Samuel Pepys, Honor, and Emergent Bureaucracy in Later Seventeenth Century England

Michael Fitzhugh
Washington University in St. Louis

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List of Abbreviations

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>Anthony Deane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSM</td>
<td>Balthasar St. Michel</td>
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<td>SA</td>
<td>Samuel Atkins</td>
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<td>SP</td>
<td>Samuel Pepys</td>
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<tr>
<td>WC</td>
<td>William Coventry</td>
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<td>WH</td>
<td>William Hewer</td>
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Abbreviations for other cited sources:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>ADM</td>
<td>Manuscript material from the National Museum of the Royal Navy, Portsmouth (UK).</td>
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<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>J. C. Sainty, <em>Admiralty Officials, 1660-1870</em> (London: Athlone Press, 1975). Citations are given without page numbers because the careers of relevant persons, including dates and titles of all appointments, may be located s.v. in the Alphabetical List of Officials at the back of the volume (106-159).</td>
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Diary (followed by date and volume number)  Robert Latham, William Matthews, and William A. Armstrong, eds., *The Diary of Samuel Pepys*, 11 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970). No page numbers are given for citations to vol. 10, the *Companion*, or vol. 11, the *Index*, because their subject entries may be located alphabetically.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbr.</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>HoC</td>
<td><em>House of Commons</em>. These are volumes from <em>History of Parliament</em> (London: Secker &amp; Warburg). Most relevant citations will be to Basil Duke Henning, ed., <em>The House of Commons, 1660-1690</em> (1983), vol. 2. Citation of these volumes follows same convention as <em>DNB</em>: no page numbers are given because subject's biographical entry may be located alphabetically.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMC</td>
<td>Volumes published by the Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NB</td>
<td>J. M. Collinge, <em>Navy Board Officials</em>, 1660-1832 (London: University of London, Institute of Historical Research, 1978). Citations are given without page numbers because the careers of relevant persons, including dates and titles of all appointments, may be located s.v. in the Alphabetical List of Officials at the back of the volume (81-152).</td>
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I am grateful to the Department of History at Washington University in St. Louis for a fondly remembered, highly stimulating graduate-school environment and especially to Derek Hirst for more patience than any student has a right to expect.

I dedicate this dissertation to all the members of my family—parents, siblings, children—for their long, long support. Completing this would have been impossible without them.

Michael L. Fitzhugh

Washington University in St. Louis

August 2018
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Honor in the Bureaucracy: Samuel Pepys and Emergent Rationality in Later Stuart Government

by

Michael L. Fitzhugh

Doctor of Philosophy in History

Washington University in St. Louis, 2018

Professor Emeritus Derek Hirst, Chair

Professor Peter Kastor, Co-Chair

This dissertation argues that the mentality of honor, deriving from ancient Germanic and perhaps Roman culture and the major component of the knightly medieval ethos, played an important role in the formation of modern bureaucracy. The dissertation makes this argument by offering a case study of Samuel Pepys, a civil servant in the naval administration of later Stuart England (the reigns of Charles II and James II). The argument begins with a Prologue that describes honor's most important social component, lordship, and discusses the ways in which current scholarship on the transition from early modern to fully modern times strongly implies that the old ethos of honor should have been displaced by new developments. An Introduction then addresses theoretical and methodological issues, including the rationale for this dissertation's heavily narrative approach. The body of the dissertation subsequently offers five chapters demonstrating that honor in a form recognizably descended from medieval practice operated as a regular stimulus to the development and implementation of what Weber regarded as key elements in the rationalization of modern bureaucracy, including systematic record-keeping, promotion by merit, and orderly, codified procedure. Various appendices supplement the main argument.
Dates, Orthography, and Source Abbreviations

The ease of the modern reader has been an important consideration of this dissertation's author. To this end, dates are rendered New Style with the year beginning on the first of January. As a result, scholars who wish to follow my citations to sources published before the New Style implementation, such as Grey's *Debates of the House of Commons*, need to make special note of my modernization in this regard. Otherwise they will fail to find any of the material I cite for most of the first three months of the year.

Also for readerly convenience, capitalization has been modernized in quotations. Spelling has also been modernized except in titles, where exact spelling is sometimes necessary in order to locate a cited text for consultation. Punctuation has been modernized except in cases where the dissertation's author judged that the original punctuation might have potential bearing on shades of meaning. Otherwise the text generally follows the *Chicago Manual of Style* (14th edition [1993]), including at some points the singular use of "they" and "their" for the sake of gender neutrality (76 n.). Against the Manual's recommendation (160), however, the writer has employed the British practice of ending quoted material with comma, period, or other relevant punctuation outside the quotation marks if the punctuation did not come with the quotation itself. Scholars attempting to be as scrupulous as possible often go even further and use ellipses at the end (and sometimes even the beginning) of such quotations, but the standard British style is less distracting and informs the reader just as unequivocally that the original sentence included further material.
Introduction

This is a study centered on the work and behavior of one man. A minor endeavor, it might appear, especially as its subject lacks the kind of particularity that normally justifies this orientation—here readers will find no free-thinking Mennochio nor mad Hu.¹ There is, instead, an office worker, a stuffy pen-pusher who wrung his hands over protocol and preened over wearing the newly invented three-piece suit as soon as it came out.² Surely the subject is altogether pedestrian, too utterly banal to merit the focus of a monograph-length project? Such appearances are deceiving, and I shall counter them here. For this short civil servant with his office routine opens a new and oddly shaped window on the wider panorama of the English³ (and perhaps even the entire West-European) transition from premodern times to the modern era. That window's shape has a forbidding and unreckoned aspect: a sword, a battle-ax or a spiked mace. This dissertation will argue that during the second half of the seventeenth century, when England began to accelerate its development of a modern style of government, what today we view as an innovative emphasis on order, rationality, and the valorizing of information was fueled in large part by invocations of the ancient warrior mentality of honor.

The social-history movement of the mid-twentieth-century, its successor the new cultural history, and "linguistic turn" scholarship have all tended to downplay and sometimes denigrate politics, yet England's transformation during the latter part of the seventeenth century into the eighteenth's global superpower was so dramatic that its examination has deservedly remained at the forefront of the profession's agenda. Eclipsed by the much larger entities of France, Spain, and Holy

¹
²
³
Roman Empire for most of the early modern period, equaled in power by others such as Sweden and even bested by the still smaller Dutch Republic, England emerged from the seventeenth century as arguably the most important political unit in Europe, indisputably so in half a century more. This transformation came about despite England's possession of fewer material resources, a lower population, and the same technology as its rivals, and moreover occurred with astounding rapidity: a state that some scholars have described as failing to defend its own shores in 1688 became an international juggernaut within a decade. In the process, many historians have agreed, England set itself upon the path to becoming the first fully modern European state and society.4

Analyses invoking modernity, however, might now be greeted with at least slightly raised eyebrows; the concept has been under attack for some time. Many historians still take as a rule of thumb various "processes—individualisation, the formation of the 'public sphere,' commodification, bureaucratic rationalisation, state formation—that are crucial to the period [extending from the mid-eighteenth century to the present] and, in various ways, mark it as 'modern'".5 But in the profession's most recent collective examination of this issue, various authors question the idea that Europe developed and then exported modernity. More than one of these writers call for major revision of what "modern" means historically, and they disparage the Eurocentric "characteristics in earlier checklists—rationality, secularization, democracy", seeking instead "new frameworks of analysis . . . [new] theoretical hypotheses".6

If we are to generate new frameworks or theories yet avoid falling into the trap of untethered speculation, we must obtain new evidence: the profession needs not merely calls for more theory but also, and perhaps more importantly, direct inquiry into relevant topics. Only by way of empirical work can the attacks upon or defenses of "modernity" be supported, refuted, or
attenuated. One potentially profitable way to proceed would be to conduct a case study of a figure who appears to epitomize the analysis of Max Weber. Whether supported or vilified, the terms governing the recent debate were nearly all his. Protests notwithstanding, every subsequent theorist and most historians concerned with this topic have worked in Weber's shadow, often making only minor adjustments to his arguments and mainly filling in details. The lack of substantive alternatives may indicate lasting validity, but it is curious that for the transitional point in England—the very England held to have sprinted first over the finish line of capitalism and the Industrial Revolution—there has been no carefully detailed interrogation of the Weberian thesis by way of an historical case study. This project aims to furnish the lack, and does so with Samuel Pepys, first the Clerk of the Acts of the King's Ships and then Secretary for the Affairs of the Admiralty for the government of Charles II.

For obvious reasons there are few better loci for an inspection of the Weberian case than the state bureaucracy; within that general space perhaps no subdivision fulfills the criterion as well as the administration of the English navy; and within or without the navy, nobody fills the criterion as well as Pepys. This portion of the later Stuart machine has been dubbed "one of the most effective branches of government" after the Restoration—it had to be, since its overall workload increased by the astounding factor of twenty between the first and second Dutch wars. And working within this paragon of proto-Weberian institutions was a paragon among proto-Weberian men. Samuel Pepys was the brightest bureaucratic star in an impressive constellation. The Restoration could vaunt many outstanding administrators: Sidney Godolphin, Sir Stephen Fox, Henry Thynne, Sir George Downing, Charles Bertie, Henry Guy, William Lowndes, William Blaythwayt, Sir Joseph Williamson, Sir Robert Long, Sir Robert Southwell, William
Bridgeman, and Roger Whitley are only the most well-known. Lesser lights too helped move the system forward, such as lower customs official William Culliford, whose zeal against "laxity, incompetence" and other problems led to a purge of that service in the early 1680s. Yet silhouetted against this background as the most paradigmatic bureaucrat in a half-century increasingly known for the type was Samuel Pepys. The historian whose close attention to bureaucracy throughout the seventeenth century made him our most qualified judge held that Pepys's level of "commitment to the duties of his office and an absolute determination to master every aspect of his business . . . marks him out from the others". Labeled a member of the urban middle class, famous not merely for his hapless philandering but also for his dogged attention to minute detail, the highly record-conscious Pepys was, and remains, an administrator's administrator. Of the massive increase in naval paperwork during his early tenure, he estimated that his own office alone saw a tenfold rise. He was not far off: the modern estimate is six. Busy, chubby and short, hailed with some justice as "the father of the [English] Civil Service," a better model for contemplating later Stuart society and culture at its most \textit{avant-garde} routine surely cannot be found.

To study Pepys is therefore to carry out the crucial case study of Weber's long-lived argument. It is to examine modern-leaning characteristics during the period of their alleged birth, and it is to do so by peering through the microscope of the country where most scholars have agreed that those characteristics first emerged. The Pepys on display here, however, may not make participants on either side of this debate very happy. A treatment of Pepys must end as more than a case-study exemplum, for this seventeenth-century bureaucrat puts Weber to a test which the great sociologist fails to ace—but which he also fails to flunk. As I proceeded with this
project, I found that Pepys did not allow me to mount a frontal challenge to the standard divisions or checklists vilified by the anti-modernity camp. The present endeavor therefore accepts Michael J. Braddick's characterization of a state as modernizing when it undergoes changes that give it "a greater resemblance to the Weberian ideal-type" than it previously bore, and thus it broadly follows the lead of the more cautious participants in the debate. But neither does this project unreservedly support standard notions of what "modernity" entails.

The case study is unable to rest easy because Pepys grabs the historiographical nose and tweaks past and future hard. Even as he seemed to model the modern, he simultaneously behaved in ways that do not comport at all well with what a Weberian would anticipate from the bureaucrat who came closer to the ideal-type than any other during his time. When Pepys (and his colleagues) needed to justify proposals or defend decisions, they often combined the usual shibboleths of "modernity," such as the desirability of orderly procedures, with explicit invocations of the ancient mentality of honor. Normally coupled with medieval chivalry, honor emerges in most estimates as highly conservative, a paradoxical element to foist upon a question involving transitions to modern times. And a warrior ethos might be thought least likely to flourish in Pepys's habitat of government bureaucracy. Yet honor and shame, we will find, had as much resonance in the later Stuart office as on the battlefield, as much to do with composing ruled tables as with loading powder and shot. However out of place it may seem, the idea of old honor in fact provided a path highly conducive to the modern period's increasing emphasis on knowledge and rationality. From the charging bloodlust of the warrior and the lofty noblesse oblige of the great magnate was born—at least in part—the rational precision of the bureaucrat.

And Pepys's honor holds yet further surprises. The individualism normally a main item on
modernization checklists has usually been attributed to urban merchants, the rising bourgeoisie whose activity is taken to have encouraged competitiveness and stimulated the growth of capitalism. Recent work on this group, however, has confounded expectations by revealing its members as overwhelmingly opposed to "the dangers of private interest" and competition, instead emphasizing (and enforcing) group solidarity and conformity. "Any sign of aggressive trading practices" was quickly stamped out in the English towns we have thought so forward-looking. But the same was far from true in the state bureaucracy. Under the sign of honor, Pepys vigorously pushed a personalized agenda and fought out office rivalries with a ruthlessness that might give pause to the denizens of a twenty-first-century corporate shark-tank.

In sum, Samuel Pepys, civil servant, reveals a paradox at the heart of one of the most important historical developments in Western European history: as the modern era neared the end of its gestation and increased preparations for its eighteenth-century emergence in the English Industrial Revolution, an aspect of culture that by all our lights should have been inimical to modern characteristics was instead incubating them.

II

Given the potential yield of a Pepysian office inquiry, moving ahead would seem eminently desirable. The order, however, is taller than it might initially appear, its complications well illustrated by the treatment this type of endeavor has received at the hands of our most influential historians of changes in early modern English government. Despite acknowledging the importance of nuts-and-bolts "administrative difficulties", C. D. Chandaman's magisterial discussion of The English Public Revenue, 1660-1688 rarely takes up administrative structure or
technique below the very highest level of the lord treasurer or commissioners and those with
whom they interacted directly, instead referring to organization and operation by way of allusions
(the scarcely merit the word "descriptions") so generic as to be nearly useless. A similar
problem looms even more largely in John Brewer's highly influential *Sinews of Power* because
the book professes to tackle it head-on. After strongly arguing the importance of the bureaucracy,
Brewer offers something of an apologia for government staffers and promises their rehabilitation:

> At the seat of dullness were the clerks. These pale and shadowy figures have never received their due. . . . A quick glance at the business accounts, financial records and government documents of this period attests to the prodigies of penmanship performed by men and women unaided by any mechanical means of duplication. Yet these clerks have no history. No group can ever have written so much and yet remained so anonymous.

This inattention is mostly owing, Brewer continues, to "difficulties of tedium and technicalities (problems I hope to dispel)". The chapter that seems designated to deliver on this promise reiterates the plight of "these precursors of Melville's Bartleby and Dickens's Cratchet [who] have not received the recognition they deserve"—but this is followed by the ominous notice that "remarkably little about them survives". And for the most part, there it ends: losing himself in structural matters, Brewer never does perform the full-scale civil-servant recovery work he originally intended. Forced to settle for an only partly nutritive and arguably wholly dry diet of institutionally oriented administrative histories, the profession still awaits a full-length study of bureaucrat *qua* bureaucrat on the cusp of modern times.

In addition to sustaining its main argument the present study hopes to address this gap in the literature, but clearly the question of procedure remains knotty. The issue is heightened by the stakes: this dissertation makes a claim with the potential to affect interpretations about one of our biggest historical enigmas, and the burden may seem too heavy for the shoulders of a single
exemplar. Chapter 6 offers brief examples of four additional Restoration government offices, demonstrating that Pepys did not represent a complete anomaly, but many readers may still wonder whether a broader range of test subjects might not have more thoroughly substantiated the point. There are two reasons for preferring this dissertation's singular focus.

The first reason for a close look is to gain interpretive insight too easily missed when traveling by the other route. Breadth is paradoxically hampered in the goal of grasping sociocultural landscapes comprehensively: it misses the telling detail that becomes more noticeable when a scholar is not distracted by a differentiated legion but instead zeroes in on one example.\textsuperscript{18} So it has been argued of Samuel Pepys's fellow seventeenth-century diarist John Evelyn, "a representative, almost an emblematic figure". Evelyn's broad interests, his cultural and political activities "make the copious records he left us of his long life and preoccupations not just valuable for biographical study, but an immensely rich source for the period in which he lived. Together they provide us with a more complete view than any other source of the cultivated late Stuart Englishman." Pepysians might bridle at this advance of ultimate credit to Pepys's intimate friend; the greater diarist may not have been the art connoisseur or the gardener that Evelyn was, but he seems to have been the better musician and he was far more involved in public affairs. The latter factor, especially, has crucial implications for writing Pepys into a wider history, for, as it is recently been observed, "those who lived their lives in the public and political arena are likely to have a particular investment in the institutional and ideological apparatus of their time." Political figures are obviously not unbiased reporters, but that disadvantage is more than balanced by the close-up view only they can supply. If of Evelyn then even more of Pepys it may be said, "to study the man and his records is to study his age."\textsuperscript{19}
The second reason for putting on a largely one-man show involves the historical contingency of Pepys's famously large archive. Where stumbled scholars of Chandaman and Brewer's stature, lesser writers might well tread with caution. My response will be to demonstrate Pepys's honor-bound behaviors with the kind of certainty achievable only by great depth—and with him as with very few other premodern figures such a goal is actually feasible. If Evelyn's records are "copious", Pepys's—boasting an entire library at Cambridge and a host of additional items at other depositories such as the Bodleian or the Caird Library at the Naval Maritime Museum—can fairly be described as nothing short of "vast."

Pepys's trove should help circumvent the predicaments that stymied previous authors. One recent anthology affects little need for such resources, instead reducing the history of single persons not merely to just their archive but right down to the "fragmentary" piece of evidence which, it is alleged, functions "as a window onto historical circumstances and contingencies, and therefore [provides] an especially rich material for early modern lives." Fragments have been similarly celebrated by feminists: "ostensibly 'small'" histories of previously unknown women whose life stories contain significant "intersections with archives . . . testify to the enduring power of the evidentiary fragment to conjure entire worlds." But this would obviously be so much the truer of men such as Pepys who accrued a large collection indeed of "fragments"—and who might thereby boost a researcher past the Chandaman-Brewer barrier.

The problem with using "fragments" to conjure an "entire world" is that the world in question may reside only in the head of the individual who is being studied. The main archive employed here comprises the words of Samuel Pepys, his rhetoric—and this, of course, is far from transparent. There is also a great deal of action to go along with the verbiage, but the source
for Pepys's behavior is often self-reportage and therefore as rhetorical as anything else he records. At the outset of the project, at least, any insights Pepys's asseverations may offer into his genuine motives and attitudes must be regarded as opaque. For simplicity's sake I will tend to write as if I am taking Pepys at his word, but I seek to avoid falling into the trap of doing so unreflectively. Even if a tight focus is valuable, then, how can it be warranted and best applied in the face of this additional quandary?

To best meet its conceptual challenges, this project enlists several complementary theories in support of a narrative method and includes a detailed preliminary discussion of historical and historiographical backdrop. I set the larger historical stage in a Prologue which recapitulates the profession's largely Weberian orientation toward the emergence of modern societies and traces the consequences which that orientation foists upon honor in the latter part of the early modern period. Theory and method are discussed in Chapter 1 along with a nettlesome issue of terminology. Chapters 2 and 3 examine how the social structure of honor affected Pepys's career, first as he acted in the role of a servant, second in that of master. Chapter 4 turns to the influence of what was arguably honor's most important value, courage, and its operation in the office. The last chapter on Pepys, 5, employs an extended narrative of a single occurrence to bring various aspects of honor together, showing how they functioned side by side in the bureaucratic milieu, allowing a much more holistic look than was possible in previous chapters at how honor inflected administrative business. Finally, as already noted, Chapter 6 glances at other civil servants to show that Pepys was not alone in his propensity for enacting honor in the bureaucracy.

Along with the framing material and the five chapters on Pepys, I provide several
appendices the contents of which give important support to the project but which would bog the argument down if included in the body of the text. The appendices are of two types: complicated issues of argumentation that demand more exposition than will fit easily within the flow of analysis, and discrete episodic or sequential narrations too lengthy to fit easily into the larger flow of Pepys's story. Appendix A will concern historians working directly on early modern honor, and perhaps feminist scholars more generally, because there I offer my reasons for bypassing what has become a something of an historiographical requirement to discuss honor in terms of gender. The other appendices are cited at relevant points in the text. The argument closes with a Conclusion which, in addition to the usual summary, also speculates about the implications of honor's pervasive and continuing influence during the early modern period for our debates about the historically modern. I finish by expanding the horizon further, offering a consideration of how my findings might affect historical practice more generally. But readers should always keep in mind the principal brief of the project: to show that traditional honor made an important contribution to the regulation and rationality of the bureaucratic engine whose perhaps not-so-humdrum routine helped to hurtle the English state to great-power status at the turn of the eighteenth century. If the pen is mightier than the sword, it is because, in a reversal of von Clausewitz's famous dictum, the former is often merely an extension of the latter. Both are instruments of war.
Notes to Introduction


2 Pepys began outfitting himself with the new style of suit soon after Charles II set the example in 1666: see *Diary*, 29 October and 4 November, respectively LATHAMPP and LATHAMPP: DELETE TEXT AFTER MATTHEWS VERIFICATION "to my tailor’s, and there bespoke a plain vest"; six days later, "Comes my tailor’s man in the morning, and brings my vest home, and coat to wear with it".

3 Here a nod should be offered to an important conceptual advance over the past three decades in the historiography of early modern Britain and Ireland (especially under the Stuarts) and even in some medieval work: the recognition that many topics cannot be understood without taking into account the isles both as a whole and as competing parts. The present writer signally fails to do this and must plead for a pass on the strength of the comparison made further afield to continental kingdoms in Appendix B. The reader wishing to mix in Scotland and Ireland may consult Derek Hirst, *Dominion: England and Its Island Neighbours, 1500-1707* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). In addition to his own account, Hirst offers a thorough bibliographical essay at the end; see especially the opening coverage of explicitly comparative work (285-89).

4 Scholars unfamiliar with this historiography may consult the Prologue for a detailed recounting.


7 Quotation on effective navy administration is from John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State, 1688-1783* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989), 67; for the dramatic increase in naval paperwork overall, see Wheeler, *Making of a World Power*, 58. All historians dealing with seventeenth-century administration recognize that the navy featured one of the most significant of the new bureaucracies, even leading the way in some respects such as the shift of tenure from life to good behavior: J. C. Sainty, "A Reform in the Tenure of Offices During the Reign of Charles II," *Bulletin of the Institute for Historical Research* 41 (1968): 150-71, and see also Braddick, *State Formation*, 269.
In G. E. Aylmer, The Crown's Servants: Government and Civil Service under Charles II, 1660-1685 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), for Downing, Bertie, Guy, and Lowndes see 29, and for Bertie also 210, for Lowndes also 211; for Goldolphin, 192-3; Thynne, 200-1; Williamson, 193-4; Southwell, 195-6; Thynne, 200-1; Bridgeman, 201-2; Long, 210; for Culliford see 211-12, quotation on 211; the quotation concerning Pepys's administrative abilities, 218. For Fox, see C. G. A. Clay, Public Finance and Private Wealth: The Career of Sir Stephen Fox, 1627-1716 (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1978). For Blathwayt and Whitley see this dissertation's Conclusion.

See Pepys's numerous index entries in Earle, Making of the English Middle Class. For Earle, figures such as Pepys embodied the "frugal saving man" (203) who was preoccupied with the modernistic goals of "profit, accumulation, and improvement" (332); cf. also Earle's placement of government bureaucrats like him in "the middle station" (73, 328).

For Pepys as engendering modern English bureaucracy, see Arthur Bryant, Samuel Pepys: The Man in the Making (Cambridge: University Press, 1933), 347. Among many other encomia for Pepys as one of the most effective bureaucrats England has ever had, see Cat. 1:248-51. Pepys's estimate of paperwork increase for the office of the clerk of the acts and its modern adjustment is in BHP, 6 January 1670, 327 and same, n. 1.

Braddick, State Formation in Early Modern England, c. 1550-1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 99, and see also 4-5. I have wanted to avoid the type of problem occurring in other work that rejects traditional terms of analysis too hastily. For example, Steve Hindle, State and Social Change in Early Modern England, c. 1550-1640 (Houndmills, UK: New York: Macmillan Press; St. Martin’s Press, 2000), stimulating and highly informative as it is, goes too far when it criticizes "narrowly institutionalist terms" that allegedly encourage a reductive charting of "teleological development towards 'modern', 'sovereign', 'rational', 'bureaucratic' state forms" (21, 19). To avoid this weakness, historians "should think less of government as an institution . . . than of governance as a process" so that finally "the state was a claim to authority, a cultural process." (23, emphasis added) In some ways that perspective supports the focus on political legitimacy here in the Prologue (see below), but such an analytical vector could prompt the celebration of governmental "discourse" to the easy disregard not just of central institutions but also the local systems, both formal and informal, static or fluid, that had a critical impact on daily life. To his credit, Hindle avoids many of the extremes that might have been encouraged by this theoretical orientation, but in this writer's opinion it is no coincidence that he has been criticized both for leaving out politics and for focusing too narrowly on the middling sort: see the reviews of Hindle's book by, respectively, Susan D. Amussen, Social History 27, no. 1 (January 1, 2002): 69–70 and Paul D. Halliday, Law and History Review 20, no. 3 (October 1, 2002): 647–649.

An example of the more conservative position is Lynn M. Thomas, "Modernity's Failings, Political Claims, and Intermediate Concepts," The American Historical Review 116, no. 3 (2011), who repeats Ogborn's earlier list using different terminology (e.g. instead of individualization and bureaucratic rationality, she offers "scientific rationality and critical self-reflection . . .

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8 In G. E. Aylmer, The Crown's Servants: Government and Civil Service under Charles II, 1660-1685 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), for Downing, Bertie, Guy, and Lowndes see 29, and for Bertie also 210, for Lowndes also 211; for Goldolphin, 192-3; Thynne, 200-1; Williamson, 193-4; Southwell, 195-6; Thynne, 200-1; Bridgeman, 201-2; Long, 210; for Culliford see 211-12, quotation on 211; the quotation concerning Pepys's administrative abilities, 218. For Fox, see C. G. A. Clay, Public Finance and Private Wealth: The Career of Sir Stephen Fox, 1627-1716 (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1978). For Blathwayt and Whitley see this dissertation's Conclusion.

9 See Pepys's numerous index entries in Earle, Making of the English Middle Class. For Earle, figures such as Pepys embodied the "frugal saving man" (203) who was preoccupied with the modernistic goals of "profit, accumulation, and improvement" (332); cf. also Earle's placement of government bureaucrats like him in "the middle station" (73, 328).

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12 An example of the more conservative position is Lynn M. Thomas, "Modernity's Failings, Political Claims, and Intermediate Concepts," The American Historical Review 116, no. 3 (2011), who repeats Ogborn's earlier list using different terminology (e.g. instead of individualization and bureaucratic rationality, she offers "scientific rationality and critical self-reflection . . .
bureaucratic forms of government"), ameliorating the discomfort "modernity" causes her with only the recommendation that historians dig deeper into these "core formations" to generate "more useful, mid-level analytical concepts"—which amounts to focusing more closely on the details of those "core" aspects (737). See also Dorothy Ross in the same debate, "American Modernities, Past and Present," 702. Almost noone in this debate or elsewhere contests the application of "modernity" to stock-based venture capitalism and capital-driven consumer culture, at least in western Europe. The label also continues to prove useful in the political realm.

13 A similar point was made for science by Steven Shapin, A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). Shapin's argument immediately proved controversial, however, and has been magisterially dismissed by Barbara J. Shapiro, A Culture of Fact: England, 1550-1720 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), who upholds a more conventionally sensible alternative as having given rise to modern rationality: law, which inherently works by ever-more-minutely categorizing and differentiating, one of Weber's defining characteristics of modernity.


15 For example, Chandaman states that the excise was broken down "into units of manageable size" (53) but his actual description reveals only that "two General Supervisors [were appointed] to oversee the local officers." He then adds, "The behavior of local officers was closely investigated, every detail of local organization was carefully reviewed," but since not a single detail of that local organization is forthcoming, readers emerge with no idea of what any of that meant in practice (73). For a similar treatment of the Customs, see 29 (especially ironic in light of the praise it receives on 36). For an example of Chandaman's exclusive focus on top administrators, see 62-5 for the Excise.

16 Quotations on, respectively, 75, xvi-xvii, 69, and 70. Chapter 2, "Civil Administration: The Central Offices of Government," offers an admirable synthesis of other (and sometimes rather obscure) scholarship, and the late seventeenth- and eighteenth-century administrative structure sketched by this previous work is skillfully solidified and sharpened by the chapter's original research. But to clarify and make bolder an outline is not to color in the shapes. The tables at the beginning of the chapter (66, tallying the period's civil servants) accurately foreshadow the whole: new information corrects previous figures but the exposition remains a standard piece of structural administrative history, unhelpful for giving neglected civil servants their long-awaited due. Save for a very few scattered asides (in the eighteenth century, for example, a "Naval Clerk of the Acts claimed to work a seven-day week in wartime": 70), the closest Brewer comes to his promised recovery is a single pageworth of text profiling one late-seventeenth-century
administrator (76-7) and another 11 pages on the inner workings of the Excise (102-13). This is certainly a start, but from 251 pages of exposition readers might be justified in judging 12 a scant return on the ringing declarations with which the author broached the issue.


This is the justification offered for microhistory by practitioners such as Carlo Ginsburg, Giovanni Levi, and Roger Charter: see Matti Peltonen, "Clues, Margins, and Monads: The Micro-Macro Link in Historical Research," *History and Theory* 40, no. 3 (2001): 349-50, and for the rationale's further philosophical and methodological support, 357-59. See also Margaret Atwood, "In Search of Alias Grace: On Writing Canadian Historical Fiction," *The American Historical Review* 103, no. 5 (1998): 1505.


Aside from Appendix A there are three additional appendices of the first, more argumentative kind, and these perhaps merit highlighting not only at the pertinent location in the body but here as well. Historians of any specialization interested in the Western transition from premodern to modern times might wish to look at Appendix B, which expands on the Prologue's contention that traditional comparisons between early modern England and the continent no longer have definitive explanatory power. Early modernists as well as feminists more generally may find
Appendix C of interest, where I reject "patriarchal" and "paternal" as portmanteau descriptions for the kind of political rulership exercised by early modern hereditary elites. Appendix D targets scholars who pay close attention to theoretical matters; these readers may wish for an explanation of my fundamental position (there is space only to mention this, not discuss it, in Chapter 1).

22 "[T]he administrative underpinning" of "the rise of England . . . to world power", writes Aylmer, "was already well laid, at least in part, by the end of Charles II's reign": Crown's Servants, 273.

This dissertation's objective is to show how honor assisted the development of what we think of as modern characteristics, but first the relevant historiography forces attention to a deeper problematic: the very persistence of honor from early modern into modern times. A large amount of research not only on Europe but also the Americas in the modern era has revealed honor to be alive and well in many of its old medieval aspects. And it was not a case of dying out and then being resurrected in some new and different form that merely appropriated a few old terms. The scholarship on modern honor demonstrates that honor in the eighteenth, nineteenth and even early twentieth centuries retained the most salient features of the old ethos, especially hierarchically spaced loyalties, a concern for reputation, and an emphasis on competition that tended toward violence. And this result constitutes a significant puzzle, as the theory and historiography of the early modern period predicts the much different outcome in which the dried-up remnants of an outmoded mentality should have crumbled to dust.

The question of honor's survival from the early modern to the modern era has not, so far as the present writer knows, previously been raised by historians of England, but before the issue can be addressed the surrounding historiographical territory must be canvassed. This Prologue therefore frames the rest of the dissertation with three sections. The first briefly highlights the generalist scholarship on Europe's transition to modern times. The second section delineates the most politically relevant aspect of early modern honor, as it is difficult to identify something in the historical record unless one first knows what it is. The third section unites the topics of the first and second by elucidating the negative expectations that the former has forced upon the latter.
Big theory has led the way to the most widely accepted portraits of modern emergence. David Hume and Adam Smith opened the way with what would become the familiar signposts of urbanization and commerce. Marx and Weber followed up with the cash nexus and progression from *gemeinschaft* to *gesellschaft*, both thinkers emphasizing capitalism and state centralization, though more subsequent writers, especially within the past half-century, have found Weber's slant the more congenial. Medieval culture conflated much that modern Western culture separates into public and private, but the early modern emergence of or increasing emphasis on rationalism, individualism, commercialization, urbanization, and political centralization imposed changes in social psychology that, by the end of the era, had significantly sharpened the earlier boundary. And because the personal was absorbed into the private while the impersonal was assigned to the public, the new individualism is usually portrayed as paradoxically leading to the impersonality characteristic of modern organizations in which the person is counted as one atom among a mass of others.

A theorist from the following generation, Norbert Elias, who has recently enjoyed his own Renaissance among scholars retailing early modernity, spent his career itemizing the Weberian transformation. Elias described a "civilizing process" that began with no distinction between public and private in a Middle Ages splintered into introverted localities; social interaction featured the uninhibited exercise of bodily functions as well as casual brutality and spontaneously "naive" emotional displays. Elias's vision of early modernity, by contrast, saw the aristocracy herded into a "transition from a theological to a scientific mode of acquiring knowledge". Pressured by centralizing courts and commercializing cities to analyze and
rationalize their behavior, nobles became increasingly self-aware and self-conscious. They were forced to act with "civility" because they rubbed shoulders with growing numbers of competitors who included more and more of an upwardly mobile middle class sponsored by monarchs. Unable to beat these upstarts, the aristocracy eventually joined them and became "bourgeoisified." Meanwhile, governments began to act "less and less according to the personal favour and interests of individuals, but increasingly according to a more impersonal and precise plan".  

The sometimes rather slack skin of big theory has been fleshed out with the muscle of big history. To name only a few examples, David S. Landes, whose seminal *Unbound Prometheus* remains a required starting-point for discussions of the West-European Industrial Revolution, set his stage by essentially recounting the Weber-Elias schema. Elizabeth Eisenstein has persuasively argued that a Renaissance push for critical thinking combined with the printing press to create a "knowledge explosion". Attended by "new forms of standardization", this development amalgamated the individually isolated, anonymous reader of mass print into the faceless modern public. Even the chaos of war became rationalized as the medieval noble and his peasant levies were dispersed by professional soldiers disciplined in drill, divided by function, and supported with carefully planned logistics.

Against this modern zeitgeist, continental absolutism—its hulking apogee in what one English historian describes as "the vast tentacular institutions of France and Spain"—has usually been viewed as fighting a rearguard action. The authoritarian regimes managed to survive long past obsolescence by selectively embracing a few of the new trends; most cannily, they exercised control through centralizing administrations staffed by newly created service nobilities of
bourgeois origins. During the later sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries in France and even earlier in Spain, this group "became a salaried, hierarchical, titled bureaucracy in the modern sense of the term". Their self-identification as crown servants was largely based on humanist ideas and their abilities on humanist education, but their direct dependence upon their kings forestalled any resistance to crown initiatives that might otherwise have been inspired by classical republicanism. Rather, Spanish letrados and the French noblesse de robe employed their middle-class values in ways that made them instrumental to the formation of the absolutist state and also led them to function as a loyal counterweight to the old military aristocracy.13 Hombres de espada and the noblesse d'épée were also brought to heel by a combination of their military obsolescence and attendance at courts whose stultifying ritual exalted hierarchical norms and precise behavior (part of Elias's civilizing process), preserving an archaic-seeming obsession with formal status that complemented the celebration of contemporary nobles as the carriers of knightly tradition even as the reality grew ever more distant. Still at the top of the social scale and thus easily diverted from dwelling on their political impotence, these cultural dinosaurs were slow to adopt the liberating humanism which might have awakened them from their torpor. Anti-merchant and anti-robe snobbery did little to clear their vision.14

By adopting centralization, bureaucracy, and state monopoly of legitimate violence but neglecting the rest of the Weberian package, absolute monarchs made it easy for England to outstrip them. In the vast valley of "modernity" literature, one of the peaks—scaled not just by native climbers but foreigners too (see Appendix B)—is the celebration of England as the first European country to become genuinely modern. The English front-runner finish was possible because continental regimes crushed representative assemblies and thus their countries'
democratic embryos in order to govern "without a bridle", forestalling efficient capitalist economies by relying on such expedients as tax farms and venality of office to generate revenue.\textsuperscript{15} England then rode the general European wave all the way to shore faster than anyone else.

Along with Marx, Weber once again staked the initial claim, Elias agreed,\textsuperscript{16} and more recent scholars of sometimes very different political persuasions have rallied in support of English priority. Landes attributes English success to a "more open" society in which "the definitions of status [were] looser" and enabled "a larger rationality" than obtained anywhere else save the Netherlands, while a decentralized government left unhindered a growing urbanization and the productive commerce of the rational entrepreneur.\textsuperscript{17} According to economic theorist (and Nobel laureate) Douglas C. North, England's less relentlessly hierarchical "social attitudes and norms" led to "modern perceptions of freedom" in a commercially sensitive seventeenth-century Parliament which fought for property rights, insisted upon a greater degree of "impersonality" in government, and thus enabled England's "political hegemony and ultimate dominance of the world".\textsuperscript{18} Jürgen Habermas famously described the divorce between public and private as giving birth to that print-mongering, anonymity-fostering, critical-thinking prerequisite for participatory democracy, the bourgeois public sphere, in Charles II's urban coffeehouses before its export outward to the rest of Europe.\textsuperscript{19} The argument for an English "agricultural revolution" in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (well before the rest of Europe caught on) has not met with complete accord, but even opponents of E. Anthony Wrigley's influential Cambridge school of econometrics accept his finding that beginning around 1600, early modern England's relative population growth far outstripped the continent's with disruptive but transformative effects.\textsuperscript{20}
II

Allowing England to rush on ahead, this Prologue will now seemingly reverse course for a look backward at the old elite culture of honor in its most politically significant guise, lordship. Lordship was an aspect of "lineage culture," a technical phrase used by anthropologists to denote customary tendencies found in a number of societies sometimes called "traditional," including those of medieval and early modern Europe. Lineage culture helped regulate behavior in accordance with a group of values gathered under the term "honor." This ancient cultural conglomerate placed one's reputation at, or at least near, the apex of personal concerns. Into honor's service were subsumed a number of tributary values helpful for building a positive reputation, including especially steadfastness, competitiveness, and loyalty to one's kin as well as good lordship and its concomitant, faithful service.21

From among these elements lordship has been singled out for scrutiny here because (aside from the more intuitively understandable phenomenon of kinship) it comprehended the most intricate sociostructural application of any honor value and therefore requires more contextualization than the others. Without a detailed understanding of lordship and the kinds of interactions it fostered in the early modern social and political milieu, Pepys's use of honor at the office can be neither appreciated nor even at times accurately identified. And because of lordship's inescapable association with power, a helpful lens through which to examine it is that of political legitimacy.22 The broad perception of power's exercise as acceptable, legitimacy was critical for early modern politicians pushing through and attempting to enforce major initiatives such as the poor law in an era that largely lacked institutionalized policing mechanisms. The respect paid to particular structures of government can become so firmly associated with them as
to seem nearly inherent, but their legitimacy depends first upon more widespread attitudes. And arguably the most crucial of these in early modern times was the constellation of honor with its social instantiation, lordship.

A further reason for delineating lordship's contours is historiographical. The crucial glue of honor-based lordship is too often ignored by students of legitimacy in early modern England, who usually favor the more rarefied air of legal theory or constitutional argument. The present section offers a corrective. This is not to say that more intellectualized arguments about law or prerogative or support of true religion had scant bearing on legitimacy: many early modern men and women obviously became greatly exercised over them. But the ramifications of such issues for political legitimacy were contained within the implicit and more fundamental bounds of lordship, at least through the civil wars; what determined the essential legitimacy of Charles I, for example, was whether he was a good or bad lord to his people. Claims about the kinds of actions he should take were not first-order logical arguments for or against his legitimacy but rather furnished second-order criteria by which the quality of his lordship could be assessed. Arbitrary government (misuse of the prerogative) was a second-order issue. The king acted arbitrarily and only then, consequent to the action, became a tyrant. A tyrant was clearly a bad lord—but only upon reaching that first-order classification was legitimacy in question.²³

Some readers may find this syllogistic hair-splitting trivial: what does it matter whether arguments about the prerogative were second- or first-order in terms of legitimacy if they had a decisive impact upon it? And especially if most people made the logical connections without conscious awareness of their thought's structure? But unless readers register the priorities of the era's cultural logic, they may fault the current project for largely ignoring the second-order issues
emphasized in standard treatments emphasizing law and constitutionality. As this Prologue proceeds, it should be apparent that such wholly high-intellectual accounts of political legitimacy during this period are incomplete and even somewhat misleading.

A convenient signpost to the cultural values arguably most fundamental for legitimacy during much, at least, of this period is provided by perhaps the most striking contrast between older systems of government and those considered by social scientists to be fully modern: the personalized conceptualization of the former as opposed to the more highly differentiated, impersonal abstraction of the latter. This distinction is related to the modern emergence of the division between public and private, the development of which required changes in political as well as social ideologies. What we consider "public" and "private" were both encapsulated in a single concept during premodern times: the harmoniously functioning body politic. Other parts of that body were construed as aggregates, but when the whole was under examination, the sovereign, as the head, was thought to act as an individual who directed the rest. Royal judgments on smaller matters were understood to be purely personal decisions. Reigning princes were supposed to take counsel if a problem was sufficiently important, but the councilors were traditionally her or his barons, with each of whom a ruler was supposed to, and with many of whom s/he did, maintain close links, so this too was an immediately personal business. Even if new ideas were disseminating through the early modern air, at least until 1689 the English consultative process continued to be conceived in traditional terms of advice offered, consent given, or service rendered to the monarch as personal lord or lady of the realm. This mode of government is now often called "patriarchal." Weber initiated this usage but it remained fairly rare until gender studies popularized the usage. The present effort does not follow suit; along
with the related and similarly common term "paternal," the label has defects that have all too often been ignored (see Appendix C). Symptomatically, neither of these words were standard early modern parlance for noble or gentry socioeconomic prominence and political authority. For that, contemporaries in England would have been much more likely to employ "lord" and "lordship".

Even more than religion, lordship through honor was fundamental to legitimacy. Unlike more intricate concepts bandied about by the educated, honorable lordship was understood by all, and was so ubiquitous that even Hobbes and Locke could not ignore it. Lordship played an obvious and immediately practical role in most people's daily lives because much of early modern society centered around it. Its foundation in law and most importantly immemorial custom made it so strong that attractive, easily grasped, and clearly plausible opposing notions ("who was then the gentleman?") lingered on the fringes for century upon century before coming into their own.

The structural means for the practice of lordship was the relationship of master and servant. Honor cast nearly all important relationships as personal, but this was the most important extra-familial tie in European lineage culture (though obtaining between blood relatives often as not). The guiding ideal of the master-servant relationship was "good lordship," which gave "honour . . . to acts of beneficence and shame to forms of avarice". This principle (along with the rest of European honor) derived most directly from the ancient Celtic and Germanic tribal societies within which chieftains had certain obligations to their warriors. The original form of "lord" was the Old English hlāford, "loaf-ward," one who had charge of resources and could therefore exercise the kind of largesse displayed by Wealthþeow, queen of the Danes, when she
ceremoniously offers drink to her guests during their first evening in Heorot and later bestows upon Beowulf a jeweled collar for killing Grendel. Or by the Geatish Queen Hygd: for all her youth, "not was she lowly [of bearing] . . . / Nor too miserly to give Geat-men / Treasure."30

Lordship's beneficence took more forms than courteous generosity and suitable reward for service. Protection was also one of its aspects, indeed perhaps foremost during the formation of early medieval sociopolitical fabric when previously independent families subordinated themselves to those more powerful in order to survive. Beowulf spends his dying breaths congratulating himself not only for winning the dragon's hoard to his people's profit but also for having kept them safe from invasion during his rule.31 Similarly, young Hygd's proud carriage (instead of other characteristics the poet could have adduced, such as beauty, grace, or rich raiment) may have been selected for remark because it signals her potential for that kind of leadership.32 Justice—the maintenance of peace between servants, who might be at odds—was another function of lordship, requiring mediation and perhaps discipline which was, however, to be apportioned in a fair and equitable manner.33

In medieval and early modern Europe, elite servants returned good lordship with "faithful service," then acted as honorable masters to their own servants in turn, the pattern repeating itself from the King downward to the rural gentlewoman or man and their tenants.34 The continuing prevalence of these ideals at the beginning of the early modern period in England appears in their 1509 prescription by a writer infamous for the opposite type of conduct. Edmund Dudley, one of Henry VII's two most notorious tax collectors, nonetheless told "all the chivalry of this realm . . . dukes, earls, barons, knights, esquires", that "every man after the honor and degree that God and his prince hath called him to" should help maintain social concord by rendering due respect to his
superiors, "nor disdain or set at naught his inferiors". Men of honor should "be the makers of ends and lovedays charitably between neighbors and neighbors" (arbitrating strife to avert lawsuits) and should "be the helpers and relievers of poor tenants", but should not shrink from being "the punishers of . . . ill-disposed people, be it their own servant or other; and then shall they be meet and able to do their prince service, both noble and honorable". One recipient of such service begged to disagree, at least partly: James I expressed annoyance with gentry who "will have men dance after their pipe, and follow their greatness" or who "must have a kind of liberty in the people". But upon that parish anchor depended the entire chain of lordship, leading link by link back to the top. There, successful rulers such as Elizabeth (wrote a peer after her death) had ensured a peaceful and secure kingdom by selecting the best men in blood and talent from the counties "to fill the most honourable rooms [offices]" in her government, "by which she honoured them, obliged their kindred and allegiance, and fortified herself."

Such assessments can seem overly pious to jaundiced modern eyes, but they were often sincerely meant. Good lordship could be as well honored in the breach, of course; some landlords accrued so much ill will that tenants burned them in effigy and even conspired to kill them. An ideal is, after all, an ideal. But this one had material consequences. Elizabeth once threatened to discipline an earl partly because he was oppressing tenants, and the same factor was one of the reasons given for excluding an early seventeenth-century gentleman from his county bench. An example of good lordship rather than bad (but in an antagonistic context that tested the ideal's strength) occurred in 1613 when peasants on Viscount Brackley's estates refused to honor their legal obligations to him. He had his day in court, but the defendants insisted that they should not be answerable because lawyers they approached had refused to represent them. The
doubtless exasperated Brackley then offered to procure for them the assistance of any professional in the realm, after which his refractory tenants enjoyed the services of (among others) no less than attorney general Sir Francis Bacon.  

Ideals of lordship applied not just to landlords but also to government officials. Relative to a landlord, officials stood at one remove from many of those in their charge. But with the exception of the occasional low-born bishop, medieval social and political hierarchies generally mirrored each other. Thus after vassalage formally institutionalized the ideal of lordship, the legitimacy of honor would have easily been extended to such officials as Carolingian counts and missi, or English sheriffs, who exercised governing authority in less directly personal circumstances—but who, even in theory, functioned impersonally downward only, not upward. Originating from the king's own household, counts and other Carolingian officers who reported directly to the center were still the servants of an individualized master. The same was true for the sheriff, the sheriff's fifteenth-century supplanter, the justice of the peace, and his sixteenth-century colleagues, the lord and deputy lieutenant, who gained honor from superiors (sometimes the monarch directly, but more often members of the privy council, other high-ranking royal officials, or powerful courtiers) through faithful service. And that service to superiors required good lordship to inferiors—not just for pragmatic reasons of enforcement, but ideologically too, since much of the monarch's own honor was thought to rest upon the welfare of the common folk. In its magisterial guise, lordship's ideal execution was perhaps most widely exemplified by the imposition of low grain prices to sustain the poor in desperate times. During the pinching years of the 1590s, the vicar called leading citizens of Barnstaple, Devonshire, "fat oxen" and accused them of using "unlawful means to . . . bring a famine amongst the inferiors and poorest
sort”, hoarding supplies in order to sell high. Imprisoned, he was soon freed by the earl of Bath and county justices, while the surly burghers found themselves forced to follow the Book of Orders.\textsuperscript{44}

The justice's and lieutenant's mantle gave him authority not only over his social inferiors but also, at least formally, over other gentlemen to whom he likewise had a duty of neighborly lordship: echoing Dudley's hundred-year-old ghost, in 1609 Sir Richard Grosvenor told fellow JPs to "count it an honour if you can compose their differences and keep them from that pick-purse lawing."\textsuperscript{45} Lordship's exercise on behalf of not just inferiors but relative equals goes far to explain the marked reluctance of officeholders over most of the English Reformation to "enforce penal legislation except when stimulated by direct and unambiguous commands from the Privy Council, by crisis conditions, or by both."\textsuperscript{46} In late-Elizabethan Hereford, for example, JPs were accused of "wink[ing]" at Catholic recusants "in respect of kindred or friendship".\textsuperscript{47}

The Hereford JPs demonstrate how honorable lordship—either its neglect, perceived if not actual, at the center or its application on the periphery—furnishes an important context for resistance to central directives, since protecting a county or parish might require circumventing higher powers bent on exploitation. However national an esquire's political awareness when at Westminster as an MP, he also served as "a watchdog for local interests". Back home as a JP, he could sometimes be found viewing royal proclamations, privy-council imperatives, and even parliamentary statutes (which he himself might have helped pass) as suggestions to be politely circumvented if he did not feel that they suited the circumstances of his locale.\textsuperscript{48} The poor law provides suitable illustrations. After a rate had been collected for the relief of plague-ridden Scarborough in 1598, despite glaring need for additional aid and a letter direct from the queen to
the archbishop of York, one justice in the East Riding refused to collect further relief from his division "until other places had paid as much." The poor law had forbidden begging for more than two decades when JPs nevertheless decided in 1624 that the Ormskirk indigent could take "liberty to ask and have reasonable relief" from more prosperous residents, though not pester any householder more than once a week.49

Contravention could not, of course, be overly complacent. Princely grumblings about such behaviors and even sheer laziness are easy to find; both Elizabeth and James I inveighed against JPs who paid little attention to their duties unless "special causes of their own or their friends" were at stake, an easy shortcoming to indulge when a goodly portion of what sustained one in office was the following that comprised one's "friends."50 The royal remarks suggest a good deal of recurrence but also hint at the possibility of repercussions. If such central demands were treated too cavalierly the privy council might place a man in the "'black book' of disfavor", an undesirable outcome indeed since additional advancement could only be obtained from the keepers of said book. And when it had a will, king or council could go further: even powerful greater gentry could be imperatively summoned to London, berated, jailed, and fined, while for lieutenants, deputies, or magistrates dismissal was perhaps worse. No one wanted to slink back to his estates under that cloud. The earl of Worcester's son complained that after his father lost a lieutenancy, the family and their network of clients faced "daily affronts . . . he being now as they term him, Jack out of Office."51 Though exceptions to the rule, the odd gentleman can be found refusing appointment in the first place. "The honor of being in," explained one of Anne's reluctant prospects for the county bench, "is not so great as the disgrace of being turned out." As there is abundant testimony to the honor gained from being in, this is a sobering assessment.52
Yet there was risk from below as well as from above: if superiors had teeth, inferiors had claws which, if blunted, could still deliver a painful scrape. The latter were ironically sharpened by the former, as faithful service's most unequivocal gauge was inevitably effective service. Indefatigability without results, though often pled, could too easily be interpreted as lackadaisical execution. Therefore to secure appointment in the first place an "interest" was usually required like the one under cultivation by one gentleman in Sevenoaks, Kent, who increased his following in 1713 by (at the last minute) leasing a migrant an amount of land sufficient to prevent the man's imminent deportation. A large number of grateful inferiors would ensure that one's orders were respected at the outset by a significant number of locals. But such standing was based mostly on the performance of good, or at least acceptable, lordship, due even the cottager and landless laborer in reciprocal return for their service of respectful obedience. Their cooperation, along with that of yeomen and other middling-sort betters, "often grudging and partial, had to be won, for it could not be assumed." When one of Henry VIII's new commercially oriented noblemen began maximizing his Cumberland rents, a neighboring earl remarked that the improver needed to stop being "so greedy to get money of his tenants". Without their support, the man would be politically and administratively impotent and therefore unable to serve the King in one of the offices traditionally assigned to northern magnates.

Poor lordship, or its perception, could result in more than just a lack of cooperation if locals felt the circumstances warranted a more vigorous message. It was sometimes asserted that JPs were "kings in miniature," but there was a sobering aspect to that analogy. Sometimes-unruly crowds could solicit action with formal petitions. If petitions failed to achieve the desired result, especially during hard times when grain was at issue, lower-middling and lesser sorts might
resort to "riots"—actually forceful protests featuring limited objectives and often careful organization aimed at alleviating a specific injustice. These were the provincial equivalent of the Pilgrims’ 1536 march on London. The purpose was the same: to remind authorities, national or local, of their obligations under lordship. For all his undisguised rage at social injustice, Piers Plowman had retained lordship's hierarchy: the knight ready to refrain from unfair expropriation and to employ his sword protecting Piers from spoliation by pests or robbers received the peasant's willing promise, "I shall swynk and sweat and sow for us both". But this was an equitable agreement, contingent upon "covenant that thou keep". The unavoidable implication was that if good lordship slackened, so could obedience, as easily in the seventeenth century as during the fourteenth.

Unenforceable commands, petitions and protests were not the worst of it for some officeholders—rather than merely failing to increase, in cases of genuinely widespread resistance their honor might suffer. The local esteem that produced support for and compliance with a lord lieutenant or justice's directions might evaporate; along with that might go not only the honor accrued by the appointment but at least some of the original standing with inferiors and equals that had legitimated the appointment in the first place. Deputy lieutenants in Devon balked at collecting the forced loan of 1625 because of "those storms of envy which we may chance to suffer for it." During the same reign, Sir John Done of Cheshire learned the truth of their worry (if regarding a different matter at a lower social level), losing even minimal deference when his order to quarantine a house afflicted with plague received the response, "What has Mr. Done to do here? A turd for him!" One of Done's colleagues on the Cheshire bench, a godly enthusiast, found himself defied by the village of Wilmslow after placing a traveling bear-owner in the
stocks. Deprived of their baiting, the Wilmslowans, apparently in a body, supported their man with drink, music, and convivial company throughout the day. Some residents openly threatened to assault the justice and his servants, one of whom was told that his warrant was "shitten". After nightfall the stocks were destroyed. Even peers floundered when their local standing eroded. After attempting to prosecute defaulters on the same forced loan that caused problems in Devon, the earl of Southampton plaintively wrote the privy council that he needed central help for enforcement because not only the general run of county gentry but even his own deputy lieutenants now "disvalue[d]" him.

Of course middling and lesser sorts, like their immediate superiors, could not push resistance too far without consequences, but even harsh official reprisals tended not to entirely abrogate the tenets of good lordship. A May 1629 grain riot at Maldon, for example, ended with the execution of four ringleaders. But a longer view of the events at Maldon complicates an easy reaction of horror to the hangings. A number of smaller preceding perturbations in the region provoked no murmur from the government. The official response to two larger disturbances was a proclamation that no further grain would be removed from the county. All grain currently in port was then distributed to the poor. Only after these measures proved insufficient to prevent the third major riot did the privy council, shadowed by a king newly embarked upon the impecunious policy of Personal Rule and probably afraid of a domino effect, force magistrates to implement capital punishment. No "merrie England" this body politic, then, rather one kept whole by stark political calculation—but it is critical to recognize the place in that calculus of not just the coercive but the beneficent aspects of lordship. At least one local gentleman, writing that the hangings went too far, registered the continuing moral (as opposed to the merely
pragmatic) force of lordship's imperative. Despite unruly behavior, where crowds only petitioned instead of taking action into their own hands almost nobody was punished during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries unless they became offensively insubordinate to those of gentle blood (deference, after all, was part of what they bartered superiors for protection). And often, as the first Maldon disturbance showed, even the leaders of major riots could escape severe censure.66

The discomforts of Maldon recall local lordship's chained connection back to the top—there lay not only final authority but ultimate responsibility with all of responsibility's repercussions: the council too prevaricated as Maldon roiled. A generation earlier Elizabeth's own cousin Lord Hunsdon, whose kinship to the queen should have made him more secure than most, was advised not to take the post of Lord Chamberlain because the risk of shame in case of error was too great. The mighty could also fall, from poor results as well as courtly backstabbing. Since local enforcement lay wholly in the hands of local elites, the effective central officer needed their goodwill as much as they needed their own inferiors'. Surely one of the reasons for which king and council did not more often impose the sanctions which could devastate individuals of even the highest magnate status was that English nobles and gentlemen represented a daunting collective.67 As late as the mid-eighteenth century, "So powerful were the justices that they were virtually independent . . . . Neither the central government nor Parliament told them what to do, closely supervised their activity, or even insured that they act at all."

Securing local elite support or at least grudging compliance was both an utter necessity and much more a matter of suasion than coercion for monarch and ministers. Their most important tool, saving arguments from the pulpit on the monarch's divine sanction, was good lordship, enacted in patronage, compromise, or the promotion of mutual interest.68

34
The cultural strength of good lordship's ideal meant that even if local recalcitrance arose from the most raw self-interest it would be disguised as faithful service upward or local protectionism outward and downward. Self-interest may certainly be read between the lines written by Lincolnshire gentry appointed as tax commissioners in 1621 when the privy council ordered them to assess both themselves and county JPs at an increased rate, thereby setting a salutary example for others. But howsoever guided by the financial agendas of its members, the commission's response dealt the terms of lordship from the servant's point of view as smoothly as any London sharp ever turned a card. Their neighbors, the JPs, would be unable to comply because it was "too burthensome for their small estates", especially "considering the daily charge they undergo by their pains in his Majesty's several services"; for their part, the commissioners were getting dangerously close to losing their goodwill among the populace—when collecting the previous assessment, "we were very hardly censured by the country for insisting so much as we did upon the continuance of the former rates" (let alone an increase) "and were very glad that we could uphold it so much as we did." Were the commissioners to pay the additional amount, "the country" would become even more restive (foreseeing an augmentation of its burden) and their own effectiveness curtailed. As a result, the commissioners concluded, refusal was the best course, enabling them to continue being at least halfway-decent royal servants: "[we] ourselves" would be more than happy to "undergo that rate or a greater . . . Were it not that we are both very desirous to advance his Majesty's service and to give your lordships the best contentment in our small powers."  

If pious protests of faithful service could cover gentry self-interest in Lincolnshire, rougher assertions of local protection seem to have done the same in Hampshire. There in 1671
Joseph and Matthew Phripp assaulted an exciseman on grounds that he represented an organization comprising rogues whose purpose was to illegitimately plunder their "country". Idealistic pretensions by Matthew, especially, bred ill confidence: his rap sheet included tax evasion and the abuse of office during the second Dutch war to steal naval prize goods. Yet maintaining a harmonious working relationship with the locals was important enough that the treasury smoothed the matter over rather than issue a rebuke, let alone attempt some kind of disciplinary measure, even though the Phripps were apparently mere parish gentry.\textsuperscript{71}

But perhaps the strongest testament to the muscularity of local lordship comes from Derek Hirst. His observation that after Cromwell expelled the Rump, "Quarter sessions continued to meet, and . . . the country continued to function, although all legitimate authority had gone" loses no insightfulness for its slight stumble over the technicality that JPs themselves clearly retained legitimacy.\textsuperscript{72} Much of that legitimacy's force, however, obviously did not arise from a central governing authority. Instead it was signaled with a form of address commonly applied by social inferiors not only to gentry and nobility but also to mid- and high-level government officials no matter what their landowning status, and still preserved in one such context to this day: "your Honor."\textsuperscript{73} In sum, the values of honor culture legitimized early modern English government both at the center and in the localities, and did so for members of the body politic at all levels: the ideal of good lordship had deep roots in not just elite but also "popular morality."\textsuperscript{74}

III

The foregoing portrait would seem to suggest a protracted and influential life for honor in the
English scene, and maybe that of Europe more broadly (see Appendix B), but a different strand of scholarship suggests otherwise. Not only good lordship but other values of honor underpinned the legitimacy of early modern governments (as Elizabeth well knew, monarchs could still get mileage from seeming martial) and were invoked to legitimize or demand political action of all kinds. It is at least plausible to propose that such a long-running force in society and politics low as well as high played some sort of role in shaping English, and perhaps European, trajectories into the modern era. However, the scholarship on "modernity" surveyed in this Prologue's first section buzzes like a bevy of horseflies in honor's ointment.

With the kind of pigments to hand provided by such theorists as Weber, Elias, Charles Tilly, and Douglass North, specialists in early modern England have not been slow to paint in the outlines sketched by the generalists. England, they have argued, got started on the modern road much earlier than anyone else when the medieval Normans created a stable judiciary, imposing a common legal structure throughout the realm in contrast to the organizationally differing bodies in independent regions developing elsewhere in Europe. Weber thought that a rational and trustworthy legal system was critical to the growth of modern capitalism; able to carry on financial wrangling by litigation within a reasonably predictable environment rather than being forced always to the sword, English warrior elites became poster children for his dictum by embarking upon a "centuries-long embourgeoisement". This entailed an increasingly exploitative attitude (embodied most visibly in the famous enclosures) toward aristocratic patrimonies. The old customary tenant loyalty decayed and an attendant "exceptionally early demilitarization" of England's nobles and gentry allowed them to look approvingly on "commercial activities long before any comparable ruling class in Europe" (at least by the end of
the Caroline period, perhaps before). It also centered them, Elias-like, on the royal court.

Blue-blooded "embourgeoisement" was accelerated during the early modern period by three factors: a new "programme of civility" put into effect by Henry VIII and his successors to promote greater societal order, a "commercial revolution" that put more money in the pockets of English subjects, and Peter Borsay's well-known "urban renaissance" in which nobles abandoned their estates for London from 1590 onward and the gentry followed to the greater towns after the Restoration. Thus leavened, the English elite abandoned "the old martial values" and instead obtained humanistic educations at the universities or Inns of Court, becoming not only more cultured but "'legally knowledgeable," a more adaptive trait in "the new commercial society." Turning their backs on the old rural pursuits such as hunting, they assumed the new role of capital-driven consumer who cultivated the newly sociable bourgeois politeness expressed in sophisticated outlets such as coffeehouses, gambling salons, balls, or clubs for books, music, and science. J. G. A. Pocock capped this line of general inquiry with an argument for a late-seventeenth-century transformation of their dominant ethos into a full-blown "commercial humanism", and historians have now passed on to considering the operation of the new civility in the novel privacy of the domestic.

But the influence of the urban environment went beyond mere entertainment to plumb deeper wells of mentality. The Royal Society, famous as Europe's first national scientific organization, was one of the city clubs writ large. Such activities were symptoms of the profound change in worldview revealed when a key element of modern rationality, "the expansion of the concept 'fact' from human to natural events and phenomena[,] occurred first in England." And it was there, even prior to the Restoration's dawning on its first coffeehouse, that Sir William Petty
conducted the Irish survey with which he helped found "political arithmetic." This inaugural foray into statistics rationalized the nation's burgeoning number of individuals into typified, numerical objects constructed for the state's informational ordering and manipulation a good deal more systematically than ever before—and, like the Royal Society, before it was done anywhere else in Europe.  

As England's worldview changed, so did its government. John Brewer's influential *Sinews of Power* and subsequent work have charted the growth of a "fiscal-military state" during the last half of the seventeenth century which came to exercise unprecedented reach. Encouraged simultaneously by the commercial revolution, the financial requirements of war and by "changes in ways of understanding and classifying the world", England underwent what has been called "an administrative revolution" in which "the departments of central government—the Treasury, the fiscal boards, the Admiralty and Navy Boards, the offices of the Secretaries of State and the Board of Trade . . . required greater knowledge; skilled government needed more detailed and precise information." These organizations also increasingly formalized their procedures, began paying salaries, and implemented other innovations that placed England directly on the high road to "the emergence of the 'modern' state defined in terms of specialised, bureaucratic, differentiated institutions." All that remained was to rationalize state finances, thus simultaneously reining in the monarch and launching capitalism in its fully modern form, a final dot duly connected after what has been called "the first modern revolution" in 1688. Small wonder that a recent article, not content with one or the other of "exceptional" and "precocious," felt that English development could be adequately served only by a title containing both.  

In view of this literature the status of honor in England must be held increasingly suspect
over the length of the early modern period. By the time the seismic waves of disruption marking the mid-seventeenth century (civil wars and Interregnum) had subsided, many depersonalizing changes in social psychology and cultural behavior—a capitalistic business ethic, consumerism, the rise of a rational mentality expressed in the smooth new "civility" and such endeavors as litigation and natural philosophy—had been underway for well over a century. This chronology poses signal problems for honor. The social anthropologists who originated systematic cultural analysis in its terms hold that lineage culture can only function in "small scale, exclusive societies where face-to-face personal, as opposed to anonymous, relations are of paramount importance and where the social personality of the actor is as significant as his office." It is perfectly sensible, then, to find that already by the time of a 1572 Act strengthening the poor law, the "older culture" was "now unmistakably under attack." From that point onward the assaults multiplied until they crescendoed in the urban "crusade to civilize the rural gentry" and the wholesale adoption of Pocock's commercial humanism.

Given these attacks, it is a seeming miracle that honor had not yet been fully extirpated by the second half of the seventeenth century, certainly by all scholarly expectation the extent of honor's influence should have been reduced to isolated pockets. Courtiers and chief ministers moving in the heady atmosphere of continuous proximity to the king's person would doubtless continue to deploy the language of antiquated ceremony, while the odd backwoods squire who regarded city blandishments with narrowminded suspicion and refused to go to town with his friends might have held to good lordship with belated tenacity for a time. But by mid-Restoration, if not earlier, any stray gestures at the old style of honor relations were, in the words of one recent commentator, "deceptively archaic trappings" cloaking a new agricultural
practice that had become "primarily a business [which] . . . . normalised the expectation of change and adaptation in the pursuit of commercial opportunity". For another scholar, "[b]y the early seventeenth century a new [humanistic] conception of gentility had totally supplanted the old [chivalric] one." If the changes discussed here did "embourgeoisefy" landholding elites according to the timetables currently on historiographical offer, then during the second half of the seventeenth century, already having long imbibed a city-based civility that one author has identified as antithetical to the independence associated with medieval honor—"willfulness, passion, and violence"—nobles and gentlemen abandoned personalized lordship. Its dregs they poured into what has been interpreted as the less intimate, more coldly businesslike cup of "patron-client relations".

As with the social, so too the political: if personalized honor had previously conferred legitimacy, the latter should have dried up with its source. Most of the relevant professional literature supports this supposition, implying and sometimes explicitly arguing that old legitimating ideas were ground to dust beneath the oncoming juggernaut of civic-bureaucratic rationality. Between 1640 and 1690 in England older methods of rule gave way to a depersonalizing "government by bureaucracy". Championed in England by such figures as William Leybourn, Petty, Josiah Child, and Charles Davenant, who saw political arithmetic as a legitimizing factor that could act as "a powerful solvent of custom", these "changes in the form and functioning of the [English] state" were "modernising in the Weberian sense." As the newly impersonal state increasingly separated the monarch's desires from the workings of government, a similar crevasse opened between both central and local civil servants and their official actions. Those signature characteristics of modern bureaucracy, "formal and
impersonal procedures", reduced individual discretion by furnishing a "routine means" of legitimating decisions in the big governmental units headquartered in London. And in the provinces, by the 1670s commoners began to displace nobles in the office of lord lieutenant. The new men transmuted what had previously been a loose-knit, community-oriented organization bent on maintaining a flexible harmony between center and locality (often more at the center's expense than the locality's) into nearly the opposite, a well-oiled machine dedicated to crushing the crown's opponents even if the crown didn't want them crushed. The emergence of England's first political parties late in Charles II's reign doubtless played a role. It is easy to see why the lieutenancy's chronicler has interpreted these developments as "vital in England's passage from the medieval past to the modern world."

Trickle-down rationalization soon reached the level of the JP as well. About two decades after the lieutenancy began its transformation, influential county gentry have been described as executing a supplementary withdrawal from local administration, leaving it to lesser gentry. The latter worthies adopted "professional methods and attitudes . . . in efforts to rationalise sessions business" with such vigor that the resulting "judicial routine" can be described as "stultifying" and the justice who implemented it as behaving like a modern "legal administrator concerned with orderly government in an atmosphere more closely approximating to that of a civil service board." The complementarity of this schema to Borsay's account of nobles and gentry migrating to towns and adopting "civility" is obvious.

The foregoing factors encouraged honor's most important English historian to argue that over the course of the sixteenth century and first half of the seventeenth, the honor of immemorial custom was steamrolled flat by the new humanist-driven civility emphasizing order,
law, and rationality in general. In both center and province England underwent "a transformation of the perceived nature of political authority" from personal to depersonalized in which legitimating "reference to the obligations of an individual" was replaced by "impersonal claims of precision and necessity". And if the early modern "bureaucratic conception of the state" was strictly opposed to "the feudal and chivalric . . . relationship between King and liegemen", on nobody should these elements have landed as heavily as on the state's new bureaucrat, as relentlessly quantitative as the capitalist and even more impersonal. One scholar describes the later seventeenth-century bureaucrat's "self-making" as "a process of shaping himself to fit . . . the requirements of the state", and that state required that he play "planned, rationally ordered . . . routinised and scrutinized roles". If administrative legitimacy stood upon the elimination of personal interests from decision-making by denying on-the-job personhood, John Brewer may be right to conjure quasi-automatons in an early modern civil service that "did not breed administrators of great imagination or powerful vision. It produced orderly and precise men, who were industrious rather than innovative. . . . attached to the minutiae of their offices and to the punctilio of their proceedings." After all, "[a]dmistrations thrive on routine. They abhor the stock in trade of the dramatist and the historian [and, it might be added, of the fiercely independent, honorable warrior]—change, disruption, violent action—aspiring to a ubiquity of sameness." Other commentators take similar stances.

The new bureaucracies' structural and ideological antithesis to honor's personalized nature implies that those administrative organs should have failed if honor had somehow gained a foothold within them. "[P]ersonal ties, voluntaristic constraints, and ostracism" as well as threat of violence, informal sanctions, heavy reliance upon kinship networks, and emphasis on
reputation are classified by social scientists as standard elements of inefficient, outmoded institutions such as those that still retard growth in Latin America. When such elements exist in a bureaucracy, they prevent government control over civil servants. All of these are attributes of traditional honor, and in any relatively effective bureaucracy—and that, commentators generally agree, the later Stuart administration increasingly was—they must have a minor place, if any.111 "Squire Western had become an anachronism even before Henry Fielding invented him", insists one scholar writing on the later Stuart period.112 If this can be said of the landed elites outside the royal government, many of whom could still be found residing for part of the year at their country estates, then both theory and much historiography require that any remnant of knightly medieval culture have been completely eliminated from the city-based civil services that began to undergo their administrative revolution during the reign of Charles II.

