Identities Matter: Identity Politics, Coalition Possibilities, and Feminist Organizing

Erica Townsend-Bell

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Identities Matter: Identity Politics, Coalition Possibilities, and Feminist Organizing

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IDENTITIES MATTER: IDENTITY POLITICS, COALITION POSSIBILITIES, AND FEMINIST ORGANIZING

by

Erica E. Townsend-Bell

A dissertation presented to the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

May 2007

Saint Louis, Missouri
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Who knew that six years could be so long and yet go by so quickly? If the time has flown by it is only because of the love and support of so many people.

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Stateside, I could not have completed this project without the help of my wonderful, extended dissertation committee. John Carey helped to stoke my interest in Latin America and provided me with funding for exploratory field work trips to Uruguay. He also assured me funding to participate in the Arizona State University Institute for Qualitative and Multi-Method Research, which helped to provide the methodological framework for this dissertation and for future work to come. Sunita Parikh has been a wonderful chairperson. I continue to be amazed by her ability to cut right to the heart of the matter and see things in a way that others do not. I can only hope that a little bit of that ability has rubbed off on me in the years that I have worked with her. This dissertation is much better and more cohesive because of her guidance; all remaining errors are mine alone. Finally, I want to thank Sunita for providing me with a model of how to conduct oneself as a colleague and a professional within the discipline.

I simply cannot remember when I became interested in the subject of gender and politics, but I suspect that Lisa Baldez had a lot to do with it. Lisa, I thank you so much for your help, advice, and especially for your encouragement over the years. Mona Lena Krook and Guillermo Rosas graciously agreed to serve on my committee in the late stages of the game. I thank you both for your patience and your help. And I thank you especially for your mentoring. You may not have known it, but I watched you both closely for clues as to how proceed as a junior faculty member and I have learned much. Andy Sobel was kind enough to offer to serve on my committee if I needed it, and I was more than pleased to take him up on his offer. Thanks Andy! A very special thank you the people who really make a dissertation possible: Janet Rensing, Heather Sloan-Randick, and Kerri Therina.

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In Loving Memory of my Grandfather,
Dan Townsend
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<td>Alianza</td>
<td>Women’s Alliance (Alianza Feminina)</td>
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<td>BF</td>
<td>Women’s Bench (Bancada Feminina)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM</td>
<td>Everyday Woman (Cotidiano Mujer)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNS</td>
<td>Beijing Follow-up Committee (Comisión Nacional de Seguimiento)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CODRH</td>
<td>National Coordination of Organizations for the Defense of Reproductive Health (Coordinación Nacional por la Defensa de la Salud Reproductiva)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conamu</td>
<td>National Women’s Commission (Consejo Nacional de Mujeres)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP/FA</td>
<td>Progressive Encounter/Broad Front (Encuentro Progresista/Frente Amplio)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAMA</td>
<td>Afro-Uruguayan Women’s Support Group (Grupo de Apoyo a la Mujer Afrouruguaya)</td>
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<td>GRECMU</td>
<td>Study Group on Women’s Status in Uruguay (Grupo de Estudios sobre la Condición de la Mujer Uruguaya)</td>
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<td>INAMU</td>
<td>National Women’s Institute (Instituto Nacional de la Mujer)</td>
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<tr>
<td>INFM</td>
<td>National Institute for Women and the Family (Instituto Nacional de la Mujer y la Familia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MYSU</td>
<td>Women and Health in Uruguay (Mujer y Salud en Uruguay)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMA</td>
<td>Black World Organizations (Organizaciones Mundo Afro)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>Black Autochthonous Party (Partido Autóctono Negro)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>Colorado Party (Partido Colorado)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<td>---------</td>
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<td>PIT</td>
<td>Inter-Union Worker’s Plenary (Plenario Intersindical de Trabajadores)</td>
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<td>PLEMUU</td>
<td>Uruguayan Women’s Plenary (Plenario de Mujeres Uruguayas)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PN</td>
<td>National (Blanco) Party (Partido Nacional)</td>
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<td>REPEM</td>
<td>Women’s Popular Education Network (Red de Educación Popular Entre Mujeres)</td>
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<td>Tupamaros</td>
<td>Tupamaros National Liberation Movement (Movimiento Nacional de Liberación Tupamaro)</td>
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<td>UNIFEM</td>
<td>United Nations Development Fund for Women</td>
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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Identities Matter: Identity Politics, Coalition Possibilities, and Feminist Organizing

by

Erica E. Townsend-Bell

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
Washington University in St. Louis, 2007
Professor Sunita Parikh, Chairperson

This dissertation examines the processes of identity construction and deployment among Uruguayan women and organized women’s groups. I employ narrative analysis and process tracing methodology to analyze the question of why attempts to create multi-racial gender coalitions are frequently unsuccessful among Uruguayan women’s groups. I find that identity is constructed differently for women along the lines of race and class, even in a South American setting where racial attributes are supposedly of little import. These competing identities result in conflicts among the gender-based organizations that women form; as a consequence there is a reduction in coalition possibilities for otherwise similarly oriented women’s groups. I find that each group has distinct ideological conceptions of the salience of race and class to gender mobilization and these divergent ideological conceptions have had a direct impact on each organization’s willingness to coalesce with other local women’s groups.
My research contributes an important component to the identity and social movements literature. The literature on identity politics and coalition formation is largely theoretical in nature. Much of the empirical literature on coalition formation highlights political and structural variables such as threat, resources, and political opportunities, and considers identity differences tangentially or not at all. My research combines these two approaches to present an empirical case study that specifies the relationship between identity politics and coalition politics. I highlight ideology, which is a key understudied variable. I find that ideological differences often impede coalition formation, and that this relationship holds variety of issue areas and types. I also find that political strategy is of central importance to coalition formation. Specifically, it may function separately from, or in collusion with, ideological differences in constraining or fostering coalition formation.
Chapter One: Identity Politics and Coalition Possibilities

I. Overview and Argument

Scholarly interest in identity politics has been widespread in recent years, ranging over a wide variety of disciplines, and analyzed in a number of ways, including the meanings of and types of identity (ies), and the construction, practice, and/or deployment of identity. Within the disciplines of political science and sociology alone, analyses of identity politics have been employed in studies of ethnic or religious conflict and mobilization, emotions, immigration, democratic stability, voter turnout, symbolic or descriptive representation, globalization, social movements or collective action, sexuality, political tolerance, nation-building, and nationalism or nationalist movements, just to name a few (Brubaker 1996; Plutzer and Zipp 1996; Laitin 1998; Jasper 1998; Tarrow 1998; Bailey 1999; Eisenstadt 1999; Hall 1999; Shamir and Arian 1999; Cruz 2000; Nasr 2000; Schmidt 2000; Barrett 2001; Cedarman 2001; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Barnay 2002; Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2002; Keenan 2003; Koopmans 2005; Della Porta et al. 2006).

The widespread adoption of identity politics by groups and individuals throughout the world has incited the interest of social movement scholars. Recent analyses include a variety of questions about the relationship between identity politics and various social movement activities, especially in the areas of: social movement mobilization and recruitment; understanding, analysis of, and creation of social movement frames; understanding of, and/or use of political opportunities; the relationship between identity politics and resource accumulation; and much more (McCarthy and Zald 1977; McAdam 1982; Snow and Benford 1988; Klandermans 1992; Gamson and Meyer 1996).
One question that has not received as much attention in the social movement and collective action literature is that of the relationship between identity politics and coalition politics. Hathaway and Meyer (1997, 61) highlight the lack of attention to coalition politics in general; they note that there has been “little systematic thinking about the effects of coalition participation on activists and on movement dynamics.” This is striking given the large numbers of scholars and activists that assume coalitions to be widespread among social movement groups and beneficial to social movement groups. The strength in numbers argument is implicit in the work of many social movement and collective action theorists, and generally goes unquestioned (Hathaway and Meyer 1997; Kleidman and Rochon 1997; Croteau and Hicks 2003; Van Dyke 2003; McCarthy 2005).

Moreover, there has been a recent surge of interest by political and social theorists who desire to understand, support, manage, or mitigate the role of identity politics in a democratic political system (Taylor 1992, Kymlicka 1995, Gutmann 2003; Appiah 2005). These well-known theorists join a host of others engaged in theoretical debates about the role and value of identity-based politics for democratic stability and/or the evolution of a progressive society. Yet, the majority of existing empirical work on the question of when and why coalitions do or do not occur focuses on the import of threat, resource, or political opportunities as the main explanatory factors (see for instance, Zald and Ash 1966; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; McCammon and Campbell 2002; Van Dyke 2003).

This dissertation asks an important and timely substantive question about the nature of the relationship between identity politics and coalition politics. Specifically, I trace the process by which identity is constructed, understood, and deployed by the practitioners of collective identity. I adopt Kaufmann’s (1990) definition of identity
politics, which is simply that identity politics is “the belief that identity itself – its elaboration, expression, and affirmation – is and should be a fundamental process of political work.” My analysis of identity and coalition politics is based on an exploratory case study of five Uruguayan women’s groups: Everyday Women (CM); the Uruguayan Women’s Plenary (PLEMUU); the Afro-Uruguayan Women’s Support Group (GAMA); the Women’s Popular Education Network (REPEM); and the Beijing Follow-up Committee (CNS).¹ These five groups form the basis of an exploratory, hypothesis-generating case study of how identity is constructed among women, and how this identity is practiced by later organizational entities of women. I began with the question of why multi-racial gender coalitions were not occurring among women’s groups that, with the exception of racial distinction, appear very similar in terms of their goals, tactics, and platforms. I find that identity is constructed differentially for women along the lines of race and class even in a South American setting where racial attributes are supposedly of little import. These competing identities result in conflicts among the gender-based organizations that women form, and the consequence is a reduction in coalition possibilities for otherwise similarly oriented women’s groups. Specifically, ideological disagreements over the salience of race and class to gender organizing impede multi-racial gender coalitions.

¹ Except for specific references to the Afro-Uruguayan Women’s Support Group, the English translation of GAMA, all other references will use the form afro-Uruguayan or afro-Latino/a in keeping with local usage.
II. Case Selection

1. Why Latin America?

The origins of this dissertation lay in the question of why multi-racial gender coalitions were not occurring among similarly oriented women’s groups. As aforementioned, the only notable differences among the five groups I include in this study are their racial and class make-ups, where four of five groups may be described as largely white and middle-class and one as largely afro-Uruguayan and lower-class. In a North American context, a lack of interaction among racially distinct groups, even those with other shared ties, is not surprising. However, Latin America in general, and Uruguay in particular has long been known for its high degree of racial integration (Hanchard 1999; Lewis 2003; Andrews 2004). With little exception the nations of Latin America adhere to a race-neutral policy; culturally there is a great degree of fluidity in racial designation, both within the population-at-large and among specific individuals. Race is clearly marked by class such that in many societies a person of darker complexion may be considered “whiter” than a person of lighter complexion, especially if he or she holds a higher class or educational status. At the same time racism is often considered to be non-existent or non-systematic, and attempts to categorize race or to make claims on the basis of race have been viewed as suspect.2

Yet, Latin America has witnessed a striking number of ethnic (indigenous) and race-based political movements and uprisings over the last twenty years or more (Escobar and Alvarez 1992, Wade 1997, Cruz 1999 Yashar 2005). Both scholars and activists argue that the notion of racial democracy in Latin America is nothing more than a myth.

2 There have been some exceptions to this rule, particularly in Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Colombia, where new developments include gaining census counts of individuals of afro or indigenous descent, and affirmative action or symbolic recognition policies for groups of afro or indigenous descent.
This disjunct between formal or national traditional understandings of the nature and importance of race, and the wide degree of political, social, and cultural movements based explicitly on racial and ethnic allegiances is striking. Moreover, it begs the question of how race is really understood in Latin America and its importance in daily life. In fact, a variety of works have considered the role of race in social and political life in Latin America and the Caribbean, particularly in Brazil, Puerto Rico, Colombia and Cuba (Wade 1993, Marx 1998, Hanchard 1999, Sawyer 2006). Outside of these examples our knowledge of the role of race in social and political life is much less developed. This is remarkable given that Latin America is home to over half of the world’s African-descended population.\(^3\)

2. Why Uruguay?

Until the 1960s Uruguay was known as the Switzerland of Latin America because of the openness of its political system and the expansive nature of its welfare state. While economic difficulties and political instability deprived it of this title, it has continued the tradition of an expansive welfare state, even in the face of neoliberal reforms, and sometimes as a direct result of citizen action. Thus, Uruguay is a nation clearly concerned with citizen needs, and it is a country clearly able to meet the demands of its citizens. I am interested primarily in inter-movement coalitions; however decades of research have left no doubt that a large part of the decision-making process of any social movement group has to do with the exigencies of the political context and their understanding of the political opportunities available to them. Hence it makes sense to

\(^3\) Afro-Latinos constitute 150 million of the 540 million people residing in Latin America (27.8%). African-Americans in the United States constitute a group of 39.7 million as of July 1, 2005. See Table 3, Appendix A
situate this exploratory study in a setting that is likely to be most open to citizen demands, including those made on the basis of race, class, and gender. Concomitant with the Switzerland of Latin America designation is a national sense of Uruguayan progressiveness on all fronts that is considered unparalleled in Latin America. Uruguay has been extremely successful in creating a largely white, homogenous, middle-class society that believes very strongly in the ideal of equality, regardless of race, class, religion, or other ‘non-important’ attributes (Behrman, Gaviria, and Székely 2002).

Yet, despite this embrace of the unimportance of ascriptive characteristics, Uruguay has produced one of the most dynamic afro-Latin political movements in Latin America, including Black World Organizations, and an active afro-Uruguayan women’s/feminist group, the Afro-Uruguayan Women’s Support Group. This divide between Uruguay’s official discourse and its reality provide the theoretical basis for my case selection. In fact, Uruguay is interesting not only for the puzzle that it presents, but for its usefulness in gauging the degree to which numbers matter. As noted, a majority of scholarly information on the role of race in Latin America and the Caribbean is specific to four locations (Colombia, Brazil, Puerto Rico, and Cuba) all of which claim afro populations of more than twenty percent. Yet, whiteness studies in particular have alerted us to the fact that race matters in a variety of ways that are not specific to large numbers of minorities. All nations are raced, regardless of whether they lay claim to notable minority populations, and all nations understand and construct racial allegiances in specific ways. In this way, Uruguay’s strong attachment to “Europeanness” is, I will argue, really an attachment to a white, middle-class, urban identity that structures the
nation’s understandings of race and racial attitudes; and in turn, structures collective understandings of what constitutes reasonable and/or valid claims to discrimination.

III. Framework

The interdisciplinary theoretical framework for this dissertation is drawn from political science, sociology, history, and women’s studies and is rooted in political process theories, resource mobilization theories, post-construction theory, new social movement theory and coalition theory. Engagement with these theoretical traditions helps me to assess the raced, gendered, and classed construction of identity among Uruguayan women, and to shed light on the relationship between this differential identity construction and the later organizational entities that arise from these identities, as well as the decisions they make about coalition formation.

New social movement theory and post-constructionist theories illustrate the need for attention to the boundaries of identity. A central component of identity construction is a conceptualization of what identity does and does not include; the construction of a “we” and a “they.” New social movement theories and post-constructionist theories highlight the process by which the collective identity occurs. Post-constructionist theories go further, and highlight not only the process of collective identity construction, but question the specific ways by which this collective identity construction is converted into the practice of identity politics. These theories beg the question of how identities are understood and how those understandings translate into practice. In particular, these

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4 I refer to social movement coalition theory not coalition theory as relates to political parties and actors. See the distinction between social movements and interest groups above for the rationale for this decision.

5 New social movement theory and post-constructionist theories are both concerned with the notion of identity construction. However, the main focus of these theories is not on the general nature of identity construction that I discussed earlier, but on the construction of a specific group or organization based collective identity that is specific to the group described. I use the term collective identity to denote the change in focus.
theories emphasize the role of ideology, or worldview, and its impact on social
movement activity. They allege that deeply held ideological beliefs, especially in the
form of essentialism, can foster or impede coalition formation.

Structural-political theories, especially resource mobilization, political process,
and framing theories, illustrate the need for attention to external processes as they bear on
coalition formation, such as resources and political opportunities. Resource mobilization
theory is the primary source of two consistently proven hypotheses. One, unequal
resource levels among social movement groups may preclude coalitions. Also, a threat in
the larger political environment may foster coalitions where they would not otherwise
occur, due to the risks that organizations face by joining a coalition. Political process
theories have been central to the notion that the political context, specifically the
existence of favorable political opportunities is a key explanatory factor of coalition
formation, and social movement mobilization more generally.

Political process and framing theories also consider the subjective aspect of
political mobilization. These theories highlight that individual organizations may not
recognize an “objective” political opportunity as such; and that the ways in which
organizations choose to organize are based on subjective assessments of the exigencies of
the political context. However, both theories retain a primary concern with the activities
of organized identity groups or movements and often neglect the question of the broader
historical context in which those very identities were created. Moreover, practical
applications of political process and framing theories place a great emphasis on the
structural aspects of the political context and how that impacts movement action, as
opposed to the question of cultural constraints on movement action that I seek to identify.
Hence, I consider resources, threat, and political strategy in the form of alternative explanations.

Taken together these theoretical traditions imply a paradigm that privileges identity construction and its translation into the practice of identity politics as it bears on coalition formation. I employ this paradigm along with a method that combines theoretically-informed historical narrative and process-tracing to identify the causal chain and the specific causal mechanism linking identity politics and coalition formation. The theoretical paradigm suggests a sequence that begins with general identity construction, specifically the naming, negotiation, and appropriation of identity; the specification of collective identity within organization through the creation of boundaries and the development of a political consciousness or ideology; and finally deployment of identity in the form of organizational coalition propensity (see figure 1). I find that ideological disagreements lead to a reduction in coalition possibilities over a variety of issue areas.

**Figure 1. Causal Sequence**
I consider five sets of issue areas. These are organization around the Beijing Women’s Conference, annual preparation for International Women’s Day, domestic violence, women’s reproductive health, and political quotas for women. These issue areas are representative of all major coalition efforts over the twelve year period that I consider in this dissertation. Moreover certain issues, especially domestic violence, women’s reproductive health, and political quotas have been of consistent importance to women’s groups around the globe, and have inspired and continue to inspire a variety of coalitions around passage and implementation of policies in these areas. This is useful for tests of the findings of this dissertation in other national and transnational contexts.

This dissertation accomplishes a number of goals. It adds an empirical case to a largely theoretical literature on the nature of the relationship between identity politics and coalition politics. It includes an analysis of the historical processes by which identities arise as a first step towards an understanding of how and why identity is deployed in specific ways. Most important is the theoretical contribution. This dissertation adds to the literature on the conditions under which coalitions occur through consideration of a key, but understudied variable, ideology. I find that ideology often impedes coalition formation, and that this is the case over a variety of issue areas and issue types. However, this may be mitigated by the existence of political opportunities that encourage coalitions where they might not otherwise occur. I find that resources and threat are not key explanatory factors in the Uruguayan case. This is enlightening given the supposed strength of resources, and particularly of threat in determining coalition formation.

Although my dissertation does accomplish a number of goals, its generalizability is circumscribed by my use of a single case study. However, the decision to employ a
single case study was mandated by the exploratory nature of this study. The primary goal of this study is to generate and identify a causal sequence thereby specifying a theory that may be applied to a wider variety of cases. This is a key goal of the process-tracing methodology that guides this dissertation. Moreover, my specific concern is to consider the relationship between identity politics and coalition formation. Given that empirical work on the specific nature of the relationship between identity politics and coalition formation has been so limited an exploratory, theory-generating case study conducted from the perspective of historical narrative and causal sequencing was the best method available to highlight the relationships I want to specify.

My data comes from three major sources: participant observation, semi-structured interviews, and archival sources. Where appropriate and available I use quantitative data, however interviews with members of all multi-issue and some single-issue women’s groups, members of parliament, and various other NGO people constitute the primary basis of my evidence of contemporary attitudes about the salience of race, class, and gender, and their importance to the issue areas around which coalitions formed.

Considine and Deutchman (1996) provide rationale for the interview method over other ways of gathering attitudinal data, especially survey methods. They note “the advantage of an in-depth interview over the survey is its ability to explain why beliefs are held and to uncover deeper levels of attitude formation . . . as we discovered, in interviews even the most guarded politician can be given the opportunity to provide frank, confidential information which would often be withheld in a survey (Considine and Deutchman, 6).

Archival data in the form of original documents, census data, and historical writings on race, gender, and national identity form the primary base of evidence for the
portion of this dissertation concerned with differential identity construction among women. It also serves as a source of triangulation of data that increases the validity of interview data. Dates, figures, numerical counts, and other points that interviewees either could not remember or might have been inclined to modify were checked against the organizations’ own published documents, newspaper sources, and website postings. The women’s section of a major local paper proved an invaluable source in this way. I was also able to conduct multiple interviews with a number of subjects, particularly women’s group’s members. This also served as source of triangulation of data, as I often interspersed the interview with questions I had asked previously to test the validity and consistency of the responses I was given. I conducted fifty-two interviews over a three year period, in the summers of 2002, 2003 and the spring of 2005.

IV. Organization of the Dissertation

The goal of this dissertation is to analyze the relationship between identity and coalition politics, with a specific emphasis on an empirical specification of the relationship between ideology and coalition formation. My objective is to generate a series/set of hypotheses that may be used in future analyses, with more observations on the dependent variable, coalition possibilities, and greater geographical variation. I begin with a report of my data selection and methodology, and an overview of the interdisciplinary theoretical framework. Successive chapters begin with a question relating to the relationship between identity construction and deployment and coalition formation.
Chapter two of this dissertation describes the methods and data collection processes I used. Methodologically I combined historical narrative and process-tracing to track the causal sequence indicated by the theoretical framework. This case study approach is best suited for an exploratory, theory-generating project. My data set consists of fifty-two semi-structured interviews that ranged in length from thirty minutes to more than three hours, sometimes over multiple days. I also used numerous archival records and secondary source materials on the women’s rights movement, feminist histories, the construction of the Uruguayan nation, the development of national identity, immigration, afro-cultural development, and slavery. Archival records came primarily from organizational documents, and original documents residing in the Uruguayan National Library.

I discuss the theoretical framework of the dissertation in detail in chapter three. I explain the relevance of the three theoretical frameworks that I combine for this dissertation. These are New Social Movement Theories, Structural-Political Theories, and Social Constructionist Theories. These three approaches emphasize distinct aspects of identity politics and coalition politics. They include attention to the internal creation of collective identity and the associated construction of group boundaries; the strategic use of identity, particularly as demanded by the exigencies of the political context; and the dialogic process of identity construction and group interaction, respectively. Taken alone these theories are insufficient for empirical exploration of the relationship between coalition and identity politics. Structural-political theories highlight primarily external political constraints, while new social movement and post-constructionist theories focus mostly on the internal dynamics of organizational and group decision-making. My usage
of these theories in a combined form allows me extra leverage over the question of the relationship of identity politics to coalition and the political constraints that may impact this relationship.

Chapter four provides the historical and sociopolitical background that gives rise to the specific organizations I consider in this study. The central question of this chapter is how gender identity is constructed differentially among women and what this has meant for their political development and practice. I explore how white and black Uruguayan female identities came to be constructed differently along the lines of both race and class, and how attributes such as moral turpitude or lasciviousness came to be associated with certain racial and class groups. I situate the evolution of gendered identity construction within the framework of the evolution of the nation; and trace the parallel identity construction of the nation and of women through the use of two overarching themes - womanhood and citizenship. I seek to explain how the images attributed to specific groups of women shaped not only the wider society’s interpretation of each group, but also how the groups themselves drew on these dominant perspectives in their interpretations of each other. I then analyze the creation, or lack, of explicit, formal women’s groups as they correspond to these major divisions.

Chapter five continues the question of identity deployment and of the relationship between identity construction and political practice. What, if any, are the repercussions of identity for coalition formation? I draft an ideal-typical scenario that covers the four major relationships between a group’s practice of identity politics, as determined by the theoretical paradigm described above. Identity politics may partially impede coalition formation such that coalitions are sporadic, problematic, or short-lived. The practice of
identity politics may impede coalition possibilities entirely such that coalition formation does not occur. Where the practice of identity politics supports or fosters coalition possibilities then coalition formation will occur in some form. Finally, it is possible that identity politics have no effect on coalition possibilities whatsoever, and some other variable or combination of variables is the major explanatory factor. Specifically, I consider the roles of threat and resources, two of the most frequently cited factors for the existence (or lack thereof) of coalitions among social movement groups. I consider coalition possibilities over four major issue areas from 1993 to 2005, which include the 1995 Fourth International Women’s Conference in Beijing, Health and Reproductive Rights, Domestic Violence, and Legislative Quotas for Women. I find that ideological disagreements partially or completely impeded coalition formation in each case.

Chapter Six continues the inquiry on identity deployment, with a focus on how identity is used to negotiate the outcomes that an organization hopes to achieve. I ask to what extent strategic or practical concerns affect coalition formation along with, or in spite of, ideological concerns. Thus, I explore the possibility that some combination of factors explains the conditions under which coalitions form. I accomplish this by revisiting the five issue areas noted above. In each case I detail the coalition effort’s preferred outcome(s) and the coalition effort’s understanding of the political context and/or political opportunities they face, as stated in publicly circulated documents and personal interviews. I then consider the use of a strategic deployment of gender identity as based on these understandings. I find that there are some cases in which ideological differences are the clear motivator of coalition breakdown, while in other cases strategic
concerns are the primary motivating factor. In one case, it is clear that a combination of ideological and strategic concerns motivate coalition breakdown.

I follow with a brief discussion of changes in the external political environment or political opportunity structure that appear to have expanded the viability of multi-issue politics for identity groups in Uruguay. I find that in some circumstances a change in the larger political environment can have a positive impact on the likelihood of coalition formation. In particular I note the positive impact of changes in political leadership that result in increased governmental attention to the demands of some social movement groups, thereby piquing the interest of other social movement groups.
Chapter Two: Data and Methods

I. Methodology

This study employs social science research methods. I chose a case study methodology to approach the questions of interest. George and Bennett (2005, 5) define a case study approach as “the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events.” I argue that this approach is the most appropriate for dealing with the questions that this dissertation poses and the research objective of this dissertation. My goal in this dissertation is primarily a heuristic one. I seek to identify a causal sequence that specifies the relationship between identity politics and coalition politics, specifically the impact of identity politics on coalition possibilities. In this way I hope to add to theorizing on the conditions under which coalitions form. This research objective is consistent with that of many qualitative analyses that adopt a “causes of effects” approach to explanation (Bennett and Elman 2006; Mahoney and Goertz 2006).

Hence, I chose to conduct an exploratory theory generating case study that employs a combination of theoretically informed historical narrative and process-tracing. This combination is the most useful for getting at the causal chain and the mechanism that I am interested in identifying, and adheres best to the development of the research project. It is often noted that unlike statistical research projects which begin from a question of effects-of-causes, e.g. how does x affect y or to what degree does x

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6 Theoretically informed narratives are actually one type of process-tracing. I specify theoretically-informed narratives separately to enumerate the type of narrative I am using, since the varieties of process-tracing include more than one type of narrative. Theoretically informed narrative is most closely associated with analytic explanation. See George and Bennett 2005, 211 for a more detailed discussion of the varieties of process-tracing.
affect y, case study approaches take the opposite view. They are concerned with causes-of-effects. This approach starts with a case and its outcome and then moves backward to identify the causes. In my case, this reflects my early observation that multi-racial gender coalitions were almost non-existent in Uruguay, and my desire to explicate the causal sequence that led to this outcome. Narrative and process-tracing are especially useful tools for unpacking these types of processes, because their primary focus is on a detailed sequencing of events that helps to identify the causal patterns and mechanisms at work. This is most often completed with exactly the types of research tools and strategies that were available to me, specifically archival research and in-depth interviews.

It is important to note the requirements and the goals of process-tracing. George and Bennett (2005) offer the most succinct explanation of the goals and advantages of process-tracing.

. . . the method of process-tracing . . . attempts to trace the links between possible causes and observed outcomes. In process-tracing, the researcher examines histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequences and values of the intervening variables in that case (George and Bennett 2005, 6).

I use process-tracing to map a series of theoretically predicted intermediate steps and take them in a step by step fashion, e.g. from A to B, to C, and so on until the end of the causal chain, the dependent variable. Process-tracing shows causality through
sequencing, e.g. that A causes B (and is therefore logically prior to A), B then causes C, and so until the chain reaches its logical end, the dependent variable of interest. In the theory-generating form of process-tracing that I employ, the process remains the same. If the evidence fits the original theory or theoretical paradigm then the researcher may maintain the causal sequence as originally outlined. If this is not the case then the original theory, and hence the causal sequence that diagrams that theory, must be modified. In either case, the final causal sequence provides the basis for a new or stronger theory that may then be applied to other cases.

I apply the theoretical framework summarized in chapter one to identify a probable sequence linking identity politics to coalition possibilities. The theoretical paradigm I employ suggests a sequence that begins with identity construction, specifically naming, negotiation, and appropriation of a collective identity, in that order. The sequence continues with the specification of that collective identity within an organization through the creation of boundaries and the development of a political consciousness or ideology. Finally, the theoretical paradigm suggests that unmatched ideologies, or ideological disagreements, will result in reduced coalition possibilities. This sequence is outlined in the figure below.

**Figure 1. Causal Sequence**
If the evidence matches closely to the causal sequence suggested by the theoretical paradigm I employ, this is a strong indication that the sequence, and hence the theory, is accurate and that it may be acting in a similar way in similar contexts. In this way the validity of process-tracing is linked not to the number of observations, but to the appropriateness of the evidence. Thus, process-tracing is unlike statistical approaches, which rely on a large number of observations and degrees of freedom. For within case analysis approaches the greatest possibility of underspecification is the problem of a lack of sufficient evidence for a test of the theory and of alternative proposed theories. In a revision of an earlier critique of case studies Donald Campbell notes

I have overlooked a major source of discipline (i.e., degrees of freedom if I persist in using this statistical concept for the analogous problem in nonstatistical settings). In a case study done by an alert social scientist who has thorough local acquaintance, the theory he uses to explain the focal difference also generates predictions or expectations on dozens of other aspects of the culture, and he does no retain the theory unless most of these are also confirmed. In some sense, he has tested the theory with degrees of freedom coming from multiple implications of any one theory (Campbell 1975, 179, 181-182)

George and Bennett expand this idea even further:

A satisfactory historical explanation of a particular case needs to address and explain each of the significant steps in the sequence that led to the outcome of that
case. If even one step in the hypothesized causal process in a particular case is not as predicted, then the historical explanation of the case needs to be modified, perhaps in a trivial way that is consistent with the original theory, or perhaps in a crucial way that calls into question the theory’s general utility and its applicability to other cases. It is this insistence on providing a continuous and theoretically based historical explanation of a case, in which each significant step toward the outcome is explained by reference to a theory, that makes process-tracing a powerful method of inference (George and Bennett 2005, 29-30).

A combination of theoretically informed historical narrative and process-tracing was the method best suited for the research objectives of this dissertation. However, it is not without shortcomings. Although I end with an updated causal sequence that may be applicable to other contexts, I cannot definitively generalize away from Uruguay. One cannot know without further testing how similar one case is to another. That is, there is no guarantee that I have not found a contextual anomaly. However, given the lack of empirical work on the relationship between identity politics and coalition formation and the underspecification of ideology as an explanatory variable, I believe that this project has served its purpose, which was to present a cohesive theory that certainly may hold in other contexts. If it does then this confirmation that I was on the right track; if not then this begs the question of what is different about Uruguay and if any other cases are similar. Given the overall degree of similarity between Uruguay and other countries (specifically Latin American countries), particularly in reference to the parallel developments of national identity and whiteness as key factors, I expect that at least some
part of my theory will be generalizable, although I make no specific claim about that here.

II. Data

I conducted the research for this investigation using archival records, interviews, and participant observation with major Uruguayan women’s groups, single-issue women’s groups, and members of parliament. I also used secondary sources, which have allowed me to triangulate data and reduces concerns of data mining.

I located some women’s group sources and other sources by the snowball method. I began with a published list of women’s groups within the country; at the end of each interview I asked the informant to give me a list of names of other people with whom I might speak. The names became redundant very quickly and I was assured that I was aware of all relevant parties. This was a particularly useful technique given the small circle that comprises activist women in Uruguay, almost all of whom reside in the capital city of Montevideo.

I located members of parliament through attainment of a list of all current members of parliament. I took a random sample of members of each major political party and phoned the office of each to request an interview. I interviewed male and female members of parliament, although I was more successful in obtaining interviews

7 The snowball method requires that one ask the subject, at the end of the interview, if he or she has recommendations for other people with whom the interviewer might like to speak. Ideally, one comes to a point where the names become redundant, and match closely to people with whom one has already spoken, thus indicating that the interviewer has been successful in identifying the universe of relevant interview subjects.
from female members of parliament. Interviews and participant observation were carried out over the summers of 2002 and 2003 and the spring of 2005.

I conducted 52 interviews total. Specifically, I conducted 28 interviews with members of women’s groups, 16 interviews with members of parliament or government, and 8 interviews with members of other local social movement organizations. In many cases I conducted more than one interview with members of the five groups that compose the basis of my study. This is an important source of triangulation of data, and a test of the validity of the data. Given the length between the interviews it is very unlikely that respondents tailored their later responses to match previous ones.8

Archival sources also proved valuable in triangulating data, especially published organizational documents and newspaper accounts of specific events. I asked respondents questions raised by the archival data and conversely helped to flesh out details like names, dates, locations, and other details that respondents could not remember. Topics included frequency of interaction with other groups, feelings on the need to think about intersecting inequalities, the material resources of each organization, relationship between the women’s movement and the state, the evolution of the organization and more. The reader may refer to Appendix D for a list of interview questions used on each visit.

Archival sources came primarily from the National Library of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay, which maintains copies of all editions of the women’s news supplement began in 1988 as well as any documents officially published by any Uruguayan women’s groups. The libraries of the women’s groups I interviewed,

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8 I conducted the majority of first-time interviews in 2002 or 2003 and follow-up interviews in 2005, resulting in two to three years distance between interviews for all respondents but two, Beatriz Ramírez and Elena Fonseca, with whom I spoke each visit.
especially Everyday Women and the Women’s Popular Education Network, which were established as and remain documentary centers, were also important. These groups maintain a library of all their published documents, newsletters, organizational records, and so forth. They also include a number of published documents on other Uruguayan women’s groups, and materials on gender, women, and feminism around the globe. Any other materials, specifically any inter-organizational documents and records were collected from the specific women’s organization to which they pertained. One shortcoming is that records could be spotty, particularly minutes of meetings, and details on income, requiring me to rely more heavily on respondent’s recollection of events, or aggregated totals of income and resources.

Multi-issue groups are the most likely to work in coalition, and the most likely to do so with some frequency (Whittier 1995, Klatch 1999). Therefore, I chose to focus my investigation on the five largest, national multi-issue women’s groups in Uruguay, which in fact comprise the universe of national, multi-issue, specifically gender oriented groups there. Hence, at least as pertains to the Uruguayan case, I have captured the scope of women’s group coalitions and organizing at this level. The same logic drove my selection of issue areas. Early interviews with women from the five major groups included here, as well as representatives of parliament and members of single-issue women’s groups confirmed that these have been the major issue areas of interest for women’s rights organizers over the last ten years. While this level of coherence might be unlikely in other countries, due to Uruguay’s centralized nature and the concentration of governmental and non-governmental activity in the capital (Montevideo), it is the norm.
Chapter Three: Theories of Identity and Coalition Politics

I. Introduction

An extensive body of literature exists on identity and identity politics within the social science canon. This literature has ranged the gamut from debates over the definition of identity to how and why identities are deployed by collective actors (Bernstein 2005; Brubaker and Cooper 2000). Discussions of identity and identity politics have also figured prominently in the social movement literature, particularly with the advent of New Social Movement theory and its supposition that identity can be both the goal and outcome of a social movement group. However, within the social movement literature attention to the question of the historical processes through which these identities come about has been less frequent (Bernstein 2002, Rubin 2004). This oversight is due, in part, to the continuing sway of resource mobilization theories that emphasize social movements as primarily resource oriented and political opportunity motivated. Political process theories combine a focus on structural factors, in the form of closed or expanding political opportunities; and subjective factors, primarily through attention to group decision-making processes, e.g. organizational perception of the nature of available political opportunities and the meaning-making that occurs around mobilization.

