, with an alternative story about the movement and reconstruction of the city that later became the tradition related during Strabo's lifetime.<sup>70</sup> Whether this or Strabo's account that Lysimachos blocked the sewers of the old city to flood Ephesian residents resistant to the move is true or

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<sup>64</sup> Polyæn. *Strat.* 5.19; Frontin. *Strat.* 3.3.7.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> See also Ionian League decrees *I.Smyrna* II.1, no. 577, and *Milet* I.2, no. 10 (289/8 BC), where Ephesos is referred to as Arsinoeia.

<sup>67</sup> Paus. 1.9.7; Kraft, et al. (2007), 135; Nudell (2023), 178; Boehm (2018), 73; Davies (2011), 184.

<sup>68</sup> Rogers (2012), 63-67.

<sup>69</sup> *IEphesos* Ia, no. 3, IV, no. 1441; Rogers (2012), 67-68; Boehm (2018), 73. See Figure 2 for a map of the new location of Ephesos.

<sup>70</sup> Rogers (2012), *ibid.*; Nudell (2023), 178; Boehm (2018), 73-74.

anecdotal, Ephesos had very likely previously suffered flooding from the Marnas and Selinous rivers (modern day Derbent River tributaries).<sup>71</sup>

Although it is unclear whether the city walls around the new settlement were constructed using civic funds, independent donations, or Lysimachos' aid, the walls were likely completed by 289/8 BC, encompassed the Ephesian villages of Smyrna and Koressos, and included the inhabitants of the formerly autonomous *poleis* of Lebedos, Kolophon, Phygela, and Teos as part of Lysimachos' *synoecism* of Ephesos.<sup>72</sup> Lysimachos is also said to have established a cult of Artemis Soteria (i.e. not Ephesian Artemis herself) in the mountain groves of Ortygia, one of the traditional birthplaces of Artemis.<sup>73</sup> He further established a royal mint in Ephesos which struck bronze coins portraying Arsinoe on the obverse and a standard type for Ephesian civic coins, a stag as a symbol of Artemis, on the reverse with ΑΡΣΙ written horizontally across either sides of stag.<sup>74</sup> Lysimachos' goal for the *synoecism* projects at Ephesos was to associate and bind himself and his family to Artemis and the foundation of the city as well as to significantly aid in the financial and physical recovery of the city after the debt crisis described in *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4. Lysimachos may have also intended for Ephesos to become one of his more important economic, religious, and financial centers in Ionia and, perhaps, even a base from which to begin launching campaigns into the Aegean in order to expand his empire. Lysimachos died, however, during his war against Seleucus I and Ephesos fell under Seleucid control in 281 BC.<sup>75</sup>

## 1.8 Findspot, Orientation, and Script of the Inscription

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<sup>71</sup> Strab. 14.1.21; Steph. *Greek Anthology* 9.424; Rogers (2012), 65; Boehm (2018), 73-73; Nudell (2023), 178.

<sup>72</sup> Paus. 1.9.7; Boehm (2018), 73-76, 93-94; Rogers (2012), 68-69; Davies (2011), 187. See Chapter 3, 91, for the discussion on the economic and financial impact of Lysimachos' *synoecism* on post-crisis Ephesos.

<sup>73</sup> Boehm (2018), 220-221; Strab. 14.1.20.

<sup>74</sup> Boehm (2018), 73 n. 271. See Figure 5 where there is also an astragalos on the upper left of the reverse.

<sup>75</sup> Just. 17.1-17.2.1.

As to what wall into which *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 was mounted when the Ephesian *polis* enacted and inscribed the law, unfortunately no part of the inscription was found *in situ*. Group A of *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 was found 3km north of modern day Selçuk, Turkey in a causeway near the River Kayster by the architect J. T. Wood during the archeological dig he conducted between 1863 and 1874.<sup>76</sup> Around the beginning of the twentieth century, R. Heberdey identified another significantly damaged part of the inscription, Group B, which was found in the cobblestones on the north Analemma of the Theater near the Austrian dig site.<sup>77</sup> In 2005, H. Taeuber found another section of the inscription, Group C, broken into three parts in the cobblestones also at the north Analemma of the Theater, but these fragments are, as of yet, unpublished.<sup>78</sup> Since Group C has not yet been excavated, studied, or published, this study will focus on Groups A and B. The four blocks are white, blue-veined, and worn grey marble originally taken from a quarry around a kilometer east of Ephesos, with a ubiquitous height of 0.50m and depths between 0.20 and 0.22m.<sup>79</sup> The lengths for Group A are 2.18m for Block 1A, 1.68m for Block 2A, and 2.03m for Block 3A, and the length for Group B is 1.59m for Block 1B.<sup>80</sup> Some of the blocks' text retains its original red paint. Block 1A's text is damaged on the left and right sides due to the use of ancient iron clamps, the cuttings of which can also be seen on the top and sides of each block.<sup>81</sup> The left side and the upper right-hand corner of Block 2A are chipped off and a quarter of the block on the left side of Block 3A is broken off in a vertical crack. Block B's inscription is completely worn off except on the left third of the block where the text is fragmentary.<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>76</sup> Walser (2008), 11.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

<sup>78</sup> Walser (2008), 12. See Figure 7 where one can see at least ten blocks in the cobblestone at Ephesos that bear a striking resemblance to the shape and design of Group A as shown in Figure 1. Special thanks to Dr. Hans Taeuber for providing the picture of Group C from the 2005 Austrian excavation.

<sup>79</sup> Walser (2008), *ibid.* See Figure 1 for photographs of Blocks 1A-3A.

<sup>80</sup> Walser (2008), *ibid.*; *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, pg. 13.

<sup>81</sup> Walser (2008), *ibid.*

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

Blocks 1A-3A are inscribed as *paragraphos*, with each block having two columns of text and each of 1A and 3A's columns being 17 lines each. Conversely, Block 2A's column on the right ends on line 13. Based on Heberdey's squeeze, Walser reports that there is one column of 14 lines on Block 1B.<sup>83</sup> Groups A and B together have 112 lines in total. In addition, horizontal lines (—) between .012 and .015m in length separate the text into sections. Groups A and B of *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 have an average letter height of 0.01 and 0.012m in an Ionic script cut with what Walser described as “curved hastae.”<sup>84</sup> The inscription's dialect is Attic, not Koine, Greek with iota adscript in the Ionic script.<sup>85</sup> Furthermore, there seems to have been only one mistake that the letter-cutter made, namely, on line 68 where there is a missing iota in καθη<ι>ρημένων.<sup>86</sup>

## 1.9 The ἔδεθλον and the Artemision

While *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 refers to a temple precinct (ἔδεθλον, l. 21) in which the *neopoiai* (temple care-takers) must set up the whitened tablets containing the new land divisions made by the court, the inscription specifies neither which temple precinct nor whether *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 itself was to be set up in the same place as the tablets.<sup>87</sup> However, since both the inscription and the tablets were public documents, it is reasonable to think that *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 was set up in the same temple precinct as the whitened tablets for the sake of convenience and protection.<sup>88</sup> In fact, the inscription goes on to direct that copies, not the originals, of the whitened tablets are to also be given to the copying-clerk (*antigraphheus*), so that any citizen who wanted to look over the new

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<sup>83</sup> Walser (2008), 14.

<sup>84</sup> Walser (2008), 14, “geschwungenen Hasten,” and 21-24.

<sup>85</sup> Walser (2013), 21-24.

<sup>86</sup> *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, l. 68; Walser (2008), 14.

<sup>87</sup> *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, ll. 20-21: οἱ δὲ ἡρημένοι γράψαντες εἰς λευκώματα παραδότησαν τοῖς νεοποίαις θεῖναι ἐπὶ τὸ ἔδεθλον. See Chapter 2, 51-52, on the duties of the *neopoiai*. One should note that, according to the *LSJ* s.v. ἔδεθλον, *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 has the earliest attestation for the use of ἔδεθλον to refer to a temple precinct. However, there may have been an earlier use in A. Ag. 776 where τὰ χρυσόπαστα δ' ἔδεθλα should be read instead of ἐσθλά.

<sup>88</sup> See Sickinger (1999), 116-118, for a similar practice in Athens with laws and decrees and the Temple of the Mother of the Gods, the *Metröon*. See below as well.

divisions of land would be able to have two forms of access to the information.<sup>89</sup> If, indeed, *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 was set up next to the tablets, citizens would then have been able to see the law used to determine the new divisions of land on the whitened tablets.

There was only one sanctuary among the several cults present at Ephesos to which the term *ἔδεθλον* might apply and which was important enough to Ephesos to house official documents: the temple of Artemis Ephesia, the Artemision.<sup>90</sup> Artemis Ephesia was a significant goddess at Ephesos before, but, arguably, more so after, Ephesos' subjugation under King Croesus of Lydia, ca. 560 BC. Prior to the subjugation of Ionia under King Croesus, Artemis Ephesia symbolized eternal maidenhood, marriageability, fertility, and was felt to ensure that the forces of nature were serviceable to humanity.<sup>91</sup> Nicolaus of Damascus reported that, before he became king, Croesus vowed to dedicate an enemy's property to Artemis Ephesia in exchange for the power to secure his kingship from his enemies and rivals.<sup>92</sup> After driving his nephew, Pindarus, the tyrant of Ephesos, out of power, Croesus not only respected the city's inviolable status by refraining from invading and plundering the city, but also dedicated a majority of the temple's columns to Artemis during the construction of the Artemision.<sup>93</sup> In general, from the time of Croesus, Artemis Ephesia assumed a conspicuous role in upholding the sovereignty of Sardis, the capital city of the Lydian Empire, and in maintaining the relationship between the Ephesian Artemision and the altar of Artemis at Sardis.<sup>94</sup> Lydian inscriptions, too, record dedicatory gifts to either Artemis of Sardis or to Artemis of Ephesos from the sixth through to the fourth centuries BC, promoting their continued

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<sup>89</sup> *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, ll. 22-24: δότωσαν δὲ καὶ τῶι ἀντίγραφῃ τούτων ἀντίγραφα, ἵν' ἐξῆι τῶι βουλομένῳ τῶμ πολιτῶν ἐφορᾶν τοὺς γεγενημένους μερισμοὺς τῶν ἐγγαίων, καὶ κοινῆμ μὲν διαίρεσιν ταύτην εἶναι

<sup>90</sup> See Knibbe (1978), 490-502, for his catalogue of other cults with temples at Ephesos from the Archaic to the Roman Imperial eras.

<sup>91</sup> Munn (2006), 163-165.

<sup>92</sup> *FGrHist* 90 F 65, ca. second half of the first century BC; Munn (2006), 166 and n. 109.

<sup>93</sup> Hdt. 1.92.1.

<sup>94</sup> Munn (2006), 166. For example, see *IEphesos* Ia, no. 2 (ca. 340-300 BC).

mutual religious relationship.<sup>95</sup> Therefore, while Ephesos had a diverse pantheon of gods and goddesses, the Artemision had a position of religious prominence over the other temples.

There is also precedent for placing official documents of the *polis* in a temple under the protection of a deity, such as Meter Oreia in Athens. Meter Oreia became a significant goddess in Athens in 411/0 BC, not only as a figure of worship, but also as a figure associated with Athenian public documents and items important to the *polis*.<sup>96</sup> Towards the end of the fifth century BC, Athens seems to have recognized and valued the importance of Ionian/Asiatic Artemis and Meter Oreia as civic goddesses.<sup>97</sup> Specifically, to facilitate an arduous systematic review of Athenian laws, a legislative review board of 500 *nomothetai* worked on the task with the Council of 500 in 411/0 BC and held their regular meetings at the old Council House in Athens which, at the time, had been converted into the Temple of the Mother of the Gods, Meter Oreia, or the Metröon with the new Council House immediately adjacent to it.<sup>98</sup> The old Council House, then the new Metröon, became the archive of the officially reviewed laws, documents, and items important to the state such as the counterfeit coins in Nikophon's Law (375/4 BC), *ll.* 10-13, which became this goddess' sacred property.<sup>99</sup> Later in the fourth century BC, Lykourgos, in *Against Leocrates* (330 BC), claimed that Leocrates' treasonous crime of fleeing after the battle of Chaironeia was equivalent to someone entering the Metröon and destroying the text of a law housed inside.<sup>100</sup> Although not immediately adjacent to the Ephesian Bouleuterion, the Artemision also served within the political sphere of Ephesos as the repository for citizenship decrees.<sup>101</sup> Considering

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<sup>95</sup> Munn (2006), 166-167, and n. 113.

<sup>96</sup> Munn (2006), 330-331.

<sup>97</sup> Francis (1990), 142.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.* See also Sickinger (1999), 112, and Francis (1990), 138-139, on how the Mother of the Gods had similar features to Meter Oreia, but was not the same goddess.

<sup>99</sup> Munn (2006), *ibid.*; RO, no. 25, *ll.* 10-13: ἐὰν δὲ ὑπ[όχαλκον] ἢ ὑπομόλυβδον ἢ κίβδηλον, διακοπτέτω πα[ραυτίκ]α καὶ ἔστω ἱερὸν τῆς Μητρὸς [τ]ῶν θεῶν καὶ κ[αταβαλ]λέτω ἐς τὴν βολήν.

<sup>100</sup> Lycurg. *Leoc.* 66-67; Sickinger (1999), 116-117.

<sup>101</sup> *IEphesos* V, no. 1455, *l.* 9; *IEphesos* VI, no. 2004, *ll.* 13-14; *IEphesos* VI, no. 2005, *l.* 12. See below.



Meter Oreia's importance as a civic goddess in Athens by housing laws, documents, and items important to the *polis*, it is reasonable to think as well that the Artemision in Ephesos housed items such as *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 similar to how the Metröon housed Athenian laws in Athens.

## 1.10 Original Location of the Inscription

Although the Classical-era Ephesian Bouleuterion, rather than the ἔδεθλον of the Artemision, is another possibility for where *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 was set up as a wall inscription, there are significant issues which exclude the Bouleuterion as a viable candidate. Similar to Athens, the *boule* in Ephesos regularly met at the Bouleuterion to conduct preliminary discussions and deliberations on matters such as citizenship decrees and legal measures, such as *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, before voting.<sup>102</sup> In addition, since *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 requires that those chosen to supervise the κοινὸς πόλεμος give copies of the whitened tablets to the copying-clerks, the *polis* may have set up the law in the Bouleuterion where citizens would have easy access to both.<sup>103</sup> An Ephesian practice of setting up public inscriptions at the Bouleuterion similar to Athens is, however, difficult to prove because of two issues. First, the Classical-era Bouleuterion site at Ephesos has not yet been uncovered, and second, Ephesian inscriptions from the fourth and beginning of the third centuries do not name the Bouleuterion as the location at which to erect official decrees.<sup>104</sup> Instead, a third of all of the over 100 citizenship and *proxenoi* decrees from Ephesos found to date specify that they are to be set up in the ἱερόν τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος so that their enactment received the protection of Artemis.<sup>105</sup> In addition, many such Ephesian citizenship and *proxenoi* decrees from the fourth

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<sup>102</sup> Rubinstein (2004), 1072; Bier (2011), 28.

<sup>103</sup> *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, ll. 22-24.

<sup>104</sup> See Bier (2011), 28-30 and 47-48, for his presentation and discussion of excavations and discoveries at Ephesos from the previous 150 years, during which the Classical Bouleuterion has not yet been found and even the claim that the location of the Hellenistic Bouleuterion is under the Roman one is not definitive.

<sup>105</sup> Walser (2008), 13; McLean (2002), 215. For examples of citizenship decrees set up in the temple of Artemis, see *IEphesos* V, no. 1455, l. 9; *IEphesos* VI, no. 2004, ll. 13-14; *IEphesos* VI, no. 2005, l. 12.

and early third centuries BC in particular state that the *neopoiai* specifically set up the inscriptions in the Artemision.<sup>106</sup> Considering the duty of the *neopoiai* in the fourth and third centuries BC to set up public decrees and their specific connection to the Artemision in many of these decrees, the *neopoiai* mentioned in *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 were likely those from the Artemision as well. Therefore, the *neopoiai* in the law set up the whitened tablets in the *ἔδεθλον* of the Artemision, a term which perhaps refers to a specific archival building in the Artemision's temple complex.

Archeologists, however, have not yet uncovered anything at Ephesos prior to *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 which indicates that laws be set up in the Artemision, nor is the inscription a citizenship or *proxenos* decree, but a law (*l.* 88: κατὰ τόνδε τὸν νόμον), and it is unclear whether Ephesians set up laws in the same location as decrees.<sup>107</sup> Despite the ambiguity, since Groups A and B of *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 are all the same height and are not *stelai*, each of the blocks were set up next to each other on a wall in a single layer of blocks vertically or horizontally, perhaps in a stoa due to the well-preserved nature of the inscriptions.<sup>108</sup> *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 was also set up on a wall specifically reserved for public documents, such as was the case in Ionia at the temple of Athena in Priene and the Delphinion in Miletus.<sup>109</sup> At the temple of Athena at Priene specifically, there have been about ten decrees and letters important to the city found to date, including *IPriene*, no. 8 (286/5 BC), a decree with its subject matter similar to *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, that were all set up in

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<sup>106</sup> *IEphesos* IV, nos. 1408 (294-289 BC), 1441 (ca. 294-288 BC), and 1443 (307/6 BC); *IEphesos* V, nos. 1447, 1448 (ca. 306-302 BC), 1450 (ca. 298-297 BC), 1451, 1452 (302/1 BC), 1453 (299/8 BC), 1454, and 1455 (301-294 BC); *IEphesos* VI, nos. 2004 and 2005 (300 BC). See *IEphesos* IV, nos. 1440 (306 BC), *l.* 7, and 1442, *l.* 7, which use the same ambiguous phrase that presumably refers to the Artemision: εἰς τὸ ἱερόν.

<sup>107</sup> See Asheri (1969), 42, and his discussion that *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, *ll.* 69-85, imply that the inscription was at first an Ephesian decree at the beginning of the κοινός πόλεμος that was meant to delay the initial repayment of debt only for the decree to later be expanded upon, enacted as a law, inscribed, and set up as a wall inscription. See Chapter 2, 63-64, for a more in-depth discussion on whether *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 was always a law, it started as a decree by the Ephesian polis, or Demetrios requested the law to be made.

<sup>108</sup> Walser (2008), 13.

<sup>109</sup> Walser (2008), *ibid.* See also Crowther (1996), 219-221, for his discussion on the chronology for the completion of the temple of Athena in Priene based on the chronology of *IPriene*, nos. 3-8.

the temple's *pronaos* and its lateral walls.<sup>110</sup> Given that late fourth- and early third-century public inscriptions, such as citizenship decrees, were set up in the temple precinct of the Artemision, the Ephesians may have set up *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 near the inscribed whitened tablets in the *ἔδεθλον* as well.<sup>111</sup>

## 1.11 Conclusions

While Ephesos likely experienced financial and economic difficulties during the years between 319 and 300 BC as a result of having to support different garrisons and their involvement in various military campaigns, the *polis* does not seem to experience damage to its lands significant enough to warrant the enactment of *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 in 299 BC, as Walser asserts. Rather, since the Ionian League was revived by 303 BC, the *koinon* likely wanted to depose the tyrant in charge of Priene near where the Panionion, their meeting place, was located. Therefore, Ephesos waged a *κοινὸς πόλεμος* against Hieron on the League's behalf and provided funds, armaments, and troops to Prienian rebels until Hieron's deposition in 297 BC. Consequently, Hieron's attack on Ephesos likely occurred prior to his removal from office, specifically around 298/7 BC, with the ensuing debt crisis occurring in early 297 BC and the enactment of *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 in 297/6 BC.

While the exact location of the placement of the inscription is unclear, it seems that Walser's conclusion that it was placed at the Artemision is supported by what we know about the importance of Artemis at Ephesos as both a religious and a civic goddess. As Artemis Ephesia was a significantly important civic goddess in Ephesos from the Archaic era, and fourth-century citizenship decrees were set up in the temple, the Artemision likely housed the whitened tablets referred to in *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 and the inscription itself. Considering the iron clamp remnants on

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<sup>110</sup> Walser (2008), *ibid.*; Crowther (1996): 219-222; *IPriene*, no. 8, *ll.* 38-42.

<sup>111</sup> *IEphesos* V, no. 1455; VI, nos. 2001-2005; Walser (2008), *ibid.*

the blocks and the well-preserved nature of the text as well, *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 was not a *stele*, but, instead, a wall inscription perhaps set up in the stoa of the Artemision. Despite Walser's work regarding the two questions the inscription raises, its historical context and where it was set up, *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 still offers a number of topics that bear further research and study, including the identities of the *tokistai* and *georgoi* referred to in the inscription, Ephesos' laws on property and loans bearing interest, and the ability in Ephesos to use property as security, to which the following chapters are dedicated.

## Chapter 2: Commentary

While the purpose of *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 seems simple, that is to mitigate debt between creditors and borrowers, the law itself is rather complex. In fact, although there are 112 lines of text across four large marble blocks, the law as it is preserved today is still incomplete and potentially included at least ten more blocks.<sup>1</sup> Not only does the law provide important information regarding Ephesian magistrates and legal processes such as the *eisagogeis* and Ephesos' use of foreign judges, but it also provides information regarding how Ephesian property was used as security for interest-bearing loans. The first part of this chapter will include a description of the marble blocks and the text, an updated section on editions where the text, a translation, or both appears, an updated Bibliography, the text, and a translation (i.e. a genetic lemma). The selective commentary on the text that follows will focus on the Ephesian magistrates and legal processes involved and how they affected the economic sphere at Ephesos. Therefore, this selective commentary will exhibit how *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 is an exceptional instance where a *polis* enacted a law to provide new legal processes with which to settle disputes about private interest-bearing loans with properties used as security.

### 2.1 Description

Description is dependent on *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 and Walser (2008).

Four blocks of white, blue-veined, worn grey marble from a wall, likely the Artemision (Hicks; Walser), marble taken from a quarry around a kilometer east of Ephesos, each block has a ubiquitous height of 0.50m, Depths between 0.20 and 0.22m; 112 Lines in total.

**Group A:** Three blocks found 3km north of modern day Selçuk, Turkey in a causeway near the River Kayster by the architect J. T. Wood; depth for each is 0.22m; length for Block 1A is 2.18m, 1.68m for Block 2A, 2.03m for Block 3A; letter height is 0.01 to 0.012m; length for encircling border is 0.03m; the columns of the text are inscribed as *paragraphe* separated with horizontal lines (—); Blocks 1A and 3A's two columns of text are 17 lines each; Block 2A's column on the right ends at line 13; the left columns of 1A and 2A are longer than the right (Block 1A ~80:60 letters); script has "curved hastae" (Walser [2008]) and retains the red paint (*miltos*) in some areas;

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<sup>1</sup> See Figure 1, for Group A, and Figure 7, for a picture of the unexcavated Group C courtesy of Dr. Hans Taeuber.

Block 1A's text is damaged on the left and right sides due to iron clamps, the indentations of which are seen on the top and sides of Blocks 1A-3A; Block 2A's left side and the upper right-hand corner are chipped off. A quarter of Block 3A on the left side is broken off with a vertical crack, but did not negatively impact comprehension of the text; the beginning of the text is lost, but perhaps there was only one block before Block 1A; one likely mistake that the inscriber made is on line 68 where there is a missing iota in καθη<ι>ρημένων.

**Group B:** One block found in the cobblestones on the north Analemma of the Theater near the Austrian excavation site by R. Heberdey; depth is .20m; Length is 1.59m; marble is halved with the inscription rubbed off where only fragmentary remains on the left third side; the inscription has only one column that ends on Line 14; line length is unknown; Block B's text does not follow Block 3A's and there is at least one Block, not yet published or identified clearly, that separates them.

## 2.2 Editions

Editions are dependent on *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 (1979), 14, until 1969.

Group A was published by Wood as *ed. pr.*, *Discoveries*, in Appendix VIII, *Inscriptions from the City and Suburbs* (1877), No. 1; R. Dareste, *Nouvelle revue hist. de droit français et étranger* 1 (1877), 161-178 (text, 174-178) [=W. Dittenberger, *Syll.*<sup>1</sup> (1883), no. 344; Th. Thalheim in K. F. Hermanns *Lehrbuch der Griech. Rechtsaltertümer* (= *Lehrbuch der Griech. Antiquitäten* 2, 1<sup>3</sup>) (1884), 134-149; E. L. Hicks, *IBM* III (1890), no. 2 with a facsimile; Dareste/Haussoullier/Reinach (1892), no. 5; Thalheim *A.O.*<sup>4</sup> (1895), 152-168; Dittenberger, *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> (1900), no. 510].

Group B was published by R. Heberdey as *ed. pr.*, *FiE* II (1912), as no. 17 with a facsimile, but not together with Group A (No. 1 with discussion concerning the date in the commentary, 98).

Groups A and B published together by F. Hiller von Gaetringen as *ed. pr.*, *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> (1915), no. 364 [=Asheri *Leggi Greche sul Problema dei Debiti* (1969), text in Appendix II, 108-117, commentary 42-44 (no. 21, misprinted as "20") and 44-47 (no. 22)]; *IEphesos* Ia (1979), no. 4, 13-27 [=A. V. Walser, *Bauern und Zinsnehmer: Politik, Recht und Wirtschaft im frühhellenistischen Ephesos* (= *Vestigia* 59) (2008), Block A text and translation and Block B Text, 26-35, Block A and B textual commentary, 35-36; J. Velissaropoulos-Karakostas, *Droit grec d'Alexandre à Auguste (323 av. J.-C. – 14 ap. J.-C.)*, 2011, text and translation in parts Vol. I, 226-228, Vol. II, 55-56, 63-64, 137-138, 182, 201, 216-217, 259, 467-468, 512].

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## 2.4 *I Ephesos Ia, no. 4 – Text*

ca. 297/6 BC

Non-Stoich

- A.1** οἱ δικασταί. — ἐξεῖναι δὲ τοῖς δικασταῖς, ἐὰν αὐτοῖς μὴ φαίνηται δικαστικὸν εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν γεωργὸς πλέονος τετιμῆσθαι, ὁ δὲ τοκιστὴς ἐλάττονο[ς], ἐξεῖναι αὐτοῖς τιμῆσαι, ὅσου ἂν δοκῆι καλῶς ἔχειν· — τοῦ δὲ χ[ρ]έους μὴ εἶναι ἀντιτίμησιν. — ἐὰν δὲ ἡ μὲν τίμησις συνομολογῆται, τὸ δὲ δάνειον διαμφισβητῆται, ἢ τὸ μὲν δάνειον [συν]ομολογῆται, ἢ δὲ τίμησις ἀντιλέγηται, περὶ τοῦ διαμφισβητουμένου τῆς κρίσιν εἶναι. — ἃ δ' ἂν οἱ δικασταὶ κρίνωσιν, ἀναγράφαντες εἰς λεύκωμα οἱ ἀγωγεῖς καὶ τὰς ἐπικρίσεις τὰς τῶν διαιτητῶν, ἃς ἂν ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαστηρίου συνομολογήσωσιν, παραδόντων τοῖς ἐπὶ τοῦ κοινοῦ πολέμου ἡρημένοις. — ὅταν δὲ παραλάβωσιν οἱ ἐπὶ τοῦ κοινοῦ πολέμου ἡρημένοι τὰς κρίσεις καὶ τὰς διαίτας, κληρούτωσαν ἐκ τῶν τριάκοντα τῶν ἡρημένων ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου καθ' ἐκάστην πενθήμερον ἄνδρας πέντε διαιρέτας τῶν κτημάτων, κληρούτωσαν δὲ καὶ τοὺς τόπους ἀναγραφάμενοι. οἱ δὲ λαχόντες διαιρείτωσαν, καθ' οὓς ἂν ἕκαστοι τόπους λάχωσιν, μὴ διασπῶντες μήτε τὰ μέρ[η μ]ῆτε τὰ τοῦ γεωργοῦ, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέρη τέμνοντες συνεχῆ ἀλλήλοις· καὶ ἀποδιδόντων τῆς γῆς τοῖς τοκισταῖς [καὶ τοῖς γεωργοῖς κα]τὰ λόγον ἑκατέροις τῶν ἐνότων χρημάτων, συλλογισάμενοι τὸ τε δάνειον καὶ τὴν τίμησιν· ἐξαιρείτωσαν δὲ ἐν τῇ διαιρέσει τῆς χώρας ὁδοὺς πρὸς τε τὰ ἱερά καὶ πρὸς τὰ ὕδατα καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἐπαύλας καὶ πρ[ὸς] τάφους. — ἐὰν δὲ τινες διαμφισβητήσωσιν τῇ γεγενημένῃ διαιρέσει, ἐπαγγειλάτωσαν τοῖς ἐπὶ τοῦ κοινοῦ πολέμου ἡρημένοις καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαστηρίου τεταγμένοις· ὁ δὲ ἀποδεδειγμένος ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαστηρίου ἐξαγέτω ἐπὶ τὸν τόπον· οἱ δὲ δικασταί, ἐὰν τι δοκῆι αὐτοῖς μὴ δικαίως διηρηθῆσθαι, ἀνισούτωσαν κατὰ λόγον ἑκάστοις προσνέμοντες τοῦ δανείου καὶ τῆς τιμῆσεως. τοὺς δὲ γενομένους ὑπὸ τῶν διαιτητῶν ἢ τῶν δικαστῶν μ[ε]ρι[σ]μ[ο]ῦς ἀνενεγκάτωσαν οἱ διαιτηταὶ καὶ οἱ δικασταὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς ἡρημένους ἐπὶ τοῦ κοινοῦ πολέμου, ἀναγράφαντες τὰ τε ὀνόματα τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ τοὺς τόπους καὶ τοὺς ὄρους τῶν μερισμῶν. — οἱ δὲ ἡρημένοι γράψαντες εἰς λευκάματα παραδόντων τοῖς νεωποῖαις θεῖναι ἐπὶ τὸ ἔδεθλον, δότωσαν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀγτιγραφεῖ τούτων ἀντίγραφα, ἵν' ἐξῆι τῶν βουλομένῳ τῶν πολιτῶν ἐφορᾶν τοὺς γεγενημένους μερισμοὺς τῶν ἐγγαίων, καὶ κοινήμ μὲν διαίρεσιν ταύτην εἶναι· — ἂν δὲ πῶς ἄλλως πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὁμολογήσωσιν ὑπὲρ τῆς διαιρέσεως καὶ ἀπογράψωνται πρὸς τοὺς ἐπὶ τοῦ κοινοῦ πολέμου, οὕτως αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ὡς ἂν ὁμολογήσωσι πρὸς ἀλλήλο[υ]ς, ἀντίγραφα δὲ λαμβάνειν τὸν γεωργὸν τῶν τοῦ τ[οκισ]τοῦ τοῦ αὐτῶι προσκοινωνούντος καὶ τὸν τ[οκισ]τὴν τῶν τοῦ γεωργοῦ τοῦ αὐτῶι προσκοινωνούντος τιμημάτων καὶ δανείων κα[ὶ] ἐπίτροπον ὑπὲρ ὄρφανου καὶ τοὺς συ[νο]ρφανιστάς, οὓς ἂν παραλαμβάνωσιν ἕκαστοι· ἄλλ[ο]ν δὲ μηθένα λαμβάνειν μηδὲ τοὺς ἐπὶ τούτων τεταγμένους διδόναι [μηδὲ] αὐτοὺς λαμβάνειν· εἰ δὲ μή, ἐξώλη εἶναι καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν λαβόντα καὶ ὃς ἂν ἔτέρωι δῶι, καὶ ὑπόδικον εἶναι καὶ τὸν λαβόντα καὶ τὸν δόντα ὡς ἀπειθούντα καὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντα τοῖς συμφέρουσι τῆς πόλεως. — ὅσοι δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς ὑπερέχουσι δεδανείκασιν, εἶναι τῆς κομιδῆς αὐτοῖς ἐκ τοῦ περιόντος μέρους τῶν



