Summer 8-2021

Examining Anti-LGBT Consequences of Perceiving Anti-Christian Bias

Chad Miller

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS
Department of Psychological & Brain Sciences

Examining Anti-LGBT Consequences of Perceiving Anti-Christian Bias
Arts & Sciences Graduate Students
by
Chad Miller

A thesis presented to
The Graduate School
of Washington University in
partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree
of Master of Arts

August 2021
St. Louis, Missouri

Table of Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

<u>Acknowledgements</u>

Thank you to my committee members Calvin Lai, Pat Hill, and especially to my advisor and committee member Clara Wilkins. Thank you to my friends and family. And thank you to my professors.

<div align="right">Chad Miller</div>

Washington University in St. Louis

August 2021

ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

Examining Anti-LGBT Consequences of Perceiving Anti-Christian Bias

by

Chad Miller

Master of Arts in Psychological and Brain Sciences

Social and Personality Psychology

Washington University in St. Louis, 2021

Professor Clara Wilkins, Chair

Christians in the US report increasing perceptions of anti-Christian bias, but little research has examined the consequences of these perceptions. Three Experiments provide evidence that for White, heterosexual, cisgender Christians, perceiving anti-Christian bias causes prejudice against gay and lesbian people – particularly when the latter are perceived as influential. Participants primed with anti-Christian bias reported lower warmth toward gay and lesbian and transgender people (relative to those who read about bias toward an outgroup) (E1 and E2). This effect was stronger for Christians who see gay people and transgender people, respectively, as having a significant cultural influence in U.S. society (E2). Experiment 3 examined the causal role of influence. Christian participants rated the qualifications of a gay applicant for an editor position that either had influence over article content or was simply a copy editor. Participants in the anti-Christian bias condition (but not in the control) rated the gay applicant as less hirable for the influential editor position than the non-influential position.

Chapter 1: Introduction

"First is the force, fervor, and comprehensiveness of the assault on religion we are experiencing today. This is not decay; it is organized destruction. Secularists, and their allies among the 'progressives,' **have marshaled all the force of mass communications, popular culture, the entertainment industry, and academia in an unremitting assault on religion and traditional values**."

-Bill Barr (United States Department of Justice, 2019)

As exemplified in Bill Barr's warning (quoted from his speech while Attorney General to the University of Notre Dame), Christians in America are increasingly concerned about bias against their group. Christians perceive that anti-Christian bias has increased over time, and they anticipate facing equivalent levels of bias as lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people in the current decade (Wilkins et al., 2021). Perceptions of Christian victimization are particularly pronounced among White evangelical Christians (who accounted for 17% of American Christians (Cox & Jones, 2017)) – the majority of whom (57%) report that their group faces "a lot of discrimination" (Jones et al., 2017; Vandermaas-Peeler et al., 2018). In this paper, I explore the consequences of believing the most populous religious group in America (see Pew Research Center, 2019) experiences bias.

I propose that (1) perceptions of anti-Christian bias will lead Christians to perceive that their values and beliefs are threatened and (2) that Christians will consequently express bias toward groups whose values and beliefs are seen as conflicting with their own: namely lesbian, gay, and transgender (LGT) people. I believe discrimination toward outgroups will be particularly severe when the group is perceived as wielding significant social influence. Specifically, I predict that Christians who are concerned about bias against their group will

1

express prejudicial attitudes toward LGT people because LGT people are seen as violating traditional Christian values (Herek, 1988). I also predict that prejudice against LGT people will be a function of perceived LGT influence because influence allows LGT people to spread values perceived as conflicting with Christians'.

1.1 Why do Christians Perceive Themselves as Victims

Christians may increasingly identify as victims of discrimination as a response to rapid social change in the United States. Perhaps the most pertinent example of social change is the declining percentage of Americans who identify as Christian (Pew Research Center, 2019). While Christians maintain their majority status, some may interpret religious demographic shifts as a sign America is actively turning away from Christianity. Religious scholar Robert Jones (2016) argues that White Christians are losing the stronghold they once held over America (e.g., near single-handedly deciding elections). In fact, White Christians who read about Christians' declining population and decreasing cultural influence perceive greater anti-Christian bias than those in a control condition (Wilkins et al., 2021).

Some conservative Christians have also interpreted recent social changes as evidence America is becoming forcibly secularized. For example, many Christian politicians have referred to the legalization of same-sex marriage as an attack on religion; former attorney general Jeff Sessions referred to the Supreme Court's *Obergefell v. Hodges* ruling (2015) as "an effort to secularize, by force and intimidation" (Sommerfeldt, 2016). Virginia House of Delegates Representative (R) Todd Gilbert went a step further and argued that same-sex marriage activists "will not be satisfied until people of faith are driven out of this discourse, are made to cower, are made to be in fear of speaking their minds, of living up to their deeply held religious beliefs" (Portnoy, 2016). The alleged attack on Christian religious rights prompted the creation and

passage of several religious freedom laws (e.g., Religious Freedom Defense Act, 2015; HB4773, 2015). Clearly, some Christians perceive gains for lesbian and gay individuals as coming at a cost to Christians; in particular, cisgender, heterosexual Christians are more inclined than other groups (e.g., members of other religious groups) to report they are in a zero-sum relationship with LGBT people (Wilkins et al 2021).

Thus, for various demographic and cultural reasons, Christians are increasingly inclined to see their group as victimized. In this paper, I address the question of what impact this belief has for Christians and how they react to this growing perception of victimization.

1.2 Perceiving Anti-Christian Bias is Threatening to Christians

Regardless of the cause, perceiving bias likely is threatening to Christians. Perceiving bias against the ingroup is associated with poorer mental and physical health and with heightened physiological stress responses (Pascoe & Richman, 2009). Moreover, perceiving pervasive discrimination against the ingroup is negatively related to well-being and increases ingroup identification to buffer the effect (Branscombe et al., 1999). The relationship between perceiving discrimination and reduced well-being is not unique to disadvantaged groups; advantaged group members' perceptions of discrimination is also negatively associated with well-being, albeit to a weaker extent than low-status group members (Schmitt et al., 2014). Thus, regardless of whether Christians are *actually* disadvantaged in the United States, they are likely to suffer negative psychological and physiological consequences from *perceiving* discrimination.

Groups who perceive bias may lash out toward other groups in response to threat that arise from perceiving bias. Intergroup Threat Theory (ITT; Stephan et al., 2009) may be useful for characterizing the *nature* of this threat and in clarifying the consequences other groups may suffer as a result of perceived victimization. ITT distinguishes between two types of threat which

3

independently predict prejudice toward groups: (1) *symbolic threat*, or perceived threats to one's values and beliefs, and (2) *realistic threat*, or perceived threats to one's resources, safety, and/or power.

Perceiving bias against Christians may encompass both types of threat, but Christians in America likely experience symbolic threat to a greater extent (Wilkins et al., 2021). In other words, they are more likely concerned about threats to their values and beliefs than to material outcomes. For example, while half (50%) of surveyed Americans reported that evangelical Christians faced discrimination, much fewer (15%) said being an evangelical Christian would hurt one's chances of getting ahead (Masci, 2019). Furthermore, Christian group membership is defined by a shared set of Christian beliefs (e.g., that Jesus is the messiah and son of God (*Christianity*, n.d.)). Thus, any threats based on group membership likely emanate from a threat to religious values and further suggests that symbolic threat may be a more dominant concern than realistic threat for Christians.

Thus, Christians who perceive anti-Christian bias are likely to perceive it as a significant threat to their group. The threat will likely manifest in particular as concern about Christian values.

1.3 Perceiving Threats to Christian Values Leads to Bias Against LGT People

When groups experience threat, they are inclined to display bias against groups perceived of as relevant to the threat. For example, when a threat is perceived as jeopardizing resources or welfare more generally, prejudice can increase toward competitive or dangerous groups (e.g., Brambilla & Butz, 2013; LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Stephan & Stephan, 2000).

Concerns about conflicting values also shapes intergroup attitudes. For example, Black and fat people are derogated when they are perceived as not living up to the Protestant ethic

(Crandall, 1994; Kinder & Sears, 1981; McConahay, 1986). Thus, perceived violations of the ingroup's values and beliefs also leads to bias, and this bias is likely to be displayed when groups perceive threats to their values and beliefs (Rios et al., 2018). Because Christians are likely more concerned about threats to their values than to their welfare, they may display bias against groups perceived as violating Christian values.

The display of bias against groups with conflicting values after being symbolically threatened can occur even when those groups are not strictly responsible for the initial value threat. For example, two sets of experiments manipulated the perception that morality is faltering in general (without mentioning any specific "immoral" groups) and found increased prejudice toward specific groups who are commonly perceived as violating values (Brambilla & Butz, 2013; Cook et al., 2015). This may be an important consideration because it is possible Christians do not perceive a *particular* group as promulgating bias against Christians. Thus, regardless of whether any specific groups are blamed for the alleged increase in anti-Christian bias, concerns about values that result from perceiving anti-Christian bias may result in prejudice toward groups whose values are seen as being in conflict with Christians.

Christians likely perceive that gay and lesbian people directly violate Christian values (e.g., Herek, 1988; Rodriguez, 2009), and thus, LGBT individuals may be prime targets of prejudice for Christians concerned about bias against their ingroup. For example, almost half (47%) of surveyed Americans who opposed same-sex marriage cited religious or biblical reasoning (Newport, 2012). Similarly, research has linked Christianity and Christian religiosity to anti-transgender prejudice (Campbell et al., 2019). Christians may perceive divine creation of men and women as normalizing the (cis)gender binary and as excluding transgender individuals

(Campbell et al., 2019). Thus, Christians might be particularly inclined to discriminate against gay and potentially transgender people in response to perceived value threat.