Still if, as is often posited, identities help to form interests (Kymlicka 1995; Norton, 2004) then this begs the question of how those identities come about, how they come to be salient, and how they are deployed by the collective actors who form around them. This requires a focus not only on identity itself but, more importantly, on the politics of identity. While these questions have not received frequent attention within the
broad social science literature there has been a good deal of research on the topic within certain subfields of the social movement literature, particularly within women’s studies, political theory, and work on the state and identity.

My research adds an empirical case of the relationship between identity politics and coalition politics to a largely theoretical literature. It adds to the literature on the conditions under which coalitions occur through the central, but understudied, variable ideology. Thus, I interrogate two major questions within the social science literature: that of how identities form and what processes or institutions are a part of that; and also of how these identities are understood and deployed by collective actors who later emerge around these identity narratives.

The question of how identities are constructed and deployed matters not only for the opportunity to place social movements within their historical contexts, but also for the question of their daily politics. Identities and, more importantly, identity politics help to determine the trajectory of a social movement organization’s activities, what types of demands they find valid, and how much, if any, interaction social movement groups within the same sector have with one another.

As aforementioned, there is some empirical research which treats the relationship between identity and coalition formation (Lichterman 1995, Hathaway and Meyer 1997, McCammon and Campbell 2002), but I am unaware of any studies which have analyzed the processes of identity construction as they bear on coalition formation. Again, identities do not arise from nowhere, nor do they come from only one source. Previous scholars have interrogated the relationship between different identity or ideological bases and coalition formation in their current forms, which has been a useful starting point.
(Lichterman 1995, Diaz-Veledes and Chang 1996, Barvosa-Carter 2001). But taking these identity pleas in their current forms tells us very little about how it is that they came about and why they take the form that they do. As a result, one can say less about the real nature of identity politics, the varied effects of the practice of identity politics, and why identity politics’ global reach has become so considerable. For these reasons, I begin the reviews below by treating the literature on identity politics and the literature on coalitions separately, interspersing the two where relevant.

II. A History of Identity and Identity Politics

1. Identity

Identity is a notoriously slippery concept that is defined by at least two entirely disparate meanings. Thus, I begin with a brief review of its history. The notion of identity, particularly at an individual level, has been around for centuries, especially in its mathematical and philosophical incarnations (Calhoun 1994). One major use of the term as it is currently understood came about in the post World War II era, and was popularized by psychologist Erik Erikson’s work on identity and identity crises within youth populations. Erikson proposed identity to mean a “mutual relation in that it connotes both a persistent sameness within oneself (selfsameness) and a persistent sharing of some kind of essential character with others” (Erikson 1959, 109). This characterization of identity as a part of the essential core of an individual quickly became the standard psychological usage of the term (Gleason 1983).

Meanwhile, the usage of identity was adopted throughout social science and humanities disciplines as scholars sought alternatives to mass society and relative
deprivation approaches to explain race, class, gender, sexuality, and other uprisings occurring around the globe in the 1960s and 1970s (Brubaker and Cooper 2000; Klandermans 1992). Still, regular usage of the term within the social sciences did not begin in force until the advent of New Social Movement theories, which characterized identity as a construction occurring at both the individual and collective level, and as fluid, multiple, and unstable (Melucci 1989; Touraine 1981).

Hence, the use of identity as an analytical concept has been the subject of debate since the beginning of its most modern usage. On the one hand, identity is a fixed quality assigned to an individual at birth, and an individual is only aware of his or her identity when it is in crisis. Typically these crises occur as the individual shifts through the stages of childhood, adolescence, and adulthood (Erikson 1959). On the other hand, identity is characterized by its multiplicitous nature; every individual inhabits more than one identity and is capable (and often unconscious) of switching between and among them with ease. Identities are no longer so rigid, but relational. The term relational is meant to reflect the fact that identities only exist in relation to an opposite or an Other9. Moreover, the term relational is meant to connote that identities are by nature an interaction between one entity and another such that no one entity may be fully defined without reference to its other.

2. Identity Politics

Identity politics is a more recent concept. The Combahee River Collective, a black feminist group operating out of Boston in the late 70s, claims to have coined the

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9 Still, the oppositional nature of identity is not meant to imply, as is often assumed, that the relation between an identity and its opposite must be a negative one, or defined entirely by terms of exclusion. I only mean to imply that identity cannot exist without juxtaposition of some kind. See Bickford (1997) for a more extensive discussion of this issue.
term (Combahee River Collective 1977). It affirms “The most general statement of our politics at the present time would be that we are actively committed to struggling against racial, sexual, heterosexual, and class oppression and see as our particular task the development of integrated analysis and practice based upon the fact that the major systems of oppression are interlocking.” Combahee later notes “This focusing upon our own oppression is embodied in the concept of identity politics” (1977).

In its first academic use it was introduced by Anspach in 1979 to refer to activism by disabled persons seeking to change conceptions of themselves both within the disabled community and society-at-large (Bernstein 2005). Like identity, identity politics is often left undefined by many of its practitioners because of the sense that it is a fairly self-explanatory term. But, identity politics is taken loosely to mean the coalescence of a group of individuals whose focus and goal is the creation and expansion of a formalized and cohesive collective identity and a politics and political strategy specifically based on that collective identity (Guttman 2003).

III. Working Definition of Identity

As opposed to understandings of identity as totally fluid and constructed, or as totally fixed and inherited at birth, I adopt a notion of identity that falls in the middle of these two extremes. Identity or, more accurately, identities are generated in response to the specific historical and social context in which a group or individual is located. These identities, even in the plural, are usually very easily negotiated by their owners and are context-specific. Still there is an aspect of identity that is permanent and enduring regardless of the situation and which identity is most prevalent at any particular time.
These are typically the ‘embedded’ identities (Tilly 2002) that often form the stuff of identity politics: race, gender, sexuality, nationality, and so forth. In the end, these are the aspects of identity that form the ‘trump card’ around which everything else must be negotiated. This understanding of identity reflects Bhargava’s (1995).

From an existing repertoire of identities a person partly selects and shapes her identity. One cannot radically alter this existing stock nor can any individual pick up any one and mould it exactly as she pleases. The entire repertoire is not up for grabs and all identities are not immediately negotiable. But all values are placed in this culture within specific contexts and therefore the identities they shape are context dependent. The only general principle to be found here is that as one moves from one context to another, one must be able to shift one’s identity, negotiate it (Bhargava 1995, 326).

This concept is very similar to that of Ann Swidler’s (1986) cultural toolbox, where a person may choose tools at will from a cultural toolbox but where what is included in the toolbox (and therefore what is available) and the toolbox itself has been predetermined by external forces, and where the contents vary for each individual.

I argue that this idea of negotiation is central to the conception of identity as a dialectic process. That is, identity is not only or even mostly subject to the whims of the person or persons who inhabit it. Instead, identity is largely determined by forces outside of the entity that embodies it, namely society. Again, this is where the oppositional nature of identity is central to the definition of the term. Identity can only exist in relation to an opposite or an Other. However, not just any Other matters, what is required
is a significant Other. For instance, most people familiar with North American racial distinctions would agree that the traditionally significant other of black people are white people and vice versa. Most people would not agree that the significant other of black people are the Maoris, or the Basques. They would, however, agree that the significant others of the Basques are the Spanish, and perhaps the French. Identity is something that must be negotiated between at least two (and usually more) parties, none of whom have total control over its construction or dilution.

To recapitulate, I consider identity to be both constructed and fixed. It is both negotiable and non-negotiable, in that not every aspect of identity is subject to the whims of the person or persons who actually inhabit it. Identity is also performed. Consequently, I agree with Norton that questions such as “What is culture? [or here, ‘What is identity?’ are] best evaded” (2004, 5). The question is not what is identity, but how is identity deployed and by whom?

I argue that the concept of identification best captures the idea of identity as fixed and constructed, negotiable and non-negotiable. I adopt Foote’s (1951) definition of term. He describes identification as the

appropriation of and commitment to a particular identity or series of identities.

As a process, it proceeds by naming, its products are ever-evolving self-conceptions – with the emphasis on the con – that is, upon ratification by significant others (Foote 1951, 17).
This is the negotiation process in practice: there is a naming which occurs from outside the entity being identified; there is also an appropriation of and a commitment to that name. This has also been described as interpellation (Althusser 1971). The word appropriation is central, because it is not equivalent to acceptance, a word that implies only passivity. Instead appropriation denotes both acceptance and metamorphosis such that the identity is reformulated by an entity to fit the needs of the body that it is supposed to describe; and this reformulation occurs within the bounds of the possible. As Brubaker and Cooper (2000) affirm identification is also useful because it invites the recognition that someone must do the identifying. This encourages attempts to determine who that someone might be. Nonetheless, Brubaker and Cooper note that “identification does not require a specifiable ‘identifier;’ it can be pervasive and influential without being accomplished by discrete, specified persons or institutions. Identification can be carried out more or less anonymously by discourses or public narratives” (2000, 16).

I posit that identification is the most appropriate term because of its direct relation to those aspects of identity under investigation here. My focus on the historical and contextual process by which political identity is constructed is equivalent to the naming aspect of identification, which seeks to identify both the known and the anonymous identifiers who do the identifying. Meanwhile, the question of the appropriation of a name by a group reflects my concern with the politics of identity, and the issue of the identities and claims around which groups organize. Thus far I have not specified identity as an individual or collective phenomenon because the theoretical analysis I have presented is applicable to both a singular and a plural subject. However,
my interest is in identity politics and therefore in groups; for this reason I refer solely to collective identity throughout the rest of this dissertation.

**IV. Recent Perspectives on Identity Politics**

At this stage I begin a more systematic review of recent perspectives on identity politics as proffered by three major theoretical traditions: New Social Movement theories, Structural-Political theories, and Social Constructionism/Post-Modern theory and then conclude with my own observations.¹⁰ I contend that these three theoretical traditions are the most relevant to a discussion of identity politics. Indeed, many social science scholars have used one, or some combination, of these theories as a starting point for discussions of the political actions and philosophies of identity groups (Bernstein 2005). This is largely because these theories have an extensive tradition of attention to identity and collective action, although they do so from very different perspectives. Moreover, unlike identity which is often left undefined and under-analyzed, identity politics are defined through collective action, the central subject matter of New Social Movement theory, Structural-Political theories, and a major subject of interest for Social Constructionism/Post-Modernism as well.

¹⁰ I use the term Structural-Political Theories to refer to Resource Mobilization, Political Process, and Framing theories. These three theoretical traditions place a great deal of emphasis on the external political structure, as opposed to the specific identity focus of NSM and SC/PM theories, and there lies my primary interest. However, I do not mean to imply that there are not important distinctions among these theories and I do highlight specific differences among them.
New Social Movement Theory

New Social Movement (NSM) theory originally came about as an attempt to explain what was considered a new kind of collective action based on identity, broadly defined, instead of class interests. The highlight of NSM theory is its insistence that a new identity politics is at the root of most social movement activity occurring around the globe post-1970 (Touraine 1981). For NSM theorists one of the most basic aspects of identity politics is the recognition that identity is constructed and fluid. As such, a major task of any social movement group is simply to come to some kind of consensus on who it is or who it wants to be (Melucci 1985, 1989). Proponents of NSM theory consider this to be a crucial step for the group, for as Rupp and Taylor have noted “people do not bring ready made identities to collective action” (1999, 365). So, the focus is largely on two types of construction: the construction of a group, and the (often) concomitant construction of the identity of the group. Thus, within NSM theory the creation – or recreation – of a collective identity that the groups feels represents it best is not simply a central aspect of identity politics; it is goal, tactic, and success all in one.

This argument forms the basis for a major criticism of NSM theory. Particularly in early iterations of the theory, identity was often discussed in a monolithic way with little distinction given to differences between the identity construction and deployment of say a third world feminist group, and a mostly Anglo-Saxon, male environmentalist group (Klandermans, 1992). Moreover, the lack of distinction between identity as goal and identity as outcome was problematic for many. Later theorists have been careful to make distinctions between the types of identities central to collective action, for instance
citizenship vs. post-citizenship identity movements (Jasper 1997) or detached vs. embedded identities (Tilly 2002).

Aside from issues of how much work identity is made to do within NSM theory, it is important for its contribution of a collective identity approach that privileges and focuses on the boundaries created by group participants as they seek to construct a shared identity. The creation or adoption of any identity is as interesting for what it does include as for what it does not.

**Structural-Political Theories**

Structural-Political theories include resource mobilization theory, political process theories, and Framing Theory. Resource mobilization theory arose in direct response to earlier theories of social movement participants as irrational and/or suffering from a sense of direct deprivation. Proponents of resource mobilization theory paint a picture of participants as decidedly rational and self-interested. Traditionally, resource mobilization theory has not been concerned with the question of whether or how identity is constructed so much as with how identity (or any other tool at the group’s disposal) is used to negotiate the outcomes the organization hopes to achieve. It has traditionally focused more on the how of mobilization than the why; resource mobilization theorists have questioned how it is that potential members become recruited to movement organizations much more than why they would be interested in the first place (McAdam 1999). Moreover, the use of this identity is highly dependent on the exigencies of the political context in which a group is operating (Costain and McFarland 1998), or according to
political process theory the group’s understanding of the exigencies of the political context (Kurzman 1996).

Framing and political process theories attempted to redress some of the concerns that traditional RM theory left out. Framing is primarily concerned with the question of how movements may frame their pleas to be more successful at achieving their goals (Croteau and Hicks 2003; Jasper 1997; Steinberg 1998). In particular, framing theory is concerned with the degree to which frame alignment successfully impacts organizational goals, whether through mobilization or achievement of another goal (Snow and Benford 1988). In their introduction of the concept Snow et. al define a frame as an interpretive orientation that must be aligned with social movement activities and goals (Snow et. al 1986, 464). Framing takes into account the constructed nature of the frames chosen, but mainly from the perspective of how well that construction will help the group to realize its objectives (Goodwin and Jasper 1999; Tarrow 1998).

Political process theory also takes social construction into account, specifically through the role of cognitive liberation. Cognitive liberation addresses how members of a movement subjectively experience shifting political conditions; and how members collectively comprehend and articulate their concerns through the joint creation of meaning (McAdam 1982, 1999). Practical applications of political process theory originate mainly from the perspective of how groups recognize and interpret political opportunities as beneficial (or not) to them (Goodwin and Jasper 1999; McAdam 1999). Moreover, neither political process nor framing theory express an explicit concern with the broader historical context in which identities arise and how this might impact an organization’s interpretations of political opportunities. A number of scholars who
employ one or both of these theoretical traditions do include an analysis of the broader historical and contextual context, including McAdam himself. However, the primary focus of both of these theories is on the contemporary nature of organized movements (McAdam 1999; Benford and Snow 2000).

Though not exclusive adherents of Structural-Political theories, a number of recent scholars have focused on the question of identity deployment, and within this focus, they have pointed to contextual, structural, or institutional factors as key to the decision-making process of identity based organizations. Some have focused on the centrality of the political context in the way of political fields (Ray 1999) or the viability of multi-issue politics in a contentious political environment (Armstrong 2002). Others such as Bernstein (1997, 2005) have been forceful proponents of the notion that groups do not necessarily understand their identities in essentialist terms, but instead may choose to deploy them strategically based on three factors: political access, the structure of social movement organizations, and the type and extent of opposition that an organization faces (see also, Tarrow 2002). Bernstein (1997) has also extended the suggestion that groups may use their identity in different ways, for instance the use of identity for empowerment, identity as strategy, and identity as goal, all of which she treats as separate entities to be empirically defined. This has been an especially important corrective to the multiple and undefined roles identity has been made to play within NSM theorizing.

My interest in Structural-Political theory lies here, in its attention to the political context and the political opportunity structure. Structural-Political theories are often criticized for structural biases that give more weight to organizational form and political structures. But the fact remains that even the most politically antagonistic groups
maintain awareness of the political context and devise their strategies accordingly. In fact, New Institutional and Social Constructionist theories have expanded on the meaning of political to include a wide variety of institutions that are not necessarily political in the traditional sense, but which nonetheless have direct (and sometimes more) bearing on group decision-making behavior (Polletta and Jasper 2001; Thelen 1999).

**Social Constructionist/Post-Modernist Theories**

Although there are some decided differences between Social Constructionism and Post-Modernism I treat the two together in reflection of the fact that they are frequently used interchangeably (and often indistinguishably) by many scholars. Both traditions consider that identity is constructed and that it has customarily been constructed in a way that is negative and not really reflective of the groups it attempts to describe (Hekman 2000). Thus, in any radical political struggle it is central that the aggrieved group finds or creates an identity and, equivalently, a politics that it feels reflects its particular social location as the group understands it. This recreated or newly created identity politics helps a group in its struggles to redefine and broaden the political landscape to embrace a real inclusivity (Collins 1998; Sudbury 2001). Unlike NSM theorists who have tended to place the process of identity construction wholly within the realm of the group itself, SC/PM theorists are disposed to take both the internal and external context into account,

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11 It might be said that one of the major differences between social constructionists and post-modernists is the extent to which each camp treats identity construction as dependent on the whims of the group doing the construction. That is, social constructionists tend to see groups’ ability to recreate their identities as at least somewhat constrained by external factors which themselves may be constructions. But though they may be constructions they are deeply embedded constructions which are difficult to change at the group level. Post-modernists also consider that everything is a construction and concomitantly that everything, identity included, is subject to reconstruction, even total reconstruction. However, this distinction is not firm, in fact there is quite a bit of latitude in each camp as to the degree to which groups may control identity formation without regard to the Other.
and consider that identity is formulated as part of a dialogic process. Hence, the Anzalduan (1990) idea that identity politics is the active creation and recreation of identity is central, as is her metaphor of “making faces.” While we control the different facial personas, or even the different masks, we assume, the interpretation of what the facial persona or mask means is a matter of perspective of the Other (Phelan 1997).

Another major concern of SC/PM theorists is the repercussions of identity politics, namely the way in which identity is deployed and the extent to which that identity deployment is based on essentialism. In fact, one of the most noted aspects of identity politics is its tendency towards essentialism (Bickford 1997; Calhoun 1994; Hekman 2000). This classification does not endear it to many who believe that social justice movements should not be reduced to arguing for rights on the behalf of the few instead of the many, and that the tendency towards essentialism by some practitioners actually prohibits everyone from achieving the success that would otherwise be available to them (Appiah 2005; Gutmann 2003). Detractors of identity politics argue that its practitioners fall into the trap of seeing their cause as valid, just, and morally ordained, with the result that anyone who disagrees with them, even other social justice proponents, are not only wrong but morally suspect (Bickford 1997, Gamson 1997). Hence, the problem is that this type of thinking precludes activism, and particularly coalition formation, on a large scale. As such, some scholars and activists argue that the best thing is to do away with identity politics entirely, and instead to make political work and coalitions dependent simply on shared interests which shift with the project at hand, and which are never reified nor permanent (Hekman 2000).

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12 Essentialism: the view that categories of people, such as women and men, or heterosexuals and homosexuals, or members of ethnic groups, have intrinsically different and characteristic natures or dispositions (Oxford Dictionary of English 2005, 593).
Others offer more modified critiques. Phelan (1993, 1994), a well-known political science scholar of post-modern gender politics has also lamented the road that many identity based groups have taken, particularly within the lesbian community. Still she does not seek to do away with identity politics and instead argues for a shift within the practice or deployment of identity politics, to make diversity a cornerstone that is central to the organizing of groups. Identity politics should proceed in a modified way that requires everyone, and not simply the supposed oppressors, to engage in a constant interrogation of and constant re-construction of their identities (Phelan 1993, 1994).

So, from a theoretical perspective identity politics have two parts. One is the active creation and recreation of identity by a collective, such that it reflects that group’s experiences in a way that it feels is truthful and accurate. This is a part of the negotiation and appropriation process mentioned above. Two, identity, as defined by the group it is meant to describe, should be both the base and the center of all political action. Identity politics is “the belief that identity itself - its elaboration, expression, and affirmation - is and should be a fundamental process of political work” (Kauffman 1990: 67). Identity – its construction and reconstruction, its practice, its substantiation by the group and the Other – is now primarily a political exercise, and is or should be understood as such by its holders/practitioners.

**Ideology**

The practice of identity politics derives from two interrelated concerns. The first is the construction of boundaries. If, as is commonly accepted, identity can only

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13 The practice of identity politics refers to an individual or an organization’s actions. It is synonymous with the deployment of identity, and I use the two terms interchangeably.
exist in relation to an opposite, then a major aspect of appropriating an identity is the
determination of who or what is and is not included in that identity. This is important for
the solidarity of the group itself and for its external political efforts, for a group cannot
mobilize or claim rights on the basis of an undefined collectivity. Of course boundaries
are constructed and thus may be subject to change or expansion. But, in practice groups
are often extremely vigilant about the restrictions they have created and, at the extreme
end, these restrictions can lead to the overly essentialist nature with which identity groups
are often described.

Second is the development of a group political consciousness or ideology.
Ideology is a system of beliefs and values; it is “the set of political beliefs on the basis of
which individuals interpret conditions and events” (Arnold 1995, 279). Ideology has a
material existence, e.g. ideology manifests itself through actions (Althusser 1971). A
group’s ideological position, e.g. the way it views the world, helps it to determine its
specific goals and interests (Crenshaw 1995; Gutmann 2003; Phelan 1993, 1994;
Kymlicka 1995; Ryan 1997; Rupp and Taylor 1999; Bystydzienski and Schacht 2001).
Specifically, ideology helps an organization to analyze the platforms and issue
orientations of all other entities, formal and informal, with whom it comes into contact.
In this way the development of a political consciousness is vital in that it provides a sort
of template for the group to consult through its existence, and this template may be
updated in response to the current configuration of political consciousness as it occurs
within the group (Ferree and Hess 2000; Lichterman 1995; Ryan 1997). The updating
capacity of ideology is central in explaining its permanence. Oliver and Johnston affirm
Because an ideology links theory, norms, and values in one interconnected system, what may seem to outsiders as an unreasonable attachment to a particular belief or norm can frequently be understood as a defense of core values by defending the whole belief system in which they are embedded. Conversely, what may seem to outsiders to be vacillation in belief or abandonment of prior beliefs may be seen by activists as a realistic reappraisal of their theory of society or their strategies as they seek better ways to pursue their core values (Oliver and Johnston 2000, 44)

These descriptions of ideology and the way that it functions imply a belief system that is coherent and permanent, yet flexible. That is, an ideology operates around a fairly consistent core, e.g. abortion is murder; murder is immoral. However ideology can be flexible to strategy as long as the strategy is not in opposition to the core belief structure. For instance, while an anti-pornography coalition between Christian Right activists and the National Organization for Women might seem odd, ideologically it is not at odds with the belief systems of either side. The Christian Right espouses a commitment to doing the work of God, in whatever form that takes. The National Organization for Women espouses a commitment to openness, and tolerance of diversity. Both sides believe that the spread and advancement of pornography is detrimental; either because it goes against God, or because it is degrading and harmful to women. These ideological belief systems allowed for a strategic coalition among two groups who are typically portrayed as staunch enemies.
Hence, ideology is distinct from framing. Ideology is deep and complex; it is a system of meaning that couples assertions and theories about the nature of social life with values and norms relevant to promoting or resisting social change (Oliver and Johnston 2000; Wilson 1973). Frames, as they are most commonly applied in social movement theory, are shallower. They are the intentional activity of movement entrepreneurs at the organizational level (Tarrow 1998). Jasper (1997) affirms “frames tend to reduce the richness of culture to recruitment strategies” (Jasper 1997, 76). Frames may be, and often are based on ideology but, contrary to popular social movement usage; they are not synonymous (Benford and Snow 2000; Oliver and Johnston 2000; Snow et. al 1986; Snow and Benford 1988; Steinberg 1998).

My reading of identity scholars’ focus on the potential dangers or possibilities of identity politics implies that an ideological disagreement is at the core of the problem. A number of scholars explicitly employ the term ideology (Armstrong 2002; Arnold 1995; Buechler 1990; Lichterman 1995; Wilson 1973; Willis 1992). Others argue for or against identity as negative or positive for coalition formation, either because it is essentialist or manageable. The idea of essentialism, especially, implies an ideological commitment to separateness. For instance, identity theorists argue that essentialism leads groups to see their positions as just, valid, and morally ordained (Bickford 1997; Gamson 1997; Gutmann 2003; Hekman 2000). The argument that identity politics precludes coalition politics may be restated to say that the (negative) deployment of identity precludes coalition politics. Implicit (and sometimes explicit) in these arguments is the idea that ideology, or some similar concept, precludes coalition through incitement of that negative
politics. Theoretically, ideology (and boundary formation) is the step between identity politics and coalition politics, because it determines the *how* of how identity is deployed.

**Summary**

NSM and SC/PM theories support attention to the creation of identity through the construction of boundaries, e.g. the question of who we are. NSM theory considers this a goal and outcome within itself. SC/PM theory considers this question important for a discussion of how groups deploy their identity. NSM and SC/PM theories also imply, explicitly or implicitly, that ideology (or worldview) has a great deal to do with how identity is deployed; specifically how identity politics impact coalition politics. I term these two parts – boundary construction, and ideology – the practice or deployment of identity politics. Finally, structural-political theories emphasize the political context; particularly the changing nature of available political opportunities, and how groups interpret those political opportunities. These theories equate identity deployment with available political opportunities and frames. I employ both of these paradigms; however I choose to trace them separately given their lack of agreement over the degree and importance of strategy in conditioning social movement actions and decision-making processes. Hence, I follow Bernstein’s (2005) and Norton’s (2004) admonishment that the question of whether groups proceed from an essentialist or strategic basis should be an empirical question, not an a priori assumption. I return to this point later.
V. A Working Definition of Coalition

What, exactly, is a coalition? Many, including coalition scholars, assume it to be a fairly self-explanatory term and therefore do not offer an explicit definition. In fact, some of the most noted recent works on coalition offer only a footnoted explanation of their use of the term (see Staggenborg 1986, Van Dyke 2003). The earliest social movement definition was introduced by Zald and Ash some forty years ago; according to them a coalition “pools resources and coordinates plans, while keeping distinct organizational identities” (1966, 335). For Staggenborg coalitions are “more sustained forms of cooperation, including the formation of coalition organizations and other ongoing cooperative efforts which do not result in formal organizational structure” (1986, 375). Staggenborg’s definition is quite similar to Croteau and Hicks (2003) assertion that coalitions result when a temporary or permanent network of some kind is formed by member organizations, all of whom must maintain a distinct organization identity.

What these definitions have in common is a focus on the sustained nature of coalitions. Coalitions need not last forever, and it is not necessary that they have a long-term focus. However, they do require more than a one-shot interaction. This is the key difference between more general cooperation amongst groups and a coalition. Simple cooperation requires no extended time frame and need not even mandate agreement on an issue. Coalitions, including short-term ones, have a more lasting quality. Coalitions may be ad-hoc but not totally spontaneous, for as is noted above, cooperation amongst groups requires an ongoing quality to qualify as a coalition.

What is somewhat less clear is how formalized the cooperation must be to qualify as a coalition. For some scholars a coalition is revealed by the official creation of a new
entity, whether as simple as a specific name and some printed letterhead, or as involved as the establishment of office space and new staff (Croteau and Hicks 2003; McCammon and Campbell 2002; Staggenborg 1986). However, as Van Dyke (2003) affirms coalitions can take on many forms and many levels of formality. A coalition can be formalized without becoming official (Ferree and Hess 2000). Indeed, I argue that only two components are required for coalition: one, a sustained or ongoing quality and two, a shared and intentional commitment to interaction among two or more social movement organizations. Of course, these shared and intentional commitments can and often do take on more official forms. Yet, in many cases groups come together in coalition without such official proclamations, and to ignore these instances is to underestimate the frequency of coalition formation (Van Dyke 2003).

VI. Recent Perspectives on Coalitions

Just as was the case with identity politics, New Social Movement, Structural-Political and Social Constructionist/Post-Modernist theories have treated the question of coalition politics very differently, and each offers a distinct perspective on the nature and role of coalitions for identity groups. Again I offer a brief review of the contributions of each approach.

New Social Movement Theory

NSM theory is not especially noted for its attention to the question of coalition formation among social movement groups. This is largely due to an overall focus that is more concerned with the question of how groups come together in the first place, around
ostensibly new forms of collective action, and how it deals with the process of then forming an identity that will solidify the group. Indeed, in a review of NSM theory, Klandermans (1992) notes that Melucci (1989), one of the best known NSM theorists, seems to localize the entire process of construction of meaning within the group itself. Since it is not a given that a group will be successful in creating a collective identity for itself, it is not surprising that traditional NSM theorists do not give as much attention to the question of the conditions under which multiple groups might come together in coalition.

Still, if successful groups are those who have managed to create a collective identity for themselves then this means that a successful group is one that has determined its margins. Extant research on coalition formation highlights that a major factor in the decision of whether or not to form a coalition is the extent of their identity differences (Bell and Delaney 2001). That is groups who do not view themselves as similar are often unwilling to come together in coalition; indeed they are unlikely even to give the option any serious consideration (Van Dyke and Cress 2006). So again, a chief contribution of NSM theory here is its consideration of the major role that boundary construction plays not only in the construction of a group, but of its politics thereafter.

**Structural-Political Theories**

Theorists employing structural-political paradigms have not paid extensive attention to the question of coalition formation, focusing instead on within organization activity or cross-movement activity (Hathaway and Meyer 1997; McAdam 1999). Scholars who delineate, empirically, the conditions under which coalitions form, have
relied primarily on a combination of resource mobilization and political process theory, especially the role of political opportunities (Almeida 2003; McCammon and Campbell 2002; Meyer and Whittier 1994; Staggenborg 1986; Van Dyke and Cress 2006). These scholars often identify threat as a major condition under which coalitions will form (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996, Van Dyke 2003; Zald and McCarthy 1980). This is in keeping with a central tenet of RM theory, that the social movement sector is couched within a very competitive atmosphere, and, as such, organizations may be reluctant to work with one another unless they feel it mandated by specific conditions (Maney 2000; Stockdill 2003). In this case threat, understood as a threat from the external political environment in the form of an organized counter attack, the pulling of funding, a change in office, in public opinion, etc. will often act as a catalyst for joint efforts among both like-minded groups, and sometimes enemy groups (Britt and Heise 2000; Eihnwohner 2002; Reger 2002; Van Dyke 2003).

Both resource mobilization and political process theories give great weight to external political constraints; one consistently identified external aspect that may affect potential for coalition building is the general political climate. Armstrong (2002) argues that the potential for coalition building is highly dependent on access to the structure of political bargaining. She makes the case that a closed political system or a reduced political opportunity structure will mean a reduction in the viability of multi-issue politics for groups trying to stay afloat. The outcome of this reduced multi-issue politics means a decrease in the likelihood of coalition formation, given that groups involved in multi-issue politics are also the most likely to form coalitions (Gerhards and Rucht 1992). In opposition to hypothesizing on the impact of a closed political climate on coalition
formation, some argue that a more open, accessible political climate can foster the development of new alliances, since movements will want collaborators to help them in taking advantage of more optimal circumstances (Diani 1990; Staggenborg 1986).

In regards to this study, the most important insights of structural-political theories as they bear on coalition formation are those related to the role of ideological differences in helping or hindering the creation of new alliances. Most of this research has focused on the ideological framing of issues that groups choose, along with discussions of how those frames impact coalition possibilities (Staggenborg 1986, Hathaway and Meyer 1997, McCammon and Campbell 2002). This emphasis on framing is consistent with a theoretical tradition that has not, as noted above, given as much consideration to the question of how groups come about their identities so much as how they choose to deploy them. Due to the basic assumption that individuals/groups are rational self-interested actors, structural-political theorists presume that an organization’s decision on how to deploy its identity is usually a strategic one. I agree with Bernstein’s (2005) admonishment that these assumptions should, in fact, be empirical questions. It is unclear whether it is simply that two un-matched frames will impede coalition formation (and concomitantly two matched frames will result in coalition formation) or if it is the case that there is a deeper ideological incompatibility that is irresolvable.

Social Constructionist and Post-Modernist Theories

SC/PM theorists have traditionally treated ideological differences as deeply embedded within the group (Gamson 1997; Buechler 1990; Melucci 1989). This is most certainly because of their attention to the issue of essentialism within identity politics and
its affects on alliance propensities among like-minded groups (Gutmann 2003; Reger 2002). Many theorists, regardless of their theoretical leanings, make the often implicit assumption that there is strength in numbers, and thus that coalition efforts will only strengthen the movement (Aronowitz 1993; Koopmans 1993, Van Dyke 2003). For some, anything – like essentialism – that undermines those coalition propensities is, at best, suspect, and at worst totally divisive (Gitlin 1996; Wilson 1999).

These debates over the role of essentialism map heavily onto those concerning the importance of recognizing diversity within identity groups. The camps fall much along the same lines as SC/PM debates about the role of identity politics. There are those that believe that the focus on diversity to the point of essentialism that they see in identity politics has a direct and negative effect on the possibility of coalition formation among social movement organizations (Huxham 1996; Ryan 1997; Turner 1999). Others admit that too much essentialism can spiral down into negativity, but do not seek to ignore the diversity as some total anti-essentialists do (Bickford 1997, Bystydzienski and Schacht 2001; Phelan 1997). Instead they seek to reign in diversity and use it in a positive way, namely by requiring that everyone recognize both their subjugation and their privilege, and use that as a base where everyone is committed to working through differences for the greater good. Still others take diversity within identity politics as the cornerstone of any coalition efforts and embrace it as the base of any good coalition politics. These arguments take two forms: one that a multiple-identity basis for coalition enables the possibility for truly radical alliances (Crenshaw 1995; Barvosa-Carter 2001), or that diversity may remain in its entirety because the question is not one of shared ideological
vision but of hard and fast institutional rules that will supercede essentialist conflicts (Lyons 2001).

Summary

NSM and SC/PM theories remain consistent in their attention to boundary construction and the way in which that may impact coalition formation. SC/PM theories also highlight the dangers and possibilities of identity politics as they are manifested through essentialism. Structural-political theorists retain a focus on the role of the political context - specifically threat - and political opportunities, and the degree to which they structure organizational action. Structural-political theorists also emphasize that resources may impact coalition formation. As I noted earlier, my preference is to treat these positions separately, for two reasons. One, structural-political theories emphasize structure and strategy; while new social movement, social-constructionist, and post-modernist theories emphasize culture, boundaries and ideology. Rather than attempt to mesh these disparate viewpoints together, I treat them separately and trace the degree to which each side holds sway within the empirical case study. Moreover, my own normative position is that there is a need for more research that emphasizes the cultural nature of identity politics. I agree with scholars such as Jasper (1997), Steinberg (1998) and Oliver and Johnston (2000) that concepts such as culture and ideology should not be reduced to frames, or other ideas that are easier to manage within a structurally oriented research project.\textsuperscript{14} The empirical literature on identity and coalition politics consistently highlights structural-political variables, while identity differences or ideology remain

\textsuperscript{14} I remind the reader that frames and framing theory, as they were originally proposed, are not as reductive as they are portrayed to be. However, in practice this has been precisely the outcome. See Benford 1997.
I wish to examine the cultural, or discursive, impact of identity politics on coalition formation. For this reason I identify a casual sequence that privileges boundary construction and ideological formation as it relates to more general processes of identity construction and coalition formation. I consider structural-political variables, specifically resources, threat, framing and political opportunity as alternative explanations.

VII. The Causal Sequence

The causal sequence is based on three processes, which I have discussed throughout this chapter. The first part focuses on general identity construction, or the creation and negotiation of larger identity groups such as man, woman, black, white, etc. I refer to this process as **general identity construction**, in reflection of the large scale on which it occurs. General identity construction process proceeds sequentially, through three steps: Naming, Negotiation, and Appropriation. These three steps highlight the fact that identity is constructed dialectically, from the top down and the bottom up.

Moreover, global identity construction has repercussions. Once a group appropriates an identity its members retain the option of whether or not to act upon that identity, and to do so in a variety of ways. My focus is on the evolution of collective identity as manifested through formal organizations. I refer to this process as **collective identity construction**. According to the theoretical paradigm noted above, collective identity construction proceeds through boundary construction and the creation of ideology.

Boundary construction is the question of who we are. Ideology is the question of what:

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15 I do not equate identity differences and ideology. I include both terms in reflection of the fact that much of the empirical literature on identity and coalition formation employs one of these two terms and within that literature both are taken to represent cultural factors.
what should we do, how should the world be, what is our place in the world, and so on. Hence the *we* question precedes the *what* question. Finally, collective identity construction impacts the practice of identity politics or deployment of identity. If theory is correct, the way in which an organization understands its collective identity should have a direct impact on its practice of identity politics or deployment of identity, e.g. its propensity to coalition formation. The causal sequence is diagrammed below.