- γεωργῶι, κἄν εἷς κἄμ πλείους ὄσι, τοῖς πρώτοις πρώτοις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπεξῆς, τὸν δὲ
- 35** [μερισ]μὸν εἶναι καὶ τούτοις καθάπερ καὶ τοῖς πρώτοις δανείσασιν. — εἰ δέ τινες [ὑποθέ]ντες ἄλλοις κτήματα δεδανεισμένοι εἰσὶμ παρ' ἐτέρων ὡς ἐπ' ἐλευθέρους [τοῖς κ]τήμασιν ἐξαπατήσαντες τοὺς ὑστέρους δανειστάς, ἐξεῖναι τοῖς ὑστέροις [δανεισ]ταῖς ἐξαλλάξασιν τοὺς πρότερον δανειστάς κατὰ τὸν συλλογισμὸν τοῦ κοινοῦ πο- [λέμου] ἔχειν τὰ κτήματα· ἐάν δὲ ἐνοφείληται τι αὐτοῖς ἔτι, εἶναι τῆγ κομιδὴν τοῖς
- 40** [δανειστ]αῖς ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης οὐσίας τοῦ χρεῖστου πασῆς τρόπωι ὅι ἂν δύνωνται ἀζημίως [ἀπάση]ς ζημίας· ἂν δὲ καὶ ἔγγυος ἦι, εἶναι τὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἐγγύου κομιδὴν καθάπερ ἐκ τῶν [τὰ μετέ]ωρα ἐγγυωμένων. — ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐγγύων τῶν ἐγγυωμένων πρὸς [αὐτὰ] τὰ κτήματα· — ἐὰμ μὲν ἴση ἦ ἢ τιμὴ τοῦ κτήματος τῶι δανείωι, πρὸς ὃ [ἂν ἦ] ἔγγυος, τῆι τιμήσει τῆι πρὸ τοῦ πολέμου γεγενημένηι, ἀπηλλάχθαι τὸν ἐγγυ-
- 45** [υον τῆ]ς ἐγγύης· ἐάν δὲ πλέον ἦι τὸ ὀφείλημα τῆς τιμῆς τοῦ κτήματος, τὸ πλέον ὀφεί- [λημα τῆς] τιμῆς ὃ ἐγγυος ἀποτινέτω κατὰ λόγον ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι οἱ τὰ μετέωρα ἐγγυώ- [μενοι, ἐὰμ] μὴ ἐπιτετοκισμένον ἦι εἰς πλείω χρόνον τῆς ἐν τῆι πράξει γεγενημένης [ἐγγύη]ς· — ἐάν δὲ ἐπιτετοκικῶς ἦι ὁ δανειστής παρὰ τὴμ πράξιν καὶ τὸν [χρόνον τὸν ὦ]μολογημένον ἐν τῆι πράξει, μὴ ἀποτίνειν τὸν ἐγγυον ὅι πλείον
- 50** [ἦ] ἐπι[ετοκ]ισ[μ]ένον, ἐὰμ μὴ ἐπεσχηκῶς ἦι τὴν εἰσπραξίν ὁ τοκιστῆς συμβου- [λομένου] τοῦ ἐγγύου· περὶ δὲ τούτου ἂν ἀμφισβητῶσιγ, κρίσιν αὐτοῖς γίνεσθαι ἐπὶ τοῦ ξενικοῦ δικαστηρίου, ἄμ μὴ τι ὑπὸ τῶν διαιτητῶν συμ[παισθῶσι] τῆς δὲ δίκης ἄρχειν τὸν τοκιστήν. — εἰ δέ τις ἐπίτροπος ἐν τῆι ἐπ[ιτροπῆ]ι λαβὼν αὐτὸς ἔχει χρήματα τῶν τοῦ ὀρφανοῦ τρόπωι ὁτωιοῦν, τούτω[ι μὴ]
- 55** εἶναι κοινὸν τὸμ πόλεμον. — ὅσοι δὲ φερνάς ὀφείλουσι θυγατρίους ἢ [ἀ]- δελφαῖς ταῖς αὐτῶν μεμερικότες ἐκ τῆς πατρώιας οὐσίας, ἢ ἐπίτροποι ὑπὸ πατρὸς καταλελειμμένοι ἢ ὑπὸ δήμου ἠρημένοι ταῖς ὀρφαναῖς ταῖς ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἐπιτροπευόμεναις μὴ ἀποδεδώκασιν τὰς φερνάς, ἄς οἱ πατέρες ἔταξαν, ἢ γήμαντες καὶ διαλυθέντες μὴ ἀποδεδώκα-
- 60** σιν τὰς φερνάς οὔσας ἀποδότους κατὰ τὸν νόμον, τούτοις ἀποδιδόναι τὰς φερνάς καὶ τοὺς τόκους κατὰ τὰς πράξεις καὶ μὴ εἶναι αὐτοῖς ὑπολο- γίζεσθαι τὸγ κοινὸμ πόλεμον, ἀλλὰ τὸ γενόμενον διάπτωμα ἀναπλη- ρούτωσαν εἰς τὴν φερνήν ταῖς ὀρφαναῖς οἱ ἐπίτροποι ἐκ τοῦ ἄλλου οἴκο[υ] οὗ ἂν ἐπιτροπεύωσι.
- 65** ὅσοι δὲ ἐπὶ κτή[μ]ασιν δεδανεισμένοι εἰσὶν ἀπὸ Δημαγόρου πρυτάνεως καὶ μηνὸς Ποσιδεῶ- νος, τούτοις τ[ὸ] μὲγ κοινὸμ πόλεμον εἶναι ὥσπερ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, τὰς δὲ τιμήσεις εἶναι τῶγ κτημά[τ]ων, ἐν οἷς χρόνοις τὰ δάνεια καὶ αἱ πράξεις γεγόνασιν, ὅπως εἴ τινες κεκαρμένοι τοῖς κτήμα[σιν] ἢ τῶν ἐπαυλίων καθη<ι>ρημένων συνηλλάχασιν οὕτως αἱ τιμήσεις αὐτῶν γίνωνται [ὡ]ς διακειμένοις συνήλλαξαν τοῖς κτήμασιν. ὅσοι δὲ πρὸ Ἀπολλᾶδος
- 70** καὶ μηνὸς [Λ]ηνιαῶνος πράξεις πεπράγασιν ἐναντίας τῶι κοινῶι πολέμωι, μὴ εἶναι τὰς πράξεις κυ[ρ]ίας, ἀλλ' εἶναι τοὺς ὀφείλοντας τούτοις ἐν τῶι κοινῶι πολέμωι. — ὅσοι δὲ ἀπὸ μηνὸς Λη[ν]ιαῶνος καὶ Ἀπολλᾶ πράξεις πεπράγασιν ἐπὶ τοῖς κτήμασιν, τούτοις δ' εἶναι τὰς πράξε[ις] κυρίας καὶ μὴ εἶναι αὐτοῖς κοινὸν τὸμ πόλεμον, ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῶι πολέμωι διαπι- στεύσαν[τε]ς εἰσευπόρησαν· τόκους δὲ αὐτοῖς εἶναι μὴ πλείους δωδεκάτων. — ὑπὲρ
- 75** τῶν δανε[ιστ]ῶν τῶν ἐμβεβηκότεων εἰς κτήματα· — ὅσοι μὲμ πρὸ μηνὸς Ποσιδεῶνος τοῦ ἐπὶ Δη[μ]αγόρου ἐμβάντες εἰς κτήματα κατὰ πράξεις ἔχουσιν τὰ κτήματα καὶ νέμον- ται, εἶναι [αὐ]τοῖς κυρίας τὰς ἐμβάσεις, εἰ μὴ τι ἄλλο ἐκόντες πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὠμολογήκασιν. περὶ δὲ τῆς π[αγ]κτησίας ἂν τινες ἀμφισβητῶσιν, κρίσιν αὐτοῖς εἶναι κατὰ τοὺς νόμους. ὅσοι δὲ ἐμ[βε]βήκασιν ὕστερον μηνὸς Ποσιδεῶνος τοῦ ἐπὶ Δημαγόρα νεμομένων τῶν δεδα- νεισμέν[ων τὰ] κτήματα κατὰ τὸ ψήφισμα καὶ κατηγμένων ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου, τὰ μὲγ κτήμα- τα εἶναι[ι τῶν δα]νεισαμένων καὶ νεμομένων, τὰ δὲ δάνεια τῶν δανειστῶν, τοῦ μερισμοῦ γενομένου καθάπερ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δανεισταῖς. — ἐάν δὲ διαμφισβητήσωσιν οἱ δανεί- σαντες πρὸς τοὺς ὀφείλοντας φάμενοι ἐμβεβηκέναι πρότερον Δημαγόρου πρυτάνεως καὶ μη- νὸς Ποσιδεῶνος, κρίσιν αὐτοῖς γίνεσθαι καθάπερ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς ἐν τῶι κοινῶι πολέμωι ἐβλαμ-
- 85** μένοις. — εἰ δέ τινες μὴ ἐμβάντων τῶν δανειστῶν αὐτοὶ νεμόμενοι τὰ κτήματα ἐκόντες τι

συνωμολόγηται πρὸς τοὺς δανειστὰς μὴ βιασθέντες, εἶναι αὐτοῖς τὰ ὁμολογημένα κύρια· ἐὰν δὲ ὁ μὲμ φῆι βεβιάσθαι, ὁ δὲ μὴ, εἶναι αὐτοῖς κρίσιν περὶ τούτων ἐν τῷ ξενικῷ δικαστηρίῳ, προ-  
δαιτᾶσθαι δὲ αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν δαιτητῶν κατὰ τόνδε τὸν νόμον. — ὅσοι δὲ ἐγκαταλιπόντες τὰ  
κτῆματα ἀπηλλαγμένοι εἰσίν, οἱ δὲ τοκισταὶ γεγεωργήκασιν, εἶναι τὰ κτῆματα τῶν τοκιστῶν.

- 90** ἐὰν δὲ βούλωνται οἱ ὀφείλοντες ἀποδόντες τὰ ἀνηλωμένα τοῖς τοκισταῖς καὶ τόκους ἐπὶ  
τεσσερεσκαιδεκάτους καὶ εἴ τι αὐτοῖς ἀνήλωται εἰς τὴν γῆν ἢ ἀπόλωλέ τι διὰ τὴν γεωργίαν  
ὑπολογισθεισῶν τῶν γεγενημένων προσόδων παραλαβεῖν τὰ κτῆματα, ἐξεῖναι αὐτοῖς ἀπο-  
δοῦσιν ἐν ἐνιαυτῷ τῷ ἐπὶ Δαναοῦ μετέχειν αὐτοὺς τοῦ κοινοῦ πολέμου κατὰ ταῦτα  
τοῖς ἄλλοις: — ὑπὲρ δὲ τῶν γεγενημένων ἀναλωμάτων καὶ τῶν ἀπολωλότων ἐν τῇ  
**95** γεωργίᾳ καὶ τῷ προσόδων τῶν γεγενημένων ἑὰμ μὲν τι πρὸς ἀλλήλους συμφωνή-  
σωσιν ἢ συμπεισθῶσιν ὑπὸ τῶν δαιτητῶν, ταῦτ' εἶναι· εἰ δὲ μὴ, κρίσιν αὐτοῖς εἶναι ἐπὶ τοῦ  
ξενικοῦ δικαστηρίου καθάπερ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, τῆς δὲ δίκης ἄρχειν τὸν ἐγκαταλιπόντα  
τὸ κτῆμα. εἰ δὲ τινες ἐπὶ Δημαγόρου ἢ Μαντικράτους ἢ Ἀπολλᾶδος ἕως μηνὸς Ποσιδεῶνο[ς]

- B.1** τὰ μέρη τῶν χρημάτων [.c.6..]νοκ[.]τ[.]τ[—]  
τὸν κοινὸν πόλεμον [..]δε[.c.7..]το[.]σ[— ἀμφι]-  
σβητῶσιν μη[.]αν[.c.5.]τα[—]  
ἀδελφόν, [κρί]σιν αὐτοῖς εἶναι κατὰ [τόνδε τὸν νόμον —]  
**5** οἴκοι παρειλήφασιν [.]α[... ]ω[—]  
τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν ε[—]  
[.]αδ[.]κ[.]α κατὰ τὸν κοιν[ὸν] πόλεμο[v — ἀμφισβη]-  
τῶσιγ, κρίσιν αὐτοῖ[ς] εἶ[ναι κατὰ] τ[ό]ν[δ]ε [τὸν νόμον —]  
νόμον καὶ ἐὰν ἀ[λ]ῶ[σιν —]  
**10** ἀποτε[ισ]άτωσαν τὰ χ[ρ]ήματα τῶ[ι — ἐὰν δέ]  
τινες ἐγλ[ε]ίπω[σιν —]  
τῆ[v] οὐσίαν τοῦ ἐγλε[ί]ποντος ἀποτ[ι]ν[—]  
χρηματ[... ]λ[...c.10...]τε[.]ν[— κρίσιν αὐτοῖς]  
εἶναι κατὰ τόνδε τὸν νόμον.

## 2.5 Translation

Group A's translation is primarily dependent on that of Bagnall and Derow (2004), as well as the translations provided by Walser (2008), Velissaropoulos-Karakostas (2011), and *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4.

**Group A:** (*I. 1*) The judges. It is to be allowed for the judges (to determine the value of the property), if the matter does not seem to them to be ready for judgement, but the farmers have placed a greater value (upon the land), and the creditor a lesser one, it is to be possible for them (the judges) to value it, to have it (the value) as much as may seem well to them.<sup>2</sup> There is to be no counter-estimate of the loan. If the valuation is agreed, but the loan is disputed, or if the loan is

<sup>2</sup> Bagnall and Derow (2004), 19, translate *γεωργός* as landowner or landholder whereas Walser translates as “Bauer.”

agreed but the valuation is disputed, the judgement is to be concerning that which is (*L. 5*) being disputed.

Let the *eisagogeis*, having inscribed on a whitened tablet the things on which the judges give judgement and the settlements of the arbitrators, which they have agreed to before the court, hand (the tablets) over to those who were chosen for the common war. When those who have been chosen for the common war receive the judgements and the arbitration settlements, let them select by lot from the thirty who have been chosen by the *demos*, five men for each five-day period as dividers of properties, and they select by lot also the areas and will have (*L. 10*) recorded (the areas); and let the men selected by lot divide in accordance with the areas which they each obtain by lot, not sundering the holdings of the creditor or the holdings of the farmers, but dividing the parts (to be) contiguous with one another; and let them give over to the creditors [and to the farmers] amounts of the land in proportion to the value inhering, having reckoned up both the loan and the valuation; let them except, in the division of the land, roads towards shrines, water, farm buildings, and graves.

If any dispute the division that has occurred, let them declare this to (*L. 15*) those having been chosen for the common war and to the one placed in charge of the court. Let the one designated to be in charge of the court lead the judges out to the place; let the judges, if something seems to them not to have been justly divided, make it fair, allotting to each in accordance proportion to the report of the loan and the valuation. Let the judges and arbitrators report the divisions accomplished by the arbitrators or by the judges to those having been chosen for the common war, having inscribed both the names (*L. 20*) of the men, the places, and the boundaries of the divisions. Let those who have been chosen, having inscribed (the information) on whitened tablets, turn them over to the *neopoiai* to set them up in the temple precinct, and let them also give copies of these to the copying-

clerk, in order that it may be possible for any citizen desiring to look over the partitions of the landed properties to do so, and this (process) for division is to be common.

But if they reach agreement between themselves in some other way about the division (*l. 25*) and register before those who have been chosen for the common war, thus it is to be for them just as they agree between themselves, and the farmer is to receive copies of the valuations and loans from the creditor in which he has a stake, and the creditor from the farmer in which he has a stake and the guardian, on behalf of an orphan, and the joint-guardians of orphans, whomever each (of the creditors and the farmers) may have accepted; no one is to receive copies from anyone else nor those (*l. 30*) assigned to be in charge of these things are not to give them nor to receive them; if not, both the one receiving and the one who gives to another are to be accursed, and both the one receiving and the one giving are to be liable to prosecution as being disobedient and as plotting against the best interests of the *polis*.

As many as have lent money on the remaining (value), these are to have recovery from the portion remaining to the farmer, whether there be one or many of them, the first with respect to the first (loan) and then the others successively, and (*l. 35*) the division is to be for these just as for the initial lenders. If any, after having mortgaged property to some, they had been lent (money) from others as if on unencumbered property, having deceived the subsequent lenders, it is to be allowed for the subsequent lenders, being treated as the previous lenders according to the reckoning of the common war, to have the property. If anything is still owed on security to them, there is to be a recovery for the (*l. 40*) lenders from the rest of the property of the debtor, in any way they can, free from all penalty; and if there is a guarantor, there is to be recovery from the guarantor just as from those giving unsecured (?) guarantees.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Note that *LSJ* only cites *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 for the translation of *μετέωρα* as “unsecured.”

Concerning guarantors giving guarantees with respect to the property itself; if the value of the property is equal to the loan for which he is the guarantor, with the valuation having been established before the war, then the guarantor is to be released (*L. 45*) from his guarantee. If that which is owed is greater than the value of the property, then let the guarantor pay the excess of that which is owed over the value in accordance with the report just as others giving unsecured guarantees, except if he was made liable to a higher rate of interest for a longer period than that of the guarantee made in the transaction. If the lender had made liable to a higher rate of interest contrary to the transaction and the length of time agreed in the transaction, let the guarantor not pay the excess by which he (*L. 50*) was made liable to a higher rate of interest, unless the creditor has postponed the collection with the consent of the guarantor. If they dispute about this, they are to receive judgement before the foreign court, unless they have been brought to some agreement by the arbitrators; and the creditor is to initiate the court case.

If any guardian during his guardianship, after having acquired it, is in possession of the orphan's money in any way, he is not (*L. 55*) to share in the (provisions relating to the) common war. As many as owe dowries for their own daughters or sisters, having assigned them from their paternal property, or being guardians, either having been left in that position by the father or chosen by the *demos*, have not given to the orphan girls under their guardianship the dowries, which their fathers assigned, or those having married and then been divorced, have not paid back (*L. 60*) the dowries to be paid back according to law, these are to pay the dowries and the interest according to the transaction and it is not to be open to them to take into account the (provisions relating to the) common war, but let the guardians make up the deficiency in the dowry for the orphan girls out of the rest of the estate whatever is under their guardianship.

(*I. 65*) As many as have borrowed on properties since the term of Demagoras as *prytanis* and the month of Posideon, for these the (provisions relating to the) common war are to apply as for the others, but the valuations of the properties are to be those of the time when the loans and the transactions occurred, in order that if any entered into arrangements with their property destroyed or the farm buildings had been destroyed, thus their valuations may be the state of the property so far as when they made the arrangements.

As many as have made transactions before (the *prytaneia* of) Apollas (*I. 70*) and the month Lenaion contrary to the (provisions relating to the) common war, the transactions for them are not to be valid, but those in debt to them are to share in the (provisions relating to the) common war. As many as have made transactions on properties security since the month of Lenaion and (the *prytaneia* of) Apollas, the transactions for them are to be valid and the (provisions relating to the) common war are not to be shared with them, since they procured in plenty while having entrusted (to themselves) in confidence during the war; but let there not to be for them an interest of more than one-twelfth.

Concerning (*I. 75*) lenders having entered upon property; as many as having entered upon properties in accordance with the arrangements prior to the month Posideon in the term of (the *prytaneia* of) Demagoras hold and possess the properties, the entering into possessions (?) are to be valid for them, unless they have willingly come to some agreement with one another.<sup>4</sup> If any dispute about full ownership, there is to be judgement for them according to the laws. As many as entered upon possession subsequent to the month Posideon in the term of (the *prytaneia* of) Demagoras, with those having been lent money having been (*I. 80*) in possession of the property in accordance with the decree and having been brought back by the *demos*, the properties, on the

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<sup>4</sup> Note that *LSJ* only cites *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 for the translation of *ἐμβάσεις* as “entering into possessions.”

one hand, are to belong to those having been lent money and those having been in possession (of them), the loans, on the other hand, to the lenders, with the division taking place as for the other lenders. If the lenders disagree with those owing, saying they entered upon possession prior to Demagoras as *prytaneia* and the month Posideon, there is to be judgement for them just as also for the others (*L. 85*) having suffered damage during the common war. If any, although the lenders not having entered upon possession, distributing among themselves the properties have themselves willingly and not with force come to some agreement with the lenders, their agreements are to be valid. If one says that he was coerced, but the other not, they are to receive judgement about these matters in the foreign court, but they are first to submit to arbitration before the arbitrators in accordance with this law.

As many as have departed after abandoning their properties, and (as many) creditors (as) have cultivated (the properties), the properties are to belong to the creditors. (*L. 90*) If they wish, those owing are to have paid back to the creditors the expenses and the interest at one-fourteenth and anything that was spent by the creditors on the land or lost due to cultivation, with the income that occurred that the properties are to receive having been taken into account, it is to be allowed for them, who pay back during the year of the term (of the *prytaneia* of) Danaos, to share in the (provisions relating to the) common war on the same terms as the others. Concerning the expenditures and the losses in (*L. 95*) cultivation and the income of the cultivation, if they come to agreement with one another or are brought to agreement by the arbitrators, these are to be (valid). If not, there is to be judgement for them before the foreign court just as for the others, and the one who abandoned the property is to initiate the court case. If any, in the terms of Demagoras or Mantikrates or Apollas, up to the month Posideon...

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**Group B:** (*l. 1*) The portions of money [..... ] νοκ[.]τ[.]τ[—] the common war [..]δε[..... ..] το[.]σ[— they may dispute] μη[.]αν[.....]τα[—] brother, the judgement for them is to be in accordance with [this law – ] (*l. 5*) they had taken the home [.]α[...ω[—] the property ε[—][.]αδ[.]κ[..]α in accordance with the (provisions relating to the) common war – they disputed, the judgement for them is to be in accordance with [this law. —] (*l. 10*) the law and if [they might be seized —] let them repay the money [to – and if] any [abandon -] the property of the one abandoning (pay back) ἀποτ[ι]ν[—] (money) χρηματ[...λ[.....]τε[.]ν[—] the judgement for them] is to be in accordance with this law.

## 2.6 Commentary

*l. 1 - οἱ δικασταί:* Although the judges in line 1 are not identified in the inscription, *ll. 52 and 87* specify that they are part of a *xenikon dikastērion* (ξενικὸν δικαστηρίον), which indicates that they are foreign judges whom Ephesos invited to resolve the debt crisis that began in 297 BC.<sup>5</sup> In fact, Ephesos seems to have been part of a larger phenomenon that began during the late fourth century BC where other *poleis* also employed foreign judges for the sake of settling debts similar to those in *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4.<sup>6</sup> Specifically, decrees which involved foreign judges and mediators settling debts include one from Samos (*IG XII 6, 1 no. 95* [280 BC]), which confers honors to judges from Miletos, Myndos, and Halicarnassos, another from Priene (*IPriene*, no. 8 [286/5 BC]), which has judges from Phokaia, Nisyros, and Astypalaia, and one more from Telos (*IG XII 4, 1 no. 132* [306-301 BC]), for Koan mediators.<sup>7</sup> In addition, another inscription from Tegea involving property

<sup>5</sup> Scafuro (2013), 366.

<sup>6</sup> Scafuro (2013), 365-366; Walser (2008), 259. See Simonton (2019), 194 n. 32, who reports that the current total number of decrees for foreign judges has risen to 310 inscriptions since Robert (1973).

<sup>7</sup> Crowther (1996), 227-229. See Scafuro (2013), 382-383, 366-368, where she argues that *diallaktai* (mediators) is a synonym for judges, specifically in the case of the Koans requested by Telos as judges. See Simonton (2019), 194-196, who instead argues that the Koans were mediators for settling prior, contested verdicts, not judges for cases not yet tried, and see 194 n. 33, where he dates the inscription.



disputes of Tegean exiles on the Peloponnesian mainland (*Syll.*<sup>3</sup>, no. 306 [324 BC]), mandates that the Tegeans form a foreign court with judges likely from nearby Mantinea, a *dikastērion xenikon* just like the one in *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, to sit for a sixty-day period at Tegea.<sup>8</sup> While a preamble to *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 might have specified the number and period of service for the foreign judges invited by the Ephesian *polis*, the incomplete nature of the text and no corresponding decree thanking them unfortunately prevents one from further identifying the judges. Although the number of foreign judges present at Ephesos for the debt crisis and the length of their stay are uncertain, there were at least two and at most ten foreign judges present at Ephesos for a year at most during the Ephesian debt crisis, 297-296 BC.<sup>9</sup>

*l. 2 - γεωργός*: The term itself is rather ambiguous. *Georgos* is first recorded from the fifth century BC and refers to “husbandmen” or “farmers.”<sup>10</sup> The use of “landowner” by Bagnall and Derow is an over-translation of the term since it can denote anyone who owned any property in Ephesos. While the disputants involved are certainly landowners, the term *georgoi* specifically targets citizen and non-citizen farmers working or leasing farmland they own.<sup>11</sup> The ambiguity of the identity for each *georgos* is, however, puzzling since legal texts, ancient and modern, are designed, at least in principle, to avoid ambiguity. The destruction referred to in *ll. 65-69* likely affected the lands of both those who owned, farmed, and were leasing land, and the number of disputants

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<sup>8</sup> *Syll.*<sup>3</sup>, no. 306, *ll. 24-25*: τὸ δὲ δικαστήριον τὸ ξενικὸν δικάζειν ἐξήκοντα ἡμερᾶν. The inscription later specifies in *ll. 31-35* that if Tegean exiles return after the sixty-day period and their case requires a defense, the exiles will have their court case with the foreign judges at Mantinea. One must note that the inscription does not expressly specify that the foreign judges are Mantineans.

<sup>9</sup> Walser (2008), 260-261. See also Chapter 1 for the chronology of the debt crisis.

<sup>10</sup> *Hdt.* 4.18; *Ar. Pax.* 296; *Pl. Phdr.* 276b, *Tht.* 178d; *Arist. Pol.* 1296b28.

<sup>11</sup> *IEphesos* IV, nos. 1389 (fourth century BC), 1443 (307/6 BC); Walser (2008), 158-167; Burford (1993), 15-16; Finley (1952), 53-54. See also Chapter 3, 70-73, for an in-depth analysis on the socioeconomic and political status of the *georgoi*.

warranted the Ephesian *polis* to not list specific *georgoi*, but instead create certain requirements which *georgoi* must meet in order to qualify for the provisions provided by *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4.

**τοκιστής:** *Tokistes* is another difficult term which seems to have appeared in the fourth century BC. In both literature and inscriptions, the term referred to either “money-lenders,” “creditors,” or, in a more negative sense, “usurers” lending money at a high interest.<sup>12</sup> The *tokistai*, contrary to Walser, might include citizens, non-citizens with the right to own land, and some institutions at Ephesos that have the capacity and desire to both lend money and own landed property.<sup>13</sup> If *georgoi* defaulted on their loans, non-citizen *tokistai* were not able to keep any confiscated property unless they had the honor of *enktesis* (land ownership by a foreigner) in accordance with the Ephesian *polis*’ land ownership laws.<sup>14</sup> In addition, *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4’s valuation and division processes in *ll.* 1-24 for any given property required that the names of the new owners and new boundaries be inscribed on whitened tablets and set up for citizens to view.<sup>15</sup> Therefore, Ephesian magistrates were likely able to check whether the division allotted property to non-citizen *tokistai*.

*l.* 3 - τοῦ δὲ χ[ρ]έου[ς] μὴ εἶναι ἀντιτίμησιν - εἰὰν δὲ ἡ μὲν τίμησις συνομολογῆται: *Chreos* (χρέος) in the literary record has commonly referred to general debt since Homer’s works.<sup>16</sup> The term also appears to refer to specific loans in inscriptions such as in *IG* XI.2, no. 142, *l.* 15 (307-305 BC) from Delos where, for example, one Athenodoros owed a *chreos* with property used as security.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Pl. *Alc.* 2.149e; *IG* II<sup>2</sup>, no. 1554 (ca. 330 BC), *l.* 69. See Arist. *EN* 1121b34 where he lists usurers among those engaged in degrading trades. However, *LSJ* s.v. *τοκιστής* refers to *IEphesos* Ia no. 4 for its translation of as a “creditor.”

<sup>13</sup> Walser (2008), 174. See also Chapter 3, 77-80, for an in-depth analysis of the *tokistai*’s socioeconomic and political status.

<sup>14</sup> Walser (2008), 174-176; Burford (1993), 33-34; Harris (2015), 119. See Chapter 3, 68-70, on land ownership laws and the honor of *enktesis* at Ephesos.

<sup>15</sup> Walser (2008), 174-176; Burford (1993), 33-34.

<sup>16</sup> See Hom. *Od.* 8.353 for the earliest use of *χρέος*.

<sup>17</sup> *IG* XI.2, no. 142 (307-305 BC), *ll.* 15-16: ὑπέ[ρ] τοῦ χρέο[υ]ς [οὔ] ὄ]φειλε Ἀθηνόδορος ἐπὶ τῶι κήπῳ ὄν ἐπρίατο Ἀπολλώ[νιος] παρὰ Παταρέως. See Kent (1948), 265, for the dating of *IG* XI.2, no. 142. See also Chapter 3, 81-839, for an in-depth discussion on loans at Ephesos.

Moreover, since the text does not use *daneion* (δάνειον) here, the debt not to be disputed in this context might have just referred to the full value of the loan owed by a *georgos* to a *tokistes*. In other sections of the text, the law provides provisions for disputes on other specific aspects of loans, such as the initial agreement, interest rate, and the time within which to pay back the loan.<sup>18</sup> Conversely, the ultimate value of the loan here in *l. 3* was one either agreed upon by the *tokistai* and the *georgoi* or one which the judges determined during the court case if the *tokistai* and the *georgoi* did not agree.<sup>19</sup> Since the amount of the loan was the basis on which the *tokistai* and the *georgoi*, the arbitrators, or the judges made the division of property, the Ephesian *polis* wanted the judgement on the amount of the loan to be determined first, foremost, and to be final.

The valuation of the properties (*timêsis*) is the process by which the Ephesian *polis* and the foreign judges determined the cost of the property used by the *georgoi* as security on the defaulted loans from the *tokistai*.<sup>20</sup> Similar to the *chreos*, the *tokistai* and the *georgoi* were allowed to determine the value of the property used as security, but the judges determined the value if the disputants were unable to do so.<sup>21</sup> The inscription later specifies in lines 68-69 that the *timêsis* of the property is to be based on the condition of the property at the time a *georgos* and a *tokistes* made the loan.<sup>22</sup> The *timêsis* is then the other basis by which the *tokistai* and the *georgoi*, the arbitrators, or the judges made the division of property.

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<sup>18</sup> See below on such provisions. See Chapter 3, 82-86, for discussions on the interest rate, repayment period, and use of a guarantor at Ephesos.

<sup>19</sup> Walser (2008), 209-211.