I also explore a potential mechanism explaining why prejudice results from perceived clashing values. I expect value-driven increases in prejudice against gay and transgender people to partly occur from concern that gay and transgender people will spread their values beyond the confines of their groups. Thus, threatened Christians may be particularly inclined to display bias when they perceive gay and transgender people as influential enough to disseminate their values.

1.4 Hypotheses and Experiment Overview

To reiterate my predictions, I expect perceiving anti-Christian bias will cause Christians to perceive their beliefs and values are threatened (symbolic threat) and will subsequently increase prejudice toward groups who (1) allegedly hold disconsonant values to those of Christians, namely LGT people, and (2) hold sufficient influence to spread these values.

There is some correlational evidence to support the notion that perceiving anti-Christian bias increases prejudice toward several groups. Pasek & Cook (2019) revealed that perceptions of religious threat and stigmatization (e.g., being disliked by others, experiencing discriminatory treatment, etc.) was associated with aggregated prejudice toward seven groups (e.g., atheists and gays/lesbians). However, their research was correlational, and the relationship could plausibly be explained by a third, confounding variable like political orientation. For example, Republicans are more likely than Democrats to perceive discrimination against Evangelical Christians (Masci, 2019), and Republicans are also more intolerant of groups perceived of as liberal like gays and lesbians and atheists (Brandt et al., 2014). My research manipulated perceptions of anti-Christian bias to determine *causality* and furthermore tests the *mechanism* that leads to intergroup bias.

To test my contentions, I conducted three experiments manipulating perceptions of anti-Christian bias in the United States. Experiment 1 tested whether perceiving anti-Christian bias causes prejudice against gay or lesbian people and atheists. Experiment 2 tested whether the prejudice observed in Experiment 1 is statistically mediated by symbolic threat. Experiment 2 also measured perceived influence of each target group and tested whether the effect of perceiving anti-Christian bias on prejudice is exacerbated when the target group is perceived as influential. Experiment 3 manipulated influence to determine its causal role in enabling discrimination toward LGT people.

Chapter 2: Experiment 1

In my first experiment, I manipulated perceptions of anti-Christian bias in the U.S. and measured warmth toward several target groups including gay and transgender individuals, religious and non-religious groups, and racial outgroups (e.g., Black, Asian, and Latinx Americans).

I predicted that participants exposed to the anti-Christian bias manipulation would report less warmth toward gay or lesbian people relative to those assigned to a control condition. Because there is less research on Christians' attitudes toward transgender people, I did not make predictions regarding warmth toward transgender people.

I also predicted that participants assigned to read about anti-Christian bias would report less warmth toward atheists. I expected that perceiving anti-Christian bias would elicit more negative attitudes toward atheists because atheists clearly contradict Christian values and beliefs. The most conspicuous example of which is that atheists reject the core tenet of Christianity: that God exists. Moreover, 63% of Protestants and 52% of Catholics in the United States indicated that "it is necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good values" (Tamir et al., 2020). This suggests many U.S. Christians perceive that atheists are unable to attain equivalent levels of morality as Christians.

It is less clear whether Christians would respond similarly negatively toward other religious groups (e.g., Muslims and Jews). There may be a shared understanding among religious groups, and particularly Abrahamic groups (i.e., Christians, Muslims, and Jews), that their religious traditions share similarities. For example, Christians' beliefs about Abrahamic religion similarity is associated with increased support for Muslims (Kunst & Thomsen, 2015), although it is unclear how common such a belief is or whether threat can increase perceived similarity of

Judaism, Islam, and Christianity. If perceiving anti-Christian bias increases perceptions of Abrahamic commonalities, threat could counterintuitively produce more positive attitudes toward some non-Christian religious groups. Because I was unsure whether threatened Christians would perceive religious outgroups as similar to their group, I made no predictions regarding warmth toward religious outgroups.

It is unclear how Christians will respond to Black people after perceiving anti-Christian bias. There is some mixed evidence that Black Americans are perceived by White Christians as violating Christian values. One set of experiments found that participants primed with Christian words reported more racial bias than participants primed with neutral words (Johnson et al., 2010). However, participants were neither exclusively Christian nor exclusively White, and it is unclear if the manipulation primed religious values or separate religious concepts. In contrast, a meta-analysis revealed that while religious identification was associated with racism, endorsement of Christian-specific religious beliefs did not reliably predict racism (Hall et al., 2010). This implies that Black people are perceived as being at odds with religiosity more than with Christianity. Moreover, Black Americans are more likely than White Americans to identify as Christian (Masci et al., 2018). Therefore, White Christians may perceive Black people as equally or more affected as White Christians by perceived increases in anti-Christian bias and thus, may be perceived of as part of the ingroup. Because of the conflicting findings, I made no predictions as to how attitudes toward Black people would change as a function of anti-Christian bias perceptions.

Qualtrics files, all measures, manipulations, and preregistered hypotheses, planned analyses, and exclusion criteria are posted on OSF (https://osf.io/5qhbj/?view_only=e1e725ae1ee14d7495b024dded82a53a).

2.1 Method

2.1.1 Participants

I recruited 448 White, heterosexual, cisgender Christian participants in the U.S.1 from Prime panels (Litman et al., 2017). I recruited White people because White Christians are more concerned about bias against their group than non-White Christians (Jones et al., 2017; Vandermaas-Peeler et al., 2018). I excluded 86 participants from analyses who failed an attention check or who incorrectly answered at least one of two multiple choice questions about their assigned bias paragraph (consistent with the preregistered exclusion criteria). I report data for 362 participants (62.2% Female, $M_{age} = 52.97$, $SD = 15.51$). No participants guessed the study hypotheses.

2.1.2 Procedure

Participants were led to believe they were taking part in two separate experiments. The first was described as testing memory of an article (assessed directly after reading and again after completing a second study). The "second study" was described as assessing social opinions. Participants were randomly assigned into one of two conditions in which they either read an excerpt about anti-Christian bias in America (e.g., "in recent years Christians have reported increased experiences of persecution and discrimination.") or a control condition excerpt describing anti-Inuit bias in Canada (McCoy & Major, 2007). After completing an attention check, participants completed the following measures.

---

[1] In my first two experiments, I indicated to Prime Panels to only recruit participants in the U.S. However, I failed to include a demographic question in my surveys to confirm they were living in the U.S.

2.1.3 Measures

All measures were completed on a 1 (*Strongly Disagree*) to 7 (*Strongly Agree*) scale unless otherwise indicated.

Feeling Thermometers assessed attitudes toward "Gay or lesbian people", "Transgender people", "Blacks", "Atheists", "Muslims", "Jews", "Hindus", "Agnostics", and "Christians". Feeling thermometers were anchored at 0 (*Very cold or unfavorable feeling*) and 100 (*Very warm or favorable feeling*). I included Hindus because I was interested in whether attitudes toward Abrahamic and non-Abrahamic groups would resemble each other.

I measured **Religiosity** with a single item: "How religious are you?". Religiosity was anchored at 1 (*Not at all*) and 7 (*Very religious*).

Christian ID was adapted from Luhtanen and Crocker (1992) importance to identity subscale of the Collective Self-Esteem Scale (e.g., "My religion is an important reflection of who I am").

Anti-Christian Bias Manipulation Check consisted of five items adapted from Wilkins et al. (2021) (e.g., "Discrimination against Christians is on the rise").

Traditionalism was measured with 11 items from Duckitt et al's., (2010) Traditionalism scale (e.g., "The 'old-fashioned ways' and 'old-fashioned values' still show the best way to live.").[2]

Political Orientation was assessed with a single item: "In general, do you think of yourself as _____?". The item was anchored at 1 (*Very Liberal*) and 7 (*Very Conservative*). The midpoint of the scale was labeled *Moderate*.

---

2 In all experiments measuring traditionalism, I left out the item concerning nudist camps because I thought they were less relevant for a US sample.

2.2 Results and Discussion

2.2.1 Analysis Strategy

I conducted independent samples t-tests to assess the effect of condition on the dependent

variables. See Table 2.1 for independent samples t-test results.

Table 2.1: Independent Samples T-Tests for Experiment 1. Compares Anti-Christian Bias
Condition and Control Condition.

Variables	Anti-Christian Bias (N = 187 to 191) M (SD)	Control (N = 168 to 171) M (SD)	t	p	95%CI
Gay or lesbian people Feeling Thermometer (FT)	54.62 (31.73)	62.99 (30.15)	-2.56	**.011**	-14.80, -1.94
Transgender people FT	47.62 (33.50)	56.38 (31.00)	-2.56	**.011**	-15.49, -2.02
Blacks FT	76.24 (22.81)	77.33 (22.67)	-.45	.650	-5.80, 3.62
Atheists FT	51.12 (31.60)	57.71 (31.68)	-1.96	.051†	-13.20, .02
Muslims FT	52.27 (31.90)	57.08 (30.74)	-1.45	.148	-11.34, 1.72
Jews FT	75.45 (23.35)	77.95 (21.37)	-1.06	.292	-7.15, 2.16
Hindus FT	63.12 (29.78)	65.87 (27.08)	-.91	.365	-8.70, 3.20
Agnostics FT	55.10 (30.49)	62.03 (28.32)	-2.21	**.028**	-13.09, -.76
Christians FT	86.07 (18.37)	86.53 (15.45)	-.26	.799	-3.99, 3.07
Christian ID	4.79 (1.65)	4.64 (1.61)	.89	.373	-.18, .49
Traditionalism	4.78 (1.23)	4.55 (1.26)	1.73	.085	-.03, .48
Religiosity	4.69 (1.66)	4.53 (1.59)	.95	.342	-.17, .50

Note: Bolded p-values are significant. Marginal significance is represented by †.