Least likely though it be to harbor the already dessicated husk of old honor, government bureaucracy is by far the best place, if the mass of current opinion is any guide, to seek the critical factors of social and political modernization. Civil servants were the most direct agents of increasing governmental impersonality and rationalization: their accumulating acts eventually resulted in those very changes. They as much as chief ministers or JPs had to execute those transformational tasks, as one scholar writes of the exciseman, "without losing legitimacy."113 For this reason they were constantly embroiled in the public sphere. Even mid-level civil servants were among the higher-paid professionals of the realm, and (with the exception of excisemen) nearly always worked in cities and towns, exposed to the full influence of the urban renaissance and the commercial revolution's consumerism; and not only did they contribute to coffeehouse arguments during their leisure, but as they did their jobs they were also forced to justify
government action (itself perhaps the main object of discussion in the public sphere) to the
disgruntled. Their general success may be taken as a symptom of how powerfully Elizabeth
Eisenstein's early modern knowledge explosion manifested itself in the new administrative
organs, where "a better command of information" and its effective deployment—"the greater
professionalism of public servants"—underlay the "enhanced effectiveness" of the later Stuart
state.114 Without them, the bounty of the commercial revolution would have been useless to the
nation as a political entity. As Brewer puts it, "international aggrandizement . . . relied on the
state's ability—political, fiscal and administrative—to harness and mobilize these resources", and
the bureaucrats were the ones who furnished England with that ability.115

One of these civil servants affords this dissertation's exhibit of honor thriving at a time
and in a place that should have destroyed it. Made here in significant depth so as to avoid the
problems that previous authors failed to surmount, the case of Samuel Pepys, his superiors, and
his subordinates shows that, despite all indications to the contrary, honor helped him promote
effective English government. In other words, the modernizing rationality often deemed so
antithetical to older attitudes was in fact given an assist in the new bureaucracy by the workings
of honor. The ancient mentality achieved this not merely at the top among department chiefs such
as the secretaries of state who reported directly to the King (and who were thus courtiers by
default) but also among their mid-level subordinates, who felt that they, too, had a legitimate
claim to honor in its traditional mode—which they did not consider the least outmoded. Honor's
continuing and vital presence at the center of government during this critical moment reveals a
previously unrecognized facet of England's trajectory into modern times.
Notes to Prologue

To the best of my knowledge, the only other scholar to have confronted this issue is an historian of France: Jay M. Smith, *The Culture of Merit: Nobility, Royal Service, and the Making of Absolute Monarchy in France, 1600-1789* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996).

The general problem of the transformation from early modern to modern is the subject of a truly Brobdingnagian literature. The treatment here in section I (and some in III) can cover only a fraction of its contours, although of course the author hopes he has cited the work most relevant to the purposes of this project.


Marx and Weber's ideas are well-known enough to need no rehearsal here, but their (rough) contemporaries Georg Voigt and Jacob Burkhardt joined the effort by holding that an inchoate, communalist medieval mindset fractured on the rock of an "individualistic" Renaissance whose humanism "pointed ahead to certain highly significant achievements of modern thought", including broadly "critical and rational habits of mind" and developments such as "the modern sciences": William J. Bouwsma, *The Interpretation of Renaissance Humanism* (Washington: Service Center for Teachers of History, 1959), 3-6, quotation on 6. Scholarship from the 1950s onward emphasizing one or another of these issues in terms of Europe as whole is sufficiently legion as to preclude any attempt at a comprehensive listing. For a well-known account of the modern state's evolution by way of conflict between commercializing, mostly urban interests with "coercive" landowners who harked back to the feudal era, see Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990* (Cambridge, Mass., USA: B. Blackwell, 1990); for a recent piece of representative work on the psychological side, see Timothy J. Reiss's argument that the modern Western self began to emerge at the end of the Middle Ages and matured at around 1700: *Mirages of the Selfe: Patterns of Personhood in Ancient and Early Modern Europe* (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2003). Even historians normally considered specialists in England have taken a hand; Eric Hobsbawm aired the Marxist perspective, while John Bossy proffered a different mechanism than Weber but still accorded a major part to Protestantism in his account of early modern individuation: *Christianity in the West, 1400-1700* (Oxford, UK; New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). Renaissance humanists have also been credited with sparking the early modern market economy: Craig Muldrew, *The Economy of Obligation: The Culture of Credit and Social Relations in Early Modern England* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1998), 16.


7 Landes, whose book was reissued in 2003 with a new preface and epilogue but no revision of the argument, adduced most of the same factors though unsurprisingly gave greater weight to aspects directly related to economics such as a cultural predilection toward property rights that gave the West an especially dynamic "business class": *The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 15-34, quotation on 19.

8 For full documentation of these arguments, see Eisenstein, *The Printing Press as an Agent of Change: Communications and Cultural Transformations in Early Modern Europe*, 2 vols., Paperback ed. (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980); the work used here is her more easily available and accessible condensation, *The Printing Revolution in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), quotations on 42 and 56. She explains, "By its very nature, a reading public was . . . more atomistic and individualistic than a hearing one. . . . The notion that society may be regarded as a bundle of
discrete units or that the individual is prior to the social group seems more compatible with a reading public”. But such individuation led to isolation and therefore social anonymity because new kinds of community such as "subscription lists and corresponding societies represented relatively impersonal group formations" while communal-seeming but print-related gathering places such as coffeehouses "required temporary isolation" for the act of reading. And rather than personally attending previously communal events such as royal entries, the new reader could stay away, participating after a fashion by instead relying upon "more impersonal channels of communication" such as commemorative prints (94-5). Moreover, the very language in which these communes were formed was subjected by print to increasing "homogenization" (81-2). For the "knowledge explosion" see 42-3. For further comments on individualism as a new phenomenon in the early modern period, see 84, 129-31, and 134-5, and for its combination with standardization, see 56-8 and 126. Indeed, Eisenstein sees printing's increased diffusion of knowledge as virtually entailing standardization. She acknowledges that print can perpetuate disorders and inaccuracies but argues that its most fundamental characteristics conduce toward uniformity and the rectification of errors: 50-4, 61-72, 74-5, 86-7, 89-90, 124-5, 191-240, 259, 261, and 268-9. A new edition of Printing Revolution contains an Afterword reaffirming all her previous points (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 313-58. Some recent histories of the book cite the interpretive activity of readers (among other factors) as evidence that the fixity for which Eisenstein argues is a chimera, but in the present writer's judgment these dismissals uniformly fail to confront the copious documentation and carefully nuanced observations of The Printing Press as an Agent of Change.

9 Infantry, for example, split into specializations such as fusilier, grenadier, sapper, and light infantry: see Brian M. Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins Of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992), 66-72, which contains references to the most important authorities on this issue.

10 Lawrence Stone, The Crisis of the Aristocracy, 1558-1641 (Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon Press, 1965), 503. One strand of older scholarship did interpret centralizing measures by Richelieu, Colbert, and other French absolutist officials as self-conscious, purposeful modernization, but revisionists have stressed the ad-hoc, reactive origins of their measures. For more on French revisionism, see Appendix B.

11 James B. Collins, The State in Early Modern France, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 208, and see also J. Russell Major, From Renaissance Monarchy to Absolute Monarchy: French Kings, Nobles & Estates (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 365. The view of the robe as basically bourgeois is in Norbert Elias's civilizing process, an important component of which was the bourgeoisie's ongoing attempt to displace the nobility. "[T]he most representative and socially influential" bourgeois group during the crucial transition to modernity "in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries", Elias felt, was not the stereotypical merchant but rather "the middle-class servant[s] of princes or kings, that is . . . bureaucrats." (SF, 402) Perhaps the most important twentieth-century specialist on the robe also holds that the group "sprang from the bourgeoisie and never wholly lost its stake in capitalist development", remaining "half-bourgeois" through most of the seventeenth century: Franklin L.


14 Elias generalizes to the whole of Europe his argument about the taming of a militaristic aristocracy by royal bureaucracy and codes of manners, but his supporting exposition focuses almost wholly upon France (*SF* and *Court Society*). For the application of Elias's thesis to France, see (to cite only a few examples), Orest Ranum, "Courtesy, Absolutism, and the Rise of the French State, 1630-1660," *The Journal of Modern History* 52, no. 3 (1980): 426-451; Miller, *Bourbon and Stuart*, 173-5; Jacques Levron, "Louis XIV's Courtiers," in *Louis XIV and

15 Quotation in Emile Lousse, "Absolutism," in The Development of the Modern State, ed. Heinz Lubasz (New York: Macmillan, 1964), 47. For French administration as the efficient, professional foundation of absolutism, see Menna Prestwich, "The Making of Absolute Monarchy (1559-1683)," in France: Government and Society, ed. J. M. Wallace-Hadrill and John McManners (London: Methuen, 1957), 105–33, or John C. Rule, "Louis XIV, Roi-Bureaucrate," in Louis XIV and the Craft of Kingship (The Ohio State University Press, 1969), 3–101; for tax farmers, who developed an even more effective bureaucracy than the government, see George T. Matthews, The Royal General Farms in Eighteenth-Century France (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), which includes some material on the later seventeenth century. For a convenient, relatively brief book-length example of the older interpretation that the elements listed in this paragraph were all part of a deliberately planned modernization strategy, see Harry George Judge, Louis XIV (London: Longmans, 1965); rare recent examples are Yves Marie Bercé, The Birth of Absolutism: A History of France, 1598-1661 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), who holds, for example, that Richelieu imposed "fiscal terrorism and political tyranny"(153) while Marillac made calculated plans for imposing royal authority over the country in what was demonstrably "arbitrary centralism" (171, and see also 108-9); Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change, which defines absolutism as the structure of "a highly bureaucratized and militarized central state that rules without a parliament, either by destroying or circumventing it" (11; see 113-38 for Downing's elaboration of the French case); and Douglas C. North argues that early modern French and Spanish absolute rulers, taking advantage of a "belief structure" that reinforced their power, systematically handed out commercially stagnant monopolies in return for ready-made revenue, maintaining control with large armies and profitable if cumbersome central bureaucracies; as a result, they "stifled both economic growth and political/civil freedoms." Quotations in, respectively, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 140; Understanding the Process of Economic Change (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005), 145. See also further citations from North's work in next note. For a transitional perspective between this pole and the revisionism described in Appendix B, see François Dumont, "French Kingship and Absolute Monarchy in the Seventeenth Century," in Louis XIV and Absolutism, ed. Ragnhild Marie Hatton (London: Macmillan, 1976), 55-84. For summaries by hostile revisionists but including helpful narratives of the previous viewpoint's
historiographical evolution from the nineteenth and early twentieth century, see Robert R. Harding, *Anatomy of a Power Elite: The Provincial Governors of Early Modern France* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), 1-4, especially strong on historiography that viewed the robe as a monopolistic instrument for controlling the old nobility; Campbell, *Ancien Régime*, 3-14; and Roger Mettam, "France," in *Absolutism in Seventeenth-Century Europe*, ed. John Miller (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 43-5. A few hispanists argue that there was no Spanish "robe" because high office could not be bought, but against this others observe that all the crown's lesser positions were sold: see Kagan, *Lawsuits*, 37, 56-8, 224 and Casey, *Early Modern Spain*, 117-18.

16 Elias thought that England had passed more quickly through his "courtly-absolutist" phase (SF, 511-13)—the most important part of the civilizing process because there the monarch obtained a full monopoly over legitimate force and taxation (SF, 268-9, 466)—and progressed earlier into his modern bourgeois phase of development, although his glances across the channel remained desultory because he felt that England's geographical separation from the continent was what accounted for its development of atypical characteristics and, as a sociologist, he wanted to emphasize more generalizable cases.

17 For Landes on England's less traditionally hidebound mentality, see *Unbound Prometheus*, 48; urbanization and commerce, 51-2; exceptional rationality, 54.

Habermas's argument is in *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989). Norbert Elias concentrated his attention on France, where he saw the "split between an intimate and a public sphere" as occurring in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (*SF*, 349, 350, 352-4; *Court Society*, 52-3, 114-16, 138-9; quotation from *HM*, 190) but he briefly observed that it had already at least "partly" developed in England (*SF*, 504).


For a full picture of most facets of medieval and early modern honor relevant to high politics, see James, passim. For a representative statement on traditional lineage culture see James, 274-5. James's *Family, Lineage and Civil Society; a Study of Society, Politics and Mentality in the Durham Region, 1500-1640* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), 67-107, portrays humanist education in grammar schools as replacing the inculcation of honor in elite households. Despite some criticism, for combined breadth and depth James's discussion has not yet been equaled, let alone replaced. In the current author's opinion, James's treatment is accurate in its portrayal of honor's fundamental structure, missing only a few elements (mainly gender and economics). With only minor adjustments, therefore, I accept James's synchronic description. His view of honor's early modern transformation (see below), however, is problematic will be contested for the rest of this dissertation.


23 See the insightful warning in J. S. Morrill, *The Nature of the English Revolution: Essays* (London; New York: Longman, 1993), 332-56, that the resentment over Ship Money should not be glossed simply as opposition to its "unconstitutional" nature. The more fundamental issue was that Charles I "became clumsily interventionist . . . riding roughshod over . . . local customs and traditions": 187.


25 What we call a "state" only began to be labeled as such during the second half of the sixteenth century, before which it was still a "country," "people," "kingdom" or "realm": John Guy, *Tudor England* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1988), 352; for the evolution of "state" itself see Quentin Skinner, *The Age of Reformation*, vol. 2 of *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 356-8. Historians discussing the "state" prior to the early modern period may find appropriate definitions in their sources, but those sources do not use the word: see e.g. Joseph P. Canning, "Ideas of the State in Thirteenth and Fourteenth-Century Commentators on the Roman Law," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 33 (1983): 1–27. When monarchs employed "people," "kingdom" or "realm", they almost always accompanied it with the possessive pronoun (again, meant literally). The latter two, with roots in "king" and "royal," explicitly signified the ruler's intimate connection with the unit ruled, while his or her customary prepending of "my" before "people" speaks for itself. "Country" may seem rather more neutral, but in Europe's older manorial economy, the word normally meant one's locality, and when landowners of gentle blood used it in that manner it included their individual holdings as well as the larger area and thus also evoked a direct personal association with connotations of possession. This usage was sufficiently ubiquitous that modern scholars can be seen employing it in straightforward descriptive form rather than restricting it to quotation and paraphrase: see, for example, K. B. McFarlane, *The Nobility of Later Medieval England: The Ford Lectures for 1953 and Related Studies* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 7. The word's current function as a synonym for a sovereign political unit's territory was merely a tertiary usage in earlier times: *The Oxford English Dictionary*, 1st ed. (hereafter *OED*), s.v. "country", II.2-3.

26 There were some countervailing forces: by the later Middle Ages, the growth of national assemblies featuring significant numbers of lesser nobles, merchants, and sometimes (in a few
places on the continent) even peasants made it impossible for kings or queens to be acquainted with every member of the councils whose assistance they sought, and this development may have helped plant the seed of modern governmental " impersonalization." If so, however, it took an extremely long time to germinate.

27 The foremost practicing authority on the development of the English state disagrees: Michael J. Braddick roundly insists that even during earlier times, English monarchical power "was not 'personal' in a literal sense" and feels that "medievalists would surely point [this] out" (State Formation, 264). This view finds some, if not complete, support in G. L. Harriss, King, Parliament, and Public Finance in Medieval England to 1369 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 21. But Braddick also admits that even in his (later) period of concern, "monarchical caprice continued to be important" (22). Indeed, the personal so far outweighed the impersonal in political function as to make Braddick's comment appear an anomalously unthinking assertion of Weberian modernization. Some medievalists, at least, are rather less than sure about the position Braddick assumes on their behalf. K. B. McFarlane, Nobility of Later Medieval England, 47, writes, "in the kingdom, as most of us realize, the source of all authority was a personal monarch; his servants were there to carry out his desires, but the responsibility was his alone; their first rule of business—and he gave it to them—was: do nothing without . . . at least an oral command from him." The early modern evidence also generally fails to support Braddick's view. Despite Geoffrey Elton's career-spanning emphasis on Tudor administrative gains, he admits—though being careful to state that the characteristic "looks back to an older attitude"—that for some purposes "the crown [was viewed] as a piece of private property": G. R. Elton, The Tudor Constitution: Documents and Commentary, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 3. Formal constraint of the king's prerogative went back at least to Bracton, was strongly reiterated by Fortescue, and was an early modern English commonplace (Tudor Constitution, 17-18), but nonetheless "the laws do attribute unto him all honour, dignity, prerogative", which included the power "to defy what prince it shall please him and to bid him war . . . at his pleasure or the advice only of his Privy Council. His Privy Council be chosen also at the prince's pleasure", and a number of other political decisions were similarly taken (William Stanford [1548] and Sir Thomas Smith [1565], respectively qtd. on Tudor Constitution, 19 and 20); on Tudor government one step down as personal too, see Williams Tudor Regime, 53-4 and 463, whose assessment is supported by Elton's judgment after his detailed depiction of Thomas Cromwell's intensely hands-on supervision of various aspects of his administration: Elton, Policy and Police: The Enforcement of the Reformation in the Age of Thomas Cromwell (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1972), passim, and on 127 see also the recommendation by Robert Beale, an Elizabethan Secretary of State, that his successors maintain an inside contact in the monarch's privy chamber so the officials could be informed of the royal mood prior to attempting any business, since it was unwise to do so "When her Highness is angry or not well disposed." More broadly, as Derek Hirst points out, the medieval and early modern constitutional expectation that a king "live of his own" (however unrealistic) meant that he, not his subjects, paid for the government and therefore it too was his own, at least in theory, while the loyalty of nobles and gentlemen to the monarch was most fundamentally to his literal person: England in Conflict, 1603-1660: Kingdom, Community, Commonwealth (London, UK: Arnold, 1999), 8 and 203. And they were probably not the only ones to hold such a conception: it seems unlikely that
the medieval and early-modern peasants participating in Wat Tyler's Rebellion or the Pilgrimage of Grace would have agreed with Braddick's "impersonal" judgment as they risked all for a direct audience with their King. Similarly, Hirst also notes that this attitude underpinned the legal decision under James II that subjects born after his accession were naturalized in both England and Scotland, not the kingdom into which they were born, because loyalty adhered to the King himself: *Dominion: England and Its Island Neighbours, 1500-1707* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 138. This doctrine applied to everyone, not just elites.

28 As Derek Hirst notes, at the Restoration Charles II "was ready to believe that the Church of England and its doctrine of non-resistance were the essential prop of monarchy and aristocracy." But Charles's actual behavior rightly demonstrated ambivalence. This highly pragmatic and judiciously political monarch was constitutionally unable to comfort himself with soothing thoughts about clerical propaganda once his father's history had proven "that prop" not so reliable after all: *Dominion*, 231.


31 *Beowulf*, 105, l. 2796-8 and 103, l. 2732-7.

32 For the development of medieval lordship, see Bloch, *Feudal Society*, vol. 1, 149-51, 158-62, in which see also 163, 154, 222, 224 for generosity. The broader understanding of this terminology, still current in the early seventeenth century, at least, should not be confused with Keith Wrightson's more narrow legal-economic usage as a specific form of landownership left over from the feudal era: *Earthly Necessities: Economic Lives in Early Modern Britain* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), 70-5, though Wrightson's approach is helpful as a social marker, for which see end of Appendix C).

33 For the double duty to discipline as well as reward and protect during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, see the general comment in Derek Hirst, "Making Contact: Petitions and the English Republic," *Journal of British Studies* 45, no. 1 (January 2006): 48, and with respect to JPs see Braddick, *State Formation*, 146. This was early a "knightly" responsibility: Bloch, *Feudal Society*, vol. 2, 303.

34 After so emphatically defining the personal nature of late medieval kingship (see note above), K. B. McFarlane writes, "the same was true of seigniorial governments . . . as the varied records
demonstrate beyond question, the lord's will was the source of decision" (Nobility, 47).

Dudley, *The Tree of Commonwealth, a Treatise* (Manchester, UK: Charles Simms & Co., [1509] 1859), 18-19. From his time back to *Beowulf* the continuous longevity of this formula is attested by such widely varying sources as the Spanish *Usages of Barcelona*, ca. 1150 (cited. in Bloch, *Feudal Society*, vol. 1, 222) or William Langland, *Piers Plowman*, B-Version Archetype (ca. 1377), passus 1.96-100 and 3.209-21, 228-9, ed. John Burrow and Thorlac Turville-Petre (Piers Plowman Electronic Archive), [http://piers.iath.virginia.edu/exist/piers/crit/main/B/Bx](http://piers.iath.virginia.edu/exist/piers/crit/main/B/Bx), accessed 6 February 2014 (and see subsequent citation of same, below). Although using "patriarchalism" instead of "lordship," Derek Hirst notes the ideal's description in Ben Jonson's "To Penshurst" (with its evocation of Sir Philip Sidney, the ideal Elizabethan man of honor) and its extension from head to toe of the early modern body politic (*England in Conflict*, respectively 62 and 1-2), then offers a concise but full precis of its practice under the early Stuarts (4-6) which complements the material presented here. See also Christopher Hill, *Society and Puritanism in Pre-Revolutionary England*, 2d ed (New York: Schocken Books, 1967), 259-60. For a more specific look at the phenomenon's head, see Linda Levy Peck's "For a King Not to Be Bountiful Were a Fault': Perspectives on Court Patronage in Early Stuart England," *Journal of British Studies* 25, no. 1 (January, 1986): 31–61 and *Court Patronage and Corruption in Early Stuart England* (London; Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990). Such behavior continued into the later Stuart period as well: for example, Charles II bestowed a warship no longer serviceable but still valuable as salvage on two naval commanders "as his majesty's free gift and bounty to them" for "service by them severally performed to his majesty": SP, Admiralty Journal, 30 Jun. 1677, in *Cat.* 4, 465. See also the discussion of lords lieutenant and their deputies (almost always peers and county gentry) in Victor L. Stater, *Noble Government: The Stuart Lord Lieutenancy and the Transformation of English Politics* (Athens, Ga: University of Georgia Press, 1994), 18-25, including an example of an earl-lieutenant distributing such small items as ribbons and feathers to even the lowest-ranking members of the militia.


Cf. Hirst, *England in Conflict*, 2: "Abundant funeral sermons, not all of them the work of sycophantic toadies, portrayed gentry patrons as benevolent landlords and supporters of the poor."

For anger against landlords see the synthesis in Hindle, *The State and Social Change*, 45-6, citations on 252 n. 44 and 45.

The examples of political consequences stemming from the breach of good lordship are in Braddick, *State Formation*, 79-80 and Henry E. Huntington Library, HAM Box 53, folder 5 (1611-1612) respectively. For other examples of bad lords despite their own lip service to the ideal, see Felicity Heal and Clive Holmes, *The Gentry in England and Wales, 1500-1700*

40 Brackley and his canny tenants are in Braddick, *State Formation*, 164-5 (in which see also 146 for the good lordship of "patriarchs" in general). It should be noted that Bacon and Brackley were not the best of friends, so when the opportunity arose to oppose Brackley, Bacon probably jumped at the chance. But that antagonism only underscores the lordship Brackley felt obliged to display in this circumstance. For additional examples of good lordship see Heal and Holmes, *Gentry* 112, 115 and Clay, *Economic Expansion*, vol. 1, 78, 82-4, 88. For an example of custom-bound lordship between lord and peasant surviving in what seems to have been its full medieval form well into the sixteenth century see the carefully light hand with which the old-fashioned Dacre managed his border tenants so as to maintain loyalty in Steven G. Ellis, *Tudor Frontiers and Noble Power: The Making of the British State* (Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1995), 97-106.

41 Although feudalism proper is generally placed after the Carolingians, Bloch sees vassalage as having originated prior to or at the beginning of their era: *Feudal Society*, vol. 1, 146, in which see also 192 for the original counts as personal vassals of their kings.

42 When lords lieutenant first became a permanent county fixture as the Armada loomed they responded to the center with a fair amount of alacrity, causing a good deal of local tension, but in a process at least as old as the Carolingian counts they tended to become more focused on their counties: for a brief overview of the Elizabethan institution, see Williams, *Tudor Regime*, 122-3; as initially active central agents, Hindle, *State and Social Change*, 4-5 and citations in n. 10; the shift to early Stuart localism, Stater, *Noble Government*, 12.


Keith Wrightson, "Two Concepts of Order: Justices, Constables and Jurymen in Seventeenth-century England," in An Ungovernable People: The English and Their Law in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, eds. John Brewer and John Styles (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1980), 26 (see also 45). The main exceptions to this rule were zealous anti-Puritan assize judges during Elizabeth's later years and, in a reversal, Puritan gentry during the 1640s and 50s.

J. S. Cockburn, A History of English Assizes, 1558-1714 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 211. For similar cases in Cheshire see Hindle, State and Social Change, 155 and 163; Williams, Tudor Regime, 282; and Miller, "Later Stuart Monarchy," 44. Derek Hirst, England in Conflict, 298, notes neighborly lordship exercised on behalf of Catholics even as Oliver Cromwell geared up for war against the Spanish anti-Christ. On the other side of that coin, radical Protestants unpalatable to Elizabeth, hammered by her assize judges, were vigorously championed by high-ranking protestors such as Lord North, who was described as "very honourably" spearheading 1582 gentry complaints about heavy-handed proceedings in Suffolk. Some of the persecuted JPs had been removed from office but Leicester's influence saw them subsequently reinstated: Cockburn, History of English Assizes, 202-6, quotation on 203, and for centrally mandated persecution in general as "slackly administered and often disregarded altogether. . . . foundering on the connivance . . . of local officials", see 211 (further examples on 212-19).


For the Ormskirk JPs, see Slack, Poverty, 128-9, and the recalcitrant East-Riding justice, Braddock, State Formation, 126-7. In Braddock see also 130 n. 112 for pre-civil-war Cheshire justices who neglected to follow privy-council orders, instead taking other measures which, they insisted, saw "the poorest sort much better served", and for a discussion which conveniently synthesizes Slack's work and other scattered examinations of local response to central measures addressing dearth and the poor law see 112-14 and 130-132. For more on the tendency of local magistrates to act first as "good neighbors" and only secondarily as agents of the center, see among other work Braddock, State Formation, 13, 29, and 35, although perhaps the strongest statement on this independence is Anthony Fletcher, Reform in the Provinces: The Government of Stuart England (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), passim and summary on 356. Even before the Restoration the local community of gentry honor in Hampshire proved its
neighborliness stronger even than the tensions that had occasioned the civil wars, reaching across political divides to reestablish "friendly relations": Coleby, *Central Government*, 77-8. For a synthesis of evidence for local independence in more specifically judicial matters, see Braddick, *State Formation*, 138-40, and for this literature itself see the citations in 138 n. 5 and 140 n. 9.


52 W. Lloyd to William Cowper, July 9, 1709, qtd. in Norma Landau, *The Justices of the Peace, 1679-1760* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 85. The significance of Lloyd's remark is heightened by having been made at a time when the rage of party made dismissal more likely for less cause and therefore, one might expect, less an automatic occasion for shame. The honor involved in serving the crown went from the JP level all the way to the very top where arrears of salary during the Restoration were especially common and most acute. One of the main explanations for the situation's acceptance by chief ministers, its observer notes, is that "many... were not serving the King for material reward or pecuniary gain at all, but for reasons of honor": G. E. Aylmer, *The Crown's Servants: Government and Civil Service under Charles II, 1660-1685* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 107. For JP honor see e.g. (among the plethora of examples available) the circle of Restoration gentry friends for whom "joint administration of local government supplied a regular venue for reciprocal displays of honor": Katharine W. Swett, "'The Account between Us': Honor, Reciprocity and Companionship in Male Friendship in the Later Seventeenth Century," *Albion* 31, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 20.


54 Tudor-Stuart historians count this a truism (see, for example, the comments made in passing by Mark Girouard, *Life in the English Country House: A Social and Architectural History* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1978), 2) but none, as far as the present writer knows, have made the necessity of lesser-sort support, as such, the object of inquiry. Of existing work perhaps closest to such a study is Derek Hirst's documentation of the astonishing inclusivity of the franchise whose members had to be cultivated as part of a rural MP's electoral efforts during the first half of the seventeenth century: Hirst, *Representatives*, 31-43 and 65-6, though for a different viewpoint, see Mark A. Kishlansky, *Parliamentary Selection: Social and Political Choice in Early Modern England* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

55 Williams, *Tudor Regime*, 420 (also 451); this assessment is directed toward the "better sort" of the village but applies equally to society's lowest strata (see discussion below). For more on collective middling-sort political importance see also Fletcher, *Reform in the Provinces*, 142; David Underdown, *Revel, Riot, and Rebellion: Popular Politics and Culture in England,*

56 Williams, *Tudor Regime*, 440; on this issue more generally, see Braddick, *State Formation*, 35.

57 See the petitions by sometimes quite humble folk from the provinces directly to the center in Hirst, "Making Contact," 26–50.

58 For rioters in general taking carefully attenuated action see Walter and Wrightson, "Dearth and the Social Order," 33. Grain riots are only the best-known signal villagers might send if they felt strongly enough that they were the object of unreasonable treatment. Attempts by activist Cheshire justices in 1609 and 1610 to license alehouses, taxing them and suppressing those of worst repute, utterly foundered on the lack of communal support. In the same county and elsewhere magistrates in the 1620s found that measures against drunkenness succeeded only where village constables concurred on the issue's importance. When Hampshire JPs gave in to an exciseman's request for a warrant against Henry Swettingham of Sopley for selling beer without paying taxes in 1665, the county gentry officiating at quarter sessions received an affidavit signed by most residents stating that Swettingham had never sold beer in the parish. Remanded to local justices, the matter was apparently dropped: Coleby, *Central Government*, 124. See also the protests against fen drainage and enclosure described in Underdown, *Revel*, 107-115.

59 For the government's explicit recognition of such protests as demands for good lordship, see Walter and Wrightson, "Dearth," 41 n. 57. On the 1536 Lincolnshire uprising and its sequel the Pilgrimage of Grace as a partially successful pair of protests, see James 261 and 267. This interpretation has been criticized, but John Walter forcefully and, in the current writer's view, correctly, expounds a principle that outlasted particular reversals: grain riots constituted a "tradition" serving as "a constant point of reference in a more enduring relationship between rulers and ruled" in which "the deference and subordination of the poor were not a reflection of some divinely ordained cosmos; they were in part conditional upon rulers fulfilling the self-proclaimed obligations of their office which helped to legitimize their authority, namely, administering justice and protecting and relieving the poor": "Grain Riots and Popular Attitudes to the Law: Maldon and the Crisis of 1629," in *An Ungovernable People: The English and Their Law in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, ed. John Brewer and John Styles (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1980), 48. For more on grain riots, see Underdown, *Revel*, 116-19.

60 Langland, *Piers Plowman*, passus 6.21-42, quotations from l.25 and 27. This context may shed much-needed light on the ubiquitous mutinies in parliamentary armies during 1646-7 which saw soldiers across the country seize a variety of goods as well as money in complex and highly orchestrated actions (which included remonstrances, petitions, and negotiations) designed to compensate for arrears and which almost never led to loss of life. After persuasively dismissing the previous assumption that Levellers masterminded these events, their chronicler finds himself at something of a loss to provide a new explanation (he avoids the issue, turning instead to the mutinies' influence on central politics). However, his evidence suggests the moral reciprocity of lordship and the tradition of the self-controlled "riot": the soldier's "aims remain local and
personal", and tellingly, no action was generally taken until after it became clear that, as one soldier put it, the "gent's engagements . . . are not to be confided in": Morrill, Nature of the English Revolution, 346 and 341.

Qtd. in Stater, Noble Government, 35, in which see also 43 for deputies lieutenant asking to resign during the 1610s because they were losing honor (and a similar example on 45).

Both instances of Cheshire magistrates losing inferiors' respect are in Hindle, State and Social Change, respectively 170 and 200. For additional JPs forced to "choose between compliance with . . . the centre" and "local interest and opinion", see Braddock, State Formation, 40, and 82-3. For more on aggressive lesser-sort resistance see Thomas Pettitt, "Here Comes I, Jack Straw: English Folk Drama and Social Revolt," Folklore 95, no. 1 (January 1, 1984): 3–20.

Qtd. in Hirst, "Privy Council," 59. For another nobleman caught in the same vice see the extended example of the earl of Huntingdon, who tried diligently to serve both center and locality as lord lieutenant of Leicestershire, satisfied neither, and finally regained standing—at least with the center—previously lost by becoming much more an agent of court than of country. But a price later came due. By reducing his efforts at local lordship, he accrued ill will among more than just his natural rivals in the county and proved unable to raise it for the King in 1642—contra most other examples of localities with resident peers, the lead of whom locals largely followed—the next year counting himself a failure as he lay on his deathbed: Thomas Cogswell, Home Divisions: Aristocracy, the State, and Provincial Conflict (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1998). Stater, Noble Government, offers a briefer view of Huntingdon in his early stage, acting the local lord who sometimes opposed central interests (9-11), but in Stater see also 30-1 and citations on 203 n. 95 for additional examples in which effectiveness was eroded in cases where lieutenants or deputies were perceived as poor lords.


For an embodiment of this fusion, see Oliver Cromwell's combination of cool political reckoning with an apparently genuine and highly personalized concern for the duties of lordship as the Protector attempted to balance the needs of his own subordinates and others who had served the cause (thereby rendering a service to his regime) with those of petitioners who had not: Hirst, "Making Contact," 38-9 and 43-45.

For the Essex gentleman objecting to the executions see Walter and Wrightson, "Dearth and the Social Order," 36, and there see also 32 n. 31 for unruly petitioners avoiding punishment save when failing to show deference to authority; 33 for conventionally careful rioters avoiding punishment. For additional instances of JPs acting upon principles of good lordship, see Slack, Poverty, 191. For a striking example of the elite's ambivalent attitude toward forceful protest by the poor—implicitly acknowledging its justice but worried about its potential to untune the string of order—see James I's 1607 proclamation against enclosure riots (Hindle, State and Social Change, 62-3). This is much the same response implemented after Kett's uprising (1549) when
the earl of Arundel stopped a countywide swell of enclosure riots in Kent by putting a few "mutinying varlets" in the stocks but also, in open court at Arundel castle, ordering oppressive landlords to reform themselves, "which they apparently did". Similar guidelines were followed in 1596 when an Oxfordshire conspiracy not only to raze enclosures but seize weapons and join angry London apprentices achieved a government investigation of local enclosing: Williams, *Tudor Regime*, 430 and 328.

67 Hirst lays much of the blame for early Stuart governmental failure on the council's own inability (and sometimes deliberate refusal) to keep track of business, but he also acknowledges councilors' probable awareness that it "might have been dangerous to tighten the screws": "Privy Council," 56. For Hunsdon see Williams, *Tudor Regime*, 97.


71 For the Phripps see Coleby, *Central Government*, 122, and in same see also the 1666 petition by gentry on the Isle of Wight to oust their hated lord lieutenant Culpepper, which was unnecessary because the King, noticing Culpepper's intense unpopularity during a local visit, had decided to replace him without any prompting (144).

72 *England in Conflict*, 278. For the same general stability during the upheavals of Charles and James II's reigns, see G. C. F. Forster, "Government in Provincial England under the Later Stuarts," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 33 (1983): 29-48. Clearly historians should be more cautious when making such claims as, "By 1640 . . . [a] breakdown in [the state's] functions or a slippage in its controls was a general catastrophe": Zaller, *Discourse of Legitimacy*, 3.

73 It was also common to describe the privy council or Parliament as "honourable" units: see e.g. quotations in Paul Slack, *From Reformation to Improvement: Public Welfare in Early Modern England* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1999), 15, Elton, *Policy and Police*, 344 and 346, and id., *Tudor Constitution*, 16. For villagers addressing squires as "your honor" see Hirst, *England in Conflict*, 74, in which see also 4-6 for a concise but full precis of personalized lordship as practiced under the early Stuarts.
Slack, *Poverty*, 144. The "mutual obligation" at the heart of lordship was mirrored in more horizontal relationships among humbler folk: Wrightson, *Earthly Necessities*, 85.

All of the general theses outlined in section I (above) have generated English applications. The references in this note, together with the following paragraphs, offer only a sampling rather than a full checklist. For a representative example of the way historians of England often simply adduce the exceptionalism of their subject with no supporting citations to work on the continent, see Penry Williams, *The Tudor Regime* (Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1979), 463-4. Some scholars stretch English uniqueness a long way back indeed, replacing a neighborly, communal mentality with the outlines of modern individualism even before the upheavals of the 1640s: Hill, *Society and Puritanism*, 493-500; same author, *Change and Continuity in Seventeenth-Century England* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), 91-102; and Alan Macfarlane, *Witchcraft in Tudor and Stuart England: A Regional and Comparative Study* (London: Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1970), 197, follow Weber's lead in seeing Reformation Protestantism as having generated the rationally acquisitive capitalist atom of selfhood. Even though Macfarlane later backtracked from this position, it "has remained influential" (Braddick, *State Formation*, 149), and anyhow the backtracking was in the service of making England yet more exceptionally individualistic and economically rational, the roots of these characteristics being sunk in deep medieval soil by *The Origins of English Individualism: The Family, Property, and Social Transition* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978). Anna Bryson, *From Courtesy to Civility: Changing Codes of Conduct in Early Modern England* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), applies Elias's argument to England. Hindle, *State and Social Change*, combines the "extraordinary stress" attendant upon Wrigleyan demography (144) with Elias's ideas; while Hindle explicitly rejects Elias's model as too top-down to be accurate for England (114-15 and 270 n. 104; 237), he mischaracterizes the theorist, for whom social pressure from the bourgeoisie was critical, and then goes on to confirm part of Elias's hypothesis rather than confront it in the book's substantive argument: middling-sort activity (if not precisely in Elias's bureaucratic form) is what, between the mid-to-late seventeenth century, "transformed the basis of [state] authority . . . in"—precisely as Elias would have it—"more sophisticated ways" (145); Hindle attributes to the middling sort the promotion of "the civilising process" (97) including the abhorrence of bodily effusions (203) and physical violence (105) and sees the latter as reduced by one or both of Elias's two major factors, the state's "assertion of monopoly violence" and "changes in social psychology" (138); the middling sort were also "politically increasingly incorporated within the early modern state", an important element in the Eliasian dynamic (225, and see also 128-9, 131-2, 169, 171-2, 174, 213-16, 226-7). Two recent authors (working independently) have updated Marx and Weber with Habermas to place the English public sphere even earlier, arguing for a mid- rather than late-seventeenth-century genesis of its "anonymous [political] audience" and making England still more precocious: David Zaret, *Origins of Democratic Culture: Printing, Petitions, and the Public Sphere in Early-Modern England* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), quotation on 177, and Leora Auslander, *Cultural Revolutions: Everyday Life and Politics in Britain, North America, and France* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), who additionally emphasizes the state's increasing impersonality. See also Withington, *Politics of Commonwealth*, who sees the "urban-based book trade" and provincial theater as "foundation stone[s] of the literary public sphere" in the sixteenth century (44). Even print, seen by Eisenstein
as developing throughout Europe more or less simultaneously, has been hailed into the parade of precocity. England, it turns out, was "one of the earliest nations to develop a sophisticated and commercial culture of printing and publishing": Adrian Johns, _The Nature of the Book: Print and Knowledge in the Making_ (Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 41. Paul Slack corroborates Eisenstein's thesis of government standardization through print with a narrative in which "the use of printed books to enforce uniformity in social policy" was adopted in pursuit of a wide range of English objectives, from combating famine and plague to regulating alehouses from the late sixteenth century onward: _Poverty and Policy_, 140. For a combined feminist and poststructuralist perspective (nearly every essay in the anthology takes a Foucauldian stance) on the emergence of the modern self in the Albionic archipelago (despite the anthology's title, most articles focus on Ireland, Scotland, or England) see Valerie Traub, M. Lindsay Kaplan, and Dymna Callaghan, eds., _Feminist Readings of Early Modern Culture: The Emergence of Subjectivity_ (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), and for a brief gloss which includes all the topics usually considered germane to European modernization and a few more, see the editor's introduction, especially 1-2 and secondarily through 9.

76 For legal centralization in England, see J. H. Baker, _An Introduction to English Legal History_, 2d ed. (London: Butterworths, 1979), 27.


78 For demilitarization and commercialization see Perry Anderson, _Lineages of the Absolutist State_ (London: N.L.B., 1974), 127, qtd. in Corrigan and Sayer, _Great Arch_, 16, and see also Corrigan and Sayer, _Great Arch_, 73. For early modern English noble and gentry commercial activity in general, see Clay, _Economic Expansion_, vol. 2, 136, 199, 201. For new techniques used to more efficiently exploit agricultural possibilities during the period, see L. A Clarkson, _The Pre-Industrial Economy in England, 1500-1750_ (London, UK: Batsford, 1971), 54-61, though 67-8 is more optimistic on landlord-tenant relations than most work; for a more recent account of the period's increased agricultural production, see Wrightson, _Earthly Necessities_, 160-4, who argues that sixteenth-century population growth and rising prices (chap. 5) helped commercialize landlord-tenant relations (131-6, 182-5, 274-88). For more on customary loyalty


80 For an overview of the "programme," see Braddick, *State Formation*, 340-47, characterization as a "programme" on 347. Ellis, *Tudor Frontiers*, argues that the attempt was misguided in the far north and Ireland, making a signal contribution to the troubles of the next century, but nonetheless confirms the "ultimate objectives of Tudor policy" as "the creation of a 'civil' English society . . . ruled by a centralized and uniform system of government": see summary of his argument 265-71, quotation on 270, and other statements on 9, 56, 59-60, 71.

81 Like the military revolution, a commercial revolution is sometimes held to have occurred throughout early modern Europe, but historians of England usually apply the term to a much shorter and more specific phenomenon recognized by contemporary observers as early as the 1730s: J. H. Plumb, *The Growth of Political Stability in England, 1675-1725* (London, Melbourne [etc.]: Macmillan, 1967), 3. For a summary that covers all the essential points and furnishes further citations, see Geoffrey Holmes, *The Making of a Great Power: Late Stuart and Early Georgian Britain, 1660-1722*, (London: Longman, 1993), 58-68; more recent is Keith Wrightson, *Earthly Necessities: Economic Lives in Early Modern Britain* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000), 236-40. For a more detailed treatment, discussing most of the

82 *The English Urban Renaissance: Culture and Society in the Provincial Town, 1660-1770* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1989), 201-4, and see explicit attempts by towns to seduce (as one town's representatives put it) "persons of honour, nobility, or other gentry" (254-5). In the work of one supporter, Borsay has "illumina[ed] the pivotal role of consumers, consumerism and consumer goods in the process of capitalist modernization": David Levine, "Consumer Goods and Capitalist Modernization," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 22:1 (Summer 1991), 77, and see Borsay's own similar, if more tentative, suggestion in *English Urban Renaissance*, 318.

83 Braddock, *State Formation*, quotations on 350 (denigration of warriorship and elevation of the law) and 355 (commercial society). For more on the education-driven transformation of English warrior elites into largely demilitarized, civil humanists turning to the law, see following: Stone, *Crisis*, 703-10 (humanism), 240-2, 386-7 (law), 239, 672-92 (humanism and law), and 722-3 (humanism and rationality); Williams, *Tudor Regime*, 237-41 (humanism and law); Corrigan and Sayer, *Great Arch*, 63 (law); Hindle, *State and Social Change*, 89 and 236 (law); Hirst, *England in Conflict*, 69-70 (civility). For longer discussions of increasing legalization see also Elton, *Policy and Police*, chaps. 6-9 (summary comment on 399); Elton, *Reform and Reformation--England, 1509-1558* (London: Edward Arnold, 1977), chap. 9; Elton, *Tudor Constitution*, chaps. 5-10; Williams, *Tudor Regime*, 4-5, 438-51 (chaps. 12 and 13). For the increasing importance of court favors and preferment see Stone, *Crisis*, 398-449, 476-81, and 490-3. Finally, in same, 237-40 summarizes the arc of all the developments discussed in this paragraph as well as the impact of "the puritan ethic".

84 In Borsay, *English Urban Renaissance*, 231 describes the new elite consumerism; 275 compares traditional elite bearing to the new style of comportment; 145-6, 269, 280 discuss coffeehouses; 161 and 248-50, gaming; 150-6, 242-3, 336-49, balls; 135-7, 221, 268, urban clubs. See also Rosenheim, *Emergence of a Ruling Order*, chap. 7. Subsequent scholarship has greatly enlarged this orbit: a more recent account confirms that towns with humanistically driven commercialism at their hearts were early modern England's prime sites of civility (thus the word's synonym, "urbanity") but has upped the ante by seeing sustained urban growth as beginning in the 1540s (with a commercial boom), Borsay's post-1650 developments constituting not the first but rather a "second urban renaissance": Withington, *Politics of Commonwealth*, 35 In same for urbanization see 6-7; for civility-urbanity, 7, 17; for civic humanism and participatory urban politics, 10, 41-4, 51-75, 78, 122-3, 128; commercialism, 25-8; for "the symbiotic relationship between civic and economic development", 25-44 (quotation on 28); for convergences of all these factors in single examples such as the plays of Thomas Middleton, 60. On humanism as primarily city-based see also Peltonen, *Classical Humanism*, 59-67 and 227-8. One book even summarizes the results of all this work in its title: Paul Langford, *A Polite and Commercial People: England 1727-1783* (Oxford, UK; New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1989). A Borsay's second wave was all the greater, the English were not merely packing towns in
greater numbers than before but doing so in much larger relative quantities than the populace of anyplace else in Europe. Clay, *Economic Expansion*, vol. 1, 169-70 argues that urban population outside London merely kept pace with English growth in general, but this judgment has been superseded by Wrigley, who finds that beginning at around 1670, mid-level towns boomed: "Their population more than doubled during the century, the rate of growth more than four times that of the national aggregate": "Urban Growth," in which see 706-22 for the contrast between seventeenth-century English urbanization and Europe's, setting aside the Netherlands as an outlier, and see also Coleman, *Economy of England*, 97-9. As another measure of this development, in 1670 only five cities aside from London boasted populations of more than 10,000, but at that point the numbers skyrocketed and only three-quarters of a century later there were twenty: R. O. Bucholz and Newton Key, *Early Modern England 1485-1714: A Narrative History*, 2nd ed. (Chichester, UK; Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 382. Laborers were simultaneously coming to be paid less in kind and more in coin (Clay, *Economic Expansion*, vol. 2, 25) and the resulting liquidity allowed easier consumption of the commercial revolution's imports at the same time that traditional economic histories identify a rise in the average wage: Coleman, *Economy of England*, 101-3 and Earle, *Making of the English Middle Class*, 26. After 1675, not just in terms of old standbys but of previously rare and even wholly new goods such as china, Englishmen and women in most walks of life "rapidly" began consuming "in ways that transformed [not merely] their economy [but also] their culture." (Carole Shammas, *The Pre-Industrial Consumer in England and America* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 28.) For more the urban-centered growth of consumption, Lorna Weatherill, *Consumer Behaviour and Material Culture in Britain, 1660-1760* (London: Routledge, 1988), 25-35 (general increase), and 75-90 (urban impact and its diffusion into the countryside). For more on consumption as a strong force for change, even "wholesale cultural revolution", see Corrigan and Sayer, *Great Arch*, 1-2, with citations to Weber, Durkheim, Elias, and more specialized historical work on 209, notes 2-4, and see also Peck, *Consuming Splendor*, 3; Muldrew, *Economy of Obligation*, 59; Ann Kussmaul, *A General View of the Rural Economy of England, 1538-1840* (Cambridge, UK; New York, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1990), chap. 5 or Neil McKendrick, “The Consumer Revolution of Eighteenth-century England,” in *The Birth of a Consumer Society: The Commercialization of Eighteenth-Century England*, ed. John Brewer, J. H. Plumb, and Neil McKendrick (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 9–33. In addition, rising wages and more people earning them meant an endemic lack of specie which undermined traditional neighborliness and threw a cultural spotlight on the abstract market of modern capital: Muldrew, *Economy* 3-7, 65, 99-109 and passim; financial difficulties, 81-5, 175-8, 253-5, 280-3, 290-8, 300-5, 307-10; increased litigation, chap. 8, especially 203, 243, and 246; arrests for debt, 280; society being "reinterpreted" and traditional hospitality faltering, 124 and 203; new ideas of equality that challenged traditional social hierarchies, 42-8 and 97-8; and for more on the resulting sociocultural changes, 158, 299, 306, 326-7. For similar judgments concerning economic change and resulting sociocultural transformation, see Morrill, *Nature of the English Revolution*, 284, and Clay, *Economic Expansion*, vol. 1, 238 and 240, and for additional material on economic hardship from ca. 1672-1690, hitting small farmers especially hard and thus further expanding the labor pool, see 243.
Pocock's extension of the argument connecting humanism and trade is in *Virtue, Commerce, and History: Essays on Political Thought and History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 37ff. (quotation on 50); Pocock views trade as the progenitor of "civil" manners (49, 113-7). For an example of an historian who takes the public-private split as fully established by the end of the seventeenth century and examines civility in a domestic context, see David M. Turner, *Fashioning Adultery: Gender, Sex, and Civility in England, 1660-1740* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2002).


While surveys had been conducted previously, seventeenth-century political arithmetic heralded "a new enthusiasm for the collection of numerical data . . . to measure social resources and opportunities": Paul Slack, *From Reformation to Improvement: Public Welfare in Early Modern England* (Oxford, England; New York: Clarendon Press, 1999), 93, and see n.75 for further citations on the early modern English use of number. For the remarkable if incipiently Orwellian achievements of Petty and colleagues such as John Graunt and Gregory King, see chap. 5 of Angus Maddison, *Contours of the World Economy, 1-2030 AD: Essays in Macro-Economic History* (Oxford, UK; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

Brewer, *Sinews of Power*, quotation on xvii. As a pan-European phenomenon, the military revolution has been most fully and conveniently treated in Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). As the dates in his subtitle suggests, Brewer set the genesis of his fiscal-military state almost wholly after the accession of William and Mary, but previous authorities dealing with some of the same issues generally gave priority to the Restoration: see e.g. Chandaman, *English Public Revenue*, 275-80, Plumb, *Growth of Political Stability*, 11-13 or
Gertrude Ann Jacobsen, *William Blathwayt, a Late Seventeenth Century English Administrator* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1932), 10-11. And the historians to most closely review the topic since Brewer have revised his chronology even further backward, pulling it past James and then Charles II down to the Interregnum, finding the crucial gestation under the Long Parliament and Oliver Cromwell, then the coming of age under the second two Stuarts: Wheeler, *The Making of a World Power: War and the Military Revolution in Seventeenth-Century England* (Stroud: Sutton, 1999) offers conveniently representative portions in 53-61, 83-90, 106-19 or briefer statements on 127, 144, 146, 148-9, 195-8; Braddick, *State Formation*, 178 n.1 endorses Wheeler's findings and adds some independent verification on 213-26 and 253-70, and see summaries of the narrative on 268, 269, and 279. See also Braddick, *Parliamentary Taxation in Seventeenth-Century England: Local Administration and Response* (Woodbridge, Suffolk, UK: Rochester, NY, USA: Royal Historical Society; Boydell Press; Boydell & Brewer, 1994), 297-8, and the early reservations concerning Brewer's chronology of administrative development in David A. Baugh, "Maritime Strength and Atlantic Commerce: The Uses of a Grand Marine Empire", in Lawrence Stone, ed., *An Imperial State At War* (London: Routledge, 1994), 190 and 216 n. 18. Indeed, as Derek Hirst has noted, "Advances in state formation, in logistics and supply, were fundamental to the war Mountjoy waged" in Ireland during the 1590s: *Dominion*, 126. This chronological revisionism is supported by cracks internal to Brewer's own argument. For example, he holds that seventeenth-century government was bureaucratically regularized after 1688 by "putting offices into commission . . . replacing a single Lord High Admiral or Lord High Treasurer by a group of several commissioners" (*Sinews*, 83). But both of these offices were in commission for much of the preceding period, the Admiralty from 1672-84 and the Treasury from 1667-72, 1679-85, and 1687: J. C. Sainty, *Admiralty Officials, 1660-1870* (London: Athlone Press [for] University of London, Institute of Historical Research, 1975), 18, 21, 34, and Stephen B. Baxter, *The Development of the Treasury, 1660-1702* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 4. Brewer is finally forced to date the beginning of effective fiscal administration to Sir George Downing's tenure during the first of the two pre-1688 Treasury commissions and to credit the completion to James II, concluding despite himself, "Post-revolutionary finance was built on a pre-revolutionary model" (95; see 92-95 for the entire discussion; Braddick confirms this in *State Formation*, 67). Brewer also acknowledges that the "improvements in administrative capability" he deals with stem "from the mid-seventeenth century" (65) and that Charles and James II both enacted significant "administrative reforms" (139), but he ignores the deleterious effect of all this on his timeline. See additional note below for more on the problem.

For the shift in general psychology see Brewer, *Sinews*, 223-29, quotation on 223; administrative revolution, Roseveare, *Financial Revolution*, 4-5; government putting increased emphasis on information, Brewer, *Sinews*, 221.

Braddick, *State Formation*, 285. For the remuneration of late seventeenth and early eighteenth administrators, see Geoffrey S. Holmes, *Augustan England: Professions, State and Society, 1680-1730* (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1982). On these issues as a whole see also Plumb, *Growth of Stability*, 12-13, and for implementation of some of the specific "conditions of a modern civil service" see Howard Tomlinson, "Financial and Administrative Developments in England, 1660-88," in *The Restored Monarchy, 1660-1688*, ed. J. R. Jones (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1979), one 112-16 (quote on 113). For a longer view of increasing government activity, see Clay, *Economic Expansion*, vol. 2, chaps. 10-11. Historians of the emergent later Stuart state can sometimes be found denying its modern characteristics, but what they take away with one hand they tend to give back with the other. Even by the early eighteenth century, Brewer asserts, administration on the English side of the channel "was not a modern bureaucracy," yet follows up the statement with, "but neither was it a special interest, wedded to corporate privilege and individual gain" (*Sinews*, 64); "This . . . was not a bureaucratic state", says Braddick, but he then admits that even the highest ministerial offices and institutions (such as the secretaries of state or the privy council) "formed a kind of bureaucracy" (*State Formation*, 25) while at lower levels such as the clockworks of the exchequer, "routinisation and bureaucratisation depersonalized political authority" (26). See below (and section I above) for more on impersonality as a characteristic of modern times.


environments bred "a growing sense of the inefficacy of corporate [i.e. traditional body-politic]


97 Readers will remember that the previous discussion of lordship included examples placed after
the Restoration.

98 Of the hodgepodge of literal and jurisdictional overlaps in the Stuart government at Whitehall,
with administrative buildings abutting the apartments of royal mistresses, one commentator
writes, "This grouping of England's social and administrative activities presented . . . a medieval
life in a modern setting and was already passing": Jacobsen, *William Blathwayt*, 29.

Revolution*, 197. For the same argument see Lawrence Stone and Jeanne C. Fawtier Stone, *An
see summary on 397-400 (my invocation of the "backwoods" squire derives from the last page).
Felicity Heal discusses the problems faced by towns who could not longer sustain "face-to-face"
charity (*Hospitality*, 321), and Clay, *Economic Expansion*, vol. 2, writes, "by the beginning of the
seventeenth century the symbols of aristocratic status had changed or were changing fast" (25),
and see also Braddick, "The English Revolution and Its Legacies," in *The English Revolution c.
1590-1720: Politics, Religion and Communities*, ed. Nicholas Tyacke (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 2007), 39. The death of traditional hospitality was already being lamented in
the mid-sixteenth century: Jones, *Tudor Commonwealth*, 93. In addition to material previously
discussed, the following two developments stand out as other notable—though not the only—
"attacks". First was an assault on the "common weal," a popular term of political art associated
with the organic body politic and which enjoined the protection of inferiors' interests as the cost
of maintaining the lord's own (thus buttressing good lordship). This concept was eviscerated by
department monopolists who abused it and then dislodged it with "the public good," a phrase
carrying newer and more properly humanist connotations of civic and explicitly civilizing
individualism and differentiation, "a modern, abstract . . . ideal". In Slack, *Reformation*, see 6-26
for an overview of the common weal, and for its displacement, 68-75 and 80, quotation on 76;
the new diction was also "civilizing" (79). The congruence of idealized medieval and early
modern lordship with the common weal is logically implicit in most Tudor "commonwealth"
polemics (Jones, *Tudor Commonwealth*, 14), and is explicit in at least one tract (23). Second,
while some humanist authors attempted to seduce the gentle with gentle values—and it certainly
seems likely that the initial acceptance by landholding elites was greatly assisted by such
writing—other humanists attacked honor: see Markku Peltonen, *Classical Humanism and
Republicanism in English Political Thought*, 1570-1640 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 1995), especially 19 and 111-12 but also 9-11, 20, and 37-8.

100 Quotations in Withington, *Politics of Commonwealth*, 118, and Corrigan and Sayer, *Great
Arch*, 45; in latter, for a more general judgment that by this time the vast tide of change was fast
corroding old loyalties and attitudes see 73-4; for corroboration see Robert Brenner, "Bourgeois Revolution and the Transition to Capitalism," in The First Modern Society: Essays in English History in Honour of Lawrence Stone, ed. A. L. Beier (Cambridge University Press, 1989), 303-4. The standard authority on English hospitality argues that the ideal had become badly tattered by ca. 1600, attributing the change mostly to the kind of long-term commercialism others have seen as causing elite embourgeoisement but also partly to urbanization and its resulting civility as well as to state centralization. She also agrees with Paul Slack that traditional giving yielded the ground to a more rationalized, calculating type of charity: Heal, Hospitality in Early Modern England, 392-402, especially summary on 402-3. It is instructive to compare these accounts with the notable similarity in outline to an older one following Weber's thesis that Protestant capitalism was to blame: Hill, Society and Puritanism, 265-97, 342.


103 Braddick, State Formation, 21 and 26; "emerging [military-fiscal] bureaucracies" used "increasingly modern languages of political legitimation" (5) and "resemble[d] more closely the forms of the modern state" (10); the new legitimation implied "an impersonal state . . . and autonomous [i.e. not related to any specific person or group, including the King] 'national' interests." (285); and see also 43 for reducing discretion as well as 261-4 for reiteration of the general point being made in this paragraph. On these issues see also Braddick, "English Revolution," 37. The Glorious Revolution's theorist, John Locke, after all sliced apart "the public and private spheres completely": Underdown, A Freeborn People, 117.


105 For the regularization of English local government and withdrawal of the greater gentry, see mainly Rosenheim, "County Governance," 111-23, quotations on 119 (professional methods), 124 (stultifying routine), and Glassey, "Local Government," 163 (modern civil-service board). See also Braddick, State Formation, 133-5, 166-7, 170-1 and Morrill, Nature of the English Revolution, who calls this a "bureaucratization": 186. This descent into banality may have been assisted by an increase in central discipline, not via the old, personal face-to-face confrontation with the privy council but by formal proceedings at law: ibid., 451. Braddick elsewhere states
that local government did not become "bureaucratized" (173), but his argument for the second half of Charles II's reign and beyond yields the opposite impression ("routinisation", for example, is adduced as a hallmark of modern bureaucracy on 26, so it is unclear why local government was not thereby bureaucratized). It is worth noting that the change from parish democracies to oligarchies (see above), occurring at around the same time, has been described as exhibiting the kind of "abstract" and "bureaucratic" structures that typify modernizing states: Hindle, *State and Social Change*, 209, 219, and 230.

106 James 9, 11, 270-1, 302-4.
107 Braddick, *State Formation*, 270.
108 Chabod, "Was There A Renaissance State?" 37.
109 Weber postulated bureaucrats who have little individual control over the procedures they follow; after him, the seminal social-science treatment of bureaucratic personality described administrative effectiveness as inculcating behavioral traits bordering on the robotic: Robert K. Merton, "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality," *Social Forces* 18, no. 4 (May 1940): 560–8. For successors who offer similar assessments see the summaries in Christopher W. Allinson, *Bureaucratic Personality and Organisation Structure* (Aldershot, Hants, UK; Brookfield, Vt., US: Gower, 1984), 33 and 36-8. Other sociologists now modify the extreme interpretation, viewing the bureaucratic aspect as only one of several personality traits that an administrator might exhibit, but these authorities still see it as dominating the others: 39-40, 43-4, and 47-50.


111 For elaboration of the theory behind this conclusion, see North, *Institutions*, 34, 39, 55, 124, quotation on 121; for the inability of Latin-American countries to make bureaucrats follow official guidelines, 102-3 and 116-17. For the more general theory of agents underlying this interpretation, see his *Structure and Change*, 25-7. These views are generally paralleled by the influential work of Talcott Parsons, who opposes the characteristics of lordship (such as nepotism) to the merit-based, "achievement-oriented" ideology encouraged by modern institutions: *The Social System* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1951), 64. Early modernists tend to confirm this position; Roland Mousnier, for example, writes that honor's master-servant relationship "implies . . . service to an individual before service to the state, to the detriment of the state": *Institutions*, 101.

113 Ogborn, *Spaces of Modernity*, 160.


Chapter 1: Pepys as Model of Narrative

En route to addressing larger questions concerning the transformation from the premodern to the modern, the portrait of honor under the later Stuarts offered in the following chapters answers the question of how this mentality survived into modern times, at least for England. The values and behaviors conferring legitimacy upon medieval lordship and knighthood were still plain to see in the later seventeenth century. Faith upward to masters and downward to servants, a fundamental concern for one's reputation, unrepentantly gritted teeth in the struggle against the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune, pugnacity both hair-trigger (Hotspur's brand) yet carefully tactical (Prince Hal's style) along with a related ruthlessness toward one's enemies—all this remained vigorously extant. Readers will see the missing link in action: honor actively working to support crucial developments in one of the sociocultural structures most deeply implicated in the birth of the modern age, the governmental bureaucracy.

Prior to engaging with the past, however, the historian must decide on strategy and tactics. The honor on display here was not the type of disembodied discursive mist found in much literary work that pretends to historical relevance and even a few linguistic- or "cultural"-turn histories. This was vociferously and possessively the honor of one Samuel Pepys. Yet defining Pepys's deployment of honor, like most historical exercises, is not as straightforward as a busy researcher might hope. Though by no means wholly, the present endeavor depends to a great extent on what Pepys and his colleagues said, how they reacted verbally to stimuli, as much as on what they did; and because much of what they did was reported by Pepys, it might be colored by his purposes. In other words, the procedure here of necessity comprises the interpretation of meaning, the audit of rhetoric. Historians weaned on the linguistic turn will
immediately assume that what follows must revolve around "discourse"; however, I distance my work from that label. Although the word has a legitimate technical usage in the formal philosophy of language and the discipline of linguistics, in other fields it is far too often deployed as a vague and ultimately rather sloppy substitute for other, more precise terms such as "ideas", "communication", "argument", "display", "writing", "publication", "conversation", and, of course, "rhetoric." But whatever one wishes to call it, there is a heavy dose of it here. On what grounds can this endeavor proceed?

At the most fundamental level, the dissertation bases itself on the psychological concept of plural subjectivity and the philosophical notion of ontological individuality. This combination results in a mode of behavior called "participant agency" which frames the actions of individuals when participating in groups. For the past three decades or so historians have usually launched explications of culture from a different theoretical platform, but that approach yields logical incongruities that severely undercut its validity. The theory of participant agency allays these basic difficulties and is presented in Appendix D.²

Participant agency in place as a foundation, my argument roofs itself with a narrative supported most directly by Quentin Skinner's recommendations for working profitably in the archive with meaning and rhetoric. In this chapter I offer a brief summary of Skinner's relevant work. I then discuss its application to cultural formations such as seventeenth-century honor and the individuals who deployed the terms of such formations. I also justify the extended use of narrative in a type of study most scholars would approach synchronically. I finish by scrutinizing one of my own terms, patronage, since the characterization of Pepys's honor poses not only challenges of evidence but also challenges of conceptualization.
Diagnosing the functions of past concepts—and the functioning of honor is critical for this project's argument—first requires understanding the meanings that concepts had for those who held them, and additionally requires a consideration of the rhetoric used to deploy those concepts. ("Rhetoric" is understood here not in the everyday sense of empty posturing but in its technical sense as the intentional garb in which all communication is clothed). As Quentin Skinner has argued, "until we put ourselves in a position to explain why [past agents] . . . evidently believed it was rational to concentrate on certain specific courses of political action, we cannot hope to explain why they chose to concentrate on just those courses of action.

The statement could easily be expanded from the political to many other types of action (the bureaucratic, for instance).

To achieve his goal, Skinner focuses on people's rhetoric because the force of a statement depends not only on its semantic content (what Skinner calls "resources of language") but on what the speaker or writer intended to achieve by deploying those meanings. Nearly every piece of communication we issue is intended to do something, to achieve some result, even if it is not formed as an argument or plea. For example, when a police officer shouts "the ice over there is very thin" to a skater across the pond, the officer (presumably) has the implicitly rhetorical purpose of persuading the skater not to skate in that area. The meaning of the statement, at any rate, is clear: thin ice in that direction. The constable's intention is also critical, however; both he and the skater may know that the ice in question is quite thick, but the skater may be a politician embroiled in a scandal. In that case the beat cop's intention is far different from that which a passing observer might infer, and therefore a true understanding of the rhetorical event is
different. This makes things rather difficult for historians; we must plumb psychological depths, arraign contexts not just carefully but with subtlety, and sometimes make assumptions that bring us close to thin ice ourselves; at times it will crack and we will flounder into the chill water of error. But that is all part of doing our business. As Lucien Febvre taught us, this does not mean that genuine understanding is impossible, just tricky and provisional in the way we all learned in our introductory research seminars.

The difficulty of sounding out meaning and intent in no way detracts from its utility. If the rhetorical nature (purpose) of a given verbalization is synonymous with its (intended) function, then from the meanings employed in, and the intended function of, a verbalization we can derive a solid holistic understanding of a given situation—in other words, an explanation. In this sense, the opposition of what people say to what they do is wrongheaded, for an utterance is as much an action as any other kind of performance. Therefore careful attention to multiple examples of what people said, how they said it, and the context in which they said it is an excellent way to comprehend the range of work that people could accomplish with a given concept in that culture and, by extension, what kinds of effects the concept might have when actually employed.

How well Skinner's methodological position maps onto the more basic philosophical concepts of participant agency within plural subjectivity can be gauged by his position on the relationship of meanings in general to the individual's use of them. Meanings in themselves he conceives as held in common by most members of a community, a factor which constrains the range of intention it is possible to hold when employing a particular meaning (this limitation is important, since without it communication would be so random as to be potentially useless; and
it should be obvious how neatly the idea of the plural subject comports with Skinner's conceptualization here). But the individual plays a critical role in the group because only by the individual are ideas thought, verbalized, and changed (in other words, the objects of Skinnerian study are ontological individuals acting within a plural subject). Communication therefore constitutes a feedback loop inside the community, as individuals do their thinking and persuading within the symbolic constellation provided by the beliefs held by others (that is to say, they are what the plural subjectivist would call "participant agents").

The approach that has just been outlined—its philosophical foundation provided by ontological individualism combined with plural subjectivity, the methodological supervenience furnished by Skinner's formulation of rhetorical analysis—is an exceptionally helpful way to proceed when studying mentalities such as honor. For purposes of the present effort in particular, this approach makes Pepys's large archive of rhetoric a potentially invaluable guide to how honor functioned in the late-Stuart bureaucratic context. Even the *Diary*, it has been argued in one biography, represents a deliberate if sometimes only half-conscious presentation of selfhood. From this type of agent-based beginning the historian can examine statements about honor and work outward to a plural subject, a group (in this case the elite male community of honor), by first recognizing that to persuade even himself of anything, Pepys would generally use words or symbols taken from the common stock bequeathed him by his culture. Further, to persuade even just himself of something that was somehow related to the concerns of a particular group of which he considered himself a member, he would need to employ ideas and concepts, and refer to attitudes, that he believed to be held by others in the group. Therefore even a study deliberately confined to soliloquies in which Pepys demonstrably misreported facts (events or
descriptions of material objects) would still yield a harvest of meanings, and understandings of how those meanings could function, that he held to be valid for his wider culture or subculture.

If the role of rhetoric within plural subjectivity draws out meanings valid within a group even during a private monologue, it follows that the historian must undertake two principal interpretive tasks, conceptually distinct though methodologically conflated in practice. The first is to separate the concepts that may have been novel with the speaker at the time of utterance from those which she believed to be shared with others; evidence internal to the text will often nullify this problem, but sometimes an idea's provenance might not be so clear. The second task is to determine whether he was correct in his construal of a shared belief or meaning; it might be that he misattributed to others at least some of his own idiosyncratic understandings. The way to untie both of these knots is by triangulating different threads in the form of beliefs articulated by other members of the culture or, more narrowly, by the applicable group. The historian's broad hermeneutical acquaintance with her colleagues' work on the culture in general provides a good guide, often all that we need. In the case of this dissertation's somewhat more specific "plural subject," so much previous work has already been done (the values sustaining the community of elite male honor have been so often documented from different sources), that if Pepys were to articulate some concept genuinely new with him, it would be immediately identifiable (I have not found one). Obviously it would also be possible to do primary research on the beliefs of other agents and triangulate those with Pepys's. The inclusion of material from Pepys's superiors, colleagues, and subordinates in the chapters below incorporates this solution.

A final consideration bearing on the potential yield of an individual's rhetoric has particular force in Pepys's case: a person's thoughts may be his or her own, but when interacting
with others the individual leaves solipsism inevitably behind. In order to function in the world with even the slightest degree of effectiveness, Pepys had to use rhetoric that convinced at least some others some of the time. And given his professional success, it must be assumed that when he portrayed himself as convincing many others much of the time, he is accurate enough. In addition, because he seems to have used his journals and even his personal diary as sources of record to be consulted when he needed to substantiate an argument for change or had to justify his conduct to opponents, he had a strong incentive to be as truthful, all other things being equal, as he could.

The type of rich harvest latent in the approach promoted here may be sampled in Frances Harris's reexamination of the profound friendship between John Evelyn and Margaret Godolphin. Like this dissertation topically narrow and textually centered, Harris's book discredits the previous understanding of this relationship as a hypocritically sordid seduction in the tradition of the Restoration libertine which Evelyn professed to despise. Yet Harris nonetheless unearths a powerful erotic if non-physical attachment between these two deeply feeling Restoration figures (those who know Evelyn only through his diary or the easy-going correspondence with Pepys will have formed quite a different opinion of Evelyn's personality). The bulk of Harris's argument depends upon Evelyn's rhetoric as expressed in the kind of individualized sources generated by Pepys, mainly diaries, letters, and publications. But Harris's work greatly augments its force by incorporating plural subjectivity in the two ways also employed for the present project. First, she triangulates evidence from different sources, most notably documents generated by Godolphin, the other party to the relationship. Second, Harris sets the friendship within a larger environment than that previously elucidated by historians who discussed the pair; Harris shows how Evelyn
and Godolphin's interaction "can only be fully understood in the context of the post-Reformation debate concerning marriage, and the much longer . . . tradition of intense friendships between men and women in religious settings."^14

Yet Harris's contextualization does not dissolve Evelyn and Godolphin into the primordial soup of a semiotic collective: Harris also excavates individuality. Godolphin, especially, emerges as no fractured figment of "discourse" but an active agent who largely set the terms of the relationship and continued to exert a pull over both Evelyn and her widowed husband until their deaths many years after her own early departure.^15 In other words, Harris affords a fascinating survey of the emotions experienced by the individuals involved, giving readers a look through a seventeenth-century window at a rich category of experience possible then but much rarer now (if not altogether extinct). Readers are also informed of the important place the larger society, at least in educated circles, accorded to a distinct form of sociability. To achieve a similar understanding with Pepys and honor is one object of this dissertation and a crucial step for assessing what impact honor might have had as modern times loomed nearer.