<sup>20</sup> See the papyri *PRev.Laws* 29.12, 43v.22, 55.24 (ca. 284-246 BC), and their corresponding commentary entries in Grenfell (1896), 101-102, 135-138, and 157-159, respectively, for similar uses of *τίμησις* in an agricultural context.

<sup>21</sup> *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, *ll.* 1-3; Walser (2008), 210-211.

<sup>22</sup> Walser (2008), 213-214.

*l. 4 - δάνειον*: Although *daneion* is the primary and collective term with which the text refers to the loans defaulted upon by the *georgoi*, the word itself is rarely attested in our sources.<sup>23</sup> Based on the context given in the law, *daneion* may ultimately be defined as a contract or agreement (*πρᾶξις*) created between a *georgos* and *tokistes* in which the *tokistes* provided to the *georgos* an initial amount (the *chreos*) as the principal and the *georgos* must pay back to the *tokistes* both the principal and interest over an agreed period of time.<sup>24</sup>

*ll. 4-5 - περὶ τοῦ διαμφισβητουμένου τῆς κρίσιν εἶναι*: This clause not only conveys to the *tokistai* and the *georgoi* by what parameters the foreign judges will make a judgement on any given dispute, whether on the amount of the valuation or the loan, but also limits the foreign court on what disputes they may preside over during their stay in Ephesos.<sup>25</sup> Furthermore, the statement seems to necessitate that the *tokistai* and the *georgoi* have a preliminary meeting in which to determine whether they disagree on the amount of the loan or the property before presenting only what their dispute actually concerns to the foreign judges.<sup>26</sup>

*ll. 5-6 - ἃ δ' ἂν οἱ δικασταὶ κρίνωσιν, ἀναγράφαντες εἰς λεύκωμα... τὰς ἐπικρίσεις τὰς τῶν διαιτητῶν*: This clause further expresses the finality of the judgment from the foreign judges on the valuation of the loans and the properties involved in cases brought before them.<sup>27</sup> The clause also reinforces the fact that Ephesian *polis* had granted to the foreign judges the jurisdiction and

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<sup>23</sup> See Dem. 34.12-13, where the Speaker approaches the maritime merchant Phormoi to repay the *daneion*, meaning both the principal and interest due, as soon as Phormio returned from his voyage. Arist. *EN*. 1164b32; Men. *Mon.* 97; *POxy.* (197 BC) 1262.16.

<sup>24</sup> *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, *ll.* 48-49; Walser (2008), 110-113. See also Chapter 3, 81-83, for a more in-depth discussion on the *praxis*, the *daneion*, and debt at Ephesos.

<sup>25</sup> Walser (2008), 211.

<sup>26</sup> Walser (2008), 211.

<sup>27</sup> See Dimopoulou (2013), 250-253, on how the invalidity of judicial decisions was seen as irregular and indicative of corruption in a *polis*.

authority to settle court cases relating to the debt crisis caused by the *κοινὸς πόλεμος*.<sup>28</sup> However, while the foreign judges seem to have been employed by the Ephesians to judge disputes over the loans, the *diaitetai* mentioned in the inscription were likely local Ephesian arbitrators that attempted to have the *georgoi* and the *tokistai* settle their dispute without a trial presided over by the foreign judges.<sup>29</sup> The *diaitetai* therefore presented an opportunity for the *georgoi* and *tokistai* to come to a formal, supervised agreement which the Ephesian *polis* recorded on *leukomata*, whitened tablets covered with gypsum.<sup>30</sup> The Ephesian debt mitigation law, however, also allows for the private reconciliation of the dispute between the creditors and farmers without the intervention of the foreign judges or the Ephesian arbitrators, but the law still required the two parties to submit records of the new boundaries.<sup>31</sup> Similar to the provisions in decrees such as *Iasos*, no. 82 (second half of the third century BC, *ll.* 34-35) from Iasos and *SEG* 49, no. 1106 (ca. 280 BC, *ll.* 6-11) from Kos, if the reconciliation failed, whether privately or under the supervision of the *diaitetai*, the judgement of the foreign judges on the dispute was also recorded on the whitened tablets.<sup>32</sup> Based on how other *poleis* such as Athens recorded cases and erased their whitened tablets, the Ephesian *polis* likely intended to keep the first set of whitened tablets mentioned in *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 until the divisions were finalized, after which the *polis* likely erased and reused the whitened tablets to record the final divisions.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Walser (2008), 209-210, 263-264; Crowther (1995), 121. See Scafuro (2013), 366-367, and 377, for her outline of how decrees for foreign judges are structured.

<sup>29</sup> Scafuro (2013), 366-367, 382; Walser (2008), 258-268; Crowther (1995), 121-122.

<sup>30</sup> See *LSJ* s.v. *λεύκωμα* where the lexicon specifies that such tablets were often used as public notice boards for documentation such as fines in Lys. 9.6 or newly proposed laws in Dem. 24.23.

<sup>31</sup> *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, *ll.* 24-26.

<sup>32</sup> *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, *ll.* 1-5; Scafuro (2013), 367, 382; *Iasos*, no. 82, *ll.* 34-35: [οἴτι]νες παραγεγόμενοι μάλιστα μὲν διαλυσεῦντι τοὺς [διαφ]ερομένους τῶν πολιτῶν, εἰ δὲ μή, κρινεῦντι διὰ ψάφου. *SEG* 49, no. 1106, *ll.* 6-11: περί τε τῶν ἀπο[γεγραμμένων] ἀμφισβητήσεων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων [τῶν ἐπιτρ]α[πέ]ντων αὐτοῖς ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως [τοὺς μὲν π]λείστους τῶν διαφερομένων ἀνα[καλεσάμ]ενοι πολλακίς ἐφ' αὐτοὺς διέλυον συμφε[ρόντως], τοὺς δὲ διέκρινον μετὰ πάσης δικαί[οσύνης].

<sup>33</sup> Walser (2008), 238-239 n. 130; Sickinger (1999), 68-69; Dem. 24.23. See below for the discussion on the second set of whitened tablets.

*οἱ εἰσαγωγεῖς*: According to ps.-Aristotle, the *eisagogeis* of Athens introduced to the Athenian courts mainly secular cases, specifically those involving loans and repayments, which the courts must settle within a month.<sup>34</sup> The *eisagogeis* at Arkesine on the island of Amorgos (*IG XII 7*, no. 3, first half of the fourth century BC) seemed to have had a role similar to Athens' *eisagogeis* where they, both before and during a social conflict with a debt crisis similar to Ephesos', received debt disputes, inscribed, and registered them on whitened tablets for the court case.<sup>35</sup> The duties of the Ephesian *eisagogeis* beyond those enumerated in the text, in addition to how many served per term and for how long, are unknown. The *eisagogeis* in *IEphesos Ia*, no. 4 only recorded the private settlements, the settlements under the supervision of an arbitrator, and the judgements of the foreign court on the whitened tablets which they then handed over "to those having been chosen for the common war" (*τοῖς ἐπὶ τοῦ κοινοῦ πολέμου ἡρημένοις*).<sup>36</sup> Although *IEphesos Ia*, no. 4 describes the duties of Ephesos' *eisagogeis* in relation to this specific law, the law does imply that they normally had duties similar to those of the *eisagogeis* at Athens and Arkesine as well.<sup>37</sup>

The arbitrators and the judges, however, directly handed over the final divisions of properties written on a second set of whitened tablets to those chosen to supervise the *κοινὸς πόλεμος* instead of first through the *eisagogeis*.<sup>38</sup> The *eisagogeis* may not have received the second set of tablets since these had the final divisions inscribed and the *eisagogeis* were therefore not needed for an unnecessary secondary step in the recording process. Another possibility may have been the logistic issue involving the number of disputes, valuations, and settlements that threatened to inundate the Ephesian *eisagogeis* so as to render them unable to lend further help during the

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<sup>34</sup> Arist. [*Ath. Pol.*] 52.2.

<sup>35</sup> Walser (2008), 256.

<sup>36</sup> Walser (2008), 255.

<sup>37</sup> Walser (2008), 257.

<sup>38</sup> *IEphesos Ia*, no. 4, ll. 17-20; Walser (2008), 255.

debt crisis. Since *eisagogeis* is always plural in the text, Ephesos likely had a board of *eisagogeis* with more than one member, similar to that in Athens. In Athens, they elected five *eisagogeis* by lot, with each official belonging to two tribes.<sup>39</sup> Since Ephesos had five *phylai* compared to Athens' ten, Ephesos may have elected by lot one to two *eisagogeis* per tribe in order to have five to ten officials on the board.<sup>40</sup> Ultimately, however, the limited source base from Ephesos is unclear on how specifically Ephesos selected the magistrates, how many there were, and their duties beyond what this law states.

*l. 7 - τοῖς ἐπὶ τοῦ κοινοῦ πολέμου ἡρημένοις*: These are the citizens elected to carry out five administrative duties according to the text. They choose by lot the dividers of land and the land assigned to each divider (*l. 9*), receive any disputes about the divisions (*ll. 14-15*), and write the final divisions of property on whitened tablets (*ll. 20-21*). This board then gives the whitened tablets to the *neopoiiai* (*ll. 20-21*), they give copies to the copying-clerk, the *antigraphus*, (*ll. 22*), and have copies of the valuations, loans, and divisions privately agreed upon be given to the *tokistai* from the *georgoi*, vice versa, or to the guardians or assistants of an orphan (*ll. 26-29*). The elected board seems to have been temporary and created only for the purposes of *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 until the debt crisis had been fully resolved. Ephesos had also created a contemporary, and similarly temporary, board called the *οἱ σύνηδροι οἱ ἐμὶ τοῖς Πριηνικοῖς τεταγμένοι*. These were potentially *stratego*i who the Ephesian *polis* tasked to supervise and manage their conflict with the tyrant of Priene, Hieron, until its conclusion (300-297 BC).<sup>41</sup> Walser claims that the board chosen to supervise the *κοινὸς πόλεμος* had a role since the war with Hieron began to create emergency

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<sup>39</sup> Arist. [*Ath. Pol.*] 52.2. See also Rhodes (1985), 582, for his analysis on the duties of the *eisagogeis*.

<sup>40</sup> Walser (2008), 255-257; Jones (1987), 311-312; Arist. [*Ath. Pol.*] 52.2.

<sup>41</sup> *IEphesos* VI, no. 2001, *ll. 10, 12-13*; Walser (2008), 250. See Chapter 1, 13-17, for the discussion on Ephesos' conflict with Hieron.

procedures and decrees in Ephesos such as the debt moratorium decree that preceded this law.<sup>42</sup> Their role in *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 also implies that the *polis* extended the duties of the group to also supervise the resolution of the Ephesian debt crisis. Since *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 provides no information on the number of citizens involved in the group, there was, therefore, another law or decree that formed the group chosen to supervise the *κοινὸς πόλεμος* and stipulated their duties.

*l. 9 - διαίρετας τῶν κτημάτων*: Once the group chosen to supervise the *κοινὸς πόλεμος* received the judgments and arbitration settlements about the valuation and the loans, they chose by lot from a pool of thirty men selected by the *demos* five dividers of land for a five-day period to then divide the properties assigned to them by lot. The two-fold allotment system ensured the greatest impartiality with respect to who divided what property.<sup>43</sup> The allotment of five men for at least five separate properties for a five-day period from a pool of thirty men implies that there might have been at least thirty properties in dispute (one divider per property) if the *polis* expected each divider to take the full five days to divide his assigned property.<sup>44</sup> Although the law does not specify a timeline, the divisions of properties may have taken thirty days for potentially thirty cases, where the first round of divisions ends on day five with five properties divided, a pool of twenty-five dividers to whom a property must be each allotted, and twenty-five more properties to be allotted and divided.<sup>45</sup> Although *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 is unclear as to whether there were properties large enough to warrant more than one divider of property, the law, however, does not state that any given property must be divided in five days. Therefore, for such a clause in the law to be unrestricted in how many times it can allot a divider of property to a given property, there must

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<sup>42</sup> Walser (2008), 251. See pages 63-64 below, for more on Ephesos' moratorium decree as a precursor to this law.

<sup>43</sup> See Wasler (2008), 215-217, for his comparison of Ephesos' practice of deciding matters by lot to that of Athens.

<sup>44</sup> See Walser (2008), 214-215, where he claims that the group chosen to supervise the *κοινὸς πόλεμος* had assigned all of the properties in dispute to all six groups of dividers of property, all at once.

<sup>45</sup> Walser (2008), 214.



have been many disputed properties large enough to warrant *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 to allow at least two different dividers of property to be assigned to the same property should the division process need to be lengthened. Similarly, the law also allows for the dividers to make the division in less than five days if the dividers and disputants are efficient. In either case, the foreign judges had five days, more or less, devoted to finalizing approximately five cases of divisions before the next round of dividers brought to them the next round of divisions.

*l. 10 - οἱ δὲ λαχόντες διαιρείτωσαν*: To divide the properties, the dividers gave to the *georgoi* however much of the land was worth the *timêsis* subtracted by the *daneion*.<sup>46</sup> This division displays the exceptional peculiarity of *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 because, as opposed to other Greek states such as Athens, the Ephesian *polis* did not instead allow the *tokistai* to confiscate the whole property of those *georgoi* who used it as security in a defaulted loan.<sup>47</sup> The dividers' word was not law in Ephesos, though, as they were not allowed to forcibly divide (*διασπῶντες*) the property of the *georgoi*, but had to consult with both the *georgoi* and the *tokistai* on who was to receive what portion of the property. The dividers therefore operated similarly to arbitrators in this initial division and the inscription seems to refer to them as such in lines 17-20. Since the *georgoi* and the *tokistai* probably wanted to secure for themselves the best parcels of land, there were undoubtedly disputes over how the initial division valued certain parts of the property.<sup>48</sup> In the event of such a dispute, the dividers then reported it to the group chosen to supervise the *κοινὸς πόλεμος* and to the one appointed in charge over the court (*τῷ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαστηρίου τεταγμένῳ*).<sup>49</sup> The one appointed in charge over the court then led the judges to the property to divide the property

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<sup>46</sup> Walser (2008), 217-218.

<sup>47</sup> e.g. in Athenian law Dem. 21.43; Harris (2015), 119; Harrison (1971), 212-213; Finley (1999), 143; Finley (1951), 110, 113, 296-297 n. 20.

<sup>48</sup> Walser (2008), 218.

<sup>49</sup> *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, *l. 15*.

should the disputants not agree with the divisions proposed by the dividers, and the judges therefore ensured that the divisions corresponded to the amount allotted to each disputant.<sup>50</sup>

*ll. 13-14 - ἐξαιρείτωσαν... ὁδοὺς πρὸς τε τὰ ἱερὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰ ὕδατα καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἐπαύλεις καὶ πρ[ὸς] τάφους*: These lines provide special instructions for the dividers to consider as they divided the properties. The water referred to was a water source of the *georgoi* such as a well, free-flowing stream, or wetlands (considering Ephesos' geography). Prohibiting the division of the road leading to farm buildings or water prevented one party from owning the road and thereby preventing the other from having access to a water source that was partitioned to him.<sup>51</sup> By instructing the dividers to not divide the roads, the law implies that the *georgos* and *tokistes* either will share the road leading to the farm building or the water source owned by one or the other, or one of the two parties will have to construct a new road leading to his portion of the property.<sup>52</sup> The roads to water sources on private land were likely only for private use by the owner(s), based on a contemporary lease, *IEphesos* Ia, no. 3 (290 BC), given to contractors for the purpose of building the new city wall. That inscription conveys that either the Ephesian *polis* or builders contracted by the *polis* who leased the land owned by the sons of Kleitophon were to have access to resources such as water, the roads, and any stone quarries for the duration of the construction of the Ephesian fortification walls.<sup>53</sup> Due to the value of resources such as water, stone quarries, and farm buildings for operating a farm, it is reasonable to assume that, when dividing the properties, such assets on the property constituted a significant portion of the amount of the property allotted to the *georgoi* or the *tokistai*.<sup>54</sup> Conversely, the Ephesian *polis* likely ensured that roads to temples

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<sup>50</sup> *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, *ll.* 15-20; Walser (2008), 222.

<sup>51</sup> Walser (2008), 219.

<sup>52</sup> Walser (2008), 219-220.

<sup>53</sup> *IEphesos* Ia, no. 3, *ll.* 11-13: λαγόμεθα δὲ λατόμια, ὅσα ἔνεστιν ἐν τῇ γῆι ταύτῃ, ἢ σκληρὰ ἢ πάρινα. χρῆσόμεθα εἰς τὰ ἔργα καὶ ὁδοῦ, ὥστε προσάγειν τοὺς λίθους πρὸς τὰ ἔργα, καὶ ὕδατος. Walser (2008), 221.

<sup>54</sup> See Walser (2008), 220-221.

and tombs remained open for public use and to form boundaries for properties along either side of the road.<sup>55</sup>

*l. 15 - ὁ δὲ ἀποδεδειγμένος ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαστηρίου*: This official was likely a local Ephesian magistrate or a judge in charge of the foreign court that, upon receiving any disputes about divisions of land, also led the judges to where the disputed land was located and ensured that the land was divided in accordance with *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4.<sup>56</sup> The Ephesian leader of the foreign court may have been a *δικασταγωγός*, a magistrate elected from among the citizenry to guide foreign judges from and back to their native *poleis*.<sup>57</sup> In addition, a *δικασταγωγός* not only financed the stay of the foreign judges but also acted as a guard against people or parties attempting to corrupt or bribe the judges.<sup>58</sup> Walser, however, asserts that, instead of a *δικασταγωγός*, the leader of the foreign court may have been one of the Ephesian *eisagogeis* since they had the capacity to provide administrative support without directly influencing the foreign judges' decisions.<sup>59</sup> Since the inscription does not specify the title for the leader beyond *ὁ δὲ ἀποδεδειγμένος ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαστηρίου*, however, the identification of this magistracy remains unclear.

*l. 20 - τοὺς ὄρους τῶν μερισμῶν*: Since the law requires a record of the new boundaries, along with the disputants' names and the area of the properties, to be written on a second set of whitened tablets, *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 implies that Ephesos used physical demarcations for both public and private property.<sup>60</sup> Even though none survive from fourth- to third-century BC Ephesos, or Ionia for that matter, the demarcations were likely *horoi*, boundary markers that were frequently used

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<sup>55</sup> See Knibbe (1978) for the multitude of temples present at Ephesos.

<sup>56</sup> *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, *ll.* 14-17; Walser (2008), 261.

<sup>57</sup> Walser (2008), 261-262. See Crowther, et al. (1998), 91-92, on the *δικασταγωγός* from Kos in *OMS* III, no. 1500 (mid-second century BC).

<sup>58</sup> Walser (2008), 262.

<sup>59</sup> Walser (2008), 262-263.

<sup>60</sup> Walser (2008), 223; Sickinger (1999), 69-70. See Harris (2015), 120-121, on the wide-spread use of whitened tablets for property records in antiquity.

during the fourth century BC in Athens and other Greek poleis.<sup>61</sup> The new records of boundaries that were required to be recorded also imply that the Ephesian *polis* had previously recorded the properties and their owners, records with which the dividers and the judges could easily locate the properties to be divided.<sup>62</sup> Once the dividers portioned out the property, they may have immediately inscribed the new divisions in a manner similar to how the Prienians demarcated their new borders with Samos, ca. 196-192 BC.<sup>63</sup> In the case of the Ephesian dividers though, the *horoi* they may have used served as either the new permanent divisions of the property or the markers the judges would have adjusted later if a dispute arose. *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4's required records of property ownership also emphasize the notion in this law that the Ephesian *polis* understands that the *polis* is, in a legal capacity, assessing the value of, dividing, and recording economic assets which future farmers and creditors will use again as security for loans.<sup>64</sup> The later stipulation in *II*. 35-39 regarding *georgoi* using their property as security for many loans also implies that the Ephesian *polis* did not have a public registrar for property ownership that also kept track of private loans in which the owner used the property as security.<sup>65</sup>

*I*. 21 – *τοῖς νεοποίαις θεῖναι ἐπὶ τὸ ἔδεθλον*: Similar to the discussion concerning the *ἔδεθλον* in Chapter 1, it is unclear whether the *neopoiai* were temple officials from the Artemision or another temple at Ephesos. It must be noted, however, that where the *neopoiai* appear elsewhere in Ephesian legal inscriptions, such as citizenship and *proxenoi* decrees from the late fourth to early

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<sup>61</sup> See Harris (2015), 125; Finley (1951), 6; Arist. *Pol.* 1321b18-23. See *SEG* 56, no. 1007, for fourth-century BC *horoi* on the island of Lemnos. See also Chapter 3, 86-88, on *horoi* used for demarcating property at Ephesos and Chapter 4, 104, for *horoi* used by the Artemision.

<sup>62</sup> See Harris (2015), 120, on the importance of property records for settling disputes. See Walser (2008), 235-238 for his discussion on how the *horoi* may have been used to refer to specific terrain features or neighbors to demarcate boundaries.

<sup>63</sup> *IPriene*, no. 37 (196-192 BC), *II*. 160-171; Walser (2008), 225.

<sup>64</sup> See Harris (2015), 118-119, on land ownership rights in Greek *poleis*, and 116-118, for the general benefits of a property system and records of property ownerships.

<sup>65</sup> Walser (2008), 248-249.

third centuries BC, they seem to be temple officials from the Artemision whose duties included setting up and being responsible for such decrees and documents.<sup>66</sup> Although the extent of public documents kept at the Artemision is uncertain, since the Artemision seems to have operated similarly to the Metröon in fourth-century BC Athens in storing the whitened tablets and legal decrees, the ἔδεθλον of the Artemision and her *neopoiai* likely served as an archive and managers, respectively, for other public documents such as leases and contracts as well.<sup>67</sup>

l. 22 – τῶι ἀντιγραφεῖ: While the group chosen to supervise the κοινὸς πόλεμος gave the original whitened tablets to the *neopoiai*, they also gave copies to the “copying-clerk” (*antigraphus*) so that any citizen may view them.<sup>68</sup> While any citizen, even if the loan dispute did not concern them, was able to access and read the records of the new divisions of property, the Ephesian *polis* cursed those who possessed illegally acquired copies or counterfeits, charging them with treason and sedition (ll. 29-32). The Ephesian *polis* may have intended to make the divisions be as public as possible so that other *georgoi* and *tokistai* were certain that no one received special treatment. In addition, the Ephesian *polis* likely intended for the originals stored in the temple archive to be inaccessible so as to prevent tampering because the tablets had the protection of the deity, in addition to having official versions against which to check the copies.<sup>69</sup> The punishment for giving and receiving illegal exact copies or counterfeits was to be accursed and also to be liable to prosecution on the charge of being disobedient and plotting against the best interests of the city (ll. 30-32). The punishment implies that the Ephesian *polis* was not going to tolerate violations in any

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<sup>66</sup> *IEphesos* IV, no. 1441 (ca. 294-288 BC); V, no. 1455 (301-294 BC); VI, nos. 2004-2005 (300 BC). See also Chapter 1, 25 n. 106, for a more comprehensive list of decrees that include the *neopoiai*.

<sup>67</sup> Sickinger (1999), 127-129.

<sup>68</sup> *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, ll. 22-24.

<sup>69</sup> Walser (2008), 242-243; Mclean (2002), 215. See Sickinger (1999), 69-70, on how the Athenian *polis* kept whitened tablets such as noted in Arist. [*Ath. Pol.*] 47.2-47.5 to verify that debts and contracts were settled in full.

way, as well as providing for itself a contingency with which to maintain the *homonoia* that will be established by the foreign judges.<sup>70</sup>

ll. 32-33 - ὄσοι δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς ὑπερέχουσι δεδανείκασιν: The lines detail a stipulation for *georgoi* who take additional loans from more than one *tokistes* by using any residual value of their property as security. In these instances, the division of property still takes place, but the division portioned out land to each lender (*daneistes*) with a value equivalent to the value of the loan, starting with the initial lender.<sup>71</sup> Furthermore, the allotment still depended on the amount of each loan subtracted from the *timêsis* of the property. For those *georgoi* who secretly took out more than one loan repeatedly using their property or portion of property as security when there was no residual value, the first lender received the amount allotted to them by the initial division based on the amount of their loan. Subsequent lenders, however, divided among themselves the remainder of the property together with however much from other properties the *georgos* owned if what remained of the initial property did not satisfy the amounts of their loans.<sup>72</sup> While there is no guarantee that the subsequent lenders received the same amount as the loans they gave to the *georgos*, it is significant that the law allowed lenders to take from whatever other property, in whatever way and free from penalty, however much the *georgos* still owed them.<sup>73</sup> This clause in *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 therefore substantially protects the financial and private lending rights of lenders against deceptive *georgoi*. It is unclear whether the law meant that lenders might take from sources other than the physical

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<sup>70</sup> Walser (2008), 245. See *FD* III, 3:214 (mid-third century BC), where a criminal prosecution was ordered as if for someone causing harm to the general public. See *IPriene*, no. 53 (post-197 BC), ll. 9-11, and *IIsos*, no. 82 (second half of the third century BC), ll. 36-38, where the *poleis* praised the foreign judges for resolving the disputes and ensuring that they live in their *poleis* in harmony, and not causing further strife. See also Scafuro (2013), 371-372, 385-388, for her discussion on the epigraphic habit of *homonoia* clauses. Crowther (1995), 121-123.

<sup>71</sup> *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, ll. 32-35. See Walser (2008), 226-227, and his longer discussion on the subject 135-142; see below on the use of *daneistes* here instead of *tokistes*. See also Chapter 3, 87-88, for the discussion on loans for already encumbered property.

<sup>72</sup> *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, ll. 35-39; Walser (2008), 227.

<sup>73</sup> *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, ll. 39-41.

farms of the *georgoi*, such as any slaves, coin, or even invisible funds such as loan (investments) contracts which the *georgoi* had made on maritime or landed trade, or whether only sources of real property were included in the *timêsis* of the *georgoi*'s other properties.<sup>74</sup> If the *georgos* had no other property beyond the one used as security, *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 implies that the lenders had to take a loss and not receive the full value of their investment.

*l. 34 - τοῖς πρώτοις δανείσασιν*: It is unclear why the law refers to the creditors as *daneistai* here, returns to *tokistai* in line 50, but uses *daneistai* elsewhere too. *Tokistes* and *daneistes* seem to be synonyms since both terms refer to money-lenders who gave out loans at interest.<sup>75</sup> Plutarch, for example, refers to *daneistai* in a similarly negative context as Aristotle does with the *tokistai*: as cruel money-lenders.<sup>76</sup> It is significant that the text refers to *daneistai* in the context of stipulations for *georgoi* with more than one loan from more than one creditor, and may point to the diverse kinds of money-lenders that such a situation may involve. Although it is unclear, based on frequency and usage, *daneistai* might refer here to creditors generally involved in commerce, whereas *tokistai* were professional money-lenders involved in property investments.<sup>77</sup> Since *tokistes* is cognate with *τόκος* (interest), lenders who are *tokistai* may have specialized in providing interest-bearing loans with property used as security similar to the *prodaneistai* seen in *IEphesos* VI 2001 (299/8 BC), who were large-scale financial entrepreneurs capable of making interest-bearing loans to institutions such as their *poleis*.<sup>78</sup> In the Delphic Law that institutes a new legal

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<sup>74</sup> See Cohen (1992), 193-194, and 201-207, on the invisible economy in fourth-century BC Athens and how loans and bank deposits represented assets hidden or unavailable to creditors seeking to collect on defaulted loans.

<sup>75</sup> Theophr. *Char.* 6.9; *IG* XII 7, nos. 67 (second century BC), 68 (fourth century BC), 69 (late fourth to early third century BC); Cohen (1992), 53; Walser (2008), 114-117.

<sup>76</sup> Plut. *Vit. Sol.* 13; Arist. *EN* 1121b34.

<sup>77</sup> Walser (2008), 116; Millett (1991), 30.

<sup>78</sup> Walser (2008), 114, 116; Gabrielsen (2011), 141-142. See Millett (1991), 30 who claims that the verb *tokizein* was a specialized term for lending at interest used increasingly by Greek *poleis* since at least the fourth century BC. See *IEphesos* VI, no. 2001, where independent money-lenders lent money to the *polis* to fund the conflict against Hieron, tyrant of Priene. See also Chapter 3, 77-80, for the discussion on the *tokistai* as professional money-lenders.

maximum interest rate (see below on 59-61), *FD III*, 1:294 (425-375 BC), line 7 uses the verbal form of *tokistes*, *τοκίζειν*, to specifically refer to the act of making interest-bearing loans.<sup>79</sup> *FD III*, 1:294 therefore implies that Delphi used *τοκίζειν* in a neutral, legal, and specialized sense rather than another verb to denote making loans in the late fifth to early fourth century BC. If a *tokistes* is distinct from a *daneistes*, then the debt crisis affected two spheres of money-lending, professional and passive, thereby expanding the unknown number of persons affected.

*l.* 41 - *ἔγγυος*: The guarantors of the *georgoi* were obligated to pay any amount of the loan exceeding the value of an over-encumbered property unless there was extra interest charged over a period longer than that to which the guarantor agreed in the original transaction.<sup>80</sup> Therefore, in such cases, not only did the *georgoi* lose a portion of their property to the *tokistai* based on the provisions of *IEphesos Ia*, no. 4, but their guarantors were also required to pay in full any excess on the loan(s) to one or more lenders, excluding interest that compounded over time, unless the creditor had previously agreed with the borrower and the guarantor to postpone the recovery of the loan.<sup>81</sup> If either party disputed the payment of excess and were not able to settle their issue with an arbitrator, then the creditor would then be required to initiate a court case with the foreign court.<sup>82</sup>

*ll.* 53-55 - *εἰ δέ τις ἐπίτροπος ἐν τῇ ἐπιτροπῇ λαβὼν αὐτὸς ἔχει χρήματα τῶν τοῦ ὀρφανοῦ τρόποι ὁτωιοῦν, τούτω[ι μὴ] εἶναι κοινὸν τὸμ πόλεμον*: The law makes clear here and in subsequent lines that the Ephesian *polis* will not tolerate nor grant the provisions from this law to protect guardians who lent the money or used as security the property of orphans or the dowries

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<sup>79</sup> *FD III*, 1:294, *ll.* 7-9: μή τοκίζ[ειν πλ]έονος ἢ τριῶν [ὀδελῶν] τὰν μὲν τῷ μηνᾶς / Ἐ[κάστ]ου μήτε τέχ[να]ι μήτε μαχανὰι μήτε παρευρέσ[ι] μηδεμίαι.

<sup>80</sup> *IEphesos Ia*, no. 4, *ll.* 45-48. See Chapter 3, 85-86, on guarantors in loan agreements with property used as security.

<sup>81</sup> Walser (2008), 142-148. See Cohen (1992), 58-60, on maritime versus landed loans with interest. See also discussion in Chapter 3, 81-83, on the loans used in *IEphesos Ia*, no. 4.

<sup>82</sup> *IEphesos Ia*, no. 4, *ll.* 52-53. See below on pages 64-65, for the discussion on the Ephesian *polis*' preference for arbitration over court cases.



of sisters, daughters, wives, ex-wives, or orphan girls. Although the law does not clarify how they became orphans, the *κοινὸς πόλεμος* may have also caused the death of citizens who left properties or doweries for their children, the use of which their new guardians may have taken advantage in the taking of interest-bearing loans using the property as security.