2.2.2 Condition Differences

The anti-Christian bias manipulation check successfully differed by condition. Participants in the a*nti-Christian bias* condition ($M = 4.70$, $SD = 1.29$) perceived greater bias against their group than those in the *control* condition, ($M = 4.12$, $SD = 1.29$), $t(360) = 4.22$, $p < .001$; 95%CI: [0.30, 0.84].

Christians in the *anti-Christian bias* condition reported colder evaluations of agnostics and atheists ($p = .051$) than those in the *control* condition. Attitudes toward religious groups (including Christians) did not differ by condition. This is consistent with the perspective that some Christians may see similarities between Christianity and other religions. It is also possible that when Christians read about bias against Christians in America, they may also think that Americans are biased against religious people in general. As a result, some Christians may perceive solidarity between their group and other religious groups and prejudice against these other religious groups may decrease as a result of the perceived commonality (see Gaertner et al., 1993).

Importantly, Christians who read about anti-Christian bias also reported colder attitudes toward gay or lesbian people, as predicted, and toward transgender people. This suggests that both gay and transgender targets are perceived as posing a threat to Christians who are concerned about bias against their group. Thus, my hypotheses regarding attitudes toward gay or lesbian people were supported. Moreover, the effect of the anti-Christian bias manipulation on attitudes toward transgender people provides initial evidence that transgender people too are perceived as violating Christian values.

However, I did not measure symbolic threat, so I am unable to detect whether concern

about values (symbolic threat) contributed toward the increase in prejudice toward gay and

transgender people and toward atheists and agnostics.[3]

---

3 I also predicted that participants who read about anti-Christian bias would report higher
religiosity, and Christian ID than those assigned to the *control* condition. These predictions,
while less central to my primary focus of intergroup attitudes, follow from the rejection
identification model (Branscombe et al., 1999; Ramos et al., 2012) which posits increased
ingroup identification after experiencing discrimination. We also predicted that participants in
the *anti-Christian bias* condition would report increased endorsement of traditional values than
those in the *control* condition to replicate findings in a pilot study. Previous research also found
increased conservativism for Whites following status threat (Craig & Richeson, 2014), and
conservativism is associated with traditionalism (Duckitt et al., 2010). Contrary to hypotheses,
participants in the *anti-Christian bias* condition did not report higher religiosity or perceived
Christian ID than those in the *control* condition. Participants in the experimental group reported
marginally more endorsement of traditional values than the control group did, however.

Chapter 3: Experiment 2

In Experiment 2, I manipulated perceptions of anti-Christian bias and measured attitudes toward target groups as in Experiment 1. However, I also measured Christians' symbolic threat and the extent to which they perceive each target group as having influence in American culture and society. This design allowed me to test three aims. First, I attempted to replicate the effect of anti-Christian bias on prejudice toward gay or lesbian people, transgender people, atheists, and agnostics from Experiment 1. Second, it allowed me to test whether these effects could be explained by an increase in symbolic threat that results from the manipulation of anti-Christian bias. My third aim was to provide evidence that prejudice toward groups is exacerbated the more those groups are perceived as influential.

Qualtrics files, all measures, manipulations, and preregistered hypotheses, planned analyses, and exclusion criteria are posted on OSF (https://osf.io/7da8p/?view_only=6f6e034cb42142a4bb54b3993046628c). Deviations from planned analyses are noted.

3.1 Method

3.1.1 Participants

I recruited 617 White, heterosexual, cisgender Christian participants from Prime panels (Litman et al., 2017). I then dropped 119 participants who failed an attention check or who incorrectly answered a multiple-choice reading comprehension question about their assigned paragraph. I report data for 498 participants (68.5% Female, M_{age} = 48.62, SD = 15.90).

3.1.2 Procedure

Participants were led to believe they were taking part in two separate experiments, one to test memory of an article directly after reading it and also after completing a second study. Participants were randomly assigned to read about bias against Christians in America in the *anti-Christian bias* condition or about bias against Inuit in Canada (McCoy & Major, 2007) in the *control* condition.[1] The anti-Christian bias paragraph was slightly different from that used in Experiment 1; it was longer and included concrete examples of ways Christians report facing bias in America and of material consequences that result from said bias (e.g., "a majority of professors have reported they would feel uneasy about accepting a devout Christian to their graduate programs"). I implemented these changes because I thought including examples would increase the persuasiveness of the manipulation. After completing two reading comprehension questions, participants completed the following measures.

3.1.3 Measures

All measures were completed on a 1 (*Strongly Disagree*) to 7 (*Strongly Agree*) scale unless otherwise indicated. Qualtrics files, all measures, manipulations, supplemental analyses, and preregistered hypotheses are posted on OSF (https://osf.io/7zmbc/?view_only=1f05c707bef848809c9636e0a1da2a8e).

---

[1] Some participants were assigned into a third condition which featured a passage detailing how the number of Christians in America has decreased over time. Because this condition did not manipulate perceptions of anti-Christian bias, I do not report it in this paper. Furthermore, participants assigned to this demographic shift condition did not differ from the *control* condition on the anti-Christian bias manipulation check. Because I are not reporting the third condition, I report independent samples t-tests to replicate Experiment 1 rather than the preregistered one-way ANOVAS with planned simple effect analyses. These participants are not included in analyses or within the "Participants" header.

Feeling Thermometers for and perceived **Group Influence** of "Gay and lesbian people", "Transgender people", "Atheists", "Agnostics", "Blacks", "Muslims", "Jews", and "Christians". Feeling thermometers were anchored at 0 (*Very cold or unfavorable feeling*) and 100 (*Very warm or favorable feeling*). Perceived **Group Influence** was measured with three items (e.g., "_____ heavily influence culture in America"), anchored normally.

Six **Symbolic Threat** (e.g., "I am worried that people in America don't respect Christian values") and six **Anti-Christian Bias Manipulation Check** (e.g., "Discrimination against Christians is on the rise in the US") items were adapted from Wilkins et al. (2021).

Political Orientation and **Religiosity** were measured as in Experiment 1.

3.2 Results and Discussion

3.2.1 Condition Differences

To replicate Experiment 1, I first report independent samples t-tests. See Table 3.1 for independent samples t-test results.

Table 3.1: Independent Samples T-Tests for Experiment 2. Compares Anti-Christian Bias Condition and Control Condition.

Variables	*Anti-Christian Bias (N = 237 to 248 M (SD)*	*Control (N = 227 to 250) M (SD)*	*t*	*p*	95%CI
Anti-Christian Bias Manipulation Check	4.78 (1.37)	4.18 (1.40)	4.88	**<.001**	.36, .85
Symbolic Threat	4.61 (1.38)	4.36 (1.30)	2.09	**.037**	.02, .49
Religiosity	5.05 (1.51)	4.92 (1.65)	.94	.350	-.15, .41
Feeling Thermometers					

Gay and lesbian people	53.71 (29.44)	58.73 (29.32)	-1.88	.060†	-10.25, .22
Transgender people	42.02 (28.61)	48.45 (29.77)	-2.39	**.017**	-11.72, -1.14
Blacks	74.69 (21.94)	75.12 (23.19)	-.21	.834	-4.48, 3.61
Atheists	39.88 (27.25)	42.50 (27.34)	-1.04	.301	-7.60, 2.35
Agnostics	44.31 (26.38)	44.65 (25.28)	-.14	.887	-5.03, 4.35
Muslims	45.96 (30.08)	51.91 (28.90)	-2.20	**.028**	-11.27, -.63
Jews	71.98 (23.27)	72.92 (23.91)	-.43	.665	-5.16, 3.30
Christians	86.33 (18.01)	85.57 (18.30)	.46	.646	-2.49, 4.01

Group Influence

Gay and lesbian people	4.50 (1.36)	4.26 (1.42)	1.95	.052†	-.00, .49
Transgender people	3.48 (1.47)	3.44 (1.53)	.31	.760	-.22, .31
Blacks	5.21 (1.12)	5.29 (1.37)	-.71	.477	-.30, .14
Atheists	3.48 (1.54)	3.16 (1.61)	2.24	**.025**	.04, .59
Agnostics	3.35 (1.34)	3.30 (1.49)	.40	.689	-.20, .30
Muslims	3.33 (1.39)	3.55 (1.60)	-1.66	.098†	-.49, .04
Jews	4.27 (1.49)	4.51 (1.45)	-1.81	.071†	-.50, .02
Christians	4.90 (1.45)	5.59 (1.29)	-5.60	**<.001**	-.93, -.45

Note: Bolded p-values are significant. Marginal significance is represented by †.

Perceptions of anti-Christian bias differed by condition, such that participants in the *anti-Christian bias* condition perceived more bias against Christians than those in the *control* condition. This suggests perceptions of anti-Christian bias were successfully manipulated.

Christians in the *anti-Christian bias* condition also reported greater symbolic threat than those in the *control* condition. Relatedly, Christians were also perceived as less influential in the *anti-Christian bias* condition than in the *control* condition. This suggests that perceiving bias against Christians increases concern about one's values and beliefs.

Although not hypothesized, Jews and Muslims were both perceived as marginally less influential in the experimental condition than in the *control* condition. Conversely, atheists were perceived as *more* influential in the *anti-Christian bias* condition than in the *control* condition. This suggests that Christians may perceive anti-Christian bias as evidence that religion (or perhaps just Abrahamic religions) more generally is not faring well in America. Gay and lesbian people, but not transgender people, were perceived as marginally more influential by Christians exposed to the anti-Christian bias manipulation than those in the *control* condition. Because gay and Christian values are perceived as being at odds (Herek, 1988), perhaps depressed Christian influence in the U.S. suggests that gay people are able to exert more influence over the country.