II

A concern for meaning and rhetoric is not the only hallmark of this dissertation: another is a wholesale deployment of narrative. Even though Lawrence stone announced the return of narrative decades ago,^16 its uncommonly heavy use here requires a comment on the importance of narrative as a mode of historical explanation. For if interrogating rhetoric and ideas is productive, so is narration. Indeed, more so if the philosophers are right. Historians have wondered about narrative's value amongst themselves at times, but philosophers generally agree that it is the most
important form of historical exposition, the very heart of history, its presumptive core no matter what form the history takes. Arthur C. Danto emphatically proclaimed the difference between science and history to be narratival: "History tells stories." The job of historians is to track changes over time while "explain[ing] these changes at the same time as they tell what happened", and their only adequate tool is narrative. What Danto wanted to get at was made clearer by his contemporary Louis Mink, who points out that narrative assumptions underlie even self-described non-narrative histories:

Even histories that are synchronic studies of the culture of an epoch inevitably take into account the larger process of development or change in which that epoch was a stage. . . . The most 'analytic' historical monograph . . . presupposes the historian's more general understanding, narrative in form, of patterns of historical change, and is a contribution to the correction or elaboration of that narrative understanding. That is what phrases like 'preindustrial society' . . . express to our narrative imagination.

The reason for narrative's utter necessity to historical inquiry is that narrative is much more than a literary form: it is "a primary cognitive instrument." Only two other modes of cognition rival narrative as "ways of making the flux of experience comprehensible", and neither of the alternatives is half so central to the historian's craft. To explain the trajectory through time of any entity, whether concrete or abstract, requires "indefinitely many descriptions of it as they are successively relevant . . . to the sequences [of action] that intersect its career." Only a narrative can represent such a process; "narrative is the form in which we make comprehensible the many successive interrelationships that are comprised by a career." This capacity makes narrative an "irreducible form of human comprehension" and by definition the single most appropriate heuristic for studying the human past where any change is concerned. Thus insofar as we adhere to Marc Bloch's famous dictum that our job is to explain change, narrative is our best tool.
As a more specific instance of how narrative can benefit our work, consider the criticism leveled by microhistorians at their predecessors (such as Fernand Braudel in *Structures of Everyday Life*) for seeking to get at past experience by excavating "material conditions without examining how these conditions were experienced." If narrative embodies one of the most fundamental methods by which we make sense of our existence, historians can use narrative to transport themselves past Braudel's error because narrative is in fact a primary way in which we experience that existence. As another philosopher of history puts it, "[t]o tell stories about the human past is not to impose an alien structure on it but is continuous with the very activity that makes up that human past."  

In sum, foregrounded narrative should add significant strength to nearly any historical project. But difficulties of method remain. The microhistorians—within whose tradition this dissertation firmly fits—have not tended to use lengthy narrative for the purpose of revealing larger ideological vistas. Well-known microhistories along these lines such as *Montaillou* or *The Cheese and the Worms* are mainly synchronic in form no matter what their larger implied narrative. How can a project that places as much emphasis on examining beliefs and meanings as this one avail itself more directly of narrative's epistemic power?

As precedent offers scant assistance, an experimental fusion being tried here. It is not a side-by-side placement but an actual welding of both approaches, the rhetorical-analytic and the narratival, in equal measure. The method attempts to produce a "thick description" of Pepys's honor not as a static, synchronic list of traits but rather *by way of* a narrative, allowing the evidence of his context, utterances and behaviors to accumulate diachronically in lived and reflective experience over the arc of his career. The first three of the four chapters devoted to him
take this approach to one key aspect of honor. Some incidents and events recur in these chapters but are viewed from different angles. The chapters feature some breaks in the narrative backward or forward: sometimes incidents separated by time illustrate a single point, so it makes more sense to place them together than to space them out on a timeline. But subject to these caveats, these three topical chapters track Pepys's musings upon their respective topic and its workings in his professional (and personal, when relevant to the professional) life from a point early in the career to its end. His final chapter constitutes a close narrative of a single incident which gathers the separate threads of his honor together and allows a more holistic look at its workings in the later Stuart administration.

III

Before jumping into the tangles of the seventeenth-century socio-administrative thicket, however, readers should register a final caution, this one about the way in which Pepys cashed out his core honor values in the relationships with others which form much of the data presented here. The seventeenth century's increasingly urban context complicated those relationships in ways that make it important to take an extended look at definition. Appendix C (cited in the Prologue) offers what seems at first the opposite argument, contending that "patriarchal" and "paternal" should be avoided, and for them we should substitute "lordship". Certainly the word is appropriate to describe the prince's honor-inflected exercise of power as well as that of peers who were, after all, addressed as "my lord". It also makes sense enough to stretch the term outward to cover the activities of the landed gentry. After all, they continued to exercise local coercive authority even when they were not formally JPs or MPs. And they continued to maintain
relationships of honorable loyalty and competitive enmity within county hierarchies which, through peers and greater gentry, reached from country to king and court.

Given this context, it is tempting to describe Pepys's sentiments and actions in terms of lordship, but this would be a mistake. It may not seem so on the surface: as the argument proceeds it will show that Pepys tended to the same sort of behavior we would expect from a peer or squire steeped in the lordly mentality of mastery and service, were one of them suddenly transplanted into a government bureaucrat's urban setting and occupation. Furthermore, as we shall soon see, Pepys got his start as a member of what was essentially an aristocratic retinue. But if these disconcertingly backward-looking features of Pepys's career make the label "lordship" intrinsically appealing, two warning signs counsel circumspection. "Lordship" applies only to those who were in legal fact lords of manors. This technicality is supplemented by the word's usage—or, rather, its lack. As Appendix C notes, the OED entry does suggest that the term was more common by far than the alternatives currently popular with scholars, but as the seventeenth century lengthened and other medieval attitudes and structures dissolved around honor, "lordship" seems to have fallen more and more into disuse.24

Further consideration bears out the benefits of prudence in this matter. Even setting aside the possibility of creeping anachronism, "lordship" will not do in the urban, bureaucratic context. It might in Germany, where it is plausible to talk about an older style of herrschaft not only during the early modern period but right through Bismarck's junker-administrators. English elite society, though, was not quite continental. Despite the argument offered here in Appendix B, there were still some undeniable differences between England and the continent. The English elite may not have been any more humanistically learned than their continental counterparts, but
their national assembly was different, and as the Stones have pointed out, they were more politically liberal than their opposite numbers across the Channel. As the Prologue's argument and Appendix B suggest, these are differences not in kind but only in degree and therefore fail to sustain the stark outlines of the old comparative synthesis. But those factors should not therefore be booted off the historical stage. Restraint is needed to draw out their effects, which will have been more subtle than we have thought, but it would be surprising to find no effects whatsoever. For Lawrence and Jeanne F. Stone, those effects were buy-in to elite values by the middling sort and a resulting longevity in real power that many other European aristocracies could only envy. At the same time, the Stones found far fewer upwardly mobile merchants than such buy-in would seem to suggest. Instead, the group that continued replenishing the ranks of the squirearchy and nobility were overwhelmingly professionals, most prominent among them government officials such as Samuel Pepys.25

Especially significant for a decision about how to describe Pepys's professional relationships is that when newcomers gave verbal form to their political economy, they often straddled the fence between the diction of lordship and a rather different terminological orientation. This was the vocabulary of Roman-style service to the state tinged with the republican virtu that had continued to be invoked in classical times even under the princeps. It is dangerous to attribute this type of language wholly to the advent of Renaissance humanism: in England, at least, it may have had much deeper roots. For it is here that the old arguments for English exceptionalism vis-a-vis the continent perhaps still bear some validity. A detailed examination of this possibility would carry the discussion well beyond this project's remit, but the undeniably greater degree of medieval English centralization relative to that of her
continental neighbors cannot be discounted. This was at least partly inspired by the Roman example with its associated rhetoric of elite duty to the state. English writers remained conscious of the Roman achievement throughout the medieval period; such a long-term awareness may have made it easier for early modern English subjects to adopt an explicit ideology of public service—service as much to an idealized, national state as to the person who led it.

Whatever its origin, such rhetoric did jostle with the rhetoric of lordship's personal service in early modern England, and this complicates the question of Pepys's honorable connections. As will be noted in the following chapter, among his patrons Pepys addressed only those with formal titles as "my lord", and the larger ambit of his connections was a good deal more fluid than it would have been in landlocked service to an earlier predecessor of his first benefactor, the earl of Sandwich. Pepys not uncommonly brokered benefits from other government officials or influential courtiers on behalf of third parties, who themselves might be allies of equal status working for the benefit of a fourth party. The emerging distinction between public and private was badly blurred by these quasi-private, networked transactions, construed as, or at least presented as, serving the greater (or perhaps the newly "public") good. The private aspect is, of course, reminiscent of lordship, and we will return to this significant point in a few paragraphs. Nonetheless, Pepys's more weblike activity created a network of reciprocal obligation that was likely to be greater in extent than that maintained by a medieval knight in service to a magnate, perhaps even by the magnate himself.

The increased range of Pepys's obligations was complemented by a more ephemeral term of service. This was true even for unquestionably blue-blooded greater gentry involved with
government. When he switched masters from the earl of Danby to the marquis of Halifax in the aftermath of the Popish Plot, Sir John Reresby, baronet, continued to visit Danby in prison.

Though not outright enemies, Halifax and Danby had long been competitors, and the earl certainly felt both anger at his own downfall and pique at his rival's success. When Danby (understandably enough) expressed "satisfaction" at some opposition Halifax was facing, Reresby made bold "to tell his lordship that I was a friend to them both" and counseled Danby to abandon this "animosity". Danby seems to have taken no permanent umbrage from these sentiments, later promising "that if he ever lived to come into business [again] he would do me all the service that laid in his power."\(^{29}\) In Chapter 2 we shall see Pepys migrating from the earl of Sandwich to William Coventry and others in the Navy Office for much less cause—simply because he outgrew his earlier benefactors—with no discernable resentment on anyone's part for that reason. During periods of transition from one to another, Pepys had two patrons rather than one; and when he finally made it to the top, receiving favor directly from the King and his brother, he had two patrons all the time until Charles's death. It is difficult to conceive of the most liberal-minded thirteenth- or even fifteenth-century magnate exhibiting such easy understanding in a comparable scenario,\(^{30}\) or even in Reresby's.

The foregoing considerations enable a more informed choice to be made about how to characterize Pepys's honor-bound relationships. The differences in structure and expectations between lordship and patronage, their apparently competing rhetorics of personalized as opposed to public service, have caused historians to posit that shift briefly mentioned in the Prologue from medieval lordship to the early-modern relation of patron and client. This dissertation agrees to the extent of seeing patronage as the appropriate term for relationships in the later Stuart
bureaucracy. Applying "lordship" to these functionaries militates against the goal of fine-grained accuracy which this dissertation's distinctive method is meant to facilitate, so that term will here usually (though not always) be limited to scenarios in which actual lords (legally constituted) are involved. The more generally appropriate model is rather the patron-client relationship—but with two important caveats. Paradoxically for a phenomenon associated with the transformation of the premodern into the modern, both caveats involve significant looks backward.

The first caveat is that patronage in this form was hardly new. The medieval memories of the classical past noted above suggest that the model should be that of classical Rome. It is admittedly far-fetched to posit the detailed medieval transmission of Roman patronage's structure nearly whole cloth to the early modern period, but that is what might as well have happened. One recent survey's multivalent description of Rome's patron-client relationships, covering both republic and principate, could be inserted with almost no revision into a book describing civic elite life under the Stuarts. Of course, the patron-client relationship fulfilled its ideals no more often then did that of lord and retainer; the dominance of superior over inferior sometimes leads to exploitation. But even this negative point reinforces the congruence of ancient Rome and Stuart England, as the classicist who articulates this caution cites Tudor-Stuart historian Keith Wrightson's *English Society* for bringing it to his attention. As in early modern England, patron-client relations in Rome went right up the social scale, obtaining even between aristocrats (senior and junior senators, patricians and wealthy equites, and so forth). For the purposes of this dissertation, one of these similarities is especially important: "for much of its history [even during the Imperial era] Rome was a society in which public agencies and official functions were mediated by the private . . . ties of patronage. State offices—senator, provincial governor or the
emperor—were enmeshed in patronage relationships to a degree that it becomes entirely misconceived to maintain a distinction between the 'formal power structures' of the state and the private bonds of patronage."35 This, too, could have been written of the England in which the most visible of the "new men" identified by the Stones as busy replenishing the ruling oligarchy were civil servants. The complex ties, not only vertical but also horizontal, used by Pepys as he went about his business were also typical of Roman officials such as Cicero (famously also a new man).36

The similarity of late premodern English patronage to that of classical Rome raises the issue of the second caveat concerning Pepys's relationships of honor: The early modern English patron-client bond was not as cold as scholars have supposed.37 This complicating factor reinstates the notion of lordship from which I have been distancing Pepys, returning him to the observation made at the beginning of this section. Were a conservatively honorable rural squire to suddenly find himself replacing Pepys, I would predict no substantial change in behavioral patterns from the old to the new clerk of the acts (saving adjustments due to the new clerk's likely lack of Pepys's superlative talent for paperwork). Previous historians would disagree: they have diagnosed patronage as much less personal than the homage-based honor of the feud (see Prologue). Pepys's evidence, however, counters such an expectation. We shall see that greater fluidity and even a notion of service to the state, at least in our period, entailed hardly less of a personal connection or commitment to one's benefactor or benefactors. The reason for which the structural applications of lordship rather than patronage were discussed at length in the Prologue is not only because genuine lordship was still widespread but also because later seventeenth-century patrons and clients in government administration had a great deal more in common with...
lords and retainers than we have been led to think. Ancient Rome might provide a more accurate structural analog, but medieval lordship was patronage's most immediate influence\textsuperscript{18} (see end of Appendix C)—and it showed. The observant scholar might be tipped off by the vocabulary of the time, as contemporaries only rarely called themselves "patron" or "client". When seeking such terms even in their bustling new urban environs they were more likely to use the old labels of lordship and honorable association: sometimes the encompassingly vague "friend"\textsuperscript{39} but for more precision "master" and "servant." Thereby hangs the title of the next chapter, the first to begin our examination of honor in the later Stuart bureaucracy.
Notes to Chapter 1

1 The sort of approach I am rejecting, associated mainly with linguistic-turn poststructuralism (now sometimes calling itself, misleadingly in my view, the "cultural turn"), denigrates "the objectivist fallacy of traditional positivist historical methods" (as if after Collingwood a good many historians would not have objected to being called "positivist") and decries the usual historicist attempt "to find truths about past events or to identify the origins or causes of past events": see Yoosun Park, "Historical Discourse Analysis," in The SAGE Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods, ed. Lisa Given, vol. 1, 2 vols. (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2008), 394.

2 Our basic theories determine the kind of work we feel that we can do and thus the questions we can ask. I therefore hold theoretical justification to be of critical importance. Nonetheless, this is not a philosophy dissertation, thus the decision to relegate the presentation of my fundamental theoretical stance to an appendix. Historians with limited time can skip it, as the more superficial theories of rhetoric and narrative which directly affect my method are presented here in Chapter 1.


4 Regarding Method, 104. For Skinner's approach as a "rhetorical perspective", see 179 and 182; in general, see Regarding Method, chapters 6 and 7. For the sake of theoretical completeness a further observation should be made: with due respect to J. L. Austin, whom Skinner takes as his inspiration, the most important rhetorical theorist of the past century writing in English, and probably any Western language, is Kenneth Burke, whose work I take to be a somewhat better validation than Austin's of Skinner's method (there is no space to argue the point here, but at points such as 105-6 and 108 Skinner is forced to qualify Austin in ways that, I would suggest, are unnecessary with Burke). Burke's most important works are A Grammar of Motives (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1945); Counter-Statement, 2d ed. (Los Altos, CA: Hermes Publications, 1953); Attitudes Toward History, 2d ed., rev. (Los Altos, CA: Hermes Publications, 1959); A Rhetoric of Motives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969); and Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose, 3rd ed., with a new afterword (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). Furthermore, the most sophisticated and thorough modern treatment of rhetoric within a single set of covers is arguably Chaïm Perelman and Louise Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969), and see also Perelman, The New Rhetoric and the Humanities: Essays on Rhetoric and Its Applications, trans. William Kluback (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Pub. Co, 1979). This work, as well as Burke's, nicely complements the individualistic ontology and plural subjectivity outlined above.
The direct meaning of the statement is the same in both cases, however; it is important not to confound concepts and their meanings, which are communal property, with individual intention. For Skinner, intentionality does not directly affect symbolic meaning per se but rather the correct understanding of an isolated event. In addition, especially in the case of literary texts, what a text actually says and what the author intended may diverge so wildly that the text must interpreted as it stands without recourse to intention, presumably with recourse to its wider context: Regarding Method, 110-111. Furthermore, even if intention and some of a text's meaning are sensibly synchronized, "any text of any complexity will always contain far more in the way of meaning than even the most vigilant and imaginative author could possibly have intended" (113). This additional example of the politician is mine, but although Skinner does not give it, he discusses irony of the kind I impute to the officer on 111-12. Within history, adherents of poststructuralism primed by the "death of the author" are especially likely to take issue with Skinner's insistence on intentionality; for his important defense of this part of his platform, see 107-110, and see also the "relevance relation" posited by other philosophers as holding between a statement and its context: Jeroen Van Bouwel and Erik Weber, "A Pragmatist Defense of Non-Relativistic Explanatory Pluralism in History and Social Science," History and Theory 47, no. 2 (2008): 171.

Skinner discusses the attendant hardship such indirectness imposes on historical research on 112-13; for ways of confronting that hardship see 116-17 and 119-20. "Postmodernism" is often credited, incorrectly, with bringing this issue to historians' consciousness. For just one of many relevant discussions written long before poststructuralist thought began to affect the profession in the late 1980s, see George F. Kennan, "The Experience of Writing History," The Virginia Quarterly Review 36, no. 2 (Spring 1960): 205–14. For Febvre, see A New Kind of History: From the Writings of Febvre, ed. Peter Burke (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1973), 19.

For an explanation of these concepts see Appendix D.

"[W]e are all limited by the concepts available to us if we wish to communicate" (Regarding Method, 117); "the meaning of utterances helps to limit the range of illocutionary forces they can bear, and thereby serves to exclude the possibility that certain illocutionary acts are being performed." (114) The very etymology of "communication" illustrates the close relationship of meaning to collective life.

Skinner agrees with the denial of authorial intention as the final arbiter of a text's total meaning in the literary-critical sense (113, 136). To understand a text's rhetorical moment requires understanding authorial intent, but that does not preclude other, unintended meanings from also inhering therein, even during the author's own time (in other words, such extra-authorial meaning is not merely a function imposed by incommensurable historical perspective). However, Skinner also insists that authorial intentions themselves be defined in terms of "what their authors meant by them." (114)

It may even be the demonstrably best way. Every historical study of honor in England published from the early twentieth century through an important journal's recent theme issue on masculinity (in which honor was the main vehicle for discussing the topic: Journal of British Studies 44, no. 2 [April 2005]) has used as evidence statements about honor, mostly verbalized
in court or published by early modern presses, rather than empirically describing behaviors that demonstrated honor. Mervyn James's groundbreaking examination and scattered articles by others since then constitute only partial exceptions, as even their work mostly situates the occasional example of nonlinguistic action within a larger web of conceptualization. It is possible to conceive of other approaches, but none have been employed—there have been, for example, no quantitative studies of differing types of honor-based altercations (say, impromptu fights as opposed to formal duels). This long historiographical trend could, of course, merely indicate that scholars are like lemmings, but then again it may signal a more fundamental methodological truth. For an endorsement of the rhetorical approach for early-modern studies, see Sharpe and Zwicker, "Introducing Lives," 6.

11 Claire Tomalin, Samuel Pepys: The Unequalled Self (London: Viking, 2002), and for recent commentary Sharpe and Zwicker, "Introducing Lives," 9-10. In other words, all of what he said and wrote carried rhetorical purpose, however attenuated and even if only expressed for the purpose of convincing himself (cf. Hirst and Zwicker, Andrew Marvell, 162-63). Although I repudiate the poststructuralist foundations of the literary New Historicism from which the notion of "Renaissance self-fashioning" originated (see above and statements in Appendix D), poststructuralist epistemology is not a necessary part of the idea that people try to portray themselves in advantageous ways, even to themselves, and that even private portraits must therefore intersect with public culture.

12 That he is correct in his self-portraits is often independently substantiated by official decisions taken in order to act on proposals he made or arguments he tendered. In addition, the editors of the Diary have found that whenever other testimony bears on events also reported by Pepys, his report of the facts seldom diverges (see Conclusion). For a discussion of similar methodological problems applied to a different field, also stressing both the reality of individual experience and the necessity of triangulation from other sources, see Geraldine Joncich Clifford, "History as Experience: The Uses of Personal-History Documents in the History of Education," History of Education 7, no. 3 (1978): 183–96, 187-93.

13 Pepys was not the only early modern literary figure for which something similar appears to be the case; it has recently been argued of Edmund Spenser, "He did not just write . . . poetry in a vacuum." Indeed, "[t]he life and the art are [so] intertwined" that "we should be wary of not reading Spenser's poetry in terms of his life and opinions". Andrew Hadfield, "Secrets and Lies: The Life of Edmund Spenser," in Writing Lives: Biography and Textuality, Identity and Representation in Early Modern England, ed. Kevin Sharpe and Steven N. Zwicker (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008), 65, 67, emphasis in original.

14 Frances Harris, Transformations of Love: The Friendship of John Evelyn and Margaret Godolphin (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2002), quotation on 6; for the type of evidence used, see e.g. Harris's analysis of the beginning of Evelyn's tract for Godolphin on how to run a household, 247-51.

15 See convenient summary of this issue in Harris, Transformations, 8-10.


Mink, *Historical Understanding*, 185. The more important of Mink's two alternatives is theory, but objects of inquiry may be described under a theory only in synchronic terms, not diachronic. Mink acknowledges that historians may sometimes use theory, but in his view it is not as distinctively applicable to their work as narrative.


David Carr, *Experience and History: Phenomenological Perspectives on the Historical World* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014), 209. This postulate chops into kindling what is by far the most important plank, emplotment, in the relativistic attack on narrative most closely associated with Hayden White and even some non-linguistic-turn authors such asJune Philipp, "Traditional Historical Narrative and Action-Oriented (or Ethnographic) History," *Historical Studies* 20, no. 80 (1983): 339–48. The two best available anti-White arguments are Chris Lorenz, "Can Histories Be True? Narrativism, Positivism, and the "Metaphorical Turn,"	*History and Theory* 37, no. 3 (1998): 309–29, and Carr's new book. Lorenz's article has languished in undeserved obscurity probably because it is severely compressed and highly technical, requiring
a good deal of prior philosophical familiarity for full comprehension. This should not be a
difficulty with Carr. He provides a rehabilitation of narrative and experience (another concept
panned by poststructuralist historians) which is not only powerful but also (nearly as important)
smoothly written. His book bids fair to give the many historians who have always been leery of
the linguistic turn the sophisticated alternative they have so badly needed; in opposition to
White's fictionalized history, Carr provides good reasons for which much history "seems to
borrow its form from the very action it is about." (213) Should relativists leap to the attack on the
supposition that linear narrative is a peculiarly Western way of conceptualizing the world, they
should be warned that Carr preempts that objection.

York, NY: G. Braziller, 1978). *The Cheese and the Worms* is cited at the beginning of this
chapter.

24 This assessment is based on searches for the term in the database Early English Books Online
performed by Derek Hirst, to whom I am grateful for this information and other feedback
concerning the issue.

UK: Clarendon Press, 1984). For a convenient summary of the data see 399-404, 407-12, and
419-23.

Alfred to the Twelfth Century* (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), who reacted powerfully
whole see the entire book, but for Roman influence specifically, see e.g. 29-30, 36-39, 43, 49,
or 444-48, and also Wormald, *Lawyers and the State: The Varieties of Legal History*, Selden
Society Lecture, 2001 (London: Selden Society, 2006) as well as *Papers Preparatory to the
2016. The evidence is perhaps too sparse to be definitive, but so carefully constructed and highly
technical is Wormald's edifice of argument that it will take a great deal more to dismantle than
the article-length opposition of such pieces as John Hudson's "The Making of English Law and
the Varieties of Legal History," in *Early Medieval Studies in Memory of Patrick Wormald*, ed.
Stephen David Baxter (Farnham, England: Ashgate, 2009), 421–32. Also apposite is Sarah Foot,
"The Making of Angelcynn: English Identity before the Norman Conquest," *Transactions of the
Royal Historical Society* (Sixth Series) 6 (1996): 25–49, who credits Alfred with creating a
generalized English political identity.

27 For the high and late Middle Ages respectively see e.g. William of Ockham, *Dialogus* 3.2, ii.28
(before 1335, Medieval Texts Editorial Committee of the British Academy),
Governance of England: Otherwise Called the Difference Between an Absolute and a Limited Monarchy, ed. Charles Plummer (ca. 1471; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1885). In the latter, 114 praises the legendary Trojan Brutus's popular election as the first English king in a putatively Roman manner, while 149 lauds successful Roman emperors for seeking counsel from the Senate.


Both from the north country, Danby and Halifax "were lifelong rivals": J. R. Jones, Country and Court: England, 1658-1714 (London: E. Arnold, 1978), 18-19. For visits to Danby in the Tower of London, see Memoirs of Sir John Reresby: The Complete Text and a Selection from His Letters, ed. Andrew Browning, Mary K. Geiter, and W. A. Speck, 2nd ed. (London: Offices of the Royal Historical Society, 1991), 2 June 1680, 196; 4 November 1681, 236; and 5 January 1682, 244. It was upon the last occasion that Reresby expressed loyalty to both Danby and Halifax. For Danby's subsequent promise of further patronage and its partial fulfillment ("he had given a very fair character of me to the King [William]"), see respectively 7 September 1684, 346, and 28 February 1689, 556. During the latter conversation Danby again inveighed against Halifax. "I wondered that he durst... to be so open before me," recorded Reresby, who remained the Trimmer's client, "but he knew I would not betray him, not so much as to my lord Halifax." (559)

Pepys's positive, even somewhat warm relationship with both Charles and York is all the more striking when given the well-known antipathy that obtained between the royal brothers. An analogous situation between sovereign and heir at the end of Henry IV's reign saw the court divided into opposing factions that would probably have forced a predecessor of Pepys—say, in the then-powerful Exchequer—to choose sides: Desmond Seward, Henry V: The Scourge of God (New York, NY: Viking, 1988), 28, 31-32.

Patronage was a crucial part of Roman society "at all periods for which we have information". In comparative terms, it "was central to the structure of Roman society as feudalism was to medieval: it constituted the dominant social relationship between ruler and ruled." Andrew Wallace-Hadrill, "Patronage in Roman Society: From Republic to Empire," in Patronage in Ancient Society, ed. Andrew Wallace-Hadrill (London, UK: Routledge, 1989), 64, 68. The seminal description of classical patronage is Richard Saller's. For convenience a summary may be found in his "Patronage and Friendship in Early Imperial Rome: Drawing the Distinction," in Patronage in Ancient Society, ed. Wallace-Hadrill, 49, but the phenomenon is carefully examined in Saller's groundbreaking Personal Patronage under the Early Empire (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1982), the arguments of which proved sufficiently resilient as to enable a reprinting in 2002 with no change in the text; and they have not been seriously challenged since.

Among other striking similarities, Greg Woolf, Rome: An Empire's Story (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2012), 84-85, lists many of the same benefits to clients, e.g. "social promotion" and "loans of capital".


In Roman times the tie could be tight enough to span generations: Woolf, *Rome*, 8.


Chapter 2: Pepys as Servant

This chapter begins the documentation of honor as a major factor in the career of Samuel Pepys—not a trivial endeavor. Although honor has become a major historical topic and Pepys is one of the most prominent figures in the historiography of the seventeenth-century England, none of his biographers has considered his life or even his career in terms of honor. "Honor" appears as an entry in no index to interpretive work devoted to Pepys of which the present author is aware nor in any of the important editions of Pepys's own writing—an omission especially striking in the Matthews and Latham Diary given the occurrence of the word and its variants ("honorable," "dishonor," "dishonorable") many times each year. The professional literature, then, tempts one to think Pepys had no honor.

Many of the naval officers he supervised might well have agreed. As Mervyn James wrote, "the man of honour" bridled at authority, "seen as liable to cabin, crib and confine...[his] autonomy." Yet as government grew and new standards proliferated, administrators attempting to supervise these combative captains proved ever more determined to add more and better oversight as the reign progressed. According to the Duke of York's General Instructions . . . To Commanders, which governed the navy after being issued in 1663, accounts had to be kept of disbursements made and supplies used by subordinates, and at the end of a voyage, a captain's journal and various account-books had to be turned in to the Navy Board. The lack of the captain's journal, at least, was nominally cause to withhold the commander's pay. But professional warriors resented the new bureaucratic requirements. One captain under censure by the Navy Board for poor paperwork shot back that he was not "bred a clerk." Another, apparently regarding record-keeping as unimportant to a ship's main business, answered that he had not
dishonored the King's service. When the Navy Board attempted to step up enforcement, captains asserted the seventeenth-century equivalent of the modern grammar-school claim that the family dog ate the pupil's homework; for Restoration naval officers, the agents of convenient destruction were natural disasters of one kind or another, or the ship's purser.

Some contemporaries can therefore be found presaging the modern scholar's notion that bureaucratic and warrior norms were incompatible. Could a pen-pusher truly be honorable? Pepys certainly started his career without much honor to speak of; he accumulated its coin as he climbed the ladder of his career. The first role he assumed during this process was that of a client to honorable patrons, so a demonstration that he self-consciously operated in an honorable social matrix properly begins with an examination of his performance as a client. The present chapter charts his rise through ever-more-responsible and remunerative levels of service to those whom he called "lord" or "master"—Edward Mountagu, earl of Sandwich; briefly, Sir George Carteret; then Sir William Coventry; and finally the royal brothers, Charles and James Stuart, successively kings of England. Along the way it examines how faithfully he served them as he negotiated his way through the inevitable complications posed by his role. Sandwich's example affords an especially clear view of how the beginning of Pepys's career placed the diarist within a household unit which, although the resemblance was of course not exact, echoed something of the medieval retinues supposedly long vanished by the Restoration—what will be called here an "honor subcommunity." These topics begin the demonstration, continued in the four subsequent chapters, of how important honor was in both Pepys's life and bureaucratic career.
Despite Pepys’s life as a gentleman of the pen, as his start with Mountagu suggests, the story does not find its origins in an inkwell. In a fitting reminder of why anthropologists have applied the phrase "lineage culture" to social milieux of this type, the genesis of Pepys's honor lay in the blood. Pepys's lowly origins undeniably make him a liminal figure, but modern historians have turned that status into a near anachronism by portraying Pepys as a self-made man who raised himself to the height of success from the lowly tailor's shop and "who owed nothing to birth". A full appreciation of Pepys's social trajectory must include the recognition that from the moment he was born he was embedded in a kinship network that provided significant advantages. He had clearly gentle relatives; as a child, Samuel often visited the estate of his great-uncle John and had significant contact with two other great-uncles of means, Talbot, an MP and squire of Impington, and Apollo, Talbot's younger brother, who had risen to rural eminence through service to the Mountagus, into whose family Apollo and Talbot's sister Paulina married. Richard Pepys, Cromwell's Lord Chief Justice of Ireland, was more distant, but Samuel was close to his children.

The diarist's immediate bloodline was wanting, along with the financial means to exhibit honor, but his close connections to relatives who had both may have made it easier for him to consider it possible to become a gentleman; they certainly provided him with an opportunity to do so that was fairly rare in early modern English society. Pepys's climb began with his most important early patron, the Huntingdon magnate and admiral Edward Mountagu, a first cousin once removed. It is unclear how the diarist initially impressed this influential relation, but the latter helped him through Cambridge. Subsequently, in 1656, when appointed joint admiral of the navy (with Robert Blake), Mountagu required someone to take care of his business and
government-provided lodgings in London. Pepys joined his household to undertake those tasks. Addressing Mountagu as "my honoured master," Pepys house-sat, ran errands, received an early baptism of fire in naval administration when Mountagu dumped the legal proceedings of a captured prize in his lap, and even defended himself against an accusation of employment-related malfeasance for the first time, but by no means the last, when one of the London servants he was supposed to be supervising made off with some of Mountagu's property. "The loss of your Honour's good word," Pepys wrote worriedly, "will prove as much my undoing as hitherto it hath been my best friend." The adroitness with which he marshalled evidence in his defense foreshadowed later occasions upon which he would also have need to extricate himself from trouble, a type of situation in which he would often be found invoking his honor. At this time in his life he made no mention of that, but honor's ties seem to have been at work, since by summer 1658 he added the post of Exchequer clerk to his employment with Mountagu, almost certainly as a result of association with the admiral, whose steward Edward Shipley was a friend of one of the four Tellers of the Exchequer. This increase in material prosperity allowed Pepys to lease his own house, in Axe Yard off King Street, instead of living in Mountagu's quarters. Pepys's undoubted gratitude was given more scope than usual for reciprocation in May 1659 when instead of running errands about the capital, Pepys sailed from England, probably with sensitive political messages, to where Mountagu was anchored in the Sound trying to broker peace between Sweden and Denmark. Thus even before he himself could (or did) claim to be honorable, Pepys was well aware of moving within precincts of honor and could begin to observe up close how they functioned beyond merely the deference he was accustomed to offer.

A look at evidence culled from the first month alone of the diary will further suffice to
establish the significant presence of honor's social formations in Pepys's life at this early date. The sketchy outline of Pepys's relationship with Mountagu explodes into a vibrantly colored pageant when the diary opens. In the second daily entry of the diary, 2 January, Pepys writes that he collected £60 (probably interest) on a larger debt of £2000 for "my Lord." This was a phrase with clear personal meaning rather than simply being an empty label: under Cromwell, Mountagu had been created a baron upon his appointment to the upper house resulting from the "Humble Petition and Advice". But the title had been revoked by Parliament in 1659 when Mountagu was stripped of his naval post upon suspicion of royalism, so for Pepys to use it at this point, prior to Mountagu's second creation by Charles, constituted a deliberate statement. Pepys never refers to other untitled men, however great, using that term. He does apply it to peers but always appends their surname (e.g. "my Lord Fairfax" in the same entry), never using an unadorned "my Lord" unless he is discussing them in the same passage in which he has already introduced them by name. The same observations hold for Mountagu's wife Jemima, called "my Lady" in this second entry. Negative evidence can be derived from Pepys's description of another Exchequer clerk as having future knight and treasury architect George Downing as "his master," a term Pepys pointedly never himself used with Downing as long as Pepys held the Exchequer post even though, because Pepys worked directly under Downing, it would have been correct to do so. He could only bring himself to apply the term to Downing after he became clerk of the acts, writing of "my late master". ("Patron" does not seem to have been a lexical option in the diary.) The closest Pepys came during his Exchequer period was "Mr. Downing master of my office," a clear distancing. Pepys expressed considerable dislike for Downing in the diary; part of the reason, and perhaps most of it, stemmed from Downing's notoriously pinch-penny ways. Only too glad to
exercise the moral right honor conferred upon servants with illiberal masters, the diarist took his services elsewhere as soon as a better prospect appeared. Pepys, then, seems to have already been well aware of how a master-servant relationship based on honor was supposed to work.\textsuperscript{11}

Pepys applied that knowledge in Mountagu's service as early as the diary's second day. This entry shows him visiting Mountagu's oldest daughter, Jemima Mountagu, who was receiving treatment in London for a deformity. Pepys had been asked to look after her, a task which he performed with what must be described as all true diligence, calling even when she was thought to have smallpox.\textsuperscript{12} And her father, out of favor for Royalist leanings since September 1659 and retired to his seat near Huntingdon, needed a good deal more help at the time. Especially important during the uncertain early days of 1660 was a good pair of eyes and ears in London; Mountagu sent at least two letters to Pepys at this time, and the latter wrote back constantly to supply news and request further instructions. Pepys also helped negotiate the continuance of his patron's Whitehall lodgings with Anthony Ashley Cooper, who had been assigned the rooms when the Council of State terminated Mountagu's government employment on suspicion of royalism.\textsuperscript{13} And Pepys performed a number of other tasks for his master throughout the month;\textsuperscript{14} he might be new to the game of honor, but he had already realized what faithful service entailed.

Mountagu certainly knew what good lordship meant. Aside from the (unknown) stipend he must have been paid, on that second of January which shows Pepys visiting Mountagu's sick daughter, the diarist received twelve bottles of sack from his master as a New Year's gift and refers to a haunch of brawn (pickled boar, traditional during the Christmas season) "which I received from my Lady," continuing appreciatively, "which proves as good as ever I had any." On
January 7 he received a "sack-posset" from Mountagu's daughter, then had supper at Mountagu's London quarters, "eating of part of his [Mountagu's] turkey-pie" and reading one of his books. Following a convivial tavern dinner on January 18 with four friends and neighbors, none of whom can be identified as having their own ties with Mountagu, the diarist felt free to remove the group to "my Lord's" more expansive accommodations for the rest of their evening. Especially significant was a present of venison a few months later. The most prestigious of all gustatory gifts, this meat, the reigning authority on early modern hospitality tells us, was considered "the food of lords." But Pepys did not merely serve Mountagu and receive directly correspondent benefits; he also participated in a subcommunity of mutual assistance and companionship surrounding the patron which was reminiscent of a medieval magnate's household despite the urban environment and the absence of Mountagu himself. Again in the diary's second entry, Pepys gave a shilling to "old East," Mountagu's servant who had delivered the New Year's gift of wine; visited Mountagu's wealthy father-in-law, John Crew, and borrowed £10 from Crew's steward John Andrews "for my own use"; paid a social call to Mountagu's steward Edward Shipley; and finally, after the day's business, returned to the Crew house for dinner but arrived too late and so went to Clare Market in Lincoln's Inn Fields for a drink and some cheese with Henry Moore, a lawyer not merely in Crew's employ but "a member of . . . Crew's household." On January 3, the diarist entertained at lunch Moore, Shipley, and Jemima Mountagu with the brawn he had from Jemima's mother. On 4 January he received "the clerk and quartermaster of my Lord's troop [a regiment of horse Mountagu had been appointed to command], and took them to the Swan and gave them their morning's draught, they being just come to town." Five days later he hosted them
for supper with "the remainder of my collar of brawn," and the day after met them for lunch as well as borrowing another £10 at the house of Mountagu's father-in-law, this time from Crew himself. The next day he again went to Crew's home hoping for supper "but came too late," although he stayed for a short game of shuttlecock. He began the following morning by drinking with Shipley and was subsequently "very merry" at the Half Moon with Philip Holland, commander of the vessel Mountagu had used as his flagship on his final assignment as a parliamentary admiral. The last half of the month was similarly occupied, sliding toward a close on January 28 when George Mountagu, cousin of Pepys's patron, treated the diarist to "a plenteous brave dinner and the greatest civility that I could have from any man." The month closed when Pepys drank with Nick Bartlett "that had been a servant of my Lord's at sea." Pepys's immersion in the social structure of household patronage surrounding Mountagu soon yielded greater dividends than small loans and good fellowship. The next month, when the Restoration became imminent, Mountagu himself returned to London and Pepys "found my lord at dinner; who called for me in and was glad to see me." Mountagu by that time judged Pepys a reliable servant and asked him "to go to sea as his secretary. . . . He . . . began to talk of things of state, and told me that he should now want one in that capacity at sea that he might trust in. And therefore he would have me to go." But as a good lord Mountagu knew that these "things of state" would not provide a permanent way of advancing his client's interests, so he also promised to "use all his own and all the interest of his friends that he hath in England to do me good." Buoyed significantly, Pepys wrote, "My mind . . . hath been very much eased and joyed in my lord's great expression of kindness this day; and in discourse thereupon, my wife and I lay awake an hour or two in our bed." In a similar conversation the next day, Mountagu again illustrated the
generosity of the honorable master who recognizes that his servant's profit is crucial to the servant's honor, and if the servant's profit is not congruent with the master's, the servant has the moral right to leave: "he did give me the best advice that he could what was best for me, whether to stay or go with him, and offered all the ways that could be how he might do me good, with the greatest liberty and love that could be." This was no pro-forma gesture. The next week, Pepys presumed upon this "liberty and love" to seek a higher place in the Exchequer, Vice-Chamberlain of the Receipt, which had become vacant. Pepys must have gotten a hint that it would not be his, however, since two days later he accepted Mountagu's offer. Mountagu does not seem to have been put out by Pepys's attempt.  

Good lordship required Mountagu to perform a balancing act when he offered Pepys this opportunity. However much he had come to value his younger cousin, Mountagu already had a secretary for matters at sea, the fairly capable John Creed, who would expect to continue performing his duties. Mountagu split the post: usually, the Secretary of the Fleet would also be its deputy-treasurer, but the admiral gave the latter office to Creed. In what may have been his first taste of honor competition, Pepys was "troubled" at this and took some satisfaction when the deputy-treasurer failed to find a bed aboard ship, whereas the secretary had secured a personal cabin. But Mountagu now had two valuable men in his retinue on whom he could count for sensitive tasks in the uncertain days ahead.  

Pepys's new post, though temporary, brought him his first intimations of personal honor. Assuming responsibility for the correspondence of the mission, he received a letter from the Admiralty addressed to "S. P. Esqr.," upon which "God knows I was not a little proud." Although he did not yet take such titles upon himself, envy or at least wistfulness can be detected in such
statements as, "Walking upon the decks, where persons of honour all the afternoon," accompanied by a list of them. And there was no need to be wistful when he had some work done on the furniture of his cabin; he could then take "great joy to see what a command I had over everyone to come and go as I ordered." The servant's ongoing physical proximity to Mountagu also furnished the opportunity to strengthen the admiral's good opinion with a dose of camaraderie administered by Pepys's violin. Mountagu loved music, and after a convivial evening during which Pepys and the earl traded passages (Mountagu on the guitar), the secretary became more truly privy to his secrets.

The personal bond thus forged was what made Pepys. Upon returning to England with king and prince in late May, Mountagu was in the ascendant, and he proposed that his young kinsman should ride on his coattails: "We must have a little patience," Mountagu told Pepys, "and we will rise together." In the meantime the earl promised to help his servant in other ways if possible. Four days later, he promised Pepys the place of clerk of the Privy Seal "in case he could not get a better employment for me." Mountagu did not delay. On June 18 "he told me that he did look after the place of the clerk of the acts for me." A member of the Navy Board, the governmental department responsible for the supply and daily administration of the navy, becoming Clerk of the Acts of the King's Ships would indeed constitute "a better employment". Indeed, some struggle proved necessary to secure it against other hopefuls, among whom the most threatening was probably an unnamed candidate put forth by Anne Monck, wife of the Restoration's architect and army commander; she desisted after Admiral Mountagu pointed out how impertinent it would be if he were to try and get army-related appointments for his own clients (a patron's sphere merited respect). As paperwork neared completion, Pepys was
optimistic enough to buy new clothes that would better suit his prospective dignity but so nervous that Mountagu felt it necessary to reassure his client twice more that "he would do all that could be done" and "that I need not fear, for he would get me the place against the world." And so it was.23

As clerk of the acts, Pepys might have moved as wholly out of Mountagu's orbit as an office worker might move from one employer to another today. He did not. For all that he was working in the largest, most impersonal urban environment of his time, and with a good deal more to do at his new post than as a lesser Exchequer clerk, Pepys nonetheless remained a member of Mountagu's entourage and continued to perform odd jobs for the newly created Earl of Sandwich (they had indeed risen together). Although these tasks became less frequent, there was immediate diminution of neither service nor favor. Pepys's patent for the navy post was formally sealed on July 13, but on the fourteenth he was at "my Lord's, where I stayed doing his business and taking his commands" during the afternoon; in the evening Pepys returned "to my Lord's late writing letters."24 The next day, Sunday, "To my Lord's and dined all alone at the table with him." On Monday Pepys worked at his new office, but Tuesday there was "much business at my Lord's." Wednesday morning was again spent at the navy office, but in the afternoon Pepys went "to my Lord for business," where Mountagu gave him "half a buck from Hinchingbrooke" which Pepys dropped off at his parents', allowing them to have a fair-sized gathering Friday night, after which Pepys went "to Westminster about my Lord's business." Saturday, Pepys writes, "to my Lord and spoke to him about the business of the Privy Seal for me to be sworn," the fallback office which Pepys no longer needed; the new member of the Navy Board intended to deputize Henry Moore (also a Sandwich client) to the Privy Seal as "a kindness." The next
day, Sunday again, "I found my Lord at home and walked in the garden with him, he showing me all the respect that can be." When the work-week began the following morning Pepys was sworn into the Privy Seal with his master at his side.\textsuperscript{25} Perhaps for a moment, however, Pepys thought that the lesser Privy Seal office might suffice, for when he was offered £1000 for his navy position, it "made my mouth water." To part with something so significant so soon, however, might seem ungrateful to the bestower, so Pepys rightly "dare[d] not . . . till I speak with my lord to have his consent."\textsuperscript{26}

Pepys was ambitious, certainly, a young man on the make, but important aspects of his conduct in relationships of this kind do not parallel modern custom but rather the behavior of a loyal retainer. As with any close relationship there would be lows as well as highs, but Pepys's tie to Mountagu lasted until the end of the earl's life (and beyond, with surviving members of Mountagu's family). The ensuing years saw continuing social occasions and reciprocal services and favors on both sides, many explicitly involving honor.\textsuperscript{27} And there were more important highlights as well—or, sometimes, lowlights. In 1662 Sandwich nominated Pepys to the commission for Tangier, England's new Mediterranean naval base, "not only great honour, but may be of profit too". This prognostication proved accurate, as the commission seat later led to the post of Tangier treasurer, which funneled a large amount of money into Pepys's pocket.\textsuperscript{28} But in late autumn 1663 a strain was put upon their relationship when Pepys dutifully, if reluctantly, assumed the mantle of counselor in the matter of an alleged, too-public affair with which Mountagu may have been dishonoring himself. Pepys prevaricated a good while but, egged on by others in Mountague's service but with less standing than Pepys (notably his old rival John Creed, whose career had not kept pace), the diarist steeled himself to the role of faithful
counselor with unwelcome advice. In a letter which framed its message as "the duty which every bit of bread I eat tells me I owe to your lordship," Pepys worried about "the uncertainty of my return" (i.e. the response he would receive) but judged the risk necessary for "the safety of your honour . . . . your Lordship's honour being such as I ought to value it to be". Pepys went on to speak of the "scandal to your lordship" and suggested that the earl remove himself from the vacation spot where lived the lady who was busy tarnishing his reputation. For days afterwards Pepys agonized, then visited the earl, who "took notice of my care of him and his honor" but denied the reports.²⁹

Writers on Pepys like to speculate that this incident opened an unbridgeable crevasse between the two men, and Pepys certainly agonized about Mountagu's coldness for a time, but the bond of honor proved stronger than injured pride.³⁰ However irked, Sandwich did not feel that his servant had acted in a manner that justified cutting ties. The diarist proceeded to serve as the go-between during government discussions with Sandwich concerning his command leading up to the Second Dutch War, in which the earl "seems to be very open with me and to receive my opinion as he used to do"; although the number of ships being offered to Sandwich was insultingly low, Pepys counseled, and Sandwich agreed, that it was "wholly inconsistent with his honour not to go with this fleet." The earl then asked Pepys to look after the family in case he should not survive.³¹ When Sandwich went to war in 1665, he asked Pepys to continue marriage negotiations which had begun for his eldest daughter; the clerk of the acts exulted over the "abundance of joy, and honour" which attended the endeavor.³² Sandwich next needed help after deciding (in his capacity as a victorious admiral) to divide the spoils of war between his forces without going through the prescribed legal process. Using his position at central naval
administration to let Sandwich know "what others say and do" in the case, Pepys wrote, "nothing shall be left undone that your lordship shall command me, for . . . nothing in all my life ever went so near my heart, as the apprehensions of the dishonor threatened to your lordship by . . . the inquisition now on foot." Pepys even wrote a defense for Mountagu should he face a formal Parliamentary inquiry (a development Mountagu sought as an opportunity to clear his name but which was not afforded him perhaps because of that possibility). This was Pepys's first close-up experience with how naval regulations could become bound up with issues of honor and disgrace at high levels; it would not be the last.

Sandwich was then out of the country for three years as an ambassador, but after his return it appears that master and servant picked up where they had left off. Sandwich was quick to borrow £500 from Pepys, and when Pepys wanted a clerkship at Trinity House for his brother John, the former diarist did not hesitate to ask the earl's help. In his turn, Pepys audited the Mountagu accounts until Sandwich died in the third Dutch war, and upon that unhappy event the now-prominent civil servant walked in the funeral procession as a bannerolle alongside the fathers of two officers who had perished with the admiral. And this was not the end of Pepys's relationship with the family. Five years afterward a letter to Sandwich's son would have seemed perfectly congruent issuing from the pen of a northern medieval knight who, in the famous phrase, "knew no prince but a Percy". "[A]s none owes so much, so as few shall pay more, either of affection, honour, or endeavours of service to you and your honourable family than myself", Pepys began, writing at a time when the inexperienced and in any case untalented young earl, who would never be much of a courtier, could be of little assistance in the former's official business. Yet if "I may be in any sort useful to your lordship or it, I beg you will not either
overlook your own right of commanding or deny me the honour and satisfaction of discharging myself towards your lordship as becomes, my lord, your lordship's most bounden and obedient servant.\textsuperscript{36} It might also be noted that Mountagu may have left one further legacy to Pepys of no minor importance, that of administrative example. This is unprovable, but one of Sandwich's biographers suggests that Pepys's careful attention to detail was an attribute he owed to the example of the earl, who applied that characteristic to forge his own productive if abortive career.\textsuperscript{37}

II

Sandwich's demise may have been an emotional blow for Pepys, but by the time of the Third Dutch War the latter had long looked to different men for support from above. A kinship structure much like that of a medieval affinity had afforded him a start, but the key to further advancement lay in other quarters even while Pepys did his best to sustain Sandwich during the prize-goods crisis of the mid-1660s. And as we shall see, these patron-client relationships were as much characterized by the faithful loyalty idealized in honor culture as had been the link to Sandwich.

By the second year of the diary Pepys had identified his seniormost colleague, navy treasurer Sir George Carteret, as a good superior with whom to form an honorable patron-client relationship. This took time; as late as August 1661 Carteret invited other Navy Board members to dinner, but not Pepys. Still, after some effort at cultivation, by June 1662 Carteret "do much esteem of me, and is my friend," Pepys could write, "and I may make good use of him."\textsuperscript{38} Thereafter Carteret proved himself a good patron with such aid as siding with Pepys during
office disputes or informing the clerk of the acts that an important merchant had been saying insulting things, a potentially important piece of news that would enable Pepys to begin taking quick steps to defend his reputation if necessary. As a heedful client Pepys responded in kind. When Carteret needed help justifying his paperwork, Pepys "offered my service to look into any old books or papers that I have that may make for him", and the clerk of the acts warned the treasurer that out in town, "one did very confidently report . . . that my Lord Craven is looking after the treasurership of the navy and reckons himself sure of it". Carteret's career was ended by a parliamentary committee established to investigate administrative abuses perpetrated during the Second Dutch War, the Commission of Accounts, known as the Brooke House Commission. In a hearing before the House of Lords to consider Brooke House's indictment of Sir George, Pepys warded him ably enough that Carteret "so far owned his obligations to me therein . . . as to tell me that he had more reason to present me with fees than his counsel [i.e. lawyers]". And a final favor may provide an example of actual affection, giving a deeper meaning to Mervyn James's phrase "the solidarities of honor" by perhaps demonstrating (as might the longevity of Pepys's relationship with Sandwich and his family) that the associations of honorable loyalty could be further strengthened by shading into genuinely affective friendship. Long after Carteret ceased to be of any practical "use" to Pepys, the latter was happy to help a friend of his old patron buy a boat on terms that only an influential navy official could procure.

Another fellow official whom Pepys courted as a patron was Sir William Coventry, the Duke of York's secretary until 1667. This was an eminently sensible connection because, as Lord High Admiral, York was Pepys's ultimate superior next to the King. The diarist's acquaintance with Coventry had its start on the momentous voyage to bring back His Majesty, when Pepys...
spent an afternoon with the Duke's secretary in good-natured conversation. Soon afterward Pepys had enlisted Coventry's support in the scramble to become clerk of the acts; the two seem to have got on well, since a few days later Coventry "told me that he would do me all right in my business." But what would become a much more powerful connection began to take form after Coventry was appointed a commissioner-at-large of the Navy Board in mid-May 1662.

Shortly before Coventry's advent, shame was occasioned by ignorance and honor's recovery envisioned by way of knowledge in an embarrassing incident that marked a critical turning point in Pepys's performance on the job. Toward the end of 1661, York asked his naval administrators' opinions of the concept that political units could own the portion of the ocean that surrounded their soil. If valid, the notion would demand that foreign vessels passing native ships show honor to the latter by "striking" (lowering their topsails and flags) or saluting with cannonades. But if the issue under discussion was intrinsically honorable, Pepys proved the opposite. His colleagues held forth but the benighted clerk of the acts, unfortunately, "could say nothing to it, which I was sorry for". To make up for his obloquy, that same day Pepys bought John Selden's *Mare Clausum* in its English translation, and the still-green official resolved "to write a little [about the] matter . . . and present it to the Duke, which I now think will be a good way to make myself known."

Pepys's subsequent study of Selden's book was determined, and close on its heels the Lord High Admiral issued new instructions to the Navy Board in early February 1662. The day after the board sat to read the instructions, which mostly enjoined good husbandry of naval resources and set guidelines for achieving it, Pepys wrote, "I do begin to be exact in my duty". He was as good as his word, going to the office earlier, leaving later, and straightening out his
paperwork. Through the rest of the diary and all subsequent Pepys documentation, this reorientation established a habit that never left him. York's instructions hardly seem likely to have been sufficient in themselves to effect such a sudden transformation, but as the happily coincidental, official embodiment of Pepys's two-month-long, honor-driven study of Selden's book, they probably served as a perfectly-timed match to freshly accumulated powder. If so, the English navy to this day has a lot for which to thank the competitive side of honor.

But honor's sociability, in the form of patronage, was also important: Sir William Coventry's appointment to the Navy Board at this juncture was of great moment to naval administration. Other members of the board at this time tended to oppose Pepys (see Chapter 4), so he needed support for any initiatives he might wish to promote under the influence of his new honor-based commitment. Though a valuable ally, Carteret did not attend meetings often enough to furnish the kind of aid necessary to support sustained efforts. Without some other change, Pepys's newfound enthusiasm might well have lapsed in time for lack of ability to achieve significant goals. Coventry, secretary to the man who was both commander-in-chief and administrator-in-chief of the entire service, provided the necessary shift in power. Cautious upon first hearing of Coventry's appointment, Pepys was soon impressed by the latest board member's zeal, which mirrored his own new-found attitude. Already on June 7 "Mr. Coventry is resolved to do much good, and to enquire into all the miscarriages of the office." By the tenth Pepys was reacting with his own optimism. "At the office all the morning, much business", he wrote, "and great hopes of bringing things, by Mr. Coventry's means, to a good condition in the office." He and Pepys, like Edward of York and the Leicestermen in the crucial year of 1471, saw in each other men of the type "such as [are] to be trusted". Coventry seemed to be (and would prove) a
master whom Pepys could serve with full confidence that his faith would not be misplaced.

Despite his inexperience in the halls of honor and courtesy (see below), the clerk of the acts turned out to have the unexpected but doubtless crucial ability to juggle patrons who were at odds. This skill that may have kept the navy office more or less effective when such struggles could have ripped it apart and left it in need of a complete overhaul. For Carteret and Coventry were soon at loggerheads. The diarist resolved to serve two antagonistic masters if he could: the "good hold I have of Mr. Coventry and Sir G. Carteret", he decided, "is necessary for me, to maintain by all fair means." This balancing act he would perform with notable success until changes in the Navy Board's composition a few years later made it unnecessary. Perhaps out of deference to Carteret, Pepys did not make an instant alliance with the new board member, but next month the pair began to work closely together.

Coventry quickly responded to Pepys's desires to forward the service, and Coventry clearly had such desires himself: a decisive shift in naval administration was about to take place, and it would be driven not by the plodding, dull, Weberian ideal-type of paper-pusher but by a leading courtier of high blood who had attached to himself the perfect servant for his aims. On July 2 Pepys and Coventry made the first of what would turn into a number of surprise dockyard inspections over the next couple of years, visiting the Deptford yard and reviewing the books of the storekeeper, clerk of the cheque, and clerk of the survey. All three had been working with "so much laziness . . . that I do not perceive that there is one-third of their duties performed", but remedies were in the offing; "to my great content, Mr. Coventry will have things reformed." The following week saw them at Woolwich, where the books were likewise "found not to answer the King's service and security at all". That evening Pepys dined "at Mr. Coventry's chamber" in St.
James's palace. There they held something of an inaugural conference, talking "of many things that will put matters into better order, and upon the whole my heart rejoices to see Mr. Coventry so ingenious, and able, and studious to do good . . . . About 9 o'clock we broke up after much discourse and many things agreed on in order to our business of regulation". After further inspections in August, Coventry was ready to act. By mid-month the clerk of the acts was "busy at my study late, drawing a letter to the yards of reprehension and direction for the board to sign, in which I took great pains." Pepys gave this to Coventry two days later "to be corrected by him in order to its sending down to all the yards". After this Coventry began to ease off somewhat. The diary gives the impression that he was at the navy office on more days than anyone else but Pepys, but he still had to split his time between duties to York and the board; it is probably no coincidence that Pepys soon began to conduct inspections by himself. But Coventry's work for the board was not confined to the time he spent in its office or at the dockyards. The burst of fact-finding activity, culminating in the admonitory report of mid-August, was followed by a far-reaching administrative change that seems likely to have been provoked by the results of the inspections and instigated by Coventry. In early September the Duke of York instituted a new policy in which the Navy Board was to meet with him each week and inform him directly about the state of naval affairs.

The spark Coventry provided also lit the fire of Pepys's own first significant administrative reform. Working with the approval of a patron who had the ear the Lord High Admiral, Pepys could now proceed with confidence. After talking with dockyard office workers, in October he began "to draw out my conceptions about books for the clerks [of] the cheques . . . I am confident it will be of great use." This was a new method of maintaining accurate lists, or
"callbooks," of who was doing what in the dockyards. The general responsibility fell to clerks of the cheque because it was information crucial for paying workers, but keeping track of workers would also have been important to uncover shirking and prevent problems such as the malpayment of people still on the books but no longer active. In December, supported by Coventry, Pepys initiated a trial run of his brainchild at Woolwich and Deptford. Pepys and Coventry returned to Deptford to "examine the proof" the next month (January 1663). The results must have been inconclusive because Pepys went back for the same purpose in February, but this time he was able to report the innovation's effectiveness. "I am very highly pleased with our new manner of call-books," he wrote, unable to resist adding that the procedure was "my invention." Finally in July it was put into practice everywhere else, including the king of the yards, Chatham, and it would prove a permanent change.55

By the time the callbooks were adopted at all the dockyards, the mentality of honor had guided Pepys on the first leg of a journey which would transform him into the best-qualified naval administrator of the seventeenth century who never sailed professionally. The Selden incident had taught Pepys that knowledge offered a path to honor, while his inspections with Coventry—which at first seem to have required the interpretive aid of technical experts such as Peter Pett and Sir William Penn—showed him how indispensable knowledge was to run a complex organization successfully (and upon success, as we shall see, hung further honor).56 But knowledge—or, rather, ignorance—posed a problem: Coventry and Pepys soon became disenchanted with Pett's devotion to their cause,57 while honor was hammering Penn into Pepys's side as a competitive thorn (see Chapter 4). To better serve his master Coventry's (and of course his own) desires for reform, Pepys embarked on a prodigious course of study which would
eventually make him a master of naval paperwork. In order to more accurately assess shipboard and shipbuilding requirements and the claims of self-interested contractors he began learning such technical details as the "nature of tar" or the quality and manufacture of rope. He also extended his program into the jurisdiction of other board members. For example, he stayed late at the office on August 29 "to look into the nature of a purser's account, and the business of victualling," which was the comptroller's responsibility. The clerk of the acts discovered that feeding sailors was more complicated than he had perhaps expected, involving "a great variety" of detail; "but", he determined, "I shall understand it, and be able to do service there also." In the wake of such perseverance the kind of service he was eventually able to render the King can be illustrated by the way in which he brought the mighty East India Company to heel two years later "in the business of their sending our ships home empty from the Indies contrary to their contract . . . none of my fellow officers, whose duty it is more than mine, had ever studied the case, or at this hour do understand it, and myself alone must do it." 58

Pepys's first step on this road to power—and as Mervyn James has noted, honor in government service was usually linked to power 59—was the hiring of Richard Cooper, a former master's mate (assistant navigator), as a basic mathematics tutor on the first day of July. A whirlwind program of approximately every third day left Pepys a competent accountant by mid-August, but long after Cooper went his way Pepys continued studying "arithmetique" on his own. A measure of Pepys's commitment might be taken from Christmas day a half-year later, the activities of which included "practicing arithmetic alone and making an end of last night's book with great content till eleven at night". In December Pepys was told that "the world" had taken notice "in particular of me, and my studiousness". At the time that "world" may well have been
limited to naval circles, but the point was still valid. The outcome was an eventual command of both theory and practice, needs as well as procedure, that would benefit the navy by helping its premier manager become a highly successful patron in the office (Chapter 3), a much more honorably performative client to men such as Coventry and ultimately two kings, and along the way establish that branch of service firmly enough that it could go on to give England an empire for two centuries.  

It is the pervasive influence of honor on these efforts that most needs emphasis for us today. The Coventry-Pepys reform effort's surprise inspections, corrective memoranda, regular meetings, and emphasis on qualifying expertise would make any committed modern civil servant feel at home. And with its consultation of workers on the spot by managers at the center and its gradual implementation preceded by careful test runs at selected branches, Pepys's callbooks were handled much like the rollout of some new policy by a modern corporate or government bureaucracy. But Coventry's presence at the outset is a reminder that the project was enabled by sponsorship occurring within the ancient structure of honor-based patronage, while the lesson Pepys learned from the meeting about naval honor at which his ignorance brought shame seems to have been veritably branded into his psyche. But Coventry had at least as much to teach Samuel Pepys, Esquire, as he had to teach the Navy Board's clerk of the acts. Part of Coventry's patronage was instruction, though perhaps unstated, in the art of being a personage of honor—how one comported oneself properly in company with equals and superiors; how one behaved not just as a faithful servant but also a good (and effective) master. Because this involved more coaching in directly personal behavior than administrative training (though there was some of the latter), it is outlined not here but separately in Appendix E. But because early
modern honor was personalized, that appendix should not be ignored: Coventry's tuition in these matters had a direct and decisive impact on Pepys's office performance. At this time, with the backing of Carteret and Coventry, Pepys began to compete directly with Sir William Batten and Sir William Penn for office bragging rights. By the end of the year Pepys was told, "[T]he world says of me, 'that Mr. Coventry and I do all the business of the office almost:' at which I am highly proud." This encouraging word was reaffirmed a month later when he could continue to take "great pleasure [in] seeing myself observed by everybody to be the only man of business of us all, but Mr. Coventry." But the business was running on rails of honor.

As events would have it, Coventry had kickstarted Pepys none too soon: inside two years the Second Dutch War was on the doorstep. But the clerk of the act was now prepared. As the emphasis on "business" with Coventry suggests, Pepys's pleasure in the social advancement signaled by increasing mastery of honor was now densely interwoven with the pleasure expressed in connection with attempts to put the King's affairs right (and because of honor's personalized hierarchy, it is not probable that Pepys would have distinguished the two). Coventry and Pepys worked assiduously to counteract corruption and prepare the fleet for large-scale combat, fairly lashing their fellow board members. Sometimes Pepys served as spokesman while Coventry stood behind him, silently hefting a blackjack in the form of his direct line to York's ear. On June 23, 1664, two ropemakers wishing to secure a higher price attempted to pass off rope made from poor raw material as having been manufactured from higher-quality hemp. They were aided by the navy's surveyor, Pepys's fellow board member Sir William Batten, presumably for a cut of the extra profit. Pepys found out the cheat, and "Mr. Coventry coming in and joining with me", managed to stop "Sir W. B.'s design". Sometimes the pair traded punches side by side with
outsiders such as Colonel George Legge of the Ordnance Office, who wanted to encroach on the navy's purview by controlling supplies which Coventry pointed out "were not ammunition, and therefore not properly under their [the Ordnance's] care", while Pepys argued that the navy could buy the supplies more cheaply, "being well seconded by Mr. Coventry". Legge became "very angry," saying that "he would bring the officers of the Ordnance hither to inform us of their reasons for their demands", but the navy officials won in the end; Pepys congratulated himself by observing "how the King is served . . . very bad in other places, compared with the present prices we buy at in the navy."

By the time Coventry sailed with his master York in the summer campaign of 1665, he could confidently leave, as he remarked, "the weight of dispatch" in the navy office upon Pepys's shoulders. Pepys had earned sufficient respect from his fellow members to oppose abuses without immediate backup, a significant step in his professional development even with the occasional failure. By 1668 Pepys was writing as if the navy's, or at least the Navy Board's, honor was interleaved with his own. When the King's service was shortchanged by the negligence of the Deptford yard's mastmaker, Pepys wrote that he felt "much ashamed". As if the incident had been a personal insult requiring the kind of response Coventry famously made to Buckingham's mockery in *The Country Gentleman*, the clerk "advised the Board to think of doing something that might show their resentment of this miscarriage". By August 1665 Pepys had become bold enough to initiate his own proposals. In a detailed report to Carteret on the stores and financing of naval food supplies, Pepys made an early suggestion that evolved about a month later into an influential and important recommendation for the management of "our victualling." The persuasive pitch was honor-based: "now the honour and wealth of King and
kingdom depend without check upon the understanding, credit, diligence, integrity, and health of 
one man [a civilian contractor], whose failure in any of these five circumstances inevitably 
overthrows all". Pepys's memo led to a further proposal to strengthen the victualing structure by 
establishing a special wartime mini-bureaucracy which, gratifyingly, Pepys ended up heading.  
Pepys’s diary entry for the day of this success shows how closely office business intertwined 
mastery and service. Coventry had spoken in "the most obliging [terms], . . . saying me to be the 
fittest man in England"; the master hoped to better compensate the servant for his ongoing 
efforts, his current rewards "being in no wise proportionable to my pains or deserts." When the 
entry reaches the point of York’s concurrence with all this, Pepys exults that it "make[s] me 
joyful beyond myself that I cannot express it, to see that as I do take pains . . .[I have] masters 
that do observe that I take pains." And apparently the relationship kept getting better: early in 
1666, "I find reason to honour [Coventry] every day more and more."  Patrons who lived up to 
honor's ideal were clearly of assistance in getting work done. 

Pepys's work in direct harness with Coventry would soon come to a close, but the same 
phenomenon in which honor loyalty to Sandwich and Carteret may have included real affection 
seems also to have occurred with Coventry—at the least, Coventry furnishes yet another example 
of how enduring an early modern patron-client tie could be. The link he had forged with Pepys 
held well beyond the point of their immediate governmental association in the mid-1660s. Pepys 
and Coventry continued exchanging both personal and administrative favors when the latter left 
the Navy Board to become a Treasury commissioner after the war,  but Coventry was then 
permanently forced out of government service after he issued his well-known challenge to 
Buckingham. As faithful a servant as could be asked, Pepys made sure to support his master in
his Tower captivity, visiting Coventry the same evening he found out as well as a majority of the
other days until Coventry's release. And their association continued long after that. Coventry
remained an MP and in that capacity supported Pepys at several important points during the
1670s even as he (Coventry) became otherwise known as a leader of governmental opposition.

Aside from showing how bonds of honor helped to promote administrative growth and
efficiency, this survey of Pepys and his patrons interrogates the argument that the early modern
patron-client relationship generally represents something more cold and "businesslike" than had been
the case between lords and retainers during the Middle Ages. It is impossible at this remove
to divine the emotions that surrounded relationships of honor in later Stuart England, and there is
also the possibility that the three non-royals whom Pepys had as masters simply happened to all
be men with whom his personality was especially compatible. But three for three seems rather
much of a coincidence: in all cases in which Pepys left patrons behind, he maintained with them
or their families ties of what we might understand as friendship. This was part of honor's older
ideal: the servant's "faithful affection" should be "a strongly emotive relationship", Mervyn
James has written, "which went beyond the more contractual". The commitment such a
relationship would entail, and thus the greater effort put forth to achieve common goals, is
obvious. Was Pepys's continuing contact with these men due to an honor so deeply felt that it
impelled masters and servants toward affect more often than would be the case in societies where
honor plays a much more limited role? Or did the pressure of membership in an honor culture
simply impel individuals to maintain such ties because it would appear unsteadfastly
dishonorable to let them lapse? Such questions will probably always remain unanswerable. What
cannot be denied is that these patron-client bonds were intensely personal in ways that the
household knights of Richard III at Bosworth, who died at their lord's side rather than change loyalties, might well have recognized.  

III

With Coventry's death the second year of James II's reign, all of Pepys's major patrons had left the scene except one: the King himself. But for some time he and his brother Charles had functioned as Pepys's masters directly. The connection made sense. The passion Pepys evinced for his job after having studied Selden would have appealed to the royal siblings, who both enjoyed sailing and deeply believed in their "wooden walls." By the late 1660s Pepys had arguably created himself the living Englishman most knowledgeable of naval affairs in combined breadth and depth; his penchant for order made him a careful administrator, while his acute interest in the world around him and his outstanding rhetorical gifts enabled him to notice problems, articulate them in a fashion that made them hard to dismiss, and present persuasive solutions. The latter abilities changed mere efficiency into effectiveness, but the world of the King and heir to the throne was a courtly one, and within their ambit above all others administrative personnel acted within the framework of what can properly be called "lordship."

The royal brothers were not long in marking Pepys's ability. As Lord High Admiral, York watched Pepys grow into his stubborn competence every week after the institution of the regular meetings (September 1662). The next year York pulled Pepys aside to talk about cutting costs when the clerk of the acts was at Whitehall on other business, and Charles himself followed suit a year later to discuss the navigability of ships of the line in the Thames. The conversation must have impressed the King, since "hereafter I must not go thither, but with expectation to be

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questioned, and to be ready to give good answers." These royal encounters reached a milestone in 1668. York granted the clerk of the acts an interview at Pepys's own request. In this meeting, the navy's chief clerk "did long and largely show him the weakness of our office, and did give him advice to call us to account for our duties". York then asked his busy little servant to prepare a report on the problems. This "great letter", as Pepys called it, was a month in the writing, but the result was all an earnest administrator could have wished. The report jump-started a retrenchment with several changes, including a new requirement that attendance be taken at board meetings and the establishment of a new dockyard position for auditing storekeepers' accounts.