As I noted, the first part of the causal sequence, general identity construction, proceeds from the question of how large-scale identities such as black and white are created, negotiated, and maintained. This is the point to which I turn now.

I. Introduction

All identities are created, including that of the nation. In the Uruguayan case the state emerged well before the nation (Bauzá 1929; González Laurino 2001, Nahum 1994). As such, this chapter treats the construction of the Uruguayan nation at the same time as it treats the construction of Uruguayan women. The larger question of this dissertation is how identity is constructed and deployed. The more specific question is how dominant narratives of identity arise, how they are understood, and how this affects collective action. This chapter traces the construction of national identity and its impact on the identity formation of distinct groups of women. Specifically, it argues that national identity construction impacted women in different ways, marginalizing or extolling them based on the degree to which they met or matched the dominant perspective of the “ideal woman.” Hence, this chapter analyzes national and female identity construction as a precursor to later organizational identity and deployment. As I argue in chapter five, women’s understanding of dominant narratives and their location within them impacts their ideological position by aiding them in the construction of boundaries and interests, e.g. what is or is not a priority or what is or is not valid.

I focus on national identity formation and the identity formation of four distinct groups of women: upper/middle class women, afro-Uruguayan women, mestiza/gaucha women and immigrant/popular class women.16 I begin by tracing the general identity construction of the four groups of women noted above through the processes of naming,

16 As will be seen in the discussion below these four groups represent the upper, middle, working and lower class of women. Popular class is synonymous with working-class and is the most commonly used terminology in the Latin American region.
negotiation and appropriation, the first part of the causal chain discussed in chapter three. Specifically, I track the manner in which dominant identity narratives are created, and the way that these narratives are understood and adapted in the form of women’s organizing and mobilization.

Carolina González Laurino (2001) posits that there are four historical defining moments of the Uruguayan nation: the inexistent nation, the nation of orientality, the nation of uruguayity, and the Latinized nation, a framework I adopt here. I trace the parallel identity construction of the nation and of women through the use of two overarching themes - womanhood and citizenship – through the end of the 1930s.17 Specifically, I detail dominant narratives of Uruguayan womanhood, especially images of the “ideal” Uruguayan woman and what that excludes. Along with this I trace formal and informal applications of citizenship to analyze distinctions made against Uruguayan women as a whole and distinctions in the level or degree of the truncated versions of citizenship that the nation/state offered to individual groups of women. Within this broader framework, I consider negotiation and adaptation of female identity through the mechanisms of women’s mobilization in the first and second waves of the feminine/feminist movement.

17 Scholars agree that the period from 1830 to 1932 constituted the height of debates about the role of the woman in society. After this, the “woman question” was considered to have been settled (Lavrin 1995; Ehrick 2005).
II. The Inexistent Nation, 1830-1870

The Uruguayan state was weak in the first forty years of independence and the nation was essentially non-existent. This period was characterized by numerous wars and uprisings, and a lack of confidence in the viability of the state and its ability to construct a sense of national belonging and allegiance among the Uruguayan population. Truncated citizenship status was the defining characteristic of all Uruguayan women’s relationship to the nation-state, although their experiences with a lack of personhood varied dramatically. This section chronicles the fragility of the nation and its relationship to Uruguayan women, particularly the degree to which each distinct group of women matched the image of the ideal woman promoted by Uruguayan elites.

Uruguay became a semi-independent state in 1825 and further solidified that independence in 1828. However, it commemorates the real foundation of the state as of 1830, the year that the first constitution was written and ratified. Yet, this date does not indicate the foundation of a settled nation. Civil wars raged within and around Uruguay for the next twenty-two years as Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay fought over the boundaries of the respective nations and ownership of the port of Montevideo. The most prolonged period of fighting was the Guerra Grande or the Great War. Uruguay’s two main political factions, the Colorados and the Blancos, pitted themselves against one another in a bid for control of Uruguayan territory. They soon found themselves allied with warring factions from Argentina, including the exiled Unitarios, who took refuge in

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18 On August 25, 1825 the Provincia Oriental del Río de la Plata (Uruguay) declared independence from Brazil and decided to adhere to a regional federation with Argentina. This led to an immediate war with Brazil which neither side won. It was eventually decided by the Treaty of Montevideo of 1828, fostered by the English, which gave birth to Uruguay as an independent state.

19 The names of each political faction refers to the color of the armbands each wore, with the Colorados, led by General Fructuoso Rivera, sporting red hatbands and the Blancos, led by Manuel Oribe, white armbands. These same groups eventually became the two traditional political parties in Uruguay. The Colorados are associated with a more liberal tradition and the Blancos with a more conservative tradition.
Montevideo and joined the Colorados. Oribe, the leader of the Blancos, was a close friend of the then Argentine dictator, Juan Manuel de Rosas, and chose to ally with him. The prolonged war began when the Colorados overthrew the Uruguayan president who fled to Argentina. The Argentine Unitarios then formed a government in exile in Montevideo and Rivera declared war on Rosas in 1839. At various points in time the war included the intervention of the French, Italian, English, and Brazilians, and finally ended in 1852 when Rosas was overthrown. Soon after, Uruguay became involved in the War of the Triple Alliance (1863-1868). It began as another civil war between the Colorados and the Blancos, this time led by Colonel General Venancio Flores and Bernardo Prudencio Berro, respectively. Flores gained support from Argentina, and Brazil and Berro gained support from Paraguay. Although Berro was overthrown in 1864 with Brazilian help, the president of Paraguay used this as an excuse to wage war on Brazil; the five year conflict between the four countries raged on with Uruguay and Argentina joining forces with Brazil against Paraguay. Flores reigned victorious against Berro after the cessation of the war in 1868 for only a short while. That very same year both men were murdered.

This rather lengthy description of Uruguayan civil wars and infighting illustrates the lack of permanence that Uruguayan nationals felt at this time. The continuing existence of Uruguay as an independent state was not clear, and the constant warfare meant that the state was not free to focus on a key goal of new states: fostering the creation of a sense of the coherence within the nation, a sense of national belonging. At the foundation of the nation in 1830 Uruguay was only recently separated from its existence as part of the much larger Rio de la Plata territory, which had included the
territories of Brazil and Argentina since the colonial era. There was no separate sense of Uruguay as a state onto itself, much less a nation capturing loyalty or a sense of belonging from its inhabitants. This was the case for much of newly-independent Latin America. Elizabeth Dore affirms “Following independence, the state virtually disappeared in Spanish America . . . elites fought among themselves not so much to control the state, which existed in name only, but to accumulate sufficient power to construct one” (Dore 2000, 14). In Uruguay, this was further exacerbated by the small size of the population. Figures from 1829 estimate the total size of the population at 74,000 (Arteaga and Puiggrós 1990). What hope was there for such a small and barren land? Some forty years later the future of the country remained a dominant concern. Roberto Ibañez wrote about the state of the country in the late 1870s “We constituted the appearance of a sovereign state. And we were nothing but an audacious paradox on the map, an erasing of blood . . . [The civil wars] had exhausted the reserves of the nation: poor, miniscule, without culture or living traditions nor any possible confidence for the future” (Ibañez 1959, 23). Ibañez highlights the paradox of the early independent Uruguayan state: a place of formal existence and sovereignty, but also an empty place, literally and figuratively; a place without a noticeable population and exhausted of the meager resources with which it began. Indeed, well into the early 1880s one of the major intellectual debates raging in the country was the question of whether the continued existence of a separate Uruguayan nation was desirable and feasible, or if perhaps it would not be more efficacious to join again with Argentina (Burgueño 2000).

What did this sense of paradoxical existence and emptiness mean for the women of this era? What relationship did Uruguayan women have with the newly forming state

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20 See Appendix A for Population Statistics
at this time? Who were the women populating the country and what did the state require of its women? Specifically, in what ways did ideas of citizenship and womanhood vary for different groups of women at the eve of independence? One trait shared among all Uruguayan females during this time period is a shared lack of citizenship. No Uruguayan female held the right to vote as dictated in the 1830 Constitution, and very few had the right to own and administer property. But how, specifically, was non-citizen status defined for and experienced by different groups of women? This is the theme I take up now.

1. Creole Women: Honor Codes

All individuals who were the direct descendants of nationals of the Spanish Crown, but born on Latin American soil, were universally referred to as Creoles. Upper- and middle-class women residing in Uruguayan territory were almost exclusively members of this particular group (Dore 2000; Lavrin 1995). From a legal and institutional perspective almost all Creole women were considered minors, a status bequeathed to them during the colonial era and one that remained intact well into the post-independence era (Canova and Almeida 1998). The only exceptions to this status were certain women of the propertied classes, specifically widows or adult, unmarried women whose fathers were either deceased or who had granted them legal emancipation. Hence, very few Uruguayan women had the ability to exercise the rights of citizenship. Moreover, no Uruguayan woman had the right to vote, as decreed in the 1830 Constitution. Notwithstanding the exceptions noted above, Creole women were

\[21\] Uruguayan women won full legal equality in 1946 with the Law on Women’s Civil Rights
considered subordinate to either their fathers or husbands, who retained the capacity to act on their behalf and in their name with neither their prior permission, nor knowledge.

Nonetheless, certain Creole women fared much better than some of their North American and European counterparts, given that some did retain the right to sign contracts, ratify official documents, and make wills. Again these rights were limited to a fairly small proportion of the Creole female population, legally emancipated adult women, and widows. For the rest of the feminine population, including the majority of Creole women, slave and free black women, and indigenous and mestiza women, their fates were left in the hands of their husbands, fathers, masters, or the state. 22 This lack of a separate juridical personhood extended quite far, even to the extent of women’s control, or lack thereof, over their children. Since the majority of women held no rights to separate juridical personhood, this also meant that they could not govern another person, including their children. All legal authority for the wife and child resided in the hands of the male, who exercised complete patria potestad in all matters. More than just a nuisance, this fact presented a real problem for quite a few women, as female heads of household were quite normal at this time (Dore 2000).

One standard was applied equally to all Creole women, regardless of marital status. This was the prevailing honor code, which originated under the Spanish crown and remained in effect well into the post-independence era. These “honor codes” were quite similar to those in effect in the slave states of North America, although there was a stronger religious aspect regulating honor in the North American case (Fox-Genovese 1988). Honor consisted of three major characteristics: chastity, racial purity, and

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22 Mestizo refers to individuals of mixed white and indigenous blood. Mestiza refers to mixed white/indigenous women specifically.
legitimacy. Chastity was related to the requirement of a woman’s involvement in sexual relations only within the state of marriage. However, it may be better read as modesty in all things having to do with women’s persons, from the full coverage of the body to the maintenance of a certain innocent and unspoiled air around all adult males to whom the woman was not immediately related.

This was a particularly important requirement for the Creole woman. In a land where the Creole was, by definition, considered inferior to, and less valuable than, a peninsular, the Creole’s status on the hierarchy could be maintained only by the purity of her blood. Given the Creole’s need to maintain a status that brought more rights and freedoms than their mixed-blood counterparts, it comes as no surprise that this group was actually the most invested in maintaining and promulgating the use of the casta system (Rout 1976). The duty to maintain and promote the Creole race near the top of the hierarchy fell to the Creole woman, where notions of purity and legitimacy would be impossible to overlook. A relationship with anyone but a Creole male, within the union of marriage, was unacceptable. In the Uruguayan case this requirement was even more imperative because of the small size of the population, and the racial balance of the population in the post-independence era. White, Creole individuals made up the majority of the population, but the black slave/free minority was a solid one-third of the population and some indicate that it was closer to fifty percent (Antón 1994; Rama 1970). Hence, in the post-independence era the honor codes for Creole women became, perhaps,

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23 Peninsular refers to a person of Spanish blood born in Spain. In the legal and social system imposed by the Spanish Crown, a peninsular was at the top of the socio-racial hierarchy, followed by Creoles. Hence, a Creole could never hope to reach the top of the hierarchy as long as the Spanish Crown retained power. Moreover, the purity of their blood was their only weapon in maintaining their second place position on the hierarchy. That is, above individuals of mixed-race descent (mestizos and mulattos), of indigenous descent, or of African descent, all of whom enjoyed considerably less rights and freedoms than the Creole.

24 The casta system is the name given to the socio-racial hierarchy proposed and implemented by the Spanish Crown.
even more stringent, for within them resided not only the future of the race, but the future of the country. In exchange for meeting these three characteristics Creole women were accorded protection, primarily by their fathers and husbands, and also by the state. As long as a woman’s honor remained unsullied she would enjoy the protection of her close male relatives, and the maintenance of the lifestyle to which she was accustomed, for the duration of her life.

2. Negra Women: Derecho Español, and Fecundity

If Creole women experienced life as something less than full citizens, many black women experienced it as something less than full people. Legal manumission occurred at several points in time, over several decades, with the first law prohibiting the practice of the slave trade in Uruguay adopted in 1812. It was followed closely by the Law of Free Birth, which granted freedom to all slaves arriving from foreign territory, in 1813. However, it appears that Uruguay was not serious about the abolition of slavery where it did not fit the needs of the landed populace, and did not enforce the laws. The major waves of manumission were not a manifestation of the government’s good will. Instead manumission occurred as necessary to meet the needs of the pre-independence armies, and later the Colorado and Blanco factions, for soldiers (Antón 1994; Lewis 2003; Rodríguez 2001). Thus, in 1829 a law was passed granting freedom to any slave who had contributed personally to the cause of national freedom (Rama 1970). At several points over the next 30 years manumission was granted based explicitly on a male slave’s

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25 I refer to women of African descent residing within the territory of Uruguay as afro-Uruguayan, black, colored, or negra, interchangeably, in keeping with local usage. Mulatta and parda refer specifically to women of mixed-blood.

26 The Law of Free Birth is not to be confused with legislation granting freedom to all newly-born children of enslaved parents already residing in Uruguay, which did not occur until 1825.
willingness to fight. This was the case in 1841 when both Rivera and Oribe freed their slaves to help in the Long War, where they occupied the front lines of the conflict (Rama 1970). Soon after, the government began conscription of colored men into the army, regardless of their status as slave or free (Acevedo 1942; Canova and Almeida 1998).

This back and forth between slavery and freedom affected negra women as well, who were unable to access freedom by fighting. For many their status as property remained absolute until the last waves of abolition in 1853, when full abolition was finally granted as a “reward” to negros (Rama 1970). This last act of abolition covered all those slave women (and men) born before 1825 who would not have been freed by earlier manumission decrees or at an individual level by their masters. Even for women who had achieved manumission, their supposed freedom was quite limited. Legal restrictions known as the Derecho Español were in place for all free negros and mulattoes, regardless of gender, included constraints on their ability to run for and hold office, to study in the academic fields, to study in the seminary, to hold a commission, to walk around at night in towns and villages, and much more (Carvalho-Neto 1965). In addition, the Derecho Español limited the freedom of the negra or mulatta female, specifically, the freedom to marry whom she pleased and the freedom to wear “luxurious” goods reserved only for women of a certain social standing (Carvalho-Neto 1965). These goods often included jewelry, certain fabrics, or basically anything associated with a higher (read white) class. The negra or mulatta (and the indigenous or mestiza) woman had to be deprived of the right to wear such things because to do so would mean her intent to try to “pass” as something she was not, and would never be allowed to become. Attempts to “pass” were a grave offense at this time (Carvalho-Neto
These restrictions remained in place through the end of the nineteenth century (da Luz 1995).

The restrictions in place on the right of matrimony skirt the gap between citizenship (or lack thereof in this case) and womanhood that interests us here. A slave woman’s freedom was legally mandated if she married her master, became his concubine, or bore him children that he recognized (Rama 1970, 108-109). In these cases alone, manumission was compelled by law. By definition a master would not require the permission of the slave woman or anyone else to marry her and/or to enter into a sexual relationship with her. Thus, one of the conditions for black female slaves’ freedom is defined by two aspects: One, the sexual nature of her body as the producer of illegitimate offspring and two, her lack of control over her body.

The most common characteristics that one notes in historical references to negra and mulatta women, whether slave or free, are those of sexuality and/or fecundity. As in North America, slave women were prized for their ability to maintain and create a cheap labor force, by means of producing offspring (Chaves 2000; Wallace-Sanders 2002). This same condition is one that might grant them a freedom that would otherwise have been denied them. For both slave and free women a major aspect of their identity was their placement, and the placement of their offspring, within the casta system. The casta system was “associated with a kind of ‘animal-like’ sexual conduct (promiscuous, irregular, etc.) and with the idea that children inherited not only their parents’ physical traits but also their vices” (Chaves 2000, 109). Honor codes did not apply to colored women; in fact, their identities were defined in opposition to this prevailing “ideal” of womanhood.
The casta system was a method of codifying and systematizing the degrees of illegitimacy of the offspring of colored, indigenous, and mestiza women. It was created so that the authorities could identify the degree to which sexual relationships “bettered” the population by creating individuals higher up on the scale of racial purity (e.g. moving closer to a position of honor) or denigrated the population by creating more individuals of sullied blood. Invariably the casta system is codified in terms of a male’s relations with an “un”honorable female. The most well-known examples are quite commonplace: a mestizo or a mulatto. Other examples include an Indian and a half Spanish/albino woman or a lobo (wolf); an Indian man and a black woman, a Zambo; and a chino and an Indian woman a Salta atrás, or a stepback.27 A Tenta en el Aire refers to unions between two non-whites of the same color or caste. The phrase literally means “stay in the air,” suggesting that racial equality will neither be improved nor weakened (Levine 1980, 129). The casta system indicates that while the status of negra women may have varied among slave and free, she was never close to approaching the standards of idealized womanhood, which were reserved exclusively for Creole women. The quality and value of every relationship in which she was involved was subject to judgment by someone else. Again, it was Creole women who had the most to gain from enforcing the casta system and it was they who did so.

27 A chino is a person that is three-quarters Spanish and one-quarter mulatto.
3. Indigenous/Mestiza Women: Bestiality

The position of indigenous and mestiza women at this time was not noticeably different, especially in terms of their citizenship status. Just as was the case for black and mulatta women, indigenous and mestiza women had little leeway in the ability to exercise common rights of citizenship such as the right to vote or own property. In fact, although all indigenous or mestiza women were free, they faced many of the same restrictions on their movement and opportunities as did free blacks. A separate code of restrictions had been put into place long ago by Spanish Crown, and was maintained in the post-colonial era (Carvalho-Neto 1965). Those specific to women again included limits on the right to matrimony and limits on the right to wear “luxury” goods. As a matter of fact, it was the original code of the Rights of the Indian that was the basis for the code of the rights of free slaves (Carvalho-Neto 1965).

Inexistence characterized the major relationship to citizenship exercised by indigenous and mestiza women, particularly indigenous women. By 1831 landowners sought a solution to the “Indian problem,” which they depicted as the inability or unwillingness of the Indian to discontinue her nomadic lifestyle and to respect property boundaries (Sztainbok 2007, 5). Ironically, the number of indigenous peoples remaining in the territory numbered in the low hundreds, at best (Nahum 1994). The population had never been very large even before the colonization of Uruguayan territory, and it was further decimated under the exigencies of colonial rule. However, by 1831 the government was ready to make good on the landowners’ request. That year a call was put out by the first president of Uruguay, General Fructuoso Rivera, to the remaining

28 I treat the cases of mestiza and indigenous women simultaneously in reflection of their small numbers within the population. These small numbers meant that, in practice, the two were treated no differently from one another in terms of their relationship to notions of ideal womanhood and citizenship.
150-200 or so Charrúa families left in the national territory (Acosta y Lara 1998). He invited them to join his troops in a fight against Brazil. Many of them accepted the invitation to fight against this common enemy. They had done so in times past, and the reward of land promised by Rivera was especially compelling (Sztainbok 2007). Instead, the Charrúa arrived at the battlegrounds to find that Rivera had prepared an ambush which was successful in clearing all but a small, remaining few of the Charrúas from the national territory. Hence, for the majority of indigenous women the exercise of citizenship, or lack thereof, was limited to a very short period. Indeed, it is likely the case that the only reason that indigenous groups were not exterminated sooner is because of the independence wars, which had preoccupied Uruguay until 1825 (Pi Hugarte 1998). Hence, this sense of a lack of groundedness that helped motivate Uruguay’s war-mongering may have been the very thing that extended indigenous existence.

Indigenous and mestiza women are known to have participated in the pre- and post-independence wars, mainly in the form of accompanying their men to the battlegrounds and setting up camp around them (Canova and Almeida 1998). However, some of them fought in battle as well, earning notoriety for their fierceness. The dominant story is that of Catalina Quintana, *La China Catalina*, who fought with the Colorados and who was described in terms of her bravery and manliness (Ehrick 2005, 23). Her story is illustrative of the prevailing sentiment of indigenous, and particularly of

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29 The Charrúa are the best known and most populous indigenous group occupying Uruguay in the pre- and post-colonial era. The other major indigenous group, the Guarani had already succumbed to extinction with the decimation of their numbers in the colonial era and a final massacre at Caibaté 1756 (Antón 1994)

30 Ironically, this same argument is made for why slavery finally ended when it did. The supposition is that if not for the need for a larger fighting force, slavery may have continued on for quite some time, as it did in Brazil. Brazil was the last country in the world to abolish slavery, which it did not do until 1888 and then only under severe international pressure.
the mestiza or gaucha, women of the (small) popular classes at this time.31 She was seen as “the female counterpart of the archetypal gaucho, whose mixed blood was often pointed to as . . . evidence of barbarism” (Ehrick 2005, 23). Gaucha women (and indigenous women before them) were mostly ignored; very little is known or written about this almost invisible population. However, what descriptions of them do remain invariably refer to their ferocity or mannishness, or other terms referring to the idea of bestiality accorded to both indigenous and gaucho/gaucha peoples at this time (Burgueño 2000). If blacks were somehow less than human because of their illegitimacy and their status as property so too were these groups, who were often compared to the tiger. Tigers are beautiful from afar, but if they get too close they become a menace, a scourge to be expunged. The same fate that befell the remaining indigenous groups in the post-colonial era soon visited the gauchos as well. From the perspective of the Uruguayan elite they had to be erased from the national territory so that it could modernize; a key component of which included whitening (González Laurino 2000). So, the ideals of womanhood escaped the indigenous and gaucha woman as well, who was defined in clear opposition to the norms associated with that position.

31 Gaucho is a specifically Uruguayan and Argentinean term used to refer to mestizo (and mulatto) men who roamed the interior during the early and mid-19th century and who are often referred to in terms of their fierceness and bravery in battle and their barbarism because of their mixed blood. Gaucha, a term much less commonly used, refers to female gauchos. Gaucha and mestiza are interchangeable in Uruguayan terminology.
III. Orientalidad, 1870-1900

Eventually the Uruguayan state became more politically settled and free from violence, and elites took up the project of nation-building full force. Like much of Latin America in the late 1800s, Uruguay desired to modernize itself in the image of the European republics to whom it looked for inspiration, especially England and France. Yet, one clear distinction between Uruguay and continental Europe was the former’s experience of impurity, conservatism, and illegitimacy among its citizenry, resulting in a decidedly “un” modern nation. Thus, in the first phase of national identity construction, in the period from 1870 to 1900, elites took on the task of creating a national story of origins, erasing, modifying, and highlighting specific aspects of the national history in order to suit its needs. In essence, Uruguayan elites adopted a political resource of negation; throwing out all the aspects of the “uncivilized” nation and emphasizing the civilized. This section covers the repercussions of this impulse toward modernization as they impacted three groups of women: elite/Creole women, negra women, and popular class women. Again, the results varied dramatically among the three groups. Creole women maintained a central, if even more restricted position in society. Negra women experienced an invisibility and marginalization that remains true to the current day. The third group, popular-class women, was vital in the foundation of the new nation. These women unwittingly aided elite performance in a sleight of hand that would simultaneously erase and privilege the indigenous and gaucho populations, and replace the void with large immigrant influxes.

Fighting subsided by the 1860s, and elites were finally free to turn their attention to creating a unified nation and a sense of belonging, or nationality, among the occupants
of the Uruguayan territory. This new peace was secured when the Blancos and Colorados tired of fighting and came to an agreement to divide up control of the country. The Colorados would rule over the city of Montevideo and the coastal region of the country, while the Blancos would control the interior. This internal pact set the stage for their conversion from extra-governmental political factions, to the party bases of the Uruguayan bipartisan system through the 1960s (Trigo 1990). In addition the Blancos would be paid a sum of $500,000 U.S. dollars to compensate for their losses (Trigo 1990).

This new attention towards the construction of a Uruguayan nation and an accompanying national identity mapped onto debates already raging in neighboring Argentina. Uruguayans soon adapted Domingo Sarmiento’s now classic dichotomy of barbarism/civilization to their national situation. All of the troubles of the nation could be described by this dichotomy of barbaridad and civilización, which served as shorthand for other longstanding divisions within the country, each one representative of the conception of barbarism and civilization. This included the rural/urban divide which divided the country spatially: in the city resided the modern, Montevidean elite; in the countryside, racial mixing was said to be unchecked and civilization unknown (Achugar and Moraña 2000; Sztainbok 2007).

Barbarism was frequently used to describe the backwards state of the gaucho; however, the span of the term was not limited solely to descriptions of mixed-blood and illegitimacy. Barbarism was a term used to refer to anything and anyone considered backwards, especially those elements of impure racial heritage (González Laurino 2000).

32 Domingo Fausto Sarmiento was an Argentine intellectual and statesman who served as president from 1868 to 1874. He is best known for his book, *Facundo: Civilización y Barbarie* published in 1845, in which he introduces the now-classic dichotomy of barbarism versus civilization.
It was also a term descriptive of obsessive ties to tradition and an unwillingness to embrace modernity, particularly by the more conservative elements of society, e.g. the traditional elites (Blancos) of the interior (Nahum 1994). The desire of the Montevidean lettered elite – the major proponents of this school of thought - was to usher in a new era of civilization that would wipe the country clean of its backwards, violent roots, and impure racial heritage. The result is what González Laurino (2000) terms *orientalidad*. This term is reflective of Uruguay’s designation as the Provincia Oriental del Río de la Plata or the Eastern Province of the River Plate. The Eastern designation refers to current day Uruguay’s location east of the Uruguay River, opposite to Argentina’s location west of the River. In González Laurino’s usage the term *orientalidad* is meant to convey a sense of belonging to the national territory, and specifically a sense of unified belonging. *Orientalidad* represents not only the first attempt to create a strong sense of national identity among the population, but to do so in a homogeneous fashion through the creation of a new national tradition, the tradition of the civilized nation or, alternatively, a non-barbaric nation. González Laurino describes the prevailing sentiment at the time.

Paradoxically, *orientalidad* is affirmed as a civilized space by means of a significant appropriation of its opposite (barbarism), in a mythic synthesis that is, in and of itself, a political recourse of negation. Extolling the gaucho and the caudillo as historic figures, the generation of 1878 gave them a privileged position in the national tradition, but at the same time buried them mythically in the heroic past . . . .and erased from the present the uncomfortable presence of the
‘towns of rats’, formed by the vagabond gauchos expelled by the fencing of the countryside (González Laurino 2000, 33).

One of the defining characteristics of the civilization/barbarism dichotomy is the issue of how to represent the gaucho within the historic tradition. The remaining gaucho population, never a large group to begin with, was harshly repressed under the regime of dictator Lorenzo Latorre (1876-1880). He utilized restrictive policies of fencing the countryside to protect the property rights of land-owners, coupled with legislation that outlawed vagrancy and delinquency. This legislation aimed to control and reduce the gaucho/mestizo population and to rid would-be caudillos (strongmen) of followers, which meant their inability to corral forces for aid in uprisings against the government (Burgueño 2000). By the late 19th century elites had achieved their goal. The country was free of any noticeable indigenous and mestizo/gaucho population, and a pattern of perceptible European immigration had begun by the 1840s (see Appendix A, Table 8).

But, this left the problem of how to represent the foundation of the nation historically. The Indians and gauchos were eradicated precisely because of the backward and the mongrel natures they represented, but now elites were left with the task of creating a compelling story that would explain and legitimize their “disappearance”. This problem of legitimacy has been a central dilemma of the white settler society. Sherene Razack affirms “The problem for the settler society is to disavow its violent origins and naturalize its’ rightful’ presence on the land. B/c the initial violence never goes away –it is the basis of national racial hierarchy – it must be erased through national narratives or mythologies that are a ‘disavowal of conquest, genocide, slavery’” (Razack 2002, 2). In
the Uruguayan case the response to this problem came not, primarily, from the
government or political elites, but from the well-known intellectuals of the era, who took
on the task of creating a new historical imaginary that would be acceptable to a civilized
country (Alvarez and Caetano 1994, Burgueño 2000). Intellectuals achieved this task
through the location of the Charrúa and the gaucho in a remote past that belied their very
recent extermination. The aging of their extinction was crucial. Too intimate a tie with
the current population would indicate a lack of purity that would make the project of the
Creole elites impossible: the construction of a “new” univocal, centralized, rational,
stable nation-state, capable of rejecting possible contradictory fissures, e.g. a modern
country (Caetano and Rilla 1994).

This distancing was achieved most notably by Uruguayan national poet Juan
Martín tells the story of *Tabaré*, a story centered on a white, Spanish woman who bears a
mestizo child (*Tabaré*) as a result of her rape by a Charrúa chief. It is the story of the
young man who, because of his racial heritage, is both timid and brave, handicapped and
powerful; and most importantly, who is overwhelmed and made strong by his love for
Blanca, a name that is defining of the character with whom Tabaré falls in love, and the
race to which she pertains.³³ Central to his story is an emphasis on the “new” origins of
the nation, as specifically Spanish and white (Burgueño 2000). In Zorilla de San
Martín’s epic poem the nation is populated and represented by a pure-bred white race that
has dominated over the degenerate Indian. He asserts “[Tabaré is the] personification of
dead lineage . . . [the white race] has remained alive on top of the cadaver of the Charrúa”
(quoted from Burgueño 1996, 4; translation mine). At the same time certain aspects of

³³ Blanca means white in Spanish.
the Charrúa are celebrated, specifically his courageous spirit and his valor. Sztainbok notes the persistence of this image even in the current day where “the claiming of the garra charrúa, the ‘Charrúa claw’ describes the strength of Uruguayan character, particularly the nation’s prowess in soccer” (Sztainbok 2007, 17).34 Burgueño affirms

The representation of the Indian, based on opposites, forms part of the conceptual content of the poem that seeks to create a referential image of identity for the uruguayan nation, one an indigenous race of which it inherits certain positive attributes, and at the same time marks its [the indigenous race’s] extinction, its inexistence in a ‘white’ ‘fatherland’ (Burgueño 1996, 116).

González Laurino seconds this notion, noting that the image of the indomitable Charrúa, situated in a remote antepasado (ancestry) was the sustaining image of the collective representation of orientalidad (González Laurino 2000, 167).

Hence, the Montevidean elite set the stage for the first wave of modernization and the new imaginary of the nation that accompanied it. They placed the Charrúa in a remote ancestry while rescuing a few important traditions. It was the first attempt at a national story that tied everyone to a shared, if remote, historical past. This search for a new historical tradition to accompany the creation of a new, modern nation is underscored by the importance of ideologies of positivism that enraptured Uruguay at this time (Ardao 1956). Indeed, positivism captivated all of Latin America at this time, though its specific form and influence varied by context. In the Uruguayan case the

34 Uruguay won the World Cup twice, in 1930 and 1950. Only Brazil, Germany, and Italy have won more (Argentina also won twice) and only 7 countries in the world can boast of a World Cup win in the history of the tournament (France and England round out the 7).
positivist ideological tradition was strongly associated with Darwinian and Spencerian, and could be summed up in one word: evolutionism (Ardao 1950).\textsuperscript{35}

This new impulse toward modernization had specific repercussions for each of the three groups of women that interest us here: Upper- and middle-class women (Creole women); black women; and women of the popular class; particularly in terms of a new ideal of womanhood and the relationship that each group would have to said ideal.

Within the prevailing dichotomy of civilization/barbarism and urban/rural some contrasting and quite distinct images of the feminine emerged. Elites employed sharp distinctions such as good/bad; saint/sinner; selfless/frivolous; submissive and feminine/rebellious and virile; hardworking and sacrificing/useless and lazy, to judge the relative merits of women and to describe the feminine image (Sapriza 1983, 118).

1. Creole Women: Disciplining

Ironically, for Creole women, the new impulse towards modernization and civilization resulted in greater restrictions on their already limited freedoms.

Specifically, elites associated civilization with a necessity to repress the natural inclinations of the human being, and new conceptions of behavior and comportment that concerned the most diverse aspects of public and private daily life (Ines de Torres 1995, 56). Barrán terms this trend \textit{disciplining}, a fact of all social life at the time, but a trend

\textsuperscript{35} The terminology ideologies of positivism is meant to reflect the dual analyses of positivism as it was originally introduced, and its mapping onto eugenics debates, sometimes referred to as “social positivism.” The original use of the term positivism reflected the idea that science can only proceed through direct observation, that progress is inevitable, and that progress occurs in stages (evolutionism). Social positivism took a number of forms, but generally assigned moral hierarchies to those aspects of social life that were understood to be negative or positive for the achievement of progress; usually the progress of a nation, a race, or a people. For instance, black was bad, evil, retrogressive; white was good, pure, progressive. In Uruguay ideologies of positivism were attached to three major issues: religion (retrogressive/bad) vs. secularism (progressive/good); non-white (retrogressive/bad) vs. white (progressive/good); and traditionalism/conservatism (retrogressive/bad) vs. liberalism/cosmopolitanism (progressive/good).
that carried especially firm and specific expectations for women (Barrán 1990). He notes “the bourgeois . . . assumed the roles, the valors, the conduct, the language, and the gestures of the masculine image of the woman, and he made her childlike, infantilizing her” (Barrán 1990, 183; translation mine). For instance, it was in the early part of the period of orientalidad that the Uruguayan government reaffirmed the Uruguayan woman’s dependence on her husband and/or father with passage of the Civil Code of 1868. The Civil Code of 1868 officially legalized what had previously been a quasi-official practice: the lack of juridical personhood for most women with the exception of widows and legally emancipate minors described earlier.

At the same time, a great deal of responsibility was placed on the woman, concurrent with a change in thought about her reproductive roles. In the “primitive” era, the country was a “population void;” and the woman’s major responsibility was that of a biological reproducer of the race, with biological reproduction of the workforce the primary goal (Sapriza 1983). Now, in the face of a “full” country, due to the noticeable increase of European immigrants, women’s role became that of a social reproducer. She ensured sufficient socialization of the next generation such that it would be adequately prepared to meet the civilized requirements of the modern nation (Sapriza 1983).

This shift in the primary role of the Uruguayan wife and mother was accompanied by some early debates over the importance of women’s education. If the woman was to be the first and one of the most important influences of the lives of her children, then she should, perhaps, be educated enough to provide the children with some basic education in the home (Ardao 1950). This was the position of José Pedro Varela’s, a well-known Uruguayan intellectual and statesman. He took on the task of educational reform and
oversaw the extension of educational opportunities throughout the territory; he was
staunch in his conviction that equal educational opportunity should be shared by (almost)
all Uruguayan nationals (Varela [1876] 1964).36 In regards to women Varela was quite
progressive; he hosted a three day conference in 1869 called “Of the rights of the
woman” where he advocated that society should educate the woman and place her at the
same height as the man, thereby doubling the intellectual capacity of the society
(Larrobla 1986).37 Many disagreed with this notion, preferring instead to emphasize the
“feminine” qualities of women, which most certainly did not include an education equal
to that of a man. Instead qualities considered feminine at this time were “beauty, and a
certain infantile air (the woman was always a minor), with a few touches of
sophistication and frivolity” (Sapriza 1983, 126). Indeed, this new tradition of
disciplining had the effect of creating a bit of confusion over the role of the woman.

Canova and Almeida and Almeida affirm “the woman was confronted now with a
domination that was more subtle and more difficult to identify, that obligated her to
identify her necessities, without even having comprehended what those were” (Canova
and Almeida and Almeida 1998, 28; translation mine).