Contrary to my findings from Experiment 1, warmth toward atheists and agnostics did not differ by condition. Unlike in Experiment 1, warmth toward Muslims *did* differ by condition; participants in the *anti-Christian-bias* condition reported less warmth toward Muslims than those in the *control* condition. The latter effect is less surprising though given the increased power; the mean difference for the Muslims feeling thermometer was similar in both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2.

Consistent with Experiment 1 and hypotheses, participants in the *anti-Christian bias* condition reported less warmth toward transgender people and marginally less warmth toward gay or lesbian people. Because the effect of anti-Christian bias on gay and lesbian and

19

transgender people was consistent between experiments and because I am most interested in gay and transgender targets, I will focus on these outcomes to test my remaining aims.

3.2.2 Symbolic Threat Mediates Effect of Anti-Christian Bias on Prejudice Toward Gay and Lesbian People and Transgender People

To test whether the effect of anti-Christian bias (*anti-Christian bias*=1, *control*=0) on anti-gay and anti-transgender attitudes is mediated by symbolic threat, I used Hayes Process MACRO Model 4. Indirect effect confidence intervals were calculated using 5,000 bootstraps.

I first tested mediation with the gay or lesbian people feeling thermometer as the outcome. The overall model was significant, $F(2, 467) = 32.15$, $p < .0001$, $R^2 = .12$. Condition significantly predicted symbolic threat, $b = .26$, $p = .031$, and symbolic threat significantly predicted the feeling thermometer, $b = -7.27$, $p < .0001$. Importantly, symbolic threat significantly mediated the relationship between condition and the gay or lesbian people feeling thermometer; the indirect effect was significant = -1.91, 95%CI: [-3.70, -.13]. See Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1: Symbolic Threat Mediation for the Gay and Lesbian People Feeling Thermometer. Symbolic Threat Mediates the Relationship Between Perceiving Anti-Christian Bias and Warmth.

I then repeated the process with the transgender people feeling thermometer substituted in. The overall model was significant, $F(2, 467) = 52.18$, $p < .0001$, $R^2 = .18$. Condition marginally predicted symbolic threat, $b = .22$, $p = .075$, and symbolic threat significantly predicted the feeling thermometer, $b = -8.97$, $p < .0001$. Symbolic threat marginally mediated the relationship between condition and the transgender people feeling thermometer; the indirect effect was marginally significant $= -2.00$, 95%CI: [-4.20, 0.24]. See Figure 3.2.

Figure 3.2: Symbolic Threat Mediation for the Transgender People Feeling Thermometer. Symbolic Threat Marginally Mediates the Relationship Between Perceiving Anti-Christian Bias and Warmth.

3.2.3 Target Group Influence Moderates Effect of Anti-Christian Bias on Prejudice Toward Gay and Lesbian People and Transgender People

I ran a regression with the gay or lesbian people feeling thermometer as the outcome and with condition (*anti-Christian bias*=1, *control*=0), mean-centered gay or lesbian people influence, and the interaction term as predictors. The overall model was significant $F(3, 483) = 57.91$, $p < .0001$, $R^2 = .21$. At mean levels of group influence, warmth toward Gay and lesbian people was significantly lower in the *anti-Christian bias* condition than in the *control* condition,

21

$b = -6.82$, $p = .005$. Perceived influence of gay or lesbian people was positively related to warmth for the *control* condition, $b = 11.78$, $p < .0001$. The interaction term was significant, $b = -5.24$, $p = .003$.

Importantly, endpoint analyses revealed that at one standard deviation above the group influence mean, the effect of condition became even larger, $b = -14.07$, $p < .0001$. At one standard deviation below the group influence mean, however, the effect of condition was nonsignificant, $b = .43$, $p = .899$. See Figure 3.3.[2]

Figure 3.3: Gay and Lesbian People Feeling Thermometer by Condition and Influence. Influence Moderates the Effect of Perceiving Anti-Christian Bias on Warmth.

Note: Error bars represent standard error of the mean.

---

[2] Table 3.1 shows that perceived influence of Gay and lesbian people marginally differed by condition. Given that there are limitations in interpreting interactions when the moderator differs by condition, it is important to note that the two analyses use slightly different samples; the regression can only use participants who reported both the perceived influence questions AND the feeling thermometer. Of Christians included in the regression analysis, the *anti-Christian bias* ($M = 4.49$, $SD = 1.36$) and *control* ($M = 4.29$, $SD = 1.40$) conditions did not differ in perceived group influence of gay and lesbian people, $t(485) = 1.57$, $p = .117$; 95%CI: [-.05, .44].

I then ran a regression with the transgender people feeling thermometer as the outcome and with condition (*anti-Christian bias*=1, *control*=0), mean-centered transgender people influence, and the interaction term as predictors. The overall model was significant $F(3, 466) = 32.38$, $p < .0001$, $R^2 = .18$. At mean levels of group influence, warmth toward transgender people was significantly lower in the *anti-Christian bias* condition than in the *control* condition, $b = -6.60$, $p = .008$. Perceived influence of transgender people was positively related to warmth for participants in the *control* condition, $b = 10.03$, $p < .0001$. The interaction term was significant, $b = -4.35$, $p = .009$.

At one standard deviation above the group influence mean, the effect of condition became even larger, $b = -13.02$, $p = .0002$. At one standard deviation below the group influence mean, however, the effect of condition was nonsignificant, $b = -.19$, $p = .957$. See Figure 3.4.

Figure 3.4: Transgender People Feeling Thermometer by Condition and Influence. Influence Moderates the Effect of Perceiving Anti-Christian Bias on Warmth.

*Note*: Error bars represent standard error of the mean.

These regressions suggest that perceiving anti-Christian bias only results in an increase in anti-gay and anti-transgender prejudice (relative to a control) when Christians perceive these groups as being relatively influential. Moreover, the effect of anti-Christian bias increases with gay and transgender people's perceived influence.

3.2.4 Does Group Influence Moderate the Relationship Between Anti-Christian Bias and Symbolic Threat or Symbolic Threat and Group Attitudes

I previously used separate models to test whether symbolic threat mediated the relationship between perceiving anti-Christian bias and anti-gay and anti-transgender bias and whether group influence moderated that relationship. However, this approach does not test whether group influence moderates the indirect effect of symbolic threat. I used Hayes Process MACRO Model 8 to test whether perceived group influence moderates the relationship between condition (*anti-Christian bias*=1, *control*=0) and symbolic threat. Model 8 also tests whether perceived group influence moderates the direct effect of condition on group attitudes. Indirect effect confidence intervals were calculated using 5,000 bootstraps and continuous variables were mean-centered.

I first tested whether gay or lesbian people influence moderates the direct and indirect effects of condition on anti-gay attitudes. See Figure 3.5 for the model being tested.

Figure 3.5: Gay and Lesbian People Feeling Thermometer Moderated Mediation Model.
Influence Moderating Direct and Indirect Effects is Tested.

The overall model predicting the mediator, symbolic threat, was significant, $F(3, 483) =$ 3.59, $p = .014$, $R^2 = .02$. Condition significantly predicted symbolic threat, $b = .26$, $p = .030$. Gay or lesbian people influence marginally predicted symbolic threat, $b = -.12$, $p = .062$. The interaction between condition and influence was significant, $b = .22$, $p = .014$. See Figure 3.6.

Figure 3.6: Symbolic Threat by Condition and Gay and Lesbian People Influence. Influence Moderates the Relationship Between Perceiving Anti-Christian Bias and Symbolic Threat.

Note: Error bars represent standard error of the mean.

The overall model predicting the gay or lesbian people feeling thermometer condition, gay or lesbian people influence, the interaction term, and symbolic threat was significant $F(4, 482) = 53.61$, $p < .0001$, $R^2 = .31$. Symbolic threat significantly predicted the feeling thermometer, $b = -6.97$, $p < .0001$. Condition significantly predicted the feeling thermometer, $b = -4.98$, $p = .027$. Gay and lesbian people influence also predicted the feeling thermometer, $b = 10.98$, $p < .0001$. Interestingly, there was a significant interaction between condition and influence, $b = -3.73$, $p = .022$. This suggests that influence exacerbates the negative effect of perceiving anti-Christian bias even after accounting for symbolic threat.

Symbolic threat significantly mediated the relationship between condition and the gay or lesbian people feeling thermometer at mean (indirect effect = -1.84, 95%CI: [-3.61, -.15]) and high-levels (+1 standard deviation; indirect effect = -3.93, 95%CI: [-6.82, -1.36]) of perceived group influence but not at low levels of perceived group influence (indirect effect = .24, 95%CI:

[-2.17, 2.71]). The index of moderated mediation was significant = -1.51, 95%CI: [-3.00, -.14], meaning that the indirect effect of symbolic threat on attitudes toward gay and lesbian people was more negative the more influential gay and lesbian people were perceived to be.

I then tested whether transgender people influence moderates the direct and indirect effects of condition on anti-transgender attitudes. See Figure 3.7 for the model being tested.

Figure 3.7: Transgender People Feeling Thermometer Moderated Mediation Model. Influence Moderating Direct and Indirect Effects is Tested.

The overall model predicting the mediator, symbolic threat, was significant, $F(3, 466) =$ 2.94, $p = .033$, $R^2 = .02$. Condition marginally predicted symbolic threat, $b = .22$, $p = .073$. transgender people influence significantly predicted symbolic threat, $b = -.14$, $p = .023$. The interaction between condition and influence was significant, $b = .17$, $p = .042$. See Figure 3.8.

Figure 3.8: Symbolic Threat by Condition and Transgender People Influence. Influence Moderates the Relationship Between Perceiving Anti-Christian Bias and Symbolic Threat.


Note: Error bars represent standard error of the mean.