To twenty-first-century eyes, the business transacted in these early modern equivalents of water-cooler conversations or interviews with the CEO may seem unexceptional, Pepys appearing to be just another desk jockey climbing the ladder of promotion. But these encounters were laden with honor. What is crucial about the 1663 and 1664 discussions is that Pepys did not seek an audience: instead, he was sought—and by the first gentlemen of the realm, in public, in full view of "the world." Such treatment constituted a specific kind of courtesy conferred upon inferiors by the powerful; Sir Francis Bacon called it "countenance." Because bystanders watched the interaction, the giver shared a portion of luster with the recipient, and the gesture conveyed a sort of imprimatur, a demonstration that the giver approved of the recipient. This is surely what explains the emphases Pepys chose when he wrote the diary entry describing the discussion with Charles. Crucially, the King "did come to me, and calling me by name, did discourse with me . . . and this is the first time that ever I knew the King did know me personally".

This special method of dispensing honor probably had a significant impact on Pepys's
conduct of administration. It hardly seems coincidental that Pepys neglected to submit a major administrative proposal (August) until a few months after the King first "countenanced" him (April). This was honor with clout: a signal had been sent that Pepys was to be taken seriously. It would be strange had he not gained greater confidence. He certainly gained greater incentive to be a more knowledgeable administrator, since "hereafter" he needed always "to be ready to give good answers." If his standards slipped, so would the honor coming his way.

Rarely letting his standards slip, Pepys worked up to the eventual achievement of the "great letter," and while this technically embodied a different sort of interaction than a "countenancing," it was no less honorific. During the preliminary interview in which York requested the report, Pepys assumed the man of honor's traditional role of counselor. Now able to presume upon the Duke's "countenance," he offered (or portrayed himself as offering) his advice courteously but with the frankness held to characterize good counsel, telling His Highness that "it was his duty to find them [the office failings] . . . which he agreed to." After York accepted the report, he praised Pepys's "good endeavors", and even in private the accolade of a prince of the blood would have an invigorating effect. But the Duke went further, inviting Pepys to continue acting as his naval counselor ("desires my further advice on all occasions"); honoring Pepys with his confidence ("did with much inwardness tell me what was doing" with regard to unrevealed plans for "alterations in the navy"); and promising Pepys his lordship: "he did . . . in words the most expressive tell me . . . that he would have a care of me on all occasions". If any single moment solidified Pepys's status as York's client, this one is surely a front runner, and York's implementation of the recommendations—the letter was issued under James's own signature—arguably made it the pinnacle of Pepys's career as clerk of the acts. It is difficult to
find a better illustration of how honor could reinforce the purposes of administration.

The final step on honor's ladder was the King, and if there was any single moment, or set of them, that turned Pepys into Charles's client, these were the Brooke House hearings of 1670. Pepys had already impressed Charles in the heat of parliamentary combat two years earlier; now instead of defending only himself and the Navy Board, Pepys for the first time undertook to shield the monarch directly. The short pen-pusher did not let pass the opportunity to immediately portray himself as an earnest and desirable servant in his opening address, asserting, "I have aimed at . . . the honour of your Majesty's service", in veiling against accusations "injurious to the honour" of the King and reiterating his own "faithfulness" as well as his "especial obligations as the eldest . . . of your Majesty's servants" on the Navy Board (Pepys was by then the longest-serving board member). Invoking the medieval etymology of lordship (see Prologue), he described the King as a master "whose bread I have long eaten". Pepys carried off this role as King's champion with (as he tells it) considerable aplomb, and once again the rhetoric of honor was associated with the advancement of Pepys's career. As soon as possible the King promoted him from the technically juniormost position on a subordinate administrative body directly to the post of Secretary to the Admiralty (1673).

One example of how Pepys employed the rhetoric of honor in his attempts to see the King's business better done at this juncture concerned the flagrant violation of the rule against carrying (as opposed to convoying) commercial goods, called simply "carrying" by naval officers. Closely related were problems that attended the transport of merchant specie ("plate"), which was allowed but which tempted commanders to disobey orders. Pepys deemed these propensities for what naval idiom dubbed "good voyages" (despite regulations propounded by York almost
immediately upon becoming Lord High Admiral) "utterly destructive to the service of his Majesty, both in its honour and success." On another occasion Pepys labeled it a "matter his majesty’s honour and service is much concerned in" (a turn of phrase apparently useful enough that he used it nearly verbatim elsewhere). When attempting to make an example of one captain, he declared that carrying was practiced "to the delivering up his Majesty’s honour, service, and treasure . . . to irrevocable ruin". Captains neglected assigned patrols in order to fill their holds in Spanish harbors; in one instance a ship had to be detached and sent to Cadiz merely to summon away Captain George Rooke, who was hanging about the port to take on merchant cargo ("get a market"). Another commander on convoy duty from Newfoundland to Italy reached Cadiz where he expected to load bullion. The specie from the New World had been delayed, however, so no "plate" was immediately available. The captain then refused to convoy his merchants onward to Italy, staying at Cadiz "two months or thereabouts" until the galleons arrived. In the meantime, his merchants had become disgusted and either sailed on their own or gave up the Italian leg of the trip because "they thought their market lost". As for the dilatory commander, he finally "went away with his money" on the assigned Italian route—but doing no naval service, "without any one convoy at all." The King's service suffered enough when commanders lay over at Mediterranean ports to "get a market" before sailing to England, but at least the goods or coin they brought would benefit their country. When captains carried to other Mediterranean areas instead without simultaneously fulfilling naval goals, the King's time was completely wasted. This type of abuse Pepys considered completely "below the honour of the King . . . . to the extraordinary dishonour and disservice of the King and prejudice of our nation."78

    Almost as harmful as carrying goods, or prioritizing the carrying of specie, was the
common habit of officers "spending their time on shore to the neglect of their duties on board and general dishonour to his Majesty", identified as a growing problem by Pepys in 1676. Two years afterward, scrutiny had turned to certainty as Pepys thundered that "staying long in town" redounded to "the great dishonour of his Majesty’s service . . . corrupting the discipline of the navy by their example". That organization, declared James when he later became king, could hardly "support our honour" when captains carried on so. But Pepys had long been engaged in a series of preemptive strikes. Reminding a dilatory captain particularly high in York's graces that he (the captain) had shown a cavalier disregard for both "his Majesty's service and the instructions of the Lord High Admiral," Pepys invoked faithful service (on both the part of himself and the captain) as well as the highly-placed man of honor's role as counselor to the King and his government: "I shall not without manifest unfaithfulness be able to omit the making known [of your trespass] both to His Majesty and my lords [of the Admiralty commission], and to his Royal Highness also, who I am sure, expects a better account of the diligence of every person he favors."\(^79\) In spite of various complaints made direct to Charles by captains themselves (who, as noted above, stood on their honor quite as much as Pepys) over such treatment, and Charles II's own overindulgence of those captains, he seems not to have reprimanded his Secretary; he himself accepted rebukes, if phrased with courtesy, at Pepys's hands.\(^80\)

Pepys's course of loyalty to Charles and James was by now set, and theirs to him. Its supreme test on Pepys's side came with the Exclusion Crisis when Pepys was imprisoned and in no small peril of his life, as the Duke of York's enemies, led by the Earl of Shaftesbury, sought to destroy the Duke's supporters.\(^81\) As Pepys was about to lose his post—and perhaps foreseeing worse to come—he pled with York for help on honor's terms, reminding the Duke of his faithful
service. But he was quick to reassure York, if perhaps more hopefully than otherwise, "your royal highness shall never receive any dishonour from the favour you have been observed to incline towards me". For honor was reflective: its bond knotted master to servant or kin to kin tightly enough that the disgrace of the one also shamed the other. For example, when the carousing of Sandwich's cousin Edward became notorious during the diary period, Pepys worried over "Mr. Mo[u]ntaguy's base doings, and the dishonour that he will do my lord".

In 1679, however, even the politically thick-skulled James Stuart must have recognized that the greater immediate danger threatened not him but the servant whose loyalty demanded recompense. Perhaps recognizing his master's denseness in such matters, Pepys spelled out the situation explicitly, writing of the "honour . . . [which the] malignity [of your enemies] designs me" (i.e., imputes to him as a close associate of the Duke). So York did what little he could, writing to the King, "I think your honor concerned". But Charles's hands were now tied as he played his deep game with Shaftesbury. Pepys maintained faith with the royal brothers, however. Scarcely two months out of jail, Damoclean inquisition hanging over his head, Pepys still insisted that his main concern was "the particular satisfaction of the King, my master", and Pepys's behavior shows he meant it: out on bail, he openly attended the openly Catholic duke. York may not have appreciated the risks involved, but Pepys would have been all too aware of them; as one biographer notes, during this time Pepys "narrowly escape[d] the gallows". As soon as the King could respond with good lordship, he did, sending Pepys on a critical mission to evacuate Tangier in 1683 and then reappointing him as Secretary for the Affairs of the Admiralty by patent, a distinction given neither before nor since. This time there was no commission: the King made himself Lord High Admiral, with Pepys his only immediate administrative
subordinate, something akin to the full-fledged "Secretary of the Navy" that one MP had labeled him in the days of high influence when he had carried a bill to fund thirty ships in Parliament just before the Popish Plot. Perhaps in gratitude, when Charles was apparently being posthumously traduced (1693) with neglecting his navy, Pepys firmly defended "the honour of that king" in said matter. Had Charles lived, Pepys doubtless would have served that king's honor as well by continuing to forward matters in the naval bureaucracy, but Charles died a scant year after making the new arrangement.

At the end of his career Pepys owned no master but his new monarch, and it is fitting that the last word on Pepys as a servant in the context of honor should be that of a king. James gave wholehearted support to his little navy chief, allowing Pepys to set in motion an expensive naval reform known as the Special Commission. In their final interaction before the reign's ignominious end, James handed Pepys a letter testifying to the bureaucrat's "long and faithful services". It was praise well earned, for Pepys's Special Commission had built for his master three new ships of the line, almost completely rebuilt 20 others, repaired 69 more, constructed a number of specialized buildings (such as masthouses and boathouses) as well as 33 additional storehouses packed with eight months' extra supplies for every vessel in the navy. This unprecedented feat of administration was accomplished half a year ahead of schedule and within budget. Simultaneously, wrote one contemporary, "the Mediterranean trade was well secured, and the pirates kept down own, and all with so great economy . . . that at the time of the revolution there was near a million in value in the dockyards, in the Tower and other places". Some other high-ranking Protestant officials waffled over to the new regime after the disasters of 1688, but Pepys went down with the sinking ship, never again enjoying even the lowest of
government offices and suffering imprisonment for his faithfulness not only once more but twice. During the Exclusion Crisis, he came close to laying down his life for his master; for the rest, he gave almost all that could have been asked. It may well be doubted whether the kings of England—and their business—have ever been more honorably served.

For Samuel Pepys, honor had early become closely connected to a well-run administration. On the last night of 1662, that heady year of Coventry's placement on the Navy Board, the clerk of the acts traced the relationship between honor and his bureaucracy. "By my last year's diligence in my office" Pepys had "come to a good degree of knowledge therein", and this growing expertise was producing recognition: "and am acknowledged so by all". That acknowledgment was Pepys's motivation, and such recognition had to be constantly reaffirmed by reciprocal exchange, as his power came from the honor his masters conferred upon him with their "countenance". This delegation of intangible potency and more material tokens never flowed downstream unearned. It was dispensed in recognition of an assiduous and, to us, very modern-seeming attention to detail both theoretical and practical, but for Pepys these emphases offered the best method by which he could further increase his own honor. "I doubt not but, by the continuance of the same endeavours," he wrote with apparent confidence, "I shall in a little time come to be a man much taken notice of in the world".

If this was braggadocio in 1662, time would bear him out. When the recapture of high position became certain after Charles surmounted the Exclusion Crisis, Pepys included himself among "other great men", and after his ascension as James II's Secretary of the Admiralty he referred to himself in practical right as a "minister". To become such, the clerk of the acts had recognized long before that he could propel himself upward with an interlocking combination of
increasing knowledge, industrious application of that knowledge (often in terms of honor), and the patronage of honorable men. None of these factors can be disentangled from the others in his career; the rationalization of early modern government, at least in Pepys's corner of it, was inextricably connected to honor's framework.

One of these factors, Pepys's industry, may well explain the worry of one contemporary contemplating a career in navy administration at the accession of James II: "I have been designing that way myself, but am timorous of being down pressed with business." Ideally, no one unwilling to press forward with the royal business would have endured long under Pepys's hand, and at that point "the world" knew it. We have seen him render supremely faithful service; now it is time to examine the performance of Samuel Pepys as an honorable master.
Notes to Chapter 2

1 For an example of the isolated, wholly non-analytic type of allusion to honor characteristic of Pepys studies, see Bryant 3:75. After the demolition of Tangier (see below), Bryant writes that friends "not directly concerned with the Navy, but who had learnt to honor its former administrator, rejoiced at his return to England". This statement functions only as a transition in Bryant's narrative from the task at Tangier to Pepys's reentry into official life, not as a point concerning honor itself. As for Pepys's own writing, all the standard scholarly editions are used in this dissertation (see prefatory material, "Dates, Orthography, and Source Abbreviations") and none of their indices contain an entry for "honor".

My orientation toward what might be considered the veritable industry of Pepysian biography requires a brief comment at the outset, as only three of his many biographies are used here. First, readers will encounter frequent references to Arthur Bryant's work. His treatment is overly hagiographical, so caution must be taken in its use, but he is by far Pepys's most thorough biographer, dealing with many incidents that other writers (including the much-lauded Claire Tomalin) completely avoid. Nonetheless I agree with the general critical assessment that Tomalin's work is excellent, so I have cited it a number of times as well. Below Bryant and Tomalin lie numerous other biographies of varying value. Of these I have chosen to occasionally use Richard Ollard, *Pepys: A Biography* (London: Sinclair Stevenson, 1991), as a judicious and fairly recent sample of the lot. But the theme of this study is sufficiently foreign to the concerns of Pepys's biographers, both old and new, that I have had to rely overwhelmingly on primary sources.

2 For the man of honor's attitude of independence, see James 314. For the General Instructions see Davies, *Gentlemen*, 46; the anticlerical captain, 45. The captain who felt that poor record-keeping was no dishonor is in PRO Adm. 106/333/467.

Davies, *Gentlemen*, 45-6; An alternative excuse was that copies of the instructions themselves, or the blank notebooks necessary to keep records, had never made it aboard ship. In charge of the ship's supplies, early modern pursers were set apart from their shipmates by receiving no salary; pursers made their livings by purchasing supplies for a ship on their own credit and then reselling to officers and crew as needed during a voyage. The isolated, artificial seller's market thus created made pursers a common object of resentment. Compliance with the record-keeping requirements was so poor in 1672 that the new post of captain's clerk was created (Davies, *Gentlemen*, 45), but it seems to have done little to solve the problem. A few years later measures were being taken to train orphans for the post: Sir Richard Ford to Joseph Williamson, 12 Sept. 1675, *CSPD* 291.

4 Mervyn James's seminal exposition implies two distinct groupings each of which, however, he confusingly denotes with the phrase "community of honor". The first is the nationwide group of all (elite) honorable men, plausibly a community insofar as they held in common a set of highly prized values but many of whom, of course, had no knowledge of or interaction with each other. The second type of unit comprises smaller groups of well-acquainted gentry and retainers in
single counties revolving around a magnate's household. For the sake of clarity, "community of honor" is understood here in the former sense, while the more localized type of group is termed a "subcommunity".

5 Bryant 3:312. For more on Pepys's liminality, see discussion of Coventry below.

6 For the rural importance of Pepys's great-uncles, concentrated in the fenland area north of Cambridge, see Bryant 1:11-14; for Richard, 31. The Mountagus comprised a long line of nobles, courtiers, and greater gentry: Mountagu 1:6-12, Paulina Pepys's marriage on 12.

7 Bryant 1:31-2. Pepys later claimed that he had been brought in as Mountagu's secretary: DoC 16 Feb. 1674, 2:426. This claim is taken at face value by R. C. Latham in his apparatus to the Diary and by one of Mountagu's biographers (Mountagu 1:99), but which Pepys's most thorough biographer, Arthur Bryant argues was both "honourable" and false: Pepys was "anxious to hide the lowness of his beginnings" (1:25). Bryant is probably correct. Even though Pepys looked after Mountagu's monetary affairs in London, as Mountagu's secretary the diarist would have had to be based at the center of operations at the family seat in Hinchingbrooke, so he seems to have been more of a secondary "man of business." On this see also Cromwell's Earl 44. Tomalin leans too far in the other direction when she describes Pepys as "a family dogsbody" (43), given the weight of such responsibilities as the 1656 prizes and the 1659 messages (see below), and Mountagu's placement in Pepys of trust sufficient for the task of paying out sums to the tune of £180: Mountagu to SP, 11 Mar. 1656, in Howarth 1.

8 For Pepys's duties in London see the letters from SP to Mountagu, ranging from 1655 to 1659, in Howarth 1-19; for the petty theft (occasioned by a maid's elopement), anxiety at Mountagu's displeasure, and his careful defense, see specifically 8 Dec. 1657, 7; 10 Dec., 8, 22 Dec., 8-9; and 26 Dec., 10-11. In same for the prize goods see SP to Mountagu, 4 and 9 Dec. 1656, 2-3. For these matters see also Bryant 1:35-6 and Mountagu 1:99-100. For Pepys's acquisition of the Exchequer post, his new home, and the 1659 voyage, see Bryant 1:46 and 50-51; for the 1659 voyage, see Bryant 1:63-4, and Tomalin 72.

9 For Mountagu's short-lived Protectorate peerage, see DNB and Mountagu 1:109. For "my lord" and "my lady", see Diary 2 Jan. 1660, 1:4-5.

10 For Downing as master of Pepys's fellow clerk, see 30 and 31 Jan. 1660, 1:33-4; "my late master", 22 Jan. 1661, 2:20; "master of my office", 1 Jan.1660, 1:2; Downing as skinflint, 19 Jan., 22 and 28 Jun., 186.

11 Honor was held to confer a moral autonomy upon its holders. This had the practical effect of making the honor of all gentlemen worthy of respect regardless of differences in social rank. Thus in dilemmas such as that of a master to whom one had pledged faith but who was failing to fulfill the honorable requirement of generosity, the individual was recognized to have the moral right to decide whether it was more honorable to stay or go: James 327, 314, 340, 341, 343. In other words, despite the crucial role of external opinion in the community of honor as plural subject, ultimately each individual participant-agent decided where their honor lay, although we
would expect this to differ from common consent mainly in times of personal adversity or broader crisis. It has also been argued that at the beginning of the early modern period, moral autonomy did not stop at making all gentlemen's honor worthy of a measure of respect, but rather went so far as to make the honor of all gentlemen fully equal regardless of rank: James 327 and Roger B. Manning, *Swordsmen: The Martial Ethos in the Three Kingdoms* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 203. This was inherited from the knightly equality of the medieval era, embodied in the concept of "franchise": James 319 and Maurice Keen, *Chivalry* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 30 and 196. It should be noted that this notion of full equality became somewhat attenuated as time went on; see e.g. Elizabeth's reasons for preventing a duel after Sir Philip Sidney's famous tennis-court challenge to Oxford: Fulke Greville, *The Works in Verse and Prose Complete of the Right Honourable Fulke Greville, Lord Brooke*, ed. Alexander B[alloch] Grosart, vol. 4 (Blackburn: Printed for private circulation [by C. Tiplady and son], 1870), 69. But it was certainly not so weakened during the seventeenth century as to have little impact.

12 *Diary* 2 Jan. 1660, 1:5, and see also 3 Jan., 6; 5 Jan., 9; 7 Jan., 11; for the smallpox scare, see 9 Jan., 13, 11 Jan., 15, and 13 Jan., 17; for further visits, 17 Jan., 20; 19 Jan., 23; 23 Jan., 26; 27 Jan., 30; 30 Jan., 33; 30 Jan., 34.

13 For letters from Mountagu to Pepys, see *Diary* 4 Jan. 1660, 1:7 and 18 Jan., 21-22. From Pepys to Mountagu, see 5 Jan., 8; 7 Jan., 11; 10 Jan., 14 (probable); 14 Jan., 17; 20 Jan., 21 (probable); 21 Jan., 24 and 25 (two letters in one day); 24 Jan., 27; 28 Jan., 32; 30 Jan., 34. For the negotiations with the future earl of Shaftesbury, which went on for some time, see 18 Jan., 22, 19 Jan., 23, 1 Feb., 36, 2 Feb., 37, 6 Feb., 43.

14 On January 16, Pepys escorted Mountagu's twelve-year-old son Eric to a school which the younger Mountagu was to attend at Twickenham (*Diary* 17 Jan., 1:19-20); on January 20, Pepys visited a silversmith and a shoemaker "about business of my lord's" (20 Jan., 24); the next day, when Mountagu's steward Shipley left to attend their master at Hinchingbrooke, Pepys took charge of "all the keys and the house" (21 Jan., 24); on January 25, Pepys arranged to have a portrait of Mountagu's wife's oldest brother, Thomas, sent to Hinchingbrooke (25 Jan., 28-29); two days later, Pepys hand-delivered a letter from Mountagu to another of his wife's siblings, this time sister-in-law Anne Wright, "which he bade me give her privately" (28 Jan., 32); on January 30, Pepys paid out a little over £12 to another client of Mountagu's, probably at Mountagu's direction (30 Jan., 33).


16 For the venison see *Diary*, 18 Jul., 1:203. For venison's significance see Felicity Heal, “Food Gifts, the Household and the Politics of Exchange in Early Modern England,” *Past & Present*, no. 199 (2008): 57. "It was a particularly valuable reward for dependants, and an especially powerful gesture in the cycle of local reciprocity, helping to develop and reinforce patronage networks." (59) Heal notes that the significance of food exchanges between the very great had somewhat declined by Pepys's time, but it still occurred, and between patrons and clients remained common (68-70).
Diary 2 Jan. 1660, 1:4-5 (for Moore's status in Crews's household, see 5 n. 4); 3 Jan., 6; for the outings with the representatives of Mountagu's cavalry regiment, see 4 Jan., 7, 9 Jan., 13, and 10 Jan., 14 (as well as borrowing from Crew on the latter date); 11 Jan., 15; 12 Jan., 16.


Diary 28 Feb. 1660, 1:71; 5 Mar., 77 and 79; 7 Mar., 80.

Diary 23 Mar. 1660, 1:96 ("troubled"); 24 Mar., 96 (Creed "dined very boldly with my Lord, but he could not get a bed"). For Creed see Bryant 1:37 and Tomalin 71 and 98; John's brother Richard, to whom John doubtless owed his initial appointment, had worked in Commonwealth naval administration since 1653.

Diary 25 Mar. 1660, 1:96-7; 14 Mar., 86.

In the early modern period, the root of "secretary" was taken literally as the job description—secretaries handled sensitive matters. Clerical workers not privy to their masters' inner counsels were not understood to be true secretaries: see Richard Rambuss, *Spenser's Secret Career* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), especially 2-3, 9, 25-30. This assessment needs to be qualified by the recognition that Mountagu seems to have one of the most unreadable and reserved of the prominent Englishmen of his time, and he probably never trusted anyone with his innermost secrets: *Mountagu* 1:137, 143, and *Cromwell's Earl*, 7, and see the revealing advice he later gave Pepys "never to trust too much to any man in the world, for you put yourself into his power; and the best-seeming friend and real friend as to the present may have or take occasion to fall out with you": Diary 15 Jul. 1664, 3:208. However, Pepys seems to have gotten as close to Mountagu's secrets as any of the earl's servants ever did: the next night "my Lord and I had a great deal of discourse about the several captains of the fleet and his interest among them, and had his mind clear to bring in the King. He confessed to me that he was not sure of his own captain to be true to him, and that he did not like Captain Stokes." (Diary 10 and 11 Apr., 1:106-107) Such confidences, which had not been previously forthcoming, were repeated as the voyage progressed: 17 Apr., 110 and 15 May, 141. In later years, see e.g. Pepys's comment, "it contents me above all things to see him treat me as his confidant" (Diary 20 Dec. 1662, 3:287). An example of what Pepys meant was a previous long unburdening that year in which Mountagu expressed pique at having been cheated of the honor that should have been his for bringing the Algerine corsairs to terms (27 Jun., 121-23). For background see David Hannay, *A Short History of the Royal Navy*, vol. 1 (London: Methuen & Co., 1898), 320-23, and for documentation, [Sec. Nicholas] to Sir Wm. Curtius, 10 May 1661, *CSPD 1660-1661*, 586; in *CSPD 1661-1662* see Thos. Clutterbuck to [Navy Comrs.], 29 Jul. 1661, 46; Warrant for Earl of Sandwich, 6 Aug 1661, 59; Thos. Dimond to Navy Comrs., 27 Aug. 1661,72; Warrant for Earl of Sandwich, 14 Oct. 1661, 112; King to Duke of York and Earl of Sandwich, 13 May 1662, 370; Sec. Nicholas to Lord Rutherford, 1 Jun. 1662, 396.
Quotations in *Diary* 2 Jun. 1660, 1:167; 6 Jun., 169-70; 18 Jun., 177. For the formal title of the post and the struggle for it, see Bryant 1:109 and 116; the clothes, ibid., 111; Mountagu's additional expressions of support, *Diary* 29 Jun., 1:188, and 3 Jul., 191.


*Diary* 15 Jul., 201; 16 and 17 Jul., 202; 18 Jul., 203; 19 Jul., 204; 20 and 21 Jul., 205; 22 and 23 Jul., 206. For the earldom, see Mountagu 1:191.

Though a notoriously poor handler of his own finances (*Mountagu* 2:3), Sandwich gave Pepys some wise early modern advice which has often been quoted by Pepys's biographers: "it was not the salary of any place that did make a man rich, but the opportunities of getting money while he is in the place": *Diary* 16 Aug. 1660, 1:223. Sandwich's opposition to the sale was sufficient, and Pepys never mentioned it again.

Within just six months, for example, the clerk of the acts indeed began to do sufficiently well for himself that he stood surety for a debt contracted by him for Sandwich to the tune of a straight thousand pounds (the earl lacked the the huge outlay of cash necessary for a peer's coronation clothes): Bryant, 1:141. In the meantime, the earl had continually shown marks of favor to his client in the form of civilities: "dined all alone with him," reported Pepys of Sandwich, "who doth treat me with a great deal of respect" (*Diary* 3 Oct. 1660, 1:258), a refrain much repeated at this point in the diary. Lady Sandwich followed suit a few days later, "showing most extraordinary love and kindness" (12 Oct., 264) and subsequently took Pepys to Whitehall Chapel where they were allowed into a section formally reserved only for peers, privy counselors, and a gentleman of the bedchamber, "which I thought a great honor": 28 Oct., 276. For further instances of such courtesies at around that time see e.g. Sandwich taking courteous notice of Elizabeth Pepys, 15 Nov., 293, and see also 20 and 27 Nov., 297 and 303. In June 1661 Sandwich granted a reversion of a place in the Wardrobe to Pepys's father (Sandwich had been made Charles II's Master of the Wardrobe in June 1660), while Pepys in turn procured the earl £300 toward a particularly large expense for a voyage. The final phase of the exchange was paid in courtesy as Mountagu, now in his capacity of Admiral, gave his servant a five-gun salute, "all [the cannon] they had charged, which was the greatest respect my Lord could do me, and of which I was not a little proud": Bryant, 1:148. During Sandwich's absence, Pepys attended his patron's wife when she fell gravely ill during the last trimester of pregnancy, not only visiting her each day but taking care of Mountagu business in a way he could hardly afford to, in terms of time, at that point (158). In 1664 Pepys exerted himself on behalf of a measure concerning the mole of Tangier out of "an especial regard to your lordship's interest in the honor and treatment of that place." (15 Dec. 1664, in *FC* 32) In September 1665 Mountagu's honor was at stake over the issue of whether his or Prince Rupert's flag should take precedence when their flagship met at sea; Pepys offered, "If your lordship shall instruct me how to behave myself thereon in case I find the question put with . . . expectation of my answer to it, I shall do what your lordship shall command me." (SP to Edward Mountagu, 20 Sept. 1664, in *SL* 2) Pepys was similarly tender for his master's interests when Sandwich received far less credit than was his due after the victory of Lowestoft. Mountagu broke through the Dutch line of battle, an achievement without which the
Dutch defeat would not have been possible, and his pre-engagement tactical suggestions were

 crucial in other ways: Mountagu 1:304, 350-4. His contribution was acknowledged readily enough in private conversation apparently throughout high society, but Prince Rupert seems to have taken umbrage and may have played some part in suppressing Mountagu's public recognition. For both widespread private recognition of Mountagu's heroics and Pepys's worries over the public silence, see Diary 9 and 14 Jun. 1665, 6:123 and 127; Mountagu's anger and Rupert's possible role, 23 Jun., 134-35. For additional commentary on the private acknowledgment of Mountagu's performance, SP to Edward Mountagu, 17 Jun. 1665, in FC 47.


29 Pepys himself had not acted with total discretion in the matter; he told Sandwich that nobody else knew about the letter, but the master was quick to retort that he himself already had an independent report of it from a third party. Pepys had indeed shown it to Moore and gossiped about it to another of Mountagu's subcommunity, so for a time the clerk of the acts lay under censure. Both of Sandwich's biographers dismiss the possible affair as untenable: Mountagu 1:249-51 and Cromwell's Earl, 116-17. However, he was rooming in Chelsea away from his wife for little discernable reason; "health" was the one given. Pepys copied the letter into the diary: 18 Nov. 1663, 4:387-88. For the conversation four days later, see Diary 22 Nov., 392-93.

30 "Until now Pepys had been unfailingly deferential toward Sandwich", Tomalin writes, arguing that Pepys's respect began to slip and he began to pay more attention to his own extended family than Sandwich's (Unequalled Self, 157-8). However, only a month after sending the painful letter Pepys asked for and was granted the use of Sandwich's coach for the funeral procession of cousin Edmund Pepys: Diary 14 Dec. 1663, 4:419 and 23 Dec., 432. Subsequently, when Pepys tried to invite Sandwich to dinner in January 1664 Samuel was received "with respect, yet as a stranger, without any of the intimacy or friendship which he used to do": 20 Jan. 1664, 5:22. Yet less than a month later "by my Lord Sandwich's favor" Pepys was put into the Commission of the Fishery, "not only a matter of honor, but . . . that may come to be of profit." (10 Mar., 79.) See also the dinner of 5 Mar. 1665, 6:50, where Sandwich's mark of respect toward Pepys "in carving for me and nobody else" seemed to indicate complete forgiveness. It is true that there are a few petulant comments indicative of jealousy that Sandwich was paying more attention to others (e.g. Diary 25 Nov. 1668, 9:374), but these are balanced by the relief Pepys felt when Sandwich showed himself jealous that York was paying increased attention to Pepys, an occasion Pepys took advantage of "to invite him to dinner . . . which I shall be glad to have over to his content, he having never yet eat a bit of my bread." (18 Jan. 1669, 9:419). See also the rest of this paragraph. In other words, the present author sees no evidence of any loss of deference, much less a loss of desire for a good relationship with the earl; quite the contrary, if Pepys's worry over the next several years concerning Sandwich's attitude offers any indication. Certainly Pepys's advice was offered with all possible courtesy. After the prize-goods scandal (see below), Sandwich was sent away to Spain as an ambassador in 1666: Cromwell's Earl 145-47. Rather than the late effect of a slow-burning fuse lit by the alleged and now-stale 1663 affair, it seems more likely that the decreasing correspondence between Sandwich and Pepys was due to the increasing press of business. Pepys did not write during this time and reproached himself for it (Diary 28 Sept. 1668,
9:321), but the distressing and time-consuming parliamentary inquests into the mishandling of the Second Dutch War required all Pepys's industry to deflect from the Navy Board (see Chapters 4 and 5). If Pepys's relation to Sandwich diminished significantly, Ollard's argument that it occurred because of Pepys's inattention during Sandwich's embassy seems the best explanation (Cromwell's Earl, 187, 210, 220, 233-34).

31 Diary 29 May 1664, 5:161 (Sandwich open with Pepys) and 31 May, 163 (Sandwich's honor). Two weeks later Lord Chancellor Clarendon independently revealed that Sandwich had spoken of Pepys with high esteem (14 Jul. 204), and the next day the Sandwich and Pepys had the intimate conversation in which the earl discussed his finances, assets, and court standing in detail: "This is the whole condition of my estate and interests; which I tell you because I know not whether I shall see you again or no." (15 Jul., 208). If the earl did remain privately angry, he did not allow his emotions to goad him into breaking with a trustworthy servant who had put a foot wrong only once.

32 Mountagu 1:259-61; Cromwell's Earl, 121; Diary 14 Jul. 1665, 6:157 and passim through 31 Jul., 178 (quotation in latter, 177).

33 SP to Sandwich, 12 Oct. 1665, SL 63. The prize-goods affair was shot through with competition for honor. In this letter, one of the reasons Pepys gave for the virulence of the campaign against Sandwich was that one of its protagonists had been dishonored by the Earl, complaining of "the disrespects he had received from your lordship, instancing in his waiting three or four hours together at that earl's (so he phrased it) cabin door for audience, and at last failed of admittance". Pepys also reported on an ally of the Earl's: "Your lordship owes very much to the civility of my lord Brouncker in this business, who has been very tender of your lordship's honor and made others less rude in their proceedings than they would have been". This issue was to dog Mountagu for years: see e.g. Diary 29 Feb. and 15 Nov. 1668, 9:96 and 363-64. For a brief but complete account of the prize-goods scandal, see Cromwell's Earl 140-48.

34 For the written defense see Mountagu 2:24. During the same period, Pepys apparently wished to pass on information too confidential for written correspondence, vaguely "pray[ing] you will give me the opportunity of waiting upon your lordship . . . , for I think it may not be unuseful": SP to Sandwich, 11 Nov. 1665, FC 78. The depth of Pepys's loyalty may be gauged by his own view, apparently never shared with anyone else, that Sandwich was indeed blameworthy in the matter: Diary 31 Dec. 1665, 6:342.

35 For John's clerkship see Bryant 2:20; Sandwich's borrowing, Diary 28 Sept. 1668, 9:321 and SP to Mountagu, 29 Sept. 1668, in Howarth 33; Pepys auditing Mountagu accounts, 1:297 n. 1. For Sandwich's funeral, see "The Disposition of the Severall Places Attending the Funeral of the Earl of Sandwich," 24 Jun. 1672, printed in Pepysiana 286.

36 The letter to the son is SP to Edward Montagu [II], 16 Jul. 1677, in FC 299; for Edward's lack of talent, Cromwell's Earl 248; and for contact with the Mountagus into subsequent decades see Pepys's visit to Sandwich's daughter Anne in 1683 (TP 23 Aug. 1683, 6). For "no prince but a Percy" see James 292.
Cromwell's Earl 41. After the earl returned from Spain, where he performed impeccably as ambassador, he was appointed to the Privy Council's Committee on Trade and Plantations and demonstrated an exemplary application there as well. The eye for detail he used in these positions had presumably also been employed during the time Pepys had worked at his side.

For the dinner to which Pepys was not invited, see Diary 9 Aug. 1661, 2:150. In April 1662 during a walk with Carteret "alone in the garden . . . he seemed to be much pleased with me, and I hope will be the ground of a future interest of mine in him": 5 Apr. 1662, 3:59, and see also 8 May, 79. The more positive June entry is 13 Jun., 108.

For examples of Carteret's support in disputes see Diary 3 Jun. 1662, 3:99-100 or 6 Oct. 1663 4:327; for the merchant's insults see SP to Carteret, 14 Oct. 1665, in SL 68. For Pepys's offer to help Carteret find precedents for validation see Diary 13 Jun. 1662, 3:107 (this seems to have been the moment that cemented the relationship); for the warning about the intended attempt on the navy treasurership, see SP to Carteret, 13 Jan. 1666, in SL 78; and for a similar warning later in the opposite direction (Carteret to Pepys) see Diary 23 May 1666, 7:131. Like exchanges are scattered throughout the diary until Carteret's fall. For examples, see the conversation soon after this master-servant bond had been formed (Diary 19 Aug. 1662, 3:171) in which Carteret "professes all love to me, and did tell me how he had spoke of me to my Lord Chancellor . . . to my advantage, of which I am very glad, and do not doubt that all things will grow better and better every day for me." Or see a similar conversation which took place after Carteret and Pepys had had a brief falling out, an incident in miniature of the much larger bruhaha over Sandwich's possible affair: "He told me that he did still observe my care for the King's service in my office" and that "I should find him in all things as kind and ready to serve me as my own brother. This . . . doth please me mightily and I am resolved by no means ever to lose him again if I can": 25 Nov. 1663, 4:. Or see the help Carteret gave Pepys soon afterward when the latter was attempting to use scarce funds to pay one shipowner's bill for demurrage at Tangier: 12 Dec. 1663, 4:414 and 15 Dec., 422 (for antecedents see 7 Nov., 1663, 4:368; 8 Dec., 408; 11 Dec., 414). See also SP to Carteret, 14 Dec. 1665, in FC 89, where Pepys attempted to strengthen Carteret's "advantage" with York.

For the defense of Carteret, see BHJ Dec. 1669 [no day], 335. For details on the Brooke House Commission see Latham, introduction to Samuel Pepys and the Second Dutch War, xxiv- xxxiv, in which also see xxxi for Carteret's hearing in the Lords.

For "solidarities of honor" see James 313 and 315 (see below for more discussion of this issue.). For the late help to Carteret's friend (in the mid-1670s), see Bryant 2:290. Note also that Robert Slyngsby, comptroller during Pepys's (approximate) first year in office, looked fair to be an important patron but died before he could have much of an impact: Diary 26 Oct. 1661, 2:202 ("all the night I could not sleep, he being a man that loved me, and had many qualities that made me to love him"), and cf. Bryant 1:135-6 and 158. Pepys seems to have concentrated on cultivating Slyngsby until that official was gone, which would account for his late start with Carteret.
For the first contact with Coventry, see Diary 22 May 1660, 1:152; for Coventry's help, 25 Jun. 1660, 1:183; the subsequent conversation, 28 Jun., 186.

Coventry's patent for Navy Board membership was issued on May 14 (NB) although he did not begin to sit for business until June: Diary 3 Jun. 1662, 3:99 (for discussion of Coventry's membership see Bryant 1:173-4).

Diary 29 Nov. 1661, 2:222-23; Of the Dominion; Or, Ownership of the Sea, trans. Marchamont Nedham (1652; reprint, New York: Arno, 1972). The original case for the doctrine was apparently made by Elizabethan John Dee in General and Rare Memorials Pertayning to the Perfect Arte of Navigation Annexed to the Paradoxal Cumpas (London: John Daye, 1577); Selden was its popularizer. See Thomas Wemyss Fulton, The Sovereignty of the Sea: An Historical Account of the Claims of England to the Dominion of the British Seas, and of the Evolution of the Territorial Waters: With Special Reference to the Rights of Fishing and the Naval Salute (Edinburgh: W. Blackwood, 1911), 99-105.

See Diary 3, 4, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23 Dec. 1661, 2:226, 227, 233-34, 235 (17th and 18th), 236, 237, 238; and 8 Jan. 1662, 3:6. It should be noted, however, that if the specific doctrine at issue initially impressed Pepys, NWB 10 Jun. 1669, 228 suggests that he later came to disapprove of it as unenforceable and thereby harmful to England's honor. See e.g. the incident described in DoC 7 Mar. 1677, 4:205n. But honor could be argued for both sides of the issue, and that complicated the matter. If the NWB entry can be taken as an expression of Pepys's genuine feelings, despite this private disapproval he always publicly supported the doctrine, in the 1680s arguing that English captains who struck to foreign warships—even when docked at the ports of the foreign nation!—should be court-martialed (see discussion of martial ethos at the beginning of Chapter 4). More generally, it is possible that Selden's book may have converted Pepys from a placeman content with the personal honor his office could bring into an activist civil servant much more emotionally invested in the welfare of the navy; over the course of his reading, Pepys may have become genuinely enthusiastic about the navy. That possibility cannot be verified, however, and whether or not an emotive commitment to the navy resulted from this incident, honor's role in it, and honor's role throughout the rest of Pepys's career (as we shall see), cannot be denied.

For York's instructions see Cat. 1: 20-23 (also Knighton 29) and Diary 5 Feb. 1662, 3:24; Pepys's newfound exactitude, 6 Feb., 24. For examples of Pepys's new dedication and practice, see among other entries 15 Feb., 29-30; 28 Feb., 37; 6 Mar., 41; 7, 43; 10, 11, and 12, 44; 13, 14, and 17, 45; 18-20., 48-49; 27, 53-54 and passim. As examples of essentially innumerable relevant entries, see 8 Apr., 3:62: "Up very early and to my office, and there continued till noon. . . . After dinner [the midday meal] to the office again. So at night by coach to Whitehall, and Mr. Coventry not being there, I wrote my business of the office to him". Or 22 Jun. 1663, 4:191: "to my office, reading over all our letters of the office that we have wrote since I came into the navy, whereby to bring the whole series of matters into my memory, and to enter in my manuscript some of them that are needful and of great influence."
For initial reservations about Coventry ("I know not yet whether to be glad or otherwise") see *Diary* 15 May 1662, 3:83; subsequent admiration, *Diary* 7 and 10 Jun. 1662, 3:103 and 105. One commentator has suggested that not just the possibility of action but even Pepys's initial desire for reform germinated with Coventry's attendance at the board: Bernard Pool, "Sir William Coventry: Pepys’s Mentor," *History Today* 24 (1974):105-6. However, Pepys's testimony of February 12 (see note, previous paragraph) and his immediate increase in dedication predate Coventry's appointment by approximately three months, so the interpretation that Coventry facilitated rather than caused Pepys's new enthusiasm seems more persuasive: Bryant 1:163-66.

James 343.

*Diary* 30 Sept. 1662, 3:210. Coventry had long "disliked" Carteret (*Cromwell's Earl* 144), so the swift development of problems was to be expected. Carteret's opening dispute with Coventry was on 12 June, and on the thirteenth Pepys had a long conversation about it with the treasurer (*Diary* 3:106 and 107). As another example of Pepys on the tightrope, see the incident in which Carteret and Coventry differed over the contents of a letter from the Navy Board to Clarendon. It was Pepys's responsibility as clerk of the acts to compose the letter, so he was caught in the middle, but "being desirous to please both, I think I have found out a way to do it." (10 Dec., 279)

For the beginnings of the Coventry-Pepys partnership, see their review of the Deptford storekeeper's provisions and books, *Diary* 2 Jul. 1662, 3:129; the check on the books at Woolwich and conference that night, 11 Jul., 136.

On August 8 they first inspected Greenwich and then went "[t]o Deptford, and there surprised the yard, and called them to a muster, and discovered many abuses, which we shall be able to understand hereafter and amend". (*Diary* 8 Aug. 1662, 3:160). Pepys's corrective "letter" to dockyards was begun on 13 Aug., 3:134, and vetted by Coventry, 15 Aug., 166. Signatures from the rest of the board were apparently pro forma.

For instance, Coventry had to attend his master when the latter fetched the queen mother from France over the last two weeks of July: *Diary* 17 Jul. 1662, 3:139.

See e.g. *Diary* 25 Aug. 1662, 3:178 and 1 Oct., 211. However, it should be noted that while Coventry's involvement in the inspections slowed after mid-August, it did not cease. See e.g. the visit with Coventry to Woolwich on 22 Dec., 288-89 or to Deptford on 7 Jul. 1663, 4:219.

*Diary* 8 Sept. 1662, 3:192. After this, as long as York was Lord High Admiral, the Navy Board held weekly meetings with him at Whitehall (see e.g. *NWB* 19 Sept. 1664, 76), characterized by Pepys as "our public attendance upon him" with all board members in London present and conducted according to various formal protocols, a glimpse of which may be caught on 19 Feb. 1667, 133.

For the purpose of Pepys's "call-books" see their entry in *Diary*, vol. 10, *Companion*. For the beginning of the project see 24 Oct. 1662, 3:234; trial at Woolwich, 22 Dec., 289 (no December
entry mentions the Deptford trial, but it must be assumed given the January review); the two examinations at Deptford, 15 Jan. and 20 Feb. 1663, 4:15 and 50; Pepys instructing "the Clerk of the Cheque in my new way of call-book" at Chatham 13 Jul., 228.

56 Pett went along on the two inaugural inspections in July 1662, and then because of Coventry's more limited time, Pett and Pepys conducted a few without him thereafter: Diary 4 and 13 Aug. 1662, 3:155 and 164; 17 Oct., 227. On October 6 when Coventry and Pepys inspected Woolwich, Pett seems to have been unavailable so Penn went along instead (3:214). Pett was the master shipwright of Chatham; Penn, while a sitting member of the board, was also a former admiral boasting a significant amount of technical expertise.

57 There is no space here to fully discuss Pett's early help and its cessation, but he was apparently somewhat truculent when asked to lend it, incurring their displeasure. See e.g. see 1 and 2 Aug.1663 4:258, 259, and 3 Aug., where Pepys "fear[ed] his performance (260); Aug. 13, 275; 20 Aug., 282; 14 Dec., 420; 27 Jan. 1664, 5:28; 13 Apr., 122; 16 Jul., 210. It is difficult not to sympathize with the shipwright's position: his main job was to build ships and manage Chatham, so he surely had even less time than Coventry for such extra work. But in consequence of their (and especially Coventry's) disapproval, by the time of the Medway disaster he was bereft of the support the Lord High Admiral might have afforded him against becoming the nation's scapegoat. For Pett's disgrace see P. G. Rogers, The Dutch in the Medway (London: Oxford University Press, 1970).


59 James 312.

60 For Cooper's engagement, 1 Jul. 1662, 3:128 and passim through 11 Aug., 163; practicing maths on Christmas day, 25 Dec. 1662, 293; notice by "the world" of Pepys's "studiousness", 16 Dec. 1662, 3:284. Pepys had known Cooper for two years already, having met the sailor on that crucial voyage with Sandwich to effect the Restoration (for Cooper's background, see Diary 10, Companion). For a few examples among many of continuing self-study see Pepys reading a treatise on administrative problems in the navy written by Interregnum official John Hollond (12 Dec. 1662, 3:280); for a modern edition, see John Hollond and Robert Slingsby, Two Discourses of the Navy, 1638 and 1659, ed. J. R. Tanner, Publications of the Navy Records Society 7 (London: Printed for the Navy Records Society, 1896); practicing more mathematics on 2 and 3 Jan., 1663, 4:2 and 3; learning to use a slide rule: 14 and 15 Apr., 103 and 104, 5 May, 124 (assisted by Anthony Deane, for whom see next chapter), 24 Dec., 443; or even inventing his own new type of slide rule specifically for measuring timber, 18 Jul., 234; 7 and 8 Aug., 266 and 267. The mathematics lessons were only the beginning of Pepys's educational odyssey; indeed, he also learned basic ship operations during Cooper's roughly month-and-a-half-long employment. At the same time he began seeking tips from timber merchant William Warren about differences in wood (4 Jul. 1662, 3:131) and visited other experts such as tar sellers and dockyard workers to ask similarly technical questions (when these informational expeditions involved to dockyards, they were often, though not always, exclusive of the surprise inspections).
On one of these excursions, Coventry accompanied Pepys to learn about tar and rope (8 Aug., 3:159). Pepys made similar expeditions alone on 14 Jul., 137 (this one concerning tar, after having risen at 4 a.m. to work on Cooper's math assignments), 21 and 30 Jul., 142 and 150, and 18 Aug., 169 (this latter to learn more about timber from Anthony Deane). For an overview of this initial burst of study see Knighton 30-35. It lasted until the Second Dutch War tightened Pepys's schedule—about two years—but NM demonstrates that acquiring expertise remained a concern until Pepys lost office permanently in 1689. TP also contains as many informational notes as it does the political invective for which the manuscript has become notorious; see especially 1 Aug. 1683, 105-153, and 20 Nov. 1683, 160-171; and for a section in which Pepys's politics are jumbled willy-nilly together with practical information see 220-245; taking the first page as an example, where Pepys asks himself, "Has our English ton in all times been the same in measure wet and dry?" and notes "a most excellent account of the profits of the Indies to Spain" in Hakluyt, while simultaneously criticizing the dismal performance of "the present officers of the Navy [Board]".

61 For competition with Batten and Penn see Chapter 4; Coventry's willingness to sometimes back Pepys in the rivalry against Penn is noteworthy given that Coventry was "a friend and admirer" of the latter: Cromwell's Earl 93; cf. Coventry's defense of Penn in Parliament, Diary 16 and 20 Apr. 1668, 9:165 and 169. A clue to the reason for which Pepys and Coventry were beginning to be talked of in this manner might be given by the diary entry for 9Aug. 1662, 160: "By and by comes Mr. Coventry, and he and I alone sat at the office all the morning upon business." This is only one of a number of entries reporting an office devoid of board members save Coventry and the navy's chief clerk.

62 For Batten's post see NB or George Jackson and G. F. Duckett, Naval Commissioners from 12 Charles II to 1 George III, 1660-1760 (Lewes, UK: n.p., 1889), 1-2 and 60. For the prevention of Batten's scheme see NWB 23 Jun. 1664, 40; the argument with Ordnance, 24 Sep. 1664, 77-79.

63 Diary 4 Nov. 1664, 5:313. For action on his own to promote efficiency, see the affair of Sir William Batten's son-in-law, who attempted to sell the navy timber of a different size than was most needed at an inflated cost after Batten assisted by falsely discrediting the product of a competitor who better met the specifications. Pepys found out the cheat and opposed Batten: NWB 8-16 Nov. 1664, 88-92; 21 Jan. 1665, 102-5.

64 For Pepys's "shame" (at a fairly trivial difficulty of £43), see NWB 7 Oct. 1668, 138-9.

65 The first memo to Carteret is 25 Aug. 1665, FC 51. Pepys next proposed the wartime appointment of a special accounting officer "at every victualling-port" who, as a group, would be overseen by "some one or more officer that should be to that purpose provided by the King at London": SP to George Monck, 6 Oct., FC 57. Pepys expressed a desire to become that national officer, surveyor-general of victualling, though he was careful to tell Coventry that if the appointment didn’t meet with his approval, "I shall never be shaken in [my loyalty] . . . and where the King’s service is concerned . . . my private accomodation shall have no preference desired by me." (SP to WC, 26 Oct. 1665, in FC 67) But Coventry did approve and moved York
to the same. Pepys was offered his self-created job the next day.


67 For example, when Pepys had to begin dealing with Parliament in the aftermath of the Second Dutch War (see Chapters 4 and 5) Coventry gave Pepys wise, and prized, advice on dealing with that hammer of the Stuarts which would stand the naval administrator in good stead for the rest of his life: *Diary* 3 and 6 Dec. 1667, 8:560 and 566. He also loaned Pepys books (SP to WC, 5 Jan. 1669, in *FC* 206), procured him extra funds for clerks (*Diary* 1 Aug. 1664, 5:228), and defended him against accusations of neglect of duty (for two different occasions see 1 Mar. 1668, 9:98, when Pepys reciprocated by helping Coventry with a similar problem, and 30 Mar. 1669, 503).

68 Pool, "Sir William", 110. Pool counts nine visits by Pepys during Coventry's imprisonment, but there were in fact ten: see *Diary* for March 1669, respectively 9:4, 468; 5, 470; 6, 471; 7, 473; 9, 475; 11, 478; 13, 481; 16, 484; 18, 486; and 20, 489. It must be noted that here, still fairly early in his career, Pepys was not always so staunch: *Diary* 31 Mar., 504 shows that after Coventry's release, the clerk of the acts was "afeared to be seen with him (he having not leave yet to kiss the King's hand, but notice taken, as I hear, of all that go to him) I did take the pretense of my attending the Tangier Committee to take my leave; though to serve him I should I think stick at nothing."

69 In 1674, when Pepys was accused of closet popery in an attempt to get him dismissed from the House of Commons, Coventry was his staunchest supporter, and Sir William also spoke in Pepys's favor a few years later when he was attacked at the time of the Popish Plot: *DoC* 20 May 1679, 7:310, 311, and 312. Coventry opposed Exclusion and retired completely from public life upon the dissolution of the first Exclusion Parliament in July 1679: *DNB*.

70 James 330 n. 92.

71 James 344, and see below, next chapter.

72 For Charles and James Stuart's enthusiasm and knowledge regarding sailing and other naval matters, see *Cat.* 1:245-7.

73 As the Navy Board's chief record-keeper, Pepys led off each meeting by recounting the board's recent measures and offering its new proposals, if any. This made the clerk of the acts an active and important part of these sessions no matter what items might be on the agenda: *Diary* 8 Sept. 1662, 3:192.

74 The interview with James is in *Diary* 4 Mar. 1664, 5:75; For Charles's attention see 17 Apr. 1665, 6:82. For subsequent contact with York outside the weekly meetings see e.g. 4 Jun. 1664, 5:168 or 29 Jan. 1666, 7:28. For additional examples of York singling Pepys out prior to the 1668 "great letter" see (among others) *Diary* 25 May 1660, 1:157 or 13 Oct. 1667, 6:476. For
Charles see e.g. 28 Apr. 1665, 6:91, where Pepys recorded that the King "now know[ing] me so well . . . never sees me but he speaks to me about our navy business."

For the "great letter," see Diary 24 Jul. 1668, 9:267 (quotation from initial interview with York) and 23 Aug., 285-86 (apellation "great letter" and its presentation to the Lord High Admiral); for a thorough account of this episode see Cat. 1:28-32, results on 32. The document at issue, PL 2242, 25-47, is quite long, 22 pages in manuscript, and perhaps for this reason has never been published.

The royal brothers had previously taken notice of Pepys by discussing him with others in private (see Diary 24 Jun. 1663, 4:194, where York praised Pepys to Coventry) or asking information of him in meetings (Charles did this in 9 Nov. 1664, 5:317). But now the royal shoe had been deliberately placed on the other foot. Cf. similarly 29 Jan. 1666, 7:27, where "the Duke called me to hime—and the King came to me of himself and told me: 'Mr. Pepys,' says he, 'I do give you thanks for your good service all this year, and I assure you I am very sensible of it.' . . . I walked with them quite out of the court into the fields". Pepys had good reason that night to write of "joy for what the King and Duke have said to me" (28). At court such choices were rarely, if ever made without purpose: see Anna Bryson, From Courtesy to Civility: Changing Codes of Conduct in Early Modern England (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1998) or Brian Weiser, Charles II and the Politics of Access (Woodbridge, Suffolk, UK: Boydell Press, 2003), and for "countenance" specifically, see the exposition in Alan Bray and Michel Rey, "Body of the Friend: Continuity and Change in Masculine Friendship in the Seventeenth Century," in English Masculinities, 1660-1800, ed. Tim Hitchcock and Michèle Cohen (London, UK: Longman, 1999), 68.

See note on the Committee for Miscarriages in Chapter 5.

TP n.d. [ca. Feb. 1684], 201. J. D. Davies feels that "there were certainly abuses, but they were not, on the whole, to the detriment of English naval policy" (Gentlemen, 182). But when seen in terms of honor, Pepys's worries cannot be dismissed as merely the fulminations of an out-of-touch landlubber. More than one captain could be found claiming that his ship needed (imaginary) repairs necessitating calls at out-of-the-way ports such as Lisbon "to be able to get something": TP 1 Aug. 1683, 139 (for which see quotation) or 143. For other examples of Pepys's concern, in Cat. 2 see also SP to Mr. [Ephraim] Skinner [Consul at Livorne], 14 Aug. 1674, 342; SP to Thomas Allin, 3 Nov. 1674, 390; SP to [William] Harmon, 8 Aug. 1674, 337; SP to Nathaniel Herne, 21 Oct. 1674, 383; SP to [Ephraim] Skinner, 26 Oct., 386; and see two large portions of TP, 176-97 and 212-215. Even the more conscientious commanders, careful to accept only the permitted specie, not goods, and who did their best to carry out assigned missions, might face a challenge to their honor from a different direction. A particular set of naval orders could specify a route and a schedule, whereupon a commander might accept coin for transportation to a certain place along that route by certain date. But naval orders could be changed at a moment's notice; perhaps a group of corsairs urgently needed to be pursued. Merchants depending on cash flows required liquidity, and that meant quick delivery, so captains who dropped everything to follow new orders could throw the plans of these merchants into
harmful disarray. This outcome in turn led to accusations "that our commanders are not men of
honour, but play the rogues . . . by promising conveyance" and then failing to deliver: TP n.d.
[1683], 178 (for an example see that of Captain Ashby, n.d. [ca. Nov. 1683], 176-77). And when
naval captains carried valuable cargoes of any kind, they were much less likely to uphold English
honor by refusing to strike sail as a sign of submission to foreign ships: the incident in which
Cloudesley Shovell was shamefully driven to salute Spanish warships, described at the begin-
ing of Chapter 4 below, had a context not acknowledged by Captain Shovell's official report. He had
been carrying merchant bullion, Pepys discovered upon investigation, "and so . . . did not think
fit to hazard the merchants' estates" by fighting the Spaniards: n.d. [1683], 186. For this reason
Pepys judged carrying a practice that undermined "our honour with foreign princes." SP,
56-7. It is also worth noting that carrying continued to pose problems under William III: ADM
121/9, 89.

For officers leaving ships without permission, see SP to BSM, 24 Nov. 1676, in Family 48,
and SP to Thomas Allin, 21 Jun. 1678, PL ADM vii/296, cited in Cat 1:197. This had been a
problem for some time: see Robert Slyngsby, “A Discourse upon the Past and Present State of
His Majesty’s Navy,” in Two Discourses of the Navy, 1638 and 1659, ed. J. R. Tanner,
Publications of the Navy Records Society 7 (London: Printed for the Navy Records Society,
1896), 353. For James II’s attempt to stop abuses, see SP, Memoires of the Royal Navy,
delayed embarkation, see SP to AD, 10 July 1675, in Cat. 3:85, and SP to Captain Priestman, 19
July 1675, in Cat.3:92-3, quotation on 93. Unlike carrying, absenteeism is seen by Davies as a
genuine problem: Gentlemen, 48.

For such rebukes in Cat. 4 see e.g. SP, Admiralty Journal, 23 Dec. 1676, 388; 27 Jan. 1677,

See e.g. J. R. Jones, Country and Court: England, 1658-1714 (London: E. Arnold, 1978), 197-
620.

SP to James Stuart, 6 May 1679, in PC, 6-9.

SP to James Stuart, 9 Jun. 1679, in PC 11.

Diary 31 Mar. 1662, 3:55-56. A potential objection to this claim needs to be addressed at the
outset, however. As this study progresses readers will learn that the characterization of honor and
shame as reflective receives a great deal of support from Pepys's archive. But experts on Pepys
can point to a direct contradiction also deriving from that archive: the "officers under" a ship's
captain, Pepys states in one document, have little interest in fighting naval battles because they
have "no honour given to them for the victory, or shame from being beaten, the captain having
all, both of one and the other, imputed to him [alone]." (TP n.d. [ca. Sept. 1683], 106) However,
the context of this assertion places it under suspicion: in this passage Pepys is riding one of his
pet hobby-horses, the difference between "tarpaulin" captains of lower social origins and captains
of gentry background, and Pepys's arguments on this issue have been demonstrated as largely hyperbolic (see Conclusion, note). In addition, the manuscript in which Pepys makes this argument is deeply polemical and must be treated with caution. That his claim about non-reflective honor should also be viewed in this light may be shown with a glance at Pepys's own clientele. When Samuel Atkins adduced the Kingfisher's damage as a "laudable testimony of the hot service we had been engaged in" and spoke of "hopes of us having a fling at them, which we greatly desired" (see Chapter 4), he was only a volunteer, not even one of Pepys's "officers", yet he clearly felt like he shared in the ship's honor, both gained and potential. And it is highly unlikely that Atkins's use of the third-person plural was limited to himself and the captain; it surely included the first lieutenant, second lieutenant, and the vessel's complement of midshipmen, all of whom outranked Atkins. Outside Pepys's archive, the same argument can be made from the report of the Hart (a sixth-rate, the smallest type of commissioned vessel) to the Navy Board during the Third Dutch War: "Much honored we have retaken a Scotchman . . . having been taken seven days [ago] by a Dutch privateer of 16 guns [now] being retaken by the Hart dogger." When the captain arrogated honor to his little ship of six guns (a dogger was a fishing boat), it seems rather doubtful that he was presuming to employ the royal "we." John Norwood to Navy Board, 20 Jun. 1673, PRO Adm. 106/281 f. 119; for the Hart's technical details, see Cat. 1:260.

85 SP to James Stuart, 6 May 1679, in PC, 6-9, and James Stuart to Charles Stuart, 22 May 1679, in PC 9.

86 For the protest of loyalty see SP to BSM, 11 Sept. 1679, in Family 96; attending York, Proceedings 9 Mar. 1680, 85.

87 Vincent Brome, The Other Pepys (London, UK: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1992), xv, citing Rawl. A 173 f. 69 (at the Bodleian). I have been unable to check this document, but the statement is accurate enough; Pepys was very lucky to wriggle out of the deadly trap Shaftesbury had set for him. Yet a few days after Pepys attended the Duke a scurrilous pamphlet attacked him over the incident: see section on Hewer, below.

88 NM 318. Pepys was a special adviser ("sole counsellor") to the leader of the Tangier expedition, Lord Dartmouth (TP 13 Jul. 1683, 4); he also had the more specific administrative job of valuing property on site so the king could compensate owners: Pepys to James Houblon, 19 Oct. 1683, in Howarth 159.

89 For "Secretary of the Navy" see Sir Francis Russel, DoC 21 Feb. 1677, 4:112. Pepys resumed office on May 23 (Knighton 147, in which see title and patent, and AO). For accounts of the developments described here, see Bryant 2:394-97 and 3:1-86; Tomalin 326-36; Knighton 143-47. For Pepys's role on the Tangier expedition see TP 13 Jul. 1683, 4. For the dismissal of the Admiralty commission in 1684 see AO.

90 For James's letter to Pepys, see James Stuart to SP, 17 Nov. 1688, printed in Bryant 3:312-13. For the results of the Special Commission, see Cat. 1:92-6; for the additional contemporary praise, see Thomas Bruce Ailesbury, Memoirs of Thomas, Earl of Ailesbury, ed. W. E. Buckley,
vol. 1 (Westminster [London], UK: Nichols and sons, 1890), 107, and see also 103.

91 The first time he was accompanied by his two most trusted servants, William Hewer and Sir Anthony Deane: Copy of the Warrant for the Arrest of Pepys, Hewer, and Deane, 4 May 1689; [James] Vernon to SP, 15 Jun. [1689]; and Mr. Cotton, King's Messenger's Receipt, 18 Jun. 1689, both in PC 1:27-8. The second time Pepys was alone: Privy Council Order for Mr. Pepys's Liberation from the Gatehouse, 14 Jul. 1690, in PC 1:32.

92 See discussion of Samuel Atkins, Chapter 3.

93 Diary 30 Dec. 1662, 3:302; in this entry Pepys recounted how he had achieved a "great . . . esteem with Mr. Coventry" and was starting to make inroads with "even the Duke himself, to whom I have a good access". He was careful to note that the latter access derived not only from Navy Board meetings but also partly from Sandwich's gift, "my being commissioner with [York] for Tangier". For "countenance" see above.

94 Diary 30 Dec. 1662, 3:302. Pepys had expressed something of the same a few months previously, writing that "my late industry hath been such, as I am become as high in reputation as any man" at the office." But just as important was the "good hold I have of Mr. Coventry and Sir G. Carteret": 30 Sept. 3:210.

95 Circa 1683, TP 299-300 and 332.

96 Anon. to Ellis, 15 Mar. 1686, in George Agar Ellis, ed., The Ellis Correspondence: Letters Written during the Years 1686, 1687, 1688, and Addressed to John Ellis, Esq., vol. 1, (London: H. Colburn, 1829), 66.
Chapter 3: Pepys as Master

If Pepys was a nearly ideal junior partner in the master-servant dyad that served as a vehicle by which honor assisted the royal business, he also rose to the senior role. There his performance was equally helpful and literally more commanding. This chapter examines how Pepys acted as a master to others in the vertical chain of honor relationships, stepping into a patron's shoes and establishing relationships of clientage with subordinates in the navy office—a crucial move in his environment. The chapter first places Pepys within what some early modern humanists would have seen as honor's most lamentably conservative framework, that of lineage, both as the de facto head and general patron of an extended family, and as a more direct master of two men from his family who served him professionally. The discussion then moves to clients outside Pepys's family but whose closeness to their master almost qualifies them to be considered part of an honorable "household" of the kind Pepys himself had experienced during his early time with Mountagu. As we shall see, Pepys's servants received protection and favor from him of the same kind he had received from Sandwich, Carteret, Coventry and the royal brothers. In turn Pepys's clients supported his efforts to increase his honor by forwarding the King's service, and in the process they too accrued honor.

"The real working head of the chief branch of the English bureaucracy"¹ obviously found his talent for juggling paper a necessity, but in early modern England it could never have been sufficient for the level of success he attained. First there is the sheer magnitude of his achievements: scholars working on Pepys have recently recognized that he could never have done it by himself, but this point has not yet received more than a page of attention.² And then there is the culture: Pepys had to work within the strictures of his society in order to accomplish
goals both small and large. Notions of service to an idealized state may have been gaining ground, but the valorization of honor's personalized leadership was still at least as strong, and probably more so if Pepys's archive is any indication. Success in his case therefore meant, in large part, working through relationships of honor, not only as an inferior but also as a superior. And in this he was as successful as with his facts and figures. Pepys had his failures as a master, but in none of them is it clear that he was at fault in honor's terms, and the disappointment of the occasional disloyal servant was outweighed by a dependable core of clients who ranged from the generally reliable to the utterly devoted.

I

Samuel Pepys was first of all a kinsman, and that is a crucial observation in the present argument's context. The anthropologists who inaugurated the systematic study of honor did so under the rubric of "lineage culture", and the critical place of kinship in Pepys's priorities is made clear in the diary immediately. Its first daily entry, 1 January 1660, records that he and his wife visited his father and mother, John and Margaret Pepys, dining there with an eight-year-old relative, Theophila Turner, daughter of his cousin Jane Turner. Thereafter, kinship ties loomed large until the end of his life. During this early stage in his career, Pepys could not afford to provide much support to relatives, so he generally appears as their social equal or inferior, but engaged with them in a continuous round of visiting and being visited, hosting small meals and being hosted. After becoming clerk of the acts, Pepys's business took up much of the time he had previously used to visit or entertain relations. A number of them pained him with their lower social status, and these he did not wish to be seen with: now able to play the patron, he made up
for his lack of time—and, where the less cultured of them were concerned, lack of enthusiasm—
with an increase of provender, assuming the responsibilities normally attendant upon the well-
off head of a family. This was a role his own father could never play, but Pepys bent over
backward to keep from calling attention to the difference in their status, always exhibiting the
particular respect for his father which a man of honor would be expected to pay the head of his
line. (The younger Pepys accepted rebukes from his father that he would never have brooked
from anyone else but Sandwich or the royal brothers.)

The help Pepys gave to his sister Paulina affords a measure of his commitment to family.
After supporting her through early adulthood, he married her to one John Jackson, a yeoman
farmer who died in 1680; Pepys then resumed responsibility for his sister, now with two sons in
tow, whom he enrolled in school at his expense. He shepherded the older boy, his namesake
Samuel, into the navy, although Pepys later washed his hands of this nephew after he turned from
the sea, wasted his patrimony, and subsequently compounded his ingratitude by having "thought
fit to dispose of himself in marriage against my positive advice and injunctions to his own
irreparable prejudice and dishonor." The other nephew, John Jackson Jr., proved little more
talented but rather better at following his uncle’s directions and was eventually rewarded by
becoming Pepys's heir. And Pepys did not stop at immediate family; as one of his biographers
has rightfully noted, "even with . . . troublesome cousins, although he grumbled, he had too
strong a sense of the obligations of blood not to do his duty. In a Latin set-piece designed to show
his tuition-paying uncle that he was profiting from his studies at Cambridge, John Jackson
addressed Pepys as "nobilissime et amplissime"; though no surprise in such a letter, Jackson's
coupling of the honorific "noble" with the adjective denoting liberal generosity was accurate
enough. A number of his extended kinfolk took advantage of this lineal connection to get a head start out of the gate. Like the King and his barons, Pepys assisted even fairly distant relatives.\textsuperscript{9}

Because the surest way to honor in the office was good results, Pepys's first criteria for clients were always talent and diligence, but within those limits he seems to have looked to his kinship circle first. His standards were such, however, that only two of his relations were able to sustain a close professional connection to the diarist.\textsuperscript{10} Even these relationships were rocky at times, but the concept of the blood as part of one's honor,\textsuperscript{11} still strong after centuries of humanist assault, may have led Pepys to make extra allowances.

Of these two family clients, Pepys's youngest brother John eventually became the most dependable and valued, although initial conflict would prevent this from becoming apparent for some time. Samuel acted the benevolent older brother early in the diary by supporting John at St. Paul's School and helping put him through Cambridge, but Samuel was angered when the latter apparently neglected his studies.\textsuperscript{12} Later the two had a falling out serious enough for Samuel to vow that he would never forgive his brother. By 1667, however, they reconciled and in 1670 Samuel procured for John a clerkship in Trinity House, the organization that regulated England's merchant marine; the older brother's recommendation portrayed the younger as possessing not merely an education but also "sobriety and diligence" superior to the previous clerk's. This seems to have been no empty praise. Two years later Samuel became a governing officer of Trinity House and labored with John to ensure order in the paperwork and in the House's "reputation." Soon John became joint clerk of the acts when Samuel was promoted to the Admiralty. At this time John also seems to have become a sort of assistant to his older sibling as family patron, writing his father, "pray draw a bill on me for 250 pounds. I will pay it here at sight," standing
bond for £1000 needed for a family lawsuit, and sending along different types of wine. This was a man one could rely on to do both official and family business, and Pepys did not hesitate to place other important tasks in his brother's hands with full confidence of their execution.\textsuperscript{13}

Pepys's brother-in-law Balthasar St. Michel, talented but nowhere near as steady as John, offers an even better example of how kinship could strengthen the bonds of master and servant. Unfortunately for Pepys, the example is better because St. Michel tested the limits of this variant of patronage. John died late in 1677, leaving St. Michel as the only long-standing naval client of close kinship. Although this brother-in-law could work hard, he was also temperamental in a way that Pepys would never have tolerated in a client outside of the family. Penniless son of a proud Huguenot refugee of gentle birth who had been "bred to nothing but the sword, and by it had in his time very many honorable commissions", Balthasar presumed upon his relationship with Pepys early in the diary to insist "upon a place for a gentleman that may not stain his family." Pepys did not immediately have sufficient influence to get the importunate St. Michel such a place, and in any case the diarist was reluctant to assist his brother-in-law, both flamboyant and signally lacking in financial acumen. Pepys presciently expressed himself "afeared to meddle therein for fear I shall not be able to wipe my hands of him again", a rare glimpse of wary cynicism concerning the burdensome aspect of honorable obligation.\textsuperscript{14} Kinship ties won out eventually, however. Balthasar gained some experience soldiering in the Dutch army, and by the time he returned, Samuel had enough clout to get him "put as right-hand man" (a muster-master in the Duke of Albemarle's Life Guards) "and other marks of special respect; at which I am very glad," wrote Pepys, continuing to track the progress of his own reputation, "to see that I am reckoned something in my recommendations."\textsuperscript{15}
Pepys's subcommunity of honor was instrumental in helping Balthasar with his next leg up. "I made it my particular request to Sir William Coventry," Pepys wrote, "to [have] him appointed" muster-master of a naval squadron upon the advent of the Second Dutch War. To facilitate this temporary opportunity without losing Balthasar his permanent position, Pepys also, though only "after a little difficulty," obtained the necessary leave from the guards for his brother-in-law—with full pay. Pepys's self-satisfaction at having provided honorably and well for his kin comes through in his diary entry for the day of St. Michel's embarkation, which was "upon very good terms . . . worth 100/ this year to him, besides keeping him the benefit of his pay in the guard." But Pepys did not stop there: that day he also pressed into Balthasar's hand a note the latter could give to his superior, Admiral Harman, asking for the bearer that signal luxury aboard the space-starved battleships, a private cabin "for the better keeping and transcribing of his books." Illustrating the way in which patronage in the seventeenth century probably even more than in the medieval period operated through "a pluralistic network of honor-infused bonds", Pepys also "beg[ged]" the admiral "your general countenance and furtherance in the execution of his place"; in return the clerk of the acts took upon himself the expected responsibility of a reciprocal obligation: "I shall impute his good success in his undertaking to your favor, and accordingly will always acknowledge it." Pepys subsequently obtained for St. Michel a promotion from muster-master aboard ship to muster-master of the navy's yard at Deal. During the Third Dutch War Pepys made him the Navy Board's deputy commissioner for the sick and wounded.