*ll. 55-56 - ὅσοι δὲ φερνὰς ὀφείλουσι θυγατρίοις ἢ [ἀ]δελφαῖς ταῖς αὐτῶν μεμερικότες ἐκ τῆς πατρῷας οὐσίας*: This stipulation implies that when a guardian borrowed money from the dowry of a female relative, wife, ex-wife, or ward for either a loan or security on a loan, the guardian was required to draw up for the woman or girl an initial loan agreement that had interest and was secured by some property to ensure that the guardian replenished the dowry to its full amount.<sup>83</sup> As with the guardians of orphan boys and their properties, the law does not grant the provisions of *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 to men, either a living relative, one appointed as a guardian by the father in his will, the *demos*, or to an ex-husband, who used the property included in the dowries of daughters, sisters, orphan girls, or ex-wives in a loan agreement.<sup>84</sup> Specifically, the guardian, father, brother, or ex-husband must pay back, in full, the dowry plus interest to the orphan girl(s), daughter(s), sister(s), and ex-wife in accordance with the original transaction and Ephesian law, not *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4.<sup>85</sup> For orphan girls, *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 specifies that the guardian must deduct from the rest of the estate under his care however much he borrowed from the girl's dowry.<sup>86</sup> *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 is unclear, though, whether it allows to the guardians the provisions of this law for loans where the guardians used as security their own property. If *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 did allow guardians to share in the provisions and if a guardian lied to the foreign judges in registering their dispute that whatever property they used as security was not his own but that of his ward, then the division

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<sup>83</sup> Walser (2008), 150-151. See Chapter 3, 73, for a discussion on the use of doweries in loan agreements at Ephesos.

<sup>84</sup> Walser (2008), 148-152.

<sup>85</sup> Walser (2008), 149-150; *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, *ll.* 55-61.

<sup>86</sup> *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, *ll.* 61-64.

of property occurred for their ward's property or dowry, not the guardians'. Therefore, in prohibiting the guardians from sharing in the provisions of this law, *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 may have been attempting to prevent such a trap that would not only place in dispute the guardian against his legally incompetent ward, but also might disenfranchise women and children of their inheritance and doweries.<sup>87</sup> While *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 prohibits guardians from using its provisions, the law does imply earlier in *ll.* 26-29 that guardians were allowed to come to a private agreement with *tokistai*, from which the guardians received the copies of the valuations and the loans, but the guardian likely deducted from his own property the amount of the loan.

*ll.* 65-66 - ὅσοι δὲ ἐπὶ κτή[μ]ασιν δεδανεισμένοι εἰσὶν ἀπὸ Δημαγόρου πρυτάνεως καὶ μηνὸς Ποσιδεῶνος: Posideon is the month and Demagoras is the *prytanis* during which the *κοινὸς πόλεμος* began.<sup>88</sup> Posideon is also the sixth month of the Ephesian calendar and corresponds to December/January.<sup>89</sup> However, any lender who gained possession of property before the *prytaneia* of Demagoras in the month of Posideon retained possession of it unless the lenders and *georgoi* made a separate agreement that did not utilize the provisions of the *κοινὸς πόλεμος*.<sup>90</sup>

It is unclear who Demagoras was, but the office of the eponymous *prytaneia* was well-established at Ephesos by the beginning of the fourth century BC at the latest and Ephesian decrees did refer to those who held the *prytaneia* at the time in order to date their decrees.<sup>91</sup> While little is known about the duties of *prytaneis* in fourth-century Ephesos, evidence from the late Roman Republican and early Imperial period indicates that Ephesian eponymous *prytaneis* handled a

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<sup>87</sup> Walser (2008), 149-152.

<sup>88</sup> See discussion in Chapter 1, 13-17, on the dating and duration of the *κοινὸς πόλεμος*.

<sup>89</sup> Walser (2008), 103; Asheri (1969), 43. See Trümpy (1997), 6 and 96-99, where Klareon (July/August) is the first month on the Ephesian calendar.

<sup>90</sup> *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, *ll.* 75-77. See also Kränazlein (1963), 16-17, on the use and meaning of the middle form for *νέμω*.

<sup>91</sup> Rubenstein (2004), 1072; *IEphesos* IV, nos. 1421, 1424, 1425-26 (all fourth century BC).

number of official duties at their own expense.<sup>92</sup> Specifically, Ephesian *prytaneis* in that later period received foreign guests, served as the *agonothetes* in festivals such as the Dionysia, lit fires at altars, and provided sacrificial victims.<sup>93</sup>

ll. 67-68 - ὄπως εἴ τινες κεκαρμένοις τοῖς κτήμα[σι]ν ἢ τῶν ἐπαυλίων καθη<ι>ρημένων σονηλλάχασιν: *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 presents two ways in which property destroyed at Ephesos was devalued to the point where farmers had to default on their loans. Ἐπαυλις refers to the actual house in which the farmer dwelled, and had his wealth and belongings, as well as any other buildings on the farm such as barns for animals, stables, or threshing floors.<sup>94</sup> Κτήμα is more ambiguous since it can mean possessions or general wealth, such as crops, slaves, cattle, sheep, and horses, as well as landed property, estates, or farms.<sup>95</sup> While the loss of wheat and barley at private farms in Ephesos might have devalued the land and negatively impacted profits for that year, it is also reasonable that Hieron's raids targeted, in addition to the farm buildings, the more valuable commodities of farms such as animals, trees, and vineyards.<sup>96</sup> Similar to the Athenian general Carcinus who, in 430 BC, raided the Peloponnesian coast, destroyed farmland, and assaulted cities in order to force the Spartans to pull their troops back from Attica, Hieron similarly raided Ephesos so as force Ephesos' auxiliary troops at Charax retreat back to defend the *polis*.<sup>97</sup> Just as the Spartan king Archedamos II raided Attic lands first in 431 BC to destroy farmland, farm-buildings, and orchards in order to weaken the Athenian *polis*, Hieron likely destroyed similarly valuable resources on Ephesian farmland in order to devalue quickly Ephesian farmland,

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<sup>92</sup> Sherk (1999), 250.

<sup>93</sup> Sherk (1999), 250-251; *IEphesos* Ia, nos. 9 (51/0-18/7 BC), 10 (third century AD), 47 (177-192 AD).

<sup>94</sup> Hdt. 1.111; Diod. Sic. 12.43; Plut. *Vit. Pomp.* 24.6

<sup>95</sup> See Xenophon (*Oec.* 1.6-1.10) for his discussion on how property is whatever that is profitable to the owner such as land, slaves, horses, cattle, and sheep.

<sup>96</sup> See Pritchett (1991), 198-202, on the tendency in raids, expeditions, and war parties to target livestock, horses, and captives as war booty. See also Hanson (1999), 141-143, on the economic impact of raids and plundering.

<sup>97</sup> Diod. Sic. 12.43. See Chapter 1, 15-16, for the date of Hieron's assault on Ephesos.

cause economic and financial strife, and prevent any supplies and funds from reaching the Prienian rebels at the fort as well.<sup>98</sup> Although the number of properties destroyed at Ephesos is unknown, it is reasonable to assume that there were a substantial number of private properties destroyed to warrant the issuance of *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4. It is significant, then, that *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 only concerns destroyed private property, implying that Hieron explicitly avoided public and sacred property for some unclear reason. Another possibility, however, is that Hieron did destroy public and sacred property, and that there are, as of yet, undiscovered laws and decrees from Ephesos during this period which mitigate sacred and public interest-bearing loans with sacred and public property used as security.<sup>99</sup>

*ll. 69-70 - ὄσοι δὲ πρὸ Ἀπολλᾶδος καὶ μηνὸς [Λ]ηναιῶνος...ἐναντίας τῷ κοινῷ πολέμῳ:* Lenaion is the month and Apollas the *prytanis* by which the *κοινὸς πόλεμος* ended, where the conflict lasted 3 *prytaneis*: Demagoras, Mantikrates, and Apollas. If the month of Lenaion corresponds to January/February, and the *prytanis* served for a year, the *κοινὸς πόλεμος* lasted for around 25 months.<sup>100</sup> Loan contracts concluded before the month of Lenaion during the *prytaneia* of Apollas were not legally binding because the Ephesian *polis* passed a decree at the beginning of the *κοινὸς πόλεμος* to delay any debt and interest payments until the *κοινὸς πόλεμος* concluded.<sup>101</sup> Therefore, any *georgoi* who had their property confiscated by *tokistai* were able to regain some of their property through the division process.<sup>102</sup>

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<sup>98</sup> Diod. Sic. 12.45.1. See Thuc. 2.19 on Archedamos II's motivation for raiding Athenian farmland.

<sup>99</sup> See Chapters 3 and 4 on whether the Ephesian *polis* and Artemis Ephesia were more involved in the debt crisis than previously discussed by scholars.

<sup>100</sup> Walser (2008), 103-104; Asheri (1969), 23; Trümpy (1997), 6, 96-99.

<sup>101</sup> Walser (2008), 228; Asheri (1969), 42-44. See below on pages 63-64, for a discussion on the debt moratorium decree.

<sup>102</sup> Walser (2008), 228-229.

*l. 74 - τόκους δὲ αὐτοῖς εἶναι μὴ πλείους δωδεκάτων*: For loan contracts made after the month of Lenaion during the *prytaneia* of Apollas, not only would the contracts be valid, but the law also stipulated that the interest rate on such loans must not be more than 1/12<sup>th</sup> per annum (8.333 percent).<sup>103</sup> It is unclear what the interest rate was before *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 during the *κοινὸς πόλεμος* or whether *georgoi* made interest rate payments monthly or yearly.<sup>104</sup> The law again, however, shows its exceptionality here, as at Delphi with debtors and creditors during a similar credit crisis ca. 80 to 130 years earlier (though not due to a conflict), whereby the *polis*, not the lender and borrower, established a legal maximum interest rate with which *tokistai* were to make loan contracts with *georgoi*.<sup>105</sup> Walser claims that the Ephesian *polis* enacted the legal maximum interest rate as a reaction to a reduced supply of credit at Ephesos and that the legal maximum interest rate was only meant to remain in effect between the month of Lenaion and the enactment of *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4.<sup>106</sup> Specifically, Walser implies that, due to the *κοινὸς πόλεμος* and the fact that *georgoi* defaulted on loans, the *tokistai* were not likely to invest after the war when the resolution of the debt crisis was unclear, so the Ephesian *polis* enacted a new legal maximum interest rate that was high enough to persuade the *tokistai* to invest but low enough to be financially feasible for *georgoi*.<sup>107</sup> While the Ephesian *polis* did likely want the *tokistai* to keep investing in properties in order to stimulate the economy after the debt crisis, Walser does not flesh out or expand on his reasoning for why the legal maximum interest rate was for a limited time only. Walser refers to *ll. 48-51* where the law states that guarantors did not have to pay the excess on additional interest charged by the *tokistai* unless they had previously postponed interest payments

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<sup>103</sup> Walser (2008), 228, 180-193; Asheri (1969), 45. See Chapter 3, 83-85, for the discussion on the interest rate in loans with property used as security at Ephesos.

<sup>104</sup> Walser (2008), 190.

<sup>105</sup> See the Delphic law, *FD III*, 1:294 (425-375 BC) in Asheri (1969), 23-25. See also below on page 61, for a brief discussion on the text.

<sup>106</sup> Walser (2008), 187.

<sup>107</sup> Walser (2008), 188-190.

with the consent of the guarantor and were to be collected over a period of time at a later date, i.e. after the *κοινὸς πόλεμος*.<sup>108</sup> He then connects the postponement with the *tokistai* in *ll.* 71-74 who did adhere to the debt moratorium decree and began receiving, after the end of the *κοινὸς πόλεμος*, the accumulated interest payments, but at 1/12<sup>th</sup> per annum so that the *georgoi* did not end up paying in interest more than double the principle.<sup>109</sup>

Contrary to Walser, however, it seems that the Ephesian *polis* intended for the new legal maximum interest rate of 1/12<sup>th</sup> per annum to be applicable to all future loan contracts with interest. An inscription significantly similar to *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 is the previously mentioned Delphic law, *FD* III, 1:294 (425-375 BC), whose main clause in its first column establishes that loans from private individuals, domestic and sacred associations cannot exceed the new legal interest rate of three *obols* per *mina* per month (8.571 percent) set by the *polis* for future use.<sup>110</sup> Although the Delphic law occurs 80 to 130 years before *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 (297/6 BC) and the context for the law is unclear, the Delphic law's establishment of a new, permanent, and legal maximum interest rate may imply that Ephesos made a similar legal regulation for the interest rate on loans using property as security.<sup>111</sup> Furthermore, considering the fact that in such a detailed and complex law with regard to particular dates by which its clauses are rendered valid or invalid, since the text does not provide a date by which the new interest rate was to be no longer applicable, *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 may instead imply that the new legal maximum interest rate was for current and future use.

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<sup>108</sup> Walser (2008), 191; *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, *ll.* 48-51.

<sup>109</sup> Walser (2008), 191-193. See a similar measure in *Syll.*<sup>3</sup>, no. 344 (303 BC) from Teos, *ll.* 35-38: καὶ ἂν προστιθῶνται οἱ τόκοι πά[ντων τῶν ἐτῶν, μηθεὶ] [δ]υνατὸν εἶναι ἀποτεῖσαι, οἴομεθα δὲ δεῖν, ἅμ μὲν ἐκόντες ἀπο[τείσωσιν οἱ ὀφεί][λο]ντες, γράφειν τοὺς συνθηκογράφους μὴ πλείον διπλασίου ἀποδ[οῦναι τοῦ ἀρχαίου.] ἂν δὲ εἰς δίκην ἔλθ<ὸ>ντες ὀφείλωσι, τριπλάσιον. See Diod. Sic. 1.79.2 who attests to a similar archaic era law from Egypt that prevents loan agreements from charging an interest rate that caused a borrower to end up paying more than double the principle.

<sup>110</sup> *FD* III, 1:294 (425-375 BC); Asheri (1969), 23, see also Appendix 1 of Asheri's work for the text and a translation; Walser (2008), 189-190.

<sup>111</sup> Asheri (1969), 25.

*l. 78 - κατὰ τοὺς νόμους*: This specification further implies that the foreign judges were to judge within the confines of Ephesian, not their native *polis*' laws. The foreign judges at Ephesos, as at Laodicea in a similar decree, were required to make their judgments on the mitigation of debt in accordance with the laws of the city (*κατὰ τοὺς νόμους*).<sup>112</sup> The implication is that the foreign judges would also have had a working knowledge of Ephesian laws and understand upon which laws the clauses of *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 were based, including those concerning debt, loans, and property divisions.<sup>113</sup> Therefore, the 'judgement' clauses and practices previously discussed in this chapter, such as the emphasis on arbitrations instead of or before a court case, may have also been representative of the normal judicial process at Ephesos.<sup>114</sup> Furthermore, the many stipulations for resolving debt in *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, such as those involving orphans, girls, and *georgoi* with many creditors or guarantors, also prevents the use of foreign laws and political systems with which the invited foreign judges had previous experience.<sup>115</sup> *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 overall indicates and emphasizes the notion that the foreign judges were not invited to make a new law nor to make judgements that contradicted or superseded existing Ephesian laws.

*ll. 79-80 - ὅσοι δὲ ἐμ[βε]βήκασιν ὕστερον μηνὸς Ποσιδεῶνος τοῦ ἐπὶ Δημαγόρα νεμομένων τῶν δεδανεισμέν[ων τὰ] κτήματα*: This clause reverses any confiscation of property by a *daneistes* that occurred after the month of Posideon during the *prytaneia* of Demagoras in accordance with the *psephisma* (*ψήφισμα*), the debt moratorium decree, enacted at that time. If a *daneistes* claimed, however, that he confiscated the property of the *georgoi* prior to the month of Posideon and the *prytaneia* of Demagoras or that one of the parties coerced the other, those in the former case would

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<sup>112</sup> *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, *l. 78*; *SEG* 43, no. 850 (200-189/188 BC) from Priene; Scafuro (2013), 368, 374.

<sup>113</sup> Scafuro (2013), 368, 374.

<sup>114</sup> Scafuro (2013), 382.

<sup>115</sup> Scafuro (2013), 374.

receive judgments whereas those in the latter must submit to arbitration before moving to a court case “in accordance with this law” (*κατὰ τόνδε τὸν νόμον*).<sup>116</sup>

*l. 80 - κατὰ τὸ ψήφισμα*: At the very least, the *psephisma* was an Ephesian debt moratorium decree that stopped loan payments, prevented confiscations by *tokistai*, allowed *georgoi* to continue using their property for the duration of the war, but it also allowed *tokistai* to collect interest payments unless otherwise agreed.<sup>117</sup> It is unclear, however, whether *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 was initially a decree that was issued by the Ephesian *polis* or an external actor such as Demetrios Poliorketes requested in the initial decree at the outset of the *κοινὸς πόλεμος*. According to Gauthier, there are three categories for how a Hellenistic royal power intervened in *poleis*’ judicial matters. The first category is where the ruler issued a *diagramma* (*διάγραμμα*) that had the same legal force as the relevant *polis* or *poleis*’ laws.<sup>118</sup> In the second category, the ruler instructed a *polis* that was experiencing a severe crisis to request foreign judges from a particular *polis* to assist in resolving the issue, but the ruler did not interfere in the selection of these judges or the *polis*’ administration of justice.<sup>119</sup> In the final category, the ruler directly ordered foreign judges to go and make decisions on pending legal cases in another *polis*.<sup>120</sup>

The first of the categories may be ruled out in the case of *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 since the text nowhere indicates that it was based on a *diagramma* from Demetrios. While the text of *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 does not specify who the judges were, from where they were requested, and who requested them, Demetrios still may have ordered the formation of a foreign court in Ephesos, chosen the *polis* from which foreign judges were to be sent, or chose the foreign judges himself to serve in

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<sup>116</sup> *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, *ll.* 79-88; Walser (2008), 230-231.

<sup>117</sup> Asheri (1969), 42-44; Walser (2008), 197-208.

<sup>118</sup> Gauthier (1994), 166; Walser (2008), 271.

<sup>119</sup> Gauthier (1994), 166-167; Walser (2008), 271.

<sup>120</sup> Gauthier (1994), 167-168; Walser (2008), 271.



Ephesos.<sup>121</sup> The inscription's ambiguity regarding who instituted the law and requested the foreign judges is, perhaps, because *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 is an incomplete text. There is, unfortunately, no preamble to *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 briefly explaining what occurred during the *κοινὸς πόλεμος* or who proposed the law which might confirm or refute Hellenistic royal involvement. Based on the chronology presented in Chapter 1, though he notionally controlled the city at the time, Demetrios was not present at Ephesos during or after the *κοινὸς πόλεμος* when the debt crisis occurred. Moreover, Lysimachos captured Ephesos one to two years after resolution of the debt crisis had already begun and was not able to influence which particular foreign judges presided over the debt disputes. Therefore, due to the absence of royal power directly ruling Ephesos at the time, it is unlikely that *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 was passed because of a royal initiative.

*Il. 87-88 – προδιαιτᾶσθαι δὲ αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν διαιτητῶν κατὰ τόνδε τὸν νόμον.* – As noted above on page 61, *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 here requires the disputants to first submit to arbitration. In fact, this stipulation is similar to what one finds in two decrees from Kalymna for foreign judges from Iasos (*Iiasos*, no. 82 [250-220 BC]), where the disputants must first attempt a reconciliation under the supervision of *diaitetai* before resorting to a court case (*Il. 87-88*).<sup>122</sup> In prioritizing arbitration, the disputants settled their case directly with one another through an agreement rather than receive a verdict from the foreign judges that the *polis* might later overturn and inadvertently cause disharmony with regard to other verdicts of the foreign judges.<sup>123</sup> Therefore, *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4

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<sup>121</sup> Walser (2008), 271-272.

<sup>122</sup> Scafuro (2013), 380-382; Walser (2008), 212-213, 263-265. See also a similar procedural preference of arbitration before judgement in *SEG* 49, no. 1106 (280 BC) from Kos, and in *IG* XII 5, no. 870 (second century BC) from Tenos.

<sup>123</sup> Scafuro (2013), 384-385. See also *IG* XII 4, 1 no. 132 (300 BC) where the people of Telos invited Koan judges because of disharmony caused by verdicts from cases previously judged by Telian judges.

accounts for the difficulty in judging cases involving coercion by prioritizing arbitration, thereby avoiding a potentially contentious verdict that might cause further disharmony.

ll. 88-89 - ὅσοι δὲ ἐγκαταλιπόντες τὰ κτήματα ἀπηλλαγμένοι εἰσὶν, οἱ δὲ τοκισταὶ γεγεωργήκασιν, εἶναι τὰ κτήματα τῶν τοκιστῶν: While the *tokistai* were allowed to begin to cultivate the abandoned property, the Ephesian *polis* allowed for *georgoi* to return and buy back their property until the end of the *prytaneia* of Danaos, the *prytaneia* after Apollas' in which *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 was enacted.<sup>124</sup> The Ephesian *polis* required, however, that the *georgoi* repay to the *tokistai* what the *tokistai* had spent on the property with an interest of 1/14<sup>th</sup> (7.143 percent), and whatever amount they expended on the property or lost from cultivation, but deducted from the cost any revenue earned by the *tokistai*. This clause only allowed the *georgoi* to buy back their property in order to then have access to the provisions of *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, which still required them to divide the property with the *tokistai* in accordance with the amount of the original loan.<sup>125</sup> The *georgoi* and the *tokistai* were then able to enter into either a private agreement on the valuation of the expenditures, losses, and revenues or into an agreement over which an arbitrator presided.<sup>126</sup> If the *georgoi* and *tokistai* did not agree on the amount which the *georgoi* must initially pay for their property, the case went to court in order for the foreign judges to make a final judgement on the amount.<sup>127</sup>

l. 98 - εἰ δὲ τινες ἐπὶ Δημαγόρου ἢ Μαντικράτους ἢ Απολλᾶδος ἕως μηνὸς Ποσιδεῶνο[ς]: Finally, on line 98, there is another clause for abandoned property that begins by naming the *prytaneis* during which the *κοινὸς πόλεμος* occurred but is cut off because it is the end of Block

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<sup>124</sup> *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, ll. 90-93; Walser (2008), 232, 234.

<sup>125</sup> Walser (2008), 223-224.

<sup>126</sup> *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, ll. 94-96; Walser (2008), 223.

<sup>127</sup> *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, ll. 96-98; Walser (2008), 223.

3A. Block 3A, however, seems to continue onto Block B for relatives hoping to claim abandoned property.<sup>128</sup>

## 2.7 Conclusions

As it survives today, *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, though incomplete, still provides a plethora of information not only about the magistrates and legal processes involved in the mitigation of disputes during the debt crisis that occurred after the *κοινὸς πόλεμος* but also about the economic figures and processes involved at Ephesos. While the law is also specific on the dates by which, and the situations in which, its clauses are and are not applicable, there is a certain degree of ambiguity in the identity of the judges, the creditors, the farmers, and the events concerning the *κοινὸς πόλεμος*. As the next chapter will discuss, *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 likely involved a significant number of farmers and creditors who did not fall into only one category or another, and their cases therefore necessitated that either the arbitrators or the judges solve each dispute on a case-by-case basis, taking into account each disputant's economic situation, as well as the terms and conditions of their agreements. The law overall also seems to focus solely on the private sphere with no mention of public or sacred loans or property even though, as the next two chapters will show, the Ephesian *polis* did take out loans during the *κοινὸς πόλεμος* and the Artemision certainly had ample funds with which to make interest-bearing loans.

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<sup>128</sup> Walser (2008), 234.

## **Chapter 3: *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 and Ephesian Real Estate**

The damage inflicted by the *κοινὸς πόλεμος* and the assault on Ephesos by Hieron, the tyrant of Priene (300-297 BC) was likely compounded by the economic strain Ephesos was laboring under as a result of the actions of Prepelaos, Demetrios, and the housing of their garrisons at Ephesos in the years leading up to the *κοινὸς πόλεμος*. Ephesos seems, however, to have managed the costs of the *polis*, farmers, the debt crisis, and reconstruction of the city during the period that period without Hellenic royal intervention or funding. *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 specifically creates provisions for farmers (*georgoi*) and creditors (*tokistai*) because the damage from the *κοινὸς πόλεμος* caused the *georgoi* to default on their loan agreements. Such loan agreements in dispute included an initial contract, interest, and used property as security. In this regard, these loans are similar, in a more general sense, to the *hypotheke* loans recorded at Attica and other *poleis* in the fourth century BC, but the loans made at Ephesos did not seem to use *horoi* to demarcate encumbered property.<sup>1</sup> The *hypotheke* loan agreements between *georgoi* and *tokistai* also sometimes required the use of a guarantor who was obligated to pay any sums remaining on the loan if the *georgos* could not afford to repay it in full. *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4's new legal maximum interest rate of 1/12<sup>th</sup> seems, however, seems to have been an intentionally lower interest rate compared to other *poleis* such as Athens and Priene in order to restore a loss in credit between *georgoi* and *tokistai*, just as was the case in a similar crisis at Delphi between 425-375 BC (*FD* III, 1:294).

Ostensibly, based on Ephesos' laws on land ownership (i.e. only Ephesian citizens were able to own Ephesian land) as they survive through citizenship and *proxenoi* decrees, Walser argues that both parties in the interest-bearing loans of *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 had to include citizens since

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<sup>1</sup> Finley (1952), 8-9, 24; Harris (2015), 125.

ownership of the property either remained with the *georgoi* or transferred to the *tokistai* if the *georgoi* defaulted on their loans. Contrary to Walser's assumption, though, the *georgoi* also likely included non-citizen residents with the honor of *enktesis* (ἐγκτησις), the right to land ownership by a foreigner. Similarly, the *tokistai* were those from Ephesos also capable of assuming ownership of a given property and may, therefore, have also included citizens and non-citizens with the honor of *enktesis* as private money-lenders, bankers, or professional creditors. Since the Ephesian *polis* and the deities of sanctuaries such as Artemis are absent from *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, despite the *polis*' need for funds during the *κοινὸς πόλεμος* and the Artemision's wealth, the law seems to have only concerned the private sphere of the Ephesian. It would then be reasonable to assume that there were additional laws and decrees governing the sacred and public economic sphere.

### 3.1 Land ownership in Ephesos

As in other Greek *poleis*, the Ephesian *polis* restricted the right to own property in the Ephesian *polis* to Ephesian citizens, the *polis*, and, in effect, deities.<sup>2</sup> While the Ephesian *polis* specifically granted the right to own property to foreigners, this was seemingly done only in tandem with citizenship (*πολιτεία*), the privilege of front seats (*προεδρία*), and membership to tribes and *chiliastyes*, "Thousands," sub-divisions within each Ephesian tribe.<sup>3</sup> The only two inscriptions that specifically confer the honor of *enktesis* to foreigners whom the Ephesian *polis* made citizens are *IEphesos* IV no. 1389, a *proxenos* decree, and 1443, a citizenship decree, both from the fourth century BC.<sup>4</sup> *IEphesos* IV no. 1389 grants to Kleon the Cyrenian and his descendants citizenship, the status of *proxenos*, the honor of *enktesis*, front seats at public games, and inviolability (*asylia*)

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<sup>2</sup> *IEphesos* IV nos. 1389, 1443 (both fourth century BC); Walser (2008), 158-159; Burford (1993), 15-16; Finley (1952), 53-54.

<sup>3</sup> For example, see *IEphesos* IV nos. 1389, 1443; V nos. 1447-1455; VI nos. 2003-2005 (all fourth century BC); Walser (2008), 159-160; Jones (1987), 311.

<sup>4</sup> Walser (2008), 159-160.

when importing and exporting goods.<sup>5</sup> On the other hand, *IEphesos* IV no. 1443 grants to the Athenian Anaxikrates only citizenship, the honor of *enktesis*, and assigns him to a tribe as well as one of its *chiliastyes*.<sup>6</sup>

Neither inscription, however, should be taken to indicate a pattern where the Ephesian *polis*, when providing citizenship in decrees to foreigners, must explicitly assign the honor of *enktesis*, given land ownership was an implied right in the naturalization of the foreigner.<sup>7</sup> Rather, it seems that the honor of *enktesis* was a particular honor foreigners might earn in addition to other specified honors, including citizenship. This approach can also be seen in the *polis* neighboring Ephesos to the south, Priene. There, the *polis* granted to the chief priest of Artemis Ephesia, called the Megabyzos, the status of *proxenos*, freedom from taxes, and the honor of *enktesis* for property worth up to five talents due to the unspecified help he provided in the completion of the temple of Athena there ca. 296 BC.<sup>8</sup> The Prienian decree, however, does not grant citizenship to the Megabyzos, therefore implying that, in exchange for special services rendered, Priene had the ability to grant the honor of *enktesis* without also conferring citizenship. While there is no evidence of instances where the Ephesian *polis* provided only the status of *proxenos* and the honor of *enktesis* to someone for exceptional services rendered, since *IEphesos* IV, no. 1389 specified that Kleon received the status of a *proxenos*, citizenship and honor of *enktesis* whereas *IEphesos* IV, no. 1443 grants the Athenian Anaxikrates only citizenship and the honor of *enktesis*, the Ephesian *polis* may well have had the ability to grant to foreigners the honor of *enktesis* without also

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<sup>5</sup> See *IEphesos* V no. 1452, which similarly grants privileged seats, but at public games specifically.

<sup>6</sup> See Jones (1987), 311-312, on how Ephesos' political structure divided and assigned citizens to *phylai* (tribes) and then subdivided them into *chiliastyes*. See also Chaniotis (2013), 101-102, on the difficulty of gaining citizenship in Athens and other *poleis*.

<sup>7</sup> Walser (2008), 160 n. 28; Harris (2015), 118-119.

<sup>8</sup> *IPriene*, no. 3 (296/5 BC); Walser (2008), 166-167. See also Crowther (1996), 219-221, on the revised dating of *IPriene*, no. 3 from 333 to 296/5 BC. See Chapter 4, 103-108, on how the temple of Artemis had enough funds by this period to have aided in the reconstruction of another temple.

conferring citizenship, similar to the approach taken in Priene.<sup>9</sup> Although the number of such residents is not clear, Ephesos during the late fourth to early third century BC may have had resident foreigners with the honor of *enktesis* whose property the debt crisis affected.

### 3.2 The *georgoi*

In the context of *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, *georgos* (*γεωργός*), while an ambiguous term, means both “farmers” who just farmed the land as well as wealthy absentee landowners.<sup>10</sup> As a result, the *georgoi* of *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 comprised two groups with the ability to take out an interest-bearing loan using the property as security: citizen and non-citizen land owners with the honor of *enktesis*. Further, although *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 does not specifically mention the *polis* or deities, it is reasonable to assume that the financial strife from the War of the Diadochi (319-301 BC) and then the *κοινὸς πόλεμος* (300-297 BC) occurring shortly thereafter also forced the Ephesian *polis* and temples to take out loans using public and sacred land as security. What is difficult to determine in the epigraphic record from fourth-century Ephesos is the population size of citizens and non-citizen residents with the honor of *enktesis*.

There were, however, likely a great number of foreign residents in Ephesos during the fourth and third centuries BC, just as there seems to have been in by the first century BC. Although 200 years removed from *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, the 86/5BC Ephesian decree mitigating debt from the Mithridatic War (*IEphesos* Ia, no. 8) prepares for further conflict by offering citizenship to non-citizens who take up arms on behalf of the city and provides clear titles with which to refer to the non-enslaved population at Ephesos:

εἶναι δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἰστοτελεῖς καὶ παροίκους

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<sup>9</sup> Walser (2008), 167.

<sup>10</sup> Finley (1952), 258 n. 98; Burford (1993), 15; Dem. 18.41. See *Pol.* 6.1319a6 where Aristotle describes how *georgoi* owned different amounts of property in accordance with Athens’ early laws on land ownership.