The overall model predicting the transgender people feeling thermometer condition, transgender people influence, the interaction term, and symbolic threat was significant $F(4, 465)$ = 56.75, $p < .0001$, $R^2 = .33$. Symbolic threat significantly predicted the feeling thermometer, b = -8.37, $p < .0001$. Condition significantly predicted the feeling thermometer, $b = -4.73$, $p = .035$. transgender people influence also predicted the feeling thermometer, $b = 8.90$, $p < .0001$. There was a marginally significant interaction between condition and influence, $b = -2.91$, $p = .056$.

Symbolic threat significantly mediated the relationship between condition and the transgender people feeling thermometer at high-levels (+1 standard deviation; indirect effect = -4.00, 95%CI: [-7.22, -.81]) and marginally mediated the relationship at mean-levels (indirect effect = -1.87, 90%CI: [-3.56, -.15]) of perceived group influence but not at low levels of perceived group influence (indirect effect = .25, 95%CI: [-2.76, 3.28]). The index of moderated mediation was marginally significant = -1.44, 90%CI: [-2.76, -.17], meaning that the indirect

effect of symbolic threat on attitudes toward transgender people was marginally more negative the more influential transgender people perceived to be.

To reiterate, I argue that perceiving anti-Christian bias increases concern about Christian values which corresponds to prejudice toward groups seen as having conflicting values. Symbolic threat mediating the relationship between anti-Christian bias and anti-gay and (marginally between) anti-transgender attitudes provides initial support for my proposed model. Furthermore, I proposed that if concern about values and beliefs drives prejudice, then that increase in prejudice should be starkest when a group is perceived as having enough influence to properly espouse conflicting beliefs and values. I again find support for this premise; target group influence moderated the relationship between condition and warmth toward both gay and lesbian people and transgender people. At relatively higher (but not lower) levels of group influence, the effect of anti-Christian bias resulted in decreased warmth toward the target groups. Finally, these contentions are again supported when tested in the same model. However, influence was merely measured in this experiment. Thus, the relationship between anti-Christian bias and influence may be better explained by a confounding variable I neglected to measure.

Chapter 4: Experiment 3

After examining *prejudice* toward groups as a whole in Experiments 1 and 2, in Experiment 3, I tested whether perceiving anti-Christian bias increases *discrimination* toward individuals. Specifically, I examined attitudes toward a purported gay applicant for an editor position. Hence, I examined consequences that may have implications for real-world hiring of LGBT people. Whereas Experiments 1 and 2 examined the effect of perceiving anti-Christian bias on anti-gay prejudice, Experiment 3 provides insight into how this prejudice may materialize into discriminatory treatment.

Additionally, I also manipulated the influence of the editor position, allowing me to measure whether threatened Christians are resistant to the idea of hiring a gay applicant for influential positions. This allows me to gain additional evidence on the causal role of influence in my proposed model.

I first manipulated perceptions of anti-Christian bias (as in Experiments 1 and 2) and subsequently had Christians evaluate a gay man's resume for an editor job that (1) either had influence over published content or (2) had no influence over content. I predicted that Christians who were exposed to the anti-Christian bias manipulation would evaluate a gay applicant as less worthy of hire than those in the *control* condition. I also predicted that this effect of perceiving anti-Christian bias on perceived hirability would be stronger for participants who read about an influential editor (as compared to one with little control over content).

Qualtrics files, all measures, manipulations, and preregistered exclusion criteria, hypotheses, and planned analyses are posted on OSF (https://osf.io/m62st/?view_only=f347a4dd53124415a1ea9cd80bf21a3f). Deviations from planned analyses will be noted.

4.1 Method

4.1.1 Participants

I recruited 1,084 White, heterosexual, cisgender Christian participants living in the United States from Prime panels (Litman et al., 2017). Aligned with preregistered exclusion criteria, I dropped 387 participants who failed a general attention check, who incorrectly answered at least one of two multiple choice questions about their assigned bias paragraph, who failed a manipulation attention check and those who provided nonsensical summaries of the bias paragraph or provided no summary at all. After these exclusions, 697 participants (69.9% Female, M_{age} = 57.22, SD = 15.29) remained.[1]

4.1.2 Procedure

Participants were led to believe they were taking part in three separate and unrelated experiments: one to test memory of an article, one examining hiring practices, and one about their opinions on various issues. To increase salience of the article throughout, they were told that their memory of the article would be tested immediately after reading it and after completing the second study. Participants were then randomly assigned into either the *anti-Christian bias* condition or the *control* condition as in Experiment 1 (McCoy & Major, 2007). I used the manipulation of anti-Christian bias from Experiment 1 rather than the manipulation from Experiment 2 because I thought the manipulation focused too heavily on realistic rather than symbolic consequences of anti-Christian bias. Moreover, the manipulation in Experiment 2

---

[1] Because my analyses and interpretation depended on participants reading the bias paragraphs, understanding the editor's influence over article *content*, and the applicant's sexuality, I had to remove a large portion of my sample. Patterns remain the same when including participants removed for missing the non-demographic attention checks, and significance is often unchanged.

contained examples of anti-Christian bias that were fabricated for the purpose of the experiment, so the manipulation was less related to real-world reports of anti-Christian bias.

The "second study" tasked participants with reading a job description for an editor position at a widely-read university newspaper. The specific job duties of the editor were manipulated. Participants were either assigned into (1) the *content influence* condition and read about an editor position that will have control over content (e.g., being able to assign article topics and elsewise approving or denying article topics that the writers come up with) or participants were assigned to (2) the *no content influence* condition and read about an editor position with no control over content (e.g., dealing primarily with grammar, syntax, or factual errors). Participants evaluated a resume of a gay, male applicant for the assigned editor position.[2] Participants then completed the primary dependent variables; they rated the applicant's hireability. Participants then completed the remaining measures described below as part of "study three".

4.1.3 Measures

All measures were completed on a 1 (*Strongly Disagree*) to 7 (*Strongly Agree*) scale unless otherwise indicated.

Hirability was assessed with 5 items (e.g., "If you were hiring for this position, how likely would you be to hire Jack for this position?" anchored at 1 (*Very unlikely*) and 7 (*Very likely*) and "Jack is unlikely to succeed in this position" (reverse scored)).

---

[2] The applicant was described as being president of the Gay-Straight Alliance club at the University and purportedly wrote a guide on coming out as gay to family members.

Because I did not think I could manipulate influence without inadvertently manipulating a job's prestige, I measured **job prestige** with one item ("This position is prestigious") to employ as a covariate in analyses.

Feeling Thermometers for "Gay or lesbian people", "Transgender people", "African Americans", "Atheists", "Muslims", "Jews", "Hindus", "Agnostics", "Christians", and "Asian Americans" were measured. Feeling thermometers were anchored at 0 (*Very cold or unfavorable feeling*) and 100 (*Very warm or favorable feeling*).

I measured an **Editor Influence Manipulation Check** (e.g., "The person who is hired for this position will have the ability to influence the opinions of others" and "The person holding this position can spread their values to readers").

Six **Symbolic Threat** (e.g., "I am worried that people in America don't respect Christian values"), six **Anti-Christian Bias Manipulation Check** (e.g., "Discrimination against Christians is on the rise in the US"), six **Realistic Threat** (e.g., "I worry that certain job options will be blocked to Christians who refuse to compromise their morals"), and four **Mutual Exclusivity of Christians and LGBT people** (e.g., "LGBT people can't be good Christians"), items were used from Wilkins et al. (2021) The latter two measures were included for exploratory purposes.

Traditionalism, **Political Orientation**, and **Religiosity** was measured as in Experiment 1.

4.2 Results and Discussion

4.2.1 Manipulation Checks

Perceptions of bias against Christians in America significantly differed between the bias conditions, $t(695) = 4.49$, $p < .001$; 95%CI: [0.31, 0.79], such that participants in the *anti-*

Christian bias condition (M = 4.60, SD= 1.56) perceived significantly more anti-Christian bias than those in the *control* condition, (M = 4.05, SD = 1.67). Thus, the manipulation worked as intended.

Perceived influence of the editor position also differed between the editor type conditions, $t(695)$ = 19.30, p < .001; 95%CI: [1.77, 2.18); participants in the *content influence* condition (M = 5.50, SD= 1.08) perceived the position as being more influential than those in the *no content influence* condition, (M = 3.52, SD = 1.58). Thus, both of the manipulation worked as intended.

4.2.2 Does the Effect of Anti-Christian Bias on Perceived Hirability Depend on Job Influence?

I ran a 2 (Bias: *Anti-Christian* vs. *Anti-Inuit*) x 2 (Editor Type: *content influence* vs. no *content influence*) ANCOVA for hirability. As preregistered, I include prestige as a covariate because participants who read about the editor with *content influence* (M = 5.13, SD = 1.18) perceived the position as being more prestigious than those who read about an uninfluential editor (M = 4.39, SD = 1.38), $t(694)$ = 7.57, p < .001; 95%CI: [0.55, 0..93]. My reasoning for its inclusion is to sidestep the potential confound that it is prestige (or potential covariates of prestige like job desirability or higher salary) rather than influence that interacts with bias. Additionally, because people likely hold higher expectations for people applying to prestigious rather than non-prestigious jobs, controlling for prestige helps eliminate unwanted variance in perceived qualifications needed for jobs of varying prestige.

Prestige was a significant covariate, $F(1, 691)$ = 17.99, p < .001, n_p^2 = .03.