Pepys's ouster from admiralty in 1679 must be counted the severest test his patronage would ever face, and of that test's components, Balthasar St. Michel must surely be counted the
most trying. St. Michel was ousted along with his patron. Given that patron's politically precarious position, his subsequent efforts to secure something else for his brother-in-law were little short of heroic. Though almost as helpless in the face of Balthasar's need as James Stuart had been in the face of his own, Pepys proved more effective, pulling every string he still could and bombarding the new Admiralty commission with a number of letters and perhaps some personal visits of which no record remains. Finally Pepys got Balthasar appointed storekeeper of the garrison at Tangier, but Michel hated the thought of leaving England and importuned Pepys for a more congenial position, invoking honor's reflectivity as an argument for Pepys's help: "for your sake Your Honor knows I am hated". Because of his "service in ever and all dangers and troubles, which I have performed with true faithfulness and honor both to your dear self and his majesty's service", he insisted, "more happy employments I may deserve and claim as my due". St. Michel turned out to despise the post as much as he'd thought he would, sending complaints back to England pleading for "some other employment at home, of more honor and profit", though he was careful to acknowledge the dynamic of patronage: "particularly of more capacity of service to you-wards". The desperate storekeeper even returned to England without leave to complain in person to the Navy Board (he was packed unceremoniously back to the tropics). These tactics must have dearly tried Pepys's patience, but he nonetheless did what he could to get Balthasar a raise; wrote to his (Pepys's) friend Henry Shere, in charge the Tangier harbor's mole, to request any possible aid for St. Michel; tried at least twice to get St. Michel's arrears of salary paid; and despite the anger Pepys must have felt at the ill-advised trip to England, he counseled his impetuous brother-in-law concerning the best way to proceed and talked to the board on St. Michel's behalf.
Despite the exasperation St. Michel probably caused Pepys, the pair emerged from the crisis intact as patron and client, surely a persuasive advertisement for the durability of the patron-client bond when strengthened by kinship. And further difficulties would not prevent Samuel and Balthasar's bond from lasting beyond defeat and final ruin until death. As part of Pepys's efforts to reshape the navy in his preferred image during James II's reign, St. Michel was made part of the Special Commission and resident commissioner of the navy at Deptford and Woolwich. Ignoring the Tangierian hiccup, Pepys nominated him on the basis of "the fullest evidences of his industry, faithfulness, and approved ability." But defeat and ruin did take its toll. Within half a year after the revolution Pepys and St. Michel suffered an estrangement in which Pepys's mistress seems somehow to have been involved, and the eventual outcome of the troubles was reminiscent of the similar divide created between Pepys and Sandwich by the Chelsea affair. Angered as he might have been, Pepys still drew up a formal petition to William III for St. Michel's continuance of employment and wrote letters to others he thought might be able to help his brother-in-law. Documentation for the ensuing years grows scanty, but there may have been a thaw since St. Michel acknowledged himself "obliged" more than once by continuing acts of generosity. And at the brink of death Pepys made one last gesture of patronage from his sickbed (the final known letter from one of the seventeenth century's more prolific correspondents), writing to an admiral in an attempt to secure for St. Michel an unspecified type of "relief" supposed to be "generally due to those under his circumstances of age and length of service". Utterly unable to undertake honor's *quid-pro-quo*, here Pepys appealed to loyalties past, referring to the recipient as the member of the current Admiralty "with whom I have had the honour of the longest acquaintance, as well as the strongest obligations of
friendship with your honoured father and family." Soon afterward St. Michel attended his benefactor's funeral and then vanished with him from the historical record.26

The longevity of Pepys and St. Michel's relationship is all the more remarkable because in addition to Balthasar's eccentricities, the relationship had to weather the more normal kind of bad, or at least disruptive, decision occasionally made by men competing for preeminence27 and striving to garner the means to sustain honorable display. During Third Dutch War St. Michel and another Pepys client, Anthony Deane, sponsored a privateer who accepted command of a sloop built by Deane, the Hunter, and straightaway sailed to France. There he procured a license to prey upon English vessels and subsequently showed a commendable impartiality to both sides in the conflict.28 "[H]ow much trouble to me it did", Pepys exclaimed to his brother-in-law two years later, fearing similar trouble when St. Michel became involved in a local controversy. (In a striking illustration of honor's reflective operation, Bishop Burnet neglected to mention the privateer's actual sponsors, simply reporting the apparently common belief that Pepys had the ship built to order.) "Therefore I do conjure you", Pepys continued to St. Michel, "to let fall whatever concernments you shall have in this [present] quarrel". For the future, Balthasar was ordered to "restrain the uses of [your authority] to causes honorable, and to such as properly come within your cognizance, and no other". Kinship might have prompted Pepys to tolerate more from St. Michel than he would from other clients, but shame still functioned as a powerful corrective to encourage proper and orderly procedure.29

Why did Pepys stay the course with Balthasar St. Michel? Probably because of a combination of kinship and meritorious service. Kinship is indicated because, as the portraits of his other clients will show, Pepys does not seem to have been likely to tolerate the full extent of
St. Michel's foibles in one of his non-kin clients. But there was more at work in his interaction with St. Michel than kin ties. According to the calculus of mutual benefit between patron and client, St. Michel seems to have merited Pepys's help much of the time despite his mercurial personality. This was a matter that had ramifications beyond those connected solely to the former's career, for the honor or shame of a client's actions reflected also upon the patron. Thus Balthasar's flightiness led Samuel to fear adverse consequences when he helped his brother-in-law obtain the place in Albemarle's guard regiment: "I am very glad [of the outcome]", wrote the diarist when his suit succeeded on St. Michel's behalf, "but wish he may carry himself that I may receive no disgrace by him." Balthasar, in his turn, was fully aware of the principle of reflective honor. "I ever performed my duty with faithful zeal to his majesty's service," St. Michel wrote while serving at Tangier in the 1680s, "and honour to my dear patron, protector, and benefactor".30 Pepys's observations of the way Balthasar made plans and kept records, however, soon went some way to allay doubts on this score. "I am infinitely pleased with Balty his deportment in his business of muster-master," he wrote in May 1666, "and hope mighty well from him"; the hope was fulfilled during the Second Dutch War when Balthasar was one of two muster-masters who had performed with sufficient diligence that York proposed to reward them with bonuses siphoned from the pay of the rest who had failed in their duty. York praised St. Michel's wartime efforts without first knowing of the connection to Pepys, and the diarist could write, "This I was exceeding glad of for my own sake".31

From this point forward Pepys generally found his brother-in-law, though sometimes disconcertingly spontaneous, "willing to take pains" that brought success and therefore honor not just to the servant but also to the master.32 While he carried out professional tasks, Balthasar
received Pepys's thanks on different occasions "for your great care and trouble in the business of putting the money for Tangier on board the *Dragon*, and procuring me Sir Roger Strickland's receipts in due form"; for the "much content it gives me that you have managed your trust so"; for "the great care which I have understood (though not from your self) that you took in the overtaking of the *Adventure*, and delivering his majesty's orders to her commander timely enough to bring her back to the Downs; though I am sorry it was accompanied with so much pain to you." And the execution of responsibility was helped along by the workings of the informal patron-client bond. On the last occasion Pepys reaffirmed the obligation Balthasar placed him under with such faithful service: "But diligence will some time or other bring its own reward, and I would not have you despair but it will do so to you." That obligation was augmented exponentially at the time of the Popish Plot. Prior to embarking for Tangier, St. Michel spent over half a year gathering evidence in France that the accusations against Pepys were false, acting as what we would now call a private detective. He performed the task admirably; "this [letter] serves only to give you my kind thanks for the continuance of your care in my affair," Pepys wrote as exonerating documents poured in from France. "I am very sensible thereof and [of] the good effects I expect from it to the justification of my innocence and honor". Word of Balthasar's extensive investigations leaked out and the primary witness against Pepys disappeared, probably afraid to be exposed as a fraud. The charges were dropped and Pepys had the results of Balthasar's efforts handsomely bound in two volumes. So there was some method to St. Michel's madness. But despite often turning in a good performance, he could not be trusted to always do so when it counted, as Tangier showed all to clearly. His relationship with Pepys was therefore characterized by a certain professional (and personal) distance. Pepys was in fact much
more intimate with more dependable clients, and to them we will now turn.\textsuperscript{35}

II

Honor was gained through success, and administrative success was most likely to stem from steady, consistent application and care—and as the Restoration navy had become a logistical juggernaut, this effort had to be spread over an entire office staff, not just one man. Yet getting good help posed a problem. Samuel Pepys operated in what was manifestly still a lineage culture, but John Pepys Jr.'s premature death left St. Michel as the only close relative with the wherewithal and desire to be a long-time naval client. Pepys always kept him at a distance professionally; it seems likely that he thought Balthasar’s temperament too erratic to support the kind of sustained order necessary in a well-run office. At any rate, in order to develop a group of dependable servants upon whom he could call with complete confidence as he built up the bureaucratic power that would enable achievement and influence, Pepys had to look outside his lineage. This section will tell the stories of his closest clients, William Hewer, Anthony Deane, Samuel Atkins, and others less fully documented, as well as those who fell from grace: for like any social heuristic, honor did not always work. But it worked well enough to catapult Pepys to heights of great influence and stimulated him to refine the later Stuart naval administration into the efficient machine that powered eighteenth-century empire. These are the servants who helped him do it.

Patronage outside the bloodline could cast a very wide net, and its levels must be distinguished. Just as Pepys helped poorer relations but did not employ them, he also practiced the kind of ephemeral beneficence reminiscent of the generic care that princes and nobles were
expected to have for meaner objects and tenants. Brief glimpses can be caught in such examples as Pepys's care for sailors who had lost their pay tickets. From these Pepys expected no return but appropriately profuse respect and gratitude, recording with pride early in the diary, "I have the name of a good-natured man among the poor people that come to the office." More substantial exchanges took place when Pepys received material gifts or service for exercising his office to assist people who were not principal clients with a promotion or some more robust piece of business. An early example of such transactions included securing an allowance for a clerk to the Chatham storekeeper, who sent Pepys a barrel of oysters in return. This was the kind of general largesse expected from liberal men of honor within their spheres of influence from Roman times forward; its practice allowed Pepys spread his net of reciprocal obligations to equals and inferiors as wide as he could through the navy, ranging from such low-ranking seamen as Cooper to commissioned officers and even flag officers, then outward to the merchants with whom the navy contracted for supplies. But clients whom Pepys could count on in the pinch (and some severe pinches came his way) were another matter. Promising candidates were brought in to serve as close subordinates, often very close: a number became part of Pepys's household literally as well as figuratively, starting as domestic servants under his roof. These included Thomas Edwards, Josiah Burchett, Samuel Atkins, and especially William Hewer.

By common consent among Pepys scholars, William Hewer was the diarist's most significant and loyal servant. In the first year of the diary, Hewer entered the Pepys household as a young man of 17, simultaneously working in the navy office under Pepys. He showed a sense of the independence supposed to characterize the man of honor when he refused to escort the household maids to church at the command of Pepys’s wife because "he would not be made a
slave of". Hewer also showed leanings toward honor of a darker shade than Pepys liked in a subordinate, keeping "bad company," drinking too much, and imitating the studied braggadocio of the rakish cavalier with a "proud trick . . . to keep his hat on in the house" or, worse, by "walk[ing] with his cloak flung over his shoulder, like a ruffian." Pepys therefore upbraided Hewer for immodesty and boxed his ears when he responded "that it was not immodest or some such slight answer." Such treatment might be expected to have bred resentment in an honor-conscious, high-spirited young man who not only sprang from the same middling background as Pepys and was therefore socially equal, but was also equally talented, managing and investing his money with a perspicacity that eventually enriched him far beyond his master.

But Hewer's master was soon enough to prove himself worthy of his servant's faith, and after three or four years the pair settled into a patron-client relationship that eventually seems to have become very close. In 1663 "I had a fray with Sir J. Mennes in defense of my Will in a business where the old coxcomb would have put a foot upon him". Such support Hewer returned with trustworthy and competent service at the office. During the latter half of the diary, Hewer was included in pleasant family outings, hosted the Pepyses for meals at his "very handsome lodging," and was asked to wed Pepys's sister Paulina (he tactfully refused, saying he preferred to remain a bachelor, and never did marry). In January 1668 he gave a diamond locket to Elizabeth Pepys "out of his gratitude for my [Pepys's] kindness and hers to him." At the diary's close, when Elizabeth famously discovered Pepys in flagrante delicto, it was Hewer who patched up the quarrel sufficiently to allow the couple to take the idyllic French vacation without which the diarist would have probably added a heavy dose of guilt to his grief at her death just three weeks after their return to England. Demonstrating that the patron-client bond remained highly
personalized even to the deployment of administrative skills, on the poignant last day of the
diary, Pepys "continued all the morning with W. Hewer, upon examining and stating my
accounts, in order to the fitting myself to go abroad beyond sea" for that very vacation.40

The strength of the Pepys-Hewer bond would eventually be sorely tested, but in the
meantime master and servant, like Pepys and Sandwich had done, rose together. By the time
Pepys became secretary of the Admiralty in 1673, he had come to trust Hewer implicitly and took
the younger man with him as chief clerk. For his part, Hewer demonstrated not merely
competence but the leadership ability of a genuine administrative lieutenant. When Pepys was
out of the office, whether for a late August vacation in 1674 or for the eleventh-hour necessity of
"assist[ing] Sir John Bankes in his election at Rochester" in early 1679, Hewer took the helm.
"Living or dying I shall remain to the end your faithful servant," he confidently affirmed during
those days when Pepys rode high. But all too soon the Popish Plot presented Mr. Secretary's chief
clerk with much ampler opportunity to keep his word than either of them would have wished
when the crown's opposition attacked York and the King through Pepys. Hewer was well known
to be the Admiralty secretary's most reliable subordinate,41 and as events were to show, this was a
dangerous connection even after the pair's jobs had been lost (records are lacking, but it is almost
certain that Hewer was sacked from the Admiralty along with Pepys). Before being pushed into
the Tower and out of office, Pepys did manage to bequeath the lucrative treasurership of Tangier
to Hewer in what must have been the very teeth of their enemies, but this would be Pepys's last
act as patron to Hewer for several years. By any measure Hewer was to requite it many times
over.42

It is hard to imagine a man of honor keeping his word more truly or a servant acting more
faithfully than did Hewer over the next two dangerous years. When Pepys was finally released on bail, having lost his government-provided housing along with his government position, Hewer took Pepys (including domestics) into his own commodious quarters by York Watergate. "I am now with Will Hewer at his house," Pepys reported to St. Michel, "and have received from him all the care, kindness and faithfulness of a son". When Pepys left for extended periods to take care of family business at Brampton, Hewer—busy managing the ongoing effort to construct a defense against the charge of treason—also kept his master supplied almost daily with news from the capital. And as Pepys had attended York the previous year, Hewer sat beside Pepys in at least one court session during the period when those who openly swam against the Whig tide ran the risk of drowning.

It was Hewer who helped obtain the dramatic deathbed confession of Pepys's estranged former butler, John James, that he (James) had been paid for false testimony against Pepys. A few months later, in a letter employing no less than three secret codes, Hewer reported that he had secured sensitive papers which apparently could have lent themselves to the case of Pepys's prosecution had they fallen into the wrong hands.

In a world turned upside down, the ties of honor could (as we shall see below), come unraveled, but not in Hewer's case. His immediate reward for such profoundly faithful service, however, was, first, to be tarred alongside Pepys as corruptor of the navy in two scurrilous pamphlets, *Plain Truth or Closet Discourse Betwixt P. and H.* and *A Hue and Cry after P. and H.*, and second, to be the object of a (fortunately abortive) kidnaping attempt. And there may have been additional danger. One of John James's confederates hinted darkly (recorded Pepys) "that more was yet designed to be done me, and also . . . Mr. Hewer."

But Hewer sustained his devotion and his master, thereby reserving their partnership for
one more ride in the administrative tilting grounds. After Charles tamed the Whigs, Hewer went
to Tangier alongside his master as the evacuation's main financial officer, then reprised this role
in 1686 as the "accountant officer" in Pepys's grand plan to reorganize, refit, and expand the
navy. To hear Pepys tell it, Hewer's financial acumen did wonders, and the Special Commission's
work did come in under budget—a feat nearly as unheard-of then as it is now. Accomplished in
Pepys's service, this exploit clearly required exceptional reward, and Pepys attempted to furnish
it by spreading the word to the largest audience possible. In the only published work by one of
the more prolific writers of the seventeenth century, Memoires of the Royal Navy, Pepys gave
Hewer all due honor, singling out him alone of all the commission's members by name and
describing Hewer's work as that of an intrepid numerical explorer. Going where no man had gone
before in method and diligence, Hewer had painstakingly set forth the accounts of the
commission to the last detail "of every species and parcel of goods bought and spent, artificer and
workman employed, penny laid out, and service performed . . . as does not appear to have ever
before been seen in the navy of England, but . . . through the single industry and peculiar conduct
of Mr. Hewer". Thus could paperwork be invested with honor heroics.

But Pepys had not intended to stop his patronage with honor's rhetoric. Soon after the
commission's work was done he created a new, executive-level position for Hewer (and his other
most valued client, Anthony Deane) which would have made them joint second-in-commands to
the Secretary of the Admiralty, entitled "Inspectors . . . over the whole, Sir Anthony Deane for
the works, and [Hewer] for the accounts". Had revolution not intervened, honor's feedback loop
would have continued along its well-worn track. But revolution did intervene, and unfortunately
for navy administration, this event signaled the end of a remarkable partnership whose records
testified to the steadying anchor that the personalized relationship of honor, with its elevation of reciprocal loyalty, could provide civil servants in the new bureaucracies. This anchor did not merely assist the daily work of the office or even the occasional extraordinary reform; we must wonder how Pepys would have gotten along without Hewer's help during the Exclusion Crisis. The question must obviously remain a matter for conjecture, but the master's life certainly would have been a good deal more difficult without the servant. Pepys's enemies would probably also have had an easier route to the attack. Hewer's faithfulness therefore may have played a large role in once again making available the navy's most capable administrator when Charles was ready for him in 1683.

Underscoring honor's ability to encourage powerful interpersonal connections, the bittersweet coda to Pepys and Hewer's naval career echoes the ties Pepys had retained with his own past patrons. And especially in the Pepys-Hewer case, the possibility of honor as a particularly strong stimulus to emotive friendship, of a type close familial affection, must be raised. Hewer was imprisoned with Pepys on suspicion of Jacobitism during summer 1690, though happily nothing stuck. Afterward, in a stronger reprise of Pepys's ongoing connections with old patrons and Sandwich's family, the two remained intimate. When Pepys became too ridden with the pain of kidneystones to care for himself toward the end of his life, Hewer took him and his household in yet again, and the servant attended his master's deathbed on May 26, 1703. Hewer was also the executor of Pepys's will, receiving more bequests than anyone else save the heir and the mistress. But in a parallel to Pepys's continuing relationship with Sandwich's family after 1673, Pepys's passing did not close the book on his relationship with Hewer. "Living or dying I shall remain to the end your faithful servant," Hewer had written.
Readers may judge how well he kept his word: Pepys's young nephew and heir, John Jackson, eventually married the sister of Hewer's heir, Anne Edgeley, uniting the two bloodlines as Pepys had once proposed nearly forty years previously. Hewer settled the princely sum of £3,300 upon Anne as a dowry and later left her £1000 more in his will. Anne and John's daughter Frances inherited all their assets; her descendants continued Pepys's line into the twentieth century. The fidelity Hewer demonstrated went well beyond what could be expected from the stonily businesslike patrons and clients often projected backwards by modern commentators on this period. Against that portrayal, the relationship of these two men had deepened to the point of not only carrying familial overtones but actually creating a lineage, perhaps the ultimate endpoint for a system the substance of which was held to be transferrable through the blood.

If Hewer was Pepys's strong right hand, shipwright Anthony Deane might be considered his chief technocrat and thus perhaps least likely of all Pepys's clients to stand upon honor. As we shall see, such an expectation cannot be sustained. In August 1662, Deane, then a young assistant shipwright, introduced himself to Pepys and exposed to the latter one of the ways in which the navy was then being cheated by sellers of timber. No low-ranking naval worker could have hit upon a better way of ingratiating himself with Pepys, especially at that moment. Deane fortuitously made his move just as Pepys's new desire to buckle down had received the boost from Sir William Coventry described in the previous chapter. By September Deane gave Pepys a highly detailed model of a ship with which sent the clerk of the acts into what can fairly be described as an ecstasy of delight, prompting an immediate resolution to reciprocate: "it so far exceeds my expectations, that I am sorry almost he should make such a present to no greater a person; but I am exceeding glad of it, and shall study to do him a courtesy for it." Thus began a
decades-long association of mutual profit and, indeed, mutual suffering.\textsuperscript{51}

Like Hewer, Deane benefitted significantly from Pepys’s patronage early in their association, both in terms of protection and promotion. In 1663 naval surveyor Sir William Batten blamed Deane for casting inaccurate aspersions on the quality of timber for which Batten had contracted, criticizing the shipwright as "a fellow not fit to be employed". Pepys, on the contrary, decided that Deane "deserves better than any officer in the yard" and resolved to "vindicate him", noting as a conscientious master should, "I am bound to do it. . . . my great trouble is for poor Deane." By late 1664, Pepys's influence had secured Deane the position of master shipwright at the Harwich yard, at that time apparently the highest ranking officer on the spot, in charge of not merely building ships but of the dockyard’s entire administration. In that capacity Deane submitted to the government a design for a new ship. In order to help his client win the day, Pepys presented Deane's design without Deane's name attached, then not only informed Deane of resultant criticisms but also sent him copies of rival designs, "praying you [Deane] to spend some thoughts about it . . . and if you see occasion, spare not your pains to do it [your design] over again, which you may do without any reproach, none but myself knowing anything hereof."\textsuperscript{52} At a time when honor was often not held to be at issue without a public accusation,\textsuperscript{53} this proceeding was honorable (however unfair) because Pepys was helping his client the way a patron should. And this practice did not militate against efficiency as much as might be thought: what honor required was success, and Pepys had—correctly—marked Deane as a highly talented man who could succeed given the right opportunities. How the master promoted that talent was not as important as the simple need that it be promoted.

Unhappily, the events which followed showed how honor might require that a master
rebuke a servant. Tension arose between Deane and John Taylor, a superintendent newly appointed to oversee the Harwich yard in 1664. Details remain vague, but personnel at the yard became involved as allies of one party or the other. During the course of the conflict, Deane seems to have wrongly disparaged an underling named Wheeler, an abuse of power for which Pepys administered the most stinging rebuke he ever seems to have given the shipwright. Although what took place remains unclear, it is significant that Pepys was apparently as incensed at actions that traduced the code of honor as he was at the potential for wrongful dismissal of a naval employee. Deane had not been forthright with Pepys, thus failing to be a loyal servant; Deane had been inconsistent in his characterizations of and accusations concerning two Harwich employees, verbal mistakes that constituted the breaking of his word when publicly revealed; and he had dishonored Wheeler with an insult.

"I will not dissemble with you because I love you", wrote Pepys. "I am wholly dissatisfied in your proceedings . . . upon my word, I have not spared to tell the Board my opinion about this business". 54

When Pepys shared his poor opinion of Deane's "proceedings" with others, he initiated a shaming process in which Deane's reputation would suffer, at least within the middle reaches of the navy administration. Deane's master concluded with an admonition to "give no second occasion". Despite Pepys's pointed threat, he stood by his client. When Deane was called to defend his conduct, his first letter to the Navy Board was highly impolitic; Pepys intercepted it and patiently, albeit with more stern words, sent it back with instructions for a "gentler" revision. 55

Deane's failure to be consistent (which seems to have been Pepys's main concern) traduced the code of honor. The resulting shame encouraged the correction of behavior that was disrupting work in the yard, while honor's manifestation in Pepys's protection encouraged the retention of a
valuable client if he could comport himself more fittingly.

As a faithful servant, Deane reciprocated such protective patronage. In 1669, for example, he prepared a "painful" (i.e. detailed) report on how best to classify the different types ("rates") of ships in the navy (presumably with a view to greater standardization). But Deane took the initiative to also include "other circumstances of essential importance to the improvement of his majesty's Royal Navy." As a result of these efforts, honor was in the offing:

You may be confident I shall not omit to lay not only this particular matter before his royal highness but your general industry and study to promote his majesty's advantage in matters of the navy . . . in such manner as may procure and confirm that opinion in his highness which is due to one so studious of his highness's honor as you are.56

The servant's reciprocation thus produced another opportunity for the exercise of Pepys's patronage, which in turn gave Deane further incentive for faithful service, a dynamic that might be described as a self-perpetuating "honor feedback loop" which not only benefited the two participants but got the Navy's work done as well—a dynamic surely made all the more powerful because the heir to the throne was the immediate audience, his honor was immediately involved, and his servants could hope for the benefit of his countenance as they attempted to produce results that would prove their studiousness of that honor.

Deane as well as Hewer benefitted Pepys’s status due to the effect that a servant’s performance had on the master's reputation. Deane may have participated with St. Michel in the misadventure of the privateer and had flailed about in his own potentially shameful imbroglio with Taylor, but he learned restraint much more quickly than St. Michel and overmatched Pepys's brother-in-law in the polish of honor's reflective mirror. No praise could be prized more highly than that of His Majesty, and Deane had earned such plaudits on the 1665 occasion when Pepys clandestinely allowed Deane to revise a ship design in light of competitor's designs. Instead of
taking advantage of the opportunity, Deane seems to have insisted on the soundness of his original ideas. With Pepys's help, Deane's was the vessel selected for construction, and Pepys's promotion of his protégé proved well-founded: the diarist was later able to write that the ship in question "succeeds so well as he hath got great honor by it, and I some by recommending him—the King, Duke, and everybody saying it is the best ship that was ever built."\textsuperscript{57}

Pepys and Deane’s professional relationship continued uninterrupted in this vein for more than a decade, with profit both to them and the King as successes were attended by concomitant honors, each following the other in turn. When the Navy Board’s fat was in the fire after the Second Dutch War, Deane provided many of the figures that bulked so large in the clerk of the act’s defenses as well as carrying out his normal duties. His services received their requital in 1668 when Pepys made Deane the master shipwright at Portsmouth, then as now the most important naval harbor in the realm. Then, after building a string of exceptionally swift and easy-handling vessels, culminating in two yachts presented by Charles II to his French counterpart (and thus directly concerned with the royal honor), Deane was knighted by the King in 1671, arguably the most dramatic possible form of royal countenance save conferral of a peerage.\textsuperscript{58} In June 1672 Pepys promoted Deane as resident commissioner of Portsmouth, in charge of the entire harbor as well as the yard,\textsuperscript{59} and then in 1674 as part of an attempt to secure increased naval funding, Deane compiled for Pepys a major report on the repairs necessary to compensate for the depredations of the Third Dutch War.\textsuperscript{60}

Also in 1674 Pepys began promoting to Parliament what would be his signal achievement of the decade, and Deane would combine honor with technical information to aid the effort. The goal was to build a large number of new ships in a naval arms race with France and the
Netherlands (at the beginning Pepys proposed twenty). Deane was the man Pepys turned to for an estimate of the proposed project’s materials and cost. Instead of merely passing the information on to his master, Deane independently pressed an MP of his professional acquaintance (a merchant who sometimes dealt in masts) to advocate for Pepys’s program. The MP in question requested a private report on the costs involved. Pursuant to this response, Deane duly furnished the figures "to that degree of exactness which I have by me ready calculated as if need be to enumerate every individual species together with its quantity, weight, and price". But he also passionately urged the necessity of the new ships with an evocation of a late medieval *pas d'armes* against any opposed to the measure:

Sir, if any member shall have other calculations . . . less than this sum . . . I do affirm they are misguided and am ready to make it out by every particular requisite from the keel to the least species . . . . Upon this truth and foundation you may depend[,] and that you may have credit to make it out[,] if any oppose your motion I’ll stand by you to make every individual appear against any who pretends to know it and you shall not fail to make it forth if occasion; upon this subject I’ll venture to manage the truth against any that oppose it; now I have said and undertaken to be your champion.[,]

It is as if Pepys's servant were rewriting Malory. Deane's task, however, remained unfinished. The price of naval buildup remained contentious, and it took three more years of assiduous lobbying before Pepys could ram through a vote not merely for twenty but thirty new ships in early 1677. Deane played a critical part not only in providing further statistics but in furnishing a blueprint for the building program, drawing up what may be the first set of standardized dimensions in Europe for a state’s warships. Pepys did not stint to provide honor's guerdon for Deane's invaluable work: the next year Mr. Secretary brought his client into the navy office itself as Comptroller of Victualling Accounts. At first glance, the latter does not appear to be a logical post for one of Deane’s technical acumen, but the work was light. Pepys seems to have intended
that Deane be freed to improve warship design—an endeavor in which the King's honor was highly concerned indeed—without the burden of supervising actual construction. Pepys's early protection and shaping of his client to the ways of honor had paid off handsomely for them both, and for the navy.

After what must have been the enormously satisfying success of the 30 new ships, fortune's wheel would bring Pepys and Deane down to disgrace, but the bond of honor held to the navy's continued benefit when the wheel turned upward again. After the Popish Plot blew up in their faces, the pair went to the Tower together. After their release, Deane went into the private sector but maintained what seems to have been fairly close contact with Pepys. When the reinstated secretary to the Admiralty organized his Special Commission to overhaul the navy in 1686, he rigged the selection process for the position of surveyor so that his most trusted technical expert would get the spot. In illustration of the give-and-take that occurred between patrons and clients who had proven themselves to each other, at Deane's request Pepys budgeted for him a £1000 salary, nearly unheard-of for a mid-level functionary. Deane filled the post with his usual determined effectiveness, and Pepys honored him (together with Hewer) at the end by the offer of a superlative new position. The Glorious Revolution, however, ended his naval career, as it did his master’s, permanently. Once again, Deane was imprisoned with Pepys for political reasons, Hewer now tagging along, although fortunately they were able to beat the rap this time also. Documentation on Deane grows scanty at this point: the terse and somewhat awkward style of his normal correspondence suggests that Sir Anthony may not have enjoyed writing letters, and if so Pepys respected the preference. Deane also had 15 children, apparently all living, whose interference with other relationships can easily be imagined. But some contact
was maintained. John Evelyn encountered Deane at dinner with Pepys one night in 1690. The shipwright-administrator also contributed various pieces of information during the early part of the decade for a major sea history Pepys intended to write, and Deane received a ring at Pepys’s funeral. Aside from Hewer the client most closely associated with Pepys, Deane was the most technically knowledgeable of his master's inner circle and therefore should have been the least likely of that number to employ the terms of honor. Nonetheless he did so vigorously in support of Pepys's endeavors, and Pepys rewarded Deane's special type of expert aid with its full deserts. These ranged from the simpler rhetorical courtesy of asking Deane for additional copies of a technical drawing "for the preserving the honour due to masters of your quality" to major promotions and exceptional remuneration. By this honor-infused process the navy grew—literally, ship by ship—and of all Pepys's clients, Deane was the one who could claim to have assisted his patron the most to achieve that goal.

Samuel Atkins stands next to William Hewer and Anthony Deane as Pepys's third most important client. Pepys retained Atkins at his side as a strong right arm in the Admiralty office to buttress Mr. Secretary against the press of routine business. But among the ranks of Pepys's clients, Atkins offers the most dramatic reminder of the negative side of honor's reflective coin: if Hewer was the most faithful of servants and if Deane showed that a praiseworthy servant brought praise to the patron, Atkins demonstrated that a shamed servant could not merely lower the master's reputation but could the make the master highly vulnerable. Yet Atkins also demonstrated that a servant could keep faith with a master even under the threat of extended imprisonment or death.

Atkins's early career was normal for one of Pepys's clerks: he showed the spirit expected
of honorable men and thus earned rebukes from his master, but because of exceptional
compentence was given a second chance. Apprenticed as a naval clerk at 13, Atkins must have
shown promise; after training in the dockyards for the first half of his time, he was transferred in
1674 to the Admiralty office under Pepys for his last three years and lived as part of the
secretary's household. Immediately prior to the end of his apprenticeship, Atkins transgressed
upon Pepys's goodwill by coming home too late of an evening without first clearing the night's
festivities with the Secretary. This was no new requirement: Hewer had had to toe that line in his
day. The erring Atkins was promptly terminated for disobedience. Atkins wrote to Pepys begging
for "the honor of serving you once more" and agreed that if he were ever again "found a minute
out of your house without your leave," Pepys should forthwith "banish me for ever your service,
favor, or countenance". The honor-based plea seems to have worked; Pepys resumed Atkins's
employment and continued him after the apprenticeship was finished. However, despite the
young clerk's protestations that he would not "hereafter be guilty," he did lapse, and seldom in
history can a broken promise have been so coincidentally fortunate. By a notable irony, his
disobedience turned into the means by which his master's neck was very probably saved from the
noose.71

Atkins was arrested on November 1, 1678, for complicity in the murder of Sir Edmund
Bury Godfrey, the incident that sparked the Popish-Plot hysteria. The arrest was requested by the
Buckingham-Shaftesbury group which, in contemporary Roger North's view, intended to get at
Pepys through his servant and then at the royal brothers through Pepys.72 When Atkins did not
come home by 9 p.m., Pepys took Atkins at his word of nearly two years before and instructed
the porter "to tell him that his master had resolved that he should never come within his doors
more." As Atkins testified to the Lords' Secret Committee a short time later, "Mr. Pepys is the severest man in his house in the world, and whoever serves him laudably for seven years, for an hour's absence from his business without his knowledge shall lose his favor." Office business was Pepys's path to honor, and clients who wished his "countenance" needed to make it an urgent priority. Hyperbolic as one might be when talking fast under such circumstances, Atkins's report fits too well with other evidence of the expectations his master had of servants, especially those living under his own roof. Pepys himself called Atkins's carousing an offense "against me as his master".

When he learned that Atkins had been arrested, however, Pepys's position vis-à-vis his clerk was immediately cast in a different light. Observing worriedly to his sister that the bond between patron and client could be dangerous, the charges against Atkins inevitably producing "reflections upon me as his master," Pepys set about defending his clerk with his usual thoroughness in organizing and deploying information. Following Atkins's trial, Pepys found that his servant had indulged in a three-day party weekend with various companions who provided a far from sterling but completely ironclad alibi for the clerk's whereabouts during the crucial period of alleged criminal activity. However, there was no way for Atkins to know this during the two first nerve-wracking weeks of imprisonment and interrogation. Isolated from almost all outside contact by the Lord's Secret Committee and his accusers, Atkins was given to understand that he should testify to having hired a thug to kill Godfrey at Pepys's request, and by turns was offered the carrot of reward for so testifying or threatened with the stick of hanging if he did not. The "force and efficacy of these arguments", North judged, would have been overwhelming at this time when the Whigs "seemed to have no less the power of life and death, than of
preferment, in their hands.”

Despite the shadow of the gallows and the possibility that, if he were fortunate enough to secure an acquittal on the basis of his true whereabouts, Pepys would immediately turn him out because of those activities, the uncompromising Atkins refused the lie that could save him and perhaps even increase his fortunes. Pepys was left deeply impressed with Atkins's steadfast and loyal lack of action; this was honorable conduct that paralleled a seemingly hopeless last stand in battle. It definitely trumped any quibbles about off-duty misbehavior. "For certainly," Pepys wrote later, "no youth of his wit and straitness of fortune ever withstood such temptations to have been a villain." Atkins, on his side, remained deeply grateful for Pepys's support, of which he became aware two weeks into his confinement. The fire of the conspiracy against them forged the fidelity of the servant and the patronage of the master into a unity never thereafter sundered.

The future of Pepys and Atkins's bond did not seem bright at first, but Pepys's commitment to being an honorable master even under straitened circumstances held it firm. Atkins was acquitted on February 11, 1679, but only a little under four months later (May 21) Pepys was forced to resign and immediately found lodgings in the Tower. Atkins was dismissed soon afterward with no justification. Depressed, health broken by 16 weeks in prison, he fell badly ill and was ridden by a fever that kept him in bed (cared for by relatives) for thirteen months. With few prospects, Atkins faced utter penury when an unexpected opportunity arose to serve in the navy against the Algerian pirates. One of the men who had provided Atkins with the saving alibi the year before was a naval captain, and he offered to take Atkins on as a "reformado," a volunteer position designed for gentlemen who were thought to need no salary and thus drew no pay, but who did get rations and the possibility of promotion into the officer
corps. To seize the moment, Atkins needed a quick infusion of cash for expenses and wrote to his master. The servant was sufficiently courteous, invoking honor reciprocity to Pepys's benefit by promising that the requested assistance would "constantly be owned as an indelible obligation among the many others you have placed on me," but he invoked the same principle on his own behalf by mentioning the "series of ill fortune I have been crushed with" which had, of course, been suffered in his master's cause. When it came to actually asking for the money, Atkins was, by the elaborate epistolary standards of the time, peremptory: "a provision of bed, linen, clothes, and other necessaries fit for the voyage being to be made very quickly to enable me to go, you will please to order me such a sum as twenty pounds for my doing that, and to support my necessary expenses to Portsmouth and from thence onward in the voyage." He also asked Pepys to have the Duke of York, exiled in Scotland but still with some influence over the navy, write commendatory letters to the commander of the Tangier squadrons and governor of its garrison.

Pepys's commitment to being a responsive master (as best he could under straitened circumstances) held his tie to Atkins firm. The former clerk's "hard fortune I do heartily bemoan and do think myself obliged to give my assistance and everything I can towards his relief," Pepys wrote to Hewer at this time. "I say again his case deserves all manner of compassion and above all from me." The £20 came through, and Atkins went off to north Africa. There he performed creditably but faced significant discouragement from a commander antagonistic to Pepys. Atkins's desires for advancement at sea had not a ghost's chance of fulfillment unless—once again—he were to turn his coat. Of course, the test of loyalty he had already passed made this a mere open-book quiz, but the disappointment was none the easier to bear, especially since he never received any of the supportive messages sent by his master. One of these promised that
Pepys, Hewer, and even the King and York were keeping in mind Atkins's "sufferings and deservings." Pepys was as good as his word to the servant who continued suffering on his behalf in the same way that he (Pepys) was suffering on York's. Atkins sailed morosely back to England but was quickly ordered to take ship for Tangier. When he boarded, "to my great surprise . . . I found Mr. Pepys." Atkins then learned that he had—not coincidentally—been appointed secretary to Lord of Dartmouth, commander of the expedition to close the tropical base. Three months later Dartmouth, an ally of Pepys, also appointed Atkins the fleet's judge-advocate. In addition to his attendance on Dartmouth, Atkins remained in constant contact with and even service to Pepys, passing information to his master which other high-ranking personnel lacked and taking a recreational jaunt with Pepys and Hewer.

The service Atkins was furnishing on the side became full-time as soon as Pepys had the wherewithal to better reward Atkins's loyalty. The expedition completed its task in early 1684. Pepys was back in the Admiralty office almost immediately after Charles completed his reversal of the Whig takeover, and so was Atkins. But the restored Secretary of the Admiralty did not allow his patronage to rest there. During the dark days of 1681, Pepys had promised that not only he but the Duke and the King were keeping track of the ousted clerk's "sufferings," and now all three made good. On August 24,

Mr. Secretary very kindly presented a petition from us both to the Duke [of York], praying his mediation with the King, to give us £500 apiece in consideration of our sufferings . . . to which his R[oyal] H[ighness] graciously and kindly received and said as he thought it reasonable, so he would move the King for it.

"Very kind" on Pepys's part indeed, since the master could have easily justified allotting a larger amount to himself than to the servant, not only on the principle of hierarchy but also because of the kind of fiscal fact beloved to their record-keeping souls: the office Pepys had lost was worth
much more per annum than that lost by Atkins.\textsuperscript{80}

Pepys's next major (probable) attempt to reward his client's steadfastness is articulated by a series of opaque but noteworthy entries in Atkins's journal from the start of the new reign. Atkins seems to have been afforded the opportunity to become more than an assistant, had he wished. Atkins's predecessor was still chief clerk when James II ascended the throne on February 6, 1686, so that post was not yet available. On March 15, as old officials departed and new appointments were being made, Atkins noted, "the news got abroad of great alterations to be in the navy." The following day, "The news increased." The subsequent entry, for Sunday March 21, reads ambiguously, "Mr. Pepys proposed to me to be Secretary to the Navy." After staying home sick on Monday, Atkins stirred himself on Tuesday March 23 and capped the incident by noting, "I gave my answer with submission negatively."\textsuperscript{81} These terse notations are impossible to decipher clearly, but the most likely interpretation is that the position in question should actually be read as "Secretary to the Navy [Board]" and by this Atkins meant clerk of the acts, which post Pepys was offering him.\textsuperscript{82} Atkins had much to weigh. When the record states that prior to Tuesday's answer on the twenty-third Pepys's client called in sick on Monday the twenty-second, the scholar may pardonably suspect that the bureaucrat was not physically ill. The incident surely shows Pepys continuing to promote Atkins's interests to an extent commensurate with his resources. Less certain but probable given the devotion Atkins showed under the threat of the gallows was the servant's determination to stay at his master's side even at the expense of advancement. By refusing promotion to what would have been his own position of leadership and independent patronage, Atkins, whatever other factors may have tipped his scales, showed loyalty beyond the normally honorable.
Nine months later Pepys was finally able to furnish Atkins with suitable compensation, and Atkins continued rendering more than suitably faithful service. The incumbent working as the Admiralty's chief clerk died in December and Pepys promoted Atkins into the slot. In return Atkins provided the kind of administrative competence that freed Pepys to direct the massive projects of the Special Commission without worrying that business would be mishandled and reflect dishonor to the Admiralty head. Atkins now fulfilled Hewer's old role of substitute navy head when Pepys needed to travel. The new chief clerk's abilities as an executive assistant may be witnessed in one memo written when Pepys had to attend a "public council" at Windsor. Four messages needed to be sent, five commissions activated, and five warrants processed, all immediately (the commissions and one warrant were urgent), but Pepys gave no specific directions on how to do any of this. Instead he simply wrote, "all which Mr. Atkins will dispose of as they ought to be."

For Atkins's allegiance he went out with Pepys at William's coming in. Furthermore Atkins probably refused to make the political noises that would have led to quick rehabilitation but betrayed his master's previous generosity. Atkins remained in affectionate contact with Pepys and received a ring and mourning clothes at Pepys's death. In the meantime, he seems to have had to make do outside the government, despite his proven competence, until a decade later. A clue to the reason for which his reinstatement took so long lies in its notice by Narcissus Luttrell, who still described Atkins as "former clerk to secretary Pepys".

It is difficult to say how many clients aside from Hewer, Deane, and Atkins became part of a solid honor subcommunity that revolved around Pepys, but there were a number of others, though less thoroughly documented, whose loyalty endured. John Shales began cultivating Pepys
as a patron in 1664 with presents of food and small furniture; the next year the clerk of the acts
seems to have secured him the surveyorship of the victualling at Portsmouth. Shales entered the
main office in 1667 where Pepys further promoted his career. Records become scanty for Shales after
that and at some point he transferred to the army, but relations remained strong; in 1679, asked to
stand for Parliament in Portsmouth (his family may have been influential there), Shales insisted on "giv[ing] way to Mr. Pepys" because "you cannot elect a more worthy and useful gentleman". When Pepys drew up his Special Commission of 1686, he recommended Shales as no less than Hewer's equal in "extent of experience and practice, both as an accountant and otherwise through the whole duty of a navy officer". Like Shales, Richard Gibson began clerking for Pepys in 1667 (having impressed Pepys favorably with his knowledge of the purser system). He loved the sea and left the office for shipboard service at least once, but he maintained connections by sending Pepys gifts (and then returned to the office); while on shore he was one of the most alert, reliable, and hardworking servants Pepys ever had. Gibson stood by his master during the Popish Plot, a risky move because he had just reentered the navy office. At the time of the Special Commission Pepys promoted Gibson to a higher post within the board, then in September 1688 to the Admiralty, but like Deane's and Hewer's, if not so precipitately, Gibson's career withered under the sun of the Glorious Revolution with dismissal in 1693, although Pepys attempted to use whatever influence he had left on Gibson's behalf. Gibson in turn maintained a frequent correspondence with his old master, and when Pepys's old servant subsequently fell on hard times, Pepys seems to have alleviated his poverty by taking the former clerk into his household.

Mortality cut short the careers of John Walbanke and Thomas Edwards, but until then
they performed as faithfully as the rest. Walbanke clerked at the Admiralty from 1673, and
during the Popish-Plot troubles was willing to take the risk of testifying that Atkins had been at
the office during some of the time the latter was said to have undertaken his alleged
skullduggery. In the event this was not required, and despite openly defending Pepys at least
once during that period, Walbanke managed to keep his head sufficiently low as to become chief
clerk. The Whigs finally began proceedings against him too late at the Oxford Parliament, of
which events Walbanke sent Pepys an account. Atkins had to wait to become chief clerk at the
Admiralty because Pepys retained Walbanke in 1684 until the latter died in harness. Thomas
Edwards, like Hewer and Atkins, began as one of Pepys's domestics while an apprentice clerk. He made the same kinds of mistakes Hewer and Atkins had, once receiving such a blow that
Pepys missed work the next day because of hand pain, but he had ability, was persistent, and
assumed an increasing load of clerical responsibility over the latter portion of the diary. When
Edwards came of age he married Pepys's maid with their master's blessing, material as well as
verbal: altogether the Pepyses gave the newly married Edwardses £80, a considerable amount at
Edwards's level. At about the same time the new bridegroom assumed full clerical duties. Later
Pepys helped Edwards move on to shipboard posts, exerted what little influence he had for
Edwards during the Popish Plot crisis, and finally upon Edwards's early death in 1682 provided
for his family.

As Hewer, Atkins, and Edwards demonstrate, Pepys might almost be said to have worked
at establishing something of a traditional European magnate-style household in a bureaucratic
guise. Pepys's various generosities to Edwards and his family, and at his life's end, Gibson,
highlight this aspect of Pepys's patronage. Also relevant is the manner in which Pepys fostered a
number of his closest clients in his home. This was normal enough for early modern apprenticeships; what was not normal was the transition from vocational training to professional service under the same master; unless the apprentice was a blood relation to the master, or contracted a kinship tie by marrying the master's daughter, apprentices were normally on their own after completing the period of instruction. Pepys's strategy resembled rather more that of the medieval elite, whose sons and daughters went off to other noble households, served as pages or maids-in-waiting, and then (if second sons) usually stayed on as household knights. Like those young medieval males, promising youths under Pepys's roof were even trained as gentlemen of their time; Hewer, for example, was forced to practice classical Latin, while Edwards—emulating Malory's Tristan—had to learn the lute and theorbo.\textsuperscript{104} Here do we get close to being able to call Pepys's practice of honor sociability "lordship," and surely it is no coincidence that elite medieval fosterage created, as George Duby has written, "nets of deferential friendship". Yet the fidelity of clients such as Walbanke and Deane who never lived beneath Pepys's roof suggests that they would not have considered themselves excluded from this "net"; "deferential friendship" works to describe Deane's as well as Hewer's relationship with their master,\textsuperscript{105} and Atkins's too when he accompanied Pepys and Deane on their romp about the Tangier countryside.

And the tie thus created could be immensely tough, a profitable characteristic for emergent bureaucracies even in the negative. Atkins's loyalty was, in its different way, nearly as staunch as Hewer's, and the younger man's was certainly more stirring, but the factors that made it dramatic illustrated the potentially dangerous consequences of honor's reflective nature. Yet precisely because it was so worrisome, this feature of honor strengthened the office in ways
ranging from the mundane (regulating Atkins's behavior so that he would be more likely to arrive at work in the morning unimpeded by a hangover) to the critical mission of maintaining proper records as a protection against parliamentary inquiry.\textsuperscript{106}

III

All did not always go well between Pepys and his clients. This section finishes the chapter by considering what happened when the ideal broke down. Honor certainly helped bureaucracy along, but it might also hinder. The strength with which honor (doubtless as well as other factors in many cases) could bind these men together was remarkable, but those bonds could also be broken—or at least, as Thomas Hayter learned, significantly frayed. Like Hewer, Hayter was with Pepys from the beginning, and like other close clients, he lived under Pepys's roof at one point.\textsuperscript{107} Ubiquitous and efficient throughout the diary, he might have become, if not as apparently beloved as Hewer, as well-regarded as Atkins. Hayter's head start was enviable: already in 1660 Pepys "took Mr. Hayter home with me to dinner, with whom I did advise, who did give me . . . counsel".\textsuperscript{108} Hayter toiled faithfully under his master's direction until 1679, keeping orderly books and deploying an unrivaled mastery of naval records that enabled him to find specific documents quickly when on-the-spot decisions needed to be made.\textsuperscript{109} But his abilities went beyond merely collating and furnishing data when asked; he also had the insight to recognize how it should be effectively used—sometimes his exceptionally good counsel required barely a word. When potential embezzlement by pursers was ignored by other board members and slipped Pepys's normally watchful eye, "Mr. Hayter, after I was withdrawn [from the meeting], inquired of me whether I was satisfied that the King had right done to him . . . . Which hint I taking returned to
the board" and initiated an inquiry. In return for such service, Hayter received promotion at Pepys's hands, becoming Pepys's chief clerk in 1664, then in 1668 his master's patronage secured him the post of purveyor of petty emptions. In 1669 when Thomas Osborne mooted the possibility of Pepys's ascension to Comptroller but was uncertain who else could effectively do Pepys's current job, "I did bring in Tom Hayter to be the fittest man". Hayter also received protection against a variety of accusations, one for outright theft of His Majesty's stores to the tune of bail at £100. Hayter even remained loyal during the earliest stresses of the Popish Plot, helping Pepys with his legal issues at the outset.

Until this point the English naval bureaucracy had undeniably benefitted from Pepys and Hayter's pairing, but the storyline of the loyal Pepys client with which we have become familiar was about to twist its plot. Hayter proved unequal to the mounting pressure and ultimately bowed with the wind. Instead of being sucked into the whirlpool that dragged down Pepys, Deane, Atkins, and Hewer, Hayter succeeded his master as Secretary of the Admiralty, and while demoted from that top post the following year, he remained a well-placed official. But the reciprocity of honor held in the negative as well as the positive: betrayal would not be dealt with kindly. After Pepys was rehabilitated, Hayter found himself pointedly excluded from the Special Commission. Lucky to retain employment in an ad-hoc body created for the purpose of straightening out the accounts of the previous naval administration (which Pepys claimed were disorganized), Hayter reciprocated for his disloyalty in the only way he could: he apologized profusely for having ever trespassed against the secretary. The apology, and doubtless Hayter's usual excellent work, appear to have brought him back into the fold. When the auditing commission finished its work, Pepys put him back in his former post, and he is likely to have
been the "T.H." who praised Pepys as the most honorable of naval patrons. "[C]oncerning himself so much and so often in the behalf of petitioning seamen", Pepys had "speedily righted" their wrongs "without any fee of office expected or paid". The text contains more in that vein, but then betrayal would require a good deal of balancing out.\footnote{115}

Hayter died shortly after William landed, so how he and Pepys would have fared going forward remains a matter for speculation, but James Southerne answered the same question definitively in the negative. Until the Glorious Revolution he paralleled Hayter's trajectory: a clerk for Coventry in the Admiralty at the diary's start, Southerne immediately began to rise by Pepys's hand when the latter moved to the Admiralty in 1673 (no sooner was Pepys put in than Southerne received £200 at York's request).\footnote{116} In 1677 Pepys promoted him out of the nest into the joint clerkship of the acts on the Navy Board.\footnote{117} But in 1679 Southerne, like Hayter, kept his post instead of being pulled down with the others; and unlike Walbanke, Southerne seems to have provided information of some sort to those bent on Pepys's ruin.\footnote{118} At the time of the Special Commission, Southerne joined Hayter in the doldrums of reordering the previous books but was likewise reinstated at the commission's end. Although there is no record that Southerne followed Hayter's example of contrition, it is reasonable to assume that he did beg Pepys's pardon at the time; some gesture would certainly have been necessary after the type of betrayal he seems to have carried out.

In this case, however, the solidarities of honor dissolved. Whatever repentance Southerne pretended was feigned. It is tempting to suspect that he may have been a Whig mole in the navy administration, for he soon became Secretary of the Admiralty under William and Mary—a huge step forward for someone whose highest previous post had been clerk of the acts.\footnote{119} At any rate,
Pepys's language makes it clear that Southerne had abandoned his patron. "However unnatural it may seem", the former wrote in 1691, Southerne no longer "remember[s] himself to have been my servant," even though "by me (and me alone) raised to the condition of a master in the navy". Of all those "under this Revolution", Southerne was the one who had "shown me not only most neglect but most despite on all occasions wherein my name has been made use of".120

Deliberate faithlessness clearly merited apposite repercussions, but Josiah Burchett learned that deleterious mistakes made without such intent could incur the same result. Burchett was one of the special clients who started with Pepys as a domestic servant. Soon afterward he served as Pepys's personal secretary on the Tangier expedition, then worked for Pepys in the Admiralty office.121 Later, a highly successful career as Secretary of the Admiralty after the Glorious Revolution demonstrated that he was precisely Pepys's kind of man, thorough, dedicated to his work, and efficient. Pepys seems to have valued him highly. However, in 1687 Pepys uncovered what he judged incontrovertible evidence that Burchett had taken outright bribes, something that his master had always been careful to avoid (at least in appearance) even in the early, less prosperous years of the diary.122 The line separating acceptable gratuity from reprehensible bribery was murky in early modern England,123 but Burchett crossed a line which, at least to Pepys, was clear enough. Burchett hoped that Pepys might allow him to become a sailor (probably as a reformado, as Atkins had done about a decade earlier), but Pepys ceased all communication, turning an icy shoulder to his erstwhile clerk's impassioned pleas for even this minimal pardon. In light of Burchett's abject verbal prostration, this was a harsh stance: "I most humbly crave pardon for what I have done amiss . . . . for God's sake, consider that necessity will catch at anything wherein there is the least show of hope"; "For God's sake, sir, grant me this and

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I'll most thankfully own it as long as I live"; or, "May not your anger be a little mitigated . . . [so]
that I may at least not find you a bar to my getting a livelihood elsewhere . . . [please] forward a
poor young man who is entirely at a loss to keep himself, rather than pull him backwards." By the
first half of 1688 he was imploring Thomas Edwards's widow Jane to intercede for him. "I would
gladly do anything that might procure me but never so small a portion of his favour," he wrote
her. "For God's sake be my solicitor." Burchett was, very fortunately, finally able to secure a post
during the defensive buildup of late 1688, but this seems to have been obtained behind Pepys's
back, Mr. Secretary not finding out until the young man had already been signed aboard. At that
point Burchett begged that Pepys refrain from forcing the captain to revoke the berth, then made
a last-ditch appeal for reinstatement at the office. But failing that—"if . . . never so sincere
repentance nor earnest prayers can purchase your pardon and the honour of your service
[now]"—he promised to demonstrate penitence during the voyage, on which "it shall be my
chiefest care that my behaviour be such as may recommend me (at my return) to your honour's
favour." 124

Pepys's unyielding stance toward Burchett constitutes the most pitiless treatment he gave
to any of his closer clients, yet for England's navy Burchett's brutal shaming may have been a
boon. To a modern eye Pepys emerges from this episode as heartless, even cruel, but we should
remember the second chances he gave Hayter and Southerne. There is a strong possibility that
Burchett truly went beyond the pale. Such conduct (depending, of course, on what kind of action
it was) could well have been of the variety that would disrupt bureaucratic functioning.
Rectification might be helpful. If this scenario is correct, Burchett's subsequent career of
outstanding and unmarred excellence—until the post's termination in the mid-nineteenth century
the longest-running Secretary for the Admiralty, the navy's anchor throughout the great wars of
William and Anne—shows that the lesson Pepys gave him, while doubtless bitterly resented, was
far from wasted.¹²⁵

As an honorable master Pepys worried about the discredit that a poorly performing
servant could track muddily in through the front door. In return for his favor he expected his
wishes to be observed even to the extent of a household curfew and moral behavior (or at least its
appearance). He construed disregard for his desires as a personal betrayal. He seems to have
followed an unwritten rule that unproven servants might receive a reprieve or two (perhaps more
if other "solidarities of honor" such as close kinship were present¹²⁶) before being turned out, but
once Pepys decided that servants were irredeemably unworthy, honor's reflective character led
him to be merciless. Those whom he observed to take the same kind of "pains" as himself over
the navy's paperwork could expect more leeway: as long as mistakes did not approach the
egregious level of Burchett's, blunders that might bring shame were balanced by the successes
that brought honor. Clients who could strike that balance, or weigh more heavily on the side of
success, received Pepys's ongoing reprimands, his protection, his largess. This included bringing
them under the umbrella of his own lord's protection: James II's Secretary of the Admiralty led all
of his handpicked special commissioners into individual audiences with the King in which the
ruler of England, Scotland and Ireland personally assured them of his full support.¹²⁷ If these
audiences were not quite "countenancings" because not public, their character as simultaneously
intimate and ritualistic would probably still have impressed; the King was still bestowing favor,
and that surely would have stimulated at least some of the commissioners to greater effort. No
less importantly, James's extension of lordship to them, even if most of the time they still
reported directly to Pepys, gave them greater power and resources with which to achieve their goals. It was not due solely to method and number that the Special Commission succeeded; it was driven, at least in part, by the stimulus of personal honor and by the personalized lordship of the realm's first gentleman.

At a slightly less exalted level, Pepys felt his patronage to be a lifelong commitment if properly reciprocated. Under pressure to sever relations with a victualing contractor in 1668, the Duke of York "did openly [reply] . . . that he was not for removing of old servants that have done well, neither in this place, nor in any other place"—to which Pepys added the gloss, "very nobly said." He had the right, for he lived that principle. And not just one of his servants but several responded with a kind of devotion which—much like Pepys's own to Charles and James II—looked not forward to even the most sincere twenty-first-century office worker's less tightly bound loyalties, but backward to the ideal medieval retainer's, unto death. And this fidelity translated into bureaucracy's profit. When Richard Gibson recognized how government standardization might serve honor (he described how the currently haphazard hiring, certification, and compensation of pilots "might be reduced in a great measure to a certainty, thereby righting the King, and the reputation of the office" he was not the only one singing that song. Deane's support for Pepys's thirty new ships, the "calculations" and the "degree of exactness" coming to be so prized in England on the cusp of the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution, were supported by the diction of medieval knighthood. That diction was made flesh in the relationships that sustained Pepys in his endeavor to materialize Deane's "quantity" and "weight" into a navy that would befit the honor of a king. Pepys may not have felt the king who eventually used it to truly be his, but for England it was the result that mattered. For that
navy, with a few further additions, would soon help William III stop Louis XIV in his tracks.
Notes to Chapter 3

1 Bryant 2:85.

2 Knighton 36.

3 *Diary* 1 Jan. 1660, 3. On January 5 he again visited his parents and was also invited to the next day's lunch (the day's main meal, "dinner") by "cousin Tho. Pepys", a well-off merchant and Commissioner of Assessment and the militia for Westminster; with the exception of a simulated venison pasty, the meal proved "very good": 5 and 6 Jan., 9. The resort of even such a local worthy as Thomas to simulated venison makes Sandwich's gift to Pepys of the real thing, bestowed during the same period (Chapter 2), a signal testament to Pepys's standing with the earl. (I am grateful to Derek Hirst for calling my attention to this point.) Later that night he had supper and participated in a Twelfth Night celebration at the dwelling of "my cousin Stradwick" with "my father, mother, brothers, and sister, my cousin Scot and his wife, Mr. Drawwater and his wife and her brother, Mr. Stradwick." (6 Jan., 10) While Pepys was at work on January 7 he received a visit from Jane Turner, her daughter Theophila, and another cousin, Joyce Norton, whom he took home for a mid-day meal of "steaks and a rabbit." (7 Jan., 10) On January 8 Pepys and his wife had Sunday dinner with his parents, after which Pepys visited cousin Jane and then returned to his parents' home to say goodbye before returning to his own dwelling (8 Jan., 11). The next day his brother Thomas carried a letter to the post for him, and Pepys also worried about his inability to pay debts immediately due "by reason of my money being in my uncle's hands" (Robert Pepys; 9 Jan., 11). January 11 saw Pepys's father visit his son at the customs office, after which Samuel walked his patriarch over to the home of his cousin Mary Joyce (11 Jan., 15); the following night his brother Thomas dropped by to discuss Pepys's "intention to feast the Joyces" and Samuel "sent for a bit of meat for him from the cook's." (12 Jan., 15-16) Pepys and his brother John spent the afternoon of 15 January reading together (15 Jan., 18). Thereafter Pepys's employments kept him focused on other matters for some days, but after a week he resumed the rounds to his relations (22 Jan., 25-26; 24 Jan., 27). He then topped off the month by using the resources of his patron Sandwich to treat his father, brother, an uncle and two cousins with their wives, and another Mountagu client at "my lord's lodgings where my wife had got ready a very fine dinner—viz. a dish of marrow bones; a leg of mutton; a loin of veal; a dish of fowl, three pullets, and two dozen of larks all in a dish; a great tart, a neats tongue, a dish of anchovies; a dish of prawns and cheese." (26 Jan., 29)

4 Snobbishness was the negative side of the honor attendant upon Pepys's rise for at least some of his relatives. After his aunt Fenner died, his uncle remarried a midwife "illbred" of "sorry mean people" whom it shamed the diarist to own: *Diary* 19 and 23 Jan. 1662, 3:13 and 16, quotations in latter. He tried to have as little contact as possible with this type of relation. When a less well-off aunt had been "been long in town" he deliberately waited until her stay was nearly over to pay her a visit, "but did find none of them within, which I was glad of": 29 May 1663, 4:164.
Honorable men, of course, were not the only ones upon whom such an orientation was incumbent, but the way in which Pepys handled the relationship with his father indicated a scrupulously courteous restraint not evinced on the other side, a restraint the more remarkable given diary entries attesting to the vexations sometimes caused by the older man: see e.g. 10 Feb. 1664, 5:44. His father's epistolary style ran to expostulations that no gentleman, however impecunious, would have sent his son. When Samuel seemed to be seriously ill, John wrote, "For godsake let me beg of you that you will have . . . some able doctor [tend you] . . . with as much speed as you can. And to beg a blessing from the lord that your life may be preserved for what a sad condition should your poor old father and mother be in if the lord should take you before us." (John Pepys Sr. to SP, 10 Jul. 1664, in Family 13) In marked contrast, the younger Pepys's prose exhibited straightforward candor but was always framed with the careful regard of filial courtesy, "it being the greatest wish I have in the world, that by my advice and purse . . . I may be able to assist you in making such provision for you as may enable you to pass the remainder of your time with a sufficiency of estate and ease." (SP to John Pepys Sr., 16 May 1663, in Family 3, and in the same vein over a decade later see SP to John Pepys, Sr., 1 Sept. 1677, in FC 305) When his father reproached him for not writing often enough to his sister in 1677 (in the midst of his fight to convince Parliament of the necessity for his 30 new ships, for which see below), Pepys acknowledged his failing with no sign of the backhanded attack he had by then honed to a fine edge. "[T]ruly Sir" he responded, "[the fault] does not arise from any defect in my duty to you, or unkindness to her, but from the misfortune I lie under of not being able to write with my own eyes, without a great deal of pain." He proceeded to humbly promise that it would not happen again: "Sir for the future I will take care that either from myself or from one of my clerks my sister shall hear weekly from me" (20 Jun. 1677, in Family 52). Three years later, at the height of his Popish Plot troubles, out of prison but still in danger of his life, frantically drawing up his defense, Pepys apologetically mentioned his problems to his father "only to excuse to you my being yet no frequenter [i.e. no more frequent] in my letters": 30 Aug. 1679, in Family 91. Further instances of Pepys's care for his parents (and siblings) may be found in Bryant 1:149.

Pepys took Paulina into his household as a servant until her mismanagement preyed so upon his orderly bent that he felt forced to let her go, but he did not actually do so until he had somewhere to put her: his uncle Robert, dying in July 1661, left the small yeomen's property of Brampton (two miles southwest of Huntingdon) to Pepys's father with a reversion to Samuel after his father's death. Pepys footed the bill for the funeral and the inevitable legal wrangling with Robert's mother and her children. After the estate was settled, Pepys's father and mother retired there and took Paulina with them. For Robert and the Brampton property, see Diary 6 Jul. 1661, 2:132-33, and vol. 10, Companion, s.v. "Brampton, Hunts." the legal troubles began immediately (8-13 Jul., 134-35, and 16-21 Jul., 136-38) and were not resolved for several years. For Paulina as Pepys's servant and for her subsequent departure with their parents, see Bryant 1:151-6 and Tomalin 118 and 129.

For Paulina's marriage, see Diary 7 Feb. 1668, 9:56; 8 Feb., 58; 12, 64-65; 2 Mar., 100; and 24 May, 210-11. For her husband's death and Pepys's subsequent care for her and her children, see in Family SP to Nicholas Pedley, 26 Oct. 1680, 171; SP to Paulina Jackson, 29 Apr. 1682, 203-4; SP to Roger Pepys, 26 Mar. 1681, 177-8; and the correspondence between Mr. [John] Matthews
and SP, 177-97, *passim*.

8 For Samuel Jackson's adulthood, see Tomalin, *Unequalled Self*, 337, 347, 363-4, and 367. For Pepys's anger at Samuel's "dishonour," see SP, codicil to will, 2 Aug. 1701, in *Pepysiana Appendix 1*, 260. Pepys nonetheless left Samuel an annuity of £40, a paltry sum at Pepys's level but an income equivalent to that of many yeomen (for the annual take of yeomen in seventeenth-century England, see Wrightson, *English Society*, 33). For John Jackson, see Tomalin, *Unequalled Self*, 337, 347, 348, and 367. He also did his best to find his spendthrift brother Thomas a wife with a decent dowry: Bryant 1:157 and 189.

9 John Jackson to SP, 24 Feb. 1687, *Family* 210. For more distant relations see the instance of one Porter, a cousin's husband: *Diary* 10 Aug. 1665, 4:186-87, and for the assistance, Bryant 2:203. For additional examples see note concerning Pepys's insistence on merit (below) as well as Tomalin, *Unequalled Self*, 129, on which page also find the quotation on Pepys's sense of duty to his line.

10 Recall the case of his nephew Samuel, as well as the note above concerning Pepys's embarrassment at being seen with insufficiently cultured relations. His qualifying number of male relatives who wanted to enter naval service would likely have been minuscule because his extended family had more elite landowning branches than most (see Chapter 2). Therefore members who were sufficiently educated to meet his criteria would have had plenty of other options.

11 James 272-73.

12 Samuel "corrected" a speech John was about to make in competition for a monetary award given by St. Paul's School, from which John had just graduated, to those going on to Oxford or Cambridge. Later, Samuel helped revise the speech yet again as well as seeking advice for John concerning the award from the High Master of St. Paul's. John ultimately proved successful: *Diary* 9 Jan. 1660, 1:11-12; 15 Jan., 18; 24 Jan., 27; and 8 Feb., 46. As an example of Samuel's initial commitment to his brother, see his visit to John during the latter's first week at Cambridge when the diarist left him 10 shillings: 26 Feb., 1660 1:69.

13 For the clerkship of the acts, see *Cat.* 1:40. For the breach, see *Diary* 19 Mar. 1664, 5:91; 15 Oct., 298; and 22 Jun. 1665, 6:134. For its repair, see 28 Apr. 1666, 7:111-12; 17 June, 170; 7-8 Feb. 1667, 8:48-49. Support for the rest of this paragraph comes from *Family*: for the Trinity House clerkship, see SP to John Pepys Jr., 26 Mar. 1670, 16, and also n. 1; for John's "diligence," see Helen Truesdell Heath, editor's introduction, *Family xxi*; for Trinity House's reputation, SP To John Pepys Jr., 30 Sept. 1674, *Family* 31; for John's aid to family, see John Pepys Jr. to John Pepys Sr., 12 Mar. 1674, 29 (the legal expenses were related to the Brampton lawsuits, for which see note above), and for another example see John Pepys Sr. to John Pepys Jr., 18 Jul. 1676, 41. For examples of Samuel asking John to do official business, see John Pepys Jr. to SP, 4 Apr. 1676, 31; SP to John Pepys Jr., 11 Oct. 1676, 43-44; and 25 Oct. 1676, 45. For family business, see John Pepys Jr., "Memorandum [to] My Brother Jackson" (containing a list of their brother-in-
law John Jackson's problems, with proposed solutions), 6 Nov. 1676, 45-6, and "Notes on Ellington" (the farmland leased by Jackson), n.d. but probably 1676, 47.


15 For St. Michel in Holland, see Diary 3 and 10 Feb. 1644, 5:37 and 44, and 26 June 1665, 6:140; for the approach to Monck and the marks of his favor, see Diary 19 Oct. 1665, 6:271 and 4 Dec., 318. The Life Guards were part of the force allowed the King as a bodyguard at the Restoration, soon to be renamed the Coldstream Guards.

16 For the position as squadron muster-master, see Diary 13 Apr. 1666, 7:97; For the help of Coventry as well as Pepys's request to Harman quoted below, see SP to John Harman, 28 Apr. 1666, in FC 131. Cf. also the attempt to secure Prince Rupert’s help: SP to James Hayes [Rupert’s secretary], 7 Jul. 1666, in FC 137; leave from the Life Guards, 1 Apr., 87; Pepys's self-satisfaction, 28 Apr., 111.