καὶ ἱερούς καὶ ἐξελευθέρους καὶ ξένους, ὅσοι ἂν ἀναλάβωσιν τὰ ὄπλα καὶ πρὸς το[ύς]  
45 ἡγεμόνας ἀπογράψωνται, πάντας πολίτας ἐφ' ἴση καὶ ὁμοίαι

Although the composition of the population in the fourth century is unclear, Ephesos in the early first century BC makes clear that, in distinguishing who comprised the foreign residents that paid the same taxes as citizens (*isoteleis*), foreign residents, sacred attendants, descendants of freedmen, and foreigners from Ephesian citizens, Ephesian citizens had certain rights, including land ownership, not usually available to non-citizens and that there was a sizable and varied population of foreigners at Ephesos.<sup>11</sup> Although the *isoteleis* were equal to citizens in the duties and taxes they owed, and therefore free from the *metic* tax, they did not have the honor of *enktesis* since they were not deemed full citizens unless citizenship had otherwise been conferred upon them, such as was the case in *IEphesos* Ia, no. 8.<sup>12</sup> In contrast to the priests of a temple who were citizens, the significant number of sacred attendants (*hieroi*) of temples such as the Artemision were free foreign residents or manumitted slaves who, in addition to other sacred and secular duties, were only capable of purchasing and managing sacred property on behalf of, and thus ultimately owned by, their deity.<sup>13</sup> As for non-citizen landowners, due to the scarcity of evidence from Ephesos, the number of non-citizen landowners who held property in Ephesos at the time of the *κοινὸς πόλεμος* and the debt crisis in 297/6 BC is unknown, but they might count, at least in principle, among the parties to whom the term *georgos* applies.

The citizens who might have qualified as *georgoi* in *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 likely included both the wealthy elite at Ephesos and more impoverished citizens who depended upon a subsistence

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<sup>11</sup> See Walser (2008), 164, on the *isoteleis*, and 161 n. 33, on how *IEphesos* Ia, no. 8 is conferring citizenship to the descendants of freedmen, not freedmen themselves. See also *IEphesos* VI, 2001, l. 9, which uses the designation of *ἐλευθέρους καὶ ἐξ ἐλευθέρων* for who may receive citizenship.

<sup>12</sup> Walser (2008), 164-165. See also *IEphesos* IV, no. 1415 (300 BC), where the *isoteles* Athenodoros was granted citizenship for his performance in the Isthmian Games.

<sup>13</sup> Dignas (2002), 194-195. See *IEphesos* Ia, nos. 17, 27, and Vittr. *De arch.* 7.16, on the various duties of the Artemision's *hieroi*.



living from their farms.<sup>14</sup> The wealthy may have included those such as Ephesian merchants, bankers, business owners, politicians, as well as orphaned boys and girls, divorcées, wives, sisters, and daughters who had guardians managing their inheritance and dowries, who owned, leased out, and derived profit from their farms, but were not themselves farming the land. More impoverished citizens may have leased out their land less often if they had no other property, and, instead, would have farmed the land themselves and sold their produce to tradesmen, such as millers, bakers or merchants, to sell elsewhere. Although there is little evidence from Ephesos to support his argument, based on leases of land from Classical Athens, Hellenistic Delos, and Hellenistic Miletus, Walser claims that each Ephesian family within the wealthy population, who perhaps comprised about one-third or more of the total citizen population, owned a significant amount of farmland, while the middle class of citizens owned between five to ten hectares of farmland per citizen.<sup>15</sup> While the evidence on population size and make-up from even well-documented *poleis* such as Athens is still heavily debated and not at all conclusive, the evidence from comparable *poleis* may indicate a pattern whereby further not yet discovered or published archeological and epigraphic evidence from Ephesos would suggest a similar ratio of the wealthy to the rest of the citizenry. However, even an approximate ratio for the stratification of citizens at Ephesos, in particular, is currently impossible to determine conclusively as there is very little literary, epigraphic, and archeological evidence on the economic status of Ephesian families that owned property and the total amount of farmland available during the late fourth to early third centuries BC.

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<sup>14</sup> Walser (2008), 169.

<sup>15</sup> Walser (2008), 170-173; Lohmann (1999), 455; Harris (2015), 125. See Shipton (2000), 39-42, where, in her comparison of Athenian and Delian leases, she argues that Athens' wealthy population seems to comprise 36 percent of the men attested in Athenian public leases while Delos' comprises 54 percent of the men attested in Delian public leases. See also *IPriene*, no. 3 where the Prienian *polis* granted for the Megabyzos to own land worth up to five talents and the discussion above on page 69.

In the case of male orphans and girls whose inheritance and dowries included farmland, *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 created strict requirements that protected the property over which the guardians of these individuals had the greatest control.<sup>16</sup> *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 excluded the mitigation of cases involving property and funds included in the inheritance and dowries of orphans and girls in to order to force their guardians to fully repay the funds borrowed or return the property used as security, thereby ensuring the protection of the full inheritance and dowry for orphans and girls.<sup>17</sup> These measures for protecting the wealth of orphans and girls from their guardians implies that the guardians who used their wards' wealth may have done so without the wards' knowledge or consent. Since the wealth at issue was not the guardians' money or property, the guardians themselves did not lose their property, but that of their wards, if they defaulted on the loan. As is evident in *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4's stipulation that allowed guardians to attempt a private agreement with their *tokistai* where a guardian had used his ward's wealth with his or her knowledge and consent, such an agreement had the implication that any deficit on the full repayment of the loan to the ward must be fully repaid from the guardian's own wealth.<sup>18</sup> Both the number of orphans and women with dowries at Ephesos as well as whether the War of the Diadochi or the *κοινὸς πόλεμος* created orphans are, however, uncertain given the available evidence from Ephesos. It is nevertheless clear that special care was taken in *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 to distinguish between certain classes such as orphans and women, perhaps due to their wealth, the number of those involved, or both, in order to protect them from guardians who made improper loans using their wards', and not their own, properties which were later affected by the *κοινὸς πόλεμος*.

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<sup>16</sup> *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, ll. 53-64. See Chapter 2, 55-57, for a discussion on the lemma in *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 concerning these stipulations.

<sup>17</sup> *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, ll. 53-64; Walser (2008), 148-152. See Chapter 2, 58-59, on the legal reason for why the Ephesian *polis* excluded guardians using their wards' property as security from the provisions of the *κοινὸς πόλεμος*.

<sup>18</sup> *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, ll. 24-29 and 62-64.

### 3.3 Public and Sacred Borrowers

The way in which the *κοινὸς πόλεμος* impacted public land and the level of involvement of the Ephesian *polis* in the debt crisis, beyond the enactment of *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, are both similarly difficult to determine. When the Ephesian *polis* needed money to fund Prienian rebels in the *κοινὸς πόλεμος* against the tyrant of Priene, Hieron, the *polis* borrowed a talent from money-lenders to purchase weapons (*IEphesos* VI, no. 2001 [299/8 BC]).<sup>19</sup> While *IEphesos* VI, no. 2001 makes it clear that the Ephesian *polis* certainly had the ability to take out loans, it is unclear whether the *polis* also used public land as security for these loans, as was the case in other *poleis* who did so, such as at Keos and Amorgos. In the fourth century BC, the temple of Pythian Apollo at Karthaia lent funds, ranging from 16 to 100 *drachmae* plus interest, to the Keos six times over six non-consecutive months, with the *polis* using public land as security.<sup>20</sup> Similarly, in the fourth to third centuries BC on the island of Amorgos, the city of Arkesine, as well as the other two cities on the island, Aigiale and Minoa, borrowed from various individuals approximately seven talents and used the public land of the *polis*, demarcated by *horoi*, as security on the loan.<sup>21</sup>

In the case of Ephesos, only *IEphesos* VI, no. 2001 attests to public loans made in Ephesos in the beginning of the third century BC. Dated prior to the debt crisis described in *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, the inscription describes how the Ephesian *polis* sold citizenship in order to repay loans advanced to it by money-lenders so as to provide weapons to the Prienian rebels at the fort of

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<sup>19</sup> See Chapter 1, 13-17, on the historical context of the *κοινὸς πόλεμος* and Ephesos' conflict with Hieron. See below on page 79, for a discussion on professional money-lenders at Ephesos during this period.

<sup>20</sup> *IG* XII Suppl. 236 (fourth century BC), ll. 3-4, 10-11, 13-14, 16-17, 20-21, with the same phrase: ἐπὶ ὑποθήκει τοῖς κτ<ή>μασι τοῖς τῶν πολιτῶν τόκου τοῦ ἐννόμου. See Migeotte (2015), 289, and Bogaert (1968), 197, for their discussion on the loans from Keos.

<sup>21</sup> *IG* XII 7, nos. 66-70 (fourth to third century BC); Finley (1951), 90-91, 278-280 nos. 15-18. See also Gabrielsen (2005), 144-146, for his discussion on Arkesine's use of publicly appointed *daneistai*.

Charax, but the inscription does not mention whether the loan had been secured using public lands or some other means (*IEphesos* VI, no. 2001 ll. 8-12):<sup>22</sup>

ὄπω]ς δ' ἂν εἰς ταῦτα πόρος ὑπάρχηι καὶ μηδὲν ἐμποδῶν γένηται τῆι φυλακῆι τοῦ τόπου

[καὶ κομίσωνται τὰ δάνεια οἱ προδανείσαντες, ποιήσασθαι πολίτας ἐξαμναίους,  
ἐλευθέρους καὶ ἐξ ἐλευθέρων, μὴ πλείους ἢ δε-

10 [καπέντε, τὸ δὲ ἐκ τούτων πεσὸν ἀργύριον παρα]λαβόντας τοὺς ἐσσηνας καὶ τοὺς  
συνέδρους τοὺς ἐπὶ τοῖς Πριηνικοῖς τεταγμένους τά[λαν]-

[τον καὶ ἥμισυ, τὸ τάλαντον τὸ προδεδανεισμ]ένον αὐτοῖς ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς  
προδανείασιν, καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ὀπλωνήσαντας δοῦναι τὰ ὄπλα

[τῶν ἐκ Πριήνης τοῖς τὸ φρούριον διαφυ]λάττουσιν·

The *essenēs*, financial magistrates of Artemis, and those appointed to handle Prienian affairs budgeted enough to not only pay off, via the sale of citizenship, the loans totaling one talent advanced to the *polis* from what appears to be many parties, but to also use the remaining half talent to purchase more weapons for the rebel Prienians.<sup>23</sup> In this instance, the security on the loans may have been the weapons themselves, similar to transactions involving merchants in Athens who used the cargo they purchased with the funds from loans as security on the loan until it was repaid.<sup>24</sup> On the other hand, since *IEphesos* VI, no. 2001 expresses urgency to provide the Prienian rebels the weapons as soon as possible, it would be counter-intuitive for Ephesos to keep the weapons as security on the loans. The money-lenders, therefore, might well have been left with no guarantee that the Ephesian *polis* would repay the loans unless the Ephesian *polis* had obtained the talent and a half shortly after purchasing the weapons or used a different form of security. In addition, considering the fact that *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 does have a clause for more than one lender

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<sup>22</sup> See Chapter 1, 13-17, on the chronology for the Ephesian conflict with Hieron of Priene.

<sup>23</sup> See Paus. 8.13.1, *IEphesos* VI, no. 2005, and *IEphesos* V, no. 1455, on the *essenēs*. See also Chapter 4, 101-102, for a discussion on the *essenēs* and their role at the Artemision.

<sup>24</sup> See, for example, Dem. 32.4-9, where grain secured a loan to one Zenothemis and was seized when he was not able to repay the loan to the private citizen and maritime money-lender, Demon, and Dem. 34.6-9, where money lent to Phormio was secured by, and to be paid back via, the sale of the cargo he was to convey back from the Pontus. See also Cohen (1992), 146-147, on the prominence of merchants going to and from Athens using their respective cargo as security on their respective loans.

who made *hypotheke* loans secured by an initial portioned value and then residual portioned value of a property, and that *IEphesos* VI, no. 2001 is so close in date to *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, the Ephesian *polis* might have used public land worth one talent as security on more than one loan, each loan being for a portion of the land's total value.<sup>25</sup> Moreover, *IEphesos* VI, no. 2001 indicates that the Prienian rebels likely needed further resources beyond weapons, so it is reasonable to suggest that the Ephesian *polis* took out additional loans, such as *hypotheke* loans, to continue funding the rebels only to later be forced to default on such loans due to the destruction caused by the conflict with Hieron. Therefore, since *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 seems to only mitigate private loans, the Ephesian *polis* may have enacted another decree or law mitigating public loans and public land used as security.

It is, however, unclear whether the deities of temples in Ephesos, such as Artemis Ephesia of the Artemision, needed funds during the end of the fourth and the beginning of the third centuries BC. The epigraphic and literary record is nonexistent on the financial activities of other temples at Ephesos besides the Artemision such as whether their deities leased land, took out, or made loans during the fourth and third centuries BC. As this chapter will later briefly discuss, with a more thorough examination in Chapter 4, the Artemision, in particular, seems to have derived profit from its leased sacred land since the sixth century BC, was accepting deposits in the fourth century BC, and was, overall, involved in the sacred economic sphere at Ephesos.<sup>26</sup> Although the temple was destroyed in 356 BC and needed significant funds to rebuild, not only did the Artemision derive such funds from its properties and the Ephesian *polis*, but the temple also protected its treasury

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<sup>25</sup> See *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, ll. 32-35, for the clause on properties with more than one loan on its residual value. See also *Agora* XIX, no. P5 (367/6 BC), ll. 1-39, in which, after the Athenian *polis* confiscated the property of one Theosebtes who allegedly committed sacrilege, the Athenian *politai* honored and repaid from the value of the property four loans which used the property as security prior to selling it.

<sup>26</sup> *IEphesos* Ia, no. 1, ll. 9-10; Xen. *An.* 5.3.4-13; Bubelis (2016), 172 n. 3.

and tax-free status (*ateleia*) during the War of the Diadochi.<sup>27</sup> Therefore, Artemis did not need to borrow money and was likely not involved as a borrower during the debt crisis.

### 3.4 The *tokistai*

Similar to the *georgos*, candidates to whom the term *tokistes* (τοκιστής) might apply also depended on whether the *tokistai* had the right to land ownership in Ephesos, given that they would have to assume ownership of a property they received as a result of a defaulted loan.<sup>28</sup> Therefore, the same options for whomever were *georgoi* also apply for *tokistai* in *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4: that is, citizens and non-citizens with the honor of *enktesis*. Although not present in the law, the Ephesian *polis* and deities at Ephesos may have been similarly involved as creditors during the debt crisis as well. It is also important to note that it is possible that some *georgoi* may have also acted as *tokistai* depending on the wealth available to them at the time. Walser specifically argues against professional creditors and bankers, and claims instead that the *tokistai* encompassed only private citizens. However, contrary to Walser, since the term *tokistes* itself is as ambiguous as *georgos* and *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 does not anywhere specify who the *tokistai* and *georgoi* are, the inscription may well have encompassed any lenders who made the *hypotheke* loans which the law mitigates.<sup>29</sup>

Walser, however, argues that since *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 does not specify the involvement of, or use, the term “*τραπεζίτης*” to refer to citizen bankers or professional creditors, they are not likely candidates to whom the term, *τοκιστής*, applies. Walser bases his argument on the scarcity of evidence for citizen bankers making loans with properties used as security outside of Athens.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> Davies (2011), 180-181, 191; Strab. 14.1.22; *IEphesos* V, no. 1449. See Ar. An. 1.17.10, on Alexander’s decree for Ephesos to provide its annual tribute to Artemis instead of the Persian Empire. See also Chapter 4, 103-108, for a detailed discussion on the properties of Artemis and their organization.

<sup>28</sup> Walser (2008), 174-176.

<sup>29</sup> See Walser (2008), 179, where he also comments that both terms are ambiguous and likely involved the same group of people.

<sup>30</sup> Walser (2008), 176.

Although *IEphesos* Ia, no. 8 dates to over 200 years after the debt crisis, the enactment of *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, and rule by Hellenistic Kings, *IEphesos* Ia, no. 8 does mention bankers, *trapezitai* (τραπεζῖται), present at Ephesos. Walser reasons that while *IEphesos* Ia, no. 8 does specify loans involving bankers, the inscription does not refer to the loans of the bankers as *hypotheke* loans, but as pawnbroking (“Pfandleihen”) loans because the bankers are not in the same stipulation found earlier in the text regarding *hypotheke* loans.<sup>31</sup> Walser’s argument regarding *IEphesos* Ia, no. 8, however, depends on his translation of ἐνεχύροις in l. 62 as “pawnbroking” instead of as property used as security. Contrary to Walser’s interpretation, Herodotus, for example, uses the term to refer to an (apocryphal) Egyptian law that allowed men to borrow money using the borrowers’ ancestral burial vault as security which the creditor might confiscate if the loan was not repaid.<sup>32</sup> In [Demosthenes] *Against Timotheus*, Apollodorus argues that if Timotheus’ affairs went badly, Timotheus might have successfully defaulted on his loan to Apollodorus’ father, the banker Pasion, since Pasion lent money to Timotheus without security and witnesses, using ἐνεχύροις again here to denote security.<sup>33</sup> Since *IEphesos* Ia, no. 8 mentions interest payments on loans to and from bankers, but does not specify the type of loans, one might instead translate ἐνεχύροις as “securities” on the loans in the form of property.<sup>34</sup> Accordingly, bankers and their loans would also have included citizen bankers who were able to become owners of property used as security on defaulted *hypotheke* loans.

<sup>31</sup> Walser (2008), 177. See *IEphesos* Ia, no. 8, ll. 48-54 and 54-62, in Figure 6.

<sup>32</sup> Htd. 2.136.2: ἐπὶ τούτου βασιλεύοντος ἔλεγον, ἀμιξίης εὐούσης πολλῆς χρημάτων, γενέσθαι νόμον Αἰγυπτίοισι, ἀποδεικνύντα ἐνεχύρον τοῦ πατρὸς τὸν νέκυν οὕτω λαμβάνειν τὸ χρέος: προστεθῆναι δὲ ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ νόμῳ τόνδε, τὸν δίδοντα τὸ χρέος καὶ ἀπάσης κρατέειν τῆς τοῦ λαμβάνοντος θήκης, τῷ δὲ ὑποτιθέντι τοῦτο τὸ ἐνεχύρον τήνδε ἐπεῖναι ζημίην μὴ βουλομένῳ ἀποδοῦναι τὸ χρέος, μήτε αὐτῷ ἐκεῖνῳ τελευτήσαντι εἶναι ταφῆς κυρήσαι μήτ’ ἐν ἐκεῖνῳ τῷ πατρῴῳ τάφῳ μήτ’ ἐν ἄλλῳ μηδενί, μήτε ἄλλον μηδένα τῶν ἐωυτοῦ ἀπογενόμενον θάψαι. See also the funerary inscription SEG 42, no. 1086 from either Hierokaisareia, Hypaipa or Philadelphia (300-250 BC), where the epitaph invokes the gods to protect the stele against those collecting on security.

<sup>33</sup> [Dem.] 49.2: οὔτε γὰρ ἐπ’ ἐνεχύρῳ οὔτε μετὰ μαρτύρων ἔδωκε.

<sup>34</sup> Millett (1991), 184; Fine (1951), 61-62 n. 4.

While, unlike in Athens, there is no manuscript tradition for Ephesos which preserves the speeches of orators that would have covered cases about bankers and their clients in the fourth century BC, and no bankers are referred to *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 nor in other sources from Ephesos during the fourth to early third centuries BC, given that banking had become more wide-spread during the Classical and the Hellenistic eras, banking as a profession must have already spread to Ephesos. This seems to be a logical conclusion, given that Ephesos was, at this time, also a hub of trade comparable to Athens, that there were already organizations such as the Artemision operating as banking institutions in the fourth century, and money-lenders were present at Ephesos ca. 300 BC.<sup>35</sup> In *IEphesos* VI, no. 2001, the money-lenders who lent to the Ephesian *polis* were, in fact, identified as professional money-lenders (*prodaneistai*) who, unlike general commercial money-lenders (*daneistai*), specialized in facilitating interest-bearing loans with property such as the weapons or land used as security.<sup>36</sup> The loans discussed in *IEphesos* VI, no. 2001 seem to have all been made to the Ephesian *polis* at the same time and may, therefore, reflect a concentrated and combined effort by professional money-lenders recognized by the *polis*, such as citizen bankers as well as professional creditors.<sup>37</sup> The lack of specification in *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 may imply that the *tokistai* included such a diverse mixture of lenders, including professional banks, creditors, or lending conducted by citizens, that the law intentionally did not define *tokistai* so as to not exclude any relevant private parties.

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<sup>35</sup> See *IEphesos* VI, no. 2001, for the money-lenders involved in providing loans to the Ephesian *polis*. See Gabrielsen (2005), 139-140, on the lending activities of sanctuaries such as the temples of Zeus at Locri Epizephyrii, Artemis at Sardis, and Apollo, Athena, and Parthenos at Halikarnassos in the fifth, fourth, and third centuries BC. See the discussion in Chapter 4, 109-112, on the Artemision's capacity to act as a banking institution in the fourth century BC. See also *Syll.*<sup>3</sup>, no. 577 (200/199 BC), where Miletus seemed to have adopted the use of a public bank.

<sup>36</sup> See Millett (1991), 28-30, on the use of *daneion* to refer to general interest-bearing loans versus *tokizein* as a specialized term for interest-bearing loans. See Bubelis (2016), 161-164, on the commercial aspect of the money in loans (*daneisma*) made by the *tamiai* of Athena Polias in Athens. See Gabrielsen (2005), 141-142, on the emergence of professional money-lenders from ca. 321 BC. See Chapter 2, 54-55, on the difference between *daneistai* and *tokistai* in *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4.

<sup>37</sup> Gabrielsen (2005), 150-151.



By the first century BC, however, the influence from Hellenistic rulers and the rise in public, private, and sacred banking in the Hellenistic kingdoms may have increased the number of bankers present in Ephesos, as well as the complexity and specialization required by their profession, such that it was necessary in *IEphesos* Ia, no. 8 to create different provision for how to mitigate debt to money-lenders as opposed to debt to bankers, in particular.<sup>38</sup> On the other hand, since the text of *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, as it survives currently, is incomplete and there is no corresponding decree thanking the foreign judges for their service, the law or a decree may have specified to whom the terms *georgos* and *tokistes* apply.

### 3.5 Public and Sacred Creditors

Walser does not discuss the Ephesian *polis* as a possible creditor at all. He also argues against the involvement of deities of temples such as the Artemision in the debt crisis. Walser's failure to mention the Ephesian *polis* as an option may well have been based on his accurate assumption that, since the *polis* was borrowing money and selling citizenship to fund Prienian rebels right before the debt crisis occurred, the *polis* did not have the liquid assets available with which to provide interest-bearing loans with public property used as security.<sup>39</sup>

Conversely, Artemis may have been involved in the debt crisis in some capacity. Walser, however, argues that since the temple does not seem to have had the capacity to provide loans from deposits in the fourth century BC, the temple burned down in 356 BC, and the inscription does not mention the temple, Artemis was likely not a source for the loans described in *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4.<sup>40</sup> As Chapter 4 of this thesis will expand on and examine in-depth, Walser does not fully consider

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<sup>38</sup> *IEphesos* Ia, no. 8. ll. 48-62. See also Gabrielsen (2005), 137-156, on the continuation and rise of loans to and from *poleis*, temples, banks, and individuals from the Classical into the Hellenistic and Roman periods.

<sup>39</sup> *IEphesos* VI, no. 2001. See also above in the section on the *georgoi*.

<sup>40</sup> Walser (2008), 177-180.

the sacred economy at Ephesos, the property and wealth of the Artemision in the fourth century BC, its temple magistrates and organization, and its ability to act as a banking institution during that period.<sup>41</sup> For example, since the deities of other temples in the Greek world such as the temples of Delian Apollo, Athena at Priene, and Artemis at Sardis had the ability to provide interest-bearing loans to *poleis* and individuals with property used as security, the Artemision at Ephesos might have been similarly able to do provide such interest-bearing loans on behalf of Artemis to the *polis* and individuals as early as the fourth century.<sup>42</sup> While it is true that *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 does not mention the Artemision or any other deities as a creditor, the law only covers the private economic sphere. Therefore, it may be reasonable to assume that there were other Ephesian laws and decrees which covered the sacred economic sphere as well.

### 3.6 Loans, Interest Rates, Properties, and *Horoi* in Ephesos

Based upon the description of loans in *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, that is, as those with interest and being secured by property, the loans seem best classified as *hypotheke* loans. In fact, the verb, *ὑποτίθημι*, which means “to mortgage/put down as a stake” in the context of *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, appears in *l.* 36 of the law in the stipulation regarding those that, after having already mortgaged their property, took out additional loans as if on unencumbered property, thereby further encumbering the property.<sup>43</sup> While *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 does not name specific property, loans, or their values, it instead provides the means for how the *georgoi* and *tokistai*, arbitrators, and the foreign judges determine the value of property and the loans.<sup>44</sup> Therefore, contrary to the approach taken in

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<sup>41</sup> See Chapter 4, 98-112, for in-depth analyses on these topics.

<sup>42</sup> *IPriene*, no. 20 (ca. 270-262 BC); Chankowski (2011), 151; *ISardis* VII, no. 1, see Dignas (2002), 70-71 and 287, who dates *ISardis* VII, no. 1 to the end of the fourth century BC. See also Chapter 4, 109-112, on the Artemision’s capacity to provide interest-bearing loans with property used as security in the fourth century BC.

<sup>43</sup> Walser (2008), 123; *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, *ll.* 35-39: εἰ δέ τινες [ὑποθέ]ντες ἄλλοις κτήματα δεδανεισμένοι εἰσὶν παρ’ ἐτέρων ὡς ἐπ’ ἐλευθέροις [τοῖς κ]τήμασιν ἐξαπατήσαντες τοὺς ὑστέρους δανειστάς, ἐξεῖναι τοῖς ὑστέροις [δανεισ]ταῖς ἐξαλλάξασιν τοὺς πρότερον δανειστάς κατὰ τὸν συλλογισμὸν τοῦ κοινῶ πο[λέμου] ἔχειν τὰ κτήματα·

<sup>44</sup> *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, *ll.* 1-7.

Athens where specific values were assigned to the lending terms *hypotheke* and *prasis epi lysei*, *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 uses the *ὑποτίθημι* in its general sense to refer to the act of making loans with properties used as security, just as the law uses the term, *δάνειον*, in its general sense, to refer to the interest-bearing loans which the properties secure.<sup>45</sup>

The *hypotheke* loans involved in *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 had a “landed” interest rate calculated *per annum* similar to those at Athens from the fourth century BC. Contrary to “maritime” loans at Athens which carried a fixed interest rate and were paid in full along with the loan when the merchant returned to port, “landed” loans had a time-dependent interest rate.<sup>46</sup> Additionally, the interest rate of “landed” loans was paid along with portions of the principle at regular intervals rather than repaid all at once because at Athens, as well as other *poleis*, “landed” loans did not involve the significant risk that came from sailing and shipping the cargo that typically secured maritime loans.<sup>47</sup> The interest rate specified in *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 as 1/12<sup>th</sup> (8.333 percent) was to be the new legal maximum interest rate *per annum* for future *hypotheke* loans after the resolution of the debt crisis.<sup>48</sup> It is unclear, however, whether the *georgoi* or their guarantors made the principal and interest payments monthly or yearly. Towards the end of the text, provision is, however, made for where a *georgos* may wish to reclaim his abandoned property from a *tokistes* who took possession of it. In this instance, the *georgos* would have to repay to the *tokistes* what the latter had spent on the property plus interest of 1/14<sup>th</sup> (7.143 percent) within a year in the *prytaneia* of Danaos in order to be allowed to share in the provisions of *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 and split his property with the *tokistes*.<sup>49</sup> The payment and interest in this section of the text may,

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<sup>45</sup> See *LSJ* s.v. *ὑποτίθημι* meaning ‘to mortgage/stake/pledge’ a property. See Harris (2015), 125, 145 n. 54, for his discussion on the terms *hypotheke* and *prasis epi lysei* at Athens. See also Finley (1952), 28-37, where he, incorrectly, claims that the terms refer to two different private transactions.

<sup>46</sup> Cohen (1992), 52-53.

<sup>47</sup> Cohen (1992), 53-54.

<sup>48</sup> *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, l. 74.

<sup>49</sup> *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, ll. 90-94.

however, have just represented situations where one lump sum payment was contemplated rather than being indicative of a yearly payment practice. It is useful, though, to note that *poleis* such as Athens, Arkesine on the island Amorgos, Stymphalos in Arkadia, and Paros from the fourth century BC onward seemed to have calculated and expressed the interest payments on *hypothekē* loans in terms of the number of *obols* or *drachmae* charged per each *mina* borrowed per month, i.e. an interest rate of 1/10<sup>th</sup> (10 percent).<sup>50</sup> Ephesos may have had a similar practice of making monthly payments based on a similar calculation during this period as well.

The interest rate of 1/12<sup>th</sup> set out in *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 appears to have been lower than that in other *poleis* in the late Classical to Hellenistic era.<sup>51</sup> Known interest rates in late Classical Athens fluctuated between 10 and 18 percent, three *obols* per *mina* per month (i.e. 8.571 percent) at Delphi in the late fifth to early fourth century, 10 percent at both Arkesine on Amorgos during the second century BC and at the Delian Temple bank during its independence (ca. 314-167 BC), and 7 percent at Thera at the end of the third century BC.<sup>52</sup> It is important to note, though, that these interest rates are derived from a small, but highly heterogeneous, selection of sources whose average interest rate falls between 9 and 12 percent, the rates are not set by the *polis* and, with the exception of the interest rate from Delphi, they are not clearly contemporary with *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4.<sup>53</sup> The new legal maximum interest rate Delphi established between 425-375 BC (*FD* III, 1:294), however, was at a rate similar to that in *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 due to a credit crisis likely similar to that of Ephesos. Specifically, the Delphic law states in its first column that the new legal interest for loans from private individuals as well as domestic and sacred associations was not to exceed three *obols*

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<sup>50</sup> Dem. 37.5, 50.13; *IG* XII 7, no. 67B (second century BC); *IG* V 2, no. 357 (pre-234 BC), but the price of the loan is unclear; *IG* XII 5, no. 112 (fourth century BC); Cohen (1992), 56-57; Walser (2008), 190-191; Millett (1992), 103.

<sup>51</sup> Walser (2008), 189-190.

<sup>52</sup> Walser (2008), 184, 189-190; Delphi = *FD* III, 1:294 (425-375 BC); Amorgos = *IG* XII 7, no. 515 (second century BC); Thera = *IG* XII 3, no. 330 (210-195 BC).