Contrary to my predictions, the main effect of bias was nonsignificant, $F(1, 691)$ = 0.00, p = .979, n_p^2 = .00; hirability did not differ between the *anti-Christian bias* condition (M_{adj} =

4.87, $SE = 0.07$) and the *control* condition ($M_{adj} = 4.87$, $SE = 0.06$), $p = .979$, 95%CI: [-.18,

.18].[3] Because this experiment conceptually replicates Experiment 1 and 2, I predicted that

Christians assigned to the *anti-Christian bias* condition would report harsher evaluations of the

gay applicant than their control counterparts. Perhaps I did not detect an effect of bias because I

measured attitudes toward an individual target rather than a target group; participants may be

more inclined to believe a group tends to hold values that conflict with their own as opposed to

believing an individual will hold such values. For example, individual targets are evaluated more

favorably than the groups the targets belong to (Sears, 1983), and if Christians perceive

conflicting values as immoral or unfavorable, they may be less likely to presume an individual

holds these attitudes.

The main effect of editor type was similarly nonsignificant, $F(1, 691) = 1.24$, $p = .266$,

$n_p^2 = .00$; hirability did not differ between the *content influence* condition ($M_{adj} = 4.81$, $SE = 0.07$) and the *no content influence* ($M_{adj} = 4.92$, $SE = 0.07$), $p = .266$, 95%CI: [-.29, .08]. As

predicted, there was a significant interaction between bias and editor type was significant, $F(1, 691) = 5.50$, $p = .019$, $n_p^2 = .01$.

Simple effects revealed that Christians in the *Anti-Christian Bias* condition perceived the

applicant as less hirable in the *content influence* condition ($M_{adj} = 4.71$, $SE = 0.10$) than those in

the *no content influence* condition ($M_{adj} = 5.03$, $SE = 0.09$), $F(1, 691) = 5.58$, $p = .018$, $n_p^2 = .01$,

---

[3] I also predicted that the effect of the anti-Christian bias manipulation would increase symbolic threat which would decrease participant's perceived hirability of the gay applicant. Moreover, I also predicted that the negative association between symbolic threat and perceived hirability would be stronger for those who read that the editor will have influence than those who read that the editor will not have influence. Because the manipulation of anti-Christian bias did not result in a significant decrease in perceived hirability (regardless of whether the job was described as influential or not), it does not make sense to test whether the unobserved effect was driven by symbolic threat.

95%CI: [-.59, -.05]. Participants in the *control* condition did not differ in hirability between the *content influence* condition ($M_{adj} = 4.92$, $SE = 0.09$) than those in the *no content influence* condition ($M_{adj} = 4.81$, $SE = 0.10$), $F(1, 691) = 0.72$, $p = .395$, $n_p^2 = .001$, 95%CI: [-.14, .36]. Thus, influence only affects attitudes when Christians were experimentally threatened; threatened Christians only are disinclined to perceive the gay applicant as hirable.

As predicted, participants in the *content influence* condition perceived the applicant as marginally less hirable in the *anti-Christian bias* condition than in the *control* conditions, $F(1, 691) = 2.76$, $p = .097$, $n_p^2 = .004$, 95%CI: [-.47, .04]. Curiously, though, participants in the *no content influence* condition perceived the applicant as marginally *more* hirable in the *anti-Christian bias* condition than in the *control* conditions, $F(1, 691) = 2.76$, $p = .097$, $n_p^2 = .004$, 95%CI: [-.04, .48]. See Figure 4.1

Figure 4.1: Hirability by Factors Controlling for Prestige. Perceived Hirability of a Gay Applicant is Predicted by Perceptions of Anti-Christian Bias and Position Influence.

Note: Error bars represent standard error of the mean.

4.2.3 Experiment 1 Replications

I conducted independent samples t-tests in an attempt to replicate the results from Experiment 1. Contrary to previous experiments, I observed no effect of the manipulation on any of the feeling thermometers. There may have been too many tasks between the manipulation and the feeling thermometers for the manipulation to have been fully salient. See Table 4.1.

Table 4.1: Independent Samples T-Tests for Experiment 3. Compares Anti-Christian Bias Condition and Control Condition.

Variables	*Anti-Christian Bias* (*N* = 332 to 334) *M* (*SD*)	*Control* (*N* = 358 to 363) *M* (*SD*)	*t*	*p*	95%CI
Gay or lesbian people Feeling Thermometer (FT)	64.01 (30.58)	65.28 (30.15)	-.55	.582	-5.80, 3.26
Transgender people FT	57.07 (31.98)	57.56 (31.79)	-.20	.841	-5.26, 4.28
African Americans FT	79.46 (22.20)	77.91 (21.64)	.93	.351	-1.71, 4.81
Atheists FT	50.48 (31.93)	52.82 (32.64)	-.95	.341	-7.17, 2.48
Muslims FT	59.54 (30.46)	58.13 (30.72)	.61	.544	-3.15, 5.97
Jews FT	79.10 (21.39)	79.81 (20.64)	-.45	.653	-3.85, 2.41
Hindus FT	66.94 (27.80)	67.20 (27.24)	-.12	.901	-4.37, 3.85
Agnostics FT	57.95 (30.20)	59.78 (30.65)	-.79	.430	-6.38, 2.72
Christians FT	88.06 (16.20)	87.57 (14.54)	.43	.671	-1.80, 2.79
Asian Americans FT	79.09 (21.95)	79.94 (20.40)	-.53	.597	-4.01, 2.31
Symbolic Threat	4.52 (1.47)	4.11 (1.69)	4.36	**.001**	.17, .65
Realistic Threat	4.20 (1.53)	3.86 (1.72)	3.36	**.006**	.10, .58

Traditionalism	4.81 (1.37)	4.63 (1.37)	1.87	.095†	-.03, .38
Religiosity	5.08 (1.60)	4.96 (1.61)	1.19	.233	-.11, .37
Mutual Exclusivity	2.93 (2.01)	2.84 (1.97)	.60	.551	-.21, .39

Note: Bolded p-values are significant. Marginal significance is represented by †.

Overall, Experiment 3 provides evidence that influence plays a causal role in discrimination against a gay target when anti-Christian bias is salient. Christians who read about bias against their group and an influential position reported the applicant as being less hirable than an otherwise comparable group who read that the position would wield no influence. That there was no effect of Editor Type for participants in the *control* condition suggests that only threatened Christians are relatively opposed to hiring a gay person for an influential position.

Chapter 5: General Discussion

In this paper, I tested whether perceiving anti-Christian bias increases prejudice toward LGT people and whether that prejudice is driven by symbolic threat and is moderated by group influence. Specifically, I tested whether the increase in prejudice would be starkest under high levels of influence because greater influence exacerbates the effect of perceiving anti-Christian bias on symbolic threat and allows groups to spread values perceived of as conflicting with Christians'.

In Experiments 1 and 2, Christians assigned to the *anti-Christian bias* condition reported more negative attitudes toward LGT people than those in the *control* condition. These effects did not replicate in Experiment 3: likely due to different methods (i.e., more time elapsed between the manipulation and feeling thermometers and no measure of group influence to test for moderation).

Experiments 2 and 3 provide evidence that perceived influence of gay and transgender people moderates the relationship between perceiving anti-Christian bias, symbolic threat, and attitudes toward gay and lesbian and transgender people. First, Experiment 2 provided statistical evidence that the effect of perceiving anti-Christian bias on anti-gay and anti-transgender prejudice is driven by symbolic threat. In Experiment 2 the effect of anti-Christian bias on anti-gay and anti-transgender prejudice only occurred (relative to control) when these target groups were perceived as relatively influential, increasing the more the groups were perceived as influential. When influence and symbolic threat were included in the same models, gay and lesbian and transgender people's influence moderated the effect of the anti-Christian bias manipulation on symbolic threat; symbolic threat increased to a greater extent from the manipulation the more influential these groups were perceived to be, and this led to increased

prejudice against transgender (marginally significant indirect effect) and gay and lesbian people. Experiment 3 revealed a causal role of influence: Christians assigned to the anti-Christian bias condition perceived a gay applicant as less hirable when they were led to believe the job was a high rather than low influence position. Thus, we found evidence, with varying methodologies, that perceiving anti-Christian bias leads to prejudice toward transgender and especially gay people because of symbolic threat and as a function of perceived influence.

5.1 Does Perceiving Anti-Christian Bias Cause Prejudice Against Other Groups?

Although LGT targets were the primary focus of this work, I theorized that perceiving anti-Christian bias would cause prejudice against other groups perceived of as violating Christian values. Because significance of results for atheists, agnostics, and Muslims was inconsistent between Experiments, I conducted a mega analysis (see Eisenhauer, 2021) which combined all data from a pilot experiments and the three experiments reported here.[1] I conducted independent samples t-tests with the combined data by using attitudes toward groups as separate dependent variables and with condition as the grouping variable. See Table 5.1.[2]

---

[1] The pilot experiment manipulated perceptions of anti-Christian bias as in Experiment 1 to test the effectiveness of the manipulation. The same exclusion criteria was used as in Experiment 1. Materials and data are posted at
https://osf.io/2hgd9/?view_only=8b2a2203beff4ccd9024847d04c7f02d.
[2] The effect of anti-Christian bias on attitudes toward Muslims becomes marginally significant ($p = .052$) when excluding pilot data. Significance and directionality is otherwise unchanged when excluding pilot data.

Table 5.1: Independent Samples T-Tests for Combined Experiments. Compares Anti-Christian Bias Condition and Control Condition.

Variables	Anti-Christian Bias M (SD)	Control M (SD)	t	df	p	95%CI
Gay or lesbian people Feeling Thermometer (FT)	58.21 (30.93)	62.84 (30.14)	-3.22	1803	**.001**	-7.45, -1.81
Transgender people FT	50.33 (31.74)	54.94 (31.50)	-3.08	1777	**.002**	-7.55, -1.67
Atheists FT	47.10 (31.03)	51.21 (31.52)	-2.77	1773	**.006**	-7.02, -1.20
Muslims FT	53.27 (31.22)	56.23 (30.54)	-2.03	1685	**.043**	-5.82, -.09
Jews FT	75.99 (22.86)	77.37 (22.50)	-1.29	1786	.196	-3.48, .71
Blacks FT	77.51 (22.37)	77.41 (22.44)	.09	1799	.931	-1.98, 2.16
Hindus FT	64.38 (29.16)	66.10 (27.58)	-1.07	1220	.287	-4.91, 1.46
Agnostics FT	52.55 (29.86)	55.63 (29.63)	-2.13	1803	**.034**	-5.92, -.24
Christians FT	87.36 (17.11)	86.92 (16.12)	.56	1711	.578	-1.13, 2.02

Note: Bolded p-values are significant.