17 James 339.

18 For the position at Deal see St. Michel to SP, 11 Jun. 1670, in Family 17. It appears that a dockyard was not established at Deal until 1672: Brian Lavery, Nelson’s Navy: The Ships, Men, and Organisation, 1793-1815, Rev. ed. (London, UK: Conway Maritime Press, 1989), 236. However, because the Downs were the hub of English maritime commerce, the navy had much business at the spot, especially rendezvousing with convoys, and had maintained an onshore office there from the Interregnum: J. D. Davies, Pepys’s Navy: Ships, Men and Warfare 1649-89 (Seaforth Publishing, 2008): 195. St. Michel may have functioned as muster-master as early as August1668, as a brief letter to Pepys at that time shows him in Deal taking musters: see BSM to SP, 8 Aug., CSPD 1667-68, 525. For the post of deputy commissioner see St. Michel to SP, 11 Sept. 1672, in Family 21.

19 For Pepys’s long effort to secure Balthasar’s post, see Bryant 2:333.

20 24 Sept. 1680, in Family 165-8.

21 BSM to SP, 9 Mar. 1682, in Family 200. For similar letters, in same source, see 5 Mar. 1682, 197, and 27 Jun. 1683, 205; St. Michel's complaints may have had substance; when Pepys sailed to Tangier in 1683 he noted evidence of "hard usage", TP 14 Sept. 1683, 16.

22 For St. Michel's unlooked-for return to England, see Mr. Hunter to SP, 14 Jul. 1681, in Family 181 and the second paragraph of 21 Apr. 1681, in Family 179; for his hurried departure back to Tangier, BSM to SP, 9 Mar. 1682, in Family 201.
For Pepys's attempt to increase St. Michel's salary, see Bryant 2:333. For Shere, see St. Michel to SP, 4 Nov. 1680, in *Family* 173; payment of St. Michel's wages, SP to the Commissioners of the Navy, 24 Mar. 1681, in *Family* 176; Pepys's assistance to Balthasar in England, SP to St. Michel, 7 Jan. 1682, in *Family* 195.

For Pepys's efforts on St. Michel's behalf after the destruction of Tangier, Bryant 3:88. Balthasar was taken to "kiss the King's hand" as one of the members of the Special Commission on 14 Mar. 1686: *SC* 183. For St. Michel's "industry" and "faithfulness," see *Cat.* 1:73.

For the falling-out between Pepys and St. Michel as well as the formal petition, see BSM to SP, 28 May 1689, in *Family* 223-4; for the letters concerning St. Michel's employment directly following the Glorious Revolution, see SP to Richard Haddock, 21 Apr. 1689, and SP to John Lowther, 9 May 1689, both in *Family* 224-5; for an honor-based plea for reconciliation by St. Michel and Pepys's probable relenting along with material aid in some form, see BSM to SP, 22 Jul. and 6 Aug. 1689, in *Family* 226-7 and 228; for thanks and a request for additional favors, see BSM to SP, 20 Mar. 1692, in *Family* 229.


See Chapter 4.

For the privateer, see Helen Truesdell Heath, editor's introduction to *Family* xxv.

For Pepys's injunction that St. Michel restrain himself, see SP to BSM, 29 Aug. 1675, in *Family* 36. The "trouble" his and Deane's errant privateer had caused Pepys was stirred up when the English ambassador to France seems to have learned about one of these English prizes taken by the *Hunter* to a French port. After he urged the French court to release the ship, his request was allegedly refused at the behest of Charles himself, whereupon the ambassador asked to be recalled to England because "he could serve no longer with honour after he had been so disowned". Whatever the truth behind this story, Burnet laid the incident at Pepys's door: Gilbert Burnet, *Burnet's History of My Own Time*, ed. Airy Osmund, vol. 2 (Clarendon Press, 1900), 94-95. The issue would rear its head again in 1679: see *DoC* 20 May 1679, 7:303, 305-6, 310, and same date, *JoC* 9:628. For Balthasar's initial approach to Pepys concerning the later "quarrel" (in which Balthasar, as muster-master of the Deal yard, sought to use his influence in the navy to the advantage of one party in a lawsuit), see SP to BSM, 13 Aug. 1675, in *FC* 281-2; for details, see Heath, editor's introduction to *Family* xxiv.

For worry about St. Michel's performance in Monck's regiment, see *Diary* 4 Dec. 1665, 4:318; For St. Michel's faithfulness at Tangier see BSM to SP in *Family*: 9 Mar. 1682, 199. From same to same, and from same source, for additional examples see St. Michel's assertion that he achieved good results "as well to my own honor as [my] friends[']" (i.e., Pepys's, 21 Apr. 1680, 179); St. Michel's claim to "have performed with true faithfulness and honor both to your dear self, and his majesty's service" (24 Sept. 1680, 165-8); "[I] never yet dishonoured you" (27 Jun. 1683, 205); and finally during the time of the Special Commission, "I shall perform my duty with care, diligence, faithfulness, to . . . my benefactor's honour" (24 Jan. 1687, 207).

For St. Michel's ongoing industry, see *Diary* 12 Apr. 1667, 8:165 and 4 May 1668, 9:185, quotation in former.

All material in this paragraph is from *Family*. For the examples of Pepys's satisfaction with St. Michel's performance, see SP to BSM, 11 Jan. 1675, 10 Jul. 1676, and 23 Jan. 1677, respectively on 32, 40, and 50-51. See also Hewer's report on the eve of the Glorious Revolution that St. Michel was conducting warship inspections with exemplary care: *Family* 213 n. 1. For a report by Balthasar as he conducted the inspections at issue, see BSM to SP, 21 Nov. 1688, in *Family* 217-8.

For the binding of the documents from France (with related material Pepys had gathered from other sources as well) see entry for "Mornamont" in Robert Latham, ed., *Catalogue of the Pepys Library at Magdalene College, Cambridge* (Cambridge: Totowa, N.J: D.S. Brewer; Rowman & Littlefield, 1978). The rest of the material in this paragraph is in *Family*: For Pepys's gratitude to Balthasar, see SP to BSM, 21 Jul. 1679, 77; 18 Sept. 1679, 97; and 30 Oct. 1679, 122; for many similar if briefer expressions, see the entire selection of letters covering St. Michel's activity in France from SP to BSM, 7 Jul. 1679 through 4 Mar. 1680, 69-154 passim. For example, 29 Sept. 1679 praises Balthasar for doing such a good job that no "sober man" could now believe the accusations once they came to trial (104). For the disappearance of the main witness against Pepys, see 30 Oct. 1679, 123, and 13 Nov. 1679, 132.

The potential for negative reflection from servant to master is also illustrated by an amusing passage in which Pepys forewarned his favorite clerk William Hewer to guard himself from accusations of bribery after Pepys himself had been so accused. While Pepy's solicitude for Hewer cannot be doubted, it has a rather different cast in this instance. Pepys began glossing his warning to Hewer with, "I should for his sake as well [as]," and then corrected his Freudian slip by continuing, "or more then for my own, be sorry for": *Diary* 25 Feb. 1668, 9:91. See below for discussion of Pepys and Hewer's relationship.

See Bryant 2:59 for the sailor’s pay ticket and similar requests for Pepys’s help; Pepys's self-congratulation at good nature, *Diary* 24 Sept. 1662, 3:205. This reputation persisted, if marginalia in a book dedicated to Pepys may be trusted: he is praised as "regarding the poor with a piteous eye" by a reader in one of the British Library’s copies of Pierre Muret, *Rites of Funeral Ancient and Modern in Use Through the Known World*, trans. P[aul] Lorrain (London: Rich. Royston, 1683), reported in *Pepysiana* 56 (although it is possible that this was penciled in by the translator himself, whom Pepys had taken on as personal secretary during the Popish-Plot defense and continued until 1698).

For the storekeeper's clerk see *Diary* 16 Feb. 1664, 5:50 and SP to Peter Pett, 16 Feb. 1664, in *FC* 14-15; for a similar example see SP to [Thomas] Wilson, 14 Oct. 1668 in *FC* 195.
For Hewer's retort invoking slavery, see *Diary* 24 Feb. 1662, 3:35; bad company, 10 May 1661, 2:97; the indoor hat, 20 Oct. 1661, 2:199; drinking, 6 Jan. 1662, 3:5; the ear-boxing, 8 Jun. 1662, 3:105; and see also the incidents on 27 Aug. 1662, 3:180 or 31 May 1663, 4:166, when Hewer's pertly "indifferent" response to a command earned him another box on the ear.

For an amusing comment on Hewer's real talents, and primacy in dirty and imaginative dealing (though the source cannot, of course, be wholly trusted), see Anon., *A Hue & Cry After P. and H.; And, Plain Truth* ([London] In the Savoy: [s.n.], 1679). I am indebted to Derek Hirst for this reference. See note below for the context of this pamphlet.

Hewer quickly began to give administrative satisfaction: see e.g., *Diary* 27 Jul. 1660, 1:209; 16 Mar. 1661, 2:54-55; 23 Jun. 1662, 3:119, and ff. until the diary's end. For an example of its continuation, see *NWB* 3 Jul. 1669, 235-6. In the diary Pepys makes only one complaint about Hewer's office capability, poor spelling (5 Feb. 1668, 9:53), but later samples of Hewer's correspondence show that this was not a lasting deficit. For Pepys's protection in the office, see *Diary* 23 May 1663, 4:152 (for Mennes, who was navy comptroller, see Chapters 4 and 5), and see also Penn's futile 1662 attempt to undermine Pepys's trust in Hewer (Chapter 4). Hewer eventually moved out of Pepys's home: Norman, "Pepys and Hewer," 55. For social gatherings and reciprocal meals, a few examples among many may be found in *Diary* 16 June 1665, 6:130 (Hewer providing sleeping quarters for Pepys's visiting mother); 6 June 1666, 7:152 (Hewer hosting "a very fine supper"); 8 Jul. 1666, 7:198 (Pepys hosting); 11 Aug. 1667, 8:382 ("W Hewers took us unito his lodging, which is very handsome, and there did treat us very highly with cheesecakes, cream, tarts, and other good things"); 25 Aug., 400 (Pepys hosting). For the marriage proposal, see *Diary* 16 Jan. 1667, 8:17; for the locket, 2 Jan. 1668, 9:7; Hewer as marriage counselor, 19-30 Nov. 1668, 9:367-79 passim; paperwork on diary's last day, 31 May 1669, 9:564.

*A Hue & Cry* makes this clear.

For the Admiralty move, see *AO* 2. For Hewer running the Admiralty during Pepys's 1674 vacation, see WH to Captain Griffith and WH to Captain Country, both 25 Aug. 1674 in *Cat.* 2:347, and for the 1679 absence, Hewer to Sir Richard Rooth, 18 Feb. 1679, NMM AGC/5/2. For Hewer's probable dismissal with Pepys, see *AO*. For the Tangier position, see Warrant to William Hewer, Treasurer of Tangier, 13 Aug. 1680, in CSPD 1679-80, 603.

For the Admiralty The court granted bail on 9 July 1679: *King's Bench* 47 and 49. For housing Pepys, see Bryant 2:277; Norman, "Pepys and Hewer," 60; and WH to SP, 16 Nov. 1680, qtd in Norman, 63. For Pepys's gratitude, see SP to BSM, 14 Jul. 1679, in *Family* 74. For Hewer's correspondence and other aid during Pepys's absences, see Bryant 2:340-2 and letters quoted in Norman, "Pepys and Hewer," 60-3. For Hewer's support of Pepys in court, see *King's Bench* 27 Jan. 1680, 53.

For Hewer's help with John James as well as some confederates, see *Proceedings* 27 and 30 Jan. 1680, 74-7 and 77; 4 Feb., 79; 5, 80-1; 29, 82; Mar. 5, 83-4; 6, 84; 11, 87; 131, 91; 14, 92;
16, 96; 17, 96-7; 18, 98; 19, 98-9; and 10 Apr., 104. For the sensitive papers see WH to SP, 2 Nov. 1680, qtd. in Norman, *Pepys and Hewer*, 61.

45 For the pamphlets, see *A Hue & Cry After P. and H.; And, Plain Truth. Plain Truth* appeared first on 13 October 1679 and was thereafter reissued with *Hue and Cry* at around December 17 (Bryant 2:282 and 302). The two officials were portrayed as gleefully diverting money from the naval budget into their own pockets by such underhanded means as defrauding poor sailors of their pay (e.g. 2). In *Proceedings* for the kidnaping attempt see 8 Mar. 1680, 84-5 and 14 Mar., 92, and for the possibility that the Whigs had "designs" upon Hewer, 24 Jan. 1680, 73.

46 See Dartmouth to SP, 11 Jan. 1684, printed in *TP* xxxiv, and numerous entries therein, e.g. *TP* 30 Sept. 1683, 31; 7 Oct., 38; 18 Oct., 44; or 20 Nov., 169 (misdated, as they did not leave for Spain until December), or n.d., 180.


50 For the importance of blood in the theory of medieval and early modern honor, see James 272-3, 276-7, and 325.

51 For Deane's initial approach to Pepys see *Diary* 12 and 18 Aug. 1662, 3:163 and 169-70; for the model, 29 Sept., 208; and for further early association, in 1663 see 20 Jan., 4:19; 19 Mar., 79; 5 May, 124; 26 May, 157; 3 Jun., 172; and ff. For Pepys's deliberate program of self-education in technical details related to the navy, see Chapter 2.

52 For the early office defense, see 14 Nov 1663, 4:381 (for Batten's position see note in Chapter 2). For Deane's promotion to master shipwright, see A. W. Johns, “Sir Anthony Deane,” *Mariner's Mirror* 11 (1925): 168-9. For the revelation of the competing ship design, see SP to AD, 14 Mar. 1665, in *SL* 35-7.

53 "Men of honor could (and did) lie, cheat, deceive, plot, treason, seduce, and commit adultery, without incurring dishonor." (James 339)

54 SP to AD, 8 Mar. 1666, in *FC* 122-3. Similar conduct earned the Harwich storekeeper (also surnamed Taylor), an erstwhile ally and then enemy of Deane's in this matter, a similar rebuke, with the reminder that Pepys had heretofore been a good master but that the storekeeper was
proving himself a disloyal servant through inconstant (and therefore by definition dishonorable) conduct: "I bear you very real friendship, and that which both hath and shall be useful to you if occasion comes, but I must advise you to apply yourself first to the full mastering of your own business, and then it will be time enough to employ your observation on other men's, it being no graceful alteration in you that in so little time you should contract a friendship with an equal to the vilifying of a superior officer (and both strangers), and in a little while after that magnify the latter as you do now and quarrel with the former": SP to Silas Taylor, 13 Mar. 1666, in FC 124. On the general issue of examining and punishing errant underlings, see BHJ 5 Feb. 1670, 384-6.

The fundamental conflict in the dockyard seems to have lain between Deane and Commissioner Taylor, the storekeeper and others acting the part of allies to one party or the other, and the matter blew over when the two principles settled their differences: SP to AD, 1 Nov. 1666, FC, 145-6; SP to John Taylor, 22 Nov. 1666, in FC 154-5.

SP to AD, 25 Feb. 1669, in FC 223. For a similar dynamic, though concerning a different issue, earlier in the month see Pepys's thanks for a report describing the effect of the Navy's funding problems on local dockyards: "I am particularly satisfied in that instance which you give us of the ill consequence of our bad payments": SP to AD, 3 Feb. 1669, in FC 219.

Diary 19 May 1666, 7:127.

For an example of Deane's support following the Second Dutch War, see e.g. Diary 20 Oct. 1667, 8:489-90 (see Chapter 4 for more discussion of these events). For the promotion at Portsmouth, see Johns, "Sir Anthony," 173; for the knighthood, 181-3.


In preliminary form this is probably the "sheet of paper" Dean speaks of in a February 1674 letter "to demonstrate the King’s charge last year . . . and what sum must be produced in case of action or new buildings, having gone through it by individual parts." See AD to SP, 23 Feb. 1674, PL 2265/63ii as well as SP to AD, 17 Mar. 1674, in Cat. 2:278, almost certainly a response to Deane’s letter of approximately 3 weeks prior. See also SP to AD, 14 Apr. 1674, in Cat. 2:291-2.

The MP’s request for figures is in John Wright to AD, 21 Feb. 1674, PL 2265/63iv.

AD to John Wright, 24 Feb. 1674, PL 2265/63 iii, f. 1. For the pas d'armes see Maurice Keen, Chivalry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 201-210.

For an overview of Pepys’s several-years-long battle for naval restoration and buildup see Cat. 1:43-55. For Deane’s standardization of ship size, see Johns, "Sir Anthony," 185-6.

For Deane’s imprisonment alongside Pepys see King's Bench 20 May 1679,42, and for release on bail, 9 Jul., 49; see also the account in Bryant 2:266-76. For contact during 1681-85, see index entries for Deane in NM and correlate them with the editor’s chronology on x-xi, and see also SP to AD, 23 Aug. 1683, cited in Bryant 2:401.

See Knighton 150; C.S. Knighton, editor's introduction to SC, 176; and Cat. 1:75-8.

The lord treasurer was startled into an indignant outburst at the amount: SC 5 Feb. 1686, 181 and 13 Mar., 182; “the less to shock his brethren” over the size of Deane's compensation package, half of it was paid through a separate account justified in terms of extra duty: 14 Mar. 1686, 182.

Although Pepys neglected to mention Deane with Hewer in the Memoires, (see above), the omission may have been inadvertent since in the notes for his planned naval history Pepys wrote that the commission's work had been "upheld by 2 of the number only, namely, Sir A. Deane and Mr. Hewer": NM 1690, 278.

For Deane's role on the commission, see Johns, "Sir Anthony," 190; for the second round of jail time, see citations for Pepys's first imprisonment after the Glorious Revolution in Chapter 2. For the 1690 dinner, see 7 Mar. 1690 in John Evelyn, Diary, ed. E. S. de Beer (London, UK: Oxford University Press, 1959), 920. For Deane’s snippets of oceanic information ca. 1692-3, see NM 274, 284, 288-9 (for the dating of these "minutes", see editors introduction, x-xi). For the ring, see John Jackson, Jr., "A List of All the Persons to Whom Rings and Mourning Were Presented on the Occasion of Mr. Pepys’s Death and Funeral", 1703 [no month or day], in PC 2:317.

For Atkins's dismissal and readmission, see SA to SP, 26 Apr. 1677, printed in John Harold Wilson, The Ordeal of Mr. Pepys's Clerk (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1972), appendix, 127-8. For Hewer being told not to be out late, Diary 11 Aug. 1660, 1:220. Other citations aside, the next four paragraphs are based on Wilson's book. James Long and Ben Long, The Plot against Pepys (London, UK: Faber and Faber, 2007), deals with the entirety of the Pepys's Popish-Plot troubles and so lacks the detailed focus of Wilson's overwritten but well-researched account.

For the purpose of Atkins's arrest see North, Examen: Or, an Enquiry into the Credit and Veracity of a Pretended Complete History (London: printed for Fletcher Gyles against Gray's-Inn Gate in Holborn, 1740), 243 (published posthumously); the warrant for Atkins's arrest issued from "the committee of Lords appointed to examine into Godfrey's murder" (244). Although Shaftesbury's biographer tries to exculpate his subject from the Atkins case, he admits that the earl's manipulative hand cannot be ruled out: K. H. D. Haley, The First Earl of Shaftesbury (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1968), 476, and for an apologetically Shaftesburian account of the incident, 476-79.
"Never come within his doors more" qtd. in Wilson, *Ordeal*, 45. For Atkins on Pepys’s severity, see SA, Statement to Lords' Secret Committee, 25 Nov. 1678, qtd. in Bryant 2:232, and for the standards to which Pepys generally held inferiors within his household, Bryant 2:140 and numerous examples such as the whipping he administered to a "boy" who failed to rouse him at a preappointed time in the morning: *Diary* 28 Feb. 1662, 3:37-38. For Pepys’s judgment of Atkins's curfew-breaking as an "offense against me", see Bryant 2:236.

For Pepys's legal preparations, see SP, "Account of Atkins's Activities," Oct. 1678, PL 2250/78-83, and Wilson, *Ordeal*, which depends wholly on Rawlinson mss (see 141); for Pepys's worry about the accusation against Atkins bringing disgrace upon himself, SP to Mrs. [Paulina] Jackson, 5 Dec. 1678, in FC 328; North's assessment is in *Examen*, 243. On November 21, Pepys's lawyer was finally able to see Atkins and acquaint him with the forces arrayed on his side. The only visit he received prior to that date was for a scant eight minutes from his sister, who was shadowed by the warden (following Shaftesbury's directions); she could only tell Atkins vaguely that his "friends" were trying to help him (Wilson, *Ordeal*, 54, 74).

SP to WH, 7 Nov. 1680, qtd. in Bryant 2:346.


SA to SP, 4 Nov. 1680, printed in Wilson, *Ordeal*, Appendix, 128-9.

For the details of Atkins's time as a reformado, see Chapter 4. For Pepys's sense of responsibility for Atkins, see SP to WH, 7 Nov. 1680, Rawl. A 194, ff. 224v-5r, qtd. in Bryant 2:346. The letter from Pepys that failed to reach Atkins is SP to SA, 5 Sept. 1681, qtd. in Wilson, *Ordeal*, 120; for Atkins's probable employment by Dartmouth prior to sailing for Tangier see Chapter 5; the embarkation itself, SA, "Journal," 12 Apr., 8 Jul., 12 Jul., and 4 Aug. 1683, NMM JOD/173/1684 (the latter entry is where Dartmouth "commanded me to wait on him this expedition as his secretary"); the position of judge-advocate, William Booth, "Extracts From the Captain's Log of HMS Grafton," 21 Oct. 1683, in *TP* 276. For a glimpse of Atkins's work during the base closure see the occasion on which he had "drawn the order" to bring Pepys and Hewer back to Tangier from a Spanish holiday: Dartmouth to Pepys, 11 Jan. 1684, postscript, printed in *TP* xxxv.

For the inside information see *TP*, 27 Sept. 1683, 26; recreation with Pepys and Hewer on 4 Nov., 53; other informational conversations such as 7 Mar. 1684, 225, and for more see Atkins's index entry.

For Pepys's restoration, see Chapter 2 above; for Atkins's, *AO*, in which see also the chief clerkship referred to in next paragraph; the £500, SA, "Journal," 24 Aug. 1684.


The other two possibilities are significantly more problematic. Read with an elliptical past-tense "to be" (i.e. "was") between "proposed" and "to me", the entry's laconic grammar makes
Pepys the object of the proposition and Atkins the one being asked for an opinion. Pepys, of course, was already "Secretary to the Navy," i.e. to the Lord High Admiral, the King himself, but it is remotely possible that with the crowning of the new king, when patents of high office automatically lapsed and needed to be renewed if the officeholder was to stay on, some subordinates might have been canvassed as to whether their chief had been doing a good job. Because Pepys enjoyed James's complete confidence, this interpretation does not sit easily. In addition, no such survey had previously attended any English monarch's crowning, nor is one apparent in the official documents surrounding James's. And all available evidence makes it inconceivable that Atkins would have responded in the negative if asked whether Pepys should remain Secretary for the Affairs of the Admiralty. Another possibility, eschewing the verb "to be" altogether and reading "Pepys proposed to me" as a straightforward subject-verb-object construction, is that Pepys himself had offered to resign his post in favor of Atkins in order to concentrate on leading the Special Commission he was proposing to the new king. However, this makes little sense because, as secretary, Pepys would have been directing the commission anyhow.

83 On Atkins's direction of the office in Pepys's absence, see Bryant 3:179 and 211 and Wilson, Ordeal, 123; for a few examples among many, see SA, "Journal," 14 Jul., 17-20 Aug., or 1-12 Sept. 1684. The memo is SP to Office, 23 Aug. 1688, printed in Bryant 3:312-13.

84 Contact with Pepys after their enforced retirement is demonstrated in NM 293, an entry from the early 1690s, and in PC see SP to John Jackson, 19 Oct. 1699, 1:202, and 3 Jun. 1700, 1:351. For the funeral, see Jackson, "A List," 316.

85 6 Apr. 1700, A Brief Historical Relation of State Affairs From September 1678 to April 1714, vol. 4 (Oxford University Press, 1857), 631. Atkins's chronicler implies that Atkins's government service was uninterrupted after the Glorious Revolution (Wilson, Ordeal, 123), but no record exists of any civil-service appointment until Atkins joined an ad-hoc commission on army finance, occasioning Luttrell's comment. He reentered naval service two years after that, in the year prior to Pepys's death: NB. Atkins then died after just four years back in harness, Aug. 1706: Wilson, Ordeal, 123.

86 Diary 2 Mar. and 18 May 1664, 5:72 and 152 (incl. n. 2), and SP to George Monck and SP to William Coventry, both 28 Oct. 1665, in FC 67-9 (and cf. also NWB 15 Jan. 1669, 180).

87 Shales became one of four underclerks of Treasurer's Accounts at the Navy Board (NB); the next year Pepys "recommend[ed] him to my Lord Brouncker's service . . . and my Lord receives him." (Diary 18 Oct. 1668, 9:331, incl. n. 2)

88 For the 1679 election see John Shales to [Robert] Shales, 29 Jan. 1679, in FC 334-5. For the recommendation to the Special Commission see Cat. 1:73, although by then Shales had an equally important position as the army's purveyor-general and was unable to accommodate Pepys's request: SC 5 Feb. 1686, 180.
For the conversations that impressed Pepys, see Diary 1 and 7 Dec. 1665, 6:315 and 321. Gibson was then in charge of victualing at the Yarmouth dockyard: in FC see SP to George Monck and SP to William Coventry, both 28 Oct. 1665, respectively 68 and 69. For his transfer to Pepys's office see NB. Gibson had previously served as a sailor and then shipboard purser in the Commonwealth navy: Samuel Rawson Gardiner, ed., Letters and Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, 1652-1654, vol. 1 (London: Navy Records Society, 1899), 1-2.

Gibson left the office for active field service during 1670-72 as purser-general to the Straits fleet during a time of heightened efforts against the Barbary corsairs but corresponded regularly with Pepys, sending him samples of Mediterranean wine: Bryant 2:57.

During the composition of 1668's "great letter" to York, for example, Hewer helped but Gibson was the clerk of the acts' main assistant and advisor: Diary 19 and 23 Aug. 1668, 283 and 286. For a typical description of Gibson's ability to keep up with Pepys's demanding clerical pace see Diary, 24 Sep. 1668 when Pepys wished to justify retaining Dennis Gauden as the victueling contractor (rather than contractors favored by other board members). After lunch, Pepys sat "close with Mr. Gibson till night drawing up our answer" before stopping work: Diary 24 Sept. 1668, 9:315. For additional examples among others see also 20 Nov. 1667, 8:539, or 29-30 Jan. 1668, 42 (preparing at night for an audit in the morning), and for a similar session with apparently no significant breaks, 28 Mar. 1669, 9:500.

Gibson sent Pepys occasional newsletters (Bryant 2:341) and offered more information than any other single contributor save virtuoso John Evelyn (arguably Pepys's closest friend next to Hewer) for a great history of the sea projected to occupy the fallen official's time: NM 23-5, 44, 134, 153-4, 176, 228, 342-3, 350-52, and 375; as an example see 51, where Pepys expects "Mr. Gibson to read over Captain Jenifer and Sir Richard Munden's journals with me." Gibson had been working as a clerk at Trinity House from 1677, so when the crisis broke he was not on the Whigs' anti-Pepys radar: Gibson, DNB. For reentry into the office in early 1680 see NB.

For Gibson's post-revolutionary career see DNB. For Pepys's attempt at help, see SP to Richard Raines, 17 Feb. 1692, in PC 54-5.

During his last few years at the Admiralty, Gibson was feeding Pepys what may have been confidential information about naval affairs (NM Dec. 1692, 268) and in 1693 Pepys made a note to ask Gibson about the origins of a sailing technique (297; the current year is given in the immediately succeeding entry). Later he mentions another matter upon which he needs to "discourse" with Gibson (310, ca. July; see entry on next page, bottom). For subsequent contributions to Pepys's compendium of oceanic knowledge see 323 and 447, the latter dating from 1693 or later.

At Pepys's funeral, perhaps in recognition of more practical needs in straitened circumstances, instead of a ring Gibson received the exceptionally large number of seven suits of clothes (only two other recipients got more than a single set, two and three respectively: Jackson, "A List of All the Persons to Whom Rings and Mourning Were Presented on the Occasion of Mr. Pepys's
Death and Funeral," 315. Here also are the grounds for suspecting that Pepys had recently employed Gibson in some form or other: the list categorizes him not as one of the "Friends" (the classification applied to, for example, Anthony Deane) but instead places him under "Former Servants and Dependents", a small group of eight limited to household attendants, most of them recent despite the adjective "former". For example, Gibson's name directly precedes that of Paul Lorrain, one of Pepys's last personal clerks, who departed only upon becoming the minister of Newgate Prison toward the end of 1700: see Lorrain to John Jackson, 9 Nov. 1700, in PC 2:119. Noone in this "Former Servants" category other than Gibson himself hails from the diary period—and, at least prior to the mid-1690s, Gibson had never served within Pepys's household.

96 For Walbanke at the Admiralty, see AO. As a witness for Atkins, see Rawl. A, 181, ff. 25-6, cited in Bryant 2:237.

97 When a navy captain who had recently been reprimanded by Pepys took the opportunity of the Secretary's misfortunes to denigrate him in company, Walbanke "reprehend[ed] him for it": Proceedings 12 Mar. 1680, 99; Pepys recorded the captain's shortcomings in NM 322. For the chief clerkship see AO.

98 Pepys was unable to attend the Oxford Parliament because of illness. For Walbanke's report see Bryant 2:353-4. For Walbanke as clerk to Pepys upon the latter's restoration, see AO and SC 19 Apr. 1686, 194. By that time Walbanke was ailing: see SA, "Journal," NMM JOD/173/1684, 1 Jul. 1686, and for Walbanke's death, 14 Dec 1686.

99 For Edwards's first appearance, see Diary 27 Aug. 1664, 5:255, and for his registration as a clerk at the Navy Board at the same time, NB.

100 For the blow see Diary 20 Jan. 1666, 7:19. Edwards was reprimanded once more: 5 May 1667, 8:202.


102 Diary 19 Apr. 1669, 9:526. £40 was the lowest estimated annual income for a lesser yeoman, and a husbandman or cottager could support a family on £11: Keith Wrightson, English Society, 1580-1680 (New Brunswick, N.J: Rutgers University Press, 1982), 33. For the marriage, see 11 Feb. 1668, 9:63-64; 16 Mar. 1669, 484; 21 Mar., 493; 26 Mar., 499; 27 and 28 Mar., 500.

103 Bryant 2:390.

104 For medieval second sons as knights in the same magnate household that provided their training, see Georges Duby, William Marshal: The Flower of Chivalry (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985), 65 and 68. In the reign of the last Tudor there were still echoes of the practice, its curriculum suitably updated: John Maclean, editor's Preface to John Smyth, The Lives of the Berkeleys, Lords of the Honour, Castle and Manor of Berkeley, in the County of Gloucester, from 1066 to 1618, vol. 1 of The Berkeley Manuscripts (J. Bellows, 1883), iii, and Lawrence

105 Duby, *William Marshall*, 68. The letter in which Deane asked Pepys for the £1000 Special-Commission salary is courteous but so insistent as to impress a reader as being addressed to an equal: AD to SP, 11 Feb. 1668, PL 1490/131-4.

106 See Chapter 6.

107 Pepys arranged that Hayter should lodge with him during the plague (along with Hewer): *Diary* 19 Oct. 1665, 271. Realizing he would soon lose his Commonwealth post at the Admiralty, Hayter began cultivating Pepys (probably because of the latter's connection to Sandwich) even before the Restoration was complete: *Diary* 10 Mar. 1660, 1:84. It paid off; as soon as Pepys became clerk of the acts, he took Hayter on as an underclerk (5 Jul., 193).

108 *Diary* 22 Aug. 1660, 1:228. Hayter's work, too, proved highly satisfactory right away—see e.g. *Diary* 4 Dec. 1660, 1:309, 25 Jan. 1661, 2:23 (where Pepys evinces honor's reciprocal nature by hosting Hayter to dinner, "and so I did make even with him for the last quarter", as Hayter had just procured payment of Pepys's quarterly salary: 24 Jan., 22), or 16 May 1662, 3:83.

109 For an example of Hayter's careful bookkeeping, see his detailed report to Pepys on current prices, 31 Dec. 1668, in *FC* 208-13; locating necessary records on the instant, *NWB* 16 Dec. 1669, 251; relaying firsthand knowledge of Commonwealth procedure, *BHJ* 1 Feb. 1670, 379; and for another example see *NWB* 1 Dec. 1668, 143.

110 *NWB* 7 Oct. 1668, 137-8.

111 *Diary* 14 May 1669, 9:555. Nothing came of this, but when Pepys became Secretary of the Admiralty in 1673, Hayter succeeded him as joint clerk of the acts along with Pepys's own brother. For promotion to chief clerk, see *NB*, and see also *Diary*, 15 Jan. 1664, 3:16, where Pepys promised "my resolutions to do him all the good I can"; for purveyor of petty emptions see *Diary* 12, 13, 15, 16 Oct. 1668, 9:325, 327, 329, 330, though Hayter still remained chief clerk (*NB*).

112 For outright theft of his majesty's stores see *Diary* 2, 3, 5 Jun. 1665, 6:115 (incl. n. 3), 116, 118. John, Baron Berkeley (who had served with York in the Admiralty and was on the board of Tangier with Pepys: *DNB*) accused Hayter to his face at Whitehall of disloyalty to the King. To Pepys, Berkeley subsequently insisted that Hayter was "a fanatic and too dangerous for me to keep." Pepys turned the discussion in such a way that Berkeley finally apologized for suspecting
Pepys's man and asked him to convey a separate apology to Hayter for the personal insult: 5 Jun., 118. Pepys also protected his chief clerk more than once against accusations of misdemeanors at the office (Diary 19 Jan. 1661, 2:18 and 7 Apr. 1663, 4:97-98) and even against the much more dangerous charge of conventicling (Diary 9, 10, and 15 May 1663, 4:129-30 and 135). The fact that master and servant later worked in separate offices had no bearing on Pepys's willingness to defend his servant when the occasion arose: SP to Hayter, 9 Nov. 1674, in Cat. 2:392.

113 King's Bench 9 Jul. 1679, 48.

114 The details of Hayter's Whig accommodation have not survived, but for the secretaryship and subsequent posts, see Cat. 1:57 and 59; AO 35; and NB. Hayter's secretaryship is usually interpreted as a rearguard attempt by Charles to keep a Pepys loyalist in the Admiralty (see e.g. Bryant 2:267 or Knighton 135), but—in stark contrast with Deane, Atkins, Hewer, and Gibson—little correspondence with Hayter can be found after this. Then Pepys pushed him to the side during the Special Commission (SC 5 Feb. 1686, 181), an unlikely decision given Hayter's exceptional ability unless more personal elements were at work. When these factors are added to Hayter's apology (for unspecified offenses: SC 26 Mar., 187-8), a bleaker interpretation must be preferred.

115 T.H., An Account of Several New Inventions and Improvements Now Necessary for England, in a Discourse by Way of Letter to the Earl of Marlborough (London: James Astwood, 1691), cxxii–iii. See also xxvi, where Pepys is described as "equiponderous to [the Exclusion-Crisis naval administrators] in moral, and much superior in philosophical and political knowledge, and the universal knowledge of the economy of the navy." The identification of "T.H." as Hayter is in Cat. 1:251, although if this is correct, the publication was posthumous, as Hayter died in the last few days of December 1688 or the first two of January 1689: NB, op. cit.

116 Southerne was a clerk for Coventry by June 1660: Diary 25 Jun. 1660, 1:183, although when Coventry became a navy commissioner, Southerne did not thereby become a board underclerk but continued serving Coventry as clerk in the latter's continuing position of the Lord High Admiral's secretary (see e.g. Diary 27 Oct. 1665, 6:280). When Coventry moved to the Treasury, his successor seems to have dismissed Southerne (see Diary 13 Oct. 1668, 9:327). £200 awarded at York's behest "for his long and faithful service under his [York's] secretary" one day after Pepys formally assumed the secretaryship of the admiralty (19 July 1673) suggests that Southerne came back into government service on Pepys's coattails and that the new secretary was seeing Southerne compensated for having had to shift for himself in the meantime: Navy Board Minutes, 20 Jun. 1673, PRO 186/281 f. 118.

117 Upon John Pepys's death in 1677 Southerne crossed to the Navy Board and became joint clerk of the acts with Hayter. When Hayter moved upstairs in 1679, their Navy Board office was left in Southerne's sole control: Cat. 1:41 and 60.

118 There was evidently some cordial communication during this time early during troubles of the Popish Plot; see NM 118 and corresponding n. 2 (to identify the approximate dates of NM entries,
see editor's chronology on x-xi). As in Hayter's case, details concerning Southerne's cooperation with Pepys's prosecutors during the Popish Plot have not survived, but it certainly occurred: *Proceedings* 2 Mar. 1680, 82-3.

119 Pepys had made the same move only on the strength of extraordinarily hard work, long and direct cultivation of two successive monarchs, and unusual public prominence as a result of his defense of the navy against and in Parliament.

120 For Southerne during the Special Commission, see *Cat*. 1:74, 80, and 89. For his promotion to Secretary of the Admiralty after the Revolution, see *AO* and *NM* 248 n. 2; the former pegs the year at 1690, the latter at 1689, but either way it was quick upon the revolution's heels. For Pepys's 1691 allegation of Southerne's ingratitude, see SP to Bishop of London [Henry Compton], 18 Dec. 1691, in *PC* 1:51.

121 For Burchett's beginnings with Pepys, see *DNB*, and for Tangier see *TP* 4 Oct. 1683, 37, and John B. Hattendorf, introduction to Josiah Burchett, *A Complete History of the Most Remarkable Transactions at Sea* (1720; reprint, Delmar, N.Y.: Published for the John Carter Brown Library by Scholar's Facsimiles & Reprints, 1995), 10. Probably following Bryant 3:123, *DNB* claims that Burchett was Pepys's favorite clerk during the second secretariat. Given Pepys's prior history with Atkins, this estimate for Burchett is debatable, but there is no reason to doubt a good amount of esteem for the youthful protégé. During the diary years Hewer frequently accompanied Pepys on excursions both personal and official outside London; Burchett fulfilled the same role during the first part of Pepys's second secretariat (Bryant 3:145). For a glimpse of Burchett in action as Pepys's clerk, see *SC* 5 Feb. 1686, 179.

122 G. F. James, "Josiah Burchett, Secretary to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, 1695-1742," *Mariner's Mirror* 23 (1937): 480.

123 For a brief discussion of corruption as opposed to acceptable perquisites in Stuart government, see Barry Coward, *The Stuart Age: England, 1603-1714*, 2nd ed. (London: Longman, 1994), 95; the most complete authority is Linda Levy Peck, *Court Patronage and Corruption in Early Stuart England* (London; Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990). For Pepys specifically, see both treatments by Robert Latham in his capacity as Pepys's editor, most fully in the introduction to the *Diary* cxxx and cxxxiii-cxxxiv, but also in the introduction to *Samuel Pepys and the Second Dutch War: Pepys's Navy White Book and Brooke House Papers* (Aldershot, England: Published by Scolar Press for the Navy Records Society, 1995), xxxiv-xxxv. It may also be that Pepys the old master was here applying a double standard to which Pepys the young servant had not held himself quite so rigidly, but the consideration of Southerne's and Hayter's cases (see commentary in next paragraph) makes that possibility at least questionable.

124 "I most humbly crave pardon" is in Burchett to SP, 13 Aug. 1687, *Diary and Correspondence of Samuel Pepys*, ed. Mynors Bright and Richard Griffin (Baron Braybrooke), vol. 9, 10 vols. (Dodd, Mead, 1887). For the rest see letters from 16 Aug. 1687 through 17 Sept. 1688 qtd. in James, "Josiah Burchett," 480-1. The begging letter to Jane Edwards is 23 Apr. 1688, printed in
Bryant 3:184n.

125 For Burchett's subsequent career see James, "Josiah Burchett," passim and *DNB*.

126 James 313.

127 For the audiences of Hewer, Deane, and St. Michel, see *SC* 13 and 14 Mar. 1686, 182.


129 James 343.

130 *NWB* 24 May 1669, 217.

131 For another incident in which Deane invoked chivalric combat see a 1669 accusation of malfeasance: Johns, "Sir Anthony," 176-77, and for Deane's response, *CSPD* 1668-69, AD to Navy Board, 21 Nov. 1669, 586.
Chapter 4: Pepys's Administrative Valor

Born on the fringes of a socially honorable matrix, Pepys first obtained honor in the wake of his early patron, the earl of Sandwich. He maintained and increased his store of honor by cultivating Carteret, Coventry, and the royal brothers. With loyalty, diligence, and mastery of naval information he made himself worthy of their trust. Becoming a patron in his own right, he gathered about him a group of men who interacted with him more as the ancient clients of Roman praetors or consuls, or the knights of a medieval magnate's affinity, than as office workers under a modern manager. We have therefore established that Pepys was embedded in relationships of honor first as servant, then as master, and that these linkages upward and downward created social structures within which effective administrative work was both encouraged and executed. But it remains to broaden the vista from single relationships onto the impact honor had on the workings of his office subcommunity more generally. Within that context, as we shall see, the most preeminent of all honor's characteristics aside from lineage, mastery, and service was to be found in abundance: the determined "steadfastness" manifested most dramatically in the way of the warrior.1 For the classical and medieval attitude that had underlain the elaborate civic triumphs of victorious Roman commanders and the pageantry of knightly tournaments not only throve in the later Stuart civil service but played a significant role in the new bureaucracy's rationalization.

I

The idealization of honorable steadfastness in its most acute aspect, that of courage in physical combat, is perhaps the feature of classical and medieval honor that modern eyes would least
expect in a bureaucrat. Yet Pepys heavily emphasized this venerable virtue. At a prize fight (employing slightly blunted swords) between "a soldier and country fellow," the deskbound clerk praised "one Warrell, who . . . performed the most of valour in his boldness and evenness of mind, and smiles in all he did, that ever I saw . . . He did soundly beat the soldier, and cut him over the head. . . . a most extraordinary man for his temper and evenness in fighting." In like vein, Pepys may have been dismayed at the mutilation of Cromwell's remains in 1660 out of respect for his godliness, from a general reverence for the dead, or similar reasons, but what the diarist chose specifically to record was that "a man of so great courage as he was, should [not] have that dishonour". When the navy official dined with the great merchants of the customs commission in 1662, the conversation turned not to a mutual interest in balance sheets or new markets but to swaggering Elizabethan Sir Jerome Bowes. On a 1583 embassy to Russia, that diplomat "did fling down his gauntlet before the Emperor and challenged all the nobility there to take it up, in defence of the Emperor against his Queen: for which, at this very day, the name of Sir Jerome Bowes is famous and honoured there." And Pepys brought this stance closer to his occupation. Throughout his career, with pride in "the daring courage of seamen", Pepys expressed outrage at what he saw as the lesser rewards and reputation accruing to naval warriors as opposed to land soldiers. This attitude, he complained, was prevalent even though sea service was more hazardous and required greater bravery, and even though "an Englishman of any capacity at sea is every whit as sensible and ambitious of honour as at land." ²

Pepys emphasized honor's failure, shame, as heavily. An apparently deplorable example was offered by Captain Cloudesley Shovell of the 42-gun James Galley, a fifth-rate (the second smallest ship of the line). In 1683, anchored in the bay of Cadiz on orders to meet another ship.
due from England, Shovell was surrounded by various Spanish warships carrying an admiral and a vice-admiral who demanded that the English render a respectful salute. Three of the Spaniards were dreadnoughts of seventy guns or more apiece, and their squadron "had so placed themselves that we could not cast our ship without being aboard of one of them". Shovell twice refused, whereupon "they fired a great gun and a volley of small shot which cut several of our running rigging". Then the lieutenant of the vice-admiral of the Flanders squadron came aboard the *James Galley*, informed Shovell that if he failed to salute by eight o'clock the Spanish admiral's orders were "to destroy both ship and men", and promised "our destruction if we offered to fly before we saluted". Shovell made what to twenty-first-century sensibilities is the only reasonable choice; he capitulated. But the correct decision was not so obvious to Pepys, especially as the shame was compounded because the Spanish did not respond with a counter-salute. It was the equivalent of turning their backs on the English vessel. Previously a French ship in a similar situation, maintaining a more steadfast refusal, fought, "blew up and went down to the bottom . . . the Spaniards being so devilish in cold blood as to kill all the poor French as they were swimming some of them for their lives". This would have been the fate of the *James Galley* too "if Shovell had not struck [sail]", but that, in fact, was all as it should have been. When Shovell instead "chose to sacrifice the King his master's honour", it was an "ill action" that merited a court-martial.1

Fortunately, exempla closer to home were more edifying. No shame could be imputed to regicide Sir Henry Vane, who showed that even those abjuring honorable defiance might become its emblem. Pepys had been involved in "drawing up his charge"4 and made sure to attend the execution. Vane's speech at the block told how, "against his worldly interest," he had abandoned
"all preferment" in favor of godliness, then served in the Long Parliament "where he never did, to this day, any thing against his conscience, but all for the glory of God." In his last words, Vane "spoke very confidently of his being presently at the right hand of Christ". Apparently as a concomitant, he had previously disavowed his honorable lineage, and done so at some length: he ensured that the crowd knew "that he was born a gentleman, that he was bred up and had the quality of a gentleman, and to make him in the opinion of the world more a gentleman, he had been, till he was seventeen years old, a good fellow"—until he saw the light.

But Vane protested too much: his behavior, speaking louder than his words, was precisely that of the ideally steadfast gentle-born. "[I]n all things [he] appeared the most resolved man that ever died in that manner, and showed more of heat than cowardice", Pepys wrote."[H]e changed not his colour or speech to the last, but died justifying himself and the cause he had stood for". At one point, for example, Vane insisted that his rights had been denied "against Magna Carta," and the sheriff had to temporarily force the condemned man to stop. It was a textbook case of what Mervyn James has described as going "to his death on the scaffold with the unrepentant stoicism of the man of honour." The clerk of the acts was not the only votary of honorable display: four days later "the courage of Sir H. Vane at his death is talked on everywhere"; eight days on, "all confess [him] with so much courage as never man died"; and even two weeks after the fact "They do much cry up the manner of Sir H. Vane's death, and he deserves it."5

Pepys did not merely articulate respect for bravado. He also made gestures at it himself. Despite apparently being unsuited to it, he put a premium upon exhibition of honor in this way. He was proud to wear a sword at the outset of the diary; he also bought one for Thomas Edwards when the latter was still a domestic as well as an office servant, and while Pepys was at it he...
decided to "set my own silver-hilt sword a-gilding against to-morrow." And however much he might have wished it, these instruments might not be just for show. During Venner's Fifth Monarchist uprising in January 1661, when the need for physical bravery seemed imminent, Pepys admitted to his diary that he had "no good courage at all". But he was not about to let anyone else know it. "[T]hat I might not seem to be afeared . . . [I] got my sword and pistol . . . found Sir Richard Ford and with him" made the public demonstration of readiness for combat appropriate to the honorable English male under such circumstances. Several days later the alarm sounded again, and Pepys found himself with the comptroller in the navy office's yard commanding sailors from ships docked nearby, "and there we armed, with every one a handspike, with which they were as fierce as could be."

No discussion of early modern martial valor would be complete without a mention of the duel, and indeed Pepys proved himself twice ready to draw his blade in defense of personal honor. In 1663 he defended Cooper, his mathematics tutor of two years previously and now a navy master, against the man's captain, Sir Robert Holmes, "in very high terms". The next day "I could not get yesterday's quarrel out of my mind, and a natural fear of being challenged by Holmes for the words I did give him, though nothing but what did become me as a principal officer." The day after that Pepys quailed at the prospect of leaving home, "being fearful almost, so poor a spirit I have, of meeting Major Holmes". Nonetheless he did, and indeed came across the man at Sandwich's lodgings. Screwing his expression, if nothing else, to the sticking-place, he marched up to the captain and former soldier and "told him I would not spoil his visit, and would have gone". Apparently impressed by Pepys's refusal to back down, Holmes stopped the clerk, and "we fell to discourse". An amiable understanding emerged in the less heated, less
public scenario of one-to-one conversation, doubtless guided by the charm of a tongue as silvery
as any gilt sword-handle, but there is every indication that the navy's chief clerk would have
temporarily turned swordsman if Holmes had chosen that path.⁷

The next time Pepys came close dueling, seven years later, matters inclined further
toward the extreme. Despite a history of office scrapes with navy surveyor Sir William Batten,
during the Second Dutch War Pepys co-sponsored a privateer with him. The privateer brought in
Swedish prizes, a circumstance which angered the Swedish diplomatic resident. Various
entanglements ensued and Batten died before the yield could be cleared and distributed.
Eventually Batten's widow and Pepys began a legal feud over the proceeds. The widow then
married the Swedish resident, who now held two grievances against the clerk of the acts. A duel
became imminent, prompting a hasty royal order forbidding Pepys to either send or receive a
challenge.⁸

If Pepys himself had more of a metaphorical than genuine hankering for the sword,
however proud he may have been to wear one and however enthusiastic he may have waxed over
its use by others at times,⁹ the same was not true of many a fellow administrator. "Even in
peace," Mervyn James wrote of later medieval and early sixteenth-century elite male society, "the
way of honour was the way of the sword, whose prestige was such that those who rose by other
callings were often more than ready, given the opportunity, to take it." This was nearly as true in
Pepys's time, when the sword could be switched for the pen as circumstances dictated. A typical
example is furnished by naval captain Sir Thomas Allin, who compiled a distinguished combat
record, then in 1671 became the Navy Board's comptroller. Five in Pepys's immediate circle
alone made the same move. The colleagues with whom he feuded the most, Batten and Penn, had

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not only both captained warships during the Interregnum but held the rank of admiral. The fighting of 1664 saw Penn stride the deck once again, then reseat himself in the office. During Republican Rome and much of the Empire, a condition of all high civil office was a decade's service in the legions. If the letter was not so formalized in the early modern period, the spirit seems to have been lively enough.

Two of Pepys's closest clients undertook similar transitions. Samuel Atkins (Chapter 3) probably would not have chosen to take up the sword, but when he did (if his journal may be trusted) he did it with an aplomb that suggests being "bred up a clerk" was no hindrance to handling a 42-pounder. His first time under fire, his ship was caught alone and attacked by a "Turkish" (Algerian) squadron of seven. The captain "fell by a great shot [cannonball] in the belly" and all of the other commissioned officers were wounded save the lieutenant, who stepped into the captain's shoes. This acting captain immediately appointed Atkins temporary lieutenant, a responsibility the latter fulfilled with distinction. After a day of "resolute" fighting, the feisty ship managed to fend off the aggressors just as the condition of "our small arms, muskets . . . and pistols" had become "so very bad as that we could not furnish six men with arms fit for use."

Taking stock in his journal, Atkins recorded that "our mizzenmast was wholly disabled, our foremast and bowsprit shot through, our rigging standing and running as well as our sails, remaining a laudable testimony of the hot service we had been engaged in." Unhappily, the second time Atkins had a chance for action, such desperate heroics were rendered unnecessary because of the foe's dishonorable behavior, pointedly sneered at by the newly minted warrior: when his ship and two others of the Royal Navy encountered five Algerians, the enemy fled. One of their number, however, was cut off by the English, whereupon the remainder "shamefully kept
hovering [to windward] without attempting to give the least relief to their companion, or hopes of us having a fling at them, which we greatly desired." Although prize money doubtless also entered into the calculation, Atkins seems to have been quite willing to risk death for glory.¹³ That he represents no anomaly in which a cloistered youth suddenly perforce discovered his true vocation is shown by the lack of hesitancy with which he returned to Pepys's office when the chance presented itself. Atkins simply applied the tenets of honor equally to both endeavors.

Instead of following Atkins's trajectory from desk to combat (or, it might be noted, Balthasar St. Michel's from combat to desk—see Chapter 3) Richard Gibson seems to have moved comfortably between the two milieus. He got his start in Blake's navy and, like Atkins, liked to tell his war stories with gusto.¹⁴ But however much he enjoyed shipboard *sturm und drang*, after the Restoration Gibson moved ashore, proving his ability and receiving promotion to Pepys's London office. Later Gibson rejoined the fleet for further action, then once again transferred back to a desk. Though acknowledging that avoidance of war was generally a good idea, Gibson told Pepys that "when entered", a war required the application of honor's most ancient saw: death before dishonor. It was "necessary . . . never to conclude it but upon terms of conquest" or, at the very least, excellent benefits, "a peace so honorable as should show the king's care of his people, the wisdom of his conduct, and give them satisfaction in the fruits of the money it has cost them." This near-paraphrase of Beowulf's final sentiments offers a clear illustration of how honor's violence and leadership were still thought to work as hand-in-glove as they ever had, and how the administrators of the newly emerging order continued to contemplate politics in the most ancient of terms.¹⁵

While never formally trading administrative for combat service, Anthony Deane also put
one foot, or at least dipped a toe, into battle. Unruly captains "demanding whatever they pleased to be done to their ships" received from him unbending defiance if their wishes conflicted with his professional assessment, even when "he had been like to have been knocked in the head by a quarrel arising upon his refusal". During the Second Dutch War he was told to form his workmen into a militia company and train them for home defense, and Deane himself was given a formal commission as captain. One of the arguments Deane later used in an attempt to get an order for his back pay, in addition to the usual protestations of faithful service, was that as military captain of the yard he had been exposed to "danger" and merited a compensatory reward. This may have been merely an attempt to bilk the government out of a few pounds, but Deane seems to have taken to military command; one observer reported him walking about town with a retinue of "fifteen men armed with cudgels and [he with] a brace of pistols."\(^{16}\)

In an age when the duel was held in esteem, at least at court, such posturing might have been mere rhetoric in the pejorative sense, but the continuing recurrence of this attitude in the documentation of Pepys and his servants suggests that it was something more than a ploy. Across each decade of his career and in private as well as public contexts, Pepys consistently vaunted an honorably valorous demeanor and appears to have respected one in his fellows, even if he responded with annoyance or harshness when he found theirs deployed against him. Here follows a short list (comprising two paragraphs). When a cousin suing Pepys failed to appear for a legal appointment in 1662, Pepys scolded him condescendingly in the tone of one now above his relative's station, and the Clerk of the Acts of the King's Ships huffed at the cousin's reply, given "in the very same slighting terms as I did to him, without the least respect at all, but word for word". Yet Pepys glossed pridefully of his kinsman's resistance that it "argues a high and noble
spirit in him." Referring to Coventry's performance at Lowestoft, for which he was knighted, Pepys wrote during the 1665 outbreak of plague, "You, sir, took your turn at the sword," then called attention to his own confrontation with death, in which he famously stayed in disease-ridden London to manage the navy while his fellows fled: "I must not therefore grudge to take mine at the pestilence".

Pepys's litany of honor continues into the next decade with the converse of the respect accorded properly aggressive men, disdain for the spineless. When one of Pepys's commanders claimed that he wished to cane Balthasar St. Michel in 1678 (Pepys's brother-in-law had implied that he had engaged in piracy), the pen-pushing Secretary of the Admiralty proved (or at least presented himself as) more familiar with honorable mores than the presumably swashbuckling commander. The captain had apparently neglected to confront Pepys's brother-in-law directly, and this refusal "to express the least resentment of [the insult] to [St. Michel] himself" was a "proceeding quite out of the road of all that I ever met with among persons so sensible of honour as you in your said letter seem to be". Later, at the time of the Special Commission, Pepys rigged Sir Anthony Deane's selection by drawing up a list of available shipwrights. All save Deane were inadequate, which might be expected, but the reasons for rejecting the best of Deane's competitors involved honorable bearing. Four other shipwrights were sufficiently dutiful as well as meeting all the requisite technical and administrative qualifications. What these men lacked was the deportment necessary for a position of honor. The first was "not of countenance . . . or authority sufficient for a commissioner of the navy, especially in this post;" the second "low-spirited" and similarly "of little appearance or authority for a commissioner of the navy"; the third and fourth "supine to the least degree" and "low-spirited", respectively, and therefore unable
to hold the charge. Although Pepys's purpose required that he find fault with everyone on the list, contemporaries reading the document still needed to find these defects plausible; the man of honor's assertiveness could clearly be regarded as desirable not only on the battlefield but also in the bureaucracy. Indeed, given the difficulty seventeenth-century civil servants faced in England when attempting to keep government going under endemic financial uncertainty, and the continual risks to career and sometimes liberty (even life) they ran while so doing, nerves of steel may well have been nearly as necessary for scratching on parchment as for firing a 24-pounder on deck.

It was accordingly no great leap for Pepys, his colleagues, and their servants to transplant honor heroics from the battlefield to the office. If, as Mervyn James wrote of an earlier time, "aggressivity was always latent in the relationships of men of honour . . . . in the company of his equals the man of honour was expected to assert his 'pre-eminence','" then (as we shall see) later Stuart administrators were easily as honorable as any of their mailed ancestors. Throughout most of Pepys's career he brought to bear on officemates a determination to demonstrate prowess on parchment. This tendency was no doubt reinforced by a conviction that the power of knowledge, so increasingly important to the success of the new administrators, was a force as important to gaining honor in war as in the office. Caliope's Cabinet, a contemporary courtesy manual claiming to teach gentlemen "degrees and distinctions of honour", stipulated that "gentility obtained by learning is honorable"; this gentility was available specifically to doctors, lawyers, mathematicians, astronomers, and finally "the orator", under whose rubric Pepys certainly could have applied. Other types of works such as Heroick Education (see Prologue) conflated philosophy with war. In such a cultural environment it should come as no surprise to find that
while Pepys was initially on good terms with Batten and Penn, the clerk of the act's work with them soon included more oneupsmanship than camaraderie.

The youngest and least experienced member of the 1660 Navy Board, Pepys was understandably reluctant to push himself forward during his first two years on the job, but he quickly became aware that he would need to make a stand at some point. Toward the end of 1661 both Sir Williams referred to him as their "register" (implying that he was a mere recorder), "which I took in some dudgeon, and see clearly that I must keep myself at a little distance with them and not crouch, or else I shall never keep myself up even with them." What "not crouch[ing]" meant was revealed once Sir William Coventry's advent gave Pepys more backing and confidence. After Penn had been sick for a while and returned "very brisk", seeking to make up for "his time that he has been out of the way by being mighty diligent at the office", Pepys decided to undermine any success Penn might achieve: "I hope by mine [diligence] to weary him out, for I am resolved to fall to business as hard as I can drive". On another occasion, Pepys attacked Mennes over a sloppy report not so much to correct the comptroller but because Batten and his wife were present, and the clerk of the acts wanted to demonstrate his prowess "before them, that they might see that I am somebody." And Pepys intended his performance to foreshadow the future: he resolved to "serve [Batten] so in his way another time." The modern capitalist system could not foster progress by competition in a more textbook fashion than did this ancient concern for honor.

Pepys also targeted Batten, Penn's patron and the other party to Pepys's shaming on the occasion of the "register" insult. For the next few years Batten and Penn would be the clerk of the acts' regular antagonists. In 1663, for example, Batten's favored merchant William Wood lost out
to Sir William Warren (whose proposal Pepys had forwarded) over a 1663 mast contract. A preemptive memorandum Pepys wrote when he discovered that Batten was planning to attack him over Wood's lost contract furnishes a typical illustration of how Pepys's administrative tasks were carried out under honor's umbrella. The memo was written to one of Pepys's own patrons, Sir George Carteret; it is always good to have allies when going into combat. Aggressive competition frames the beginning, where Pepys writes to that he had not previously stirred to defend himself out of a proper care for his reputation. He had been worried that "seeking justification" might give the impression that he "design[ed] reproach to another [i.e. Batten] more than right to myself", especially since this was "a matter little needing any" justification in the first place. Pepys had, after all, done his due diligence, making a close examination and taking counsel from others prior to sanctioning Warren's proposal. Nonetheless the main body of the text comprises no less than four vindicatory pages. The one listing the reasons for which Warren's bid was best may stand proxy for the others. Warren was charging between 5 and 7% less (depending on the product); Warren's delivery costs were less, "by which means the King gains above 220l"; Wood had heretofore enjoyed a monopoly of the board's mast contracts, and had thus "for a good while been able to set and command his own price", so it behooved the navy to "encourage another merchant in that trade"; and Wood's bid required that his products on hand be purchased "as they are, great or small," while Warren's allowed the flexibility "of setting our own number to every sort of masts, as his Majesty's occasions most require."

The tactics used by the clerk of the acts in this altercation combined (probable) procedural trickery with orderly rationalization. Pepys may have purposely initiated hostilities: upon his own recommendation, his contract for Warren was signed at a full board meeting from which Batten,
perhaps not coincidentally, happened to be absent. Batten proceeded to turn the tables, although
in Pepys's telling he snuck behind Pepys's back and "in my absence reproached me most
passionately about that bargain". Only at the next meeting, having already prepared the
battleground to his advantage, did Batten charge Pepys to his face with having arranged a "bad
contract". Pepys became heated: "I was moved and desired him to say wherein it was so bad a
one." Batten then asserted that the navy already had enough masts and had no need of Warren's.27
The navy's want of masts was the reason for entertaining bids in the first place, so Batten was
making little sense, but he also had little recourse: between the meeting Pepys failed to attend
and the meeting of the confrontation, Pepys had written his memo to Carteret.

The document now before the board disposed of Batten's more rational objections with
rational disarm that left Sir William weaponless and Pepys's point at his throat. Apparently not
having paid much attention to the wording, Batten asserted that Pepys's contract "over-clogged
the stores". However, Pepys noted, under Warren's proposal "the number of Norway masts
agreed for is no greater, and that of the Gottenburg much less,28 than the very number which
[Batten] himself had . . . [arranged for with] Wood." Pepys's contractor would therefore be
supplying fewer masts than Batten's and the objection was spurious. Batten also alleged that
Pepys's contract allowed Warren to supply whatever type of mast he wanted, but Pepys pointed
that in fact the contract's text "expressly" specified otherwise. Here Pepys reproduced a table
comparing the number of masts that Wood and Warren had each proposed according to type (see
Table 1):
### Table 1: Warren

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size (in Hands)</th>
<th>Merchant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quantity Proposed by Wood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Size of masts and how many of each proposed in bids for the 1663 naval contract by merchants William Wood and Sir William Warren

The bigger masts were much more in demand than the smaller, and Warren was offering far more of the larger sizes than Wood, who was proposing a ratio rather to the contrary. Furthermore, Wood's proposal was rigid; Warren, on the other had, would make available the full number specified but agreed to sell fewer if the navy turned out to have insufficient need. The better value was plain to see. The coup de grace was Pepys's word of honor: "this I affirm in every circumstance to be the true statement of that contract".

His foe finished off, Pepys retired in the best honorable style, with a flourish of graceful dissimulation of the kind discussed in contemporary courtesy manuals. Though intended as a document of record, the memo was addressed to Sir George Carteret, not only Pepys's patron but also the senior member of the board. Pepys coyly reminded the recipient of his (Carteret's) patronage while simultaneously insisting that the sender did not wish it unworthily: "I leave [this]
with you, without . . . bespeaking your favour in the least measure beyond what my want of experience only may at any time call for." The memo terminated with an allusion to faithful and superior service under tribulation, coupled with the triumph of victory: "for the difficulties of this kind I now and then meet with, 'tis satisfaction enough that the difference is so legible in our books (to the king's advantage) between the contracts heretofore made without trouble [i.e. discrimination] and those of later date made with it"—the new-and-improved trouble being taken, of course, by Pepys, his honor thus stimulating him to more careful administration.

Whenever assaulted, Pepys would present this type of indomitable front, combining the studied theatrics of the court with a ready fund of seemingly unassailable data, for the rest of his career. But sometimes he did not lead out, politicking covertly instead in order to gain office advantage without betraying his hand. In 1666 the decision of Viscount Brouncker, one of the Extra Commissioners, to discharge navy crews at the onset of winter during the Second Dutch War unsurprisingly elicited "a very great cry" from their captains. Less justifiably, given their position as board members who should have supported their fellow (at least publicly), Batten and Penn also offered "bad words concerning it." Coventry, however, "doth undertake to defend it," and this time Pepys made no move to stand with him, perhaps because there seemed to be little need: "my lord Brouncker got ground by it I believe". So far Pepys had been mostly a bystander in this tussle, supporting Coventry only by signing an affidavit in support of the discharges, but now he saw a way to seize the moment by twisting the knife of Brouncker's anger against Batten and Penn. "I have made it worse by telling him that they refuse to sign to a paper which he and I signed on Saturday to declare the reason of his actions", Pepys wrote. His purpose was most likely to further alienate Brouncker from his (Pepys's) opponents. Brouncker's anger might soon
cool, but he might also remember the slight, and the next time Pepys needed to face off with one or both of the Sir Williams, Brouncker would be the more willing to stand with Pepys.\textsuperscript{30}

But a straightforward calculus of honor was not the whole story. It is a risky business to psychologize, but as far as the evidence can be trusted Pepys seems to have experienced such competition for preeminence not merely as a necessary process but as an undeniable frisson. On one occasion Robert Meres, a purveyor Pepys labeled corrupt and who may have been put up to it by Batten, alleged that there were no small masts to be had in England at the time. This deficiency would require the Navy Board to contract for more expensive imported masts. Although Pepys was sure that his favored supplier Warren had some available, Meres asserted the opposite; Pepys resolved "to know more particularly." At the following week's board meeting, Batten came close to giving Pepys the lie, saying "that for all what I said [about Warren's masts] the other day, Sir W. Warren hath not nor hath had any new small masts come this year. I asked him whether he was sure of it: he told me before the whole table, yes." The gauntlet had been thrown down in public. But Pepys had come prepared. Apparently relishing his moment, he "produced a letter Sir W. Warren sent me yesterday . . . Where he tells me particularly the time and place where . . . [the masts] have lain ever since they came." Batten was thereby "justly shamed."\textsuperscript{31} The navy bought the less costly homegrown product.

Another instance of what seems like genuinely emotional involvement involves Batten yet again. That worthy happened to be the main source of corruption in the Chatham Chest, a government fund for disabled sailors. On multiple occasions "promising" to return what was essentially embezzled money "and fixing on precise times for its delivery," Batten had nonetheless "for so many years avoid[ed] the giving it in". Since "the giving of one's word, the
'word of honour,'" shamed the gentleman who broke it—the most obvious manifestation of what the early modern English called "inconstancy"—Pepys could deliver the satisfyingly scornful verdict, "I must say it is one of the most extraordinary things that I have met with in all my life from a man of honour". The clerk of the acts, on the other hand, had committed himself to rectify the Chest's accounts. It was now under his protection, and he promised to be the champion of justice and beneficent patronage against Batten and all other such black knights. He had disparaged Batten to his face on the issue: "I have not spared to say this to himself, so do not write it to you in any secrecy; for contrarily, I shall repeat it to him shortly once more and in such a manner as becomes my duty and faithfulness to the poor for whom I am concerned and will see right done to, let who will be offended." If Deane seems like he was rewriting Malory in Pepys's support in 1674 (Chapter 2), the shipwright may have been taught by Pepys, who here turns an accounting job into an Arthurian mise-en-scène. Modern readers may think this all a bit much, but once again honor seems have spurred administrative work: the Chest funds would soon be receiving first-rate attention.

After six years in the office, having graduated from Coventry's honor course and having received York's and His Majesty's "countenance" at least once (see Chapter 2), by 1666 Pepys felt strong enough to go up against opponents of higher rank and greater status. When he appeared in a privy-council meeting to discuss naval financial problems and offered a strategy for partial relief of private contractors on the brink of ruin, he was opposed by both the lord treasurer (a peer, Thomas Wriothesley, the earl of Southampton) and Sir George Carteret, usually a supporter. Pepys nonetheless recounts with seeming pride how he "made bold" to defend his notion and silence opponents; "His Majesty and Royal Highness were pleased to concur [with
me] (my lord treasurer and Sir George Carteret offering no reply)". Pepys had been grimly steadfast in the face of not inconsiderable opponents, and he had comported himself so in no less than the royal presence. And there he had triumphed, receiving the royal imprimatur. Honor's feedback loop would then have started over again: like results might send even lazy timeservers back to the office with renewed determination to produce the next piece of work to the same carefully painstaking standard that had produced the previous success—or perhaps to work harder and make it even better, as one could not count on one's competitors to let their quills go blunt. And Pepys was not lazy.

The "aggressivity" not only practiced but, from all signs, valued by these men was carried into their offices by more than just the master; clients too had their contests for preeminence. One of these shows that the heat of rivalry could trump obligations of reciprocity if a gentleman felt his honor injured. When Pepys asked St. Michel to step up the oversight of ship readiness in 1688, Balthasar's presentiment about sea-captains' bridling (see Chapter 3) proved accurate. The Pheonix sailed only after severe prodding by St. Michel, and the commissioner's efforts occasioned an (undescribed) expression of resentment by the ship's captain, whose insulting note Balthasar forwarded to Pepys. "I leave you to judge, whether sufferable from Captain Gifford to one who hath the honor of serving the King in my station", wrote St. Michel, suggesting that the captain be reprimanded "hereafter severely". Pepys asked for further details. The precise kind of relationship St. Michel had with the captain is unclear, but it involved honor's reciprocity. "I have strained my cares and my authority too to oblige him," replied St. Michel, "not only in point of dispatch, but of accommodation". But the captain had broken the chain of honorable exchange. To be fair, St. Michel continued, "till this one instance I never
found the least flaw in a reciprocal return on his part . . . there was no former ill blood betwixt us". St. Michel had thus been "heartily vexed to find him for whom I had such regard" offering "[me] so great a neglect". But now that the chain had been broken, St. Michel could not let the slight pass: "I thought myself in duty bound roundly to resent it".33 If the solidarities of honor snapped, aggression would not be far behind.

St. Michel's tiff with the captain, though, involved one party who was supposed to be a swashbuckler by profession. The impulse to assert personal honor in wholly bureaucratic matters was made abundantly clear—and not helpfully—by Brouncker's insistence that a disputed, difficult-to-interpret document be accepted as a valid contract simply because he had unthinkingly signed it two years before: he "challenged it in honor and right to his own hand that the paper be admitted as authentic". Always protective of his own honor, Pepys perhaps also had a better sense of what honor in the bureaucracy entailed, since the potential for shame from poor records was always a risk. But his demurral at this "instance of the credit sometimes given by the board to the least minutes of a principal officer" was overruled, and "accordingly [payment] was by bill signed . . . for 560l."34 Honor in the office was not always a blessing.

It was, however, certainly present, and its competition mobilized not only individuals but also groups. For operations in the naval bureaucracy, group competition was even more significant than that between individuals; indeed, sometimes an individual could not compete qua individual with being part of an honor subcommunity. Chapter 2 noted Pepys's own cultivation of Carteret as well as Coventry, and these relationships quickly proved important as office competition heated up with the Sir Williams. Both exceeded Pepys in rank, experience, and wealth; in such a situation, Pepys could make little headway without the support of patrons
such as Carteret and Coventry. Until he became their client, the clerk of the acts had fulminated against Batten and Penn in the diary but had taken little substantive action despite his bluster at the end of 1661 to "not crouch". Until Pepys could receive help from above, the most defiant gesture he seems to have offered Batten and Penn was, significantly, outside the office, and involved no direct confrontation.