<sup>53</sup> Walser (2008), 189.

per *mina* per month.<sup>54</sup> While the law allows for principal and interest payments until the end of the month of Byzios in the archonship of Kadys, the new legal maximum interest rate went into immediate effect starting in the next month of Theoxenios.<sup>55</sup> The remainder of that law then provides stipulations for situations that might occur due to the new maximum interest rate, including penalties for violators, trials for disputes, and special cases. The new maximum interest rate at Delphi, therefore, may not have been the result of a sudden conflict-related debt crisis which inspired *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, but rather may have resulted from a significant number of lawsuits and confiscations arising from defaults on loans, created in itself a debt crisis, and then resulted in a subsequent credit crisis at Delphi similar to the debt crisis at Ephesos.<sup>56</sup> Accordingly, the legal maximum interest rates established by *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 and *FD* III, 1:294 were both likely established because of debtors who did not have the immediate means with which to begin repaying the existing principal and interest due on their loans. The defaulted loans for both Ephesos and Delphi in turn decreased credit between potential borrowers and creditors who, at that point, did not trust to make loan agreements to even previously trustworthy borrowers. The new maximum interest rates may have also curtailed certain creditors at Ephesos and Delphi who were lending at intentionally high interest rates in order to force debtors to default and allow the creditors to confiscate the security on the loan. The new legal maximum interest rate at Ephesos seems, therefore, to have been the Ephesian *polis*' response to a reluctance by *tokistai* to extend credit and charge affordable interest rates to *georgoi*. The Ephesian *polis*, similar to Delphi, likely intended to encourage the *tokistai* to begin making *hypotheke* loans again at a rate which the *georgoi* might

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<sup>54</sup> *FD* III, 1:294, ll. I.1-20; Asheri (1969), 23.

<sup>55</sup> *FD* III, 1:294, ll. I.1-6. See Trümper (1997), 212-213, on the Delphic months.

<sup>56</sup> See Asheri (1969), 25, for the uncertainty regarding the historical impetus and dating of *FD* III, 1:294.

be able to repay reliably while rebuilding any damaged property, restarting cultivation and the production of their farms, and selling produce after the resolution of the debt crisis.<sup>57</sup>

In *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, the properties themselves seem to have qualified as a collateral form of security on the loan, rather than as a substitutive form. According to Harris, there were creditors in the ancient Greek world who, in the substitutive form of security, did not view the property pledged as security as a commodity, but rather as a substitute for a loan if the borrower defaults, allowing the creditor to confiscate just the property used as security, regardless of its value.<sup>58</sup> Conversely, there were also creditors who did view pledged security as a commodity to sell in the collateral form of security, and, unlike in the substitutive form of security, creditors were also capable of taking any excess property from the borrower if the sale of the initial property did not cover the value of the loan.<sup>59</sup> In *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, ll. 39-41 and 45-48, for example, if the value of the loan is greater than the value of the property because of either more than one encumbrance on the property or a guarantor guaranteed a loan worth more than the property, creditors may recover the excess from any property of the debtor, or a guarantor, beyond the initial property used as security:

ἐὰν δὲ ἐνοφείληται τι αὐτοῖς ἔτι, εἶναι τὴν κομιδὴν τοῖς

40 [δανειστ]αῖς ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης οὐσίας τοῦ χρεῖστου πασῆς τρόπῳ ὧι ἂν δύνωνται ἀζημίους  
[ἀπάση]ς ζημίας·

(ll. 42-44 omitted)

45 ἐὰν δὲ πλεον ἦι τὸ ὀφείλημα τῆς τιμῆς τοῦ κτήματος, τὸ πλεον ὀφεί-  
[λημα τῆς] τιμῆς ὁ ἔγγυος ἀποτινέτω κατὰ λόγον ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι οἱ τὰ μετέωρα ἐγγυώ-  
[μενοι, ἐὰμ] μὴ ἐπιτετοκισμένον ἦι εἰς πλείω χρόνον τῆς ἐν τῇ πράξει γεγενημένης  
[ἐγγύη]ς·

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<sup>57</sup> Walser (2008), 187-188.

<sup>58</sup> Harris (2015), 128.

<sup>59</sup> Harris (2015), 128.

Since the law assigns a value (*τιμή*) to properties, both stipulations (for *georgoi* with and without guarantors) therefore account for how creditors might obtain any excess funds due beyond the value of the property if the value of the loan is more than the property value.<sup>60</sup> The requirement in *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, ll. 46-47, that guarantors had to pay any excess from their own personal property also implies that the loans which the guarantors guaranteed were secured only by the property which the *georgoi* staked in the original agreement and not by any additional property of the *georgoi*.<sup>61</sup> The guarantor was, however, exempt from paying the excess if there was excess because of interest which accumulated over a period of time longer than that originally agreed upon by the creditor and the guarantor. Ephesos' use of collateral forms of security, guarantors, and the stipulations for such security in *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 implies, too, that Ephesos had an established real estate market, in the sense that properties were seen as commodities or assets to use as security in loans, and the confiscation of which the Ephesian *polis* allowed if borrowers defaulted on their loans except, as we see in *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, in extreme situations such as a debt crisis.<sup>62</sup>

Unlike in some other *poleis* in the Classical and Hellenistic Greek world where *horoi* (boundary stones) were used to denote encumbered property, *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, in line 20, instead used *horoi* as part of a public registry kept at the Artemision and copies of the records kept with the *ἀντιγραφεύς* (copying-clerk) in order for the Ephesian *polis* to keep track of who owned what property after the Ephesian *polis* and foreign judges fully settled the debt crisis.<sup>63</sup> Arkesine on Amorgos had a similar public registry in the fourth century BC, but for public debtors, not property owners in general.<sup>64</sup> In other venues, such as Athens in the fourth century BC, *horoi* were typically

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<sup>60</sup> Walser (2008), 142-148, 193. See similar later stipulations in laws and decrees such as the law from Samos, *SIG*<sup>3</sup> 976 (ca. 200-150 BC), ll. 64-68, and the decree from Delphi, *SIG*<sup>3</sup>, no. 672 (ca. 162-160 BC), ll. 64-72.

<sup>61</sup> Walser (2008), 123.

<sup>62</sup> Walser (2008), 194; Harris (2015), 128-131, 133.

<sup>63</sup> *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, ll. 17-20; Shipton (2000), 25; Harris (2015), 125.

<sup>64</sup> See *IG* XII, 7 no. 3 (400-350 BC), ll. 35-36, where a *χρεωφύλαξ* ought to receive an admission of liability in writing. The *χρεωφυλακία* does not seem to appear in other *poleis* until the second century BC.

set up on land used as security in a loan in the presence of witnesses, and had inscribed on them the name(s) of the creditor(s) and their demotic, the amount of the loan, and itemized the property used as security.<sup>65</sup> The boundary stones helped to inform third parties that properties were encumbered and protected the validity of the creditors' loans.<sup>66</sup> It is unclear, however, whether, prior to the enactment of *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, Ephesian citizens used *horoi* for the purpose of denoting property used as security.

One indication that Ephesos did not use *horoi* to denote encumbered property is the stipulation in *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, ll. 35-39, which specifically accounts for *georgoi* who used their already encumbered property as security for additional loans from other *tokistai* in a way to deceive the *tokistai* by presenting the property as if it were unencumbered:

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εἰ δέ τινες

[ὑποθέ]ντες ἄλλοις κτήματα δεδανεισμένοι εἰσὶμ παρ' ἐτέρων ὡς ἐπ' ἐλευθέροις  
 [τοῖς κ]τήμασιν ἐξαπατήσαντες τοὺς ὑστέροισι δανειστάς, ἐξεῖναι τοῖς ὑστέροισι  
 [δανεισ]ταῖς ἐξαλλάξασι τοὺς πρότερον δανειστάς κατὰ τὸν συλλογισμὸν τοῦ κοινοῦ πο-  
 [λέμου] ἔχειν τὰ κτήματα·

This section of the law, however, does not mention whether, in the deception of the *tokistai*, the *georgoi* at Ephesos removed *horoi* denoting the property as encumbered, as was the case in Demosthenes 31 (ca. 364 BC) and 42 (ca. 330 BC). In each speech, the plaintiff (Demosthenes himself in 31 and an unnamed speaker in 42) describes how the opposition, Onetor (31.1-3) and Phaenippus (42.5 and 9), hid the presence of *horoi* on the property which indicated it as encumbered so as to remove suspicion that the defendant was preserving property for the previously convicted Aphobus in Dem. 31 and to avoid an exchange of property in Dem. 42.

<sup>65</sup> Shipton (2000), 25-27; Harris (2015), 125. See Finley (1952), 107-108, on the significance of two or more creditors for one loan on *horoi*.

<sup>66</sup> Harris (2015), *ibid.*; Shipton (2000), *ibid.*



While it may also have been the case that, with regards to encumbered property at Ephesos, *georgoi* and *tokistai* had actually used some device such as *horoi* to specify to the creditors what property of the *georgoi* the loans used as security as well as the value of the loans in a manner similar to *horoi* from Athens, it is possible that such demarcations were destroyed during the tyrant Hieron of Priene's assault on Ephesos.<sup>67</sup> However, since the assault by Hieron likely did not destroy all the *horoi*, it is unclear why *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 would not have relied on and referred to any *horoi* that did survive the conflict in the provisions for determining the value of the *hypotheke* loans. Instead, as *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 refers only to loan transactions made between a *georgoi* and *tokistai* without reference to the use of *horoi* in such contracts, the parties may have only used contracts to detail their original *hypotheke* loan transactions (*πρᾶξις*), setting out the valuations of the property, the loan, and the terms and conditions upon which the loan contract was agreed.<sup>68</sup> If so, the *georgoi*, the *tokistai*, and the Ephesian *polis* might, therefore, have only used *horoi* to demarcate their boundaries, similarly to how the Prienians and the Samians used *horoi*, in the early second century BC.<sup>69</sup>

### 3.7 The Need for Loans with Interest at Ephesos

While no historical sources explicitly state why the *georgoi* of Ephesos took out so many *hypotheke* loans during the end of the fourth and beginning of the third century BC, the garrisons of Prepelaos and Demetrios, as well as the conflict with Priene, compounded financial difficulties for *georgoi* in paying operational costs for their properties. As discussed in Chapter 1, not only did Prepelaos, under the command of Lysimachos, take Ephesos in 302 BC and set up a garrison, but, after

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<sup>67</sup> Harris (2015), 125; Shipton (2000), 27; Finley (1952), 121, no. 6. See Chapter 1, 15-16, for the discussion on Hieron of Priene's assault on Ephesos.

<sup>68</sup> *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, ll. 65-69.

<sup>69</sup> See *IPriene*, no. 37 (ca. 196-192 BC), ll. 160-171, where the Prienians specify how they demarcated the border with Samos.

Prepelaos left, there also arose an issue concerning the billeting of soldiers at the Artemision and the temple's right to *ateleia* (tax-free status).<sup>70</sup> Since the Artemision was the most significant temple at Ephesos, the actions of Prepelaos' troops suggest that Prepelaos needed funds for his campaign and that, if not from the Artemision, Prepelaos likely forced the allotment of funds, resources, and aid be handed over to him from the rest of Ephesos' residents, including the *georgoi* and their produce.<sup>71</sup> After Demetrios reclaimed Ephesos later that year, he likely instituted similar requisitions from the Ephesians because, according to Plutarch, Demetrios' troops were similarly tempted to pillage the Artemision for funds.<sup>72</sup> Since some number of *georgoi* also repeatedly secured with their property *hypotheke* loans from more than one *tokistes*, the *georgoi* likely needed such funds prior to the debt crisis to cover immediate operational costs on their property due to the costs of supporting Prepelaos and Demetrios' garrisons.<sup>73</sup> The costs of the garrison may have been so significant that, while *georgoi* needed larger *hypotheke* loans to support themselves, the value of the property alone was not alone sufficient enough to act as security. Therefore, as *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 implies, some *tokistai* only provided loans to *georgoi* who also had guarantors.<sup>74</sup> Since the economic strain from different garrisons lasted about 20 years prior to the debt crisis (ca. 318-298 BC), *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 also suggests that, closer to the time of the crisis, some of the *georgoi* had to take out more than one *hypotheke* loan on the residual value of their property or were desperate enough for funds that they deceived the *tokistai* and took out additional loans on their already encumbered property. The likely drain on domestic Ephesian resources, including commodities such as grain, seems to have actually caused a grain shortage and forced Ephesos to place such

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<sup>70</sup> *IEphesos* V, no. 1449; Davies (2011), 191; Rogers (2012), 46-47.

<sup>71</sup> Rogers (2012), 47. See Chapter 1, 22-23, on the importance of the Artemision at Ephesos.

<sup>72</sup> Plut. *Vit. Demetr.* 30; Davies (2011), 181.

<sup>73</sup> *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, ll. 32-41; Walser (2008), 194-195.

<sup>74</sup> Shipton (2000), 24-25, 39; Harris (2015), 126; Walser (2008), 130-131. See *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, ll. 46-47: ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι οἱ τὰ μετέωρα ἐγγυώ- | [μενοι, which implies that the use of guarantors was already an established practice at Ephesos.

great reliance on imported grain such that the *polis* granted citizenship to Archestratos, the Antigonid commander in Klazomenai, for protecting grain ships in 302/1 BC and to Agathokles of Rhodes for selling grain under the market value ca. 301-294 BC.<sup>75</sup>

At the start and end of the conflict with Hieron of Priene (300-297 BC), the Ephesian *polis* also needed funds to supply the rebels and, later, for reconstruction. Generally, *poleis* accepted financial contributions in forms such as loans with low interest rates for the sake of civic defense.<sup>76</sup> *IEphesos* VI, no. 2001 reports that the Ephesian *polis* sold citizenships in order to repay loans used to fund the Prienian rebels against the tyrant Hieron of Priene. While the Ephesian *polis* and *georgoi* may have helped to provide Ephesian resources to the Prienian rebels, Hieron's raid into Ephesos likely damaged or destroyed a significant number of properties, causing private landowners and the *polis* to default on their loans from the *tokistai* and the Ephesian *polis* to enact *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4. Since the *κοινὸς πόλεμος* impacted the value of properties which were damaged, the law also accounted for any excess from accumulated interest on both damaged and undamaged property.<sup>77</sup> As discussed in the previous section, after the *κοινὸς πόλεμος* and the debt mitigation, however, the Ephesian *polis* lowered the maximum interest rate to a sum below the standard interest rate at Ephesos so that the *tokistai* might again begin lending *hypothekē* loans, but at an interest rate which *georgoi* might reliably pay, even while rebuilding any damaged property.<sup>78</sup> Since *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 seems to cover only the private sphere of the Ephesian economy and does not mention the *polis* as a borrower, but the *polis* needed funds before, during, and after the *κοινὸς πόλεμος*, it is reasonable to assume that the Ephesian *polis* passed another law mitigating interest-

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<sup>75</sup> Davies (2011), 187-188; *IEphesos* V, no. 1452 (302/1 BC); *IEphesos* V, no. 1455 (301-294 BC).

<sup>76</sup> Chaniotis (2013), 91.

<sup>77</sup> *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, ll. 65-69. See also the discussion on the damage and devaluation of property in Chapter 2, 58-58.

<sup>78</sup> Walser (2008), 191-193.

bearing loans with public property used as security. If such decrees and laws mitigating public loans were passed, the Ephesian *polis* would have been able to afford the initial costs of reconstruction efforts as it appears they were.

After conquering Ephesos in ca. 295 BC, Lysimachos ordered the construction of a fortification wall around the new location of the city and joined in *synoecism* the old city of Ephesos, as well as the inhabitants of Teos, Lebedos, and Kolophon, for the sake of a larger population, land area, and better security for the city from naval attacks.<sup>79</sup> Lysimachos' goal in Ephesos' *synoecism* may have been twofold: to make Ephesos a more significant political entity in Ionia and to help stimulate its economy with public works, albeit likely at the Ephesians' own expense in part.<sup>80</sup> It is difficult to conceive that the Ephesian *polis* or its citizens had the liquidity to fund the initial costs of city walls unless *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4's provisions for *georgoi* and *tokistai*, another decree or law's provisions for the *polis*, and the new legal maximum interest rate had, in fact, preserved some public property and encouraged *tokistai* to provide *hypotheke* loans to *georgoi*. In that event, the *georgoi* might have quickly rebuilt and started deriving profit from their farmland again. The *polis*, in turn, might have quickly earned revenue from taxation on the commerce of the *georgoi*, as well as rent if the *polis* leased its remaining public property. These funds could then have been utilized by the *polis* to finance the initial costs of reconstruction, such as taking out leases to build the wall, financing public contractors, and quarrying stone (*IEphesos* Ia, no. 3 (290 BC)).

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<sup>79</sup> Davies (2011), 187; Boehm (2018), 73-74; Nudell (2023), 178; Strab. 14.1.21; Paus. 1.9.7.

<sup>80</sup> Boehm (2018), 99. See *IEphesos* Ia, no. 3 where the *polis* or public contractors leased out land in order to build the new city wall. See Newell (1927), 69-70; Thompson (1986), 94; Lund (1992), 131-134; and Wheatley and Dunn (2020), 275 on the Antigonid, Lysimachaeon, and Ephesian coins struck at Ephesos with which the *polis* perhaps financed the *κοινὸς πόλεμος*, reconstruction efforts, and Lysimachos' *synoecism*. A more in-depth investigation, examination, and discussion on the relevant numismatic evidence is, however, required to better understand their economic impact at Ephesos during the late fourth to early third century BC.

### 3.8 Conclusions

Although *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, as well as other contemporary Ephesian inscriptions, provides much detailed information and insight on land ownership, creditors, debtors, and loan practices at Ephesos during the fourth and third centuries BC, the law itself is significantly vague concerning the parties subject to the law. Not only did Ephesian citizens have the right to land ownership, but also some exceptional non-citizens, the *polis*, and deities such as Artemis. While *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 is unclear as to the full scope of who, specifically, is a *georgos* or a *tokistes*, since the law focuses only on the private sphere of the Ephesian real estate market, the *georgoi* and *tokistai* likely consisted of both citizens and non-citizens with the honor of *enktesis*. Furthermore, not only is it probable that some *georgoi* were also *tokistai*, but both terms may have also applied to passive money-lenders, professional money-lenders, and bankers. Although *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 does not refer to the *polis* as a borrower, considering the Ephesian *polis* took out loans to fund the conflict against Hieron of Priene, it is reasonable to assume that there was another decree or law mitigating loans the *polis* took out using public land as security. As the next Chapter will examine, the resources and funds available to the Artemision suggests that Artemis did not need to take out loans, but rather had significant wealth, and the *polis* therefore may have passed a similar decree or law concerning the sacred economic sphere.

The *hypotheke* loans in *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 operated in a manner similar to other *poleis*, where payments of principal and interest payments were made monthly or annually, were secured by property, and if a debtor defaulted on the loan and the value of the property was less than the loan, the *georgos* (or his guarantor) had to pay the excess until the loan was fully repaid. One difference, however, seems to have been that Ephesos, like Priene, did not use *horoi* at this time to demarcate encumbered property, but rather used these stones instead to simply demarcate the

boundaries of properties. Additionally, since previously higher interest rates may have helped to cause the debt crisis, the Ephesian *polis* lowered the new maximum interest rate to 1/12<sup>th</sup> in *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4. In lowering the interest rate and establishing a legal maximum for any interest imposed or calculated, the Ephesian *polis* likely wanted to encourage *tokistai* to begin lending again at a rate which *georgoi* might reliably be able to repay after the resolution of the debt crisis. Although Hieron's attack on Ephesos may have been the catalyst for the debt crisis, the establishment of garrisons in Ephesos in the years before hieron's attack, along with the funding necessary to support those garrisons and their campaigns also placed significant economic strain on the *polis* and her domestic resources. Lysimachos' reconstruction projects may have had a similar effect on Ephesos' resources during the time the *polis* was still attempting to recover economically.

## Chapter 4: *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 and the Artemision

Although Artemis Ephesia was a significantly important deity at Ephesos and had a fundamental connection to the *polis*, the goddess' involvement in the Ephesian debt crisis seems to be almost non-existent. The temple of Artemis, however, had significant funds, land holdings, and political privileges such as *ateleia* (tax-free status) and *stathmos* (safety from the billeting of troops) with which to operate in the sacred economic sphere at Ephesos during the fourth and beginning of the third centuries BC. In particular, Artemis Ephesia held and protected deposits, handled both sacred and secular funds, managed profitable properties such as the Selinousia lake, and even received, after a decree by Alexander the Great in 334 BC, the yearly tribute from the Ephesian *polis* which had previously sent it to the Persians. In addition, the Artemision had an abundance of priests and officials skilled in handling financial matters such as their chief priest, the Megabyzos, the *essenēs*, and the *hieroi logistai* who handled both the goddess' secular and sacred properties. It is important to note, however, that the literary evidence on, and the epigraphic tradition from, Ephesos does not mention any lending activities of Artemis until the first century BC in *IEphesos* Ia, no. 8 (87/6 BC). However, in the fifth, fourth, and third centuries BC, the deities of temples of comparable size and significance to the Artemision, such as the sanctuaries of Nemesis at Rhamnous, Artemis at Sardis, Athena Alea at Tegea, Delian Apollo, and Delphic Apollo had the ability to make interest-bearing loans with property used as security, so Artemis Ephesia may have had the same capability in the fourth century BC.

Yet Walser argues that, since *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 does not specifically mention Artemis or the Artemision and since the sanctuary burned down in 356 BC, the Artemision was neither involved in the provisions of *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 as a *georgos* or a *tokistes*, nor even capable of

lending in the fourth to third centuries BC. Conversely, the temple's destruction in 356 BC was one potential motivation for Artemis to lease land and provide interest-bearing loans in order to fund reconstruction efforts. In addition, the need of the Ephesian *polis* and her citizens for funds and grain, due to the economic strain of the Diadochi's garrisons and the conflict with Hieron, tyrant of Priene, also would have served as a significant motivator to provide loans. Therefore, since it is highly improbable that the properties of the goddess and the properties of those to whom she made loans were not also seriously damaged, it is reasonable to assume that Ephesos also enacted a decree or law similar to *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 which mitigated sacred loans and property.

## 4.1 Walser's Argument Against the Artemision

One of Walser's main arguments against Artemis as a *tokistes* in *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 is that the text does not mention Artemis as a *tokistes* anywhere in its several provisions.<sup>1</sup> Although the inscription's reference of the temple precinct, *ἔδεθλον*, in line 21 likely refers to the Artemision, the *ἔδεθλον* does not denote a *tokistes* as such, but rather the location where the *neopoiiai* (temple caretakers) must set up the whitened tablets with the records of the divided properties.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, Walser denies the capacity of Artemis to lend out deposited funds as *hypotheke* loans, especially during the time *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 was implemented, based on Dio Chrysostomos' claim that the Artemision protected deposits and, as a policy, did not lend them out.<sup>3</sup> Walser also argues that the temple officials did not begin making interest-bearing loans on the goddess' behalf until the Mithridatic Wars (88-66 BC), during which the Ephesian *polis* passed a decree, set out in *IEphesos* Ia, no. 8 (86/5 BC), to annul or mitigate loans from Artemis, as well as from the *polis*,

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<sup>1</sup> Walser (2008), 177. See Chapter 2 for a commentary on the legal provisions for *georgoi* and *tokistai* in *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4.

<sup>2</sup> *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, ll. 20-21: οἱ δὲ ἡιρημένοι γράψαντες εἰς λευκώματα παραδότωσαν τοῖς νεωποιαῖς θεῖναι ἐπὶ τὸ ἔδεθλον. See Chapter 1, 21-24, for the argument that the *ἔδεθλον* refers to the Artemision specifically.

<sup>3</sup> Walser (2008), 177-178; Dio Chrys. *Or.* 31.54-31.56.



independent money-lenders, and bankers.<sup>4</sup> Walser does not, however, fully explore whether the Artemision was able to provide interest-bearing loans on the goddess' behalf as well as any potential motivations for the temple to create passive income during the fourth century BC. Instead, Walser attempts to make the definitive claim that, since the Artemision was burned and damaged in 356 BC and was certainly not reconstructed by 334 BC when Alexander the Great liberated the city from Persian rule, the temple did not even have the liquid assets to make the loans described in *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4.<sup>5</sup> In addition, since Ephesos was under Persian rule at the time, there was not yet an Ionian League which could have helped fund the reconstruction of the Artemision until the end of the fourth century BC, so the temple incurred all of the costs for reconstruction efforts. Although the Artemision may have diverted much of its available liquid funds to reconstruction as Walser argues, there does not seem to be evidence supporting his claim that the priests and administrators of the Artemision did not also seek to secure additional passive sources of revenue using its substantial property holdings, such as through leases and loans to Ephesian citizens or the *polis*, particularly during the periods of economic strain.

## 4.2 Financial Structure and Operation in Other Temples

The Artemision in Ephesos had an internal structure that included citizen magistrates who handled religious and secular activities similar to the temple-structures of other Greek poleis such as those at Delphi, Delos, Kos, and the Akropolis in Athens.<sup>6</sup> As a point of comparison, one magistracy within both the temple-structures of Athena Polias in Athens and the temple of Asklepios on Kos who handled sacred (*hiera*) properties and funds was that of the *tamias* (sacred treasurer).<sup>7</sup> The

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<sup>4</sup> Walser (2008), 178.

<sup>5</sup> Walser (2008), 178-179.

<sup>6</sup> Chankowski (2011), 142-143.

<sup>7</sup> Dignas (2002), 30-31, 34. See Bubelis (2016), 147-148, for a summarized description of their archaic and classical duties at Athens, and 118-141, for a more detailed description.

*tamiai* primarily acted as stewards of *hiera khremata* such as temples, statues, and *kosmoi* (ornamentation).<sup>8</sup> *Hiera* property was not typically removed, granted, surrendered, or sold by the temple.<sup>9</sup> There were, however, exceptions recorded, particularly from the Temple of Athena Polias, where the *tamiai* transferred such *hiera* property to the *epistatai* (public financial functionaries) to spend on labor and materials for broadly religious, but time-constrained, projects such as the construction of the Parthenon, the Propylaia, and the chryselephantine cult-statue of Athena on the Acropolis.<sup>10</sup>

Another magistracy was the *hieropoios* who managed the more secular operations of sanctuaries. The *hieropoioi* were an annually selected college of magistrates, usually one from each tribe in a *polis* with major cults, common to many Greek temples on the mainland and on island *poleis* such as Athens, Delos, Rhodes, and Kos.<sup>11</sup> While the *hieropoioi* had a varied number of duties, such as supervising sacrifices, setting up inscriptions, crowning officials for exceptional service, and managing festivals, they primarily managed the sacred finances of the temple.<sup>12</sup> The *hieropoioi*, specifically in fourth-century BC Athens and earlier, seemed to have been such an important religious magistracy in that they were chosen from a select group of wealthy and prominent citizens even when they were no longer chosen according to a census class.<sup>13</sup> The sacred funds primarily handled by the *hieropoioi*, however, were not *hiera*, but *hosia*, or sanctioned, funds. Compared to the legal status of properties classified as *hiera* and *demosia* (public), *hosia* properties were comprised of sanctioned property and funds of the temple which

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<sup>8</sup> Bubelis (2016), 147, see 120-121, on the definition of *kosmoi*.

<sup>9</sup> Dignas (2002), 15-16; Bubelis (2016), 148-149.

<sup>10</sup> *IG I<sup>3</sup>*, nos. 436-451 (Parthenon, 447/6-433/2 BC); *IG I<sup>3</sup>*, nos. 462-466 (Propylaia, 437/6-433/2 BC); *IG I<sup>3</sup>*, nos. 453-460 (Athena Parthenos cult-statue, 447/6-440/39 BC); Bubelis (2016), 160-161; Dignas (2002), 34.

<sup>11</sup> Dignas (2002), *ibid.*; Chankowski (2011), 152; Athens = 10 *hieropoioi*, Delos = 4, Rhodes = 4; Kos = 3.

<sup>12</sup> Chankowski (2011), *ibid.*; Bubelis (2016), 144, 184-185; Dignas (2002), 34; Smith (1972), 532-534; Kent (1948), 243-244; Smith (1973), 38, 41-42.

<sup>13</sup> Bubelis (2016), 144-145.

did not have the same restrictions as *hiera* and could be used to provide profit from which a temple's expenditures would be made.<sup>14</sup> In fact, *hosia* funds usually originated from *demosia* funds. Bubelis, in his analysis of a lead sheet from the Nemesis' shrine at Rhamnous (ca. 500 BC), demonstrated that the *demosia* funds were transferred, not dedicated, by the *epistatai* to the shrine's *hosia* fund.<sup>15</sup> In his analysis, Bubelis thus distinguished the financial nature of *hosia* from *demosia* and *hiera* property, while also positing how *hosia* may be derived from *demosia* funds.<sup>16</sup> The connection between *hosia* and *demosia* funds also shows the close relationship between a *polis* and temples in the *polis*, as well as how a *polis* and a temple were able to transfer funds to one another depending on the financial necessity of either institution.

### 4.3 The Financial Officials and Structure of the Artemision

Even though the Artemision and temples such as that of Athena Polias in Athens may have operated in a similar fashion, especially as to how they differentiated types of properties owned by the gods, the Artemision had different designations for its various group of magistrates. Although Bubelis' distinction between *hiera* and *hosia* has not yet been proven to be the case for *poleis* outside of Athens, such a distinction is still a useful tool with which to discuss the finances of the Ephesian Artemision since there does seem to be a similar distinction present. The distinction between the Artemision and the Ephesian *polis*' funds had existed since at least the sixth century BC, as seen from an inscription on a silver tablet listing sacred revenues of the temple in monetary terms (*IEphesos* Ia, no. 1). That inscription specifically refers to the funds as originating *ἐκ πόλεως ἠνείχθησαν* ("they were taken from/out of the city"), which may be construed as either the location

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<sup>14</sup> Bubelis (2016), 179-180. See Dignas (2002), 15-16, 31-32, for a similar distinction of *hiera*, *demosia*, and *hosia*.

<sup>15</sup> Bubelis (2016), 180-182.

<sup>16</sup> Bubelis (2016), 182-187.

from which the funds were garnered or the public treasury from which the funds were transferred.<sup>17</sup>

*IEphesos* Ia, no. 8, a much later inscription from the first century BC, also distinguishes in several instances between the *polis*' public and the Artemision's sacred offices, interest-bearing loans, fines, and properties:<sup>18</sup>

31: [ρ]ὰς καταδίκας ἢ δημοσίας ἢ ἐπίτειμα ἱερὰ ἢ δημόσια ἢ ἄλλα ὀφειλήματ[α]

33: εἰ δέ τινες ἔνεισιν ἐν ταῖς ἱεραῖς μισθώσεσιν ἢ δημοσίαις

42: τὰς τε ἱερὰς καὶ δημοσίας δίκας

43-44: εἶναι δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἰσοτελεῖς καὶ παροίκους  
καὶ ἱερούς καὶ ἐξελευθέρους καὶ ξένους

The Roman proconsul's Paullus Fabius Persicus' edict in 44 AD also specified the Artemision's funds as the sanctuary's *ιδίων χρημάτων*, 'its own funds' in *IEphesos* Ia, no.18b ll. 1 - 8:<sup>19</sup>

τό  
τε τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος αὐτῆς ἱερόν, ὃ τῆς ἐπαρχείας  
ὅλης ἐστὶν κόσμος καὶ {ὃ} διὰ τὸ τοῦ ἔργου μέγεθος  
καὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ περὶ τὴν θεοῦ σεβασμοῦ ἀρχαιότητ<α>  
5 καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν προσόδων ἀφθονίαν τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ  
Σεβαστοῦ ἀποκατασταθεισῶν τῇ θεᾷ, στέρεται  
τῶν ἰδίων χρημάτων, ἃ καὶ εἰς ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ εἰς  
κόσμον τῶν ἀναθημάτων ἐξαρκεῖν ἐδύ<νατο>·

And the temple of Artemis herself, which is the decoration of the universe and which, because of the greatness of the work and because of the antiquity of the reverence for the goddess and because of the abundance of revenues which had been dedicated back to the goddess by Augustus, is without its own funds, which were able to be enough for both upkeep and decoration of votive offerings.