Participants in the *anti-Christian bias* conditions reported significantly more negative

attitudes toward atheists, agnostics, and Muslims than those in the *control* condition. These

effects may be driven by threatened Christians perceiving these groups as symbolically

threatening (a function of holding conflicting values and having enough influence to spread these

value). If so, attitudes toward Jews and Hindus may not have differed because (1) these groups either may not have been perceived as influential or (2) these groups may not have been perceived as holding values that conflict with Christians. I have no data to support the second possibility, but I believe the first is unlikely because attitudes toward Jews and Hindus in Experiment 2 did not differ by condition at high levels of group influence (+1 *SD*). This suggests that even Christians who perceive these groups as relatively influential do not perceive them as a threat. Finally, attitudes toward Black people did not differ by condition. This might result from an understanding that Black Americans are more likely than White Americans to identify as Christians (Masci et al., 2018).

5.2 Are Christians Actually Victims of Bias?

Because my research identifies real, deleterious consequences of Christians perceiving bias against their group, it is important to identify why Christians perceive bias. One glaring possible reason Christians may report increasing bias is that Christians actually are increasingly victimized in America; however, there is little evidence to support that possibility. American Christians are vastly underrepresented in religious hate-crime rates as they only account for under 10% of religious-based crimes (Federal Bureau of Investigations, 2018). Additionally, Americans' negativity toward conservative Christians (i.e., Fundamentalist Christians) did not increase over time and aggregated attitudes are generally neutral or positive (Yancey, 2018). Furthermore, biology faculty evaluated purported Christian Ph.D applicants similarly to Atheist applicants and applicants without a religious identity (Barnes et al., 2020). Biology faculty did show preference toward a UNICEF volunteer who submitted a letter of recommendation about commitment to service compared to an evangelical Christian mission trip volunteer who

submitted a letter of recommendation about Christian faith, however. Overall, there is no compelling evidence to support the notion that Americans are biased against Christians.

Given that extant research does not support the notion that Christians are victims of bias in America, future research should examine the psychological processes that give rise to high-status groups perceiving victimization (e.g., Wilkins et al., 2021). Regardless, this paper examines the effect of *perceiving* anti-Christian bias, even if these perceptions are not justified.

5.3 Limitations and Future Directions

The largest limitation of my set of experiments is that I have yet to successfully manipulate the influence of gay and lesbian people and transgender people *as a group*. While Experiment 2 provides evidence that these groups' influence increases anti-gay and anti-transgender prejudice for experimentally threatened Christians, it is possible that the moderating effect of influence is explained by a covariate with influence (e.g., power or popularity). Because influence was associated with favorable group attitudes, one possibility is that participants are inclined to evaluate groups as influential if they are personally influenced by the group or if they perceive the group as likeable. I attempted to reduce this concern by manipulating influence of a job in Experiment 3. However, Experiments 2 and 3 test related but separate processes because Experiment 2 tests whether group influence exacerbates prejudice from perceiving anti-Christian bias while Experiment 3 tests whether perceiving anti-Christian bias motivates Christians to discriminate by denying a gay person of influence. However, because I did not manipulate influence of the group or an individual who belongs to this group, though, I am unable to provide further evidence that LGT people's influence increases symbolic threat for Christians who perceive bias against their group.

Another flaw of Experiment 3 is that participants might not believe an editor is likely to significantly influence American culture. While the description of the job described the newspaper as being widely read across the country, participants may still have had trouble perceiving a campus newspaper editor as truly influential. For this reason, manipulating the influence of a single editor job may have been an overly conservative test of the effect of influence, which could contribute to our failure to detect an effect of anti-Christian bias for those in the influential editor position. Alternatively, the conservativeness of the job choice illustrates that positions do not have to be overly influential for threatened Christians to discriminate against gay people.

An additional flaw of Experiment 3 is that I did not measure attitudes toward a transgender applicant. I chose to use a gay applicant instead of a transgender applicant because in Experiment 2, symbolic threat only marginally mediated the relationship between the anti-Christian bias manipulation and anti-transgender prejudice. I expect that perceived hirability of a transgender applicant would resemble the results observed in Experiment 3 because attitudes toward gay and lesbian and transgender people were similar in Experiments 1 and 2. Still, attitudes toward gay and transgender people do not perfectly resemble the other (see Worthen, 2013) and future research should examine whether threatened Christians perceive transgender people as less hirable for an influential rather than uninfluential job.

Similarly, future research on the effects of perceiving anti-Christian bias should examine whether attitudes toward gay and transgender people depend on gender of the target. Because stereotypes and attitudes regarding gay and transgender people differ based on target gender (see Worthen, 2013 for a review), it is possible that gay and transgender people are differentially perceived as holding values that conflict with Christians depending on gender. This is an

important distinction because the effect of anti-Christian bias on anti-gay and anti-transgender prejudice was mediated (marginally for transgender attitudes) by symbolic threat. Thus, if some subgroups are perceived as violating Christian values to a lesser extent than others, symbolic threat may increase prejudice less toward these groups.

Relatedly, my examination of attitudes toward gay and lesbian people in these experiments may more closely resemble attitudes toward gay men than lesbian women. Research participants tend to think about men when evaluating groups with nearly equal gender representation (e.g., Black people) and tend to presume individual targets with unspecified gender identities are male (Bailey et al., 2019). Because I measured attitudes toward "Gay and lesbian women" instead of merely "Gay people", and thus reminded participants of both male and female targets, it is possible that this tendency to think of male targets was reduced, though. The tendency to think of men over women may also apply to transgender targets. However, this may depend on each participant's acceptance of transgender identities and whether they categorize transgender targets based on assigned sex at birth or based on gender. Because acceptance of transgender identities is not universally accepted, it is unclear whether transgender men or transgender women are presumed more typical of transgender people in general.

Similarly, the measured attitudes toward LGT people in these experiments may be more representative of attitudes toward White than Black LGT people. For example, stereotypes of gay men in general share more overlap with stereotypes of White gay men than Black gay men (Calabrese et al., 2018). Moreover, this experiment found stereotypes of Black men overlap more with those of Black heterosexual men than Black gay men. Because stereotypes toward Black gay men are *relatively* separate from attitudes toward Black men and Gay men, future research

should examine attitudes toward Black LGT people specifically and how they are affected by perceptions of anti-Christian bias and influence.

Finally, in these three experiments, I did not collect data to rule out an alternate interpretation of my results: perceiving anti-Christian bias may increase prejudice toward gay and transgender people because these groups are perceived as biased against Christians. However, we collected data on this possibility in the pilot experiment, albeit with a low sample size; participants primed with anti-Christian bias were not more likely to think that gay or lesbian people and transgender people were biased against Christians than participants in the *control* condition, $t(86) = .31$, $p = .761$, 95%CI: [-.59, .80] and $t(86) = .22$, $p = .825$, 95%CI: [-.63, .79], respectively. Moreover, the extent to which our Christian sample collectively thought gay or lesbian people and transgender people were biased against Christians was relatively low ($M = 3.16$, $SD = 1.63$ and $M = 3.23$, $SD = 1.67$, respectively where a score of 1 indicates *Strongly Disagree* and 7 indicates *Strongly Agree*). This suggests that gay and lesbian people and transgender people are not perceived as especially biased against Christians, and the anti-Christian bias manipulation does not increase perceptions that these groups in particular hold anti-Christian sentiments.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

Bill Barr warned of an "unremitting assault on religion and traditional values" (United States Department of Justice, 2019), and my research identifies real consequences LGBT people will face as a result of perceiving this attack. LGBT people are becoming more accepted globally (Poushter & Kent, 2020), and their influence is bound to increase as a result. Christians who perceive bias may be inclined to discriminate against LGBT people as influence grows and may try to slow LGBT people's burgeoning influence whenever possible (e.g., by not hiring an LGBT person for an influential position).