36 Various scholars have noted Varela’s antipathy to blacks, to whom he professed to object, not because of
their race but their inferior social class (Rama 1970, Rout 1976). Of course the point of his legislation was
precisely to introduce education to all members of the society, including the “inferior classes.” Perhaps the
more honest version of his thought is captured by Sapriza (n.d.) who notes “influenced by ideas of
positivism José Pedro Varela sustained that the equality of the races was a falsehood.” This exchange
illustrates the types of sleight of hand that often occurs around race in Uruguay; that is the public objection
to something or someone as inferior based on class or some other acceptable prejudice, accompanied with a
private opinion of racial inferiority (Foster 1999)
37 The Law of Common Education was passed in 1877 and created a free, obligatory, secular, and
coeducational system of education in the Republic under Education Minister, José Pedro Varela.
However, many women were still excluded from education opportunities by custom if no longer by law
(Canova and Almeida 1998).
2. Negra Women: Marginalization and Invisibility

Black women also found themselves in a curious position at the beginnings of the modern era. Manumission was finally granted to all slaves; all were free. It is not clear how large the black/mulatta population was at this time. Many black and mulatto males had lost their lives in the civil wars and many black and mulatta women had entered into relationships - willful and coerced - with non-black men, thereby creating a new generation of mixed-blood and illegitimate children (Rama 1970). However, while these new generations were certainly not white, they were not necessarily black either, given that racial lineage in Latin America is not determined by the one-drop rule as is the case in North America. Varying degrees of skin color and class affiliation meant that someone phenotypically darker than another black person might still be counted as white depending on his or her personal circumstances (Rout 1976). Theoretically this tradition was always applicable in Uruguay, but in the pre- and early post-independence era there was quite a bit of hostility to the idea of social climbing on the part of Creole elites who had a vested interest in maintaining a strict casta society with themselves at the top (Rama 1970).

However, by the late 1800s the immigrant population had swelled to more than forty percent of the total population; the desired whitening and purifying of the population had begun full-force (Rodríguez 2001). This also meant that the majority of

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38 The terminology “one-drop rule” is a commonly used euphemism in the United States and reflects the way that racial lineage is traced in the U.S. where one drop of black blood means that a person is black, regardless of phenotypic appearance. Moreover, in most cases the members of that person’s immediate family are also often considered black, especially close blood relatives and spouses, who became black by association. This is opposed to the more common Latin American tradition in which blackness is fluid and contextual. Hence the observation that one may be black in a certain social context, but not in another; or that wealth or status reduces or erases blackness entirely. The understanding of blackness as fluid is the basis for mixed families, such that one finds persons who claim to have a black cousin, grandparent, or even parent, but does not claim blackness for him or herself.
new mulatto offspring would mostly likely be the combination of a black or mulatta woman and an immigrant male, as opposed to the black female/landed Creole male coupling that was the norm prior. This race-mixing was not nearly as problematic for two reasons. First, the sheer dominance of the immigrant class over the black and mulatto class meant that the children of mixed-blood could never accumulate to any noticeable number within the population, and it was likely the case that each new generation would become successively lighter/whiter because of the fluidity of relationships at the popular class level. Second, unlike the early post-independence era, where recognition of the children of white and black unions would have required the creation of a mixed-blood middle- and upper-class (since white men at the time would have belonged almost solely to those particular class positions), black and white unions now resulted in placement of the child as a member of the popular class, just like her parents. Thus, social hierarchies were not damaged.

Very little is known about either male or female afro-Uruguayans during this time period. This lack of information is in keeping with the prevailing mode of thought about their position in the early modernizing era and their positions in the current era. That is, a position of invisibility. Uruguayan elites did not feel it necessary to violently exterminate afro descendants in the same way they had the indigenous and gaucho populations. da Luz (1995) credits afro-Uruguayan survival to their “profound importance in the country’s everyday life . . . and because they did not constitute a real force of opposition, because they were not organized; they had stronger ties with their owners than among themselves” (da Luz 1995, 334). The Indian and the gaucho were both eradicated because of their supposed blight on the purity of the nation. They were also difficult for
Creole elites to contain. I have already referred to elite concerns that neither the Indians nor the gauchos respected property boundaries and roamed where they pleased; and their renown for indomitability and ferocity. They were extolled for these characteristics after their extermination; before, they were problematic. Blacks and mulattoes did not share these characteristics. With the exception of a few stories of slaves who tried to kill their masters, I am unaware of widespread perceptions of blacks and mulattoes as ungovernable or difficult to contain (Merino 1982). Nothing in the history of blacks in Uruguay would indicate that elites would have any reason to fear them or to feel that they could not dominate them. Perhaps the desire to exterminate yet another minority population was quelled for these reasons.

Beyond this, the role of the massive European immigration occurring in the country whitened the population by increasing the numbers of whites in the country; moreover, it also directly reduced the black and mulatto population in terms of simple proportion. Hence this massive immigration inaugurated the process of invisibility for black and mulatta women as it literally bled them out of the population.

A rapid process of blanquamiento (whitening) took place. The non-discriminating ‘colour-blindness’ of the government’s discourse and policies resulted not in equity but in a subtle form of racism . . . Thus, ‘invisibility’ became the official policy. . . . young Afro-Uruguayans today will find that their nation’s
history records only one black person: the loyal soldier Ansina (da Luz 1995, 342).³⁹

This general demographic process was also aided by the preferences of the elite. Whereas before black women had worked as maids, laundresses, ironers, pastry makers, domestic servants, and like positions, a clear preference for giving these jobs to white females emerged (Rodríguez 2001). This shift in preferences and its accompanying economic displacement was not nearly as severe for black and mulatta females as it was for black males, who were pushed out of their traditional positions as handymen and factory workers. However, it occurred among both sexes and had the further effect of pushing blacks out of the national imaginary, both economically and socially.

As I have noted repeatedly, European immigration became noticeable as early as the 1840s in Uruguay. It was interrupted somewhat by the civil wars that plagued the country during the 1850s and 1860s, but then it picked up where it left off. By 1890 the government actively supported the immigration it had always welcomed and solicited, through direct subsidization of the passage of European immigrants (Rama 1970; Rodríguez 2001). Only four years prior, in 1886, the Uruguayan parliament passed legislation that strictly prohibited any Asiatic or African immigration into the country (República Oriental de Uruguay 1930). This law was reinforced by an 1888 immigration bill which again specifically prohibited any Asiatic or African immigration into the

³⁹ Ansina fought alongside José Gervasio Artigas, “liberator” of the Río de la Plata, who was alternately depicted as a traitor and a hero at various points during his lifetime. Ansina was his most noted aide and remained with him for his entire life.
country at any time and for any reason, and promised to levy a penalty of 100 pesos per person on any ship captain who defied this order (Cámara de Representantes 1888).  

3. Popular Class Women: The Foundation of the New Nation

The result of this massive integration was a total shift in the members of the popular class, which in the post-independence era was inhabited by the gaucho/mestizo minority, and was now overwhelmingly white and first-generation European (González Laurino 2000). New popular class women embodied a position somewhere in between that of the ideal woman and the invisible and impure black woman. Simply by virtue of their whiteness they occupied an important place in the new popular imaginary, and thus were subject to the feminine dichotomies noted earlier (Ehrick 2005). Elite concern rested on the fact that European popular class women would be the most numerous “social reproducers” of the nation. Thus, the need to for them to identify with and to promote the new civilizing tendencies of the nation was supreme. However, their status as recent immigrants meant that, though they were white, they were most certainly not equal to the Creole elite (Rovira 1950). They were better than what was available locally, and their immigration was needed because of the smallness of the early Uruguayan population, but it would be some time before they would come to be accepted as equals within the nation, and thirty years before the first of their ranks would be considered Uruguayan (Oddone 1966; Taglioretti 1984). Their inferiority was further compounded by the fact that they were from the “second-rate” Southern European countries, mostly of Spain and Italy. While the Creole elites were also, and very proudly,  

40 This legislation was still in effect as late as 1956, which is the last direct reference to it that I have found. It is likely that the law is still on the books although it may not actually be enforced any longer.  
41 I am referring to the extension of universal male suffrage, which was achieved in 1917.
of Spanish descent, they were of the Spain that reigned supreme and exercised her power over much of the world through colonization. The Spain, and Italy, of the late 1800s was quite a different and less illustrious place, or so went common thought (Levine 1980). Moreover, the immigrants were of the lowest classes of Europe. Gallego is a common term used to describe immigrants at this time and evokes images of a “Spanish peasant immigrant, who [is] stereotypically considered to be undernourished, with raven-black hair, and stingy. Gallegos are supposed to exploit and dominate their children, and favor honest work over education” (Levine 1980, 55). Typically a hard-working nature would not seem a bad trait for an immigrant. However, this was the height of the modernizing trend in Uruguay. For Uruguayan elites modernization required education, specifically the creation of a massive, cultured, lettered population, and this was the very task in which the new immigrant was supposed to be involved (Ardao 1950).

Hence, the new immigrants were one of the last phases in the evolutionary cycle of the country, with only one or two steps remaining to the realization of the elite’s grand goals. Immigrant women were subject to prevailing feminine dichotomies of the time to a degree, but these contrasts were mostly applied to women of the elite class; the most important social reproducers at that time (Ines de Torres 1995). The women of the popular class would not become totally invoked in this project until the next phase of uruguayity, to which I turn now.
Uruguay continued with and increased its efforts to modernize the nation in the first third of the twentieth century. The second phase of the modernization project was spearheaded by the Colorado Party and its most famous leader, José Batlle y Ordoñez. His Batllismo program presided over a power shift from a more dispersed elite to a centralized state; and a shift in the dominant, now state-led image of the ideal woman, from privileged and Creole to middle-class and professionally trained. This period also marks the beginning of the negotiation phase of the causal chain, as women’s activism and organizing increased. Elite and middle-class women challenged the government arguing for and against suffrage and women’s role in society. Negra and popular-class women organized in their own ways although formal organizing or mobilization among these groups was much less frequent, perhaps in reflection of the extra burdens they carried. Governmental elites continued to ignore negra women, moved away from a reliance on Creole women, and elevated middle-class, and popular-class women in keeping with the modernizing mission they set forth.

By the turn of the century the modernizing impulse had begun full force. The civilizing process undertaken by the national elite achieved some successes, especially in initiating the centralization of the nation around the capital of Montevideo (home of the modern, intellectual elite); and in creating a new, white mass base through the open-door (European) immigration policy (Caetano and Alfaro 1995). This new civilizing process also included the first shifts away from concerns of racial purity and a move towards class as the only politically correct social distinction “perhaps even a sign of modernity” (Rama 1970, 48). But there was still much progress to be made in the formation of
Uruguay as an enlightened and modern nation equal to those of the European continent, particularly France and England. Hence, the second stage of the modernizing project began.

González Laurino terms this third stage in the historical imaginary of Uruguay: urugayity (González Laurino, 18). That is, a project that continued the mission of modernization through the lens of an increasingly centralized, pure, and intellectual society; a project that encouraged particular attention to integrating the new popular masses. The ultimate goal was the creation of a sense of “uruguayaness” among all sectors of the society. This integrationist project of urugayity would develop around certain key elements, particularly the image of a cosmopolitan, universalist, secular nation (González Laurino 2000).

This next stage in the modernizing project of the Uruguayan elite was soon synonymous with Batllismo, the program of Uruguay’s most significant political figure, José Batlle y Ordoñez (1856-1929), and the Colorado Party. Batlle y Ordoñez served as president from 1903 to 1907 and again from 1911 to 1915. During the first 29 years of the century, either in his service as president or as the head of the Colorado Party, he instituted a series of reforms in a successful drive to make Uruguay the first welfare-state in the continent of Latin America. Uruguay was well ahead of even some of its North American and European counterparts in its attention to the needs of its working-class and poorer citizen. These reforms ranged the gamut from divorce legislation (1907), unemployment compensation (1914), and an eight-hour workday (1915), to workers
pensions (1919) and much more, culminating with the passage of universal female suffrage in 1932.\textsuperscript{42} Although Batlle is the most well-known figure tied to the program of \textit{Batllismo} and the \textit{Batllista} state, this program of reformism and consolidation by the government was really the project of the entire Colorado party. The party sought dominance in the creation of the new cosmopolitan and universalist nation, and achieved this goal through a politics of absorption (Vanger 1980; Zum Felde 1967).\textsuperscript{43} Perelli confirms “. . . in the decade of 1910 one of the ideological principles of \textit{batllismo} sustained, ‘we must make the Colorado Party a party so liberal that it makes the Liberal Party unnecessary, and so humanistic that it makes the Socialist Party obsolete’” (Perelli 1985, 7). The goal of the Colorado Party and of the mission of \textit{batllismo} was to make a party apparatus so open that it could sustain a variety of distinct ideological traditions all at the same time. In fact, the party apparatus was so open that it could contain not only the liberal and socialist trends of the time, but even more conservative societal elements (Ehrick 2005). In this way the Colorado, and to a lesser extent the Blanco, party achieved a catch-all status that would allow it to retain an uninterrupted power until 1959.\textsuperscript{44} The party was aided by the introduction of the double-simultaneous vote in 1925, which allowed each party to arrange lists by political faction. This meant that members of the same party could break off and form new lists, thereby allowing rival factions to run against each other at the same time as they ran for president.\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{42} For more on Batllismo and its welfare-state expansion see Vanger 1980
\textsuperscript{43} \textit{Batllismo} refers to the social reformist Batllista political faction within the Colorado Party; a faction that dominated the Colorado Party agenda for much of the twentieth century. I use \textit{Batllismo} and \textit{Batllista} interchangeably to refer to this dominant trend.
\textsuperscript{44} The Colorado Party ruled continuously from 1868-1959.
\textsuperscript{45} The president was the number one person on the most-voted for faction list meaning that the number of presidential candidates could be almost infinite. Moreover, individual factions often made secret
More importantly, this meant that the Colorado Party would be quite successful in its reformist mission to absorb major political trends and ideological factions within its ranks (González 1991). As a result of the expansive Batllismo reformist plan, Uruguayan civil society would never become a particularly strong force, and much of social and civil life was and is closely tied to the political and party system. Christine Ehrick notes that the “Batllista state anticipated, rather than responded to, the emergence of an organized civil society and a vocal middle class” (Ehrick 2005, 7). In this way, the era of uruguayity was also reflected by a shift in power and control from a more dispersed elite to a specifically governmental elite. Thus, the centralization considered so vital to a successful modernization process shifted from the concern of a dispersed, public and private elite force to a more explicitly politicized, governmental centralization of power and society.

The relationship between women and the evolving nation-state changed quite a bit at this time. Three specific trends are noted. First, the image of the ideal woman shifted quite a bit and came to reside primarily with the women of the new middle-class; and to a slightly lesser extent, the women of the popular class. Universal female suffrage was also achieved during this period, along with other laws that finally granted the Uruguayan woman a place among the national citizenry, in opposition to her prior, truncated position as solely an Uruguayan national. Tied very closely to the shift in the image of the ideal woman was the second major trend of the new relationship between women and the nation-state. That is the role of the woman, particularly the popular-class woman, as agreements among themselves to combine votes. This was a legal option under Uruguayan election rules until the 1996 electoral reform. The result is that citizens were often unsure of for exactly whom they were voting. It is primarily through use of these electoral options that the Colorados were able to maintain electoral dominance for so many years.
central to the mission of uruguayity, e.g. the creation of a sense of a unified and homogenous population. Finally, the Uruguayan woman exercised her collective voice for the first time; women’s activism and organizing and the first-wave of feminism began during this era and helped to shape the relationship of women and the state.

1. Creole Erasure and Middle-Class Replacement

The era of uruguayity would signal the demise of the dominance of the elite Creole woman in Uruguayan society. Although she played an important role in the early women’s movement, specifically up to the early 1920s, the elite Creole woman would eventually be replaced in importance by the middle-class, professional woman. It was the middle-class professional woman that would be the cornerstone of the Batllista program for a secular and modernized state (Lavrin 1995). At the turn of the century feminine and feminist organizing was still more or less nonexistent. This changed in 1906 when the Liga de Damas Católicas del Uruguay (The Catholic Ladies’ League, hereafter referred to as the Liga), was formed in direct response to the removal of crucifixes and all other religious images from public hospitals (Carreras de Bastos 1909). These elite women were kept busy by the passage of divorce legislation in 1907, which catalyzed a petition drive resulting in the collection of some 93,000 signatures (Rodríguez Villamil and Sapriza 1984). This early momentum set the stage for elite women’s organizing, and other organizations followed, including the Association of Marriages in 1908, the Pro-Mother’s Association in 1915 and numerous other social-

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46 The 1907 divorce legislation allowed for uncontested divorce in the case of all female adultery, or in the case of male adultery only if it occurred in the marital home. It also provided for divorce in the case of violence, imprisonment and other specific clauses. It was soon followed by 1912 legislation that allowed for divorce by the sole will of the woman.
assistance organizations. These were the first privately run, elite, female, charitable associations of the time and they were founded on two general principles. One, the extension of the privilege of the *noblesse-oblige* to those less fortunate. Two, lessons on strong moral character to lower classes that were, at best morally misguided and at worst, morally corrupt (Ehrick 2005). Hence, organizations like the Mutual Aid Society and the Liga gave health and hygiene instruction to women of the popular class (specifically female factory workers); solicited funds to allow poor-women to afford a wedding and decrease illicit relationships; and much more (Cassina de Nogara 1989).

Ten years later the mission had shifted from more isolated acts of charity to groups organized specifically around the goal of continuous charitable assistance to the needy and misguided masses. For instance, the Pro-Mother’s Association founded a home for “deserving” unwed mothers and their illegitimate children, and sought to decrease the number of illegitimate unions by offering strong moral persuasion and financial help to young, unmarried couples (Ehrick 2005, 111). Ironically these elite, conservative women cited state financial aid as a part of the reason for their existence. Ehrick notes “The state . . . provided significant financial resources subsidizing the work of Pro-Matre and other women’s beneficent associations. In return, these associations were entrusted with carrying out social assistance, effectively making these women agents of the Batllista welfare state” (2005, 92).

In fact, the *Batllista* state was quite concerned with creating or aiding in projects that decreased the burden of the working class woman and helped integrate her into the society. This attitude is very much in keeping with the *Batllista* notion that the Uruguayan woman was central to the creation of the newly, modernized state (Cassina de
Nogara 1990). For instance, it is a widely agreed-upon fact that the 1907 divorce law had as much to do with wrecking the clerical base of the Church as it did with the rights of women (Rodríguez Villamil and Sapriza 1984). The thought was that the move to a secular society would require the breaking of the women’s religious ties to the Church; instead fostering her strong ties to the state (Ardao 1962; Vanger 1980).47

The state’s success in breaking the Church’s ecclesiastical base opened the way for it to step in and take over what was previously the Church’s role. This was a part of the larger Batllista “compensation” policy or the idea that the state had to compensate for social and economic inequality so as to promote social harmony and order (Ehrick 2005, 72). Compensation began with the states sponsorship of privately run ladies charitable organizations such as the ones noted. However, public officials soon began to express discomfort with the placement of such activities in the hands of elite women. By the late 1920s some state bureaucrats openly favored replacing the private ladies’ associations with professionally trained staff. The state had desired this for some time, but the lack of a widespread group of educated women precluded the possibility. Ehrick asserts “. . . policy formulation prematurely anticipated the existence of a supporting class structure needed to create the cadre of bureaucrats and professionals that reformers had envisioned” (Ehrick 2005, 110). Although Varela’s co-educational legislation was enacted in 1877, custom still prohibited most women from more than a basic education (Rodríguez Villamil and Sapriza 1988). In response to this problem the Batllistas created a “Women’s University,” a separate women’s institution charged with the task of making women feel “comfortable” and protected (Rodríguez Villamil and Sapriza 1984).

47 Official separation of the Church and State was secured in the 1917 Constitution.
This shift in the goals of the state coincided with the appearance of a stronger liberal, middle-class feminist movement. The liberal feminist movement was in place as early as 1906 with the foundation of the Liberal Ladies Association and the entrance of the founding mother of feminism, María Abella de Ramírez, in 1907 (Rodríguez Villamil 1995). However, both the Liberal Ladies Association and Ramírez had strong ties to Argentine feminism, and were primarily connected with the Argentine feminist movement. The first locally based Uruguayan liberal women’s association did not appear until 1911, with the creation of the Emancipation Women’s Association. This organization and the one that followed it, the Uruguayan Section of the Pan-American Federation founded by Abella de Ramírez, were both short-lived and tumultuous (Cassina de Nogara 1989). The primary tie among the organizations’ members was an opposition to the Church, which would not prove strong enough to unite disparate groups like middle-class women and anarchists.

The first long-lasting liberal organization was the National Council of Uruguayan Women (Conamu), a branch of the International Council of Women, founded by Paulina Luisi in 1916. Luisi was, in many ways, the ideal embodiment of the secular, modernized Batllista state (Cassina de Nogara 1989; Lavrin 1995; Sapriza 1983). She was the first women in the country to complete medical school in 1909 and served as an image of the model Uruguayan woman: middle-class, professional and educated. In a description of Luisi Ehrick notes, “All of these views [anticlerical upbringing, medical training, party affiliation] help underscore Luisi’s connections to Uruguayan state formation: a product of the liberal secular state, who in turn saw that state as principal force for the improvement of women’s lives and society in general” (Ehrick 2005, 98).
The modern woman was the primary source of the “irreversible advance of progress” that would bring forth improvements for all women, and in turn for the country at large. The development of the middle-class women was central to the modernizing project of the nation. Large increases in the availability of secondary schooling and education, and active campaigns for civil and political rights were the key tools employed by the Batllista state to achieve this goal (Rodríguez Villamil and Sapriza 1988).

2. Negra Women: Invisibility Continued

Shifts in the image of the ideal women did not signal a change in the reception of black women in Uruguayan society. No official statistics are available for this time period, but it is likely that the afro-Uruguayan population was nearing the roughly 6 percent of the population that they constitute today, down from a high of one-third of the total population as late as the 1850s. For black women the continuing trend was one of invisibility, coupled with a continuing outsider status in definitions of the ideal woman. This position was complicated by the fact that no real black middle-class existed at this time (or at any time). Ironically, the lack of de jure segregation like that experienced in the United States or South Africa meant that people of color remained dispersed and un-unified, specifically in economic terms. Blacks of the time certainly felt this condition. One gentleman who was born around 1926 stated

48 No official statistics are available because the Uruguayan government, like the rest of Latin America, considered it racist to catalog individuals by race, and ceased to do so by the middle of the 19th century. For more on possible reasons for the sharp decline of the afro population see Antón (1994) and Rodríguez (2001)
Of course, the negro had been a slave. . . . myself, my mother, and my grandmother in slavery, three generations. It existed because it had always existed. The negro had always known inferiority, he knew inferiority. . . . He was not in the technical areas, he was not in the organized disciplines, there were no doctors, no architects, he was in the lowest tasks (Porzecanski and Santos 1994, 98; translation mine).

The result, ironically, is that there existed no noticeable independent black elite. Even as late as the 1960s Ildefonso Pereda Valdes, the most significant writer of afro-Uruguayan history in the country, noted the existence of only two or three families that integrated the upper-middle class, the highest social rank that anyone in the country has ever achieved, even through the current day (Pereda Valdes 1965; Rodríguez 2001).

For black women the lack of a black middle class meant a triple invisibility, very similar to analyses of triple jeopardy that poor black women experience in the United States (Giddings 1984; King 1995). However, in the Uruguayan case, this invisibility or jeopardy was consistent across the entire female population of color. This status is reflected in a series of interviews that Teresa Porzecanski and Beatriz Santos did with people of color in the early 1990s, some of whom ranged from 8 to 25 in the time period under discussion, some of whom were not yet born by 1932. In every case but one, the

49 The black “middle class” at this time was almost non-existent, although there was a small cadre of individuals who had attained “better” jobs. These were public employees at the rank of doorman, chauffeur, and sweeper, and they maintained a certain hierarchy because of the stable nature of their employment and their paycheck (Porzecanski and Santos 1994. “Ruben.” P. 92)

50 The concept triple jeopardy refers to the triple oppression of many African-American on the basis of their race, sex, and class status. Hence, the common refrain: poor, black, and female. The term became popular in the 1970s. A number of black women used the term in slightly different ways (sometimes substituting imperialism for class) in their writing and speaking. It is unclear who originally coined the term. The Third World Women’s Alliance and the National Black Feminist Organization are some of its earliest referents.
mothers, grandmothers, aunts, and sisters of the individuals interviewed were employed in the domestic sphere; in the case of female interviewees the women themselves were employed in the domestic sphere. The one exception to this was the mother of a young woman who was one of those rare anomalies; the child of a black middle-class family.\textsuperscript{51} Her mother owned a small bookstore for the duration of her marriage, although even she originally took in ironing and worked as a laundress, a position to which she returned as a widow (Porzecanski and Santos 1994, 57). Historically, the black female performed the most inferior tasks and this status did not change post-slavery; nor has it changed much in the present tense (GAMA 1997; Malvasio n.d.). This created a sense of invisibility that is noted by some people of color in Uruguay. Angelica affirms “. . . the theme of racism and of the treatment of all the rest, locates the black in a place that is not visible. This is a characteristic of the black collectivity: its invisibility” (Porzecanski and Santos 1994, 110).

Members of the black collectivity did attempt to organize and better their positions. Black newspapers and cultural groups began as early as 1872, with the founding of the journal \textit{La Conservación}. \textit{La Conservación} was a voice of resistance and uplift that protested against racism in Uruguayan society and took on a decidedly militant tone for that time period (Lewis 2003). The most well-known of these newspapers was \textit{Nuestra Raza} or \textit{Our Race}, which ran from 1917 to 1948, and had the most profound impact on afro-Uruguayan intellectual life (Ferreira 2003; Lewis 2003). This magazine served as a center for black political and social life through the publication

\textsuperscript{51} Even for this family middle-class status was more a product of luck than anything else. When the father’s family was broken up due to a fire on the ranch where his mother worked as a peon, each child was parceled off to someone else in the area. He ended up with another ranch owner who taught him photography, a skill he later turned into a profession. It is likely that his siblings did not fare as well (Porzecanski and Santos 1994. “Margarita.” Pp. 51-57).
of poetry and cultural criticism, the posting of announcements for black events, intellectual articles, reports on black organizing in other parts of the world (particularly in the U.S.) and eventually, through the sponsorship of the country’s first and only black political party, the Partido Autóctono Negro or the Black Autochthonous Party (PAN).

Overall, black women were not particularly active in the writing and dissemination of Nuestra Raza or within the activities on which it regularly reported. It is likely that the lack of black, female participation in Nuestra Raza was partially the result of the same double burden cited in explanation of the lack of noticeable feminine activity in the parties and organizations of the working class, such as the Socialist and Communist parties. The double burden of worker by day and mother and housewife by night leaves very little time for other activity outside the home (Ehrick 2005).

Nonetheless, some black women were instrumental within the ranks of Nuestra Raza and its accompanying social mission, and urged other black women to become more involved for the betterment of the race. In a note to “the women of our race” “Chichita” pleads

we need an organ for people of color like we need bread . . . it is very important . 
.. This thing of having to feed our children with the un-intellectual satiety of the white women is hateful, unpleasant, and anti-black. It is to not know ourselves, to believe ourselves incapable of elaborating, our own happiness. . . ¡Let’s go! We can do a little for ourselves (Nuestra Raza 25 August 1933, 10; translation mine).

It appears that these appeals fell on mostly deaf ears, as no visible feminine presence was ever detected in Nuestra Raza.
Instead, the majority of black female activity reported within the pages of *Nuestra Raza* dealt with picnics, dances, or other cultural activities hosted by the ladies’ of a certain group or area. This more feminine behavior met with the approval of the men of *Nuestra Raza*, who supported it with the introduction of “feminine pages” in 1935. This section published recipes, housecleaning tips, and so on (*Nuestra Raza* May 1935). This feminine activity was likely welcomed in an attempt to recreate traditional structures of masculinity and femininity within the black race – the “ideal” black woman - something quite common in many accounts of black social life in the U.S. as well (Giddings 1984; White 1999). However, the primarily social, cultural nature of black women’s organizing does not mean it did not play an important role in the creation of a black consciousness.

Lewis affirms that the primary weapon of resistance in the afro-Uruguayan community was poetry and other cultural outlets, due to a historic lack of a sense of community among phenotypically colored people; a sense that all of the various newspapers, magazines, journals, cultural societies, and political endeavors have never been able to overcome (Lewis 2003; Merino 1982; *Nuestra Raza* 10 March 1917). This likely explains why the PAN only receive 87 votes in its first and only political run in the 1938 elections. Lewis observes

The failure of these publications also points to the historic difficulty of constructing a black identity in Uruguay. In spite of their adverse social and economic status, Afro-Uruguayans still clung to the hope of being perceived as Uruguayan, period, in spite of the fact that they were looked upon as black first

52 Nonetheless of all of the major afro-Uruguayan poets who wrote at this time only one, Virginia Brindis de Salas is an afro-Uruguayan woman (Lewis 2003).
and Uruguayan second. Consequently, they learned very little from history or from the attitudes toward racism and discrimination articulated years before in La Conservacion and constantly reiterated in the black press (Lewis 2003, 33).

It appears that the centralist, universalist mission of the Uruguayan nation-state had impacted afro-Uruguayans as well, even as they formed its least important members.

3. Popular Class Women: The Backbone of Uruguay

If black women, and black people in general, were the least important members of Uruguay’s modernizing mission, the women and men of the popular class were the most important. Popular class women shared an especially important relationship with the Batllista state, particularly as the primary subjects of its paternalist and protectionist policies. Batllismo has been noted for its paternal attitude regarding women of the popular class, expressed most frequently in the form of protective labor laws for women. Special laws regulated maternity and maternity leave, the welfare of mothers and children, and special social security laws for women (Rodríguez Villamil and Sapriza 1984). Rodríguez Villamil and Sapriza suggest

One of the more apparent goals of the State was protection of maternity by way of a series of measures (the Code of the Child, Maternity Leave, Family Assignations) materializing the preoccupation to elevate the quality of life of the popular sectors; the woman was understood within a global policy inclined to
regularize and strengthen the family as a social cell (Rodríguez Villamil and Sapriza 1984, 57-58).

These measures appeared as early as 1911 in the form of two months paid maternity leave for teachers that was later extended to public employees; a 1914 law that established that women and children could not be employed in the cleaning or reparation of machines or other agents of dangerous transmission; a 1915 law that created a Maternity House to help future mothers and their children; the 1918 “law of chairs” which established that all establishments where women work have a sufficient number of seats for female employees such that each could take a seat if the work permitted; and a 1920 law that imposed an obligatory weekly rest for all workers, with absolutely no exceptions permitted for women and children, even domestic servants (Rodríguez Villamil and Sapriza 1984, 92-93).

If the Batllistas had gotten their way, these protectionist policies would have gone even further. The Batllismo Program of 1922, approved during the Colorado Party’s convention, attempted to: reduce the female workday from 8 hours to 6; declare that a mother was allowed and deserved the goods of the Republic, regardless of her civil state; prohibit the woman from working the 30 days preceding and following childbirth; and create asylums to shelter and assist women in the last 30 days of pregnancy and 30 days following birth, or longer if her health required it (Canova and Almeida 1998). During this time she would also be instructed on how to raise the child, no doubt by middle-class female professionals. The program also attempted to: establish cradle rooms in establishments where breast-feeding women were employed; and assign 10 pesos
monthly for the year beginning prior to the month of delivery, assignation of which would be supplied with pension fund (El Día, 5 October 1925). There was a fierce opposition, especially among employers, to much of this program and only a small portion of it was initially ratified. However, over the years many of these measures were enacted by the government, either through direct legislation or through the use of state subsidies to private charitable organizations that could provide some of these services.

The scope of the paternalist Batllista state regarding women and children of the popular class was immense. The policies noted above highlight the real mission of the Batllista legislators to create a sense of integration, of uruguayity, among the members of the popular class by providing for their social needs, in many cases, before they anticipated it themselves. Some policies were geared more towards men, such as the passage of universal male suffrage in 1917, or more gender neutral in their impact, such as the and the creation of worker’s compensation and a pension system in 1914 and 1919 (Pendle 1952). But the state constructed those specifically female policies with a specific image in mind; that of the “ideal” woman as social reproducer. The early women of the mass, popular class did not quite qualify as “ideal” women, a status limited to women of the middle- and professional classes (Ehrick 2005; Turenne 1932). But within as little as one generation they could be or, more likely, their daughters could be, given a little help from the state to promote their health and well-being (Turenne 1932). Hence, the first- (and sometimes second-) generation immigrant of the popular classes was the last stepping stone in the evolution of the Uruguayan nation and its shift from barbarism to civilization, from primitivism and backwardness to modernization. Women like the Luisi sisters are some of the best examples of this. The daughters of first-generation immigrant
parents from Poland and Italy went on to become a lawyer (Clotilde), a physician (Inés), a well-known poet (Luisa), and the most famous sister, Paulina, a doctor and later an Uruguayan diplomat (Ehrick 2005). These women, and others like them, were the public face of the Uruguayan national mission.

There was another reason that the Batllista state was so keen on establishing protective legislation for the members of the working classes. Its successful ability to predict the demands of the working classes gave it the upper hand as an anticipatory state that would preempt much organizing on the ground (Canel 1992). The Batllista state and its accompanying social reform programs, known collectively as el escudo de los débiles (the shield of the weak), was successful in anticipating the emergence of civil society and of a vocal, middle-class, rather than responding to it (Ehrick 2005). Once established, this relationship has continued into the current day. Hence, the rationale for widespread perceptions of a weak civil society that remains mostly dependent on the Uruguayan government, and particularly the Uruguayan party system, in routing the majority of its demands and activities (Canel 1992; Perelli and Rial 1992).

Due in part to these government efforts, women of the popular classes were not especially prone to organizing for themselves, although there were a few important exceptions. The most successful organizing effort among popular class women was the Telephone Worker’s Strike of 1918. At this time, the all-female worker core at the “La Uruguaya” telephone company began to protest their low wages and long working hours. The strike was initially quelled as a result of negotiations between the state and the telephone workers, and with the special intervention of Paulina Luisi and Conamu

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53 In this instance my reference to members of the working classes is meant to refer to any classes whose members work, specifically the popular and middle-classes.
but the resolution was short-lived and the female telephone workers struck again in 1919. This strike was much longer and more violent; it eventually required the intervention of the national government before the strike could end. By the time that it did, the telephone workers walked away with 10 pesos more per month than they originally demanded (Ehrick 2005).

The first round of the telephone workers strike highlighted the asymmetric relationship between the popular class telephone workers and the middle-class women of Conamu who helped them. The uneven relationship between the two groups is credited to middle-class arrogance. “Because of their particular place in the state (and class) structure, many of these women still viewed poor women as clients, students, and patients, but rarely as partners colleagues, sisters, or equals” (Ehrick 2005, 122). The personal communications of some Conamu members who reference the first telephone worker’s strike attempt reflect this attitude. A 1919 letter from Fanny Carrió de Pollera to Paulina Luisi described Conamu’s displeasure with the telephone worker’s behavior “Dra. [Isabel Pinto] de Vidal did some great work for the telefonistas [female telephone workers], keeping them from having to go on strike, and as usual......they did not even thank her. Some women deserve the beatings they get” (Ehrick 2005, 151). In sum, popular women were portrayed as apathetic, apolitical, and unappreciative of the work that middle-class women had done on their behalf.

The Socialist and Communist Parties also took an interest in promoting the rights of working-class women; the Socialists would advocate for female suffrage as early as

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54 Fanny Carrió de Pollera, was a Liberal feminist and a member of Conamu. Isabel Pinto de Vidal was also a Liberal Feminist, a lawyer, and a member of Conamu.
1907, even before becoming a political party (Lavrin 1995). However, Socialist and Communist Party attitudes toward popular-class women were, in some ways, quite similar to that of elite and middle-class feminists. They felt that they needed to “help” the working-class woman who could not necessarily help herself, by promoting her interests in the public sphere (Ehrick 2005). These were the attitudes of “pro-women” cadres within the Socialist and Communist Parties. There was also an “anti-woman” component that felt that the woman needed to be neutralized. This group noted “Women are like peasants, and as such cannot be fully incorporated into the party, but need to ‘neutralized,’ lest they pose an active impediment to party organizing and the establishment of a communist society” (Ehrick 2005, 191). This attitude is quite representative of a common strain of thought within the Socialist and Communist Parties. Women were considered an impediment to the larger goals of the movement, which was focused primarily on strong labor laws and a good wage for the male worker, who could then take care of his family (Rodríguez Villamil and Sapriza 1984). Female workers inhibited this drive, because they drove wages down and required so much protective legislation that they shifted attention away from the worker’s “true” needs and foiled the progress of the movement (Sapriza 1985).