But Pepys began to make aggressive moves soon after his precarious position became a good deal stronger in 1662 when he acquired both treasurer Carteret and York's secretary within a few months of each other. When Pepys was "offended by Sir W. Pen's foolish talk" in May of that year, out of caution the clerk of the acts did not stand up for himself on the spot. That night, however, he decided he could put up a stiffer front thereafter "because of the interest which I am making with Sir George." The following month Penn "most basely" attempted to assert that preparing contracts was not included within Pepys's prerogative but came under the comptroller's purview, "and so begun to employ Mr. Turner about it". Whether Penn actually insulted Pepys is doubtful; the "baseness" came from its design to steal a portion of Pepys's power. This time Pepys "begun to dispute", and with a combination of office records and "the practice of our predecessors, which Sir G. Carteret knew best when he was Comptroller, it was ruled for me." Coventry too played his part in Pepys's initial competitive forays. Sir William's support was evident, for example, if silent, when he took Pepys to inspect the Woolwich yard in October 1662 after they had both been studying various kinds of ropemaking materials for three months. Penn also went along, and Pepys took the opportunity to "vex Sir W. Pen . . . to appear so well acquainted . . . better than he, in the business of hemp"—also a neatly packaged example of how honor's drive to preeminence spurred the acquisition of knowledge in the service of bureaucratic
rationality. By the middle of 1663 Pepys could write, "I have endeavoured to displease . . . my fellow officers, all but Mr. Coventry and Pett"—and Pett would go the way of the others in about a month.  

It is impossible to tell how much of Pepys's growing aggression was due to Coventry's tutelage, but if York's secretary provided an especially important guide for Pepys to the way in which a man of honor should act as both patron and client (see Chapter 2 and Appendix E), he also set the example for the proper response of a man of honor to an attack. When Coventry opposed an innovation Carteret wanted to make concerning payment to victualers "contrary to old practice", Coventry expected the navy treasurer to 

   bespatter him . . . openly. Against which he [Coventry] prepares to bedaub him, and swears he will do it from the beginning, from Jersey to this day. And as to his own taking of too large fees or rewards for places that he had sold, he will prove that he was directed to it by Sir George himself among others.

Despite the fact that the spleen of this lesson was directed at another of Pepys's patrons, the clerk of the acts wrote enthusiastically, "by my troth, I do see more real worth in him [Coventry] than in most men that I do know."  

For the rest of Pepys's career his behavior seemed to be patterned on that example.

Pepys soon had his own clients who needed similar guidance, help, and protection. Anthony Deane, for example, began to face problems in 1664. In late 1663, Christopher Pett, master shipwright at Woolwich, apparently colluded with Mennes and Batten to overturn a contract with Pepys's favored timber merchant Sir William Warren and replace it with goods purveyed by one of Warren's competitors, Thomas Winter. Pursuant to this goal, Pett had reported that Warren was selling the navy bad knees. Deane inspected the controversial product
and reported back to Pepys that the wood was sound. Pepys insisted on Warren's knees at the board, and when "Mennes told me angrily" that Winter's offering was at least as good as Warren's and cheaper to boot, "I told him that it was not so . . . and I would prove it was as dear a bargain as had been made this half year—which occasioned high words between them and me, but I am able to prove it and will." Pepys referred to this elsewhere as a "great contest between Sir J. Mennes, Sir W. Batten, and myself," but its repercussions extended to the man who had furnished Pepys the evidence needed to win. Until then Batten had been vocal in his appreciation of Deane's ability. But "so soon as he [Batten] saw me to favour him [Deane], and that he did inform me of the truth in the business of [Winter's] Hornechurch timber, he [Batten] could never endure him, but presently he and Sir J. Mennes cried out that he was a useless officer, that there was no need of such an office, and what do we do with him, and I know not what." Deane was now a part of Pepys's side against Batten's, and the "contest", great or not had (in Pepys's telling, at least) saved the navy money.

As Pepys's clientele grew in the diary period, it began to take on the aspect of a bureaucratic "household" that could support him as medieval knights had supported their lord. Pepys was a good master to have, as his usually unerring tactical direction led the group to various triumphs. Looking for a chance to get back at Pepys for the 1663 contract, Batten soon afterward refused to accept "the deals [planks] that came in with Sir W. Warren's masts" even though these were allowed by Warren's contract, and then tried to pass a purchase order for deals from William Wood for which no contract existed. Covered at the top by Coventry (who initiated the attack by questioning the purchase order for Wood's deals) and supported from the bottom by Deane (who had informed him that the masts he had received from Wood for the Woolwich
dockyard were too short), Pepys opened fire on Wood by asking him about the rule for measuring masts and catching him trying to trick the Board with a method that gave him a false elongation. The clerk of the acts then squeezed from Wood a price five percent cheaper than Warren's, who had undercut Wood in the first place. Wood might well be pardoned for ruing the loss of so much anticipated profit, but Pepys sneeringly portrays him as a coward, describing how "He fell to cry out of his bad usage . . . [and] insisted mightily upon having the whole referred to indifferent [i.e. disinterested] men." Pepys and his colleagues (excepting presumably Wood's ally Batten), in contrast, remained steadfastly committed to their position: "We consented to refer the [technical] point concerning the true rule of measuring masts, and nothing else." All of Pepys's underclerks seem to have been involved when Sir William Penn defended himself against Pepys's "great letter" of 1668, claiming that he (Penn) had done nothing wrong and, indeed, deserved a reward for his good performance. Pepys gathered "my people" and took counsel from them concerning the possibility of undermining Penn with another accusation concerning his capacity as Comptroller of Victualling Accounts, a new variation on the charge of neglecting the books of the pursers he was supposed to supervise.

One example in particular shows how Pepys's fighting subcommunity, stimulated by its master's concern for honor and using the tools of method, could help rather than hinder the growing Stuart government. The ugly big gun of honor, shame, furnished the vehicle of delivery, but its powder and shot were the records of administrative rationality. A merchant bill left over from the Second Dutch War came due in 1668. In the meantime the account had been overseen by the incompetent Sir John Mennes and proved notably lacking in documentation. At the meeting when the account was first examined, other members of the Navy Board were in favor of
rapidly "coming to a composition" with the merchant, who, of course, had few objections to that prospect. Pepys had business outside the office and had to leave, but "I stayed so long as to declare my dislike" because of "the want of that light which should enable us to proceed with any judgment". Pepys became so worried about the "injury which both his majesty in his treasure, [and] this office in reputation" seemed likely to suffer that he felt it important to both enlist an ally and begin keeping a record of his dissent—on the spot, but without interrupting the meeting. Using some sort of device that enabled him to write covertly, "to avoid offense [I] made a hard shift, with the help of my tube, to scribble" a short memo. This was slipped under the table to Brouncker. The latter seemed to concur with Pepys's sentiment that with Mennes in charge, it was "more suitable to the honour of the board to lay this case . . . before his Royal Highness, that some other course may be taken".42

Pepys had decided that a too-quick agreement with the merchant would probably lead to significant mistakes and damage to the office's reputation. Yet despite his efforts to uproot the problem before it could grow bigger, later that evening the board's clerk found that after he departed his objections had been set aside and an agreement made. Not unreasonably he expressed to Brouncker his annoyed "surprise[. . .] profes[ing] my total ignorance of the measures that could lead them to the doing it with any safety". At a subsequent meeting when the bill was presented for members to sign, Pepys flatly refused (as did the cagey Penn, though without making a fuss). As the clerk of the acts grew more alarmed, he deployed his entire subcommunity in an aggressive attack that shamed Mennes in an attempt to avert what Pepys saw as potential disaster. At the next meeting Pepys employed all three of his clerks as he came close to giving the lie to Mennes. Once more Pepys "forbore to sign it, asking Sir J. Mennes
again whether he . . . had examined this account as it ought to be." At Mennes's affirmative reply, "I did publicly at the open board—many persons standing by and particularly Wm Hewers at my elbow—declare myself in these words: 'Then I pray God keep me from having any accounts examined by you, where I shall be concerned as the King is in this."

The insult delivered, Pepys then retired to his private office, perhaps to let the rest of the board contemplate the seriousness of the situation. There he had "Mr. Gibson write a note . . . and deliver it privately to my lord Brouncker" asking that the room be cleared of all save board members and Hewer, on whose presence Pepys insisted so that, if need be, the clerk could later bear witness to "what I said". In the meantime, Thomas Hayter had been working on a technical objection which he now passed through the door to Pepys. Behind the closed doors, the better to safeguard the board from external enemies such as the Brooke House Commission, Pepys raised Hayter's objection, then reiterated his refusal to sign. He finally agreed only on condition that an official memorandum be entered into the board's records stating that he had nothing to do with the matter and should be held blameless in case of problems. But an official document was not enough by itself. He felt the support of his servants as a group to be vital to its efficacy—"my own clerks . . . are able to justify me in the substance of what is here set down, viz. Mr. Hayter, Gibson and Wm Hewers." Honor might need to be defended later, and until this point Pepys had been a lone voice in the matter—on the board. But he had his household, and with them he stood against all the rest. A competent administrator, marshalling his subcommunity of honor, had—as events would prove—staved off, if not quite disaster, a major financial shortfall for the King.

Honor—or rather dishonor—finally prevailed. The intensive efforts of Pepys and his servants were validated when finally the rest of the members pressed "upon him [Mennes] with
many expressions of dissatisfaction and shame, [and] the matter ended."45 Pepys's confrontation with the Navy Board, Mennes in particular, was carried out by a unit of men comprising hierarchical relationships that functioned according to honor's ethos but who simultaneously deployed administrative techniques in its service. They created and marshalled a variety of documents, from Pepys's "tube" note in the initial meeting to Brouncker, to Hayter's note passed in through the door, to the formal protest against the settlement to be entered into the office books; and they acted according to the lights of honor. The objection to the settlement was conceived in terms of honor; honor's dark other, shame, was loosed; Pepys's recalcitrance adhered to the kind of "consistency in standing by a position once taken up" described by Mervyn James as the most visible manner, saving physical violence, by which honor could be publicly asserted. The combined efforts of Pepys's warband resulted in the belated recall of the settlement a week later. The matter would remain far from ended, however, for years to come. Pepys was right; the account proved so complicated that its resolution took until 1675. A hasty "composition" seven years earlier would apparently have lost the crown a very large sum indeed.46

But if honor was deployed in such charged scenarios as Mennes's highly problematic merchant account, it will not do to elevate competition completely at the expense of cooperation, for honor also nurtured the latter. Pepys did not summon his carefully built clientele about him solely when he was about to unsheathe his pen in combat. This group worked as a team to help speed the navy along its normal course of operation, and we will end this chapter by briefly examining that role. Pepys fostered unit cohesion to that end by his largesse as patron in the friendly way that Coventry had shown him during the heady days of 1662. Coventry had fed him,
taken counsel with him, enrolled him in the great cause of the king's service; now Pepys in 1667 recorded, "at noon home to dinner with my clerks, who have of late dined frequently with me, and I do purpose to have them so still, by that means I having opportunity to talk with them about business, and I love their company very well." True, the combination of love and business, paralleling (if the point may be stretched) those twin pillars of chivalry, love (between males) and battle, could have its unwanted effects. Opponents also knew that he "love[d] their company", and this was dangerous when Atkins, Gibson, and Walbanke were singled out as reliable servants of Pepys during the Exclusion Crisis (Chapter 3). But more mundane affairs constituted the daily round of Pepys's subcommunity from the early days.47

Pepys's office routine was never just his; without his clerks there would have been no office—at least not the office of the diary years, let alone the times at the Admiralty, and no major reforms or Parliamentary triumphs. His immediate clerks and assistants were handpicked, often hand-raised, and highly competent. They sustained his efforts as affinities had sustained barons. "Up by five o'clock" he roused in 1664, "and to my office, where T. Hayter and Will Hewer met me, and so we dispatched a great deal of my business as to the ordering my papers and books which were behindhand." Similarly, when preparing his important proposal for reform 1668 (see Chapter 2), "all day and afternoon without going out, busy upon my great letter to the Duke of York, which goes on to my content. W. Hewer and Gibson I employ with me in it." On a subsequent occasion, "Up, and all the morning till 2 o’clock at my Office, with Gibson and Tom Edwards, about drawing up fair my discourse of the administration of the navy"; or "to the office, and there with Gibson and Tom [Edwards] finishing against tomorrow my notes upon commanders’ instructions". When Pepys prepared a lengthy "discourse" for the Lord High
Admiral arguing that impressment during peacetime brought dishonor to the King, the clerk of the acts was assisted by all three of his most reliable clerks at the time, each with their specific administrative expertise complementing the effort as a whole. Hewer's contacts at the East India Company allowed a comparison with the English merchant marine; Hayter, the walking naval-procedure database, provided an analysis grounded in "ancient practice" of what was likely to occur if a certain change were implemented; Gibson the former sailor, Pepys's main source for what was actually happening on the water, found out how the Dutch East India Company was successfully handling their personnel needs. The combined effort paid off; York issued an order halting the worst abuses.

Pepys and his subcommunity were still serving James Stuart two decades later. Balthasar St. Michel might have been expected to remain for his ties of blood, but the continuing presence of William Hewer and Anthony Deane shows how genuinely close-knit the group was. Still at a dockyard in 1668, Deane had not helped with the "great letter", but by then he was a dependable member the clientele; and Atkins's loyalty had been proven, if somewhat later, in the blast furnace of peril, sickness, and depression. And now such projects as wholesale reform in a major organ of state were insignificant trivialities. This time Pepys's household was attempting to defend the throne of their master's lord. They began mobilizing the fleet in late summer and early autumn 1688, hurrying from location to location. At the center Atkins ensured smooth communications and orderly transactions (see Chapter 3), while Hewer, Deane, and St. Michel worked themselves to the bone taking care of external matters alongside Pepys or as his deputies at various naval installations. All three of the latter appear in a single letter from Hewer to Pepys dated August 23. Hewer reported that he left Deane in Chatham pressing the business at 8:00
p.m. on the twenty-second, reached London at 4:00 a.m., wrote orders until the afternoon, then
visited the Woolwich yard with St. Michel to stoke efforts there. The letter was written at
midnight, apparently dashed off by Hewer just prior to turning in after at least 28 hours without
sleep (and that assumes he had a nap prior to his departure from Chatham). By early October
Deane and Hewer were both sick with exhaustion. Atkins, usually remaining in the office to
manage the overload of business when Pepys had to supervise some important matter on
location, seldom appears in documentation concerning such external matters. We may assume,
however, that he was as ready to drop as the rest.\textsuperscript{49} The end of their story makes for unpleasant
reading, at least from our protagonists' point of view, and we have had enough of antagonism. As
an act of historical respect we will leave them here, working in harness with all their strength,
attesting the powerful solidarity that their "net of deferential friendship" had created—and which
would continue to see Pepys through his final defeated years.

But perhaps the example of honor obligation in Pepys's bureaucratic story most revealing
for the purposes of this dissertation's general argument occurred in a meeting with York. There
"upon a motion of Sir J. Mennes's . . . and seconded by all the rest, the Duke did promise that our
clersks, as being the fittest men and those that deserve it best, should be advanced into places as
places fall."\textsuperscript{50} Honor's characteristic competitiveness drove the proposal: now interlopers
promoted by powerful outsiders, even if they were civil servants from other branches of
government, were by implication barred from joining the navy office at anything other than the
entry level so that board members could reward their own clients without interference. But
cooperation, too, underlay the new policy, with unanimous agreement between the members of
that office itself and their master. Thus honor's Janus-like revolving door swung open yet again,
passing one more piece of government business smoothly on its way.

Yet there is more to this particular piece of business, at least for modern observers, because of the incongruous overlap between what we expect from the past and what we know of our present. Here, a prince of the realm, the foremost link in honor's chain save one, promised to help his immediate servants be good masters to their own. It was as patrician or as medieval a gesture as could be made; thus was patronage affirmed in its value by a paramount lord in response to a recommendation from faithful counselors, a marvelously circular example of the way in which honorable leadership had, by that time, been (ideally) conducted for century upon century. Yet the measure also embraced the Weberian bureaucratic ideal of promotion by merit ("the fittest") per seniority ("as places fall"), and it was executed in as modern and up-to-date a setting and fashion as can be imagined: in a board meeting by seconded motion. Honor, bureaucracy; bureaucracy, honor—that may not have been all those men needed to know, but it was perhaps most of what their government required to run.
Courage in combat has been a premier value in most cultures of honor wherever we have found them. At least in Western Europe, however, publicly demonstrated steadfastness was arguably the great foundational ideal of honor, underlying nearly every other facet of the mentality, although it must be acknowledged that Mervyn James did not make this point. "Consistency in standing by a position once taken up" appears in his account only as one subvalue among others (if more important than most), expressing itself mainly in the publicly given word of honor (James 316, 325, 339-40). The evidence and logic of James's discussion, however, imply a much greater role in which steadfastness applies not only to specific stances or goals but to the more general avenues of honorable behavior such as beneficence (in a master, 274-5), faithfulness (in a servant, 330), or bravery on the battlefield (311-12), even if no specific promise has been made to carry out a certain task. For example, see the discussion of Richard III on 315-16, elaborated with other examples on 342-44, where James couples steadfastness with a violent honor dissidence requiring a generalized loyalty to one's lord; and within the evidence supporting the present study see Sir William Coventry's comment in parliamentary debate, "'Tis honour in councils, as well as in fight, to keep steady." (DoC 21 Feb. 1677, 4:123) After all, without at least the somewhat reliable practice of such values by a fair number of participant-agents (see Introduction and Appendix D), the honor system would collapse. This is not to say that steadfastness in James's more narrow sense was unimportant in the present context: Christopher Pett, master shipwright at the Woolwich yard, found himself accused of setting a different monetary value on supplies of the same type. If once he set a given rate for the items from one source, when evaluating the same kind of item from elsewhere he "must for his honor rate these so too." (NWB 8 Oct. 1664, 80) Pett was also condemned by various board members for having asserted that he needed no assistant and yet subsequently asking for one. His failure gained added bite because his initial boast had been delivered in order to make himself seem more effective than competing master shipwrights at other yards. As a result, it was a greater-than-normal "shame that he should make this demand": NWB 15 Apr. 1665, 116. The same problem arose when Anthony Deane tangled with Commissioner Taylor (Chapter 3).

Note that I do not mean to imply that steadfastness was a value unique to honor; certainly other ideological constellations could also emphasize the importance of commitment. The point here is simply that steadfastness seems to have been the most fundamental point of reference within honor's framework.

The prize-fight is in Diary 12 Apr. 1669, 9:516-17 (and see also admiration at a similar event, 1 Jun. 1663, 4:167-68); Cromwell's courage, 4 Dec. 1660, 1:309; the customs dinner, 5 Sept. 1662, 3:189 (also mentioned in Chapter 2); sailors' "daring courage", NWB 10 Jun. 1669, 227; English sailors as braver than "landsmen" and just as "ambitious" for honor, respectively 222 and 224; on 222 he describes shipboard dangers that land soldiers never face, "tempest, fire, springing of leaks" as "terrors so surprising to a person unacquainted therewith" and reports the example of New Model troops transferred to naval service, "of tried courage at land, yet they were not suddenly [i.e. easily] brought to bear and contend with great guns, such as the sea service most
depends upon." See also the "great pleasure" Pepys took at Tangier in hearing "every considerable [military] action that has happened . . . about the town since the beginning." (TP 4 Nov. 1683, 53) And he made sure to record the report from soldiers in the garrison "that we Englishman are to this day reckoned the best gunners . . . even in foreign service . . . . Not that every English[man] has skill more than others, but that they do handle powder with more readiness and boldness [than] any people in the world": 17 Oct., 149, and see also n.d. [1683], 302; 1 Aug. 1683, 111; n.d. [ca. Mar. 1684], 234; and NM 83, 90 n. 1, 128-31.

For the Cadiz incident see Shovell to [George Legge, Earl of] Dartmouth, Jun. 1683, in HMC Dartmouth, vol. 1, New Series 11, Appendix Pt. 5 (H. M. Stationery Office, 1887), 82; Pepys's admiration for the French captain's choice of death before dishonor and acknowledgment that Shovell and crew would have suffered same, TP n.d. [1683], 193; construal of "ill action", 191; that Shovell be court-martialed, 17 Oct. 1683, 151. Pepys was not alone in this judgement. On hand for the incident, the English consul at Cadiz wrote angrily that "if he and all had been lost by maintaining our king's honor, he had done his duty and left a famous name behind him." (qtd. in Davies, Gentlemen, 64) See also de Ruyter's recapture of Dutch trading outposts and raids of English stations in Africa during the Second Dutch War. Pepys judged this "the foulest reproach of cowardice that hath ever been found due to so many English ships as we had there . . . . 'Tis hard to say whether this news be received with more anger or shame, but there is reason for both." SP to the earl of Sandwich [Edward Mountagu], 22 Dec. 1664, in FC 34.

For Pepys's part in the legal formalities against Vane see Diary 22 May 1662, 3:88.

For the execution, see 14 Jun. 1662, 3:108-9; as a subsequent topic of London conversation, 18, 112; 21, 116; and 30, 127; the standard of honorable scaffold behavior, James 349.

For Pepys's early sword-wearing, see Diary 3 Feb. 1661, 2:29; for the purchase of Edwards's handle and Pepy's gilt variety, 30 Apr. 1669, 9:537 (for more on Edwards, see Chapter 3); for the Fifth Monarchist alarms, Diary 9 Jan. 1661, 2:9, and 13 Jan., 13, and for his native indisposition to courage see also his relief at the news that the Moors at Tangier pledged not to attack, "which do give me a great deal more quietness of mind, though I speak not of it", TP 4 Nov. 1683, 52. Nonetheless at Tangier he also "walked out into the fields up the hills and there ventured very near the Moors' sentries . . . and in the evening too, when they might have come and snapped me and nobody have seen". Not content with one escapade, a couple of weeks later he and two companions repeated the venture with yet more risk by going "several times out of our bounds, as we were told when we came home, and might have been shot or taken prisoners". It was all in the name of what was, as we shall see, Pepys's favorite weapon, information: "but this I am glad I have once done to know the most of the place". TP 12 and 21 Oct. 1683, 40 and 46 (although see the prelude on 11 Oct., 40; Pepys seems to have been building up courage for these adventures).

For Cooper, see Chapters 2 and 3, and for the "high terms" to Holmes, Diary 21 Mar. 1663, 4:81; next day's worry, 22 Mar., 83; agreeable conversation with Holmes, 23 Mar., 83-84.
For Charles's command to forbear from fighting see Matthew Wren to SP, 9 Nov. 1670, in Howarth 39; for overviews of this second near-duel, see Bryant 2:45-6 and Knighton 80-81. The privateer also had a third co-sponsor, Sir William Penn, a roving naval commissioner until 1667 and then Comptroller of Victualling Accounts. For Batten and Penn's employments at the Navy Board see below and NB.

In contradistinction to fighting on the battlefield or for prize money, Pepys's general opinion about dueling, even when he was not involved and thus at no risk, was mildly censorious: see Diary 19 Aug. 1662, 3:170-71. But against that entry should be set his assessment, just two weeks previously, of the affray between engineer and first gentleman-usher to the queen Hugh Cholmley and Edward Montagu, a cousin to Sandwich but whom Pepys seemed to dislike. Cholmley humbled Montagu, and Pepys's gloss was, "the world says Mr. Mo[u]ntagу did carry himself very poorly in the business, and hath lost his honour for ever with all people in it, of which I am very glad, in hopes that it will humble him." Pepys certainly did not object to dueling so far as to reject its employment in a well-deserved comeuppance: 6 Aug., 3:157. For both Cholmley and Montagu see Diary vol. 10, Companion s.v.

Quotation in James 312-13. For Allin see George Jackson and G. F. Duckett, Naval Commissioners from 12 Charles II to 1 George III, 1660-1760 (Lewes, UK: n.p., 1889), 52-3. For Batten and Penn's Commonwealth commands, see ibid., respectively 60 and 103-4.

In some areas of contemporary France, enough elite families could be found with one son sporting armor and another the robe that demographic analysis boots little in terms of noblesse de robe vs. noblesse d'épée (see Appendix B).

The complaint of the captain who refused to do his paperwork is in Chapter 2.


For Gibson's opinion about honorable war, NWB Memorandum, 10 Jun. 1669, 228-9. For his career see Chapter 3. See Prologue for Beowulf's near-death injunctions on lordship.

For Deane's "quarrel" with a captain, see NWB 15 Nov. 1668, 129. For the militia command, possible defensive combat, and armed entourage, see A. W. Johns, “Sir Anthony Deane,” Mariner’s Mirror 11 (1925): 171; the claim of endangerment, 174. During the Medway incursion the Dutch had attacked Landguard, the fort defending Harwich: J. R. Jones, The Anglo-Dutch Wars of the Seventeenth Century (London: Longman, 1996), 178 and P. G. Rogers, The Dutch in the Medway (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 121-22. It is doubtful that Deane saw action on this occasion, however, as the fort is on the opposite side of the river.

Diary 19 Mar. 1662, 3:48
18 SP to WC, 25 Aug. 1665, in FC 53, wherein see also SP to WC, 20 May 1665, 45: "my pains exceed any of my neighbours . . . in the early and late pursuance of my duty". At Brooke House Pepys later used this episode when his "diligence" was questioned: "no concerns . . . did at any time (even under the terror of the plague itself) divide me one day and night from my attendance on the business of my place": SP to Brooke House Commissioners, 6 Jan. 1670, in BHP 326.

19 SP to [Francis] Willshaw, 17 Feb. 1678, in FC 315. Similar scorn for lack of honor's grit had been expressed by Pepys and Coventry at Chatham commissioner Peter Pett's failure in an attempt to dismiss two possibly corrupt pursers: Pett's frustration "did make us laugh mightily, and was good sport to think how awkwardly he goes about a thing that he hath no courage of his own nor mind to do." (Diary 13 Aug. 1663, 4:275).

20 SP to His Majesty [James Stuart], 9 Mar. 1686, PL 1490/146 (first description), 147 (second and third descriptions), 151 (fourth description).

As we have seen, Pepys once had to reprimand Deane for letting aggressive competition disrupt his dockyard (Chapter 3), but occasional difficulties of this kind may have been the necessary price of working with high-strung men in a culture that valorized aggression, or at least one important part of which did so. Cf. also the trouble during Hewer's early years when the underclerk's impertinence earned him boxes on the ears (Chapter 3), or a similar refusal to awaken hastily at Pepys's call, Diary 7 Apr. 1663, 4:97. Pepys might have been unable to abide wilfulness under his own roof, but he never seriously considered dismissing Hewer from the office for that reason. Even though remaining irked at Hewer's "idle talk and carriage" with the maids, Pepys promised the underclerk £20 per year extra for "maintenance" when he moved out: Diary 31 Oct. 1663, 4:358; for the timeline of Hewer's relocation see 27 Sept., 318; 3 and 28 Oct., 323 and 353, and 6 and 14 Nov., 367 and 381.

22 Pepys explicitly applied this principle to war. A naval commander, he wrote, must "know every particular rope, line, block etc. that is in a ship and the use thereof and dependence one upon another, and how the preservation and government of the whole, and particularly of the masts, depend thereon". Ignorance of the ship's operation could lead to problems such as "masts brought perhaps by the board, without ever a shot in it, by the cutting of a rope." If not prevented, such a problem "if timely seen and understood might be timely mended" by a knowledgeable captain; but an ignorant one "shall never be able to give the King the benefit of his ship . . . his mind will be confounded . . . [and] he shall never be able to do anything and lose the prize and honour he might otherwise get": TP 1 Aug. 1683, 123.

23 James Salter, Caliope's Cabinet Opened Wherein Gentlemen May Be Informed How to Adorn Themselves for Funerals, Feastings, and Other Heroick Meetings: Also, Here They May Know Their Place and Worth with All the Degrees and Distinctions of Honour in the Realm (London: Printed by G.M. for Will. Crooke, 1665), 10-13.
For Pepys as "register", Diary 21 Dec. 1661, 2:236. Readers of the diary will know that it contains many entries in which Pepys continued having dinner, going to taverns, or simply holding sociable conversations with Batten, Penn or both, despite prosecuting undeniably antagonistic struggles against them not only over office issues but also concerning matters we would consider private. Part of the explanation for this dichotomy is that the Navy Board was a plural subject whose corporate honor reflected back upon its individual participant-agents, so these members would be likely to present a united front to outsiders even while contending internally. But to maintain a modicum of unity while simultaneously carrying on such internal competition required some sort of social grease, and this was furnished by the dissimulation prescribed by contemporary courtesy manuals in which inner virtue must often give way to hypocrisy in order to maintain camaraderie amongst companions. Castiglione was only the most famous writer to propound this doctrine; there was many another. See Anna Bryson, From Courtesy to Civility: Changing Codes of Conduct in Early Modern England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 122 for Castiglione, and for others 56, 128 and 136-7. This allowance affronted the godly, who insisted that true civility and gentlemanliness was to be found in the morality of the inward person, a line of criticism that retained vitality into the eighteenth century (211, 216-17, 230). But most writers prevaricated on this issue, allowing that gentlemen could dissimulate without guilt (206, 208-9, 220, 222, 225). Pepys exemplified this dilemma in a measure that approximated the number of authors on each side of the argument—a bit of prevarication about hypocrisy but going ahead anyhow with no loss of sleep thereafter. See e.g. Diary 9 Jul. 1662, 3:134: Penn decamped to Ireland for a time to oversee his landed interests there. Prior to leaving, he "did commit the care of his building to me, and offered all his services to me in all matters of mine. I did, God forgive me! promise him all my service and love, though the rogue knows he deserves none from me, nor do I intend to show him any; but as he dissembles with me, so must I with him." See also 27 June, where Penn invited Elizabeth and Samuel to dinner, "which I did give a cold consent, for my heart cannot love or have a good opinion of him since his last playing the knave with me, but he took no notice of our difference at all, nor I to him" (123-24). Pepys probably guarded himself during all interactions with Penn, Batten, and other opponents with whom he needed to socialize. Even when Pepys neglects to mention taking such precautions, they should probably be inferred: cf. the conversation in Diary 28 Feb. 1664, 5:67-68, where Pepys was careful only to say things that he felt could be safely repeated because "Penn, I know, offers the discourse only like a rogue to get it out of me, but I am very free to tell my mind to him, in that case being not unwilling he should tell . . . again". Of a dinner at Penn's three years later, Pepys wrote, "in so false a place . . . I must dissemble my hatred": 6 Jun. 1667, 8:253. See also 1 Sept. 1661, 2:169 and 7 Mar. 1663, 4:68. "Complaisance" was a word used by courtesy manuals to describe this kind of accommodation: see Bryson, From Courtesy, 236, and anon., The Art of Complaisance, Or, The Means to Oblige in Conversation (London: Printed for John Starkey, 1673). In this regard cf. Diary 7 Oct. 1662, 3:215: "Sir J. M. and Sir W. B. being come from Chatham . . . I did go see them for complaisance, and so home and to bed." Similar behavior much later can be seen during the Tangier expedition when Pepys's assistant for valuing properties, lawyer William Trumbull, proved unenthusiastic and unhelpful, and in Pepys's pithy expression, "signified little." At Pepys's prompting Dartmouth suggested to Trumbull that he return early to England, and the lawyer jumped at the chance. For Trumbull's "despondence" and lack of enthusiasm see TP 24 and 27 Sept. 1683, 23 and 26; doing little work and Pepys's
suggestion, 10 Oct., 39; "mighty brisk upon" leaving Tangier, 12 Oct., 40. By this time Dartmouth and Pepys expressed little respect for the unsteadfast Trumbull ("a man of the meanest mind as to courage that ever was born", 14 Oct., 42), but they hoped "that he might be useful in England" by providing good publicity for the controversial mission—and though Pepys does not say so, they could ill afford bad publicity, the London political environment still unstable in the aftermath of the Exclusion Crisis. Therefore "with all seeming respect . . . [we] drank a parting bottle to his good voyage . . . walked down and saw him in the boat and gave him several guns from the town. And so the fool went away, every creature of the house laughing at him." (20 Oct., 45)

25 Diary, 5 Mar. 1663, 4:66 and 20 Nov. 1664, 5:325.

26 Unless otherwise specified, the rest of the material in the following two paragraphs is from SP to George Carteret, 14 Nov. 1663, in FC 6-10. Penn as Batten's client, see Penn's entry in Diary vol. 10, Companion, which notes that Penn's career began with an apprenticeship to Batten.

27 For the meeting without Batten see Diary 10 Sept. 1663, 4:303; the meeting without Pepys, SP to WC, 22 Sept. 1663, qtd. In FC 6 n. 2; the face-to-face conflict, NWB 15 Dec. 1663, 10-11.

28 At this time some of Europe's most sought-after masts were being manufactured in Sweden and Norway.

29 Bryson, From Courtesy to Civility, 57, 206, 208-9, 220, 222, and 225; see note above for full discussion of Pepys's practice of dissimulation.

30 Diary 16 Dec. 1666, 7:410. For background on Brouncker, see note in Chapter 2.


32 For Meres's claim about the lack of small masts see NWB 7 Jun. 1664,12-13, and for Batten's broken faith regarding Chest funds, SP to the governors of the chest, 2 Feb. 1667, 157; Pepys's claim to champion the poor, 158. For the word of honor in early modern English culture see James 316.

33 For Balthasar's increased inspections, see chapter 3. For the Gifford affair, see BSM to SP, 21 and 23 Nov. 1688, 218 and 220, in Family. Quotation in next paragraph is to 220.

34 For Brouncker's "challenge", see NWB 6 Feb. 1669, 182.

35 Pepys's first difference seems to have been with Penn, occurring on 20 May 1661 (2:103). Pepys was more careful with Batten, the senior member of the pair, not recording a conflict until April 1662; even then the diarist hoped that "we shall not much fall out about it": 12 Apr., 3:64. It might also be noted that Elizabeth Pepys carried on a similar competition with Lady Batten and her daughter for social precedence, though space does not allow further discussion: see e.g. 25 Aug. 1661, 2:161.
The Sir Williams had both outfitted servants in "new livery", so "to outdo" his rivals, Pepys got a sword for his own Thomas Edwards. But the diary's opinion page was the only court in which its writer enjoyed successful adjudication ("I do take mine [Edwards] to be the neatest"). 4 May 1662, 3:77.

For the expectation that Carteret's "interest" would help against Penn, see Diary 1 May 1662, 3:75; Carteret's assistance in the dispute over contracts, 3 Jun., 99-100; Coventry's silent backing at Woolwich, 6 Oct., 214; angering all board members but Coventry and Pett, 24 Jun. 1663, 4:196. For another example of similar help from Coventry, see Pepys's opposition to Batten over the rope cheat described in Chapter 2. For Pepys's break with Pett see note in Chapter 2's section on Coventry. See also Coventry's affirmation to Pepys that "he puts his trust most upon me in the navy, and talks, as there is reason, slightly of the two old knights" (Mennes and Batten): 7 Jul., 219.

Diary 3 Oct. 1662, 3:243. Carteret was famous for having held Jersey in the Royalist cause until 1651; see note in Chapter 2. See additional note in Chapter 2 for the hostility between Pepys's two patrons.

For the initial conflict over Deane, see Diary 6 Oct. 1663, 4:326; Pepys's gloss on the argument is in NWB same date, 6. For the fallout to Deane's disadvantage, see NWB 19 Jun. 1664, 57-8. Knees are bent timber easily adapted to certain ship's fittings; modern knees may be artificially joined, but at this time, at least for purposes of shipbuilding, they seem to have been required to be naturally curved. See Chapter 3 for examples of office animus directed at Hewer and Hayter.

The incident with Wood is in NWB 22 Dec. 1663 and 7 Jan. 1664, 35-36.

For charging Penn with having ignored pursers, see NWB 5 Dec. 1668, 146.

For Pepys's first assertion of uneasiness, the board's initial agreement with the merchant, and Pepy's resulting protest to Brouncker, see NWB 4 Dec. 1668, 148-50, but this record makes no mention of the attempt to enlist Brouncker's help on the sly. For that see SP, Memorandum, 4 Dec. 1668, in FC, 199-201 and also Diary 4 Dec. 1668, 9:384.

For the intervening meeting at which Pepys and Penn refused to sign, see NWB 2 Jan. 1669, 150.

The subsequent meeting was on 9 January. For Hewer's moral support during the insult to Mennes and for Gibson's delivery of the note, see that date, NWB 169; Hayter's help with the objection, 170; the rest of the board's shaming of Mennes, 171; Pepys's insistence on the exculpatory memo and its support by his clerks, 153-4.

NWB 12 Jan. 1669, 171.

For the account's delayed settlement see NWB 148 n. 1. For consistency in honor, see James 316. See also Chapters 2 and 3 for the Brooke House Commission (Commission of Accounts).
For lunch, business, and enjoyable company, see Diary 20 Nov. 1667, 8:539-40 (briefer mentions of hosting his office servants abound in the diary: see e.g. "I with my clerks home to dinner", 3 Mar. 1668, 9:100, or 18 Apr., 167). For love or profound friendship between medieval knights, see Duby, William Marshal, 35 and 47. For external identification of Pepys's subcommunity during the Popish Plot, Proceedings 5 Feb. 1680, 81.

For rising at five with Hayter and Hewer, see Diary 31 Aug. 1664, 5:257; all day with Hewer and Gibson on the "great letter," 19 Aug. 1668, 9:283; with Gibson and Edwards on "the administration of the navy", 18 Apr. 1669, 9:524; with Gibson and Edwards on "commanders’ instructions", 9 May 1669, 9:548. Clerical help with the presentation about impressment is in NWB in which for Hewer's Company information, see 14 May 1669, 205; for Hayter's analytic prognosis, 206; for Gibson on "Hollands' [sic] East India Company", 209-10; the success of the effort, 210.

For the subcommunity's exhausting effort to ready the navy for William, see Hewer's letter to Pepys cited in Bryant 3:212, and for Hewer and Deane's illness, Bryant 3:223. For York's and Coventry's earlier attention, see Diary 21 Sept. 1668, 9:312.

NWB 19 Sept. 1664, 76.

After arresting Mortimer and deploring the "damage and dishonor" wrought by the miscreant's regime, Edward III declared that his resolve to "be directed by the common counsel of the magnates of his realm". Even Richard II, despite the dismal record he would compile, knew that at the outset he must promise to conduct affairs "with the advice, assent, and counsel of the prelates, lords and great men of our said realm . . . with the deliberation of our council": qtd. In W. M. Ormrod, "Coming to Kingship: Boy Kings and the Passage to Power in Fourteenth-Century England," in Rites of Passage: Cultures of Transition in the Fourteenth Century, ed. Nicola McDonald and W. M. Ormrod (Woodbridge, Suffolk, UK: York Medieval Press, 2004), 45 and 46. The fate of Richard, or for that matter of Julius Caesar, offers stark evidence of how seriously the notion of honorable counsel was traditionally taken.
Chapter 5: Documentary Honor

The body of this dissertation will now conclude with a much more in-depth examination of Pepys's application of honor to a single administrative episode than has been possible thus far. From his first appointment to mid-level government office, as Pepys rose he sought and gained honor. His honor's grasp became wider the higher he rose. For the latter part of his career he dominated the offices he supervised, so he (and his close clients) would thereafter compete on a national stage for the honor of "the world" in Parliament and Whitehall rather than for preeminence over the colleague across the hall. But if it was contention in that earlier, more intimate setting which prepared Pepys and his servants for their deadly serious performances on the stage of national drama, a last look backward at the old office would not be amiss.

The snapshot offered here will be taken just eight months after Pepys underwent a parliamentary baptism of fire over "tickets," unpopular pay vouchers for sailors, an issue that occasioned Pepys's first foray into the battleground of the Commons at the behest of the Committee for Miscarriages.¹ Now the Navy Board was under investigation by the Commission for Accounts,² but Brooke House had not yet begun its hearings, so this juncture affords a view of Pepys in the office immediately before those hearings cemented his dominance.³ He crossed a threshold then; following Brooke House he would exercise complete control over the offices in which he worked until he was dismissed from them. The conflicts in which he would thereafter engage took place on a larger scale. Surveying a confrontation at the point of crossing that threshold should therefore yield the best available impression of how congruent an office row conducted by experienced officials could be with the greater campaigns these men would later
conduct: it will show that honor in the office was little different than honor in the wider political world. And more importantly for the main purpose of this dissertation, the external pressure which Brooke House was beginning to exert heightened the stakes of internal struggle and brought to the fore aspects of seventeenth-century bureaucratic development and its stimulus by honor barely discernible under more normal circumstances.

The incident to be narrated here involves an attack on Pepys and William Hewer by Colonel Thomas Middleton, navy surveyor, in December 1668. But to adequately serve its purpose, the following description is lengthy. This proceeding departs from previous practice: the proposals, relationships and wrangles upon which this dissertation concentrates have been served up thus far as thumbnail-sketch portions of a few sentences, at most a page. That kind of short vignette is useful for examining a single stream from honor's multiple tributaries, faithful service in one sketch or the competitive impulse in another. And compiling a good number of these brief, singular glimpses, as this study has done, is imperative in order to demonstrate that the single phenomenon pictured in each thumbnail was no fluke. But the isolation thereby entailed makes it difficult to connect the various parts. A more complete portrait of these phenomena requires observing the way in which the several elements of honor examined here manifested themselves in the bureaucracy at the same time, together. That kind of picture can, at best, only be roughly imagined by aggregating the types of examples offered until now. These simply do not serve to effectively demonstrate the simultaneity and interrelationship which are much better captured in a more inclusive, extended panoramic shot. The longer example enables a wider view of how those tributaries intersected with each other and flowed into the broader river of honor in the bureaucratic context.
And the extended panorama offers one more advantage. So far the discussion has said much about naval business but shown rather little of it. This expository bias has been necessary to keep the focus on honor—the dissertation is not about bureaucratic regulation and procedure per se—but without more of such material in the docket, readers may justifiably feel that something is missing. The longer narrative in this section affords the luxury of viewing some of those technicalities at closer range and observing how honor interacted with them. As a bonus, though certainly not equal in entertainment value to stories about duels or salacious court behavior, the type of narrative offered below is arguably the least tedious way to bring the still-shadowy backdrop of the seventeenth-century office fully to life.¹

Colonel Thomas Middleton replaced William Batten as navy surveyor late in 1667, promoted to the Navy Board from a post as resident commissioner at Portsmouth. Middleton stepped into his predecessor's shoes in more ways than one, taking up the torch of opposition to Pepys as well as the duties of the surveyor's office. The colonel had impressed Pepys with his results at Portsmouth during the Second Dutch War, and the clerk of the acts at first judged the new surveyor an improvement over Batten. Yet the clerk of the acts is likely to have brought the new surveyor's enmity upon himself. Pepys tacitly recognized this, adducing two classic causes of honor competition as the probable reason for Middleton's animus: anger over an affront or envy at a fellow's preeminence. As to the first, Pepys could easily have delivered what might appear an insult when he allowed himself "freedoms in taking notice of matters relating to his office." Exactly what those "freedoms" entailed has not survived, but as we have seen at various points, Pepys sometimes neglected to mince words when pointing out problems with his colleagues' performance. To be sure, when sitting with the privy council, if a grandee such as the
Duke of Buckingham took exception when Pepys argued in "too high" a manner, Pepys might restrain himself, recording, "I could have answered, but forbore". The result of such carefully passive courtesy was that, in the end, "all liked very well." But within the office Pepys was not shy about forbearing to forbear, and it would not be the first time that a hypersensitive newcomer perceived abrasive advice as sheer rebuke. The other ground of Middleton's hostility may have been jealousy at the success of Pepys's "great letter" in August 1668 which had censured all members of the board save, of course, its writer. York was so impressed by the document that he issued it to the board under his own signature, adding the Lord High Admiral's galling imprimatur to reproaches written by their equal. Middleton's attack could therefore also have been prompted by, in Pepys's aloof circumlocution, "his envy at that want of matter which hindering me of a place in his royal highness's late reflections [i.e. criticisms] he would thus supply."5

As Surveyor of the Royal Navy, Middleton was responsible not only for maintaining the king's ships and naval buildings but also for the storage of naval supplies. Writing on 7 December 1668, Middleton recounted that "about five months since" (Middleton is vague on dates), the navy's treasurer, the earl of Angelsey (no longer in office at the time of writing), noted an overstock of cloth at the Chatham dockyard. The earl had communicated this fact to Middleton, the latter exercising the relevant jurisdiction. This excess cloth would become Middleton's stepping-stone for a full-scale frontal assault on Pepys's administrative redoubt, but the surveyor did nothing about it immediately, stating that "no one person then at the board would take notice of the knowledge of any such commodity served in, and for my own part I was of an opinion that it was a mistake in my lord". But peer pressure gave way to evidence "about a
month later" when Middleton visited Chatham to take a survey. There Middleton found that earl was right. Back at the office the surveyor approached Pepys, informing the clerk of the acts about the problem and saying that he (Middleton) had detected a dubious transaction in which the needless cloth seemed to have been sent to Chatham deliberately. Pepys replied that he would ferret out any malfeasance, then checked the relevant records and found no misconduct. He neglected to report this finding to Middleton, however. Pepys later excused himself to the rest of the Navy Board with the prim remark that Middleton never followed up with him about the issue, and "his silence led me to think he had by his own inquiry long ago removed" any doubts about it. But imputing "silence" to the surveyor was a misleading feint on Pepys's part, accurate only in the technicality that Middleton had not formally requested the results of the deeper probe into the records which Pepys had said he would make. Otherwise Middleton was vocal enough. At odd intervals he had continued to remind "several of the board" about the issue, "yet it die away as if it rather had been a piece of good service than a crime".6

Pepys's own diary testimony confirms Middleton's claim to vociferousness (see below), and both men seem to have wanted a showdown. Pepys was in charge of the Navy Board's documentation (as Middleton put it, "kept very safe in Mr. Pepys his closet"). On their face Middleton's worries were pursued in a manner respectful of office turf; if Pepys's uppermost concern had been the smooth running of the navy, he surely would have reported back to Middleton without being asked. The office's records comprehended what the seventeenth century called Pepys's "province," and his defensiveness about not volunteering the information underscores dereliction of duty. Further, if Pepys had truly been free with unsolicited advice to Middleton prior to this incident, it makes even more sense to expect that Pepys would have told
the surveyor he needn't worry. Indeed, it would have been in character for Pepys to take advantage of the opportunity to preen by giving the new man additional pointers about board policy. Most plausibly, therefore, Pepys realized that the game was afoot, recognized severe deficiencies in Middleton's strategy, and welcomed the chance to help the newcomer hang himself if he wished to be so foolish. Middleton, in his turn, does seem to think that he had stumbled upon a problem. However, he treated it as an opportunity to attack the clerk of the acts rather than as an issue to be rectified. As Pepys pointed out later during the controversy, the King's stores lay within Middleton's province. He was the surveyor, and had he been genuinely worried about the extra material, he could have taken direct action. True enough, before acting he might have wished to wait for clerical confirmation of his suspicions, and he might have expected duty to nudge the clerk of the acts into walking across the hall and informing him upon the matter. But Pepys had a point, if slanted, concerning Middleton's "silence": when the desired intelligence was not quickly forthcoming, a watchful surveyor would surely cross the hall in the other direction. As Middleton himself said of the inquiry Pepys had promised, "I presume [it] might have been done in half an hour."

After three or four months of innuendo, Middleton finally made his move in December. The specific catalyst remains unclear; he may have been encouraged by Sir Thomas Littleton, Buckingham's client, who had just been appointed co-treasurer in November. Or perhaps he simply figured that he had dropped enough hints to prepare the minds of other board members, and now was the time. The casual treatment of his warnings, Middleton wrote on December 7, "gives me reason to believe that which I am ashamed to speak." Speak he did nonetheless. December 8, the next day, "breaks out the storm . . . from the surveyor," Pepys wrote, noting in
the diary that "W. Hewer and I have long expected" it because "he hath often complained, and lately more than ever". Middleton now submitted his formal written complaint, alleging that a contract for unnecessary "kerseys and cottons" had been granted, implying thereby that the contract involved a conspiracy between a conniving merchant and office insiders on the take. Middleton stated that he had obtained a copy of the contract's warrant from the Chatham clerk, then had gone into Pepys's office, located the offending instrument itself, and beheld with amazement his own signature and that of three other board members, including Pepys's—"yet no man knoweth anything of the contract." To the end of "this fraud", therefore, "all our hands were surreptitiously gained" by an office clerk. Exactly which had done this was left unspecified, but the peroration of Middleton's text pointed a clear finger:

I take of you all to consider what a condition the King's treasure is in, and how safe every man that is here at this board is, when it shall be at the liberty of a clerk to send what he pleases into the King's stores at his own price, be they good or bad, and we in whose care and trust the King hath committed so great a charge, shall with so great a neglect of our own suffer ourselves to be so much abused[.]

As it was Pepys's office that prepared and executed contracts, the clerks most likely to send anything "into the king's stores" were the underclerks of the acts. 8

After reading this written accusation, Middleton launched an extempore attack of greater specificity. His penned fulminations had been too vague to do the work he wished. As Pepys would subsequently admit, there was indeed an overage of cloth at Chatham, but Middleton seems to have known little beyond that. The resulting imprecision in the written denunciation suggests that he sensed weakness in his substantive case, and he may have gambled that an aggressive oral exposition of his thesis would carry the day. Cash was always a precious commodity in Restoration government, and when he began his argument Middleton turned the
scarcity of specie to his advantage by contending that the fraudulent contract had prevented the board from allocating "ready money to occasions more pressing." Worse, the extra cloth would now perish for lack of consumption (mildew sometimes occurred in navy storehouses, and cloth was not uncommonly ruined by rats). He then blamed Pepys for tricking him into signing the contract, if perhaps inadvertently (Middleton left the intention ambiguous)—it was Pepys's job to ensure that correct procedure had been followed with contracts, so upon seeing Pepys's signature there, Middleton had added his own on trust. But the major villain, the clerk who had undertaken the "fraudulent procuring of this contract", was William Hewer. Furthermore, Pepys's clerk had expedited the contract's payment to the perfidious merchant by pestering "Mr. Wilson the storekeeper at Chatham by letter upon letter to his [Wilson's] great disquiet" until the poor dockyard functionary yielded and sent in a bill. For his finishing flourish Middleton then, as Pepys described it indignantly in his subsequent rebuttal to the rest of the board, "closed with the public branding of my said servant with the title of knave."9

Fireworks ensued. Pepys and Middleton "fell to such high words . . . as can hardly ever be forgot; I declaring I would believe W. Hewer as soon as him, and laying the fault, if there be any, upon himself". Middleton retorted that if Hewer "were his clerk, he should lose his ears." Pepys volleyed back by declaring accusations ridiculous, but Middleton had the last word, "swearing that the King should have right in it, or he would lose his place." The combatants then parted in, it may be presumed, the fullness of wrath.10

Pepys and Hewer proceeded to arm themselves. During the evening they closeted together until midnight over the affair, concluding that Middleton's case was "so groundless" as to be "shameful to him", but Pepys failed to sleep well anyway. Counting his honor before it hatched,
Middleton was spreading word of the disagreement: two days later, on December 10, Pepys found that his favorite navy timber contractor Sir William Warren had heard of the matter and, moreover, that the surveyor "do intend to complain to the Duke of York". The more people who knew about Middleton's anticipated triumph, the greater would be the payout in reputation. But for the same reasons that drove Middleton, Pepys decided that he would be happy see his enemy take the conflict to a higher level. Indeed, the next day the clerk of the acts too decided to push the issue with York. However, he also enlisted Brouncker in his effort to "make Middleton appear a fool". The viscount, now comptroller of treasurer's accounts, promised to prevent the surveyor from going upstairs and asked Pepys also to keep the scuffle internal "on considerations relating to the office in general". Almost certainly this refers to the board's scrutiny by Brooke House (see below), and after some persuading, Pepys agreed.11

Assessments made and plan of attack formulated, on Saturday 12 December Pepys geared up for the struggle, working hard to clear his desk so he could turn his attention to the surveyor. The entirety of the sabbath was accordingly spent on "my answer to Middleton," first in the morning dictating to Hewer at the office, then home working alone until midnight. Pepys brought Hewer back on Monday night for a consultation. The following day, the 15th, the two huddled over the task from afternoon to evening, and "all day" on Wednesday 16th the pair "were at it till 2 in the morning". Finally, on the 17th at his house, Pepys set Richard Gibson and one of comptroller Sir John Mennes's clerks to begin writing "a fair copy" of the rebuttal. Given what followed, this Thursday-morning version was intended not as a final copy but as a clean draft meant to ease further revision.12 Pepys himself went into the office—there seems to have been a morning meeting he had to attend—but at noon he returned home with Hewer, where the two
principals made further adjustments to the work of their seconds "all the afternoon" and into the evening. At length Pepys satisfied himself with final revisions and retired, again at around 2:00 a.m., leaving the three others "to finish the writing it fair, which they did by sitting up most of the night". Early on Friday, December 18, Pepys rose and retrieved the now professionally prepared rebuttal from his fatigued clerks. Taking it to Brouncker, Pepys "got him to read over my paper, who owns most absolute content in it, and the advantage I have in it, and the folly of the surveyor."^{13}

The stage was now set for the kind of office theatrics which Pepys, after five years under the tutelage of Sir William Coventry and with much practice against Penn and Batten, now excelled. But the clerk of the acts was forced to face two opponents in one day: by unhappy coincidence, after lunch he had an appointment at Brooke House with one of its most formidable inquisitors, Colonel George Thomson. The prospect of dueling twice in so short a span seems to have been too much even for Pepys; he wrote in the diary that while Thomson was finding "many" errors, "I took little notice of them" (as we have seen, this was manifestly not Pepys's normal attitude toward the parliamentary commission). Then he returned to the office. A meeting was convened—and after the dramatic buildup of the past week, the confrontation that followed stands as a good candidate for the most anticlimactic moment of Pepys's entire career, at least as the diary portrays it. Though "a little brisk at the beginning", Middleton yielded at first blood, to use Pepys's characteristic and revealing swordplay metaphor: "when I come to the point to touch him, which I had all the advantages in the world to do, he become as calm as a lamb, and owned, as the whole board did, their satisfaction, and cried excuse".^{14}

What the diary omits is a view of the mammoth rebuttal which Pepys had just read out.^{15}
Pepys's (and the formally uncredited Hewer's)\(^{16}\) response comprises approximately 24 pages (Middleton's comparatively minuscule effort runs to about one-and-a-half.)\(^{17}\) Pepys set his stage by sonorously framing the issue as "a case where the honour both of the board, myself, and a servant (for whom I am accountable in matters of this trust) is to be upheld against so much seeming ill will and neglect of truth". Icily insulting Middleton along the way, Pepys then methodically demolished everything the surveyor had stated or insinuated. The clerk of the acts structured his text with numbered lists ("Objection 2d", "Objection 3d") and sprinkled these liberally with the facts so conspicuously absent from Middleton's indefinite memo. For instance, the allegedly conniving merchant, Phillip Coleby, had replaced a previous dealer in "kerseys and cottons" because Coleby was willing to offer a "3d per yard abatement in the former, and four pence in the latter," such that now the navy was getting its cloth for "2s.11d the former, and 1s.10d the latter, instead of 3s.2d and 2s.2d". Through his faithful fulfillment of his contracts, Coleby currently had "unpaid him by the King near 3000l". Therefore when "a supply of 24,000 ready money" had come into the navy's hands for summertime deployment, Coleby naturally sought remuneration. The funds were earmarked for the present operation, however, and could not be used to pay off debt. What the Navy Board could do, and did, was offer him a new contract on the ready money, which being to hand would be promptly disbursed.\(^{18}\)

Pepys's facts and figures, however, were themselves liberally interspersed with the kind of witty barbs associated more with competition at court than drudgery at the desk. Compared to what Coleby was already owed, his latest deal was niggardly at £500; this was "a case wherein the board will not be found very lavish in their charity", especially since "the surveyor himself" had thought it reasonable to do more for other merchants in similar straits "when acting singly at
Portsmouth." But let the surveyor's inconsistency be set aside in this matter. The point at issue was that Coleby had simply fulfilled the contract and then received payment precisely as it specified—quoting from the contract itself, issued 16 May: "300 pounds presently [from the £24,000 ready money], and the remainder out of the custom assignment for the month of July next". That this had been done by the book was demonstrated with evidence from an "inquiry by the treasurers' weekly returns" which Brouncker had performed at Pepys' request in his capacity as comptroller of the treasurer's accounts.19

Yet a good price and a deserving supplier did not justify buying something unnecessarily. Fraud remained a possibility: Chatham's extra supply of cloth was, after all, still sitting in its dark storeroom, idling away the time until the rats should ruin it. Of course, Middleton himself had signed the contract, and that should be sufficient justification against accusation by same. Yet "since the surveyor will have it so," Pepys wrote slyly, "I am content his hand shall stand for nothing". Meanwhile the rest of the board, whose hands did count for something, could congratulate themselves on having made a decision that was correct at the time. After the initial order for the fleet on May 4, by "three [additional] orders from his royal highness of the 7, 11, and 20 of the same month we were directed to fit for sea 2 second rate [sic] and three 3rd rates more." These were the ships for which the cloth had been intended, and the cloth was only superfluous now because of "the unexpected stop to the fleet preparations given us in June". Had not York's orders for additional deployment been superseded, the stuffs would have been used. And they would probably still be used, for Pepys had received word from Coleby that "with careful keeping these goods are ordinarily preserved for three years and more".20

Even if the contract looked justifiable, what about the signatures on the contract? Might
they still not have been obtained "surreptitiously"? Pepys reminded the board that Middleton had not only "charge[d] the fraudulent and surreptitious procurement of this contract on one of my clerks," but had also blamed "the misfortune of his signing of it to its being first signed by me". True enough that Pepys usually signed documents first in order to signify that all was in order. Was there any possibility that the clerk of the acts might have used his procedural mandate to pull a fast one? Well, Pepys observed, when we review the contract—and let the board members recall that Middleton claimed explicitly to have done so—we encounter only three signatories: Angelsey, Brouncker, and Middleton. No Pepys. "I shall not make difficulty of gratifying him," Pepys continued sardonically, "with a supposition that the contract was ill, and so ill as to join with him in lamenting that we in whose care and trust the King hath committed so great a charge, should with so great a neglect of our own suffer ourselves to be so much abused".21

But Middleton's mistake, embarrassing as it was, only cleared Pepys of having tricked Middleton into signing. The surveyor's accusation of fraud might remain valid, involving the sneaky procurement of signatures by some other means. The clerk of the acts next duly pulverized this prospect, "proving the overtness" of the Coleby agreement by tracing its formalized history. Apart from the contract itself, this history comprised six documents. First were two warrants, one to send part of the goods to Chatham, the other to Woolwich, both issued on different days from each other and on different days from the contract. Only two signatures on these latter also appeared on the contract: Brouncker's and Middleton's. Given "the industry used by the surveyor to promote your belief of the fraud", Pepys felt compelled to echo Middleton's own wording and express "amazement that the hands that signed this warrant should be the very same with those that had been surreptitiously procured to the contract". But this was only the
beginning. There was also a bill of receipt for the portion of the cloth that arrived at Woolwich; when the navy office received the bill, it too had been countersigned by Middleton. Next, and rather worse, was paperwork individually done by the surveyor who "so painfully disavows both his interest in and all remembrance of this whole matter". The cloth going to Chatham had to pass customs at Gravesend, so merchant Coleby came to the office for a certificate that would allow him to ship the material through without hindrance. Middleton, "(then alone of the whole board in the outward room) stayed the writing and signing of such a certificate," after which Pepys merely countersigned the finished item. When the cloth arrived, storekeeper Wilson wrote from Chatham to the board saying that he accepted it with reluctance because it did not match any of the approved cloth patterns he had on hand. Some board members had in fact forwarded him new patterns (apparently delayed in transit) and now sent him a note confirming that fact, also signed by Middleton (as well as Angelsey and Pepys). Here the latter stopped and requoted Middleton's squib concerning "the liberty of a clerk to send what he pleases into the king's stores". This charge, Pepys observed, "so unduly as well as scandalously laid to the reproach . . . of my clerk," was also a scandal to "the board itself," for "both they that signed and drew the contract [Angelsey and Middleton] will be found to have provided patterns solemnly sealed by the office for prevention of the evil here suggested".  

And there was a further piece of evidence, one "last act of this board I shall trouble you with". Down at Chatham, after storekeeper Wilson received the board's pattern and could match it with the new cloth, he issued a bill of receipt. When the bill arrived in the navy office, it had been signed into the record by Brouncker, Mennes—and Middleton. Actually, Pepys continued, "I could proceed to the offering you demonstrations of another kind," including "the particular
notice the comptroller must have had of these goods served in from the weekly certificates from
the yards," and the fact that the board had forced Coleby to an additional "abatement of a penny
in a yard" despite Coleby's already discounted price. Such a deliberate stipulation, Pepys noted,
surely represented "an act which as the board cannot be thought to have been surreptitiously
brought to; so will it, I conceive, sufficiently remove that . . . reproach which the surveyor in his
forgetfulness draw [sic] upon us, when he complains of 'a liberty our clerks is [sic] at, of sending
what he pleaseth into the king's stores at his own price.'" Then Pepys delivered what was
ostensibly his final blow ("[I] shall content myself to stop here") by "collecting the sum of the
written proofs already given you into the following abstract":

Table 2: Middleton

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acts</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Signed by</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contract</td>
<td>16 May</td>
<td>A B TM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant to Woolwich</td>
<td>26 Br</td>
<td>JM TM SP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant to Chatham</td>
<td>23 June</td>
<td>Br JM TM SP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bill from Woolwich</td>
<td>2 July</td>
<td>Br TM SP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certificate to Gravesend</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>TM SP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter about Patterns</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>A TM SP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chatham Bill</td>
<td>13 Auga</td>
<td>Br JM TM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Signatures to documents pertaining to Phillip Coleby's contract for "cottons and kerseys"

Legend: A = Angelsey, B or Br = Brouncker, JM = John Mennes, TM = Thomas Middleton; SP = Samuel Pepys²³

Here was clear proof of either Middleton's near-dotage or deliberate perfidy. "Of how unsafe a conversation", Pepys declaimed, was the official who would blame another for a mistake made under his own jurisdiction, "though to the abandoning of his own honour in a confession of a weakness that should betray him to the several prostitutions of his hand".²⁴ Showing as no exposition could that the only member of the Navy Board who had signed all the documents at issue was the surveyor, there in damning juxtaposition sat all the relevant sources and signatures in the rationalized symmetry of the table.

Despite his multiple promises to finish, Pepys had some way yet to go, fulfilling his role
as honorable patron by offering "two words in right of my clerk" (these added up to four pages). Pepys's systematic dismantling of Middleton's case for "surreptitious" signatures had essentially absolved Hewer along with Pepys, but Pepys, and doubtless Hewer, apparently felt that the stain which shame could leave on a reputation required that every point Middleton raised be likewise crushed. In this context, Pepys had not yet addressed the accusation that, with "letter upon letter", Hewer had browbeaten the Chatham storekeeper into issuing the bill of receipt with untoward alacrity. "I have told Hewer," wrote Pepys sternly, placing his own honor next to his servant's, "that (besides his known sobriety and credit) he is one of whom I am after 8 years continued experience of his faithfulness obliged in justice to declare that he hath never given me occasion of doubting his truth". Just to ensure that no questions remained, Pepys first spent a page comparing Coleby's contract with similar instruments to show that fraud based on quick payment was highly unlikely in this case. The capstone of his defense of Hewer, however, was an affidavit Pepys had obtained from the dockyard officer, Thomas Wilson, concerning Hewer's multitudinous importunities. Wilson testified that Hewer had written nothing "about Mr. Coleby but what any man (who was civil) would have done". Indeed, Hewer's requests had been so lacking in forcefulness that "I cannot say positively"—and here Wilson may have indulged in his own witticism—"whether those many letters were two or three". Wilson continued that he "remember[ed] only two and the best of my memory to this purpose." The worthy warehouser did aver that "if there were a 3d letter had I any hint possibly might remember the substance of it . . . but leave that to better judgments". Better judgments, at any rate, than Middleton's.

And with that, aside from two concluding sentences, Pepys's avalanche was over. It had the desired effect. The board took some time to verify "matter[s] of fact"; documents were
retrieved as the board took "recourse to as many of the original papers as either themselves or the
surveyor thought fit to call for". But then the board "unanimously owned their satisfaction
therein, the surveyor . . . desiring my excuses as being led to what he had done by the earl of
Anglesey's first mention of this matter". For "my own and [my] servant's justification," the entire
board signed an affidavit affirming that Coleby's contract had been treated with "no undue
practice". Heartily embarassed, Middleton asked that his own letter "be returned to him, which by
the board's direction being done, he forthwith with a candle set it on fire and in their presence
burnt it." Next the board called in Hewer and apologized to him. Finally, everyone "repeating
their desire to me that all dissatisfaction from what had happened on this occasion might be laid
aside, the whole matter was ended." 26 Honor had been vindicated by record and method, dishonor
banished by the immolation of one piece of paper and its replacement by another. It would be
difficult for a fiction writer to dream up a scene more illustrative of honor's power in and
involution with the Restoration civil service.

Pepys was not quite finished with the incident, however. His and Hewer's honor had been
fully satisfied, and at Middleton's expense, but the clerk of the acts did not place his trust in the
board's closing attempt at peacemaking. The very reason we can read today about that expression
of hope for no further "dissatisfaction"—the reason we have a more detailed account of the
affair's end than that provided by the diary—is because Pepys feared that injured honor might
drive Middleton to retaliate. The clerk of the acts therefore lodged with Brouncker a copy of the
board's affidavit releasing the pair from wrongdoing, accompanying that copy with a letter to
Brouncker documenting the results of the board meeting. With time, Middleton might become
emboldened as the recollection faded of how utterly he had been vanquished; he might not be
able to restrain his anger; "the weaknesses both of the memory and passions of the surveyor" might lead to a future "need of [this documentation]". Pepys's performance may have been calculated to destroy his enemy such that, ideally, the defeated could never rise again. As first-century Romans well knew, however, enemies with physical breath still in them were not so easily left behind even after an overwhelming loss in the courts or the Senate. Pepys knew it too, even with his own signal triumphs and severe setbacks yet to come.

Larger concerns than Middleton's accusations, however, had by this time forced themselves upon the clerk of the acts. Pepys closed his lengthy rebuttal by instancing not only his own but "the honor of the board also, to which all concernments of my own have and shall ever be subservient". This was courteous hyperbole, but it held more than a grain of truth. Insofar as the Navy Board not only furnished the platform for his honorable achievements as an individual but also reflected honor to him, its honor was important indeed. So was its value to his patrons Charles II and James, Duke of York, to whom he professed his sincerest duty (see Chapter 2). This explains the many references to the board's honor scattered throughout the evidence reproduced in this dissertation. And in this connection there were much greater battles looming than those within the walls of the navy office.

For "the world" was battering at the navy-office door. By the time of the face-off with Middleton, Pepys had already given a nerve-wracking, momentous speech in Parliament against the accusation of the Committee on Miscarriages concerning tickets. Pepys's session with Thomson that afternoon occasioned a disturbing reminder that similar adversities portended. In order to concentrate on honor's immediate work of the evening Pepys may have deliberately suppressed his worry about the ongoing Brooke House investigation, but the latter could not have
been far from his mind. In his letter to Brouncker, Pepys cited Brouncker's request "(on considerations relating to the office in general) which prevented my appeal . . . to his royal highness". Counterattacking Middleton before York as he had intended, rather than dealing with Middleton internally as Brouncker asked, would have done much more to advance Pepys's personal honor. Presumably envisaging the occurrence in one of the public rooms at Whitehall rather than in York's "closet," Pepys insisted that he had relinquished a golden opportunity "of letting the world know" about his "strictness and painfulness" in the execution "of my own office". Inherent in the scene, of course, would have been the publicizing of his heroic struggle "against the envy and weaknesses of some of our own number" (Middleton). But he had also looked forward to parading the "additional loss I am subjected to of asserting the honour of the office in general against its traducers abroad". Fortunately for his fellows, Pepys did not use this "happiest occasion any man in my station could . . . have wished for" to pursue the individual gain he thus imagined. The board's honor, for which two days earlier he had claimed a "subservient" tenderness, would have been significantly tarnished, and Brooke House—the "traducers"—emboldened.

This passage opens a window onto matters that were crucial to Pepys when he considered his honor at this time, especially his own work habits, entailing careful method and record-keeping, and the worry about external enemies. How serious Pepys truly was about going public is debatable; he would not merely have embarrassed the other board members but also York, whose Navy Board it was. But in passing, Pepys's posturing revealingly relates honor and method. In the politically tense world of Restoration government from Clarendon's fall through Charles's taming of the Whigs in 1682-3, Pepys's confrontation with "traducers abroad" was to be
expected. But competition's generic cast receives a more specific significance when connected with his evocation of "strictness and painfulness", a trait that none of his fellow board members shared, at least to the same degree. Pepys was correct in his claim that he (and his clerks) were shouldering the lion's share of the defense on behalf of the other members. The Middleton affair gave Pepys a chance to expostulate to the rest of the board on the urgent necessity of improving method in the rest of the office. At one point the clerk of the acts devoted two pages of his "answer" to hammering home the board's collective danger. Here Middleton was as much the vehicle as the message: "at this time of censure and inquisition," Pepys prodded, "should every other member of the board use his reputation with the like cheapness as the surveyor has done" by "disclaiming the virtue of their hands [signatures]," the board would face significant trouble.31 Documentation must be respected as it stood.

The king's service too, of course, stood to lose if administrative method was disregarded. Another piece of business involving Middleton showed "what inconveniencies the King no less than us would be subjected unto should the memory of a single officer find credit to the contradicting of a written evidence." A short time before instigating the confrontation with Pepys, Middleton had insisted that the board owed merchant John Shaw £39 per ton for hemp, but Pepys had retrieved the documentation and demonstrated that Shaw's agreement was only at £25, "preventing the loss of 280l/ which had otherwise been given away." But this was just one "consequence of giving way to the memory or non-remembrance of a particular officer to supersede or bring into question a written act of his own or others." There were worse: recall "those gentlemen whom the parliament have expressly appointed for the discovery of what is amiss amongst us". If the board failed to honor its orderly procedures, it could suffer severe
damage "should the present inquisition continue", as the commissioners might begin investigating acts of the office for which there existed fewer "records serving for justification [than] this before us chances [to have]". Sometimes the board had not kept records as well as it should, so at all costs it must defer to what it did have.\textsuperscript{32}

The point about written documentation was important enough to Pepys that he had already emphasized it once. Near the beginning of his argument, before his account of the contract's important papers, Pepys cited Navy Board minutes concerning the Coleby contract in order to highlight record-keeping deficiencies. Doubtless shaded by Pepys's continuing attendance at Brooke House, the warning was grim: "if we ourselves shall disparage their [the minutes'] testimony in cases where concurrent acts of the board [documents such as contracts and warrants] do appear, you can with less reason expect their [the minutes] being better esteemed of elsewhere, in cases (as many such may be instanced) where the honour of the board will be found unfurnished of any better support." Office procedures and policies must be strictly followed, with the unstated implication that records must be more carefully kept so "better support" might be more plentiful.\textsuperscript{33} On these proceedings depended both the king's honor and their own.