Chapter 7. References

Bailey, A. H., LaFrance, M., & Dovidio, J. F. (2019). Is Man the Measure of All Things? A Social Cognitive Account of Androcentrism. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, *23*(4), 307–331. https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868318782848

Barnes, M. E., Truong, J. M., Grunspan, D. Z., & Brownell, S. E. (2020). Are scientists biased against Christians? Exploring real and perceived bias against Christians in academic biology. *PLOS ONE*, *15*(1), e0226826. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0226826

Brambilla, M., & Butz, D. A. (2013). Intergroup threat and outgroup attitudes: Macro-level symbolic threat increases prejudice against gay men. *Social Psychology*, *44*(5), 311–319. https://doi.org/10.1027/1864-9335/a000127

Brandt, M. J., Reyna, C., Chambers, J. R., Crawford, J. T., & Wetherell, G. (2014). The Ideological-Conflict Hypothesis: Intolerance Among Both Liberals and Conservatives. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, *23*(1), 27–34. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721413510932

Branscombe, N. R., Schmitt, M. T., & Harvey, R. D. (1999). Perceiving pervasive discrimination among African Americans: Implications for group identification and well-being. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *77*(1), 135–149. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.77.1.135

Calabrese, S. K., Earnshaw, V. A., Magnus, M., Hansen, N. B., Krakower, D. S., Underhill, K., Mayer, K. H., Kershaw, T. S., Betancourt, J. R., & Dovidio, J. F. (2018). Sexual Stereotypes Ascribed to Black Men Who Have Sex with Men: An Intersectional Analysis. *Archives of Sexual Behavior*, *47*(1), 143–156. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10508-016-0911-3

Campbell, M., Hinton, J. D. X., & Anderson, J. R. (2019). A systematic review of the relationship between religion and attitudes toward transgender and gender-variant people. *International Journal of Transgenderism*, *20*(1), 21–38. https://doi.org/10.1080/15532739.2018.1545149

Christianity. (n.d.). Wikipedia. Retrieved July 7, 2021, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christianity

Cook, C. L., Cottrell, C. A., & Webster, G. D. (2015). No good without God: Antiatheist prejudice as a function of threats to morals and values. *Psychology of Religion and Spirituality*, *7*(3), 217–226. https://doi.org/10.1037/rel0000013

Cox, D., & Jones, R. P. (2017). America's Changing Religious Identity. *PRRI*. https://www.prri.org/research/american-religious-landscape-christian-religiously-unaffiliated/

Craig, M. A., & Richeson, J. A. (2014). On the Precipice of a "Majority-Minority" America: Perceived Status Threat From the Racial Demographic Shift Affects White Americans' Political Ideology. *Psychological Science*, *25*(6), 1189–1197. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797614527113

Crandall, C. S. (1994). Prejudice against fat people: Ideology and self-interest. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *66*(5), 882–894. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.66.5.882

Duckitt, J., Bizumic, B., Krauss, S. W., & Heled, E. (2010). A Tripartite Approach to Right-Wing Authoritarianism: The Authoritarianism-Conservatism-Traditionalism Model: Authoritarianism-Conservatism-Traditionalism. *Political Psychology*, *31*(5), 685–715. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2010.00781.x

Eisenhauer, J. G. (2021). Meta-analysis and mega-analysis: A simple introduction. *Teaching Statistics*, *43*(1), 21–27.

Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2018). 2*018 Hate Crime Statistics.* https://ucr.fbi.gov/hatecrime/2018/topic-pages/victims

Gaertner, S. L., Dovidio, J. F., Anastasio, P. A., Bachman, B. A., & Rust, M. C. (1993). The Common Ingroup Identity Model: Recategorization and the Reduction of Intergroup Bias. *European Review of Social Psychology*, *4*(1), 1–26. https://doi.org/10.1080/14792779343000004

Hall, D. L., Matz, D. C., & Wood, W. (2010). Why Don't We Practice What We Preach? A Meta-Analytic Review of Religious Racism. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, *14*(1), 126–139. https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868309352179

HB4733 (2015)

Herek, G. M. (1988). Heterosexuals' Attitudes toward Lesbians and Gay Men: Correlates and Gender Differences. *The Journal of Sex Research*, *25*(4), 451–477.

Johnson, M. K., Rowatt, W. C., & LaBouff, J. (2010). Priming Christian Religious Concepts Increases Racial Prejudice. *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, *1*(2), 119–126. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550609357246

Jones, R. P. (2016). *The End of White Christian America*. Simon & Schuster. https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/The-End-of-White-Christian-America/Robert-P-Jones/9781501122323

Jones, R. P., Cox, D., Cooper, B., & Lienesch, R. (2017). Majority of Americans Oppose Transgender Bathroom Restrictions. *PRRI*. https://www.prri.org/research/lgbt-transgender-bathroom-discrimination-religious-liberty/

Kinder, D. R., & Sears, D. O. (1981). Prejudice and politics: Symbolic racism versus racial threats to the good life. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *40*(3), 414–431. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.40.3.414

Kunst, J. R., & Thomsen, L. (2015). Prodigal Sons: Dual Abrahamic Categorization Mediates the Detrimental Effects of Religious Fundamentalism on Christian–Muslim Relations. *The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion*, *25*(4), 293–306. https://doi.org/10.1080/10508619.2014.937965

LeVine, R. A., & Campbell, D. T. (1972). *Ethnocentrism: Theories of conflict, ethnic attitudes, and group behavior* (pp. ix, 310). John Wiley & Sons.

Litman, L., Robinson, J., & Abberbock, T. (2017). TurkPrime.com: A versatile crowdsourcing data acquisition platform for the behavioral sciences. *Behavior Research Methods*, *49*(2), 433–442. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13428-016-0727-z

Masci, D. (2019). Many Americans see religious discrimination in U.S. – especially against Muslims. *Pew Research Center*. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/05/17/many-americans-see-religious-discrimination-in-u-s-especially-against-muslims/

Masci, D., Mohamed, B., & Smith, G. A. (2018). Black Americans more likely to be Christian, Protestant than US adults overall. *Pew Research Center*. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/04/23/black-americans-are-more-likely-than-overall-public-to-be-christian-protestant/

McConahay, J. B. (1986). Modern racism, ambivalence, and the Modern Racism Scale. In J. F. Dovidio & S. L. Gaertner (Eds.), *Prejudice, discrimination, and racism.* (1986-98698-004; pp. 91–125). Academic Press. http://libproxy.wustl.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=psyh&AN=1986-98698-004&site=ehost-live&scope=site

McCoy, S. K., & Major, B. (2007). Priming meritocracy and the psychological justification of inequality. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *43*(3), 341–351. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2006.04.009

Newport, F. (2012). *Religion Big Factor for Americans Against Same-Sex Marriage*. Gallup.Com. https://news.gallup.com/poll/159089/religion-major-factor-americans-opposed-sex-marriage.aspx

Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. (2015).

Pascoe, E. A., & Richman, L. S. (2009). Perceived Discrimination and Health: A Meta-Analytic Review. *Psychological Bulletin*, *135*(4), 531–554. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0016059

Pasek, M. H., & Cook, J. E. (2019). Religion From the Target's Perspective: A Portrait of Religious Threat and Its Consequences in the United States. *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, *10*(1), 82–93. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550617739089

Pew Research Center. (2019, October 17). In U.S., Decline of Christianity Continues at Rapid Pace. *Pew Research Center's Religion & Public Life Project*. https://www.pewforum.org/2019/10/17/in-u-s-decline-of-christianity-continues-at-rapid-pace/

Portnoy, J. (2016, February 12). Religious freedom or license to discriminate? *Washington Post*. https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/religious-freedom-or-license-to-discriminate/2016/02/12/5775fe9e-d114-11e5-abc9-ea152f0b9561_story.html

Poushter, J., & Kent, N. (2020, June 25). The Global Divide on Homosexuality Persists. *Pew Research Center*. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/06/25/global-divide-on-homosexuality-persists/

Ramos, M. R., Cassidy, C., Reicher, S., & Haslam, S. A. (2012). A longitudinal investigation of the rejection-identification hypothesis. *The British Journal of Social Psychology*, *51*(4), 642–660. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8309.2011.02029.x

Religious Freedom Defense Act, SB2164 (2015).

Rios, K., Sosa, N., & Osborn, H. (2018). An experimental approach to Intergroup Threat Theory: Manipulations, moderators, and consequences of realistic vs. symbolic threat. *European Review of Social Psychology*, *29*(1), 212–255. https://doi.org/10.1080/10463283.2018.1537049

Rodriguez, E. M. (2009). At the Intersection of Church and Gay: A Review of the Psychological Research on Gay and Lesbian Christians. *Journal of Homosexuality*, *57*(1), 5–38. https://doi.org/10.1080/00918360903445806

Schmitt, M. T., Branscombe, N. R., Postmes, T., & Garcia, A. (2014). The consequences of perceived discrimination for psychological well-being: A meta-analytic review. *Psychological Bulletin*, *140*(4), 921–948. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0035754

Sears, D. O. (1983). The person-positivity bias. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *44*(2), 233–250. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.44.2.233

Sommerfeldt, C. (2016, December 2). *Donald Trump's attorney general Jeff Sessions fought to derail gay-rights conference*. Daily News. https://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/trump-ag-jeff-sessions-fought-derail-gay-rights-conference-article-1.2895887

Stephan, W. G., & Stephan, C. W. (2000). An integrated threat theory of prejudice. In *Reducing prejudice and discrimination* (pp. 23–45). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers.

Stephan, W. G., Ybarra, O., & Morrison, K. R. (2009). Intergroup threat theory. In *Handbook of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination* (pp. 43–59). Psychology Press.

Tamir, C., Connaughton, A., & Salazar, A. M. (2020, July 20). The Global God Divide. *Pew Research Center*. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/07/20/the-global-god-divide/

United States Department of Justice. (2019, October 14). *Attorney General William P. Barr Delivers Remarks to the Law School and the de Nicola Center for Ethics and Culture at the University of Notre Dame*. https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-william-p-barr-delivers-remarks-law-school-and-de-nicola-center-ethics

Vandermaas-Peeler, A., Cox, D., Fisch-Friedman, M., & Jones, R. P. (2018). Diversity, Division, Discrimination: The State of Young America | MTV/PRRI Report. *PRRI*. https://www.prri.org/research/mtv-culture-and-religion/

Wilkins, C. L., Wellman, J. D., Toosi, N. R., Miller, C. A., Lisnek, J. A., & Martin, L. A. (2021). Is LGBT progress seen as an attack on Christians?: Examining Christian/sexual orientation zero-sum beliefs. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, No Pagination Specified-No Pagination Specified. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000363

Worthen, M. G. F. (2013). An Argument for Separate Analyses of Attitudes Toward Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual Men, Bisexual Women, MtF and FtM Transgender Individuals. *Sex Roles*, *68*(11), 703–723. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11199-012-0155-1

Yancey, G. (2018). Has Society Grown More Hostile Towards Conservative Christians? Evidence from ANES Surveys. *Review of Religious Research*, *60*(1), 71–94. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13644-017-0303-8