“Pro-women” forces did see the importance of getting the worker woman involved in labor struggles, and decried what they perceived as her lack of interest in organizing. Socialist and Communist Party members voiced a consistent disappointment in popular women’s lack of activism, which they assumed to be based on her disinterest (Ehrick 2005). Various attempts to integrate the woman were made, including appeals to

55 The Socialist Party was founded in 1910. The Communist Party was founded in 1921. The majority of the members of the Socialist Party voted in favor of affiliation with the Third International and converted to the Communist Party, with the result that the Socialist Party was essentially dissolved (Ehrick 2005, 189).
her motherly instincts and short-lived clubs, like the Union of Servants, Maids and Affiliates (Ehrick 2005). But, the activities were always short-lived, and Party members became hostile to women and chastised them for the lack of participation. What never accompanied these attempts at organization was an attempt to understand why working women were not active; the structural demands that kept them from organizing. Instead hostility towards working women’s perceived apathy continued, and by 1924 interest in the “woman question” had faded into the background (Lavrin 1995).

V. Latinization, 1960+

This final section covers the period of decline in women’s mobilization from the 1930s to the 1960s; and Uruguayan economic and political decline beginning in the 1960s and culminating with the installation of a dictatorial regime in 1973. Like a number of other dictatorial regimes initiated in the 1970s, the Uruguayan military championed a return to liberal economic models and a return to traditional society, including the “traditional” woman. As a result the military underestimated and overlooked women’s capacity to organize and unwittingly helped to foster feminine and feminist women’s organizing, culminating in the second wave of the feminist movement.

Public sentiment by the late 1920s assumed that the passage of women’s suffrage was inevitable. At this time activity picked up from a broad spectrum of women’s groups, particularly Conamu and the Alianza, who established a joint campaign committee in 1930, and started a spate of pro-suffrage activities, including a petition drive that collected 4,000 signatures, which they submitted to parliament (Lavrin 1995). A number of politicians who had previously opposed women’s suffrage came out in favor
of it, including members of the more conservative, National Party. Even those with strong ties to the Catholic Church had come to support the women’s vote. Finally in December of 1932 the law passed both houses and women’s suffrage was secured.

Ehrick (2005) argues that the passage of women’s suffrage should be understood as a combination of the efforts of the women’s movement and political pressures. In each case the backers hoped to gain what would come to be perceived as a crucial women’s vote in the face of the political uncertainty that characterized the country in the first two years of the 1930s. Political and constitutional changes were brewing and both Batllista and conservative forces wanted to gain women’s support to help them secure their places in the upcoming political elections. In an effort to put off a rising conservative impulse and political crisis in the country, Batllista legislators began what they termed the “second reformist impulse,” meant to strengthen the state; approval of the women’s vote was the last of those measures (Rodríguez Villamil and Sapriza 1984). But, the conservatives were the victors in this case. The day that suffrage legislation passed both houses an article appeared in the newspaper El Pueblo, asking women for their support in a pseudo-feminist party that would eventually be asked to support the coup d’ etat that occurred on March 31, 1933 (Rodríguez Villamil and Sapriza 1984). Ironically, this pseudo-feminist party had more women’s support than the real feminist party, the Women’s Independent Democratic Party. The Feminist Party, as it was better known, was founded in January of 1933 but, due to the coup that followed, it was not allowed to run a candidate until the 1938 elections. While the Feminist Party fared better than the PAN, it achieved far from a resounding victory, with a mere 139 votes in its first and only election run (Ehrick 2005).
It is frequently the case that the passage of suffrage coincides with a denouement in the women’s movement, often leading to decades long lulls in women’s organizing (Banaszak 1996, Lerner 1979, Scott 1991). This was particularly true in Uruguay, where many felt that the “woman” question had been resolved with the passage of suffrage (Rodríguez Villamil and Sapriza 1988). This was so much the case that the majority of women’s groups disbanded by the late 1930s or early 1940s (Sapriza n.d.). It appears that the Batllista goal to coop civil society by beating it to the punch worked. Women’s activism waned so much that a small cadre of members of parliament, working entirely of their own accord and without help from women’s groups, introduced and secured the passage of the Law on Women’s Civil Rights in 1946, which finally granted women full equal civil capacity (Rodríguez Villamil and Sapriza 1984). In fact, by this time the two largest women’s organizations, Conamu and the Alianza had disbanded.

The waning of women’s activism also coincided with Uruguay’s golden years. Under Colorados Juan José Amézaga (1881-1974), who served from 1943-1947, and Luis Batlle Berres (1897-1964), who served from 1947-1951, politics returned to normal and Uruguay experienced a golden period characterized by a very popular slogan “Como el Uruguay, no hay” (There is no place like Uruguay), and earning it the designation of the Switzerland of South America (Townsend-Bell 2006). Like many of its Latin American counterparts, Uruguay implemented a policy of import-substitution industrialization (ISI); a policy meant to reduce the country’s dependency on foreign imports and to build up its own industrial infrastructure to make it more competitive on the world market (Finch 1981). Between 1945 and 1955 imported consumer goods fell from 47% to less than 10% as a result of rapid industrial expansion; employment in
manufacturing rose as well from just over 65,000 jobs in 1936 to more than 161,000 in 1955 (Pearce 1980)

This new economic prosperity had important social repercussions as well. By 1956 Uruguay had the highest per capita income in the region (Pearce 1980). The state increased worker’s benefits and social security provisions and state employment jumped. In 1938 the state had employed 57,000 individuals; by 1955 this number had more than tripled to reach 168,532 in 1955 (Finch 1981). The increase in state pensions was just as dramatic rising from 70,000 in 1936 to 200,000 in 1955 (Pearce 1981). These figures highlight more than the just the general economic prosperity in Uruguay at this time, they also highlight the culmination of the goal of the Batllista state, particularly in the form of a growing, modernized, middle-class. The massive increase in state employees was a reflection of the increasing size and stability of the middle-class and of a blurring of the lines between the popular and middle-classes (Johnson 2000).

There was one major exception to this new economic prosperity. Afro-Uruguayans were no better off in the height of the Uruguayan economic boom than they had been before. A newspaper took up the question of economic racial discrimination and conducted a survey of black employment in the city of Montevideo in 1956. In a survey of 14,797 “modest” jobs such as hotel waiter, bus driver, hairdresser, and the like, only 11 of those positions were held by blacks (Marcha 11 May 1956). This pattern, which still holds today, was again reflective of the invisibility of blacks within Uruguayan society (GAMA 1997). Black women still held positions primarily as laundresses, nannies, domestic workers and the like, a situation unchanged since slavery. In fact, it was exactly these conditions that prompted Leslie Rout Jr. to proclaim,
“Possibly the most striking factor in the history of the black man in Spanish America has been the absence of a significant change in his overall position . . ..The Spaniards brought the African to the New World to perform manual labor; four hundred years later that is still his primary function (Rout 1976, 202).

For non-black women the Uruguayan economic model was quite beneficial. The prosperity of these years had the effect of appeasing women who, along with a large proportion of the general population, believed that social inequalities were being progressively eliminated (Johnson 2000). Women gained increased access to education and greater personal freedoms in this time of economic expansion. Women had not advanced very far in the formal political arena, but many felt that this was more a reflection of women’s personal preferences and lack of training than discrimination (Johnson 2000). The fact that there were no formal obstacles to women’s participation meant that there were no clear targets for feminist campaigning and this remained the case until the breakdown of the economic and political system that began in the 1960s (Johnson 2000; Rodríguez Villamil and Sapriza 1984).

By the 1960s the ISI economic model, and the general economic status of the country, showed some cracks. Agricultural production was stagnant, the value of Uruguayan exports on the world market decreased, and the price of imports rose (Finch 1981). IMF sponsored stabilization measures resulted in the devaluation of the Uruguayan peso, GDP dropped, real wages dropped by an average of 10 percent by 1968, inflation rose to a peak of 125 percent that same year, and unemployment doubled between 1955 and 1970 (Finch 1981).
Economic unrest soon led to political unrest. In the mid-1960s a guerilla group appeared on the scene. The Tupamaros’ National Liberation Movement (Tupamaros), based in Montevideo, antagonized the government with the use of robberies, kidnappings, and other violent means (Weinstein 1975). At the same time a new political party appeared on the scene, the Broad Front/New Space coalition, which began in the mid-1960s and became an official political party in 1970 (EP/FA website http://www.ps.org.uy/fa_doc_nacimiento.htm). A number of small third parties existed in Uruguay in the past, but none ever achieved the performance of the Broad Front coalition, which garnered 18 percent of the vote in the 1971 elections (Weinstein 1988).

The bi-partisan system began to crumble, and President Juan María Bordaberry treated parliament as if it were a subversive element (Bonino 2000). Instead he relied heavily on Emergency Security Measures, allowing him to rule by decree, the same as President Jorge Pacheco Areco before him. On June 27, 1973 President Bordaberry dissolved parliament and invited the military to occupy positions of responsibility in the government instead. The military kept Bordaberry on as a figurehead until 1976 when it did away with all illusions of civilian ties within the government.

Under the dictatorial regime, social welfare benefits were slashed. Between 1970 and 1980 real wages decreased by 56 percent and by 1976 25 percent of Uruguayan families were living below the poverty line, up from less than a tenth in 1963 (Caetano and Rilla 1994). Married women with young children constituted the highest rate of entry into the workforce recorded during the period: the proportion of married women in the workforce rose by 27.7 percent between 1975 and 1985 (Aguirre and Méndez 1987). Ironically, these dire economic circumstances meant that a position traditionally held by
the undesirables of society, e.g. black and other poor women, became quite competitive. The number of women seeking domestic work in Montevideo alone doubled from 1981 to 1982 from 11,565 to 23,256; and this increase only represents formal applications made through the employment bureau (Prates and Rodríguez Villamil 1986).

These dire economic circumstances motivated a new group of women to organize. Housewives and mothers started and ran soup kitchens, community shopping clubs, canteens, health clinics, and neighborhood housing committees. Many women ignored the mandate of the military, which had outlawed social gatherings; although they did so out of a sense of desperation as opposed to active resistance (Johnson 2000; Perelli 1994). However, these original subsistence organizations formed the training ground for dispersed popular protests – especially towards the end of the dictatorial regime. Women organized one-day shopping strikes and coordinated the banging of pots and pans on balconies and doorsteps (to signify their emptiness) (Tornaría 1990). The military found this activity particularly difficult to suppress, for one of the key components of its ruling ideology had been the return to tradition (Rodríguez Villamil, Sapriza, and Prates 1989). Hence, the violent suppression of women, and specifically of mothers and housewives, was not an option. Instead, the military watched all activities with a careful eye, but did not intervene.

More than just housewives would organize during the dictatorship. The first of the second-wave feminist groups to organize during the dictatorship was GRECMU or the Study Group on Women’s Status in Uruguay, in 1979. The group was started by academician Suzana Prates, an Uruguayan sociologist, who, with the encouragement of UN projects emphasizing the need to set up gender research institutions as part of the UN
Decade for Women (1976-1985), started a study group with other Uruguayan men and women to analyze the condition of women in Uruguay (Johnson 2000). The group originally focused on “academic resistance” to the dictatorship, though they eventually came to realize the need to develop a different type of feminist activism (Prates 1987) specifically, consciousness raising.

GRECMU was just the beginning of women’s organizing at the waning end of the dictatorship. Many others formed at this time as well, including four of the five groups that are the subject of this dissertation - CM, REPEM, PLEMUU, and GAMA. The majority of these groups were a product of the “social movement explosion” that occurred towards the end of the dictatorship, when hopes ran high that a real change in the political system might be afoot (Canel 1992). These groups hoped, finally, to enter a political system that was tightly controlled first by the Blancos and the Colorados (especially given the early professionalization of these parties), and then by the military (Johnson 2000). However, in the years since the end of the dictatorship Uruguay has been noted for its swift return to politics as usual (Cason 2000; González and Gillespie 1994). This shift back to traditional party and political structures was particularly damaging to the seedling women’s movement, as most women were active at the grassroots level, the first of the activist spheres to be dismantled after the first elections (Bonino et. al 1990; Canel 1992; Johnson 2000). Many women did enter into the formal party structure, hoping to increase women’s activism and visibility that way. PLEMUU notes that “the reactivation of traditional spheres of political activism led to an ‘emptying’ of women’s organisations, as members who had previously been active in political parties returned to that militancy, and others joined those organizations for the
first time” (PLEMUU 1987, 238). These experiences proved less than fruitful. Women who entered the party structures with high hopes were soon disheartened. “The most common – if not unanimous – response was ‘But what problems have women got in Uruguay? You’ve got access to everything. Article 8 of the Constitution guarantees that. What could possibly be your problem?’” That was the response from all parties” (quoted from Johnson 2000, 84; Personal Interview with PN Activist 27 June 1997).

Summary

National identity construction in post-independence Uruguay affected distinct groups of women in different ways, marginalizing or extolling them based on the degree to which they met or matched the dominant perspective of the ideal woman at different points in time. It is clear that women’s differential identity construction set the stage for distinct approaches to mobilization in the first part of the twentieth century. What remains to be seen is the degree to which a differential identity construction matters in the current day, specifically the way in which it does or does not impact collective action among the formalized women’s groups that materialized in the time of democratic transition. This is the point to which I turn now.
Chapter Five: Identity Politics, Ideology and Coalition Possibilities 1993-2005

I. Introduction

Thus far I have discussed how the gendered experiences of Uruguayan women differed on the basis of their race and class backgrounds. Historical evidence shows that the experiences of different groups of women have varied quite a bit based on their racial and/or class status, particularly from the perspective of their claims to full citizenship and their relationship to societal ideals of womanhood. If the causal sequence is correct, then that suggests that these differential experiences result in distinct interpretations of collective gender-based identities and a distinct practice of identity politics. In terms of the five groups I discuss here, some emphasize the importance of race and/or class, while others do not consider it a priority. How have these differential constructions affected interaction among these gender-based groups? What, if any, are the repercussions of identity for coalition formation?

I will argue that differential gender identity constructions among Uruguayan women also foster differential ideological positions on the importance of race and class to gender organizing, which results in a reduction in coalition possibilities among otherwise similarly oriented gender groups.\footnote{By similarly oriented I mean that each group’s platform/issue focus is quite similar as are their organizational characteristics, e.g. organizational style, approach, size, monetary resources} Hence, this chapter links the first and second parts of the causal chain, general identity construction and collective identity construction, introduced in chapter three. In chapter four I traced the formation, understanding and negotiation of dominant narratives of femininity. I now connect this process to women’s perception of place within these dominant narratives as manifested in collective identity.
construction, e.g. the creation of interests and boundaries, and their translation into ideology.

The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. I begin with brief reviews of theorizing on the relationship between identity politics and coalition formation; and theorizing on the impact of the practice of identity politics, or ideology, on coalition possibilities. I follow with an overview of the five groups on whom this empirical case study is based, highlighting the processes of boundary formation, as evidenced by the creation and evolution of each group’s organizational history and platform. I then discuss the degree to which the organizations do or do not overlap in terms of interests, goals, and tactics as a precursor to understanding why coalition may or may not occur among these distinct groups. I consider two major alternative explanations of coalition likelihood: threat and resources. I then move on to a discussion of interaction among the five women’s groups over the last twenty years and ideological disagreements amongst Uruguayan women’s groups at a conceptual level. Finally, I trace the effects of conceptually distinct ideological position on coalition possibilities around major issue areas among these same groups over a twelve year period (1993-2005).

II. Identity Politics

By definition, once a group of people order themselves into a formalized identity group, they become practitioners of identity politics, one of the major characteristics of which is the sense that identity should be a fundamental part of all political work. One logical extension of this supposition is that groups for whom interests are either secondary to identity or defined by identity may find it difficult to interact with other
groups whom they do not consider to be of like mind. What does this practice of identity politics mean for the possibility of interaction between groups who are of the same social movement sector? Said another way, what impact do these differentially constructed and differentially understood identities have on coalition possibilities among ostensibly similar groups?

This concern is vital for both activists and academics concerned with the outcomes of the practice of identity politics. Debates over the role and effects of identity politics in democratic systems take two positions that I will refer to here as anti-essentialism and pro-identity politics. Anti-essentialists argue that identity politics are divisive and create barriers among otherwise like-minded groups. The negative result of this practice is that one does not see coalitions occur where they might otherwise exist, and social movement progress is stymied. Pro-identity advocates claim that identity politics are not necessarily problematic, it is how they are handled that can create problems; where groups are not willing to work through the difficulties of creating and maintaining a substantive alliance then no true coalition is possible and cannot be forced. Thus, it is not identity politics per se that are the problem, instead it is the specific practice of them. The assumption is that the practice is a skewed version of what a “true” politics of identity call for. So, in one version groups must transcend the potential destructiveness of identity politics for the greater good. In the other version groups must also transcend identity politics, not by erasing them, but through a negotiation of difference at the interpersonal and structural level. A real commitment to negotiating through difference will help identity practitioners to understand the particular subject positions of the individuals or groups with whom they might become involved.
The brief summary that I offer above is in fact only a sliver of a wide and extensive debate on the role that identity politics plays on the possibility of coalition formation; one that has been mostly theoretical in nature (See chapter 3). It is unclear to what extent these debates reflect empirical realities. What is the relationship between identity politics and coalition formation? Four possibilities exist:

1. Identity politics completely impede coalition formation
2. Identity politics partially impede coalition formation
3. Identity politics foster coalition formation
4. There is no relationship between identity politics and coalition formation.

If the practice of identity politics is somehow problematic for coalition formation, as many theorists and activists suggest, then coalition formation will be impeded either entirely or partially. Where identity politics functions as a partial impediment to coalition formation, the coalition will occur but it will be sporadic, short-lived, or problematic in some way. Alternatively if, as others argue, a positive practice of identity leads to a stronger possibility of a sustained alliance then the likelihood of coalition formation is much higher and coalitions should occur. It is entirely possible that the practice of identity politics has no direct or primary effect on the likelihood of coalition formation amongst identity groups. In this case one would expect some alternative explanation of what has an impact on coalition formation. I return to this point later.
III. Ideology

If identity groups take as their base the idea that their identity should inform and dictate all of their politics, then their understanding of that identity becomes the base from which all meaning and action originates. Another term for this is ideology. Very simply, ideology is “the set of political beliefs on the basis of which individuals interpret conditions and events” (Arnold 1995, 279). Ideology reflects a group’s sense of how the political world is ordered and their place in that political world, e.g. a group’s political philosophy or worldview. Ideology in this sense does not imply a position on a left-right political spectrum. Instead, ideology is synonymous with philosophy, e.g. a sense of how the world is and should be; a system of beliefs. In this sense a group’s ideology is both global and local. That is, ideology functions as an overarching structure that helps a group to order the world and to negotiate both everyday, the local, and the mundane decisions, as well as those so large in scale that they might be said to define the very essence of the group.

Formally, a group’s ideology helps it to define its decision-making structures, and organizational principles and practices. This includes the organizational principle that is of most interest to us; that of with whom the group will and will not interact in political collaboration. Thus a group’s ideology and, by extension, its identity is central to its coalition politics. That is, identity is largely concerned with the determination and construction of boundaries while ideology is largely concerned with the maintenance and policing of boundaries. So, a group’s ideology determines with whom it will – or will not - interact in coalition.

57 I consider ideology to be synonymous with philosophy. However, ideology is the term most frequently adopted by the identity scholars on whose theoretical work much of this dissertation is based, thus I retain the word in reflection of this common usage.
Coalition scholars agree that ideological differences among social movement organizations can be a major impediment to alliance work among groups (Diaz-Veledes and Chang 1996; Lichterman 1995; Staggenborg 1986). This is true for many feminist groups, who because of their commitment to enacting their vision for the world in their own organizational practices, often feel that to compromise on ideals that they consider fundamental to the soul of their organization is unacceptable (Arnold 1995; Phelan 1993; Ferree and Hess 2000; Staggenborg 1986). Theoretically a group’s ideological stance will always supercede practical concerns, for ideology is defined as an overarching structure that functions at a level above strategy (Hathaway and Meyer 1997; Lichterman 1995). Whether ideology functions empirically in the same way remains to be seen. For feminist groups, ideology, or practice of identity politics, generally takes one of two forms: one, a sense that their organizing must be based on the need to incorporate the views of all women by not privileging the views of any women; or two, that their organizing must be based on the need to incorporate the views of all women by allowing a focus on the specific needs of particular groups of women – especially women of color and women of the working class (Crenshaw 1995, Ferree and Hess 2000).

This debate closely mirrors Kimberlé Crenshaw’s discussion of the role of intersectionality in women’s group organizing. She notes “The embrace of identity politics . . . has been in tension with dominant conceptions of social justice . . . According to this understanding, our liberatory objective should be to empty such categories of any social significance” (1995, 357). This is the goal of those who advocate a practice that subsumes all other relations of power and dominance – race, class, religion, and so on – to the greater good of a solely gender-based politics. The rationale behind this objective
is fairly straightforward – “our specificities, our differences, needn’t require that we
discontinue exploring the effects of gender. Aren’t there points at which protean multiple
subjects and fractured identities intersect as ‘women’?” (Fraser 1991, 191) Anti-
essentialists argue that we should not get bogged down in difference and in the reification
of man-made constructions (race, religion, etc.) to the point of forgetting the greater goal
– a progressive female-focused politics. Crenshaw offers a response to this noting,

The problem with identity politics is not that it fails to transcend difference, as
some critics charge, but rather the opposite – that it frequently conflates or ignores
intragroup differences. . . .Feminist efforts to politicize experiences of women and
antiracist efforts to politicize the experiences of people of color have frequently
proceeded as though the issues and experiences they detail occur on mutually
exclusive terrains. Although racism and sexism readily intersect in the lives of
real people, they seldom do in feminist and antiracist practices (1995, 358).

Said another way, in one ideological vision gender politics must proceed from a base of
antiessentialism – the understanding that individuals contain no essential qualities or
cores that may be pre-identified - while in the other ideological vision, gender politics
must proceed from a base of intersectionality – attention to the ways that race and gender
interact within people’s lived realities. What do these oppositional ideological positions
mean for coalition possibilities on the ground? Are there any instances under which we
might find support for the alternative hypothesis – that identity politics increase the
likelihood of coalition formation? Or is it possible that ideology is not the major explanatory variable at play?

IV. The Uruguayan Case

1. Organizational Histories

The Uruguayan Women’s Plenary, one of the earliest organizations of the five central to this dissertation, was one of the few spaces available for women who chose to stay outside of the party structure in the post-transition phase. It was founded as a result of a massive strike in January of 1984, in which 2000 women participated. The largest trade union in the country the PIT or Inter-Union Workers’ Plenary was founded in 1983, but was almost immediately outlawed in January of 1984 as part of another wave of Emergency Security Measures. The men of the PIT were too frightened to go ahead with a planned worker’s strike, so their female counterparts decided instead to hold a silent march on the appointed day (PLEMUU 1984). 2,000 women turned up and the march was a success; no one from the armed forces intervened. Afterwards at an evaluation meeting some of the women decided to found PLEMUU as an open, plural, heterogeneous space in which the whole range of women’s organizations could coordinate their activities (PLEMUU 1984, 2-3). PLEMUU was founded as a non-hierarchical organization with a flexible structure, to allow for open access to anyone who chose to be involved. Originally the main objective was simply “the mobilization of women in the struggle against the dictatorship” (PLEMUU 1984, 3). The group’s original platform reflected this motivation. It included seven demands: (1) Liberty and democracy now; (2) Full respect for human rights; (3) General and unconditional
amnesty; (4) Decent jobs, wages, and pensions; (5) Cheaper basket of basic goods; (6) Right to housing, health, and education; and (7) Free elections without proscription of individuals or parties (PLEMUU 1984, 3).

Eventually PLEMUU’s mission would come to change, as it shifted towards a more explicitly feminist model and away from a primary focus on ending the dictatorship. This would cease to a motivating factor within just one year’s time (Personal Interview, Ana Nocetti - PLEMUU 2 July 2002). The organization’s global objective was redefined as “the integration and active, conscious mobilization of women in the reconstruction of the country, without oppression, and free and democratic in its political, economic, cultural, and social spheres” (PLEMUU 1984, 5-6). By the late 80s PLEMUU sought again to redefine itself. In the years immediately after the dictatorship it used its contacts to organize neighborhood meetings with political party activists. These meetings encouraged women’s participation in political parties and social movements (Tornaría 1990). However, this project did not go very far mainly because the political parties had little interest in women. Their constituent bases were stable and they did not seek to co-opt the female electorate as was the case in Brazil and Argentina (Alvarez 1994; Feijoó and Gogna 1990; Johnson 2000). This attitude was already quite clear, given that not one single woman was elected to any parliamentary seat in 1984. The dictatorship and its political fallout had ended, housewives turned towards other activities, and a number of other women’s groups had ceased to exist. In the early 1990s PLEMMU became involved with a domestic violence program trial implemented by the state and the municipality of Montevideo and soon became the home for the national domestic violence hotline. Since then work around domestic violence, either through the
hotline or training of various groups of professionals, has been a major aspect of
PLEMUU’s work in the last 15 years.

The Women’s Popular Education Network Uruguay is part of a larger Latin
American group known by the same name. The Latin American based REPEM network
began in 1981 and REPEM Uruguay was founded in 1983. REPEM’s original mission
was also one of resistance to the dictatorship. Specifically, it was founded with the
mission to contribute to the political, social, and economic transformation of a region
marked by long dictatorial regimes, and to shape the problematic of women as a central
axis of analysis and reflection (Personal Interview, REPEM Uruguay Directive, 6 August
2003). REPEM Uruguay’s focus throughout the early 1980s was to “bring women
together in popular education, communication, and research” (Lissidini and Batthyány
1991), a goal that it maintained throughout the early to mid 80s. There was a major shift
in REPEM’s operating structure in 1988, when it initiated a project of “organic
institutional autonomy”, allowing each country to run its operations semi-autonomously
expanded to include a more specific focus on non-sexist Education, and a greater
attention to strengthening the women’s movement and women’s education (Personal
Interview Iliana Peyreyra - REPEM 29 March 2005). This shift is reflected in REPEM’s
updated mission statement to

from an educative dimension, contribute to the achievement of gender and social
justice via the strengthening and consolidation of articulation processes and
construction of alliances at the interior of women’s and feminist movements and,
with other social and political sectors at the local, national, regional and global level” (http://www.repem.org.uy Accessed 18 January 2007).

This updated mission is reflected in a major change in REPEM and REPEM Uruguay’s activities: the addition of an economic articulation to its mission. In the mid 1990s, REPEM Uruguay created a Gender, Education, and Economy program that trains women in microeconomy, particularly via means of loans and training for small business ventures. This has become a key aspect of REPEM Uruguay’s and REPEM at large’s endeavors.

Cotidiano Mujer (CM), originally known as the Women’s Collective, was founded in 1985 as a feminist editorial collective. Its primary activity was the publication of a feminist magazine titled by the same name. The magazine serves as a platform “to denounce discrimination against women and reclaim women’s role in the history of the country” (Aguirre 1991, 21) Cotidano Mujer’s goal was to create a space for the interchange of ideas “to open a space for reflection and the dissemination of information on the condition of women,” and to act as a platform for the different voices of the women’s movement; a basic mission that remains unchanged some twenty years later (Cotidiano Mujer Series I, No. 1 1985; Personal Interview Elena Fonseca - CM 16 March 2005; www.cotidianomujer.org.uy Accessed 18 January 2007). The writing and dissemination of the Cotidiano Mujer magazine has remained a central aspect of the group’s activity since its foundation. Over the years it has added few other activities to its repertoire, specifically in the last ten years (Personal Interview Lilian Celiberti - CM 17 March 2005). This includes a radio program and political lobbying for women’s
rights in Uruguay, especially around issues of women’s health and women’s political quotas.

The Afro-Uruguayan Women’s Support Group (GAMA) was founded September 11, as a special caucus of Afro World Organizations (Mundo Afro). Mundo Afro is a social movement organization founded in 1988 as the socio-cultural political voice of the afro-Uruguayan population. Like many minority women’s groups before it, GAMA came about because of concerns that afro-Uruguayan women’s needs were not being met by the sole gender focus of women’s movements or the sole racial focus of Mundo Afro (Malvasio n.d.; Personal Interviews Beatriz Ramírez – GAMA 10 July 2002). Afro-Uruguayan women chose to form a separate collective from which to operate, though they elected not to break away from Mundo Afro due to concerns about the need for the continued unity in racial struggle. For the first five years of its existence GAMA functioned as a working caucus within the Mundo Afro organization. Originally composed of a few women concerned with having “everything of the black movement with all of the special attention to the woman question,” it has now morphed into an autonomous civil organization, within the federated umbrella of OMA, and claims a workforce of some 80 women (Personal Interview, Alicía García – GAMA 31 March 2005). It has also expanded its original focus to include analyses of the intersections of race, class, and gender and their combined effects on the lives of black and other minority women. The mission of GAMA is the positive personal development of the afro-Uruguayan woman. “In a country where discrimination is perceived to be rampant, but subtle and therefore difficult to combat, GAMA [is] particularly concerned with raising Afro women’s self-valorization and reducing feelings of worthlessness (O.M.A. Resumen
2002; Personal Interview Claudia de los Santos – GAMA 16 July 2003). This objective is centered on the issue areas that constitute GAMA’s programmatic mission: Employment, Education; Health; Housing; Political Participation; Youth Work; and Discrimination and Culture (GAMA 1997; GAMA n.d.).

Finally, the National Follow-up Committee to the Beijing Accords better known as the National Follow-up Committee or CNS was founded in May of 1996. The committee came about as a result of Uruguay’s participation in the four U.N. sponsored World Conferences on Women, the last of which took place in Beijing in 1995.58 Although the official Beijing delegation included no members of civil society, Uruguayan women’s groups took the opportunity to form a Beijing Initiative Group which conducted a study of women’s condition in Uruguay.59 The Group presented its findings to a larger assembly of women’s groups and elected a small delegation to take its proposals to Beijing.

The Group and the assembly drew up proposals for Beijing based on the original issue areas introduced by the Group: violence, work, health, education, poverty, and communications. Upon return from the Beijing conference, the members of the Group decided to form the CNS. The CNS’s principal goal was to “set itself up as a body representing women” that would carry out “actions relating to monitoring, control over the agenda and accountability” of the Uruguayan government’s implementation of the Beijing Accords (CNS 1996). It was proposed that the CNS would continue to work on

58 The first conference was held in Mexico City in 1975, the International Year of the Women. Successive conferences were held in Copenhagen in 1980 and Nairobi in 1985. This ten year period covered the International Decade for Women.
59 The Beijing Initiative Group was comprised of ten women’s groups: Everyday Woman (CM), CDD, GRECMU, PLEMUU, Woman Now, La Union Women’s House, Women and Society Institute, REPEM, Freidrich Ebert Foundation (FESUR), and the Interdisciplinary Center for Development Studies Uruguay (CIEDUR).
the six programmatic areas defined by the Beijing Initiative Group. It was also decided that the CNS would conduct its activities with respect to two spheres. First, activities would be directed toward the state. These activities would include monitoring of the gender perspective in policy-making; the channeling of proposals drawn up by the CNS, as well as those originating from other women’s groups; and creation of mechanisms for negotiation with state actors, to ensure the participation of the CNS in the implementation of Beijing accords (Johnson 2000). The CNS was also interested in establishing a consistent working relationship with civil society, especially other women’s groups. Interaction took the form of construction of a permanent information web that linked women’s groups actors from all parts of Uruguay and at all levels of action; and support for individual organizations focused on influencing government policy (CNS 1997).

Currently, the CNS maintains a primary focus on these two spheres of action. It has more recently added a Youth Advocacy line to its programmatic mission, much like other women’s organizations in Uruguay. The CNS has also undergone a slight name change from the National Follow-up Committee to the Beijing Accords to the National Follow-up Committee: Women for Democracy, Equity and Citizenship. This change occurred in response to the economic crisis of 2002 and reflected the CNS’ sense that its original name implied a strict focus on the implementation of the Beijing Accords that was not indicative of its organizing. (Personal Interview Patricia Acosta – CNS 25 April 2005). That is, its programmatic issue areas and general mission of strengthening

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60 A number of organizations have begun programs directed at engaging youth with feminism. There appear to be two reasons for this. One to educate them from the source, i.e. to make sure that young people are not subject to distorted ideas of what feminism includes, such that they understand what feminism is, regardless of whether they choose to interact with feminism or feminist movements. Second, there is a hope that once properly educated some youth will be attracted to the feminism movement, thus helping to slow down the “aging” of the movement. I refer to all programs of this type as youth advocacy.
organized women’s groups have remained the same. However, the organization’s goals in relationship to the state have expanded from a primary focus on monitoring the state in regards to implementation of the Beijing accords. Now the CNS has taken a more pro-active stance, making use of its articulation with other women’s groups to mobilize and to “promote gender equity as central to the democratic practice of the country in all state arenas” (Personal Interview Patricia Acosta – CNS 25 April 2005).

2. Interests, Goals, and Tactics

A focus on coalition politics begs the question of why one should expect coalitions. That is, why should one assume a priori that all women’s groups want the same things just because they have decided to mobilize based on their gender? Table 1, reviews the perspectives and issue interests of each organization, and the tactics most frequently employed by each organization. On paper, they have a good deal in common. Beyond the fact of simple gender-based mobilization, these organizations share very similar interests; a number of issues appear repeatedly, especially employment rights, women’s sexual and reproductive health; equality of educational opportunities and gender-balanced education; domestic violence; youth advocacy; and increasing women’s political participation through substantive and affirmative action appeals.61 In many cases all five organizations devote attention to these issues.

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61 Youth advocacy refers to workshops or campaigns meant to teach youth about feminism, and perhaps interest them in joining the movement.
In fact, if any organization appears as a major outlier it is REPEM, with a more constrained focus on education and employment alone. Structurally they are quite similar as well. The five groups display a fairly even mix of collective decision-making

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*Note the use of the ampersand sign for GAMA. This reflects GAMA’s adoption of a consistent intersectional approach since its origination. PLEMUU makes no theoretical commitment to working with any sectors of women, including the lower-class. However, a major part of its activities is the running and maintenance of a large youth center in a lower-class neighborhood. Finally, REPEM does make a theoretical commitment to class concerns, although this is a more recent addition to its gender organizing. I return to these points later in the chapter.
structures and what I refer to as flattened hierarchies. This term reflects the fact that while some organizations employ the terminology of a business organization, e.g. Director, President, Treasurer, they do not typically employ the strict division of labor and responsibility implied by the term hierarchy. More importantly, they typically do not adopt the strict chain of command implied by the term hierarchy; thus the term flattened hierarchy. Finally, there is a good deal of overlap in tactical approaches. Political lobbying, and workshops or training of others is quite popular among the organizations. Consciousness-raising in the form of the written word and data collection are popular as well. The goal with these tactics is to educate adherents and/or foes through the use of publication, and the collection of data to back anecdotal evidence of inequality.

Hathaway and Meyer indicate (1997) that this level of overlap is exactly what might pit social movement groups against one another. In general, social movement organizations often feel the need to create and maintain their own specific niche in a competitive social movement sector, something that may be difficult to accomplish where there is a great degree of overlap. According to Hathaway and Meyer (1997), groups in this position should be the least likely to interact with one another in coalition. This insight overlaps with the threat hypothesis, the most frequently invoked factor in explanations of coalition formation.

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63 For more on social movement decision making-structures, especially within the feminist movement, see Freeman 1971 and Echols 1989
3. Alternative Hypotheses

Threat

Contrary to general ideas of social movement activity, coalitions can be quite difficult to come by, even for non-identity-based social movement groups (Hula 1995; Staggenborg 1986). Extant research on coalition building among social movement groups has generally noted two major impediments: threat and resources, where threat has generally been agreed to be the largest impediment to coalition building. In general, groups are assumed to be risk averse and prefer to avoid coalitions unless the benefits clearly outweigh the costs. The potential risks of joining a coalition can be quite high for social movement groups. These dangers may include increased opposition from countermovement groups as a result of the alliance, dilution of the group’s agenda in response to the needs of the coalition, and the possibility that credit for coalitional accomplishments may not be shared evenly amongst the groups involved (McCammon and Campbell 2002). Perhaps even more egregious, groups may be faced with possibility of the loss of their specific identity. If an organization is not careful about limiting when and where it chooses to join in partnership with others, the organization’s target audience may become confused about what the group’s specific demands and goals are, and how that organization differs from other, similar, organizations (Arnold 1995). This is particularly problematic in a competitive social movement sector where organizations are often best helped by their ability to distinguish themselves from the competition.