Specifically, lines seven and eight detail that the temple's now depleted funds were considered separate from those of the *polis*', and that they were meant for the upkeep of the cult and in support of decorating the votive offerings. The two different uses for the Artemision's funds imply a

<sup>17</sup> *IEphesos* Ia, no. 1; Bubelis (2016), 172 n. 3. See also Dignas (2002), 142-143, where she claims it refers to a tax paid by the Ephesian *polis* to the temple such as the tax on objects manufactured in the city.

<sup>18</sup> Dignas (2002), 198.

<sup>19</sup> Dignas (2002), 196.

distinction between how the temple used a *hosia* fund for the cult's upkeep and a *hiera* fund for votive offerings. In addition, the proconsul's motive for this decree was to impose an external control on the temple's finances that did not previously exist in order to stop the Artemision's priests from continuing to misappropriate its funds.<sup>20</sup> J. Davies, in the context of the late fourth century BC, also distinguished the Artemision's funds between revenues such as the tribute from the Ephesian *polis*, which might be considered *hosia*, and the substantial dedications, or *hiera*, the Artemision possessed but did not use for financial purposes on behalf of the goddess.<sup>21</sup>

There also seems to have been a number of magistrates at the Artemision who handled the goddess' finances and property in addition other religious duties. The chief priest of Ephesian Artemis was a carefully chosen, non-Ephesian eunuch priest for life, known by his Persian title of Megabyzos, and who served, in addition to his other duties, as some type of financial officer.<sup>22</sup> While Ephesian citizens appointed other citizens to serve as *hiereis*, priests for life, the Megabyzos was a *neokoros* (*νεωκόρος*), a temple-warden, who protected deposits at the Artemision such as the money Xenophon obtained and deposited from the sale of captives in 394 BC.<sup>23</sup> Therefore, the chief priest had financial duties comparable to Athens' *tamiai*. Specifically, the Megabyzos seems to have overseen *hiera* property, deposited funds, conducted sacred duties, and maintained

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<sup>20</sup> Dignas (2002), 142, 148.

<sup>21</sup> Davies (2011), 181. See also Chankowski (2011), 146-148, for a similar distinction, but Chankowski also pointed out how many temples still ascribed a monetary value to dedications. See below on pages 106-107, for Ephesos' annual tribute to Artemis.

<sup>22</sup> Dignas (2002), 189-190; Bremmer (2008), 39-41; Xen. *Anab.* 5.3.6; Plut. *Alex.* 42.1; Strab. 14.1.23; *IPriene*, no. 231 (296/5 BC); App. *BC.* 5.9.

<sup>23</sup> Xen. *Anab.* 5.3.4-6. Dignas (2002), 190-191. See Bubelis (2012), 95-97, on the hereditary nature of priesthoods at Athens. See Zaidman and Schmitt-Pantel (1992), 49-50, who note the unique examples of priests of Dionysos Eleuthereus, Asklepios, and Zeus Soter in Attica who served as annual religious magistrates versus other priests such those of Apollo at Delphi who served for life.

relationships with other temples through acts such as helping to facilitate the reconstruction of the Temple of Athena in Priene, but he did not manage *hosia* property.<sup>24</sup>

Other magistracies from the Artemision temple-structure include the *hieroi logistai*, ‘holy accountants,’ and the enigmatic *essenēs*. The *essenēs* were priests at the Artemision whose duties are not well attested in the literary and epigraphic records.<sup>25</sup> The second century AD geographer Pausanias characterizes them as just *ἱστιάτορας*, or religious magistrates that hosted a banquet, but does not elaborate on their duties beyond the fact that they lived for only a year in celibacy.<sup>26</sup> According to Demosthenes, a *hestiator* in Athens was a wealthy citizen religious magistrate elected to cover, as a *liturgy*, the costs of banquets, sacrifices, and the hosting foreign visitors at major religious festivals such as the Panathenaic and Dionysian festivals for a year.<sup>27</sup> In the epigraphic record from Ephesos, the *essenēs*’ roles primarily involved providing new citizens with a *phyle* and a *chiliatyes* as well as participating in sacrifices and, therefore, seem to have performed a similar ritual role as the *hesiator* from Athens in the fourth century BC.<sup>28</sup> Only *IEphesos* VI, no. 2001 (299/8 BC), however, refers to these priests in the context of a financial role in Ephesos during the early third century BC.<sup>29</sup> In *IEphesos* VI, no. 2001, the *essenēs* and the councillors (*bouleutai*) assigned to the conflict with the tyrant Hieron of Priene are to repay the talent lent by independent money-lenders and use the remaining half-talent to purchase and provide weapons to

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<sup>24</sup> Xen. *Anab.* 5.3.6; Dignas (2002), 194; Bogaert (1968), 245; *IEphesos* Ia, no. 27 (104 AD), ll. 483-484; *IPriene*, no. 3 (296/5 BC).

<sup>25</sup> See Bremmer (2008), 48, who claims that the *essenēs* were not priests of the Artemision even though they performed sacrifices on Artemis’ behalf alongside the priestess and the *οἰκονόμος* (financial magistrate) of the Ephesian *polis*’ (*IEphesos* V, no. 1448).

<sup>26</sup> Paus. 8.13.1.

<sup>27</sup> Dem. 20.21; Bubelis (2016), 131-134. See Schmitt-Pantel (1992), 121-125 on the origins of *hesiator* as a *liturgy* in Athens.

<sup>28</sup> *IEphesos* IV, no. 1408 (ca. 294-289 BC); *IEphesos* V, nos. 1448 (ca. 306-301 BC), 1455 (ca. 301-294 BC); Schmitt-Pantel (1992), 294-295.

<sup>29</sup> Bremmer (2008), 49.

the Prienians guarding the fort known as Charax.<sup>30</sup> In addition, *IEphesos* V, no. 1448 (ca. 306-301 BC) mentions the *essenes* performing a sacrifice alongside the priestess of Artemis and the *οἰκονόμος*, the Ephesian *polis*' chief financial magistrate, which suggests a close relationship between a sacred and a public magistrate involved in financial matters.<sup>31</sup> Since the *essenes* acted as a guarantor on behalf of the *polis*, the *essenes* seem to have operated in a fashion similar to other Greek temples' *hieropoioi*, handling a variety of sacred duties, loans, *hosia* properties, and engaging in the overall economic management of the Artemision.

Although they are not attested to in connection with the Artemision during the fourth or third century BC, the Ephesian debt mitigation decree from 86/5 BC mentions the *hieroi logistai* of Artemis. *IEphesos* Ia, no. 8, ll. 26-30, implies that the *hieroi logistai* were a committee of elected *hieroi* who served the Artemision as financial officers for an unspecified period of time:<sup>32</sup>

τοῦ πράγματος ἀνήκοντ[ος εἰς] τὴν φυλακὴν καὶ ἀσφάλειαν καὶ σωτ[η]ρίαν τοῦ τε ἱεροῦ  
τῆς Ἀρτέμ[ιδος καὶ] τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῆς χώρας. Τοὺς μὲν ἐκγεγραμμένους ἢ  
παρα[γεγραμ]μένους ὑπὸ λογιστῶν ἱερῶν ἢ δ[η]μοσίων ὠτινιοῦν τρόπῳ πάλιν εἶ[ναι]  
30 ἐντίμους καὶ ἠκυρῶσθαι τὰς κα[τ'] αὐτῶν ἐκγραφὰς καὶ ὀφειλήμ[ατα]

since the affair is connected to the defense and security and safety both of the temple of Artemis and the city and the land. Let those having been erased or those having been subjoined by the holy and public accountants in any way be honored again and let the erasures and their debts be cancelled

The *hieroi logistai*, as well as the *demosiai logistai* in *IEphesos* Ia, no. 8, were charged by the temple and the Ephesian *polis* to keep track of loan payments owed to the Ephesian *polis* and to Artemis prior to 86/5 BC.<sup>33</sup> As a point of comparison, the office of the *demosiai logistai*, however,

<sup>30</sup> *IEphesos* VI, no. 2001, ll. 10-12: τὸ δὲ ἐκ τούτων πεσὸν ἀργύριον παρα]λαβόντας τοὺς ἐσσηνας καὶ τοὺς συνέδρους τοὺς ἐπὶ τοῖς Πριηνικοῖς τεταγμένους τά[λαν][τον καὶ ἡμισυ, τὸ τάλαντον τὸ προδεδανεισμ]ένον αὐτοῖς ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς προδανείσασιν, καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ὀπλωνήσαντας δοῦναι τὰ ὄπλα [τῶν ἐκ Πριήνης τοῖς τὸ φρούριον διαφυ]λάττουσιν

<sup>31</sup> *IEphesos* V, no. 1448, ll. 5-7: [θύειν δὲ καὶ] [εὐ]αγγέλια τῆι Ἀρτέμιδι τοὺς ἐσσηνας καὶ [τὴν ἱέρειαν] [καὶ τ]ὸν οἰκονόμον.

<sup>32</sup> Dignas (2002), 192; Bogaert (1968), 250.

<sup>33</sup> *IEphesos* Ia, no. 8, ll. 28-30.

is attested to in the fourth century BC in Athens as serving a similar duty for the *polis* of auditing the accounts of magistrates exiting their office at the end of the year.<sup>34</sup> Therefore, although attested to later in the first century BC, public and sacred *logistai* may have been present at Ephesos and the Artemision during the fourth century BC, helping the *essenes* to keep track of public and sacred loans made using *demosia* and *hosia* property as security during the garrisoning of troops in the *polis* by the Diadochi and during the conflict with Hieron.

#### **4.4 The Funds and the Properties of Artemis in the Fourth Century BC**

Due to a scarcity of literary and epigraphic evidence, the properties of Artemis, the profits derived from them, and how the Artemision used its funds during the fourth century BC are also difficult to ascertain. For the borders of the temple as a place of refuge (*asylia*), Strabo reports that, in 334 BC, Alexander extended the limits of the Artemision equal to the distance of a stadion (ca. 180m).<sup>35</sup> The recorded properties of the Artemision from the fourth century BC outside of the temple precinct included sacred herds of cattle (Xen. *An.* 5.3.9), sacred deer (Strab. 14.1.29), two lakes (the Selinousia and another unnamed lake [Strab. 14.1.26]), as well as the river Selinous (Xen. *An.* 5.3.8).<sup>36</sup> Although the sacred herds described by Xenophon were owned and grazed in the sacred precinct of Artemis Ephesia at Scillous near Olympia, Xenophon also stated that he meant for the altar, temple, and sacred precinct to be a smaller version of the greater Ephesian Artemision (*An.* 5.3.12). Therefore, while the exact size of Artemis Ephesia's herds is unknown, Artemis' cow and deer herds at Ephesos were likely much larger than those at Scillous. Just as with sacred land from

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<sup>34</sup> See Arist. [*Ath. Pol.*] 54.2, on the duties of the *logistai* in fourth-century BC Athens.

<sup>35</sup> Strab. 14.1.23.

<sup>36</sup> Davies (2011), 180; Dignas (2002), 176.



Delphi, Scillous and Ephesos presumably had sacred land specifically demarcated for the sacred herds to graze and for cultivation.<sup>37</sup>

Unfortunately, the only physical evidence concerning other landholdings of Artemis, specifically, inscriptions and *horoi*, originates from the first centuries BC and AD. The Roman proconsul Paullus Fabius Persicus' edict in 44 AD, in discussing the misappropriation of funds by the *hieroi* and annual magistrates, reminded the Ephesian people of Augustus' generosity in restoring to the Artemision her abundant revenues ca. 27 BC.<sup>38</sup> Augustus' restoration of revenues primarily concerned Artemis' extensive landholdings in the Kayster valley previously confiscated by Roman tax collectors in the Late Republic.<sup>39</sup> In addition, *horoi* naming Augustus as well as Domitian and Trajan were discovered *in situ* demarcating several estates sacred to Artemis in the Kayster valley.<sup>40</sup> Considering the fact that Augustus' ruling was a restoration of sacred property to the Artemision, not a new grant, the extensive number of sacred estates restored may have included those which the sanctuary possessed from at least the fourth century BC and which were used to produce *hosia* funds for sanctioned purposes like upkeep.<sup>41</sup>

Artemis Ephesia also received annual contributions from its properties and the Ephesian *polis* to the temple's *hosia* funds. For example, the lake known as Selinousia, the other unnamed lake, and the river Selinous provided substantial revenues to the Artemision in the form of fish and

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<sup>37</sup> See Horster (2010), 440-442, for her discussion the use of *horoi* to mark the boundaries of sacred land since the sixth century BC at the Artemision on Lemnos. See also Dillon (1997), 120-122, on the different prohibitions and restrictions at Greek temples on non-sacred animals grazing in sacred land.

<sup>38</sup> *IEphesos* Ia, nos. 18b, ll. 4-7, and 19B b, ll. 4-7; Dignas (2002), 147-148, 170-171.

<sup>39</sup> See *IEphesos* VII, 2, nos. 3513 and 3516, and *SEG* 39, no. 1175 (6/5 BC), which refer to Augustus' restoration of property to the Artemision. Davies (2011), 180; Dignas (2002), 172-175. See the map of the Artemision's properties in the Kayster valley in Figure 3.

<sup>40</sup> *Horoi*: *IEphesos* VII, 2, nos. 3501 and 3502, under Augustan era; 3503-3505, under unnamed emperors; 3506-3510, under Domitian; and 3511-3512, under Trajan.

<sup>41</sup> See *SEG* 39, no. 1175, where the Artemision used revenues derived from its restored properties to finance paving a road in 6/5 BC. See Dignas (2002), 171-172, on restorations to the Artemision during the first centuries BC and AD.

mussels.<sup>42</sup> Based on Xenophon's account where he created the sanctuary of Artemis Ephesia at Scillous, Artemis and the Artemision in Ephesos also seem to have received a tithe from the annual profits of its properties. Specifically, Xenophon reports that he set up an inscription at the temple of Artemis in Scillous stating:

ΙΕΡΟΣ Ο ΧΩΡΟΣ ΤΗΣ ΑΡΤΕΜΙΔΟΣ. ΤΟΝ ΕΧΟΝΤΑ ΚΑΙ ΚΑΡΠΟΥΜΕΝΟΝ ΤΗΝ ΜΕΝ ΔΕΚΑΤΗΝ ΚΑΤΑΘΥΕΙΝ ΕΚΑΣΤΟΥ ΕΤΟΥΣ, ΕΚ ΔΕ ΤΟΥ ΠΕΡΙΤΤΟΥ ΤΟΝ ΝΑΟΝ ΕΠΙΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ. ΑΝ ΔΕ ΤΙΣ ΜΗ ΠΟΙΗΙ ΤΑΥΤΑ ΤΗΙ ΘΕΩΙ ΜΕΛΗΣΕΙ.<sup>43</sup>

The land is sacred to Artemis. Let the one holding it and enjoying its produce dedicate a tithe from each year, and from the remainder let him repair the temple. And if anyone should not do these things, it will be a care to the goddess.

The text specifies that a *dekatê* of the annual profits must be offered as a sacrifice to the goddess and then the remainder (*περιττός*) must cover the costs of temple repairs (*ἐπισκευάζειν*). The annual profits offered as sacrifice to pay for the annual festival included the grain, produce, sacred cattle, and profits derived from whatever sale of produce occurred during the year, in addition to any deer caught during the festive hunts.<sup>44</sup> Since Xenophon was an Athenian and modelled the Artemision at Scillous on the one at Ephesos, the annual *dekatê* dedicated as a sacrifice is perhaps similar to tithes of *hosia* property extracted annually by Athena Polias and Nemesis at Rhamnous to pay for festivals such as the Lesser and Greater Panatheneia<sup>45</sup> While Xenophon's inscription is vague as to exactly how the remaining funds were to be used for repairs, such repairs likely required the purchase of building materials as well as the funding of contracted laborers. Therefore, Xenophon's instructions imply that the remaining annual profits after the tithe became part of the temple's *hosia* funds. Operating on the assumption that Xenophon intended for his temple to operate similarly to the greater Ephesian version (Xen. *Anab.* 5.3.12), the Ephesian Artemision

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<sup>42</sup> Xen. *An.* 5.3.8; Strab. 14.1.26.

<sup>43</sup> Xen. *An.* 5.3.13.

<sup>44</sup> Xen. *An.* 5.3.9-10.

<sup>45</sup> Bubelis (2016), 161-168, 178-187, and 188-194.

also likely extracted an annual tithe from the profits of property grazed upon by sacred herds or farmed for produce as a *dekatê* to pay for the Ephesia, an annual festival held in honor of Artemis during the month of Artemision, the Artemisia held every four years during the same month, and the remainder used for upkeep and repairs on Artemis' properties and the temple, especially after the Artemision's destruction in 356 BC.<sup>46</sup>

As noted in the introduction of this chapter, Alexander the Great, upon taking and freeing Ephesos from an oligarchy under Persian rule, also decreed in 334 BC that the Ephesian *polis* was to begin providing to Artemis the annual tribute previously sent to the Persians, funds which undoubtedly helped to pay for the reconstruction of the temple.<sup>47</sup>

Τετάρτη δὲ ἡμέρα ἐς Ἔφεσον ἀφικόμενος τοὺς τε φυγάδας, ὅσοι δι' αὐτὸν ἐξέπεσον τῆς πόλεως, κατήγαγε καὶ τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν καταλύσας δημοκρατίαν κατέστησε· τοὺς δὲ φόρους, ὅσους τοῖς βαρβάροις ἀπέφερον, τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι ζυντελεῖν ἐκέλευσεν.<sup>48</sup>

After he (Alexander) arrived in Ephesos on the fourth day, he both recalled the exiles, who were driven out of the *polis* because of him, and established the democracy after he dissolved the oligarchy; and he bid that they contribute to Artemis the tribute, which they were handing over to the barbarians.

Although no record documenting the exact amount of the tribute exists, Davies speculates that the tribute size may have been close to the six to seven and a half talents paid annually to Athens when Ephesos was in the Athenian *archē*.<sup>49</sup> The Ephesian *polis* did, however, reject Alexander's generous offer to cover the current and future expenses of reconstructing the Artemision (Strab. 14.1.22) because Ephesos likely wished to maintain neutrality in Alexander's unfinished conflict with Darius III, though it may also have been because Ephesos already had extensive funds and

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<sup>46</sup> Zabrana (2020), 158-160; Kalinowski (2021), 101-103.

<sup>47</sup> Davies (2011), 181.

<sup>48</sup> Arr. *An.* 1.17.10.

<sup>49</sup> Davies (2011), 178 and 181.

annual profits devoted towards the reconstruction and thus did not require additional funds for this purpose from Alexander.<sup>50</sup>

Towards the end of the fourth century BC, the Artemision was also able to conserve considerable funds in its treasury because the temple continuously maintained its right to *ateleia* (freedom from taxation) and the holy *stathmos* (freedom from billeting soldiers), as documented in *IEphesos* V, no. 1449 (302 BC). Artemis' wealth was first threatened when Prepelaos took Ephesos in 302 BC and garrisoned troops in the *polis* because the soldiers attempted to reside in the Artemision and extract taxes from the temple's presumably significant *hosia* fund which contained the profits earned on the goddess' properties and the tribute granted to her by the Ephesian *polis*. The *gerousia* (a legislative council of Ephesos) and the *epikletoi* (a committee of privy councilors connected to the Artemision), on behalf of the Artemision, sent an embassy to Prepelaos the same year the *polis* was taken in order to secure the temple's right to *ateleia* and the holy *stathmos*:<sup>51</sup>

καὶ νῦν ἀποσταλείσης πρεσβείας πρὸς Πρεπέλαον ὑπὸ τῆς γερουσίης καὶ τῶν ἐπικλήτων ὑπὲρ τοῦ σταθμοῦ τοῦ ἱεροῦ καὶ τῆς ἀτελείας τῆι θεῶι συνδιοίκησεν μετὰ τῆς πρεσβείας ὅπως ἂν ἡ ἀτέλ[ει]α ὑπάρχηι τῆι θεῶι

And now, after the ambassadors were sent to Prepelaos by the *gerousia* and by *epikletoi* concerning the holy *stathmos* and the *ateleia* for the goddess, he (Euphronios) brought it about together with the ambassadors in order that the *ateleia* may belong to the goddess.

This successful embassy to Prepelaos also included one Euphronios of Akarnania, as well as the appointed *neopoiai* and *kouretes* (notaries of the Artemision) at the time, who advocated to the *gerousia* and the *epikletoi* on behalf of Euphronios for him to receive citizenship for helping to

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<sup>50</sup> See Davies (2011), 193, 199-201, and Rogers (2012), 48, on Ephesos' diplomatic efforts to maintain neutrality and balance.

<sup>51</sup> Davies (2011), 191; Rogers (2012), 46-47; *IEphesos* V, no. 1449 (302 BC), ll. 3-5.

protect the rights of Artemis.<sup>52</sup> Once granted, the *gerousia* and the *epikletoi* then sent the *neopoiiai* and the *kouretes* to deliver the decree granting him citizenship to the Ephesian *boule* and *demos* for final ratification.<sup>53</sup> *IEphesos* V, no. 1449 therefore shows that, in addition to the Artemision, the Ephesian *polis* itself had an invested interest in maintaining the wealth and prestige of Artemis.

Given that *IEphesos* V, no. 1449 also implies that the Artemision had significant resources and funds at the end of the fourth century BC by virtue of the fact that it was able to secure the rights of *ateleia* and the holy *stathmos*, the temple was able to continue protecting and regulating how the sanctuary used the goddess' funds and property. The existence of the Artemis' significant funds is also emphasized by Plutarch's account, concerning how, when Demetrios returned to Ephesos after his defeat at Ipsos in 301 BC, he feared that his soldiers might not listen to him and plunder the Artemision and her property for money and supplies, and so he left quickly with his army.<sup>54</sup> Furthermore, Artemis seems to have had enough wealth, too, for the Megabyzos to use her funds to help the Prienians rebuild their temple of Athena.<sup>55</sup> What is still unclear based on the available evidence is how Artemis and her officials used these funds during the fourth century BC, beyond for expenses required for the reconstruction of the temple.

## 4.5 Artemis and the Sacred Economic Sphere

Although the Artemision held considerable funds, had collected significantly more funds from redirected tribute, and owned profitable sacred properties during the fourth century BC, there is a distinct lack of direct evidence attesting to whether the Artemision also acted as a banking institution and provided interest-bearing loans to Ephesian citizens, non-citizens with the honor of

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<sup>52</sup> See Rogers (2012), 46 and 84, for his classification of the *kouretes* as notaries. See also Lund (1992), 126, who interprets the *gerousia* and the *epikletoi* as non-religious colleges of magistrates within the Artemision who were involved in the management of the sanctuary and grants of citizenship to people for exceptional services rendered.

<sup>53</sup> *IEphesos* V, no. 1449, ll. 1-2.

<sup>54</sup> Plut. *Vit. Demetr.* 30.2; Davies (2011), 181.

<sup>55</sup> See *IPriene*, no. 3 (296/5 BC), which confers honors and the honor of *enktesis* to the Megabyzos, naming him as the *neokoros* of Artemis Ephesia.

*enktesis*, or to the Ephesian *polis* with private or public property used as security. According to Xenophon and Strabo, it is evident that the Artemision had the capacity by the beginning of the fourth century BC to fulfill the basic activity of banking institutions and protected deposits such as those from Xenophon and the Persians:<sup>56</sup>

τὸ δὲ τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος τῆς Ἐφεσίας, ὅτ' ἀπήει σὺν Ἀγησιλάῳ ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας τὴν εἰς Βοιωτοῦς ὁδόν, καταλείπει παρὰ Μεγαβύζῳ τῷ τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος νεωκόρῳ, ὅτι αὐτὸς κινδυνεύσων ἐδόκει ἰέναι, καὶ ἐπέστειλεν, ἦν μὲν αὐτὸς σωθῆ, αὐτῷ ἀποδοῦναι· εἰ δέ τι πάθοι ἀναθεῖναι ποιησάμενον τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι ὅ τι οἴοιτο χαριεῖσθαι τῇ θεῷ. (Xen. *Anab.* 5.3.6)

And he (Xenophon) left behind the money of Artemis of Ephesos beside the Megabyzos, *neokoros* of Artemis, when he was departing with Agesilaos from Asia for the road to Boeotia, because he was thinking that going (there) will be dangerous, and he gave orders to give it (the money) back to him if he might escape destruction; but if he should suffer anything, that he (the Megabyzos) bring about for himself to dedicate to Artemis whatever (offering) he would believe would gratify the goddess.

ὡς ἐκ τῶν Περσικῶν παρακαταθηκῶν ἐποιήσαντο τοῦ ἱεροῦ τὴν ἐπισκευήν· (Strab. 14.1.22)

That they produced the restoration of the temple from the Persian deposits;

Both Xenophon and Strabo's accounts, as well as every other record that discusses deposits at the Artemision, emphasize that, unless otherwise agreed to by the owner of the deposit, the Artemision protected such deposits and never used them for loans, instead considering the deposits *hiera* property until withdrawn.<sup>57</sup> The noun *παρακαταθήκη* that Strabo uses in particular usually denotes deposits both at temples and banks in fourth-century *poleis* such as Athens.<sup>58</sup>

If the Artemision did act as a banking institution and her *essenēs* lent funds on behalf of Artemis during the fourth century BC, the *essenēs* likely used the personal *hosia* revenues of Artemis and not the deposited sums or valuables of private or public parties left in the temporary

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<sup>56</sup> Dignas (2002), 20 and 146. See Cohen (1992), 23 n. 99, 66, on how the protection of deposits, such as in Dem. 49, was a function of banking in the fourth century BC.

<sup>57</sup> Dignas (2002), 146-147. See Dio Chrys. *Or.* 31.54-56, who emphasizes the Artemision's dedication to protecting its deposits. See also Cohen (1992), 114-115, 203-204, and 220-223, on the illegal lending of *hiera* funds, including those on deposit by the city, by the *tamiai* to bankers in Dem. 24.

<sup>58</sup> See *LSJ* s.v. *παρακαταθήκη* to denote deposits: e.g. Dem. 36.6; *IG* II<sup>2</sup>, no. 1407 (385/4 BC), l. 42.

custody of the goddess. The only evidence, however, that the Artemision was involved in lending during the late fourth to early third century BC lies in *IEphesos* VI, no. 2001. That inscription implies that the Artemision, through its priestly officers, the *essenēs*, acted as a guarantor for loans to the *polis* from money-lenders, which the *polis* repaid by virtue of the sale of citizenships:<sup>59</sup>

[...ὄπω]ς δ' ἄν εἰς ταῦτα πόρος ὑπάρχηι καὶ μηδὲν ἐμποδὼν γένηται τῆι φυλακῆι τοῦ τόπου [καὶ κομίσωνται τὰ δάνεια οἱ προδανείσαντες,] ποήσασθαι πολίτας ἑξαμναίους, ἐλευθέρους καὶ ἐξ ἐλευθέρων, μὴ πλείους ἢ δε[καπέντε, τὸ δὲ ἐκ τούτων πεσὼν ἀργύριον παρα]λαβόντας τοὺς ἐσσηνας καὶ τοὺς συνέδρους τοὺς ἐπὶ τοῖς Πριηνικοῖς τεταγμένους τά[λαν][τον καὶ ἥμισυ, τὸ τάλαντον τὸ προδεδανεισμ]ένον αὐτοῖς ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς προδανείσασιν

And so that there exists a provision for these things and there is nothing presenting a hinderance for the defense of the place and those having advanced money may receive back the loans, to make citizens those who pay six minae, free men also (born) from free men, not more than fifteen (men), and upon receiving the money accrued from these things, a talent and a half, let the *essenēs* and those appointed for Prienian affairs repay the talent that was advanced to those lending in advance

The initial loans (*daneia*) from the money-lenders to the *polis* helped the *polis* to immediately purchase weapons and supplies for the Prienian rebels, just as the remaining half talent the *polis* received from the sale of citizenships did.<sup>60</sup> If the money-lenders required a guarantor for the Ephesian *polis*, the requirement would not be surprising considering the risk money-lenders took on by lending to an entity capable of defaulting on the loan with little to no consequence.<sup>61</sup> The lenders therefore likely wanted sureties, such as Artemis as a guarantor, to be put in place in order to guarantee that they would ultimately be repaid. *IEphesos* VI, no. 2001, therefore, emphasizes both the close financial relationship between the *polis* and the Artemision, as was also seen between Athens and Athena Polias, and supports the hypothesis that Artemis and her priests were involved in lending prior to the debt crisis and *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4.

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<sup>59</sup> *IEphesos* VI, no. 2001, ll. 8-11.

<sup>60</sup> See Chapter 1, 15-17, for the discussion on how the aid Ephesos provided the rebel Prienians likely drove Hieron, tyrant of Priene, to attack Ephesos so as to curtail supplies to the rebels.

<sup>61</sup> See Cohen (1992), 143-144, on the risks involved in lending to a *polis*.

While there is no record of Artemis lending *hosia* funds during the fourth century BC, the fact that other similarly sized sanctuaries did make interest-bearing loans with property used as security between the fifth and third centuries BC seems to suggest that Artemis was able to do so as well. For example, Nemesis' cult at Rhamnous made a series of interest-bearing loans to private individuals ca. 450 BC in order to raise *hosia* income for cult activities and upkeep.<sup>62</sup> At Delos, Apollo supplied interest-bearing loans to citizens and other island *poleis* for periods of around five years during its subjugation by Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries BC, especially between 376-373 BC.<sup>63</sup> After gaining her independence from Athens in 314 BC, Apollo then restricted loans to the Delian *polis* and the citizens.<sup>64</sup> In addition, a *diagramma* from Alexander the Great has the temple of Athena Alea in Tegea mitigate Athena Alea's interest-bearing loans with property used as security which returning exiles had previously taken out and owed to Athena Alea.<sup>65</sup> A similar mitigation occurred at Telos in 300 BC, where foreign judges, acting as arbitrators, resolved disputes likely concerning interest-bearing loans owed by individuals to the sanctuaries of Athena and Demeter.<sup>66</sup>

As for evidence from temples in Asia Minor, the temple of Artemis in Sardis used surplus profits from her revenues to provide interest-bearing loans.<sup>67</sup> An inscription from the Sardis temple during the late fourth century BC reports that a man named Mnesimachus failed to repay a debt of 1,325 gold staters to the temple and, as a result, forfeited his large estate which he had supplied as

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<sup>62</sup> *IG II<sup>3</sup>*, no. 248. See also Bubelis (2016), 188-190, for his discussion on such loans.

<sup>63</sup> Gabrielsen (2005), 152; Chankowski (2011), 151.

<sup>64</sup> Chankowski (2011), 151.

<sup>65</sup> *Syll.<sup>3</sup>*, no. 306 (324 BC), ll. 37-48: ἐπές δὲ τοῖς ἱεροῖς χρήμασιν .ΛΩ...Ν τοῖς ὀφειλήμασι, τὰ μὲμ πὸς τὰν θεὸν ἀ πόλις διωρθώσατο, ὁ ἔχων τὸ πᾶμα ἀπυδότω τῶι κατηνηθηκότι τὸ ἥμισσον κατάπερ οἱ ἄλλοι· ὅσοι δὲ αὐτοὶ ὄφηλον τῶι θεοῖ συνινγύας ἢ ἄλλως, εἰ μὲν ἂν φαίνηται ὁ ἔχων τὸ πᾶμα διωρθωμένος τῶι θεοῖ τὸ χρέος, ἀπυδότω τὸ ἥμισσον τῶι κατιόντι, κατάπερ οἱ ἄλλοι, μηδὲν παρέλ[κ]ων· εἰ δ' ἂν μὴ φαίνηται ἀπυδεδοκῶς τῶι θεοῖ, ἀπυδότω τοῖ κατιόντι τὸ ἥμισσον τῶ πᾶματος, ἐς δὲ τοῖ ἥμισσοι αὐτὸς τὸ χρέος διαλυέτω· εἰ δ' ἂν μὴ βόληται διαλυῶσαι, ἀπυδότω τοῖ κατιόντι τὸ πᾶμα ὅλον, ὁ δὲ κομισάμενος διαλυσάτω τὸ χρέος τῶι θεοῖ πᾶν.