Thus, a threat hypothesis suggests that groups will only come together in partnership in the face of some external constraint that invites them to overlook the perceived risks associated with alliance work. The most common examples are a change
in political leadership, the rise of an important countermovement, changes in the
economic climate, and so on (Van Dyke 2003). However, external constraints can take
almost any form; they can be myriad and unpredictable, especially since they are usually
associated with changes in the larger political structure and are therefore subject not only
to the ebb and flow of the external political environment, but groups’ perceptions of that
political environment (Meyer and Whittier 1994).

However, coalition work is relatively common among Uruguayan women’s
groups (Townsend-Bell 2002). It has often been the case for women’s groups, and for
(most of) these groups in particular, to maintain regular contact and to launch initiatives
together when possible (Personal Interviews, Elena Fonseca – CM 20 June 2002; Ana
Nocetti – PLEMUU 2 July 2002; Celita Eccher – REPEM 6 August 2003). In particular,
the last five years have seen sustained coalitions around the issues of domestic violence,
International Women’s Day, reproductive rights and women’s health, education, and
women and labor (Personal Interview Moriana Hernández - MP 23 July 2003; Personal
Interview Elena Fonseca – Cotidiano Mujer 16 March 2005). The frequency of coalition
among major multi-issue groups working within the region – Everyday Woman (CM),
the Women’s Popular Education Network (REPEM), the Uruguayan Women’s Plenary
(PLEMUU), and the National Follow-up Committee (CNS) is in keeping with the theory
that multi-issue groups are the most able to absorb ideological differences, and therefore
the most likely to work in coalition on a regular basis (Whittier 1995; Klatch 1999).
Among the multi-issue women’s groups operating in Uruguay, it is only the Afro-
Uruguayan Women’s Support Group (GAMA) that does not participate in coalition
regularly. Thus, the threat relationship would not appear to hold here unless one argues that GAMA presents a particular threat that no other organization does.

**Resources**

Resources can also play a role in the decision to form coalitions or not, albeit a less important one than threat. There are two schools of thought behind the import of resources. One, scarce resources can lead to competition among similarly situated social movement groups and thus reduces the likelihood of coalition formation among them (Hathaway and Meyer 1997; Maney 2000; Zald and McCarthy 1980). Conversely, limited resources, which are the hallmark of most all social movement groups, might make social movement groups more likely to engage in coalition with other groups. That is, just as there is strength in numbers, there is strength in shared resources. Therefore, it may benefit individual groups with limited resources to pool them together, hence strengthening the likelihood of achieving a particular goal (Almeida and Stearns 1998; Berry 1997).

Of course, if this latter rationale were the case, there is no clear compelling reason that GAMA would not appear in coalition with other groups. If resources are scarce across the board – which arguably, they are – then the desire to pool resources should mean that some coalitions should, in fact, occur. It does stand to reason that scarce resources might impede coalition formation since groups will fight over the acquisition of very few funds. However, given that coalitions are relatively common among women’s groups, as noted above, it would have to be the case that GAMA has notably different economic circumstances than all of the other multi-issue groups, or is somehow poised to
receive funds differently. Information about budgets is difficult to attain, however it is quite likely that GAMA operates on a budget that is significantly less than the roughly $100,000 budgets that the other organizations command (Personal Interviews, Lilian Celiberti – Cotidiano Mujer 17 March 2005; Iliana Peyreyra – REPEM 29 March 2005; and Patricia Acosta - CNS 25 April 2005). However, GAMA shares office space with its federative partner Black World Organizations (OMA), which was granted office space in a municipally owned, subsidized building with a long-term lease in 1991. That is to say, that office rent is minimal for these organizations due to one of the first examples of affirmative action for afro-descendents in Montevideo.64 Hence, in terms of disposable income, GAMA’s budget may be on par with, or even a bit higher than those organizations responsible for their own rent, especially given that Uruguay is currently the third most expensive Latin American country, above Argentina. Finally, PLEMUU did preside over a budget approximating 100,000 US dollars, but lost most of its money in the 2002 bank run that occurred as a result of the Argentine/Uruguayan economic crisis, which the state has promised to pay back but over an extended period. Hence, prior to 2002 it was also on par with the other organizations, and post 2002 it is “effectively broke” (Personal Interview, Ana Nocetti – PLEMUU 19 April 2005). So, budget alone does not explain the lack of coalition between GAMA and other multi-issue women’s groups.

It is possible that there is a broader resource issue, for instance that the other groups are concerned that interaction with GAMA will hurt their chances of obtaining outside resources. Yet, there are a few reasons why this is not likely. One, none of the

64 The other occupant of this building is a more typical municipal resident – a municipally sponsored meat market.
data indicate that coalitions with or without particular groups has any effect on monetary grants. This explanation seems even less likely given that all of the organizations but PLEMUU – which is mostly state funded - obtain the majority of their funding from external sources such as the UN or European NGOs who are not likely to be concerned about the specific women’s groups with whom they interact, but about the specific issues they hope to target.65 More importantly, the definition of a coalition implies that it occurs only punctually, around specific issues. Even long-term coalitions are limited in scope and do not imply the actual joining of two organizations, which implies a merger not a coalition. This is quite evident in Uruguay where, as I have noted, coalitions occur around specific issue areas – domestic violence, reproductive rights, quota laws, and so on. It is unlikely then, that a scarce resource concern would eliminate GAMA as a potential coalition partner, especially in any consistent manner among distinct issue areas.

4. Ideology and Coalition History

By now it is clear that GAMA – a multicultural, afro-Uruguayan women’s group that consistently highlights its identity as black, working-class women and constructs its politics around these three elements – historically has been the one major multi-issue group that does not join in regular partnership with other women’s groups in the area. The four other major multi-issue women’s groups - CM, REPEM, PLEMUU, and the CNS - operating in Uruguay are mostly white and middle-class. A review of interview data and published group documents confirm that CM and the CNS tend not to emphasize

65 Indeed, given that grant proposals are always written based on issues that will be addressed, there is no reason to believe that this would be an issue even if they were all locally funded.
either of these aspects in their organizing. Although PLEMUU works with many working- and lower-class women, it is similar to CM and the CNS in its lack of a formal emphasis on class. These groups espouse commitment to organizing on behalf of all women, regardless of their particular background. Finally, REPEM though originally in the same category as the other three organizations, has changed its platform in the last ten years to focus specifically on gender and class. What is the basis for the relationships or lack of relationship among these groups? The next section continues with a focus on the second part of the causal chain. This is boundary formation, as I have discussed in the organizational histories, and ideology. How do these concerns affect group interaction? I provide an overview of group interaction since the 1980s and continue with a more contemporary analysis.

Interaction among the Four Women’s Groups

Prior to GAMA’s arrival in 1989, there was no women’s group that included a specific racial-focus in its organizing. Moreover, given the Uruguayan cultural, political, and social norms described above, there was no reason to expect that any women’s groups would have taken a special interest in issues of race and gender previously. Even after GAMA’s arrival within the women’s movement sector, it was clear that many were unprepared to incorporate a raced-focus within the larger gender movement. For groups whose specific platforms included “denounce[ing] discrimination against women and reclaim[ing] women’s role in the history of the country;” or “to shape the problematic of women as a central axis of analysis and reflection” (Aguirre 1991, Personal Interview, 66 The CNS is not included in this overview because its creation in 1996 puts it outside of the timeline covered in this section.)
REPEM Directive, 6 August 2003), the mission was quite clear: their work would concentrate on the needs of all Uruguayan women – read as the “average” Uruguayan woman. Given Uruguay’s success in making people of Afro-Uruguayan descent largely invisible in official culture; and Afro-Uruguayan women’s dual invisible role - as black women and largely poor employees of the unregulated informal economy, especially domestic service – it is not surprising that many members and organizations of the women’s movement found GAMA’s position difficult to reconcile with notions of a non-discriminatory Uruguay.67 “It was all quite new at that time, no” (Personal Interview, Iliana Peyreyra 29 March 2005).

It was also unclear, particularly in GAMA’s early years, whom GAMA represented. One member reflected on GAMA’s early years “it has not been very easy to unite the members of the collectivity . . . it has not been very easy for us as GAMA, as a group of women, to try to unite the women, because if we don’t go to them, they don’t come to us” (Personal Interview, Claudia de los Santos (29 July 2003). “It is a problem of low self-esteem you see. . . and this is also a cause of blanqueamiento [the whitening process]” (Personal Interview, Mirta da Silva 29 July 2003). Hence, for many involved with the women’s movement, it was unclear from where this new “collectivity” had arisen, and who exactly they could claim to represent. For GAMA an important part of

67 The Uruguayan government would again prove successful at erasing the Afro-Uruguayan presence from the physical landscape. In 1976 the dictatorial regime decided that some of the buildings of barrios Palermo and Sur, two traditionally Afro-Uruguayan neighborhoods that were home to estimates of one-quarter to one-half of the total Afro-Uruguayan population, were blighted and had to be demolished (Lewis 2003). The land would be held by the city of Montevideo and used to build more appropriate residences, given its prime location on the southern coastal edge of the city. Among those buildings targeted were some historically well-known conventillos or tenement houses, which were almost entirely Afro-Uruguayan. Those residents were then distributed throughout the suburban neighborhoods of Montevideo, and in some cases, were relocated to abandoned warehouses that lacked even the bare amenities of the conventillos in which they had lived previously (Rodriguez 2001). In this way the government achieved two goals: the recapture of prime real estate and the erasure and removal of unwelcome population.
the reason for its creation was a sense by its early members that the women’s movement did not speak to their lived realities.

We arrived at the conclusion that in its development the feminist movement, if it has concerns that are common to us, did not contemplate our ethnic differences. Feminism makes an analysis from a class sector that has its own dynamics and interests and from a Eurocentric vision where we are not contemplated. And, obviously, when a social sector is not contemplated then one must plant the ideas and propose the alternatives for change that we believe valid for our communities (Ramírez n.d.).

Alicia García notes that it is GAMA, the *Afro*-Uruguayan Women’s Support Group, that is one of the most multicultural organizations in the country, with a member base that includes women of various races and classes and a policy that leaves it open to whomever would like to join and pledges to support the general human rights mission of GAMA (Personal Interview Alicia García 31 March 2005, emphasis mine).

The rhetoric of the larger women’s movement was indeed, unapologetically concerned with attention to and concern with establishing gender equity and non-sexist laws and practices. Members of the Women’s Consensus Building Forum reflected that “above the diversity of philosophical and political opinions, there existed . . . a more important unifying cause: the awareness that women were unjustly discriminated against, and the need to struggle and work in an organized fashion to eradicate that injustice.”
A joint statement by groups involved with the “Uruguayan Women Today” conference held in 1986 affirmed the frustration of women countrywide with the perceived gap between their formal political rights and the rights available to them in practice in the post-transition democracy.

We are fighting for democracy... democracy will only be achieved when women have in practice the same options and rights as all human beings. In our country, the equality of all human beings is enshrined in law, without distinction by sex, but in practice... full equality does not exist (Giambruno 1986).

For the members of these women’s groups, this statement was indicative of their concern that women, all women, were included centrally in the democratic process; and their sense that this huge discrimination was unappreciated by many members of society.

Women’s groups’ rhetorical appeals to the Uruguayan democratic tradition were quite common at this time, and preceded the women’s rights as human rights frame that became quite common across the world after the 1995 Beijing Conference. The National Consensus-Building Forum began each programmatic document with direct quotes from sections of the UN Elimination of Discrimination Convention “a deliberate strategy designed to give their claims objective legitimacy and to increase the sense of obligation felt by the state or political actors to respond to those claims” (Johnson 2000, Personal

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68 The Women’s Consensus Building Forum was the first attempt at a formal coalition among Uruguayan women’s groups, and included CM, REPEM, and PLEMUU among many other groups. It arose around the desire for a women’s response to a proposed immunity law for the members of the dictatorial regime; however the reason for its origination would also be the reason for its demise, as members found themselves unable to agree on what, if any, position the Forum should take. By early 1989 the Forum began to fade away and was not replaced with a new coordinating effort, as a number of women’s groups at this time also began to disband.
Interview, Ana Nocetti 2 July 2002). Specifically, the decision to express these appeals for women’s substantive political rights within the frame of international conventions reflected the movement’s attempt to remind the Uruguayan state of its continuing concern with the appearance of modernity and progressivism (Johnson 2000). A modernity that was still explicitly based on the ideal of a model European (read as white, middle-class, and cosmopolitan) country that just happened to be located in South America (González Laurino 2000; Rodríguez 2001; Sztainbok 2005).

GAMA considered appeals with a language based on undifferentiated women’s’ relationship to democracy reflective of a women’s movement that had sought, mistakenly, to aggregate women in a way that was not reflective of their specific subject positions. Early attempts to integrate GAMA within the activities of the wider women’s movement were met with either hostility or benign indifference (Personal Interview Claudia de los Santos and Mirta da Silva 29 July 2003). Beatriz Ramírez affirms “we had a conflictive tie, it was an element of tension, it divided us. We went our own way” (Personal Interview 17 July 2003). For GAMA it was clear that the majority of the women’s movement held the ironic position of recognizing one type of discrimination – gender discrimination – while remaining either ignorant of or unsympathetic to other types of discrimination.

On the other hand, members of the women’s movement have repeatedly emphasized their openness and willingness to welcome the involvement of anyone interested in gender equality. In response to the question of interaction with groups such as GAMA, members of PLEMUU consistently emphasize that “we tell them to come when we’re going to have meetings but they don’t come” (Personal Interview, Ana
Nocetti, 2 July 2002). “Perhaps they are so ideological that they cannot make room for those who do not fit” (Personal Interview, Ana Nocetti, 19 April 2005).

The result of this “impasse” was that each side chose to go their own way, and work separately for the next few years (Personal Interview Ana Nocetti 2 July 2002, Personal Interview Beatriz Ramírez 17 July 2003). In the end this was not as great a loss as it might appear; the early to mid-1990s are noted for the decline of many social movement organizations, including many women’s movement organizations (Canel 1992; Johnson 2000). These years were also characterized by a major debate within the women’s movement of whether it should pursue positions of autonomy from the state, or interaction with the state. A number of women’s organizations were disillusioned with the political system which they perceived to be just as closed to civil society as it had been before the dictatorship (Aguirre 1991; Conferencia 1987; Johnson 2000). The result was that widespread coalition efforts among women’s movement organizations ceased by the late 1980s (with the decline of the Women’s Consensus Building Forum) and would not resume until women’s groups met to organize for the 1995 U.N. International Conference on Women (Tornaría 1989, 1995). Members of the women’s movement again invited GAMA to participate in that coalition effort and those that would follow; but the relationships among these distinct identity groups were tentative and fraught with tension.

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5. Conceptual Debates

A review of the debates that characterized interaction among GAMA and other multi-issue women’s groups highlight the ways in which each organization’s understanding of the societal context influences its ideological position on the salience of race and class to gender organizing. Popularly held notions of an equal Uruguayan society have had a major impact on the thinking and organizing of women’s groups in that country. At the same time that those involved in Uruguay’s women’s movements recognize the discrimination that plagues an individual on account of her gender, they otherwise do not necessarily question the general Uruguayan premise that everyone is equal, and therefore share the general assumption that race is not important. This has been formalized in Article 5 of the Constitution, which strictly prohibits discrimination based on race, sex, religion, language, or social status. Article P states “All persons are equal before the law, no other distinctions being recognized among them save those of talent and virtue.”

Meanwhile though discrimination has often been a daily fact of life for most afrouruguayans, there is little de jure or even de facto evidence of discrimination, with the result that more than 60% of the population believes that racism in Uruguay is non-existent, or at the very least not systematic (Berhman, Gaviria, and Székely 2002; Foster 1999). Moreover, until very recently no data had ever been collected on the existence of afro groups (or any particular groups for that matter). These realities, accompanied by anecdotal evidence of further marginalization of afro-Uruguayans, can make it quite difficult to enter into any meaningful dialogue about the role of race discrimination. For instance, some (white) Uruguayan citizens suggest that there exist no afro-Uruguayans
In general, afro descendants are among the least likely to hold advanced (or often even high school) degrees, own property, or be represented in government. The majority of afrouruguyan women are employed in the tertiary sector (89.6%), with fifty percent employed as domestic servants. A similar amount of afrouruguyan men are employed in some form of manual labor (GAMA 1997). Illiteracy rates and unemployment rates for these populations are among some of the highest, and decent health care is difficult to come by, among other things (GAMA 1997). These are some of the current manifestations of the process of blanqueamiento that I described earlier. Even where this whiteness project was not consciously engineered it served the purpose of creating a race-blind society in rhetoric, though not in practice. Hence, for all the illusions that race is a non-variable in Latin America, some disturbing truths have begun to come of the fore in recent times.

Yet, marginalization is a vicious predator. As I noted in chapter four, the hallmark of the afro-Uruguayan woman and afro-Uruguayan people post-slavery in general is their invisibility. Many Uruguayans are simply unaware of the extent to which afrouruguayans were erased from the national image. The hallmark of the whitening processes that occurred in much of Latin America is that they did not necessarily vilify a minority group, thereby making them central to the national story. Instead, whitening proceeds by erasure. Thus, contemporary Uruguayans find it difficult to understand the rationale for what they consider separatism in organizing. Simply put, racial discrimination is not something that automatically appears on their ‘radar screens’ as they
seek to catalog and deal with gender discrimination especially given that, traditionally, theorizing about race and gender have been kept separate.

Given this, it should come as no surprise that these differential understandings have mapped onto coalition possibilities among these groups. In response to a question to GAMA about the extent of their cooperation with other women’s groups, one member noted

> Occasionally we will do things with other groups, but it can be difficult. Of course we are invited when they [white women] are meeting, but not if we’re going to talk about black people’s concerns that have no place in an ‘everyone is equal society’” (Personal Interview, Mirta da Silva - GAMA, 29 July 2003).

Thus, there is the concern that white women are happy to have them, but only on their own terms, e.g. gender must remain the sole focus of discourse. Otherwise, any type of working alliance with black women becomes more difficult, if not impossible. When GAMA was asked to participate in the March 8, 2003 International Women’s Day celebration it was enthusiastic, and mentioned its desire to prepare a program detailing some of the difficulty associated with being black, female and often poor in Uruguayan society. The CNS and the Montevidean Municipal Women’s Commission, the primary organizers of the annual celebration, responded that they could not understand why GAMA would want to single out this particular issue on what was supposed to be a day for all women. GAMA responded “If, indeed, it was a day for all women, why wouldn’t they?” (Personal Interview, Mirta da Silva - GAMA 29 July 2003, emphasis hers).
In the end an agreement was reached and GAMA participated in the 2003 Women’s Day celebration under its terms. However, this was not the end of the debate, as GAMA has had to fight each year to have their particular experience included in the Women’s Day celebration. In fact, in 2005 it was only at the very last minute that the CNS and the Municipal Women’s Commission finally agreed to allow GAMA as an addition (Personal Interview, Alicia García – GAMA 31 March 2005). Hence, what might be the foundation for a stronger relationship between GAMA and other groups is instead drawn as an annual site of struggle; one in which GAMA participates only because of the importance of International Women’s Day in Uruguay.70

Ruth Frankenberg (1993) has noted the tendency of white people in North America to see race and racism as the concern of people of color. White women may be sympathetic to these concerns, but because they don’t see themselves as raced, they don’t see anti-racist work as central to their own organizing. In the Uruguayan case the issue is somewhat different. White women are still sympathetic to discrimination experienced by people of color. Nonetheless, many share the sense that racial discrimination in Uruguay is non-systematic; that many people don’t see color. Hence anti-racist work is not necessary or primary to their organizing; moreover, it should not necessary or primary to black women either. If there are any issues besides gender with which women should be concerned it is class, and even that is debatable. Yet, as I note above, what statistics are available indicate that afro-Uruguayans are overrepresented in the lower and working classes and in low-paying occupations, as well as some of the most likely to be the least

70 International Women’s Day is of major import in Uruguay, for it is the day when women’s groups officially meet with members of parliament and members of the executive government, and detail their agendas and demands for the year. So, symbolically it is the time for each group make its voices heard, either in coordination with other groups, or alone.
educated. These concerns, which the women of GAMA and other afro organizations highlight, would appear to indicate that something larger than a class issue is at play.

Earlier I noted Crenshaw’s use and discussion of the term intersectionality to highlight the need for attention to the intersection of racism and sexism in everyday life. However, what is more useful for a discussion of ideological differences and coalition possibilities is what I consider the parallel of intersectionality: intersectional insensitivity. Intersectional insensitivity is a lack of awareness of, or attention to, the ways in which the lived realities of race, class, and gender impact the lives of all of us, not simply those who carry the attributes in a more obvious manner. This is similar to Frankenberg’s, and other whiteness studies scholars’, argument that white people tend not see themselves as raced. White, or male, or middle-class is not a specific subject position, but a neutral ground against which all other persons or practices are compared.

This intersectional insensitivity has played itself out for the women of GAMA who have often felt isolated from the organizing and interactions occurring between other groups. On the one hand GAMA considers an integrated analysis of race, class, and gender central to its organizing. Alicia García, director of GAMA, affirms

I am not a closed feminist, to us [GAMA] the big themes that we have with women’s movement here in Uruguay is the fact that we [black women] have a different feminism, because we value a personalized feminism . . So what we want to change . . .if the women want to theorize and take as the common, the fact that gender is of everyone, not only one or two or five or six that great, then we walk around the world feeling as if, and why not, that when I plant cultural or
social policies, or other policies . . . they [the women’s movement] should support me (31 March 2005).

García seeks a feminism which speaks to the experiences of people it claims to include; in this case, black women. More specifically, she values a version of feminism that does not attempt to speak for her as a black woman, but one that supports her as she speaks for herself (31 March 2005).

However, my conversations with representatives of other major groups have revealed a serious concern with what they consider to be excessive emphasis on particular sectors of women, as opposed to a more generalized perspective that may encompass all the women they hope to serve. For instance, Lilían Celiberti of Cotidiano Mujer comments

This is what black women have done always, complain that we as white women always speak in the name of all women, blah, blah, blah, and I think the complaint is valid, but what is more difficult, is how to express what is common to the situation of gender, the gender relationships that are of all women regardless of ethnicity (Personal Interview Lilían Celiberti- CM 17 March, 2005)

Later she notes

sometimes we look for specificities only to vindicate our particular identities . . . and I say, sometimes the search for specificities only leads to confusion . . . and
my political battle does not have to be that, I don’t have to substantiate that this woman suffers from violence or that one suffers, or that is, I don’t have to search for the most dramatic aspects just to defend a right (Personal Interview Lilian Celiberti- CM 17 March 2005; emphasis hers).

Essentially Celiberti argues that while recognition of intersecting identities may have its place, it is not central to the overall gender struggle. Other organizations appear to agree. The CNS, for instance, plainly references itself as Women for Democracy, Equity, and Citizenship, and thus far the only sector of women with whom it has chosen to work explicitly is young women, in the form of youth advocacy (Personal Interview, Patricia Acosta - CNS, 5 April 2005).

Other organizations are even more explicit about their ambivalence over special attention to issues of race. Ana Nocetti, director of PLEMUU, has her doubts about GAMA, and remarked

I don’t know, it appears to me that this project of unifying black women isn’t coming along too well. I don’t account with them, especially this complaint that they want to be included. They want to be included and we invite them and they don’t come (Personal Interview, 19 April 2005).

Lucy Garrido of Cotidiano Mujer and a regional group called MARCOSUR has the last word.
Listen, we have a campaign against fundamentalisms, ‘open your mouth against fundamentalisms. We don’t work with black women, nor with poor women, nor with lesbian women, handicapped women . . .The only thing that we consider fundamental are the people. (14 March 2005).

What is particularly interesting about this quote is that MARCOSUR is a multi-raced and sexed group of feminists. It recognizes and affirms the importance of diversity but not at the expense of creating a unified feminist force. Its main goal is to organize against all types of inequality and anything that suppresses unity; hence the campaign against fundamentalisms. By now it is clear that these groups have differing conceptions of what the role of the women’s movement, and specifically of their organizations, is or should be. What has this meant for coalition possibilities on the ground? I discuss all national coalition possibilities available to these groups for the 1993-2005 period, broken down into three time periods to reflect any changes introduced by changes in government.

6. Coalition Possibilities by Issue Area

1993-1995: The Road to the Beijing Conference

GAMA was established as a working group within OMA on September 11, 1989. It was not until 1993 that it became its own autonomous organization. Hence the 1993-1995 period is the first period for which there is observable evidence of interracial cooperation between Uruguayan women’s organizations. During this two year period one major coalition opportunity arose, in the planning for the 1995 UN sponsored Fourth
World Conference on Women in Beijing. Planning, in the form of local, national, and regional pre-conferences, began early and lasted until just days before the international conference occurred. Women’s’ group representatives were not involved in the drafting of the official Beijing National Action Plan. However, ten women’s organizations, including PLEMUU, REPEM and CM, decided to form the Beijing Initiative Group. The Group conducted a study of the Uruguayan women’s condition, and presented the results at an assembly comprised of fifty organized women’s groups throughout the country (CNS 1997; Johnson 2000). The Group decided that the most expedient option for a productive meeting would be to limit the agenda to six programmatic concerns: violence, work, health, education, poverty, and communication. GAMA, though a relatively young organization was invited to these meetings “just as everyone else was. We invited them and they don’t come. They [GAMA] complained, so we did not include them” (Ana Nocetti, Personal Interview, 2 July 2002). For PLEMUU and others, their responsibility was complete once they had extended an invitation to GAMA to participate just as was done for all other Uruguayan women’s organizations (Elena Fonseca, Personal Communication, 20 June 2002).

GAMA’s response to this is that it was only invited after the fact. “What was the point of us going once the entire agenda had been determined?” (Mirta da Silva, Personal Interview, 29 July 2003). GAMA’s hope was to have a real insertion of a discussion of

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71 Coalition opportunity refers to any attempts at creating a coalition, whether successful or not. In the twelve year period I consider here there were no failed coalition attempts, although in some cases specific groups, such as GAMA chose to bow out of coalitions. Because interaction among groups is my primary focus, I do not consider missed coalition opportunities, e.g. issues that might have incited a coalition, but around which no organizations attempted to mobilize.

72 The Beijing Initiative Group was comprised of ten women’s groups: Everyday Woman (CM), CDD, GRECMU, PLEMUU, Woman Now, La Union Women’s House, Women and Society Institute, REPEM, Freidrich Ebert Foundation (FESUR), and the Interdisciplinary Center for Development Studies Uruguay (CIEDUR).
the realities of afro and afrouruguyan women. The issue areas noted above overlapped with GAMA’s interests to a great degree, but it did not see the possibility of this within the coordinated Uruguayan women’s movement. The starting point of the Beijing preparations was a study on the condition of the Uruguayan woman and both the Initiative Group and the larger assembly felt that this was where the focus should remain. This impasse was insurmountable. GAMA was not interested in a national articulation of the woman’s condition, especially given that the government was already doing this (Personal Interview Beatriz Ramírez – GAMA 10 July 2002). It hoped that the point of a self-selected civil society delegation was to allow for a broader perspective that would include the condition of a variety of women. The Beijing Initiative Group and the assembly voted that a national articulation within the pre-defined issue areas was the most useful way to proceed. Already somewhat suspicious of “white” women’s groups GAMA adopted a position of militancy where it chose to work alone or with other women of color groups. The president of GAMA, Beatriz Ramírez, went to Beijing alone to represent afro-Uruguayan women and to make connections with other women of color groups within Latin America and other parts of the world. The organization felt that it was important that someone from the group attend to represent Uruguayan and Latin American women of color, to gain firsthand knowledge of the proceedings of the conference, and to gain more information about options for transnational women of color networks (Personal Interview, Beatriz Ramirez – GAMA, 10 July 2002). Upon her return GAMA embarked on the implementation of some of the same issue areas that had originally been broached in the wider women’s movement meetings, specifically a
diagnostic of the situation of black women and an accompanying action plan (see Diagnóstico socioeconómico y cultural de la mujer afrouruguyaya).

‘White’ women’s organizations were willing to do no more for GAMA than they did for any other women’s organization, regardless of its particular focus, to invite them to the table to discuss the topics at hand. GAMA was not willing to participate in an environment where the only feedback it could give would be around pre-determined issues and took this incident as indicative of what further interaction with the women’s movement might be like, leading them to the decision to avoid it all together.

1995-2000

GAMA’s experience with other groups leading up to the Beijing conference impelled them toward a position of self-described militancy in which it chose not to seek interaction with other feminist groups for some years. Thus, very few coalition efforts occurred during the five year period from 1995-2000. However, even had GAMA not chosen this course, coalition possibilities were far and few between during this time period. Although nothing about the national political environment would indicate that conditions were not right for activity amongst Uruguayan women’s groups, very little action around major women’s issues occurred in this period.73

There are a few reasons for this. First, it seems that women’s groups were retooling after all of the activity surrounding Beijing and were largely focused on aiding the creation of a new multi-issue women’s group: the National Follow-up Commission for Beijing Compromises (CNS) which was founded in 1996 (Personal Interview, Elena

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73 The political environment at this time was relatively stable. Luis Lacalle, a Colorado, was president, the democratic system had returned to its precoup level of high democratic stability and the economy fared well until the beginnings of the economic crisis hit in 1999, although the brunt was not felt until 2002/2003.
Fonseca 20 June, 2002). The CNS has been a major impetus for the major issue area actions occurring in the eleven years since its founding. However, on the eve of its foundation it was just another fledgling organization that had to prove itself to many different sectors of society, both governmental and nongovernmental, before it assumed its position as the central organizing structure of the Uruguayan women’s movement (Personal Interview, Lilian Celiberti, 17 March 2005).

At the same time, the other major stimulus for women’s group activity, the Bancada Feminina (BF) had not yet been established and would not be until March 8, 2000 – International Women’s Day.74 Finally, there was at least one aspect of the national political environment that did not lend itself to many coordinated activities between feminist NGOs and the state. This was the loose tie between the INFM and the organized women’s movement since its inception in 1991, given that it was an under-funded sub-ministry within the National Ministry of Education and Culture.75 The INFM had very little in the way of a defined mission or an autonomous space in which to work on a mission. A CEDAW committee tasked with following up on Uruguay’s implementation of its Beijing Compromises noted the “the institutional weakness of the INFM” and that it “without doubt, has contributed such that since 1995 the INFM has not achieved the effective promotion of the implementation of the recommendations emanating from the Beijing Conference” (CEDAW, n.d.: 3). In its recommendations for how the INFM might go about implementing these polices it notes the need for inclusion

74 Bancada Feminina, loosely translated, means the women’s bench and reflect the congressional bancadas or benches in which legislative groups sit during floor sessions.

75 The INFM’s 1995-2000 budget was $100,000 US annually, or .001% of the national budget for this time period. (CEDAW 2002)
of representatives of civil society, in particular women’s organizations and feminist groups (CEDAW, n.d.)

The only major activity begun in this time period was the early stages of a push to introduce a stronger and more cohesive piece of domestic violence legislation, which occurred in 1999. Prior to this point, what domestic violence legislation existed was scattered among different parts of the penal code, and was not uniform in its definition of what constituted domestic violence. In fact, one of the few pieces of women’s rights legislation passed in the 1995-2000 period specified domestic violence in the penal code.76 This is important not only because it represents the sum of legislative activity around specific “women’s issues,” but because it is a further indicator of the lack of activity occurring in the sphere of independent women’s organizations. Uruguay has long been known for the deep roots of its political parties – some of the oldest in the world – and their tradition as the central mechanism of representation and expression of political interests. Most scholars agree that the political parties have long been “accepted as the only or best mechanism of expressing popular demands” (Bergara et. al, 2006, 26). Thus, the level of activity at the state level, within the legislature and at least potentially within the women’s ministry, is a fairly accurate indicator of all major activity. Due to all of these factors there was very little coordinated activity among women’s groups during this five year period until work on domestic violence began in 1998 in preparation for its presentation to parliament in 1999.

76 The two other laws passed during this time period were the specification of domestic violence and accompanying sentences in the Penal Code, and the ratification of the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women. I do not have numbers for how many initiatives were introduced in this five year time period, but 58 initiatives total were introduced within the 1985-1999 period, with 13 approved.
Domestic Violence

Uruguayan women’s groups, led by the CNS, came together in 1998 to begin a push for more uniform and better enforced domestic violence legislation – one of the compromises agreed to by the government in its 1995 Beijing presentation. The goal was to introduce a comprehensive piece of domestic violence legislation that would make clear the definition of domestic violence and all that it includes: physical violence, psychological/emotional violence, sexual violence, and patrimonial violence.77

Moreover, there was a concerted effort to make sure that the law included state based prevention measures to stop domestic violence from occurring to begin with, and protection measures to deal with it when it does occur. These protection measures include training of judges, police officers, hospital personnel and other state workers who will have primary interaction with victims and perpetrators of domestic violence (Abrir los Ojos: Ley de Violencia Doméstica: n.d.). To bring this project to light took four years, ending with successful passage in 2002, and due to the combined work of women’s groups, represented by the CNS and the Uruguayan Network against Domestic and Sexual Violence, an umbrella group representing individual women’s organizations including CM and PLEMUU.

Little, if any, cooperation between major groups and GAMA took place. GAMA did support the domestic violence legislation in the form of acting as a signatory to petition initiatives, and participate in one or two marches (Personal Interview, Beatriz Ramírez, 10 July 2002). In this case, the lack of participation did not stem from its earlier position of militancy, as is indicated by the actions above. Instead, interview and

77 Patrimonial violence is defined as all actions or omissions that imply harm, loss, transformation, subtraction, destruction, hiding, or retention of goods, work tools or documents, legal documents or economic goods meant to reduce the self-determination of another individual.
archival evidence indicate that GAMA thinks about domestic violence in a totally different way than most of the other single- and multi-issue groups in operation. GAMA’s section on domestic violence as written in its *Diagnóstico Socioeconómico*, is illustrative. The domestic violence section, the last section of the manual, titled Discrimination and Violence, begins with a notation of discrimination that manifests itself primarily in the “inequalities of access to social ‘goods’” (education, health, qualified employment, and so on) (GAMA 1997, 68). GAMA notes that “many women are the objects of this discrimination and unconscious of it, given the ease with which a woman can experience what are in fact structural systems of discrimination, but which she sees as her individual destiny” (1997, 68). It does note other more explicit forms of violence that are exercised against women in everyday life “for reason of her race, verbal aggression, physical violence, sexual aggression, moral attacks, and sexual harassment,” and note that these types of violence and discrimination can also be perceived as natural to many women given that in many cases they have lived with it from a very young age (GAMA 1997, 69). However, GAMA argues that “both types of discrimination, if conceptually distinct, constitute the same social problem. Structural forms of discrimination ideologically sustain it in the psychosocial order” (GAMA 1997, 90).

Hence it appears that for GAMA, violence against women as perpetuated by men is not of major consequence. This is not to say that there has been no organizing on their parts on the issue of domestic violence, and in particular, in the afrouruguayan community. However, it seems that there is a stigma around domestic violence similar to that operating in African-American communities in the United States. That is, out of a desire to protect afrouruguayan or African-American men from dishonor by furthering
the stereotype of African descended men as particularly violent, there has been something of a silence around the issue of domestic violence.

This is illustrative because it points to the difficulties that can surround a true politics of intersectionality. The women of GAMA claim to adhere to a politics of intersectionality, in fact they highlight it as the basis of their political and social work. However, in this case they prioritize the work of anti-racism ahead of that of anti-sexism, and as Crenshaw affirms “Among the most troubling political consequences of failure of antiracist and feminist discourses to address the intersections of race and gender is the fact that, to the extent that they can forward the interest of ‘people of color’ and ‘women,’ respectively, one analysis often implicitly denies the validity of the other” (1995, 363). Until, or if, some change in ideology occurs within the ranks of GAMA coalition with other groups around the issue of domestic violence will be impossible. Of course, even if GAMA does decide to begin to address the issue of domestic violence, the extent of its coalition possibilities with other like-oriented groups will depend on the degree to which any new ideological impasses can be forestalled.

2000-2005

There was quite a bit more organized women’s group activity occurring within this five year period, both at the national and sub-national level. This five year period includes the existence of a five year old and fairly strong CNS, and the foundation of the parliamentary Bancada Feminina (BF), the two major coordinators of all national level activities occurring during this time period. Although it was the CNS’s mission to support other organizations’ actions, especially those attempting to influence government
policy, it was the CNS that would eventually spearhead a good deal of activity among organized women’s groups. It soon became the primary catalyst of women’s group activity, particularly in the form of large coalition efforts attempting to change government policy (Johnson 2000).

There are two reasons for this. One, many women’s movement organizations became suspicious of interaction with the government because of their experiences in the transition phase of the return to democracy. High hopes for a new pact between civil society and government were dashed by a swift return to ‘politics as usual,’ much to the chagrin of women’s and other social movement groups (Canel 1992). Organized women’s group’s disillusionment with the government led them to a focus on autonomy and other activities, especially in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Filgueira 1991, 1992; Tornaría 1994). The CNS played a key role in changing this mentality. It helped to convince women’s groups that a position of strict autonomy is not always advisable (Personal Interview, Lilián Abracinskas – CM – CNS- MYSU March 2005). More importantly, it acted as interlocutor between women’s groups and the government. Hence, women’s groups could be involved in government focused activities without the need to make it a primary focus. Instead each group could take advantage of a coalition politics model that allowed it to have as much or as little interaction as it liked, either through a simple signature on CNS drafted documents, or more active participation in the form of major committee coalition work.

The CNS functions particularly well as an interlocutor because of its historical tie with female members of parliament. In the first years of its existence CNS members included members of the Network of Women’s Politicians. They were soon asked to
leave the organization because of the conflict of interests apparent in having members of the government and the opposition involved in an organization whose primary goal was the monitoring of government activity. However, the severing of this relationship did not create bad blood between the two groups. In fact, it was the CNS’s idea to create “minimum agendas” that each female politician could present to her respective party that led to the creation of the Bancada Feminina, the Women’s Bench (BF) in 2000. The historical tie between these two organizations and women’s groups more broadly have resulted in a mutually supportive relationship over areas of shared interest. The CNS helps to mobilize organized women’s groups in support of BF legislation proposals and the BF has sometimes sponsored legislation in response to CNS or other organized women’s groups’ requests.

In the 2000-2005 period the country was headed by another Colorado president, Jorge Batlle, grandnephew of renowned welfare-state president Jorge Batlle (1903-1907 and 1911-1915) and son of Uruguayan president Luis Batlle Berres (1947-1951; CEO 1953-1954), which might have seemed auspicious for women’s rights groups. However, Batlle did not prove to be especially concerned with women’s rights issues. He was even less so by 2002 when the economic crisis that had been brewing since 1999 hit full force and dominated government and NGO attention in many spheres. Nonetheless, led by the CNS and the BF, major activity occurred around health and reproductive rights legislation, quota legislation, and domestic violence legislation as noted earlier.
Health and Reproductive Rights

There has been quite a lot of activity around women’s health and reproductive rights, as Uruguayan women’s and feminist organizations have pushed for legislation legalizing abortion and enhancing school sex education programs, among other things. Preparation for a full blown lobbying campaign began in earnest in 2002 and was spearheaded by the CNS, CM and a single-issue organization called Uruguayan Woman and Health (MYSU). It also had the continuous support of Woman Now (MA), PLEMUU, REPEM, and many other single-issue women’s organizations. Along with this organizing on the non-governmental side, the groups had the support of the BF who aided the women in circulating nation wide petitions to garner the signatures of abortion supporters, and introduced the abortion legislation and made sure that it was brought to a floor vote in both chambers. Hope ran high after the Chamber of Deputies approved the legislation in late 2002, but the bill was tabled in the Senate and did not pass in that legislative session. Currently, there is movement on the ground to introduce the bill again in the current legislative session, in which both houses are led by Progressive Encounter- Broad Front – New Majority majorities (hereafter Frente Amplio, FA). The Frente Amplio is a large coalition of left-leaning and socialist parties, thus there is hope that there is now enough support to secure passage of the bill, although the president of Uruguay, Tabaré Vazquez of the Frente Amplio, has vowed to veto any pro-abortion legislation that passes his desk.

Formally, GAMA supported the women’s organizations in their previous effort, and will do so again in the future. This is both because GAMA does in fact support the extension of choice over reproductive rights to women, and because GAMA like most
other single or multi-issue group in the country is an associated member of the CNS. Thus, whatever the CNS signs, all women’s groups sign, de facto. However, this formal support belies the real debate around health and reproductive rights that occurred when the issue first arose. GAMA had a specific vision for how the fight around health and reproductive rights should proceed and what the debate should include. Indeed, this was the case for many individual organizations. Individual organizations had their own hopes for what the abortion debate and legislation would include, as well as their own reasons for getting involved. For instance, Catholics for Choice were interested in analyzing the compatibility of a pro-choice position within a unified Catholic faith (Abracinskas 2004, 5).

GAMA’s suggestions were more difficult for the coalition to absorb. GAMA was concerned that a debate about reproductive rights include a focus on HIV/AIDS and its impact on the Afro-Uruguayan community, especially the transmittance of the disease from mother to child (Personal Interview, Alicia García – GAMA, 31 March 2005). It also wanted a discussion of nutrition and prenatal care for those mothers who wished to have their babies, specifically Afro-Uruguayan women (Personal Interview, Alicia García – GAMA, 31 March 2005). Finally GAMA, along with the Women’s Commission of the PIT-CNT (the largest trade union in the country) were concerned that there be a real emphasis on the population that would be most helped by the passage of a reproductive rights bill – the working or popular class (Personal Interview, Alicia García – GAMA, 31 March 2005; Personal Communication Nohelia Millán - PIT-CNT 15 March 2005). It is common knowledge in Uruguay that middle-class and upper-class women routinely have safe abortions through means not available to working class women due to lack of funds
(Abracinskas 2004; Htun 2003). This problem is compounded for afro-Uruguayan women because of their greater likelihood to be overrepresented in the popular classes. The result of botched illegal abortions for working class women could range from death to unpleasant hospital visits where reports of mistreatment were not uncommon.\footnote{La República de las Mujeres 3 October 2004, 6} These were GAMA’s major concerns and the issues that it wanted to see emphasized in the debate.

There were some other organizations willing to engage certain aspects of the issues about which GAMA was concerned. In fact, it had already been discussed and was widely agreed upon that the women’s groups (coordinating committee) had to be honest about the group for whom legalized abortion would be most important, working-class women. As I noted it is common knowledge in all circles that those who suffer the most from illegal abortion are not middle- and upper-class women who have the resources to obtain a safe abortion, wherever that source might be. Many of these same groups were also concerned about greater prenatal care and education for expectant mothers, so as to curb the problem of expectant mothers who drink, smoke, or indulge in any other types of activity that might have an adverse affect on the fetus.

The disagreement stemmed from two locations. One, there was very little support outside of GAMA to approach any of these issues from a raced perspective. For the coordinating groups, the class angle in this particular instance was clear. The race angle was not. In fact, even as they played up the class angle there was a sense that it could not be the only frame used, because there was a concern that to do so would leave people with the impression that illegal abortion is only a poor person’s problem (Personal...
Communication, Niki Johnson – CM, Academic, 12 April 2005). Hence, there was also a major focus on a tack that emphasized that in talking about the need for greater reproductive rights, one was really talking about helping his or her mother, sister, cousin, friend, or in the case of a woman, herself. Given this strategy it should come as no surprise that there was little support for a discussion of the impact of HIV/AIDS and its transmission from mothers to children. Although GAMA emphasized this from a raced and a more generally classed perspective, there was little interest in highlighting this concern as the coordinating committee sought to gain widespread support for the legislation by convincing Uruguayan citizens that reproductive rights is an issue that affects them all.

Again, rather than participate in a coalition around an issue to which it could not give its full support, GAMA chose to do its own work on the issue of health and reproductive rights. Its focus has been on creating more autonomous policlinics in neighborhoods where sizeable afro populations reside, in the hopes of dealing more directly with the needs of black women and their health (Personal Interview, Mirta da Silva (29 April 2005)

**Quotas**

In 2003, a major push occurred around the introduction of an affirmative action clause guaranteeing a specified amount of women’s representation. The plan was called the 50/50 initiative and called for a requirement that no more than 70 percent of any one sex be represented in any list. No clause regarding the placement of women on party lists was included, the rationale that the women of the Colorado party cited for their lack of
participation in the initiative. According to them because this clause did not exist the initiative would not help the party to increase the ranks of women in the interior of the country, where they really needed it.

Coalitions around this issue were more tense than on any other issue, because many groups and individuals had mixed feelings about whether this is the way that they wanted to increase women’s representation in parliament. There is a concern that to push an affirmative action solution to the low representation of women might be alienating, instead women’s ranks should be allowed to increase naturally. The public seemed to agree. Women’s groups were successful in forcing a direct vote referendum on the issue which was defeated by the public, including many of the women to whom feminist groups appealed to support the legislation. Still, others, notably the members of CM, REPEM, and the CNS, argue that to wait for parity to occur naturally is essentially to say that one is willing to wait until the year 2070, the first year in which that is a possibility (Sapriza 1998). “If they do not approve it, to wait for society, is to wait until the 21st, 22nd century to achieve parity, and why wait so long when there is something we can do about it now” (Personal Interview, Elena Fonseca, 16 March 2005, emphasis hers).

GAMA offered another position. First, while concerned about affirmative action measures for women, it was more concerned about affirmative action measures for afro-descendants. At the time only one person of African descent had ever been elected to Parliament, an afro-Uruguayan man, Edgardo Ortuño, and he was only an alternate. If

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79 Uruguay operates on a closed list system, with party leaders determinative of list placement. This system has become stronger since an electoral reform in 1996 meant to reduce factionalism came into effect.
80 Alternates (Suplentes) are those who hold lower positions on party lists- and function as stand ins for duly elected MPs when they cannot appear in Parliament. This responsibility can range from standing in for one day to assuming the parliamentary seat if the original MP is called to take on another government responsibility, such as a cabinet appointment. Edgardo Ortuño was elected as an MP in the last legislative elections, and remains the only person of afro descent to ever be elected to parliament.
GAMA was going to support any affirmative action measures it would be affirmative action for people of color.

However, GAMA highlights the importance of autonomy from government. Inserting women, black or white, in parliament was not a primary goal. Instead, GAMA wants to insert people of color, male and female, in various levels of the national and municipal government (Personal Interview, Claudia de los Santos, 22 July 2003). This shared policy between GAMA and OMA has in fact been in place since 1993 when GAMA became federated. The rationale is that to insert afro-descendents – preferably a male and female in each instance - at various levels of government will go much farther than political quotas in helping GAMA achieve its goals. This rationale is also reflected in the decentralization program taken up the municipal government of Montevideo in 1990. It would appear that this logic is sound, since what affirmative action success GAMA and OMA have achieved have come directly from the government and not as a result of lobbying parliament.81 This position also makes sense for GAMA and OMA, given that attitudes about afro-Uruguayans mean that they do not constitute a constituency that MPs look to capture. Hence unless the numbers of either race-sensitive MPs or afro-descendent MPs (regardless of gender) increased significantly, they see no reason to believe that an increase in the number of women in parliament would be particularly beneficial to the goals of GAMA, given the consistent ideological impasses between them and other autonomous women’s groups (Personal Interview, Beatriz Ramírez - GAMA, 19 April 2005).

81 Two of the biggest achievements, among others, have been the granting of municipally subsidized organization space with a long term lease for all of OMA, and a housing grant for the construction of 200 black female head of house apartments, 36 of which have been completed thus far.
Conclusion

I began with a review of the literature on the relationship between the practice of identity politics – as manifested in organizational ideology – and coalition formation, of which there are four. Ideology may partially impede coalitions, which result in short-lived, sporadic or problematic coalitions. Ideology may impede coalition possibilities entirely, such that they do not occur; or ideology may support coalition possibilities. Finally, it may be the case that ideology has no impact on coalition possibilities and an alternative mechanism is at work. In the Uruguayan case it appears that ideology is indeed a major impediment to coalition formation amongst otherwise like-minded women’s groups. In the twelve year period that I detail coalitions occurred around five major issue areas: International Women’s Day, the Beijing Conference, domestic violence, health and reproductive rights, and quota legislation. Within these five potential opportunities, coalitions between GAMA and other women’s groups were partially impeded in one case, with regards to International Women’s Day, or impeded altogether in the other cases.

Specifically, these coalition possibilities were partially or completely impeded because of ideological disagreements between GAMA and other women’s groups on how extant issues should be addressed. For GAMA any discussion of topics without the addition of race and class is pointless and counter to their mission. For many of the other groups, to focus on issues like race and class is the surest way to get bogged down in specificities and to ignore the larger issue.

I also considered two alternative explanations of coalition formation, resources and threat. I found that neither of these factors explained impeded coalitions in the
Uruguayan case. Uruguayan women’s groups have routinely come together in coalition over a multi-year period, even in more open political contexts and without the threat of a countermovement to compel an alliance. The resource levels of each group are fairly similar as well and do not appear to be a primary factor behind impeded coalitions. I have yet to consider the question of how identity might be used strategically to negotiate the outcomes that a group desires, specifically in the form of available political opportunities or political frames. I take up both of these questions in the next chapter.
Chapter Six: Strategic Concerns, Political Context, and Changing Political Opportunities

I. Introduction

How is identity used to negotiate the outcomes that an organization hopes to achieve? Thus far, I have argued that distinct ideological differences can form a major impediment to coalition formation amongst otherwise similarly oriented groups. In the Uruguayan case these ideological differences take the form of a contested understanding of the salience of race and class to gender organizing among otherwise similarly-oriented women’s groups. However, it is clear that collective identity groups use their identity in a variety of ways to achieve their desired outcomes. Moreover, while I find that ideology plays a large role in fostering or impeding coalition formation, empirical evidence highlights the role of other explanatory factors and their relationship to coalition formation. I have already considered alternative impediments to coalition formation, such as threat and resources. I now turn to the impact of political strategy. I use the term strategy to reflect the two most commonly invoked political tools, strategic framing and the use of favorable political opportunities. In this chapter I consider whether the use of political strategy influenced coalition formation outcomes. Specifically I consider whether strategic concerns operated in a manner distinct from ideological concerns, or in collusion with ideological concerns.

Political process and framing theories have been especially cogent in the argument that much of the relationship between identity politics and coalition formation is characterized by identity groups’ understanding of the ways in which the strategic deployment of identity can help them to realize their preferred outcomes, either through the use of strategic frames or favorable political opportunities (Bernstein 2005;
Both political process and framing theories have highlighted the question of how groups understand and interpret the nature of the political context and the favorability of available political opportunities at any given moment. Political process theories make claims that variations in political opportunities are the most important determinant of variations in collective action; that relevant variations in opportunity result primarily from the interaction of social movements with political actors and institutions; and that these variations are primarily structurally shaped (Koopmans 1999; Polletta 1999). This “objective” assessment of the political context and the favorability of political opportunities available to groups, along with social movement organizations’ ability to interpret those conditions as favorable, are considered the best indicator of movement mobilization around a particular issue (Polletta 1999; Meyer et. al 2002). Specifically, a group’s understanding of the exigencies of the political context will determine the specific frame(s) it chooses (Hathaway and Meyer 1997; McCammon and Campbell 2002). Framing theories, place a great deal of importance on groups’ interpretation of the political environment. A group’s interpretation of the political environment helps it to determine the degree to which a certain frame will resonate, e.g be successful in mobilizing participants or in gaining a desired outcome (Snow and Benford 1988; Munson 1999). Hence, the choice becomes a primarily strategic one, as social movement organizations seek to frame their demands, and the public face of their collective identities in the ways that they think will resonate the most (Oliver and Johnston 2000; Tarrow 1998).

To what extent did concerns about the resonance of a multi-raced and classed gender frame affect interaction among the five women’s groups that I cover here? In at
least one case - domestic violence - it is clear that ideological concerns were the primary cause of impeded coalition formation. To what extent did ideological and/or strategic concerns motivate coalition breakdowns in other issue areas? I revisit the other four coalition issue areas noted for the 1993-2005 period covered in chapter five: International Women’s Day; preparation for the Beijing Conference; women’s health (abortion) legislation; and the affirmative action push for gender quotas. In each case I detail the coalition effort’s preferred outcome(s), the coalition effort’s understanding of the frames required by the political context, and the availability of political opportunities, as stated in publicly circulated documents and personal interviews. I then consider the use of a strategic deployment of gender identity as based on these understandings. I follow with a brief discussion of changes in the external political environment or political opportunity structure that appear to have expanded the viability of multi-issue politics for identity groups in Uruguay.

II. Coalition Issues 1993-2005

1. International Women’s Day

As noted in chapter four, the proceedings surrounding the International Women’s Day march have been an annual site of struggle among mainstream women’s groups and GAMA. Each year the debate centers on the question of whether, as the CNS argues, International Women’s Day is a day for all women, despite their differences, to come together around the fight for women’s equality; or whether, as GAMA argues, International Women’s Day is a day for all women, because of their differences, to come together around the fight for women’s equality (CNS 1997, Celiberti 1997, Malvasio
Discourse about the march in the late 1990s centered on women’s full political participation, and the relationship between women’s status and the true degree of democratic consolidation. For instance, in 1997 the CNS issued the “Women citizens’ passport” which stated

I, full citizen of my country, cognizant of its Constitution and of the commitments signed at the IV UN World Conference on Women, which consecrated women’s rights as UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS, declare my inalienable right to have the right to... (CNS 1997, 1; emphasis in the original)

followed by a list of political, civil, and social rights. In a follow-up newspaper editorial the CNS noted “By widening the debate about the meaning of citizenship and raising issues of rights and accountability, the Follow-Up Committee aimed to contribute to ‘a richer and more plural conception of democracy’” (Celiberti 1997, 5). This mission was in keeping with the CNS’s original creation as “a body representing women” and its desire to maintain a “heterogeneous and open space” for women (CNS 1996).

Since the year 2000, an additional purpose of the Uruguayan International Women’s Day march has been to bring together women from a variety of different backgrounds and platforms to march together toward parliament. The women meet with the legislators of the Bancada Feminina (BF), and any other interested parties, to make their demands known for the year (Johnson 2002; Personal Interview Patricia Acosta - CNS 25 April 2005). The variety of women’s interests and demands are reflected by the diversity of placards carried in the march. For instance “Another Mercosur is possible, without discriminations and with social justice;” “No more outsourcing nor private enterprises. Equality of opportunities for everyone;” and “Enough of children without

82 Lilián Celiberti, cited in La República de las Mujeres. 2 March 1997, p. 5.
love, with hunger and with a future like ours” (La República de las Mujeres 16 March 2002, 4). This variety was even more apparent during the March 8th meeting of 2005. A sample of the first page of requests logged by the members of the BF include “Legislate pensions and psychological help for single mothers with handicapped dependents;” “Make known the Law of acoustic contamination and the hours of bars to the municipality of Rocha;” “A request to be received to discuss an unjust firing from school number 144;” “Better implementation of the Domestic Violence Law;” “Legislate that caretaking of the elderly and the handicapped should be bonus services;” “Make available emergency contraceptives and preventative treatment of HIV in cases of rape” (Bancada Feminina 2005, 1).

These are the requests of individual women, formalized women’s organizations, human rights organizations, and more. The lengthy examples above highlight both the variety of requests made and the largely symbolic nature of the March 8th parade. The parade does exactly what it is meant to do – reflect the diversity of women’s capabilities and experiences, and their desire for greater inclusion along with a more open conceptualization of the meaning of citizenship (Personal Interviews Patricia Acosta – CNS 25 April 2005; Elena Fonseca – CM 16 March 2005, Alicia García - GAMA 31 March 2005). Given the highly symbolic nature of the day and the fact that the CNS defines the purpose of the day in such open and plural terms, it is difficult to reconcile the CNS’ continuing resistance to the inclusion of GAMA’s specific platform with strategic concerns. Instead it appears that International Women’s Day is an example of the difficulty that some women’s groups have in shifting from a universalist platform to one that provides a space for a variety of diversities.
Planning for the IV U.N. World Conference on Women (Beijing) took place in the form of local, national, and regional pre-conference around the globe. In Uruguay, pre-planning began in 1993 with the construction of the Beijing Initiative Group, which included REPEM, CM, PLEMUU, among other single-issue women’s groups. With funding from the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), the Beijing Initiative Group undertook an analysis of women’s condition in Uruguay, and then held an open meeting with more than fifty women’s groups to discuss proposals for the Beijing conference (Johnson 2000). UNIFEM’s desire was that the women’s groups it funded would be invited to participate in the construction of their countries’ national action plans; however this would not be the case in Uruguay, where the government chose not to involve organized women’s groups in the drafting of its National Platform (Personal Interview Elena Fonseca - CM 23 July 2003). This did not dissuade women’s groups from working on their own plans. The coordinator of the Beijing Initiative Group noted

If these world conferences serve any purpose it is to promote – at national, regional or subregional levels – processes of reflection, the elaboration of plans of action, a stirring up of things internally, rather than to stake everything on the outcome of these conferences (Carmen Tornaría 1995, 7)

This language indicates that the Beijing Initiative Group understood their work to be concerned, primarily, with opening up a space for dialogue and deliberation among
women generally, and organized women’s groups specifically. This was an especially important task given the timing of the Beijing coordination efforts. After the breakdown of earlier women’s groups coalitions inspired by the early waves of democratic transition and the military immunity law, Uruguayan women’s groups went their separate ways. “By the beginning of the 1990s the women’s movement in Uruguay had entered into what participants most often referred to as a period of ‘decline’ (Johnson 2000). Remaining groups were fragmented and often in disagreement about the way forward, particularly as concerned questions of autonomy from government and strategies for a unified political identity. A number of women’s groups active at the time were somewhat suspicious of working with, or alongside, the state, and claimed a position of total autonomy in all aspects of organizational life. The result was that in the period from the late 1980s to the beginning of the 1993 preparations for Beijing there had been no coordinated efforts of any kind occurring among organized women’s groups in Uruguay. Hence, participants in the pre-conferences welcomed the chance to meet with one another, in some cases rekindling old ties or friendships, in other cases meeting for the first time, with the goal of creating a space for open dialogue and discussion (Personal Interviews Elena Fonseca - CM 16 March 2005, Iliana Pereyra - REPEM 29 March 2005).

The members of the Beijing Initiative Group reiterated this commitment after the conference while they solicited support for the creation of the Beijing National Follow-up Committee (CNS 1996). This would seem to indicate a kind of atmosphere and space for reflection that would be open to both a discussion of a unified women’s agenda, and a discussion of the needs of specific groups of women. However, the Beijing Initiative
The group chose in practice to function with a pre-defined agenda centered on a few basic themes: health, work, violence, education, poverty, and communications, creating a list of general demands that reflected a concern with speaking on behalf of all women (Johnson 2000). GAMA felt that this approach was overly limited and not reflective of its concerns as poor women of color and chose not to continue with the pre-planning meeting, or to travel to Beijing with the members of other women’s groups. Instead, the president of GAMA, Beatriz Ramírez traveled alone. This impasse is ironic given that the groups were preparing for the International Conference on Women, one of the first spaces to open a true dialogue about women’s universal needs as well as their specific needs based on their particular lived realities (Simpson 1996; Zinsser 2002). Beatriz Ramírez notes “In a way the World Conference of Women constitutes for us a historical instance, because it is the first time that we as black women wanted to insist on our inclusion as an important contingent of the population, we want to participate in the movement of women but we insist that they respect our specificities and our diversity” (Beatriz Ramírez 2006, 2).

Given the nature of the conference planning and both sides’ indications of their objectives going into the planning, it is difficult to accept that the split among GAMA and the other women’s groups was not primarily an ideological one. Again, I quote GAMA’s concern about the feminism of the Uruguayan women’s movement. “[Their] feminism makes an analysis from a class sector that has its own dynamics and interests and from a eurocentrist vision where we [black women] are not contemplated” (Beatriz Ramírez 2006, 1). The differential identity construction that occurred among distinct
sectors of Uruguayan women has had the effect of making a dialogue around different
types and understandings of gender discrimination quite difficult.

We have had to learn and understand that along with sex discrimination, women
are affected by other discriminations like class and socio-economic status, race,
and ethnicity. It is not that we were not aware of this before, but perhaps we did
not consider these themes as centrally as we might have (Personal Interview,
Iliana Pereyra 29 March 2005).

The salience of race and class to gender organizing remained unclear for many in the
mainstream women’s movement, particularly at this point in the early to mid 1990s.

3. Women’s Reproductive Health

    In 2002 the political context seemed ripe for the introduction of legislation
regarding women’s sexual and reproductive health; specifically legislation on women’s
right to an abortion up to the twelfth week of pregnancy by her free will. President Jorge
Batlle was of the more liberal Colorado Party, and he was the great grandnephew of the
José Batlle y Ordoñez, the great welfare-reform and protector of women’s rights
discussed in chapter three. Moreover, while no party held a majority of seats in either
chamber of the legislature the leftist coalition, New Space/Broad Front, held the largest
number of seats in both chambers.\footnote{The Broad Front coalition held 13 of the 33 senate seats and 42 of the 99 seats in the Chamber of Deputies in the 2000-2005 legislative period.} Hence, a positive vote for legislative
decriminalization of abortion would require that only a few Colorado party members vote
affirmatively; alternatively if female legislators were willing to support the legislation regardless of party affiliation this also could have been enough to sway the vote.\textsuperscript{84} Either way it seemed that the passage of legislation decriminalizing abortion was at least a real possibility.

The abortion legislation was drafted by a joint group called the National Coordination of Organizations for the Defense of Reproductive Health (CODRH) and the Parliamentary Women’s Bloc (BF).\textsuperscript{85} The major goal of the group was to introduce legislation decriminalizing abortion up to the first twelve weeks of pregnancy, with the decision do so made by the free will of the pregnant women. GAMA was in agreement with this provision, but had other specific concerns that it wanted to include as well. Specifically GAMA desired an inclusion on HIV and AIDS and reproductive health; a nutrition and prenatal care clause; and a strong emphasis on the importance of legal abortion for poor and working class women. Moreover, it wanted to see specific attention to the reproductive needs and concerns of women of color.

Some of these concerns were included in the final draft bill, specifically the nutrition and prenatal care clause. Article I of the draft bill states

\begin{quote}
The State will safeguard the right to conscientious and responsible procreation, recognizing the social value of maternity, responsible paternity, and the protection of human life. To these effects it will promote social and educational policies designed to promote reproductive health, to defend and promote sexual rights and to reduce maternal morbidity and mortality. These policies will seek to encourage
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{84} All of the parties chose to let legislators vote their own conscious on the subject of abortion.

\textsuperscript{85} The coordination included CM, the CNS, and other single-issue women’s health groups.
responsible sexual and reproductive behavior, with the aim of achieving more active involvement in family planning (Bill in Defense of Reproductive Health 2002)

Article II follows with specific mandate that the Ministry of Public Health include sex education and training of health professionals in its budget (Bill in Defense of Reproductive Health 2002). In regards to class status, a clause was included that required the medical doctor performing the abortion to notify any women requesting an abortion because of economic hardship of resources available to her (Article 5 Bill in Defense of Reproductive Health). Moreover, the abortion act was declared a medical act without commercial value that could not be denied because of economic hardship (Article 11 Bill in Defense of Reproductive Health). These articles reflected everyone’s concern that those without economic means not be made to suffer from an inability to afford an abortion; or from the consequences of botched abortion (Personal Interview Elena Fonseca - CM 16 March 2005). Everyone was aware that Uruguay’s otherwise perfectly acceptable public and private healthcare system, often failed women suffering the complications of a poorly performed abortion; the country ranks high on scales of maternal mortality due to this specific condition (La República de las Mujeres 3 October 2004, 6). The Coordination deemed that, beyond these provisions, it was not necessary or feasible to include the rest of GAMA’s demands; specifically its demand

86 This comment was made in conjunction with the announcement of new norms of assessment of maternal security, better known as norms of attention pre- and post-abortion. These norms arose from concerns that women suffering complications of botched abortions were not well attended in public and private hospitals, because of a sense that the women had brought the problem on themselves and did not deserve the same degree of attention as others (Personal Interview Niki Johnson 12 April 2005; La República de las Mujeres 2004, 6).
that abortion rights and sexual and reproductive rights be discussed from a raced angle. The Coordination and the BF felt that it was important that the debate around a topic as contentious as abortion be framed in a way that made it appear to be the concern of all people in a society, women and men. In fact, even as CODRH played up the class angle there was a sense that it could not be the only frame used, because of their concern that to do so would leave people with the impression that illegal abortion is only a poor person’s problem (Personal Interview, Niki Johnson – CM, Academic 12 April 2005). In particular, CODRH wanted to emphasize that the need for an abortion was something that could affect one’s mother, or sister, or friend, or one’s self “this is not the problem of just a certain kind of person, it is the problem of all of us” (Personal Interview Leticia Lázaro – MYSU 25 April 2005). Their desire was that “from a plurality of reasons, we generated a democratic action that was broad and concrete” (Lilián Abracinskas - MYSU March 2005). An unrelenting concern with the needs of specific sectors of women could undermine the broader goal of abortion legislation from which all women could benefit. In a reflection on the diversity of voices surrounding the draft bill and the legislative vote, Lilián Abracinskas affirmed

The analysis of gender also allows us study in depth situations of discrimination that occur within our own diverse groups. To the discriminations of being black, indigenous, young, old, poor, and or homosexuals is always added that of being a woman, intensifying still more the situation of discrimination. To make evident the power relations that occur between and among diversities is a good way to avoid, also, essentialist identities that impede any type of social or political accord
to advance in the construction of a more democratic society, that does not attempt
to homogenize people, but that does guarantee equality of positions to exercise
this diversity with equality of rights (Lilián Abracinskas 2004;
http://www.chasque.net/frontpage/comision/04noti028.htm).

Hence a combination of strategic and ideological concerns motivated the coordinating committee’s actions. As was the case in the past, there was an impasse over the importance of race within the coalition. GAMAs provisions on HIV and AIDS and a specific focus on abortion and black women were not welcomed in the CODRH coalition. This is reflected in Abracinskas’s note that diversity should be recognized, but not in a way that privileges essentialized identities or ignores an equality of positions (Abracinskas 2004).

The coalition breakdown occurred as result of a disagreement over the most appropriate frame. Even if GAMA were willing to ignore the race issue, it felt that class had to be a central part of the argument for reproductive rights. The CODRH did not disagree that class was a crucial component. However, the CODRH was convinced that its best chance at success was to adopt a universal frame. This required that it minimize the inclusion of components that would undermine the overall strategic frame - that abortion is the problem of everyone. To have included GAMA’s or any other specific sector of women’s demands was deemed to be clearly detrimental in this case. It appears that this was the right move for the coordinating committee. The abortion bill passed by the Chamber of Deputies but did not pass the Senate, where it failed by only three votes.
4. Gender Quotas

On March 8, 2003 (International Women’s Day) a contingent of women’s groups and the female legislators of the three major political parties (the members of the BF) announced that they would promote a law obliging the parties to include more women on lists for popular election. The Law of Political Participation, better known as the Quota Law, established that lists at the national, departmental, and party levels could not contain more than seventy percent of individuals of the same sex. The legislation also required that this norm would regulate the parties’ internal elections.

The CNS, REPEM, CM, and a number of other women’s groups formed a part of the coordinating committee along with the BF, and conducted publicity campaigns, seminars, conferences, and information sessions that preceded the legislative vote. The coordinating committee argued that parity was necessary now and not in 2070; the first year in which it would occur naturally. The committee adopted a frame in keeping with previous arguments that placed the quota law at the center of a debate that questions how fully consolidated a democratic system that does not provide mechanisms for women’s full formal and substantive political participation really is. Arguments for the quota law included “The incapacity to include half the citizenry in the democratic atmosphere is one of the gravest contradictions of democracy;” and “It is not a women’s concern, it is a question of democracy” (CNS 2004).

By this time GAMA had become a member of the CNS, and so supported the quota legislation by default. However, its support went no further than this and GAMA chose to bow out of any further coalition efforts surrounding the topic of quotas. GAMA felt quite simply that while increasing the representation of women in parliament might
be a positive step in general, it would do very little to further the specific aims of the Afro-Uruguayan Women’s Support Group, or the women of color that formed their primary constituency (Personal Interview Alicia García - GAMA 31 March 2005). Also, as noted in chapter five, while GAMA recognized that women were underrepresented in parliament, it noted that people of color were radically more underrepresented, as they constitute .01 percent of the current parliament, the largest number ever elected to the parliamentary body. However, GAMA has announced no plans or interest in pushing for an affirmative action quota for afro-Uruguayans either; instead it and OMA agree that the best way forward is to try to mainstream people of color in all levels of government (Personal Interview Beatriz Ramírez - GAMA 19 April 2005).

GAMA and OMA feel that race mainstreaming is the best way to get results and to deal with the specific electoral, political, and structural aspects of the Uruguayan political system that constrain minority involvement (Personal Interview Beatriz Ramírez - GAMA 19 April 2005, Personal Interview Alexander Silvera 23 March 2005). An increase in elected female members of parliament, is certainly welcome “but of course the legislature has a number of constraints on it; legislators must worry about re-election and cannot accomplish the things they promise when they first ran” (Personal Interview Beatriz Ramírez - GAMA 19 April 2005). Hence, GAMA questions the affirmative-action quota from an ideological standpoint as well, as it debates what is really the most positive way forward for a greater representation of underrepresented populations.

Again, it appears that GAMA’s motivation in bowing out of the coalition was both strategic and ideological. While the members of GAMA agreed that an affirmative action clause guaranteeing a minimal number of list places for women was a positive step
forward, they feel that it will make no real difference to them. “When we plant the theme that there is a determined, that there is a sector that is majority afro, they tell you about governmental policies that are ‘we are all equal,’ and this is true for men and women” (Personal Interview Alícia García - GAMA 31 March 2005). GAMA also argues that, while a legislatively based affirmative action policy could potentially have some positive repercussions, it is not necessarily the best way to invite a real change in the power of women, or people of color. Gender and/or racial mainstreaming is preferable, because of the difficulties legislators can face in getting legislation through parliament, especially legislation designed to impact specific sectors of the society. Alternatively, the placement of individuals within various levels of government, and especially at the executive and municipal levels is GAMA’s (and OMA’s) preferred strategy. Given the amount of legislation that originates from the president’s desk and the degree of his or her control over parliamentary agenda-setting, as well as the amount of legislation originating from the department of Montevideo, this appears to be a good strategy.

Ideologically, GAMA felt it could not give its support to a gender-based affirmative action plan would not result in any positive changes for afro-Uruguayan women. GAMA knew that afro-Uruguayan women’s specific position had not been, and likely would not be, contemplated even with the advent of greater female political representation (Personal Interview, Alicia García 31 March 2005).

The strategic disagreement between GAMA and the coordinating committee is what Benford (1993) refers to as an intra-movement frame dispute, or prognostic frame disputes. Prognostic frames disputes stem from disagreement over the construction of an alternate reality; they involve the question of how reality ought to be transformed.
Hence, while the coordinating committee advocates political quotas, GAMA emphasizes gender mainstreaming as the most expedient way to invite change.

III. 2005+: New Political Opportunities?

Whether for reasons of ideological and/or strategic concerns it is clear that multi-raced and classed coalitions have been difficult for Uruguayan women’s groups to achieve, particularly in the period from 1993-2005. One constant in these years is the continued influence of the two traditional parties, the Colorados and the Blancos. During this time either a Colorado or Blanco has controlled the presidency. Furthermore, although the leftist New Space/Broad Front (EP/FA) coalition gained the largest number of seats in the 2000-2005 period, it did not hold a majority of the legislative seats. Meanwhile the Colorados and Blancos continued their more recent tradition of uniting against the common enemy, the EP/FA, forming legislative coalitions whenever possible over the last few years (González 2003). However, on October 31, 2004 the leftist coalition made history in Uruguay, gaining the presidency and a solid majority of seats in both houses, in the first round of the elections. On March 1, 2005 President Tabaré Vázquez, was inaugurated into office, along with the EP/FA parliamentary majority.

Beyond their historical importance, these changes in the Uruguayan political context beg the question of the availability of new political opportunities for women’s Uruguayan women’s groups. Might these new aspects of the external political context foster coalitions where they might not otherwise occur? Or will politics, and resulting civil society actions, remain the same as usual?