<sup>66</sup> *IG XII.4*, no. 132, ll. 44-47.

<sup>67</sup> Chankowski (2011), 154-155; Dignas (2002), 27-28.



collateral for the loan.<sup>68</sup> Due to the close political and religious relationship between the temples of Artemis at Ephesos and Sardis since the Archaic era, they likely had a parallel development in financial activities such as lending as well.<sup>69</sup> As previously noted, although, again, around 200 years after the third century Ephesian debt crisis, *IEphesos* Ia, no. 8 (86/5 BC) also refers to Artemis Ephesia as a creditor for interest-bearing loans.<sup>70</sup> It stands to reason then that Artemis and the Artemision, a temple of significance, wealth, complexity, and renown comparable to temples such as Apollo's at Delos, had the ability to act as a banking institution in the late fourth century BC and supply interest-bearing loans with property used as security. Therefore, contrary to Walser, considering the motives the temple had for providing loans to Ephesian citizens and the *polis*, it is reasonable to assume that Artemis was involved in the sacred economic sphere at Ephesos and possibly even a creditor during the late fourth to early third century BC, particularly before, during, and after the *κοινὸς πόλεμος*.

## 4.6 The Motives for Artemis to Make Loans

The need for funds to reconstruct the Artemision after its destruction as a result of arson is one important motive for Artemis' magistrates to generate immediate funds such as selling *hiera* and *hosia* property as well as to create passive income such as through interest-bearing loans. It is unclear whether the priests stored *hosia* funds in the temple together with the *hiera* treasury and, if they did, how much of the temple's previous funds the arsonist Herostratos burned in 356 BC.

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<sup>68</sup> *ISardis* VII, no. 1; Gabrielsen (2005), 139. See also Dignas (2002), 70-73, for an in-depth analysis, and 287, on the dating of this inscription to the end of the fourth century BC.

<sup>69</sup> See Munn (2006), 165-169, on the archaic and Classical relationship between the temples of Artemis at Sardis and Ephesos; *IEphesos* Ia, no. 2 (ca. 334-300 BC). See also the discussion in Chapter 1, 22-23, on the relationship between the two temples.

<sup>70</sup> *IEphesos*, no. 8, ll. 36-41: ὅσα δὲ ἱερὰ δεδάνεισται, πάντας τοῦ[ς] ὀφείλοντας καὶ χειρίζοντας ἀπολελύσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν ὀφειλημάτων, πλῆ[ν] τῶν ὑπὸ τῶν συστημάτων ἢ τῶν ἀποδεδειγμένων ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἐκδανεισ[τ]ῶν ἐπὶ ὑποθήκαις δεδανεισμένων, τούτων δὲ παρῆσθαι τοὺς τόκους ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰσιόντος ἐνιαυτοῦ, ἕως ἂν ὁ δῆμος εἰς καλλίονα παραγένηται κατά[σ]τασιν. Dignas (2002), 148-149; Gabrielsen (2005), 140; Davies (2011), 182-183.

Strabo does state that the temple still had other treasures and resources that survived the fire which the Artemision sold for the sake of raising funds to rebuild:

ἄλλον ἀμείνω κατεσκεύασαν συνενέγκαντες τὸν τῶν γυναικῶν κόσμον καὶ τὰς ἰδίας οὐσίας, διαθέμενοι δὲ καὶ τοὺς προτέρους κίονας.<sup>71</sup>

They constructed a better one after gathering up the ornamentation of women and its own properties, and also after having sold the former (temple's) pillars;

While Strabo uses *sympherein* (συμφέρειν), 'to gather up,' to describe what happened to the *kosmos* (ornament or decoration) of women and the temple's *idiai ousiai* (own properties), *sympherein* also has the connotation of being "for the benefit of" or "profitable for" in an impersonal or intransitive sense.<sup>72</sup> The structure of this sentence also implies a separation of the women's *kosmos*, treated as *hiera*, and Artemis's *idiai ousiai*, treated as *hosia*.<sup>73</sup> The use of *diatithemi* (διατίθημι), 'to dispose of,' to refer to the sale of the temple's damaged pillars may further strengthen the idea that the Megabyzos or the *essenes* began selling Artemis' property to both clear the temple site of debris and acquire immediate funds for reconstructing the Artemision rather than wait for year-end profits to flow in from Artemis' other properties.

The reconstruction of the temple, however, took a significant amount of time, resources, and funding as is evident by Alexander's decree and offer to the Ephesian *polis* in 334 BC.<sup>74</sup> The construction of the first temple, the one which burned down, began under the reign of Croesus (ca. 560 BC), took 120 years to complete, was 129.54 meters long, 68.58 meters wide, with 127 columns, each 18.28 meters high.<sup>75</sup> The second temple and its altar were reportedly bigger and more ornate, where the temple precinct's borders as a place of refuge were extended to a stade, or

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<sup>71</sup> Strab. 14.1.22.

<sup>72</sup> Dem. 18.308. See Pl. *Grg.* 527b for the various meanings of *συμφέρειν*.

<sup>73</sup> See Cohen (1992), 46-52, where he discusses the tendency in ancient Greek to polarize different things such as landed and maritime loans.

<sup>74</sup> Arr. *Anab.* 1.17.10; Strab. 14.1.22. See above on pages 106-107.

<sup>75</sup> Plin. *HN.* 36.95.

180 meters.<sup>76</sup> As a point of comparison, Burford extrapolates from the available epigraphic evidence that the temple of Asklepios at Epidauros was built within five years (371/0-366/5 BC), was 23.06 meters long, 11.76 meters wide, and cost over 230 talents.<sup>77</sup> If one assumes for the sake of argument that its new dimensions were around six times larger than that of the temple of Asklepios at Epidauros, as measured in total volume of space and material, the Artemision likely took at least 35 years to rebuild and cost at least around 1,380 talents, not including ornamentation within the temple, the new larger altar, or the cost of the new cult statue. With the additional funds from the sale of the temple's *hiera* and *hosia* property and the annual tribute from the *polis*, however, it may be reasonable to suggest that the Artemision's *essenes* also began to provide interest-bearing loans to citizens in order to generate monthly income and fund reconstruction efforts happening throughout each of the years of construction. Making such interest-bearing loans for the sake of passive income would also help to offset any delays in construction incurred from the expenditure of the goddess' funds for the annual Ephesia and the quadrennial Artemisia, both of which were held during the month of Artemision.<sup>78</sup>

The economic strain from the garrisons at Ephesos on Ephesian farmers and the *polis* provides a second motivation for the Artemision to provide loans. Given the close economic, political, and cultural relationship between the goddess, the *polis*, and the citizens, it is difficult to imagine why Artemis would not have provided interest-bearing loans during a period of financial strife. Although Demetrios and Prepelaos did not significantly damage the city *per se*, the negative impact on Demetrios and Prepelaos' funds due to their restraint in not plundering the Artemision and its property may have motivated the garrisons to turn instead to taking resources from the *polis*

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<sup>76</sup> Strab. 14.1.22-23. See Figure 8.

<sup>77</sup> Burford (1969), 54-59, 82.

<sup>78</sup> See Zabrana (2020), 159-160, on what activities the Greater Artemisia entailed. See also Kalinowski (2021), 101-108.

and her farmers to sustain the garrisons. As discussed in Chapters 1 and 3, the citizenship decrees for Archestratos of Macedonia (*IEphesos* V, no. 1452 [302 BC]), who protected grain-transport, and Agathokles of Rhodes (*IEphesos* V, no. 1455 [301-294 BC]), who sold grain below its market value in the agora, imply that Ephesos was suffering a grain shortage at this time.<sup>79</sup> Considering that Artemis' property and revenue were unaffected by the garrisons, it is reasonable to suggest, then, that Artemis provided interest-bearing loans in order to help cover the growing operational costs of Ephesian farmers such as constructing farm buildings, digging wells, or maintaining animals. Since the Ephesian *polis* also needed funds in the conflict against Hieron, tyrant of Priene, and even had Artemis, through her *essenes*, act as a guarantor for the loans from the money-lenders, Artemis may have provided the *polis* with interest-bearing loans, or rather interest-bearing transfers, to fund the early stages of the conflict, just as the *tamiai* of Athena Polias did with Athens at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War.<sup>80</sup> In turn, although there is no evidence attesting to the fact, it is still reasonable to assume that since Hieron's raid was widespread and destructive (as the discussion in Chapter 2 points out), the raid also damaged or destroyed sacred property owned by Artemis or other deities as well as public and private property used as security in loans from Artemis. Therefore, the Ephesian *polis* might have created a law or decree similar to *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 that mitigates sacred loans and devalued sacred property at Ephesos.

## 4.7 Conclusions

Given that the text of *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, as it survives today, concerns the private economic sphere at Ephesos, there are likely Ephesian legal inscriptions concerning the sacred economic sphere at

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<sup>79</sup> Davies (2011), 188.

<sup>80</sup> *IEphesos* VI, no. 2001; *IG I<sup>3</sup>*, no. 369 (425/4 BC). See Bubelis (2016), 162-163, for the discussion on these interest-bearing transfers. See also *IEphesos* Ia, no. 1 (sixth century BC), which also refers to a transfer of funds between the *polis* and the Artemision.

Ephesos, specifically the sacred loans Artemis' magistrates made on her behalf and sacred property destroyed or devalued by Hieron's raid. The lack of evidence does not exclude Artemis' involvement in the sacred economic sphere in Ephesos during the *κοινὸς πόλεμος*, the debt crisis, and the resolution of the crisis. Instead, since the *polis* and farmers needed funds to endure the economic strain from the garrisons of the Diadochi and the conflict with Hieron, Artemis may have provided interest-bearing through her temple officials during this period just as other temples did in the fifth and fourth centuries BC. The Artemision likely had the *hosia* funds to do so because, although the temple had to undergo reconstruction after it was burnt down in 356 BC, temple officials such as the Megabyzos, the *essenēs*, and the *hieroi logistai* still managed the finances of the sanctuary, the goddess' property outside of the temple as well as the properties inside temple which the fire did not destroy. Moreover, the properties, animal herds, and wealth the Artemision still controlled were so profitable as to enable the temple to both continue operating and begin reconstruction efforts by the time Alexander the Great arrived in 334 BC. Funds received from the *polis* after 334 BC doubtless also significantly helped to offset the cost of reconstruction. Therefore, the Artemision was able to continue operating within the sacred economy at Ephesos and perhaps pursue other uses for its *hosia* funds on behalf of Artemis such as the loans discussed in *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 in order to generate passive income with which to consistently fund the temple's reconstruction.

## Conclusion

*IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 is a rich, but complicated and incomplete law from the tumultuous period that was the early Hellenistic era. Since the discovery and publication of Group A, the first three blocks, ca. 1863-1874 and Group B, the fourth block, in 1912, two main schools of discussion had persisted until Walser's publication on the text in 2008: the date of the inscription and what constituted the *κοινὸς πόλεμος* that the inscription states was the cause of the debt crisis which the law mitigates. Until Walser, scholars such as David Asheri and Charles Crowther agreed that *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 dated to 297/6 BC and that the *κοινὸς πόλεμος* was the Ephesian *polis*' conflict with the tyrant of Priene, Hieron, from 300-297 BC. Walser, in his 2008 monograph, however, instead attributes the *κοινὸς πόλεμος* to the war of the Diadochi, thereby dating *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 to 300/299 BC, after the Battle of Ipsos. While Walser provides an interesting basis for his argument, namely that Ephesos was part of the Antigonids' Hellenic League (IG IV<sup>2</sup> I, no. 68 [302 BC]), he did not take into account the re-emergence of the Ionian League at that time nor did he definitively prove that Lysimachos, his general, Prepelaos, or his commanders damaged Ephesos enough by 301 to have caused the destruction described in and addressed by *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4. Therefore, the *κοινὸς πόλεμος* must be Ephesos' and the Ionian League's conflict with Hieron and the inscription's date must return to 297/6 BC as a result.

Another difficult question posed by the existence of *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 is whether it was set up along with the records on whitened tablets in the *ἕδεθλον* of the temple of Artemis Ephesia, otherwise known as the Artemision. Similar to the Metröon in Athens which stored official documents of the *polis*, Artemis also had a tradition of housing the official decrees of the Ephesian *polis* in the Artemision. The Ephesian Bouleuterion might be another viable candidate for where Ephesos set up the law, but that is difficult to ascertain since archeologists have yet to find the

Classical Bouleuterion. Therefore, similar to the practices at the temple of Athena in Priene and the Delphinion in Miletus, the Artemision likely housed both the whitened tablet records and *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 so as to place the documents under the protection and sanctity of Artemis.

The text of *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 itself reveals much about the actual constitutional and judicial structure of the Ephesian *polis* in the late fourth to early third centuries BC. Due to the severity of the debt crisis which the law seeks to mitigate, Ephesos employed the skills of foreign judges just as other *poleis* such as Priene, Telos, and Samos did when faced with similar crises. In forming a foreign court led by an Ephesian citizen, the judges worked within the laws of Ephesos, with established Ephesian magistrates such as the *antigraphheus*, the *neopoiiai*, and the *eisagogeis*, who likely had a job similar to their counterparts in Athens prior to the *κοινὸς πόλεμος*, as well as with temporary groups of magistrates, specifically the dividers of property and those having been chosen to supervise the common war. In working with Ephesian magistrates, the foreign judges developed a way in which the *georgoi* and *tokistai* might settle their disputes over defaulted interest-bearing loans with the property of *georgoi* used as security. Specifically, in a fashion similar to other *poleis* who employed foreign judges, the *georgoi* and *tokistai* were encouraged to submit themselves to arbitration first at almost every step of the process before resorting to a court and verdicts from the judges.

Instead of mandating the confiscation of the whole property, *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 allowed the *tokistai* to only confiscate the portion of the *georgoi*'s property equal to the original value of the property at the time of the loan agreement minus the original value of the loan. The law provides directions in cases where there is more than one encumbrance on different portions of the property's value, more than one encumbrance as if on unencumbered property, stipulations for the handling of debt mitigation where there were guarantors, for guardians of orphan boys, girls, or

female family members involved, and for situations in which *georgoi* had abandoned their property but wanted it back. By dividing the properties of the *georgoi*, recording the names of the new owners, and the boundaries of the new properties, the terms of *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 imply that the Ephesian *polis* began to use a public registry of property records with *horoi* to simply demarcate boundaries, not encumbered property as the Athenians did in Attica, for example.

*IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 was also innovative in the sense that the law establishes a new legal maximum interest rate for future interest-bearing loans with property used as security at 1/12<sup>th</sup> interest, something only established once around 80 to 130 years prior in Delphi (*FD* III, 1:294, 425-375 BC). The Ephesian *polis* presumably intended for the new legal maximum interest rate, which was lower than the more common non-legally mandated maximum rate of around 1/10<sup>th</sup> in the Greek world, to both encourage creditors to begin lending and borrowers to begin borrowing again at a more manageable rate of interest, thereby stimulating the economy quickly, preventing future economic crises, and placing a regulation on lending in the Ephesian real estate market. The new legal maximum interest rate and the destruction described in the law imply, too, that Hieron's raid was widespread and devalued different properties enough so that Ephesos felt that this law was necessary to mitigate interest-bearing loans using private property as security. Additionally, based upon how *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 portrays the division of property, interest-bearing loans with property used as security, and the use of guarantors for such loans, it appears that real estate used as security for the loans in question had a collateral and not substitutive property. Further, the interest-bearing loans themselves seem similar to *hypotheke* loans in the more general sense of the term rather than the specific form seen at Athens.

Due to a distinct lack of specificity in the law, it is unfortunately difficult to ascertain who the *georgoi* and *tokistai* were in *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 beyond persons capable of owning property,



comprised specifically of only citizens and non-citizens with the honor of *enktesis*. Citizens and non-citizens with the honor of *enktesis* were likely a *tokistes*, *georgos*, or both, where each may have been a wealthy absentee landowner, a banker, a professional or passive money-lender, or, simply, just farmers. In limiting its scope to only loans in the private economic sphere at Ephesos, *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 also allows for the reasonable assumption that there were other laws or decrees passed during this same period mitigating loans in the public and sacred economic spheres as well. The Ephesian *polis* was also borrowing from professional money-lenders towards the beginning of the conflict with Hieron, tyrant of Priene, in 299/8 BC (*IEphesos* VI, no. 2001). The fact that the *polis* took out loans during this period further reinforces the hypothesis that the Ephesian *polis* had to take out additional interest-bearing loans with public property used as security to fund the *κοινὸς πόλεμος*, defaulted on those loans after Hieron's raid, and so was required to enact a law or decree similar to *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 in which to mitigate loans and property used as security in the public economic sphere.

In the sacred sphere of the Ephesian economy, however, there is currently no information about the economic activities of other deities at Ephesos during the fourth century BC besides Artemis Ephesia. As Ephesos' most prominent goddess, Artemis seems to have had the magistrates, resources, and ability to provide interest-bearing loans to those who had property to use as security for those loans in the fourth century just as she did in the first century BC. The Artemision had priests such as the Megabyzos and the *essenes* who filled financial roles similar to those of the *tamiai* and the *hieropoioi*, respectively, at Athens and other *poleis*. As to sufficient funding to engage in these loans, Xenophon and Strabo both report on property owned by Artemis from which the Artemision derived an annual *dekatê* with which to pay for festivals and any reconstruction costs. In addition, when Alexander freed Ephesos in 334 BC, he decreed that

Artemis receive the annual tribute that had previously gone to the Persians and, while the War of the Diadochi strained Ephesos, the Artemision successfully protected the rights and treasure of the temple from the Diadochi who were garrisoning the *polis*. If the Artemision possessed significant funds and property in the fourth century BC as the literary evidence suggests, then, even with the destruction of the temple in 356 BC, it is reasonable to suggest that the officials of the Artemision made interest-bearing loans with property used as security on behalf of the goddess just as similarly sized temples, such as Delphic Apollo, Delian Apollo, and Artemis at Sardis, did during this same period. Although, again, there is no evidence that she did make interest-bearing loans, such passive income would not only have helped to consistently fund the reconstruction of the temple but would also have helped the Ephesian *polis* and her citizens endure the economic strain from the Diadochi's garrisons as well as the *κοινὸς πόλεμος*. Therefore, just as with the hypothesis concerning the Ephesian *polis*' loans and public property, it is reasonable to assume that the *polis* also made a decree or law mitigating sacred loans made on behalf of Artemis as well as any property used as security in such loans.

What requires further research and study, however, are the after-effects of *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4, how quickly the *polis* recovered from the debt crisis (if it did at all) and, of course, a study of Group C of *IEphesos* Ia, no. 4 when the blocks are finally excavated and published. Particular questions on those subjects include: What does the text of Group C say? What was the money supply of Ephesos like before and after the *polis* began minting royal coinage? Did Lysimachos have a significant impact on the economic recovery of Ephesos once he finally conquered it in ca. 295 BC and began instituting a *synoecism* at Ephesos' own expense? Finally, what impact, if any, did Lysimachos have on the cult of Artemis in the Artemision when he established the cult of

Artemis Soteria on Mt. Ortygia? While such questions are incredibly intriguing, they unfortunately fell outside the bounds of this work, and will thus require future research and consideration.

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



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

# Figures

1. *IEphesos Ia, no. 4, Photographs Taken by Jake Neil Pawlusch (2023) – Ancient Greek Inscriptions in the British Museum, 477.11-13:*

Block 1A:





Block 2A:





Block 3A:



2. Map of Ephesus and its Vicinity (Kraft et al. [2007], 125):





Figure 2. The vicinity of Ephesus and the Artemision in their 19th-century environmental settings showing the location of cross-sections and geological borings used in this study (based on a map by Schindler, 1906). The city walls of Lysimachus (early Hellenistic) are shown in relation to the flanking mountainous terrain.

3. Map of Augustan Era Properties of the Artemision (Dignas [2002], 174):



Map 4. Artemis' landed property in the Cayster valley.

4. **Ephesos mint. Demetrios I Poliorketes. Struck circa 301-295 BC. AR Tetradrachm (28mm, 17.17 g, 12h)** – Nike, blowing trumpet and holding stylis, standing left on prow of galley left / BA-ΣΙΑΕΩ-Σ ΔΗΜΗΤΡΙΟΥ, Poseidon Pelagaios standing left, preparing to throw trident, chlamys draped over extended left arm; monogram to left, star to right. Newell 51 (dies XLVI/88 [unlisted combination]); HGC 3.1, 1012d; SNG Fitzwilliam 2288 (same rev. die). Near EF, dark toning. Well struck (= CNG 106, Lot 216 [Sept. 13, 2017]):



5. **Ephesos Mint. Ephesos (as Arsinoeia). Struck circa 290-281 BC. Æ (13mm, 1.83 g, 12h)** – Galai[...?], magistrate. Veiled bust of Arsinoe II right / Forepart of a stag kneeling right, head left; astragalos to upper left. Head, *Ephesus* p. 44; BMC 74. VF, black and green patina, minor roughness. Rare. (= CNG 278, Lot 99 [April 25, 2012]):





6. *IEphesos Ia, no. 8* (= *Syll.*<sup>3</sup>, no. 742; Asheri [1969], Appendix III, 114-117)

Length 1.30m; Width 0.75m; Depth 0.24m. Currently located in the Ashmolean Museum

(Inv. G 1187):

- 1 [— ἐπειδή, τοῦ δήμου]  
[φυλάσσον]τος τὴν πρὸς Ῥωμαίους τοὺς κο[ινου]ς σωτήρας πα-  
[λαι]ὰν εὖν]οιαν καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν τοῖς ἐπιτασσομέ[νοι]ς προθύμω[ς]  
[πειθαρχ]οῦντος, Μιθραδάτης Καππαδοκί[ας] βασιλεὺς παρα-  
5 [βάς τὰς π]ρὸς Ῥωμαίους συνθήκας καὶ συναγαγῶ[ν] τὰς δυνάμεις ἐ]-  
[πεχείρη]σεν κύριος γενέσθαι τῆς μηθὲν ἑαυτῶι προ[σηκούσης]  
[χώρα]ς, καὶ προκαταλαβόμενος τὰς προκειμένας ἡμῶν πό[λεις ἀ]-  
[πάτ]η, ἐκράτησεν καὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας πόλεως καταπληξάμενος  
[τῶι] τε πλήθει τῶν δυνάμεων καὶ τῶι ἀπροσδοκῆται τῆς ἐπιβολῆς,  
10 [ὁ] δὲ δῆμος ἡμῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς συνφυλάσσωσιν τὴν πρὸς Ῥωμαί-  
ους εὖνοιαν, ἐσχηκῶς καιρὸν πρὸς τὸ βοηθεῖν τοῖς κοινοῖς πράγμα-  
σιν, κέκρικεν ἀναδειῖξαι τὸν πρὸς Μιθραδάτην πόλεμον ὑπέρ  
τε τῆς Ῥωμαίων ἡγεμονίας καὶ τῆς κοινῆς ἐλευθερίας, ὁμο-  
θυμαδὸν πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν ἐπιδεδωκότων ἑαυτοὺς εἰς τοῦ[ς]  
15 [π]ερὶ τούτων ἀγῶνας, διὸ δεδόχθαι τῶι δήμωι, τοῦ πράγματος [ἀ]-  
νήκοντος εἰς τε τὸν πόλεμον καὶ εἰς τὴν φυλακὴν καὶ ἀσφάλειαν κα[ὶ]  
σωτηρίαν τοῦ τε ἱεροῦ τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος καὶ τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῆς χώ-  
[ρ]ας, τοὺς στρατηγούς καὶ τὸν γραμματέα τῆς βουλῆς καὶ τοὺς  
προέδρους εἰσενεγκεῖν ψήφισμα παραχρῆμα καὶ περὶ φιλανθρώπων  
20 καθότι συμφέρειν, καὶ περὶ τούτου διέλαβεν ὁ δῆμος.  
ἔδοξεν τῶι δήμωι, γνώμη προέδρων καὶ τοῦ γραμματέως τοῦ  
βουλῆς Ἀσκληπιάδου τοῦ Ἀσκληπιάδου τοῦ Εὐβουλίδου, εἰσαγ-  
[γ]ελαμένων τῶν στρατηγῶν· ἐπεὶ τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων ἐ-  
παγομένων τῶι τε ἱερῶι τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος καὶ τῆι πόλει καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς πολεί-  
25 ταις καὶ τοῖς κατοικοῦσιν τὴν τε πόλιν καὶ τὴν χώραν, ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι

πάντας ὁμονοήσαντας ὑ[πο]στῆναι τὸν κίνδυνον, δεδόχθαι τῶι δή-  
 μωι, τοῦ πράγματος ἀνήκοντ[ος εἰς] τὴν φυλακὴν καὶ ἀσφάλειαν καὶ σωτ[η]-  
 ρίαν τοῦ τε ἱεροῦ τῆς Ἀρτέμ[ιδος καὶ] τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῆς χώρας. τοὺς  
 μὲν ἐκγεγραμμένους ἢ παρα[γεγραμ]μένους ὑπὸ λογιστῶν ἱερῶν ἢ δ[η]-  
 30 μοσίων ὠϊτινιοῦν τρόπῳ πάλιν εἶναι ἐντίμους καὶ ἠκυρωσθαι τὰς κα-  
 [τ'] αὐτῶν ἐκγραφὰς καὶ ὀφειλήμ[ατα], τοὺς δὲ παραγεγραμμένους πρὸς [ἱε]-  
 [ρ]ὰς καταδίκας ἢ δημοσίας ἢ ἐπίτειμα ἱερὰ ἢ δημόσια ἢ ἄλλα ὀφειλήματ[α]  
 ὠϊτινιοῦν τρόπῳ παρεῖσθαι πάντας καὶ εἶναι ἀκύρους τὰς κατ' αὐτῶν  
 πράξεις· εἰ δὲ τινες ἔνεισιν ἐν ταῖς ἱεραῖς μισθώσεσιν ἢ δημοσίαις ὠ-  
 35 ναῖς μέχρι τοῦ νῦν, τούτοις ἐστάναι τὰς πράξεις κατὰ τὰς προῦπαρχούσας  
 οἰκονομίας κατὰ τοὺς νόμους· ὅσα δὲ ἱερὰ δεδάνεισται, πάντας τοῦ[ς]  
 ὀφείλοντας καὶ χειρίζοντας ἀπολελύσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν ὀφειλημάτων, πλή[ν]  
 τῶν ὑπὸ τῶν συστηματῶν ἢ τῶν ἀποδεδειγμένων ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἐκδανεισ-  
 [τ]ῶν ἐπὶ ὑποθήκαις δεδανεισμένων, τούτων δὲ παρεῖσθαι τοὺς τόκους ἀπὸ  
 40 τοῦ εἰσιόντος ἐνιαυτοῦ, ἕως ἂν ὁ δῆμος εἰς καλλίονα παραγένηται κατάσ[τα]-  
 σιν· καὶ εἰ τινες δὲ πεπολιτογράφηται μέχρι τῶν νῦν χρόνων, εἶναι πάντας ἐ[ν]-  
 τίμους καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν μετέχειν φιλανθρώπων· λελύσθαι δὲ καὶ εἶναι ἀκύρο[υς]  
 τὰς τε ἱερὰς καὶ δημοσίας δίκας, εἰ μὴ τινὲς εἰσιν ὑπὲρ παρορισμῶν χώρας ἢ δι' ἀμφ[ισ]-  
 βητήσεως κληρονομίας ἐξευγμέναι· εἶναι δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἰστοτελεῖς καὶ παροίκους  
 45 καὶ ἱεροὺς καὶ ἐξελευθέρους καὶ ξένους, ὅσοι ἂν ἀναλάβωσιν τὰ ὄπλα καὶ πρὸς το[ῦς]  
 ἡγεμόνας ἀπογράψωνται, πάντας πολίτας ἐφ' ἴση καὶ ὁμοίαι, ὧν καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα [δια]-  
 σαφισάτωσαν οἱ ἡγεμόνες τοῖς προέδροις καὶ τῶι γραμματεῖ τῆς βουλῆς, οἱ  
 καὶ ἐπικληρωσάτωσαν αὐτοὺς εἰς φυλὰς καὶ χιλιαστῶν· τοὺς δὲ δημοσίους  
 ἐλευθέρους τε καὶ παροίκους, τοὺς ἀναλαβόντας τὰ ὄπλα· προελθόντες  
 50 δὲ εἰς τὸν δῆμον καὶ οἱ δεδανεικότες <κατὰ> τὰ συμβόλαια τὰ τε ναυτικά καὶ κατὰ χειρό-  
 γραφα καὶ κατὰ παραθήκας καὶ ὑποθήκας καὶ ἐπιθήκας καὶ κατὰ ὄνας καὶ ὁμολογί-  
 [α]ς καὶ διαγραφὰς καὶ ἐκρήσεις πάντες ἀσμένως καὶ ἐκουσίως συνκαταθέμε-  
 [νοι] τῶι δήμῳ, ἀπέλυσαν τοὺς χρεοφιλέτας τῶν ὀφειλημάτων, μενουσῶν τῶν



[.c.6..]αι διακατοχῶν παρὰ τοῖς νῦν διακατέχουσιν, εἰ μή τινες ἢ ἐνθάδε ἢ ἐπε-

55 [...c.10...]ενοὶς δεδανείκασιν ἢ συνηλλάχασιν· τὰ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς τραπεζεῖ-

[τας, ὅσοι μὲν ἐν τῷ ἐ]φ' ἔτος ἐνιαυτῷ τεθεματίκασιν ἢ ἐκχρήσεις εἰλήφασιν ἢ ἐνέ-

[χυρα δεδώκασιν, ἐστά]ναι αὐτοῖς τὰς πράξεις τὰς προὔπαρχούσας κατὰ τοὺς

[νόμους· ὅσα δὲ ἐστὶν θέμα]τα ἢ ἐκχρήσεις ἐκ τῶν ὑπεράνω χρόνων, τούτων

[οἱ τραπεζεῖται τοῖς θεματεῖται]ς καὶ οἱ θεματεῖται τοῖς τραπεζεῖταις τὰς ἀ-

60 [ποδόσεις ποιείσθωσαν κατὰ μέρος ἀπὸ] τῶν εἰσι{ον}όντος {<sup>26</sup>εἰσιόντος}<sup>26</sup> ἐνιαυτοῦ ἐν ἔτεσιν δέ-

[κα, τοὺς δὲ τόκους ἀποτινέτωσαν κατὰ τ]ὸ ἀνάλογον· ἐὰν δὲ ἔν τινι ἐνια-

[υτῷ — ἀπο]δόντος τὰς ἐν τοῖς νόμοις

[—]ος ἐπ' ἐνεχύροις ε[.]

## 7. Picture of Group C, Received Courtesy of Dr. Hans Taeuber (2024):



## 8. Layout of the Artemision (Konuk and Kerschner [2020], 88):