87 When I refer to party based coalitions I mean to imply a more traditional definition of coalition as outcome-based coalitions of political expediency.
It is still quite early in the Vázquez administration; at the time of writing the administration’s time is less than half complete. Moreover, the administration signaled early on that it would focus almost all of its attention on the development and enaction of an Emergency Plan meant to help assuage the massive increase in the population that has fallen below the poverty line in the economic crisis of the last decade, and culminating with the harshness of the economic crisis of 2002-2003 (Vázquez 2005). By the year 2000 the percentage of individuals below the poverty line was almost 18 percent; in 2002 it had risen to 23.4 percent; and by 2003 it was more than 31 percent in 2003 (Beltrami 2004; Vázquez 2005). The greatest concern has been with the rapid increase in the number of children falling below the poverty line, which included 57 percent of children age 5 and under and 43 percent of children age 13 to 17 (Vázquez 2005). The government has promised that the Emergency Plan will remain its primary focus through the Spring of 2008, at which point it will unveil an Equity Plan that will carry it through the end of the term.88

Hence, the degree of the government’s concern with forwarding the agenda of organized women’s groups remains somewhat unclear. Early on in the new administration organized women’s groups and members of the BF signaled that they would reintroduce abortion legislation to the current parliament. Leftist leaning legislators are varied in their support for such legislation, including some female legislators of the EP/FA coalition who have indicated a no vote for abortion (Personal Interview Daniela Payssé (EP/FA) March 2005, Mónica Travieso (EP/FA 14 April 2005).

88 There is currently little information on the character or content of this plan. It will purportedly include greater social spending in a continuing fight to combat poverty and will be developed and made public over the coming months. The announcement of the plan was made to the media on January 9, 2007 (Observa 9 January 2007)
The same is true for the quota law, which organized women’s groups and members of the BF have also indicated will be reintroduced in the current presidential administration. In this case, the largest sector of the EP/FA coalition the Popular Participation Movement (MPP) has indicated its antipathy towards a quota law, which could mean a great degree of difficulty in passing such legislation in the current term [Personal Interviews Mónica Travieso (EP/FA and MPP member) 14 April 2005, Iván Posada (Independent Party) 13 April 2005).

However, President Vázquez has again made history by appointing the first avowed feminist, Carmen Beramendi, to head the state women’s agency.89 One of her first acts as director was to appoint the head of GAMA, Beatriz Ramírez as Secretary for Women of Afro-Descent in March of 2005. It appears this appointment has generated quite a bit of interest from organized women’s groups. Members of the CNS and CM and REPEM have all indicated a greater interest in and willingness to work with GAMA, and/or a more general attention to issues of diversity within their organizing (Personal Interviews Patricia Acosta - CNS 25 April 2005, Elena Fonseca – CM 16 March 2005, Iliana Pereyra - REPEM 29 March 2005). GAMA has also indicated a greater interest in cooperation with mainstream women’s groups (Personal Interviews Alicia García – GAMA 31 March 2005; Beatriz Ramírez 19 April 2005). For GAMA this increased interest is a part of the larger goal of the mainstreaming of black women through their placement of afro women in all levels of government and through greater interaction with other organized women’s groups. To achieve this goal GAMA adopted a new structure

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89 Previous directors of the state women’s agency, which was known as the National Institute of Women and the Family until 2005 when the name changed to the National Institute of Uruguayan Women, have been president’s wives or otherwise “safe” women who were chosen for the perception that they would not create a lot of chaos (Personal Interviews Lilian Abracinskas 14 March 2005, Lucy Garrido 14 April 2005).
in late 2003 and has implemented it over the last few years, beginning with an increase in the executive directorate to cover areas ranging from health to legal help to cultural projects. It followed with a successful petition to create an afro-themed unit for the rights of afro descendents (UTA) within the municipality of Montevideo in December of 2004; and the appointment of Beatriz Ramírez to the National Institute for Women (INAMU) as Secretary for Women of Afro-Descent in March of 2005.

Since the appointment of Beatriz Ramírez interaction between GAMA and other women’s groups has clearly increased, especially in the form of talks, seminars, and conferences. Members of the CNS, CM, and REPEM attended the celebration for International Day for Afro-Latina and Afro-Caribbean women for the first time ever. The theme of the celebration hosted by GAMA was “Afro-Uruguayan women in movement from invisibility to visibility;” members of all three organizations not only attended but participated in the program, with short speeches made by each affirming the need for more attention to diversity within the programs of the women’s movement.

Interaction between REPEM and GAMA has been particularly noticeable; and began even earlier than the appointment of Beatriz Ramírez to INAMU. Instead, this cooperation came about as a result of REPEM’s attendance at the World Conference Against Racism in Durban, South Africa in 2001. Particularly as a result of its experience there, REPEM began to rethink some of its goals, as reflected by the name change of one of its most important programs. In 1989 REPEM Uruguay launched a “No Sexist Education” campaign which continues year-round and culminated in “No Sexist Education” day every June 21st.
But we realized that a day for non-sexist education had a connotation that really took only one type of discrimination, gender discrimination. After [Durban] we changed to ‘No Discrimination in Education Day’, but we realized that even that was not targeted enough, and now we have changed to ‘Inclusion in Education Day’ (Personal Interview Iliana Pereyra - REPEM 29 March 2005).

REPEM also launched a campaign geared towards training women in micro and macro-economics, with an aim towards helping them to obtain small business loans to support themselves and their families without the necessity of depending on a man or the government. This program began in the mid 1990s and has since developed into a massive regional program involving regional, local, and international NGOs. REPEM’s shift towards a greater class focus along with its increasing concern with theorizing diversity within the women’s movement has meant a great deal of interaction between it and GAMA in the last few years, especially around the area of small business training. With REPEM’s help GAMA was able to mount a micro-training program and a women’s crafts store within the multi-cultural complex where it resides.

It remains unclear just how much either GAMA or other mainstream women’s groups are willing to shift from their general positions on the question of a primarily universal gender frame vs. one that consistently recognizes the needs of specific sectors of women. Interaction between GAMA and mainstream women’s groups has been mostly symbolic thus far, although this is certainly a step forward from recent years when even that basic degree of interaction was lacking. Moreover, the relationship between GAMA and REPEM, while quite positive, does not require the same degree of consensus
that a coalition like those around abortion or quota or domestic violence legislation does. Thus far there has been no evidence of a change in position on these issues from either GAMA or the other women’s groups. The BF has reintroduced the abortion bill to the legislature in June of 2006, where it remains under committee in the Chamber of Deputies. The character of the campaign has changed very little since the previous fight and the language of the draft bill remains the same (CNS 2007). The CODRH feels that it has a valid argument for abortion and that this will prevail (Personal Communication Lilian Abracinskas August 2006). Meanwhile GAMA has not indicated any change of position in its feelings about the character of the draft bill and has not increased its support or lobbying this time around (Personal Communication Alicia García August 2006).

Nonetheless, both sides seem to appreciate the multiple political opportunities that have become available to them as a result of changes in the national and international political context. The increased interaction between the groups supports the theory that new political opportunities can increase the likelihood of coalition formation where it might not otherwise exist. What remains to be seen is how far this new relationship will go. As Koopmans (1999) argues, political opportunities leave ample room for cultural factors and agency. It is likely that the debate over universalism vs. diversity will continue into the foreseeable future, until such time as the question of diversity becomes a part of a larger debate in Uruguayan society. Differential gender constructions that took years to create cannot be dismantled overnight; nor can they be eradicated by only a small sector of society. Only when the society-at-large takes up the question of the diversity within its population might this situation be fully reconciled.
Chapter Seven: Conclusion – Identity, Ideology, and Strategy Combine

I. Overview

In this chapter I revisit the purpose of the study and summarize my findings. I argued that identity is constructed differentially for women along the lines of race and class. This differential identity construction leads to a divergence in the ideology or worldview of later organized women’s groups, and frequently impedes coalitions among otherwise similarly oriented women’s groups. The evidence supports this theory and also highlights the role of political strategy, which can act separately from or in collusion with collective identity construction, particularly as is typified through ideological differences. I offer an updated causal sequence that reflects this reality. I continue on with an overview of the shortcomings of this research and future research plans. Finally, I consider the normative question of this dissertation. That is, what might be done to make groups more likely to coalesce?

II. Purpose of the Study

I began this dissertation seeking an answer to a very specific question: Why weren’t multi-racial gender coalitions occurring among similarly oriented women’s groups in Uruguay? This lack of interaction was quite puzzling to me, given that coalitions appeared to be frequent among most women’s groups; and given that race—which is supposedly of little or no import – appeared to divide one women’s group from the others.

This puzzle led me to a more general version of the question motivating this research project. That is, how is identity constructed and understood, and what can this
tell us about a question that has intrigued social scientists since at least the 1960s; why is identity deployed in the way that it is and what patterns might we observe. My research objective in this dissertation was to specify the relationship between identity politics and coalition politics. I wanted to go beyond the generally accepted position that identity politics impacts coalition politics - often in a negative way – to investigate how identity politics act upon coalition politics, and in what ways identity matters. Some studies that have focused on the conditions under which coalitions form have noted the role of ideology, especially the role of ideological differences, in affecting the likelihood of coalition formation, but this discovery has often been considered tangential to other, more frequently invoked explanatory variables, particularly resources and threat. Due to the lack I chose to conduct an exploratory case study to aid me in my research objectives, the first of which was to add an empirical case study to a largely theoretical literature on identity politics and coalition politics. I also used this empirical case to make a theoretical contribution, in the form of a specification of the causal chain linking identity politics and coalition politics. I found that a differential identity construction frequently leads to a divergence in ideology among collective identity groups. The consequence of this ideological divergence is a reduction in coalition possibilities for otherwise similarly oriented women’s groups. This finding is a key contribution to the literature on coalition formation; as noted earlier (in the dissertation) a number of theorists have argued that identity politics can have a negative impact on coalition possibilities, but very few have gone deeper in asking why this is the case, or how identity politics come to be practiced in specific ways. Yet, as more specific information about the contextual nature of differential identity construction can act as a guide in thinking about a number of the
ramifications of the practice of identity politics (deployment) in all of its forms, e.g. the ways in which it may have a negative or positive impact; as well as what guides identity salience. That is, why do some identities become politicized while others do not?

Knowledge about the contextual nature of differential identity construction draws attention to patterns in the way identity is practiced or deployed. I return to this point later.

III. Revisiting the Causal Sequence: Summary of Findings

Chapter Three introduced the theoretical paradigm that guided this dissertation. I selected a combination of new social movement, structural-political, and social-constructionist/post-modernist theories for their emphasis of distinct aspects of identity and coalition politics. These theoretical approaches highlighted distinct factors such as: the internal creation of collective identity, the construction and maintenance of boundaries, and the role of ideology, threat, resources, framing, and political opportunities. My goal in this dissertation was to focus on the cultural and discursive aspects of the relationship between identity politics and coalition politics. Hence I began with a theoretical paradigm that highlighted variables such as the historical construction of identity, boundary formation, and ideology as they bear on the practice of identity politics; and consider structural-political variables as alternative explanations. I identified the causal sequence diagrammed below
The causal sequence orders the processes of general identity construction and collective identity construction as they bear on identity deployment or the practice of identity. I traced the parts of the causal sequence in chapters four and five, and considered alternative explanations in chapters five and six. I summarize them here.

Chapter four focused on the process of general identity construction as it proceeds through the stages of naming, negotiation, and appropriation. These three stages specifies the how of identity construction as it occurs among large groups. I began with the question of how gender identity is constructed differentially among women and what this has meant for their political development and practice. I traced the parallel identity construction of the women and the nation, employing a framework of womanhood and citizenship to investigate how groups of women, such as elite and middle-class women; black women; gaucha/mestiza women; and women of the popular class came to be. I investigated how their identities shifted over time; and their responses to the elites, the state, and, occasionally, to one another. I found that national identity construction in post-independence Uruguay affected distinct groups of women in different ways,
marginalizing or extolling them based on the degree to which they met or matched the dominant perspective of the ideal woman at different points in time. Moreover, this differential identity construction set the stage for distinct approaches to mobilization in the first part of the twentieth century. 

Chapter five continued with the question of identity construction and its repercussions, emphasizing the second and third portions of the causal chain. It focused on the construction of collective identity through the construction of boundaries and, especially, of ideology; and their impact on the deployment of identity, in this case, each organization’s propensity for multi-racial coalition formation. I hypothesized that each organization’s stance on the salience of race and/or class to gender organizing would play a large role in the likelihood of coalition formation. I synthesized the four most commonly theorized relationships between identity politics and coalition politics: that identity politics impedes coalition formation, either partially or completely; that identity politics fosters coalition formation; or that there is no relationship between identity politics and coalition politics. The supposition that identity politics somehow fosters or impedes coalition politics requires a specification of how identity politics function, e.g. how do identity politics act upon coalition formation. I argued that identity politics functioned on the basis of ideology. That is, ideology helps to determine a group’s goals, interests, and actions. I considered these hypotheses over five sets of issue areas and found that ideological disagreements completely or partially impeded multi-racial and class coalition formation in all five cases. I also considered two consistently highlighted alternative explanations of coalition formation: resources and threat. I did not find any evidence that unequal resource levels or external threats affected coalition propensity.
among Uruguayan women’s groups. I found that resource levels were fairly equal among the multi-issue groups I analyzed and that coalitions were quite common over a twelve year period, even at points where the political context seemed promising.

Chapter six, considered a third alternative explanation, the role of political strategy and its impact on coalition formation. I used the term strategy to reflect the two most commonly invoked political tools, strategic framing and the use of favorable political opportunities. In this chapter I consider whether the use of political strategy influenced coalition formation outcomes. Specifically I considered whether strategic concerns operated in a manner distinct from ideological concerns, or in collusion with ideological concerns. I revisited the five issue areas covered in chapter five and considered the use of a strategic deployment of identity, and followed with a brief discussion of changes in the external political environment or political opportunity structure that appear to have expanded the viability of multi-issue politics for identity groups in Uruguay.

Ideological disagreements remained the primary factor behind coalition breakdown in three cases: domestic violence, international women’s day, and the Beijing conference. In two other cases - women’s reproductive health and political quotas – it appears that a combination of ideological and strategic concerns motivated coalition breakdown. The women’s reproductive health coalition effort was stymied, in part, because of a racial impasse between GAMA and the CODRH, specifically they disagreed on the extent to which, and the way in which, diversity should be recognized such it did undermine the larger goal of the coalition – unified abortion legislation. There was also an impasse over the most appropriate frame. GAMA insisted that, at the very least, the
class angle should central to the coalition’s argument; the CODRH did not disagree that a consideration of class was important, but it felt that the best chance for success lay in adopting a more universal frame.

The political quota coalition was also stymied because of an ideological and strategic impasse between GAMA and the coordinating committee. Ideologically GAMA felt that a gender quota law was useless to black women, thus while GAMA would not hinder the coalition effort it would not support the coalition either. Moreover, there was a prognostic framing dispute over what is the best way forward for gender equality. GAMA argues that gender and racial mainstreaming is preferable; while the coordinating committee maintained a sole focus on affirmative action.

Finally, new political opportunities appear to have fostered interaction where it did not occur previously. Since Beatriz Ramírez’s appointment to the INAMU interaction between GAMA and other women’s groups has clearly increased, especially in the form of talks, seminars, and conferences. Interaction among GAMA and REPEM has been especially noticeable. Moreover, this interaction began prior to the change in government. Instead, this relationship stems from GAMA and REPEM’s shared class and diversity focus. REPEM credits its increased interest in diversity to its participation in the 2001 World Conference against Racism.

IV. An Updated Causal Sequence

Hence, differential collective identity construction, especially in the form of ideological differences, led to impeded coalition formation in a number of cases. However, as chapter six makes clear, ideological differences are not the only determining
factor. Political strategy may also impede coalitions. In particular, disagreements over the most effective frame act had the direct result of impeded coalition formation.

However, political strategy can also foster coalitions. It is especially interesting to note that this relationship goes two ways. In one case there appears to be a strategic use of available political opportunities. The president of GAMA was appointed to the National Women’ Institute and women’s groups that had previously ignored GAMA now appear to have a greater interest in recognizing diversity. This would seem to debunk the conclusion that ideology has a direct impact on coalition formation. Nonetheless, interaction between these groups remains mostly symbolic thus far, even in the face of greater state recognition of racial diversity.

Again, it appears that strategic and ideological factors are working in combination with one another. Organized women’s groups’ recognition of an increased interest in racial diversity makes them more interested in interaction with GAMA, but not to the extent that it compromises the goal of gender equality for all women. Oppositely, GAMA’s focus on mainstreaming and its concomitant recognition that it might be more proactive in finding points of agreement with other women’s groups, makes it more interested in interaction with other organized women’s groups, but not to the extent that it compromises the goal of full equality for black women.

Finally, the relationship between GAMA and REPEM highlights that political opportunities can increase coalition formation in a different way. REPEM’s increased emphasis on racial diversity does not point to a strategic consideration. Instead, it appears that an ideological updating has occurred. Its participation in the World Conference against Racism has pushed it to reconsider its original ideological stance, and
to open its boundaries somewhat. This change serves as a perfect example of some identity theorists’ argument that identity politics are not necessarily bad for coalition; instead it is a question of how they are understood and managed.

These findings lead me to an updated causal sequence, which is diagrammed below.

**Figure 2. Updated Causal Sequence**

![Diagram of updated causal sequence]

Political strategy, in the form of framing disputes and political opportunity, can have a mixed effect on the deployment or practice of identity. In some cases political strategy operates distinct from collective identity construction. In other cases it may mitigate the effects of collective identity construction such as it did for GAMA and organized women’s groups like the CNS and CM. Or it may motivate groups to update, or reconstruct, their collective identity orientations, such as was the case for REPEM.
V. Future Research and Shortcomings

The updated causal sequence that I offer above is the culmination of this dissertation project. I sought to conduct a theory building case study that would result in the specification of the relationship between identity politics and coalition politics, through identification of a causal sequence. That sequence is diagrammed above. However, this project is not without its shortcomings. In particular, this dissertation project suffers from a lack of generalizability and inability to determine the significance of the major explanatory factors. These problems are embedded in the methodological approach that I chose. That is, process-tracing is a method best suited to middle-level theorizing that may then be applied to greater and greater numbers of cases, ideally through the use of mixed-methods approaches. It is not suited to generalizability beyond a few cases. Another shortcoming of this dissertation is that I can say nothing about the weight of the major explanatory factors. Unlike statistical analyses I cannot determine the significance of ideological differences, or political strategy. Again, this is a problem of the methodological approach that I chose. However my goal was to formulate a theory of an underspecified relationship between two variables, and through the use of a combined narrative analysis and process-tracing approach I have accomplished that goal.90 What remains now is to apply my theoretical finding to a greater number of cases, such that issues of generalizability, statistical significance, and spuriousness might be resolved.

Again, one of the purposes of process-tracing is to specify new theory that may then be applied more widely. This may occur through the direct application of theoretical insights gained from case study analyses to mixed-methods approaches, such as rational

90 I remind the reader that narrative analysis is a type of process-tracing.
choice modeling and statistical approaches. Alternatively, the theoretical insights gained from a single case study may then be applied to a greater number of case studies within qualitative methodological approaches. As I mentioned in Chapter One, Uruguay may or may not be a “typical” case. Hence, in future research I plan to add between two and three countries to the research design so that I can create an explanatory typology of the relationship between identity politics and coalition politics. Explanatory typologies accomplish two important goals. First they can capture interaction among the variables of interest because the number of cases remains small enough that diverse variables can be traced through distinct country contexts. Second, explanatory typologies allow for equifinality, or the specification of conjunctural conditions under which some outcome will occur. Again, because the number of cases is typically more than one, but less than five, exploration of variable interactions through distinct contexts remains a manageable enterprise. Moreover, the results of typological theory are less likely to be spurious or overly specific to one national context. Thus they add directly to the expansion of middle-level theorizing, and can potentially add to the expansion of statistical theorizing.

VI. Summary

This dissertation accomplishes a number of goals. It adds an empirical case to a largely theoretical literature on the nature of the relationship between identity politics and coalition politics. It includes an analysis of the historical processes by which identities arise as a first step towards an understanding of how and why identity is deployed in specific ways. Most important is the theoretical contribution. This dissertation adds to the literature on the conditions under which coalitions occur through the identification of
a causal sequence that specifies the nature of the relationship between identity politics and coalition politics. I found that ideological differences frequently impede coalition possibilities. Moreover, I found that political strategy can have a direct impact on coalition formation as well, where it may function separate from, or in collusion with ideological differences. As I mentioned I began this dissertation with the question of why multi-racial gender coalitions were not occurring among organized women’s groups. This question is of theoretical interest because it raises the question of how identity is constructed and deployed. This question also highlights a normative concern: what can be done to make groups more likely to interact? This is the question to which I turn now.

VII. Bridging

Identity politics frequently impede coalitions. In this dissertation project I found that identity politics impeded multi-racial gender coalitions over a variety of issues. This is problematic for a number of people. First, if the strength in numbers effect really holds true, then anything less than the most broad-based coalition possible is retarding organizational effort. Impeded coalitions are also problematic from a normative point of view. For groups who claim a primary concern with eradicating discrimination on all levels, an inability to come together around that very issue is problematic and raises the question of whether they are really serving the communities on whose behalf they profess to work. Where universal claims to serve are not accompanied by universal attempts to serve, controversy is the result. At an individual level when a person does not do what she claims to do, our reaction is mistrust, and the result is often a disassociation in the form of a break-up, a firing, or some other penalty. At the electoral level politicians are
held accountable for their failed mandates, and reprimands can include loss of office. At the level of civil society this disconnect provokes the question of “for whom do you really speak? To whom are you accountable?”

Whether the concern over impeded coalitions proceeds from a concern that success is less likely with smaller alliances, or a concern that groups are not as representative as they claim, the question remains the same. What might be done to make groups more likely to coalesce? How can we assure that groups do not get bogged down in divisions to the point that coalition becomes impossible? This is essentially a take on the question of how we can best manage the practice of identity politics, since we know that they are here to stay. A number of feminist scholars have suggested that groups engage in what I label a bridging process. This is the idea that groups, or individuals, make a conscientious effort to find or to create ties that bond them; ties from which they can create partnerships that allow for continued interaction among them. This idea has been prevalent in some feminist scholarship since at least the early 1980s, e.g. around the same time that women of color began to make calls for the women’s movement to think seriously about intersectionality and its relationship to the movement.

The basic logic behind the idea of bridging is that a common ground should be sought and built, not assumed a priori. This challenge holds for everyone, even groups or individuals for whom there is already an assumed pre-existing tie. For instance, Anzaldúa and Moraga (1983, 105) affirmed “It is critical now that Third World feminists begin to speak directly to the specific issues that separate us. We cannot afford to throw ourselves haphazardly under the rubric of ‘Third World Feminism’ only to discover later that there are serious differences between us.” Chandra Talpade Mohanty echoed this
idea when she suggested the creation of an imagined third world community based on “collaborations across divisive boundaries” (1991, 4). Essentially, a bridging model assumes that there is no basis for coalition in and of itself. This basis must be created and continuously recreated, and it cannot be color or sex or class based, for anyone. This is an important point, because a cursory reading would leave the impression that minority groups, in particular, should stay away from the presumption of alliance based on shared minority characteristics, and division with those who do not share those characteristics. This is certainly true. But, it is just as true that those in majority do not assume solidarity based on unexamined perceptions of the ways in which race, class, and gender function in their lives. For instance, Joan Scott (1998) highlights the unexpected alliances drawn between white women and black women working in California domestic violence shelters. She tells of two instances of black women who formed unexpected bonds with white co-workers, bonds that were tighter than those they shared with black co-workers.

But the connections between Renee and Andi, or Eleanor and Marty, were not given. Rather they were constructed in the day-to-day work in a rape crisis center and a battered women’s shelter. Through dialogue and persistent effort, both Renee and Eleanor felt that they were able to build up trust with Andi and Marty, respectively, despite the apparent racial divide between them (Scott 1998, 421).
Scott also affirms

Such moments reveal the contingency of all alliances and provide hope for unexpected bonds based sometimes on other aspects of identity, but ideally based on the chosen political links of which Mohanty speaks. These alliances draw on and incorporate the crucial difference made by race and ethnicity (or other identities), without reifying that difference, or constructing it as the grounds for absolute sameness and consistent unity. (Scott 1998, 421)

These quotes highlight both the need for a bridging paradigm and the difficulties that are associated with it. For even within calls for the creation of a common ground, there is often the implicit assumption that essentialism is only the purview of minority groups. But we are all prone to essentialism and it is only when we recognize that and interrogate the sources of our beliefs that we can truly come together in creating radical alliances. A “true” bridging paradigm does not require only that women of color be willing to make broader alliances; it requires that everyone recognize that to “other oneself, to recognize fluid and multiple locations and split affinities, is critical for building multiracial and multiethnic feminist solidarity (Breines 2002, 1126).

I highlight the idea of bridging because it is a good way for us to think about how coalition work can proceed in a way that assures the most broad-based alliances possible. For those of us, and I include myself here, who do see a value in promoting broad-based radical alliances, bridging appears to be the most promising tool available. However, the way the process is described might make it seem daunting at best and totally unrealistic at
worst. Is it reasonable to expect that groups will begin a new bridging process each and
every time they seek to work on an issue? Barvosa-Carter (2001) indicates just how time
consuming this process can be. She argues that bridging must occur at two levels: the
interpersonal level and the structural level. Just the interpersonal level requires three
distinct steps:

1) recognition and acknowledgement of an individual’s experiential differences
and identities that result from social categorization; 2) the parties involved need to
conduct an honest appraisal of how privilege based on gender, race, class,
sexuality, age or other factors is played out in the specific relationship or alliance;
and 3) parties need to find a common ground by accepting and honoring those
perspectives, experiences, and insights that are shared between them and search
for points of commonality that go beyond merely strategic considerations for
accomplishing something (Barvosa-Carter as quoted in Bystydzienski and
Schacht 2001, 9; emphasis mine)

If all of this is required just to solidify the alliance, one wonders at what point groups can
shift focus to accomplishing the specific outcome that the coalition set out to achieve?

Yet, bridging can, and often does proceed at a more basic level. The relationship
between GAMA and REPEM highlights this point. In fact, I argue that the alliance
between them bridges the divide between ideology and strategy quite nicely. The
common ground on which their alliance rests is partly strategic. REPEM has something
to offer and GAMA is taking advantage of it. But there is also an ideological basis which
binds them. Both care deeply about empowering women in a way that makes them dependent on no one but themselves, and once that common concern became clear to both sides, alliance work proceeded where it had not previously. To speak in the language of bridging, the identities that both sides have prioritized for this coalition effort are those of gender and class. A simple gender bond was not enough. REPEM had to shift from an organization concerned primarily with gender. GAMA had to shift from an organization that claims a primary concern with race, class, and gender, but that sometimes functions in a way that subsumes class to race. This is the way that bridging functions in the real world. It is the way that it must function if it is to be useful as a widespread tool for creating coalitions among diverse groups.
### Appendix A: Population Statistics

Table 3. Contemporary Afro-Latino Population Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Afro-Population Estimate</th>
<th>Total Country Population</th>
<th>Afros as Percentage of Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina*</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>39.9 million</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>7.9 million</td>
<td>158,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>158 million</td>
<td>73 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>33 million</td>
<td>10 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3.3 million</td>
<td>66,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>10.5 million</td>
<td>3.6 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>7.7 million</td>
<td>7 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador*</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>11.6 million</td>
<td>550,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador*</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>6.8 million</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala*</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>12.3 million</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>5.6 million</td>
<td>112,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>90 million</td>
<td>450,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>4.6 million</td>
<td>599,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>2.5 million</td>
<td>350,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>4.6 million</td>
<td>162,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>23 million</td>
<td>1.1 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rico</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>3.5 million</td>
<td>805,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay*</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>3.1 million</td>
<td>164,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>21 million</td>
<td>3.1 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Population figures taken from CIA WorldFactBook Online 2006
91 Afro-population figures come from Ribando 2005.
92 Afro-population figures come from Uruguayan National Statistics Institute; Encuesta de Hogares 1998
Table 4. Early Nineteenth-Century Afro-Uruguayan Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1810</th>
<th>1819</th>
<th>1829</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 5. Population Statistics: Cabildo of Montevideo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race of Persons</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Indigenous</th>
<th>Unspecified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1778</td>
<td>4,280</td>
<td>2,903</td>
<td>1,304</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1803</td>
<td>4,676</td>
<td>3,033</td>
<td>1,040</td>
<td>603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Cabildo of Montevideo statistics cited in Pereda Valdes 1943.
Note: Native Uruguayans were generally nomads, and thus would not have been numerous within the urban confines of Montevideo. Indigenous estimates outside of Montevideo vary from 600 to 3000 (Antón 1994)

Table 6: Population Statistics: Archivo Histórico Nacional

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Indigenous</th>
<th>Unspecified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1781</td>
<td>10,223</td>
<td>7,272</td>
<td>2,653</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>.007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Archivo Histórico Nacional cited in Pereda Valdes 1943
Note: Native Uruguayans were generally nomads, and thus would not have been numerous within the urban confines of Montevideo. Indigenous estimates outside of Montevideo vary from 600 to 3000 (Antón 1994)
### Table 7. Black Population Breakdown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>Free</th>
<th>Slave</th>
<th>Unspecified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1778</td>
<td>1304</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1781</td>
<td>2653</td>
<td>1186</td>
<td>1467</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1803</td>
<td>1040</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>899</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>86.4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Cabildo of Montevideo and Archivo Histórico Nacional cited in Pereda Valdes 1943

### Table 8. Population Statistics and European Immigration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>Immigrant</th>
<th>Unspecified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1835</td>
<td>128,371</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>4,880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1852</td>
<td>131,969</td>
<td>28,586</td>
<td>35,845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860</td>
<td>223,238</td>
<td>41,217</td>
<td>832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>915,647</td>
<td>149,757</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>1,042,686</td>
<td>133,255</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Apuntes Estadisticos del Dr. Andrés Lamas, cited in Arteagra and Puiggrós 1990 and Narancio and Capurro 1939.

Note: Dr. Andrés Lamas was not a statistician but the chief of police of Montevideo. Most scholars doubt his numbers, but they are all that are available (See Narancia and Capurro 1939 and Rial Roade 1983 for more discussion of this topic).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA</th>
<th>TOTAL (thousands)</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Indigenous</th>
<th>Yellow</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2,790,600</td>
<td>2,602,200</td>
<td>164,200</td>
<td>12,100</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>93.2</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montevideo</td>
<td>1,337,100</td>
<td>1,248,700</td>
<td>78,000</td>
<td>5,200</td>
<td>5,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>93.4</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Interior</td>
<td>1,453,500</td>
<td>1,353,500</td>
<td>86,300</td>
<td>6,900</td>
<td>6,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>93.1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National Statistics Institute, 1998 Encuesta Continua de Hogares
Appendix B: Organizational Abbreviations

Alianza  Women’s Alliance (Alianza Feminina)
BF      Women’s Bench (Bancada Feminina)
CM      Everyday Woman (Cotidiano Mujer)
CNS     Beijing Follow-up Committee (Comisión Nacional de Seguimiento)
CODRH   National Coordination of Organizations for the Defense of Reproductive Health (Coordinación Nacional por la Defensa de la Salud Reproductiva)
Conamu  National Women’s Commission (Consejo Nacional de Mujeres)
EP/FA   Progressive Encounter/Broad Front (Encuentro Progresista/Frente Amplio)
GAMA    Afro-Uruguayan Women’s Support Group (Grupo de Apoyo a la Mujer Afrouruguaya)
GRECMU  Study Group on Women’s Status in Uruguay (Grupo de Estudios sobre la Condición de la Mujer Uruguaya)
INAMU   National Women’s Institute (Instituto Nacional de la Mujer)
INFM    National Institute for Women and the Family (Instituto Nacional de la Mujer y la Familia)
MYSU    Women and Health in Uruguay (Mujer y Salud en Uruguay)
OMA     Black World Organizations (Organizaciones Mundo Afro)
PAN     Black Autochthonous Party (Partido Autóctono Negro)
PC      Colorado Party (Partido Colorado)
PIT     Inter-Union Worker’s Plenary (Plenario Intersindical de Trabajadores)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PLEMUU</td>
<td>Uruguayan Women’s Plenary (Plenario de Mujeres Uruguayas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PN</td>
<td>National (Blanco) Party (Partido Nacional)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPEM</td>
<td>Women’s Popular Education Network (Red de Educación Popular Entre Mujeres)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tupamaros</td>
<td>Tupamaros National Liberation Movement (Movimiento Nacional de Liberación Tupamaro)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFEM</td>
<td>United Nations Development Fund for Women</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C: Interviews by Organization

Afro-Uruguayan Women’s Support Group (GAMA)

2. Beatriz Ramírez, President; 10 July 2002, 17 July 2003; 19 April 2005

Black World Organizations (OMA)

1. Romero Rodríguez; President 8 July 2003

Broad Front Coalition (EP/FA)

1. Moriana Hernandez; Assistant to Margarita Percovich EP/FA Deputy in 2003; 23 July 2003
2. Edgardo Ortuño; EP/FA Suplente in 2003; 17 August 2003
3. Daniela Payssé; EP/FA Deputy; March 2005

Colorado Party (PC)

1. Washington Abdala; Colorado Party Deputy; March 2005
Everyday Woman (CM)

1. Lilián Celiberti, Treasurer 17 March 2005
3. Lucy Garrido; CM Directive 14 March 2005

Inter-Union Worker’s Plenary- National Worker’s Convention (PIT-CNT)

1. Nohelia Millán; Women’s Division 15 March 2005

National Beijing Follow-up Committee (CNS)

1. Patricia Acosta; Assistant to the Director; 25 April 2005
2. Lilián Abracinskas; Director; March 2005

National Party (PN)

1. Beatriz Argimón, National Party Deputy; 31 March 2005

Other

1. Niki Johnson; Academic 12 April 2005
2. Jill Foster; Academic 15 July 2003
3. Iván Posada; Member of Parliament, Independent 13 April 2005

Women and Health in Uruguay (MYSU)

1. Lilián Abracinskas; Director, March 2005; August 2006
2. Leticia Lázaro; Coordination Assistant, 25 April 2005
Women’s Popular Education Network (REPEM)


2. Iliana Pereyra; REPEM Uruguay Directive; 6 August 2003; 29 March 2005

Uruguayan Women’s Plenary (PLEMUU)

1. Ana Nocetti, Director; 2 July 2002, 19 April 2005
Appendix D: Interview Questions

1. Tell me a bit about the history of the organization? How has the organization changed over time?

2. How many are you total?

3. How many are you in the office and what are the responsibilities of each person?

4. How would you describe the mission of the organization? Has it changed over time? If so, how so?

5. If you had to rank order the five top most issues of concern to your organization which ones would those be?

6. What are some of the programs you offer?

7. Do you consider yourselves feminists?

8. Do you work with, or do you have work lines that focus on specific sectors of women?

9. Do you ever work in coalition with other NGOs.

10. What kinds of relationships do you have with other groups working on the same issues?

11. How much contact do you have with other social justice groups? What types of groups specifically? Race-based, gender-based, other?

12. How do you publicize your services? How can women find out about the services you offer?

13. How do you obtain funding? Where does it come from? How much goes for maintenance, administration, etc. and how much for projects?

14. Do you earn a salary for your work?

15. What activities are you currently working on?

16. How do you decide when to begin a new project or to push for new legislation?

17. How do you decide what issues are most important, and what takes priority?
18. Is there some type of plan in place for the future, for instance a five year plan you can use to gauge progress? Do you believe your group has made progress? In what ways?

19. What types of activities do you do with the community? Do you have a regular base of individuals with whom you work?

20. Do you interact much with the Bancada Feminina? In what ways?

21. Do you interact with other legislators, in what ways?

22. Do you interact much with the National Institute for Women and Family? In what ways? What is the nature of the relationship?

23. What are your expectations for the new National Institute for Women?

24. What was your involvement in International Women’s Day?

25. What was your involvement in the Beijing Conference?

26. What happened exactly with the domestic violence law; abortion bill; quota bill?

27. Do you know of any popular class women’s groups?

28. Do you think that discrimination is a problem in Uruguay?

29. What do you think about the idea of Uruguay as the Switzerland of Latin America?

30. What role do you envision for women/women of color in society? How are you, or how do you hope to aid implementation of that vision?

31. Are there other causes in which your group does not play an active part, but which you believe to be important?

32. What do you want for a more just Uruguay?

33. What do you think the relationship between government and civil society should be?

34. What are your expectations of the new government?

35. Do you have any doubts about the new government?
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