Some readers might remark that Pepys's rebuttal to Middleton certainly shares one key characteristic associated with modern bureaucracy: its text goes on and on. Fair enough, but that text places most of the elements at issue in this dissertation alongside each other with their interactions appearing more clearly in context than would be possible in any other way. Cooperation is plain to see, functioning both vertically and horizontally. Reciprocal loyalty between patron and client is illustrated on the one hand by Pepys's protection of Hewer and the master's mindfulness in taking counsel from his clerk; on the other, by the faithful service of
Hewer and Gibson as they helped prepare the defensive memorandum. Brouncker's assistance exemplifies horizontal alliances among other men of honor. The competitive aggression often fomented by honor arises in Middleton's anger over perceived insult and his envy of Pepys's dominance in the office, or very possibly both, and his assault therefor. Courage manifests itself in the steadfast refusal to back down displayed by Pepys and Hewer, in their stinging ripostes and debilitating counter-barrages. And then there is the relief of satisfaction to injured honor, clutched at so avidly, achieved at the office but sometimes out of reach in the less controllable environment outside. The attitudes, approaches, and maneuvers seen briefly in Chapter 2's glimpse of honor on Brooke House's big stage also manifest themselves here on the small. And the larger milieu impinges directly on the smaller in Pepys's lament to Brouncker over the tempting prospect of gaining honor by way of victory in front of "the world". But Pepys laid that opportunity aside and composed his "answer" for the board's eyes only, hence embodying the unity with which competing subcommunities of honor comprised by an overarching unit—the Navy Board—should face that world together if possible. Thus despite internal conflict, the group's pyramidal honor (focused locally but reflecting up to the Duke of York and, more distantly, the King) might remain untarnished.

Intertwined with all these threads of honor is the context of that government office, its ordered division of responsibility and its record-books, its quills and inkwells, the painstaking documentation of every step in the contractual process, each supporting item dated and signed. Most pieces of Pepys's data are either reproduced in full, cited as to source, or both, and we may safely assume that board members knew where to find items the sources of which were not specified. They certainly went through the motions, at least, of reviewing some of the originals.\textsuperscript{34}
The proofs of Pepys's case pile one on top of another, datum after datum like a 500-crew, 80-gun, 1295-ton, 44-foot-wide ship of the line bearing inexorably down on a sloop the entire length of which did not equal the dreadnought's breadth. Encased within numbered paragraphs, some subsections block-indented to form bulleted lists, the text is as carefully delimited as that of any modern office report. Its most incapacitating broadside is that grandsire of all abstracted information, the table, reducing the confusing density of discursive text down to symmetrical relationships that can be grasped at a glance. Yet these modern-seeming elements of scrupulous regularity are propelled by Pepys's need to defend against "scandalous reproach", to protect "my said servant", and to save "the honour of this board". The acerbic jabs at Middleton, absent or much more discreetly veiled in similar situations today within business and government organizations, are as integral to Pepys's "answer" as his data. The combined effect, much more than the sum of its parts, was designed to excoriate and mortify Middleton and leave his colleagues no choice but to return the condemnation he had flung toward Pepys upon his own head.

The derisive section in which the clerk of the acts mocks the surveyor for having claimed to look at the contract fastens honor to administration with exceptional strength. Not Rochester bandying insults could have put it more caustically in the "contract was ill, and so ill" passage, splicing the badinage with which honor was asserted at court with an everyday instrument of bureaucratic routine. But the bureaucratic context was not subordinated to courtly practice. At court the passage would likely have stopped there. The aesthetic of irony, the mordant "raillery" that could continue to be relished long after the winner's triumphant turning of the heel, would confer a more satisfying victory than the genuine truth of the matter. Pepys recognized that
other strategies would best cap a defense of honor in the bureaucracy. Statements made there, where concrete results in the king's service could be required at Parliament's hands, should be more obviously delineated. In this official record, Pepys followed his scathing gibe with a clearer assertion pointing out Middleton's "way of serving himself, without doing what himself (for better grace) did not forget to pretend to his having done, namely, the examining of the contract-book".38

Within this involution of honor and administration both local and national, what is surely most revealing is the worry disclosed by Pepys's injunctions that the board depend on its records, on the material embodiment of its methods and procedures, as justification for its decisions—as well as the concomitant brooding over insufficient documentation. That Pepys had to argue these points at all, which seem so obvious to us, suggests that they may still have not been universally accepted in the civil service of 1668.39 This incident shows how pioneering administrators such as Pepys had to continually demonstrate the efficacy of these standards much in the way that Middleton had accused Hewer of bothering the Chatham storekeeper: "letter by letter". Indeed, almost exactly a year earlier Pepys had lamented to a correspondent the necessity of "inculcating it to the board . . . which I have daily done".40

Honor was a crucial spur to Pepys's concern for bureaucratic method. What had given urgency to Pepys's comments of the year before was first the shame attendant upon blunders, and second, the ideal of faithful service: "failure in the business of books", he continued in the melancholy letter, "is a matter of infinite reproach to us as well as damage to the King". Twelve months later Middleton went down in the face of superior might—and that battlefield metaphor makes the point. Pepys's relentless promotion of modern-seeming method may have been partly
stimulated by the standards themselves as some sort of intrinsically attractive goal, but only partly, and not the major part. Much more prevalent in his evidence is a concern for his honor and that of his servant in the face of internal attack, and the honor of the board in the face of the ongoing parliamentary investigation of which he had been forcibly reminded that very day. The Middleton incident, in short, offers a remarkable snapshot of the new bureaucracy in the very throes of its birth—and as perhaps its chief midwife, the old crone of honor.
Notes to Chapter 5

1 Even earlier than the Brooke House Commission, Parliament's Committee on Miscarriages was formed in October 1667, its mandate to probe the navy for mismanagement relating to campaigns. "Tickets" were what led the Committee on Miscarriages to turn its gaze to the Navy Board by late 1667; the issue concerned the men who had sailed on campaign and so fell within the committee's purview. Parliament had reserved a certain amount of money to pay ships' crews, yet the men had been issued vouchers instead. Discharged but penniless in 1666, the sailors understandably rioted. At the time, Pepys had sympathized, writing of "the horrid shame brought on the king's service by the just clamours of the poor seamen." (Diary 19 Dec. 1666, 7:415, quotation on 416) That dishonor now came unpleasantly home to roost. For Pepys's first inkling of the Committee on Miscarriages see Diary 17 Oct. 1667, 8:484-85. At the end of February 1668 (Diary, 28 Feb., 95) the Committee on Miscarriages set an early March date to arraign the Navy Board over tickets; Pepys had only six days to prepare a defense. This occurred before a full House on March 5: Diary 5 Mar., 103-4. Pepys's own comments on the date of the speech convey nothing of its content. Synopses by MPs who took unfortunately incomplete notes are available in Doc 15 Feb. 1668, 71-75 (the date is a mistake) and The Diary of John Milward, Esq., Member of Parliament for Derbyshire, September, 1666 to May, 1668, ed. Caroline Robbins (Cambridge [Eng.]: The University Press, 1938), 5 Mar., 207-9, but both sources have been conveniently extracted in E. S. de Beer, ed., “Reports of Pepys’s Speech in the House of Commons, March 5th, 1668,” Mariner’s Mirror 14, no. 1 (January 1928): 55–58.

2 On the distinction between the Committee on Miscarriages and the Brooke House Commission (for accounts), see Robert Latham, introduction to Samuel Pepys and the Second Dutch War: Pepys’s Navy White Book and Brooke House Papers (Aldershot, England: Published by Scolar Press for the Navy Records Society, 1995), xxiii-xxiv (the latter committee was to decide whether improprieties had accompanied the disbursement of monies for the war).

3 Pepys so impressed York and Charles II when he defended them that he was never again a principal client to anyone but themselves (see Chapter 2).

4 For discussion of this weakness in John Brewer's otherwise rightfully influential work, see end of Prologue. Admittedly we will not be examining a normal workday here, but the method's example should point the way to doing so. This incident in particular lends itself to the purposes of the current argument because archival providence has preserved much more of its outlines than most early modern office events of which we have record. Here an external source (the diary) can be triangulated with a manuscript that reproduces a number of the event's attendant documents. This happenstance is highly fortuitous because the Navy Board lost much of its documentation up to 1673 in a fire of that year: J. D. Davies, Pepys’s Navy: Ships, Men and Warfare 1649-89 (Seaforth Publishing, 2008), 28.

5 Middleton assumed office on 25 Nov. 1667: NB. For Middleton's career see DNB. For Pepys's conjectures about Middleton's discontent, see SP to Navy Board, 16 Dec. 1668, NMM Phillips
PLA/19, 34. As all the various documents copied into this manuscript were created in 1668, as well as the relevant diary entries, the year will henceforth be omitted from these citations. (The month will be retained merely as a convenient way to distinguish days from folio numbers, which would otherwise become confused.) For refraining to anger Buckingham, see *Diary* 17 Jul. 1668, 9:263. For the contents of the "great letter" and its result, see Chapter 2 above.

6 For Pepys's excuse for not telling Middleton that there was no fraud, see SP to Navy Board, 16 Dec., NMM Phillips PLA/19, 24. For Middleton's account of Angelsey's report, his own confirmation of the report, his initial alert to Pepys, and subsequent reminders, see Middleton to Navy Board, 7 Dec., NMM Phillips PLA/19, 10-11.

7 In NMM Phillips PLA/19, Pepys's animadversions upon Middleton's responsibilities are in SP to Navy Board, 16 Dec., 27; Middleton's upon Pepys's are in Middleton to Navy Board, 7 Dec., 11. For a brief overview of Navy Board compartmentalization, see J. D. Davies, *Pepys's Navy: Ships, Men and Warfare 1649-89* (Seaforth Publishing, 2008), 27, and for more detail that includes dockyard administrators such as the storekeeper who features later in this example, see David Hannay, *A Short History of the Royal Navy*, vol. 1 (London: Methuen & Co., 1898), 309-313. For another detailed account, this one with the emphasis on the clerkship of the acts and how Pepys expanded its remit, see Knighton, 27-30 and 49-53.

8 The written accusation is Middleton to Navy Board, 7 Dec., NMM Phillips PLA/19, 10-12. For Pepys's comments on the day of Middleton's accusations, see *Diary* 8 Dec., 9:388.

9 For Middleton's exposition of his memo see Pepys's recounting in SP to Navy Board, 16 Dec., NMM Phillips PLA/19, 12-13, and for a more thorough explanation by Pepys of his responsibility concerning office procedure, see also 21. For problems with cloth in navy storage, see Davies, *Pepys's Navy*, 80. It should be noted that Pepys's diary entry, quoted above, confirms that Middleton had previously hinted at Hewer's guilt. But as Pepys records nothing of the matter prior to December 8, these hints were presumably not very striking, probably consisting of insinuations vague enough to be easily disclaimed and thus offering little purchase for a response.

10 *Diary* 8 Dec. 1668, 9:388.

11 For the late-night conference after Middleton's "storm", see *Diary* 8 Dec., 9:389; Warren's warning that Middleton was about to approach York, 10 Dec., 390; Brouncker's plea to keep the brouhaha within the board, SP to Brouncker, 19 Dec., NMM Phillips PLA/19, 37, and see also *Diary* 11 Dec., 9:391.

12 The document's length would have required at least two skilled scribes writing quickly in order to finish a full copy in four to six hours (see below).

13 For Pepys working extra so he could spend the next day composing a rebuttal of the charges, 12 Dec., 1668, 9:392; doing so until midnight, 13 Dec., 392; consulting at night again with Hewer, 14 Dec., 393; the probable morning meeting and all afternoon with Hewer, 15 Dec., 393;
all day until 2:00 a.m. with Hewer, 16 Dec., 393; the December 17 marathon with Gibson, Hewer, and Mennes's clerk, 394. The office meeting Pepys attended that morning may be inferred by his gesture in the rebuttal at a piece of business "arising yesterday", mentioned in a way that assumes all the other board members know about it: SP to Navy Board, 16 Dec., NMM Phillips PLA/19, 28. For the consultation with Brouncker the following morning, see Diary 18 Dec., 9:394. After reading Chapter 3, readers may find it odd that Thomas Hayter does not appear here, but as he was Pepys's chief clerk, it would have made sense for Pepys to assign most of his and Hewer's normal work to Hayter for the week. Analogizing backward can be hazardous, but in a modern office Hayter would be the type of employee possessed of the seniority and, more importantly, the experience and knowledge necessary to carry on without usually consulting Pepys; most importantly, Hayter would have been able to identify unerringly any decisions and steps which he could not or should not take on his own, and would know whether they could be postponed or needed immediate attention. Thus leaving Hayter in charge (the way Pepys sometimes later left Hewer and Atkins in charge when he was away from the office as Secretary of the Admiralty) would have freed Pepys as much as was possible to concentrate on Middleton. Note also Hayter had also been made purveyor of petty emptions by this time (see Chapter 3), so he had extra responsibilities in that direction. Juggling his own duties as chief clerk and purveyor along with Pepys's may have required him to put in as much overtime as the others. The reason for the involvement of Mennes's clerk is less easily explained, especially since Mennes may have sided with Middleton in this affair (see below). Pepys interpreted Mennes's near-complete incompetence as a sign of what today would be regarded as early-stage dementia (see e.g. "dotage and folly" in Diary 12 Mar. 1664, 5:80 or 2 Mar. 1668, 9:100). Some modern commentators have attentuated this; see e.g. Geoffrey Callender, “Sir John Mennes,” Mariner’s Mirror 26, no. 3 (January 1940): 281-3. However, if Pepys was correct, even if the comptroller was at the office that day he may not have noticed the clerk's absence. In addition, it may be that when Mennes's clerks needed help of the kind that we have seen Pepys furnishing to his own, they could not depend on their weak-minded master even if his heart was in the right place. It also may simply be that Mennes did not come into the office that day; he tended to be absent more often than not. And by early 1668, while Pepys did not wholly dominate the board, he was fast becoming its most influential member. Under such circumstances it is plausible to suppose that Mennes's clerks might have sided over to Pepys's side of the navy office, asking for aid and promising in return whatever service they could offer in the future.


15 Pepys mentions nothing of its presentation in the diary, but in a followup memorandum to Brouncker written to formally document the meeting Pepys speaks of "my answer of the 16th... being read": SP to Brouncker, 19 Dec., NMM Phillips PLA/19, 35.

16 As we have seen, Hewer may have played an important part in composing this document. In one diary entry, of an evening, Pepys writes that he was with Hewer "to talk" (14 December; for citations to these entries see note to relevant paragraph above). And the last day they worked on it, the seventeenth, Pepys wrote of "examining with W. Hewer", which sounds like genuine collaboration. But they did not co-write every time they worked on the "answer," since on 13
December Pepys specifies that he dictated to the clerk. In all other entries the type of labor performed by Hewer is unspecified, so it is impossible to tell how much he actually contributed and how often he functioned as an amanuensis. In the face of this ambiguity, and for the sake of convenience, the following discussion accepts the text's formal attribution and treats it as if written solely by Pepys.

17 The paper is approximately the size of modern A4, and the writing is of average size for seventeenth-century government documents—not inordinately large. The present writer's transcript in 11-point Times New Roman type on 8½-x-11" paper comes in at 14 full single-spaced pages, not including the table (see below).

18 16 May 1668, Navy Board and Phillip Coleby, contract for cottons and kerseys, NMM Phillips PLA/19, 17. For the opening statement invoking honor, see SP to Navy Board, 16 Dec., 13; for the board's decision to grant Coleby the new contract, 14-15.

19 For Coleby's original agreement and unpaid bills, see SP to Navy Board, 16 Dec., 13-14; quotation concerning the board's "charity", 19.

20 For Pepys's dig at Middleton's signature, see SP to Navy Board, 16 Dec., NMM Phillips PLA/19, 17; the validation of the contract on the basis of York's orders in May, 17-18; preservation of the cloth, 20.

21 SP to Navy Board, 16 Dec., NMM Phillips PLA/19, 20. Why Pepys's hand was lacking on this contract is unclear, as he was at the office that day (Diary 16 May 1668, 9:201), but it was normal for the board to issue such documents without signatures from all members. His failure to sign this one, he observed, was unexpectedly fortuitous: "such an accident as that (whatever it was) which by preventing my doing it here, hath given me so fortunate a proof of that ill use designed to be made of it" (SP to Navy Board, op. cit.).

22 For the two warrants and the Woolwich bill, see SP to Navy Board, 16 Dec., NMM Phillips PLA/19, 21-22; the certificate to Chatham, Middleton and SP, 9 Jul. 1668, 23 (Pepys's comments on same page); the exchange with the Chatham storekeeper concerning patterns, Thomas Wilson to Navy Board, 3 Jul. 1668, and [Earl of] Angelsey, Thomas Middleton, and SP to Wilson, both in 23; Pepys's gloss on the patterns, SP to Navy Board, 16 Dec., 24 (my best guess concerning the nature of these patterns is that they were samples of weft and weave).

23 By this time William Penn was no longer a member of the Navy Board. He had signed the original Coleby contract but only in his capacity as comptroller of victualling accounts, to which post he had been demoted in 1667 (NB). Pepys seems to have deemed only board members as having sufficient status to be included in the table.

24 For the storekeeper's final bill, see SP to Navy Board, 16 Dec., NMM Phillips PLA/19, 23; notifications to the comptroller, 24; Coleby's further discount, 23-4; table of signatures, 24; aspersions on Middleton's honor, 27.
For Pepys's avowal of support to Hewer, see SP to Navy Board, 16 Dec., NMM Phillips PLA/19, 30; ensuing comparative arguments, 31; Pepys's request and the Chatham storekeeper's affidavit, SP to Thomas Wilson, 11 Dec., 32, and Thomas Wilson to SP, 12 Dec., 33.

For the board's perusal of documentation and its unanimous "satisfaction", see SP to Brouncker, 19 Dec., NMM Phillips PLA/19, 34; Middleton's apology, 35; the board's affidavit, Middleton burning his letter, apology to Hewer, and general hope for future goodwill on both sides, 36.

For Pepys's worry about repercussions see SP to Brouncker, 19 Dec., NMM Phillips PLA/19, 35. Middleton apparently preferred not to undergo such plenary discomposure a second time: Pepys later found him good company (Diary 27 Mar. 1669, 9:499-500), and they cooperated to reform navy court-martials (1, 3, 6 Apr. 1669, 9:505-6, 508, 510-11).

For "the honor of the board also" at the end of Pepys's rebuttal to Middleton, see SP to Navy Board, 16 Dec., NMM Phillips PLA/19, 34.

See above.

SP to Brouncker, 19 Dec., NMM Phillips PLA/19, 37.

SP to Navy Board, 16 Dec., NMM Phillips PLA/19, 27. Much has been said in the previous chapters concerning Pepys's burden of navy-office defense, but see also Pepys's complaint to York in Diary 14 Feb. 1668, 9:69 about "the troublesome life we lead, and particularly myself, by being obliged to such attendances every day as I am, on one committee or another." Or as he met with the board to discuss the defense concerning tickets: "to my great vexation I find my Lord Brouncker prepared only to excuse himself, while I that have least reason to trouble myself, am preparing with great pains to defend them all": 3 Mar., 100.

For Shaw's contract, see SP to Navy Board, 16 Dec., NMM Phillips PLA/19, 27-8; consequence of allowing memory to supercede documentation, 28; the Parliamentary committee, 29; lack of documentation on other matters, 28.

SP to Navy Board, 16 Dec., NMM Phillips PLA/19, 15.

Aside from Pepys's reference to the "contract-book" (below) and Brouncker's "treasurers' weekly returns", see Pepys's assertion when discussing the Gravesend certificate, "I am prepared to show you not only the entry of this certificate in my book but the original also, which for your fuller satisfaction I have recovered of the master": SP to Navy Board, 16 Dec., NMM Phillips PLA/19, 23. For another example see an item not discussed here, a bill of imprest for Coleby's payment "lying with Mr. Waith" (15). This was Robert Waith, paymaster to the navy's treasurer: see his entry in Diary vol. 10 Companion, s.v.

The capital ship described here is the Prince Royal, a first-rate, the English navy's largest type, though of the first-rates this was not the biggest specimen. For crew and guns, see Davies,
Pepys's Navy, 41; tonnage and breadth, Cat. 1:256 and 266. Sloops were two-masted vessels, the smallest ship employed in regular service during the Restoration. Most were slightly longer, but several were shorter along the keel than the Prince's width: Davies, Pepys's Navy, 58, and Cat. 1:292.

36 Not all of Pepys's insults have been quoted here.


38 SP to Navy Board, 16 Dec., NMM Phillips PLA/19, 21.

39 They were certainly paid little attention by the inhabitants of Tangier with regard to property rights when Pepys was sent to help supervise the base's evacuation in 1683. The legal claims of "even the people of most understanding among them," Pepys wrote, were characterized by "a habit of disorder and forgetfulness of all method and discipline . . . taking such evidence for their security as would not be worth sixpence in Westminster Hall": TP 27 Sept. 1683, 25.

40 SP to Sir Thomas Harvey, 4 Dec. 1667, in FC 182.
Chapter 6: Honor in the Bureaucracy

Was Samuel Pepys an anomaly? The glimpses he presented of his associates and competitors, and of their own testimony, suggest that in his care for honor he was not unique within the larger courtly world nor, more importantly, naval administration. Other men too stood on their honor as they executed bureaucratic business. But the significance of Pepys's honor for larger questions about transitions to modern ways of thinking and performing (see Conclusion) would be significantly undermined if his behaviors and responses were not shared in other branches of the civil service. What about them? In general, could they have been significantly less honor-bound?

The present project lacks space to address this question fully, but as a preliminary answer this chapter briefly demonstrates the operation of honor in the office work of the secretaries of state; of Roger Whitley, England's deputy postmaster-general during Pepys's first tenure as secretary of the Admiralty; and of William Blathwayt, secretary to the committee for trade and plantations during (roughly) Pepys's second stint as secretary. In a final parallel with the chapters on Pepys, which ended by scrutinizing the 1668 episode with Middleton, this chapter closes with the discussion of a revealing episode in the ordnance office at the beginning of the eighteenth century.

I

The first of these extra-naval loci offers the softest target, the branch of administration in which old honor might be most expected to survive. Not only did the office of the two secretaries of state oversee high diplomacy with all its protocols and courtesies to foreign dignitaries, but it
held direct responsibility for national security. Were this unit to be found wanting in honor the blow to the dissertation's argument would be severe, so a confirming glance is required. But the secretarial office does not disappoint. The oath of the principal secretaries was veritably larded with honor, requiring them "to be a true and faithful servant unto the King's majesty",

not [to] know or understand of any manner of thing to be attempted, done or spoken against his majesty's person, honour, crown, or dignity royal; but you shall let and withstand the same, to the uttermost of your power . . . . You shall to your uttermost bear faith and allegiance unto the King's majesty, and shall assist and defend all jurisdictions, preeminences and authorities granted to his majesty and annexed to the crown by act of Parliament or otherwise, against all foreign princes, persons, prelates, states or potentates."¹

Some, at least, of the secretaries' subordinates seem to have ably supported their masters in fulfilling this mandate. In 1674 Pepys congratulated the consul at Algiers "in his present difficult employment" with the turbulent North African statelet for brokering a recent agreement with "honour".² If William Bridgeman, clerk to secretary of state Arlington until 1674, is to be believed, most of the diplomats his masters attempted to manage were rather lacking in this regard: "all nations think slightly of us for the choice of our ministers abroad, not speaking to our honour of any of them". But Bridgeman may have been denigrating rivals, and in any case by insinuating a lack of honor in others he was by implication asserting his own appreciation and perhaps possession of that commodity. This orientation was also demonstrated when he approvingly observed to Pepys that it was a felony for the King's soldiers and sailors to beg (implying either that such a resort would cast aspersions on the King's lordship, sully the honor of the King's arms, or both).³

Bridgeman's employer Arlington and Sir Joseph Williamson, Arlington's undersecretary from 1662-1674, both had their own subcommunities of honor. Williamson was Arlington's
protégé so the two men did not compete with each other, but the subcommunity of each viewed their opposite numbers much as Pepys's group had viewed Batten's a few years earlier (see Chapter 4). In the early 1670s when Williamson was out of the office, his underclerks Henry Ball and Robert Yard complained of the scurvy treatment they were receiving from Arlington's clerks. For example, when Williamson's clerks asked Bridgeman about an important piece of mail for their master which they expected to arrive that day and which they needed to deal with immediately, Bridgeman feigned ignorance. Williamson's servants learned that the relevant item had indeed reached the office only because of an offhand mention by the doorkeeper. Williamson himself can be found acting the solicitous master in 1673 when he went on a diplomatic mission to Cologne, stipulating a solid position under Arlington for Yard and Ball during the time they would have been more vulnerable to the bullying of Arlington's staff, apparently to the extent that they feared dismissal.

Competition seems to have been as fierce in the secretariat as it was in the navy office. Williamson's care turned out to be necessary as the Bridgeman coterie incessantly attempted to undermine their office rivals: "they endeavour all they can to run me into errors," Yard wrote of the opposing group. Bridgeman took "many occasions to find fault with the writing and style of the [London] Gazette" that Yard was producing, and then Bridgeman attempted to make the criticisms come true by "keeping up from us all kind of letters which come to their hands," the lack of which would undermine the reputation of Williamson and Yard's newsletter. Bridgeman's attack then branched outward to the Stationers' Office, which had duties pertaining to government publications such as the Gazette, but unfortunately for Bridgeman the stationer's official he had to go through was a Williamson ally. This was Thomas Newcombe, who wished
Williamson "honor and success" and promised to "stir not a foot" until Williamson told him what kind of response he should give to Bridgeman's incursion. Inside the office and out Williamson's protective umbrella seems to have been strong enough to fend off such storms, and as a faithful servant, Yard worked hard not just to generally do a good job but also to get Williamson's salary arrears paid. When Williamson fell during the same Popish-Plot stresses that downed Pepys, like various clients of the former admiralty secretary (see Chapter 4) Yard, though managing to retain his position, remained in loyal contact with Williamson.

But if the state secretariat does not disappoint hopes of honor, it does disappoint expectations that honor and efficient administration could not mix. They might seem to have conflicted when Henry Ball resented the forced intrusion into Williamson's office of one "Mr. Charles, my Lady Portsmouth's gent", a beneficiary of the duchess's very powerful good lordship at the expense of the existing subcommunity. But effective bureaucracy seems to have had its own honor-based defenses. Ball sneered that the new man could produce only four acceptable newsletters per day as opposed to 13 to 16 by his fellows, and it seems rather a stretch to attribute coincidence to the fact that the personnel archives hold no trace of this Charles. Even if Ball's comment was rank hyperbole, it suggests that Charles's officemates found ways to shame him which would have been too trivial to merit intervention by higher powers but would have made the workplace most uncomfortable. Voluntary withdrawal in the face of overwhelming, if largely intangible, opposition probably became an attractive option. If Ball was correct in his assessment of Charles's abilities, honor seems to have helped eliminate a drag on the team and thus overcame the inefficiency that outside pressure might otherwise have fostered.

Williamson's example certainly encouraged effective work in the office. He has been
described as "the outstanding example of a ministerial drudge" who had "an exceptionally methodical mind", "an eye for detail", and a mania for knowledge that equaled Pepys's. These characteristics impelled the secretary to create "a strict discipline in office practice leading to a division of labor and a systematic order." Pepys himself seems to have recognized a kindred spirit in Williamson, of whom the diarist recorded, "the more I know, the more I honour."\textsuperscript{11} Williamson's influence seems to have lingered in the office after his Popish-Plot departure: packets of copious letters preserved at the Kent History and Library Centre sent during the 1690s from his former client Robert Yard to Alexander Stanhope, William III's envoy to Madrid,\textsuperscript{12} substantiate with daunting abundance the proposition that diligence in duty and attention to detail were characteristics that could be found in other offices besides Pepys's.\textsuperscript{13} But Joseph Williamson's historian has well noted that the Weberian lens through which "we tend to see efficiency per se as the ultimate goal in administration . . . . may well be anachronistic." Instead, efficiency was often "a byproduct of a drive towards something more significant in [seventeenth-century administrators'] lives—increased power, respect and social status." Indeed, perhaps the line written in all of Restoration England that best illustrates the combination of honor and bureaucracy was in a letter of recommendation to Williamson: the prospective clerk was described as "one ready to drudge for you in the most Herculean labor of the pen".\textsuperscript{14}

II

At the opposite end of the expectational spectrum from the state secretariat, the post office should be a much tougher nut for the present argument to crack, but it too turns out to have been laced with honor. The post office has been singled out as one of the most modern--leaning of
seventeenth-century government's "new mechanisms", and within it, Roger Whitley, England's deputy postmaster-general from 1672-1677, has been classified together with Pepys as one of the avant-garde "middle-ranking office-holder[s]". Whitley's correspondence would certainly seem to support these views. His fundamental dictate for postmasters was "discharge your duty and observe the rules", but he encouraged innovation that might conduce toward efficiency. He put nearly as much value on gathering knowledge, keeping records, and meritorious performance as Pepys, and in an echo of Pepys and Coventry's surprise dockyard inspections (see Chapter 2) Whitley also sent occasional "officers" from the center to the provinces to keep postmasters on their toes and provide on-the-spot training. He used these strategies to run an administrative empire as far-flung in its own way as the navy and arguably as complex. Yet despite his devotion to order and regularity in the postal service—or perhaps at this point in the study, might we say "therefore"?—Roger Whitley cared a great deal about honor. His commonplace books are extant and are valuable for pointing up ideas Whitley considered important. Though by no means systematic nor comparable to the more compendious check performed by Pepys's diary, Whitley's jottings do show that honor was a topic with which he was much exercised.

Some of the maxims Whitley chose to record for his private contemplation sketch a view of honor articulating the medieval framework in which the honor consists mainly in reputation and in which quintessentially honorable deeds are done either battle or in governance. "What ill can be feared from an honorable man?" Whitley asks rhetorically, perhaps presuming steadfast adherence to the word of honor. "To purchase immortal honor," he writes, perhaps rather optimistically, "it is necessary that all one's actions be great." "Honor is the desire of great courages," he continues. "Honor is the only object of great spirits and dearer to them than their
lives." Indeed, "[t]here remains nothing to lose for him that hath lost his reputation; he dies too late that survives his honor".  Whitley finds it fitting to record Henry IV’s words of lordship to the Estates General: the French king promised to "receive your councils, to believe them and to follow them", and professed a "violent love I bear to my subjects" which "makes me find all things easy and honorable."  And at the end of his largest commonplace book, as its last item, Whitley sets down the wholly traditional view based on lineage, martial valor, and perhaps most tellingly, governance (catalogued as honorable by Mervyn James): "Honor ought to be conferred out of a consideration of birth, for the service of the sword, or the dignity of office".  But of the various aphorisms Whitley recorded perhaps two are most broadly applicable to his government work; both reflected the dual impulse to honor and knowledge evinced by Pepys. The first of these features "glory" and stresses its achievement through information-based action: "Glory consists both in knowing and in doing."  The second aphorism reverses the emphasis of the first, putting the greater weight on honor: though "accompanied by wisdom" to be sure, the "zeal of honor ought to be maintained".

The post office's certainly was under Whitley's administration; at least his rhetoric put a zeal for honor on center stage. Like Pepys, Whitley was at pains to place "great . . . value on my word" when interacting with his subordinates, and unless modern readers have perused Whitley's commonplace books, they may be surprised to encounter the heroic manner in which the deputy postmaster-general construed his organization, writing to one sub-postmaster of how "we work and travail night and day . . . our hazards and charge both by land and sea".  An issue which to modern eyes may seem purely regulatory, the accurate assessment of a letter's cost (based on number of sheets and paper size), was for Whitley only partly so: it was indeed a
matter of "preserving the right"—the correct fee—but apparently as important was the "reputation of this office." And the exhortations with which he urged postmasters to greater efforts at transporting the mail on time often included honor as a reason for doing so. For example, the newly installed sub-postmaster of Gretabrigg (probably the modern Great Bridge, Staffordshire), was adjured to be "careful in your employment for the satisfaction of the country, [and] the honor and interest of the office". Whitley also expected that "if the postmasters have any concern for the honor and good of the office", deliveries in eastern Kent would speed up.

As in Pepys's office, in the post office honor (and its converse, shame) could serve as a vehicle for reproof as well as encouragement. Whitley warned one contumacious postmaster, "be assured that I will be as industrious to preserve the honour and interest of this office as you are to undermine it." Another who scrimped to send the mails "on a horse not worth 10 shillings" which could travel only at the snail's pace of two mph was chastised about "the great shame of your employment". And after submitting inadequate documentation, Postmaster Neal learned that in Roger Whitley's post office as on Samuel Pepys's Navy Board, honor could depend directly upon good records: "let me oblige you for the future to send me a more exact and perfect list as well for the satisfaction of the merchants as reputation of the office". Even a normally reliable postmaster who had accrued a significant amount of credit on Whitley's intangible books of obligation was severely castigated for causing "great dishonor and damage" when he allowed plenipotentiary letters to proceed by normal carrier rather than express during the urgent days of the Second Dutch War.

But that postmaster was not sacked: the scaffolding of patron-client relations held as firm in Whitley's post office as in Pepys's navy. At the top of honor's chain, of course, was the King.
Not only did Whitley, as did Pepys, often refer to his organization as "His Majesty's service" but when he felt that postmasters—especially deputy postmasters—had trespassed regulations egregiously, he could threaten them with a direct line to Charles. Sometimes he would also promise to intercede with the King for various benefits. Below the King was the Earl of Arlington, secretary of state and titular Postmaster General, and sometimes Whitley would approach him as well on behalf of local postmasters. But these figures usually remained distant. Whitley was the patron who mattered in the post office. Openly articulating the reciprocal quid-pro-quo of honor relationships, he wrote to one postmaster, "let the kindness you have for me appear in . . . using your best endeavors [for me] . . . which will oblige me to express my thankfulness to you in all good offices of friendship". Dispensing largesse in order to encourage one (unspecified) "improvement", Whitley promised that he "would not stick for a Gazette or one or two other civilities if I found the business well-managed". Relief from the obligation to quarter soldiers was another benefit Whitley commonly bestowed in reward for or expectation of faithful service.

Like Pepys, Whitley sometimes forecast unspecified future benefits so as to extend the chain of honorable obligation into the future, although in the post office as in the navy the chain's reciprocal links could sometimes snap. In response to the efforts of one vigorous postmaster Whitley promised, "I will find some way to evidence to you how sensible I am of your civilities." To another correspondent, perhaps nervous, he wrote reassuringly, "I will lay no man aside that discharges his duty carefully and honestly". However, like Pepys's, Whitley's protection and aid would be withdrawn if a local postmaster persisted in obtusely poor performance. "Expect no connivance [on your behalf from me] henceforward," Whitley wrote
after Watts at Hartfordbridge was a full 12 hours late sending out one of his mailbags, "if anything shall fall out contrary to your expectation". But contrary expectations could surprise Whitley too, since honor's moral autonomy conferred the power of breakage upon client as well as patron. When Postmaster Lodge of Deal accepted a presumably more remunerative position with customs, Whitley lamented, "it is no small trouble to me . . . I am sorry for it". There followed a remarkable attempt to retain patronage of a highly valued client in a manner that would be unthinkable in today's developed governments unless, perhaps, the object is espionage. About two weeks later Whitley wrote to the new customs official thus: "If I can do anything here to requite you, you shall find me ready . . . I know it may lie in your power to oblige me in the capacity you are in, in the custom house there . . . for the good of the office I will gratify you, or give you a certain salary, that you may see how great a value I have for you, and how much I desire that you may still have dependence on me".

Lodge's removal to a different branch of government highlights the types of forces that external factors could exert on internal workings. The post office did not exist in a vacuum; honor pushed against the organization at all levels of the hierarchy starting with Whitley. Like Pepys, he was very much out in "the world." As the post office's effective chief administrator, Whitley had to do business with other government units and social groups. This type of concern explains why he overrode the Northallerton postmaster's recommendation against establishing a new station in Richmond: there was a clamor of "many honorable and worthy persons" for the measure. To increase his efficacy when dealing with such external groups, Whitley would have been able to expand his range of honor-bound obligations by indebting influential third parties when he accepted their beneficiaries into his service. This is may be why several of Whitley's
local postmasters had been recommended by a "friend" of Whitley's, usually "honourable", "honoured", or a "gentleman". Sometimes the beneficent influence of such patrons could follow a postal worker into the office; Postmaster Dounham got a second chance when "my honored friend Colonel Williams spoke to me in your behalf, for whose sake I shall pass by these great miscarriages in hopes of more care and diligence hereafter". But external patrons might be transmuted into a double-edged sword when a postmaster misstepped; honor's reflective nature meant that Whitley could threaten a doubled portion of shame, not only that which erring parties would bring upon themselves but also that which they would splatter upon their sponsors.

Sometimes such blandishments, positive or negative, did not seem to work as effectively as might be hoped. To Deputy Postmaster Houseman at Dover, whom Whitley regarded as especially reliable, the deputy postmaster-general complained of "my hard fortune, that I cannot be more prevalent with [the postmasters of Dover, Canterbury, and Sittingbourne] for their own reputation and interest as well as the good of this office". But as Pepys would doubtless testify of Southerne and Burchett, not all subordinates could be Housemans or Lodges, nor would rhetoric always strike home even when backed by a powerfully hegemonic mentality. What counted was that Whitley did not miss often enough to matter. These were the best tools he had, and given the Restoration post office's general success, they were more than adequate to the task.

III

William Blathwayt, another of Pepys's acquaintances from other units of the late Stuart administration, was yet another civil servant to whom modern scholarship would impute little
honor. If Williamson and Whitley can be seen as analogs to Pepys, of contemporary bureaucrats Blathwayt was the nearest to an outright clone, credited with doing for the army administration what Pepys did for the navy. Blathwayt began as a clerk with a diplomatic mission to Holland—his knowledge of Dutch was a rare accomplishment in England, which Pepys once took advantage of—but under the patronage of his uncle Thomas Povey, Sir Joseph Williamson, and Pepys's friend Sir Robert Southwell, Blathwayt became a clerk for the privy council committee on trade and plantations in 1675. Blathwayt's paternal line had been London tradesmen for generations, and like Pepys he hailed from an immediate family of solid urban middling-sorts (Blathwayt's father was a London lawyer ruined by the civil wars). Similarly possessed of a nearly superhuman power to concentrate on paperwork, executing his duties by way of "careful planning and prodigious industry" as well as the emphasis on information shared also by Williamson and Pepys, Blathwayt too seems the epitome of the new urban cog in the bureaucratic machine. In one respect he was even more the archetypal bureaucrat than either the secretary of state or the secretary of the admiralty, the courtly smoothness of Williamson and the razor-edged tongue of Pepys being conspicuously absent in this civil servant whom William III singled out as "dull". But if Blathwayt lacked Pepys's quick wit, he did not lack Pepys's quickness to the anger of competitive aggression, beginning a stiff office rivalry directly upon commencing his career with Sir William Temple's embassy to the Hague in 1668. Temple's chief clerk, Thomas Downton, attempted "to make me [ridiculous] upon all occasions . . . treats me as a cipher". How Blathwayt met this challenge is not recorded, but somehow he forced Downton to retreat.

Skillful conversation was clearly not a must for honorable conduct; Blathwayt like Pepys
did business through patron-client relationships forged with subordinates. He met American colonist Joseph Dudley, for example, in 1683 when the latter arrived in England as an agent of Massachusetts to defend the colony’s charter against attempts by the Lords of Trade to amend it. Dudley had also taken up a career in government by that time on the Massachusetts court of assistants. Because one of Blathwayt’s hats at trade and plantations was surveyor and auditor-general of crown revenue in America, Dudley had to apply to him regarding the Massachusetts business. Dudley’s larger mission did not go well, but the relationship he forged with Blathwayt would stand him in good personal stead. When their charter was revoked in 1684, Dudley’s compatriots in Massachusetts blamed him for the disaster, alleging that he had traded in his Puritan principles for pecuniary advantage. The blame was unfair. Dudley’s mission to England had little hope of success from the beginning: the King and his councilors had already made up their minds on the matter. The accusation itself, however, was not wholly unfounded. Dudley’s biographer fails to remark his connection to Blathwayt at this juncture, but a letter written by Dudley in August 1683, immediately prior to his departure for America, strongly hints that the two men had established an understanding—and this understanding was couched in terms of patronage. Dudley represents Blathwayt as a master magnanimous both to him (Dudley) and to his fellows. The colonist tenders an "acknowledgement of your . . . favor for me in my attendance here" and alludes to Blathwayt’s "respects and care for them [the Massachusetts colonists] if they can be wise for themselves" (presumably by accepting Whitehall’s political injunctions without protest)—the caveat "if they can be wise" reflecting the characteristic reciprocal economy of the honor bond, wherein good lordship was to be met with loyalty, each party receiving a benefit that made the relationship worthwhile. For his part, as a return on Blathwayt’s
"favor," Dudley promises to "always bear a grateful sense thereof upon my mind" and to "sincerely endeavor his Majesty’s service and satisfaction at home". Portraying himself as eager to begin this service, he urges Blathwayt to command the Massachusetts legislature to fulfill the King’s desires and assures Blathwayt that he (Dudley) will "attune our government at home."

When Dudley wishes Blathwayt well, the colonist describes his new patron as exemplifying the ideal of honorable service to which this new client aspires—"I wish you all the advance of honor that your faithful service to his Majesty doth at all times deserve"—and also pledges to maintain their own more personal relationship, "kiss[ing] your hand sometimes by a line or two."61

A few months afterward, presumably as soon as Dudley had something praiseworthy of himself to report, his quill duly puckered up for Blathwayt’s hand in order to strengthen their tie and portray himself as a faithful servant. The surveyor again exhibits himself as the ideally honorable man: "I was highly satisfied . . . both of your great care and faithfulness of his Majesty’s service and of your candor and goodness to myself." Dudley’s assertion here that he had evaluated Blathwayt is of a piece with the honorable person’s moral autonomy; no matter how disparate the respective ranks of persons of honor, it was incumbent upon each to make his or her own decisions about matters of honor, including whether a higher-ranking individual was worthy of one’s service. Dudley concludes that he "therefore can with all freedom give you a full account of our present sullen proceedings." These turn out to feature Dudley fulfilling his earlier promise to "attune our government at home" by having formally presented the London proceedings to the Massachusetts Assembly and advising that body to attenuate its recalcitrant stance.62

In the same letter, after offering this proof of his own "care and faithfulness for his
Majesty’s service,” Dudley began pushing for the reciprocal reward that a good master should provide under such circumstances. Dudley did this by suggesting that native colonists should be appointed to posts in the soon-to-be-reorganized government because the locals will obey such men more willingly than a stranger from across the water. Although he refrained from declaring his own candidacy, the implication seems clear. A little short of a year later, Dudley heightened his claim to honor, declaring that his assiduous support of Whitehall’s policy had so angered his compatriots that he had lost his reputation—in the context of honor, a grievous consequence indeed, although balanced by the bond of honor between himself and the King (through the conduit provided by Blathwayt): "I shall be joyful for that I desire nothing more than in all things to approve my good allegiance and duty to His Majesty."\(^6^3\) Four months later, sated with merely Platonic joys, or perhaps feeling that he had laid foundations sufficient to bear the weight of a more direct approach, Dudley abandoned the pretense of coyness. "I did always refuse to stand trial with [i.e. oppose] his majesty," Dudley writes, and this loyalty "hath procured me the hatred of factions and ill-minded men." A truly honorable master such as the kind Dudley had declared Blathwayt to be could not with impunity scruple to requite such costly service, as Dudley may have meant to imply when he proceeded with the following blunt request: "if by your honor’s favor I might be presented to sustain any office of tolerable profit and not beyond my ability to manage, I should endeavor therein faithfully to serve His Majesty and acknowledge your respect and favor to me."\(^6^4\)

Whether or not Dudley intended that line as a notice that his loyalty to Blathwayt needed to be strengthened by a tangible demonstration of patronage, Blathwayt came through the following year. Pending the selection and arrival of a regularly appointed royal governor, the
Lords of Trade sent instructions for the establishment of a temporary government with Dudley as interim head. "[T]hat I do sustain any share, much more the quality of President and Vice Admiral, I must attribute to your own undeserved good opinion of me, which I shall always remember," Dudley enthused when the instructions arrived. He then affirmed the new obligation devolving upon him: "[I] hope a good settlement, and the peoples’ obedience to his majesty’s commands, will enable me to pay the good presentment I have thereof to your hand." Good results from the man Blathwayt had sponsored would strengthen Blathwayt’s position at Whitehall, increasing his "credit" with his immediate superiors and the King, ultimately accruing honor to himself. Dudley would thereby have fulfilled his (Dudley’s) debt to his patron.

When Dudley entered upon the duties of his new office, he lost no time in portraying his execution of the same as consummately faithful. Like Pepys he invoked that most honorable of all activities, combat. In June 1686, he wrote again to reiterate the "abuse" he continued to suffer from the council, ending the letter with this description of the kind of zealous service that was earning him enmity: "It is late in the night and Mr. Randolph and myself are taking horse . . . the Rhode Islanders will battle us or else I had not taken a journey in this intolerable heat nor allowed such a hasty scrawl to come into your hands." Once Dudley and his companion arrived, Dudley implied, they took not a moment to rest from their travels but immediately "advised the government of Rhode Island of our being there" in order to lose no time "that we might do all things agreeable to the King's honor and make our asserting the government there effectual". A few days after getting so directly to work Dudley had proclaimed new orders, sworn new justices, settled the militia, and could now offer a list of potential candidates for the colony's council, men of honor all: "certain gentlemen very loyal and worthy of a trust in his Majesty's
service." Dudley wanted to give the impression that honor permeated not only his relationship with Blathwayt but his actions on behalf of that patron.

Dudley's letter was calculated to portray him as an earnest servant mindful of not just his master's formal business but also mindful of the need to maintain the patronage that prosecuted that business. Dudley's partner against the recalcitrant Rhode Islanders, customs officer Edward Randolph, was also one of Blathwayt's clients. Appearing attentive to both Blathwayt's mastership and his (Dudley's) own comrade and ally's just deserts, Dudley promised, "I am at no time without a sense of Mr. Randolph's long pains and trouble . . . which I will neither forget nor see unrewarded".67

These three years set the stage for a nearly life-long correspondence between Dudley and Blathwayt as patron and client. They continually reiterated the themes of faithful service and reciprocal obligation during discussions of governmental business,68 and Blathwayt’s protection was crucial in having Dudley twice cleared of criminal charges brought against him by rivals. In large part because of Blathwayt's influence, Dudley eventually rose to become the governor of Massachusetts.69 It was his turn to become a master: widely hated in the colony for toadying up to England at the expense of colonial interests, he nonetheless gathered a good deal of support by "distribut[ing] patronage with much skill".70

The relationship of honor revealed in Blathwayt's dealings with Dudley is of a piece with supplementary external details, for Blathwayt was no paper-pushing automaton. The first detail is the most personal: like Pepys, he had blood ties to gentility. They were neither as widespread nor as high as the navy man's, but they were more direct. Blathwayt's mother Anne Povey hailed from an impeccably blue-blooded Cheshire gentry line, and he was mentored as a gentleman—as
was Pepys by Coventry (Appendix E)—by his large-living uncle Thomas Povey, well known to readers of Pepys's *Diary* for hopelessness at accounting but unimpeachable taste and fine living. Leaving the bad, nephew William took the good, which included his uncle's influence in government circles; Sir Joseph Williamson initially took the young man as a favor to Povey. In his turn Blathwayt, like Pepys, took care of family, but as with Pepys, Blathwayt preferred that merit accompany favor. At work one of his most important servants, like Pepys's, was his brother-in-law, although John Povey could offer the solid dependability that "Balty" lacked. Povey served as Blathwayt's main clerk.\(^{71}\)

But for a man of honor most matters were personal, so Blathwayt could not afford to rest on the laurels of kinship—he also made very sure to sustain what Sir Thomas Smith famously called "the port", the display required of the honorable man. Like Pepys, Blathwayt eventually purchased that supreme seventeenth-century status symbol, a personal coach,\(^{72}\) but he seems to have indulged himself somewhat further in the trappings of honor. A connoisseur who reached the level of his uncle Thomas's widely respected discernment, Blathwayt imported the best in European art and furnishings (especially Dutch, highly fashionable during William's reign).\(^{73}\) His marriage was contracted purely for wealth, a country estate in Gloucestershire (Dyrham Park near Bristol, still extant under the care of the National Trust), and the entry into genteel rural society it brought him. Blathwayt rebuilt his newly acquired Tudor mansion along the lines of the Palladian architecture so often hailed as betokening the abandonment of rural lordship, and some of Peter Borsay's distancing between gentlemen and their inferiors can be seen in Blathwayt's early eighteenth-century behavior (he failed to remember the poor in his will).\(^{74}\) But on the whole his biographer sees rather little of that:
The role of country squire was becoming to him and the traces of his London upbringing not so deep but what he could fit into the habits of the gentry with great ease and satisfaction to himself. . . . He did not . . . forget the fact that he was lord of a manor and had a social position to keep up. . . . He rode over his wide estate, watched over his affairs, instructed his tenants. He was proud of his position”.

And he put his eldest son not into administration but instead the more glamorous and indisputably honorable military; after the young man was blooded in the 1710 Flanders campaign, his father purchased him a commission as a major. William Blathwayt would have roundly insisted that he (Blathwayt) was a man of honor.

IV

A final example of honor in the wider bureaucracy comes from the ordnance office of Anne's reign. For the purpose of examining honor in the context of modernizing government an incident of 1709 is especially helpful, showing how Weberian bureaucratic conventions such as security of tenure were still being applied within the framework of honor. It also bears some similarity to the struggle between Pepys and Middleton described in Chapter 5. New storekeeper Robert Lowther was one of the members of the Board of Ordnance, a "principal officer", roughly equivalent to Pepys on the navy board. Service in the ordnance office was something of a family tradition; James Lowther had preceded Robert, and Robert may have felt more entitled than perhaps was warranted. He immediately set about dismissing the incumbent storekeeper's clerk in favor of his own client.

Clerk Eustace Alexander, about to be ousted, immediately appealed in terms of both honor and the orderly practice of the office to his overlord two levels up. This was the master-general of the ordnance, a personage of no less standing than the Duke of Marlborough (away at
war though he was). Alexander cited his long tenure in the office—nearly two decades' worth—and previous precedents set "when principal officers would have dismissed clerks in ordinary under them without alleging any misdemeanor but have been prevented by the interposition of the Master General of the office then in being." But in addition to such modern-seeming rationales, Alexander emphasized the impeccably faithful nature of his service, having "diligently and faithfully performed the duties incumbent on him as a clerk without any manner of complaint hitherto". Even better, he had performed courageously when sent on campaign (as ordnance administrators sometimes were): "in several services abroad . . . his conduct hath always been honoured with the approbation of the ordnance board and the general officers he hath served under".77

Lowther riposted with an attempt to eviscerate Alexander's claim to honor by using shame. "[I]t is notoriously false that his conduct hath been always honoured with the approbation of the ordnance board", Lowther countered, because a decade earlier, in 1699, "he endeavored to cheat the late king of a very considerable sum of money for which fraud he was suspended from his place." Somehow Alexander had escaped the consequences of his criminal attempt and was even allowed to return to work. It was all very mysterious and, Lowther implied in a rhetorical move reminiscent of Middleton's tactics, probably underhanded: "how he stopped a prosecution . . . does not plainly appear".78

Alexander rallied with a blast of fact, and his point-by-point explanation of the putative fraud was reminiscent of Pepys's crushing replies to Middleton. At the time Alexander had been assigned to oversee the transport of materiel from Holland to England. A parcel of prohibited goods worth £115 had been placed amongst the rest by mistake. When this was discovered by
English customs, an investigation had to be undertaken during which Alexander was suspended from office. At its conclusion, however, he was cleared of all wrongdoing and reinstated. In any case, Alexander asserted with true bureaucratic nicety, even had he been guilty of malfeasance it would not have constituted the fraud alleged by Lowther, for there could be no "cheat where no customs were payable but [instead] an absolute prohibition at the peril of the importer, as it happened in this case where the King and his officer became masters of the whole and could lose nothing". Alexander also argued that Lowther's decision would harm the office, as knowledge, that most precious of administrative commodities, would be signally lacking in the replacement Lowther proposed, "a gentleman never acquainted with this office or the business thereof." The retention of Alexander's service would therefore serve the purpose of maintaining a continuity of expertise.

Good argument and alleged fact were not enough, however: like Pepys in the Middleton affair, Alexander also presented supporting documentation. The ordnance board already possessed the items relating to the 1699 case, but Alexander thought it might not be amiss to attach a list of precedents showing that clerks had "not been removed upon the changes that have been made of the principal officers in the several reigns" but only upon genuine misconduct. He also gathered supporting letters from three colleagues who provided eyewitness accounts supplementing some of the examples contained in these lists.

Yet under all the carefully collated information and precise explanations, driving home Alexander's facts and documentation with carefully placed highlights was the rhetorical force of honor. It was easy, he noted, to cite similar cases involving prohibited goods of much greater value in which the persons concerned "have not suffered in their reputation". And Alexander's
service had been so exemplary since the incident that "he has received several gratuities from the Board and never had the least reflection cast upon him by any of the officers he had the honour to serve under. . . . this honorable Board who have known his deportment so long". Furthermore, both administrative fastidiousness and honorable fidelity were reflected in Alexander's quotation of a crucial clause in the ordnance office's *General Instructions* directing the principal officers to the "encouraging the faithful and punishing the negligent and unfaithful". To clinch the case that he was one of the former, Alexander accompanied this letter with another attachment, an affidavit from the Duke of Ormond vouchsafing that "Mr. Alexander Eustace hath faithfully and carefully behaved himself as commissary in the late Descent Train whilst under my command in Spain etc. and for his services deserves encouragement."  

Like Middleton, Lowther never had a chance as he faced this combination of the rational and the honorable. Alexander's honor and documents, the latter constituting an impressive packet, were gathered by the ordnance board (with Lowther recused) and forwarded to Marlborough. Along with this formidable barrage the board added its own lengthy cover letter arguing that Alexander had the right of it in terms of both precedent and the good working of the ordnance (they were especially incensed at the insertion of "a perfect stranger to the office"). But the board too used honor to launch its administrative arguments, hoping that "your Grace will support us in maintaining the honour and reputation" of the office.  

Lowther was well aware of the way honor worked, articulating several of its principles, but he had apparently not yet had sufficient time to train in that crucial bureaucratic defense: paper. He failed to marshal a set of countervailing documents supporting his position. In this environment, as Pepys would have told him, without such armor he was lost. But if he did not
appreciate how one gained honor in the civil service, he did appreciate honor itself. In his
original letter to Marlborough, Lowther had noted the old problem of honor's reflectivity in its
negative form, dishonor to the master from poor service. "[I]t seems but reasonable that every
officer should have the nomination of their own clerks", Lowther wrote, himself attempting to
combine "reason" with a principle of honor, "because of the great risk they run if the public
should suffer through any neglect or mismanagement in their office, they being answerable . . .
for any prejudice that shall happen to the service through any fault or neglect of their clerks."
Later, as the tide turned powerfully against him, Lowther made a last appeal to the Duke, this one
on terms of local lordship. If he couldn't appoint his own client to the post, his failure would lead
to "the destroying my interest in the country, which I lay more to heart than anything else".
However much most English nobles might have sympathized with the need to maintain an
"interest" back home, stating so baldly that one's county was more important than ordnance
duties was doubtless unwise when writing to the man who, of all English generals to ever lead
major campaigns, may have been the most logistically painstaking. Nonetheless Lowther
protested that the undermining of his local interest "would deprive me of the best means of
convincing your Grace that I am entirely devoted to your service." But Alexander stayed. His
(avowedly) faithful service combined with precedent, and the board's concern for their "honour
and reputation", supported the continuity of personnel. Honor at the bureaucratic center trumped
honor in Lowther's county. But that latter honor remained important too, and had its own
continuing consequence at the center: Lowther finally asked that he be allowed to employ his
client at his own expense. Lowther may not have quite understood the best strategies for
deploying honor in the bureaucracy, but he understood how important honor was more generally
and tried to use that resource to the best of his ability.

Branches of the later Stuart civil service other than Pepys's navy, then, did feature honor as an important part of their "company culture." To coax results from his local postmasters, Roger Whitley employed honor. William Blathwayt, like Pepys, both delivered and received it. The subcommunities in Williamson's office as well as Eustace Alexander pled, fought, and succeeded on its terms. These men may have been gears in the new machine, but as they ground away, their turnings were made easier, the occasional impediment of dust and dirt smoothed away, by the grease of old honor. We can safely assume that further research would demonstrate the presence of honor in yet other branches of the later Stuart civil service. Samuel Pepys, Esquire, was no outlier, only an outstanding embodiment of what was seems to have been a standard feature in later Stuart government: the reliance on a very old set of ideals to help forward endeavors in the new organizations that would create the modern world.
Notes to Chapter 6


2 Pepys's congratulations to the consul at Algiers are in SP to Mr. Martin, 28 September 1674, in *Cat.* 2:362, and in the same see also two other letters from Pepys to the consul, 19 October 1674, 380, and 28 December, 420.

3 For Bridgeman's opinion that Restoration diplomats were regarded "slightly" by other countries, see *NM*, 152; illegality of military men's begging, 147. (Bridgeman was wrong—the Elizabethan statute he had in mind mentioned no soldiers and all "shipmen pretending losses at sea", presumably merchant seamen as well—but the inaccuracy merely underscores his attachment to honor: *NM*, 147 n. 2.)

4 For subcommunities in the secretariat, see Evans, *Principal Secretary*, 163, and for competition between them, n. 8.


6 Williamson to Arlington, [no day or month] 1673, BL Stowe MS 549, f. 18, printed in Evans, *Principal Secretary*, 191-2 (original ms misdated; see Evans's headnote).

7 For the assault upon Yard during Williamson's absence, see Yard to Williamson, 3 October 1673, in W. D. Christie, ed., *Letters Addressed from London to Sir Joseph Williamson While Plenipotentiary at the Congress of Cologne in the Years 1673 and 1674* (Westminster, UK: Camden Society, 1874), 2:32.

8 In vol. 1 of Christie's *Letters* see Newcombe to Williamson, 13 June 1673, 31 (quotations), and Yard to Williamson, 18 Aug. 1673, 175, as well as Evans, *Principal Secretary*, 292. The precise tie between Newcombe and Williamson is not clear, but Williamson had apparently taken Newcombe's son with him on the lengthy mission to Cologne during the Third Dutch War, as in the letter of 13 June Newcombe tendered "humblest hearty thanks for your care of my son . . . and that you vouchsafe to own him; I know not how he pays his acknowledgments, but I am sure the father can never sufficiently express his."

For Ball's derision of his unwelcome colleague's ability see Evans, *Principal Secretary*, 294 n. 2. For personnel see J. C. Sainty, *Officials of the Secretaries of State, 1660-1782* (London: University of London, Institute of Historical Research, 1973). The records for Williamson's office personnel are not perfect, but there is enough material that his subordinates who continued on the payroll for more than a year or two should have left some trace or other (4-8).


Yard's duty was to keep Stanhope abreast of all important goings-on at home. For the important purposes of such correspondence see Marshall, "Sir Joseph Williamson," 19-20.

See, for example, 17 February 1690, U1590/O59 1, a letter that fills two full pages of 12-point single-spaced Times New Roman type when transcribed. Stanhope had failed to receive any letters for "near two months," but Yard protested, "I have writ constantly by every post since I began this correspondence, and when I heard that the packet boat had miscarried I repeated by the following post as near as I could remember what I had writ by the former". Little news about politics was too small; here Yard reported on Londoners who had created an "indecent" betting pool about the war in Ireland, with participants contributing 5 guineas to receive "100 if Dublin be not in the possession of their Maj's on Christmas day next". Yard took care not to waste space by replicating news available in the government newsletters (some of which he himself was writing), but instead gave extra details that might be diplomatically useful; to the bare report that there had been a naval skirmish "off of Alderney", Yard added the inside information, not yet publically known, that English and Dutch ships had destroyed a French man-of-war and captured 18 merchant vessels.

For the secretariat's efficiency as a byproduct of honor see Marshall, "Sir Joseph Williamson," 25. To the present writer's knowledge, Marshall is the only previous historian of Restoration England to have made this connection; it is unfortunate that he did not pursue the point. In same for the Herculean drudge see 38.


Whitley to Mr. Armorer, 1 Feb. 1673, BPMA 94/15. All Whitley letters used here are from this archive, letterbook 94/15, and almost all have been restricted to 1673. All this material was written by Whitley, so subsequent citations will omit his name as given, and he never used the first names of his postmasters in his salutations, so they do not appear here. Only the recipient's
surname and the date will be reproduced henceforth unless it is necessary to re-specify the archive because an item from another source has been cited immediately prior, in which case "BPMA 94/15" will be added to avoid confusion. The year will be given only in such cases or on one of the rare occasions when a non-1673 letter has been cited immediately before.

17 "Improvement" and its variants were favorite Whitleyan watchwords (see e.g. Cole, 24 May; Smith, 24 June; Wills, 24 June; or Levitt, 27 Nov.). He urged an eager postmaster at Stone to "send the whole model of your proposals in writing," then after Whitley had seen it, he wrote back with approval for implementation, urging the man to "improve the design all you can". When this local functionary encountered opposition, Whitley "heartily thank[ed]" him for his "ingenious kind endeavors" and promised to use central influence to "prevail with them to be more compliable": Barber, 29 January; same, 27 Mar.; same, 10 June. For other proposals see Coursey, 1 Jan. and Chaffin, 30 Jan. In this connection, Whitley also had the modern organizational consultant's awareness that changes beneficial in the long term would produce mistakes in the short term as workers adjusted to new rules, so allowances had to be made: Forest, 3 July.

18 Whitley regularly requested information about conditions at local posts: "let me hear sometimes from you," he wrote to the postmaster at Sherborne, "as anything occurs to your knowledge or thoughts that may be useful to us".Chaffin, 30 Jan. For additional examples see Pearse, 29 Apr. 1673; Cole, 24 May; Carter, 19 June; Devit, 27 Nov.; Tarant, 27 Nov.; Greenway, 6 Dec.; Carr, 16 Dec.; Rodham, 16 Dec.

19 Of course Whitley used documentation simply to ensure that the post office's job got done—fortunately for the postmaster of Plymouth, thus exculpated from an accusation of losing some of the mail: "our books acquit it again, and contain the full number of letters that makes the sum charged in your account." (Blackborne, 11 Nov.) But good records were also an important means by which Whitley kept track of good performance—or its opposite, even to very small discrepancies. Postmaster Emes in Lynne found himself reprimanded when the regular reports revealed that he had allowed his local sheriff to frank a letter at 3p when it should have been a shilling, as "these things will soon sink the office to nothing": Emes, 1 Jan. When the documents showed the opposite peccadillo, that of overcharging, Whitley warned, "I must expect from you all diligence and integrity in your employment" henceforth, even though the delinquent was an old royalist from Whitley's home county of Chester with whom the deputy postmaster-general had been "long acquainted and fellow sufferers together": Baker, 14 Jan.

20 See e.g. the tour in June 1673 in which Whitley's agent was to check on "Salop, Ludlow, Worcester, etc." as well as Hereford, to whose postmaster Whitley was writing: "it shall be no obstruction to your business"—in other words, the inspection would afford no excuse for failing to make normal deliveries (Philpott, 21 June). For another inspection see Cranke, 11 Dec. The post office appears to have employed no dedicated inspectors, and it is usually unclear who these agents were; Whitley often describes them simply as "officer". But under chief clerk James Hickes there were five additional Clerks of the Inland Office each of whom was responsible for overseeing daily operations on one of the main postal routes: see the office structure delineated
by "Salaries of officers of the general letter office," ca. June 1671, in J. W. M. Stone, ed., *The Inland Posts (1392-1672): A Calendar of Historical Documents with Appendixes* (London, UK: Christie’s-Robson Lowe, 1987). It may be that one of these road clerks was sent out at intervals to inspect the stations under his purview, the other clerks distributing his office work among themselves while their fellow was away. But Whitley also often sent out two personal servants, Saladine and Sawtell, for purposes of provincial hiring and firing, and although I have not been able to connect either of them to a tour of inspection, they must be considered candidates for having performed such tasks. For Sawtel see e.g. Lyning, 24 June 1673, BPMA 94/15; Williams, 24 June; Wills, 24 June; Fry, 21 Oct.

The post office comprised a complex system of interlocking stations spreading the length and breadth of the kingdom. Aside from a fairly small office at the center, Whitley was assisted by local supervisors called "deputy postmasters" who coordinated local "sub-postmasters" in smaller towns: Richard Blome, *Britannia, or, A Geographical Description of the Kingdoms of England, Scotland, and Ireland, with the Isles and Territories Thereto Belonging* (London: Tho. Roycroft, 1673), 12-13. Exactly contemporary with the letters used here, Blome's atlas puts the number of deputy postmasters alone at 182. The workings of the deputy system may be briefly glimpsed in instructions given to one new deputy postmaster, Smith of Taunton, who was to receive incoming letters for his assigned area, disburse them, then collect his own and his substations' outgoing letters. Next he should forward those (along with checklists of the letters, although Whitley failed to mention this in the instructions) on to "Crookhorn, in due time to be sent hither with the western mail in course": Smith, 24 June 1673, BPMA 94/15. About a week later Whitley had to clarify that once Smith received the letters for the outlying stations he was to "seal up theirs in a small bag" before delivery: 1 July. Mr. Snead at Northopp, "obliged by your articles to be a check upon your neighbor postmasters (of Chester and Denbigh)" seems to have been another of these deputy postmasters. So was Bedbury at Salisbury, responsible for "an exact account . . . of all by-letters as well in your own stage as in your neighbors": respectively 7 and 26 June 1673, and see also the similar charge given Cappur, 14 June. But the coasts posed the most difficult challenge. Wherever they docked, by law seagoing vessels had to turn over all letters to the post office. The process could be fraught with confusion, however, so Whitley spelled it out for the postmaster of Deal: his assistants were to wait for the captain or purser at the dock, promise them a penny for each letter, and furnish a receipt with an exact count redeemable at the central office in London. The postmaster must also keep his or her own record and then send a list of all letters received with "what ship you receive them [and] to whom you give your receipt" as well as "how many pieces" to Whitley so he could properly discharge the account: Neale, 26 Jun. Continued mistakes meant that these instructions had to be repeated more than once: 5 Jul. For a different postmaster receiving direction on this issue see Cole (at Bristol), 27 May. It was imperative for coastal postmasters to stringently monitor harbor arrivals because freelance mailcarriers could arrive first on the scene, pay the ship's officers to hand over the letters, and depart to collect private delivery gratuities which would signally fail to augment government coffers.

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21 Bodleian MS. Eng. hist. e. 313:99.
23 e. 312:33.


25 Bodleian MS. Eng. hist. e. 310: 79.

26 Bodleian MS. Eng. hist. e. c. 712:367; James 312.

27 Bodleian MS. Eng. hist. e. 313:99.

28 e. 312:33.

29 Houseman, 5 Mar. 1673, BPMA 94/15. Cf. also Whitley's remonstration with Postmaster Fry at Shaston, "do not break your word with me; if you do I shall make haste to right myself and never have to do with you more." (Fry, 12 July)

30 Lulman, 13 Mar.

31 Cale, 18 Mar. 1673.

32 Thwaites, 27 Sept.1673, and Houseman, 24 Oct.; see also e.g. Neal, 24 Oct., Read, 24 June, or Thomas, 8 Nov.

33 Whitley's industry included a threat to have the man arrested: Wilson, 18 Apr. For similar examples, if with slightly lesser consequences or more veiled, see e.g. Landeck, 11 Feb. ("carry yourself . . . for the reputation and interest of the office . . . if you receive any dissatisfaction by your miscarriages herein, you must blame yourself"); Rigden, 2 Dec. ("for your own sake as well as the honor and interest of the office, let all possible care and diligence be used for the giving more content hereafter"); or Baldock, 18 Dec. ("[I] cannot believe it of a person of your abilities and reputation", but Baldock is reported to repeatedly start the mail an hour late; "if this should be informed [to] my Lord Arlington or king or council, they would not endure it").

34 Watts, 28 Apr. For additional uses of "shame" see e.g. Naggs, 5 June; Fry, 21 Oct.; or Watts, 4 Dec.

35 Neale, 18 Dec.

36 Houseman, 22 May. For Houseman's prior good performance see 28 Apr. and additional letters to him cited in this section.

37 See e.g. Watts, 12 Nov. 1672; Langley, 12 Apr. 1673; Lovitt, 3 June.

38 See the letter to Baldock cited above.

39 See e.g. Whitley's promise to "procure your satisfaction from his Majesty on whose account those extraordinary services were performed" after a local postmaster had procured six horses for
the King's pleasure: Hollister, 14 November 1672.

40 See e.g. the relief from quartering soldiers sought by one postmaster for which "my Lord Arlington writ to my Lord Allington in your behalf; and I have also spoke to his lordship about it": Skyring, 14 Dec. 1672.

41 Redmane, 10 Apr. 1673; for another example, see Snead, 7 June. On this basis Whitley expressed annoyance to one postmaster who wanted to renew his appointment with an increased salary yet who had failed to make "a handsome present to welcome me into the employment": Cole, 19 June 1673. Whitley's own recent appointment stemmed from late 1672. It may be that Whitley did not consider himself a postmaster's patron until the functionary had approached him with a gratuity. For gifts as a means of satisfying and affirming obligation in Pepys's honor relationships see Chapters 2 and 3.

42 Quotation in Bull, 4 Feb. Robert Yard's London Gazette (see section on the secretariat of state, above) was sufficiently popular that postmasters outside London could make a good deal of money by renting copies to locals in the days immediately following an issue's release. Normally, though, local postmasters had to purchase each copy. For Whitley furnishing free Gazettes to other postmasters see Burnet, 8 Mar.; for both Gazettes and immunity from quartering see Naggs, 1 Apr.; Lovitt, 12 Apr. and 10 May.

43 Houseman, 1 May. Similarly, when Postmaster Carter in Abingdon ferreted out abuses, reported them to Whitley, and promoted better performance among neighboring postmasters Whitley was pleased to see "that you concern yourself so much for the interest and reputation of the office". As a consequence of this faithful service, Whitley promised reciprocal patronage: "I take this care very kindly, and will be ready to show it on all occasions": Carter, 1 Nov.

44 Blackborne, 27 Dec. 1672.

45 Watts, 28 Apr. 1673.

46 24 June 1673.

47 28 July 1673.

48 Redmane, 29 Mar.

49 See e.g. Bradwood, 28 Dec. 1672; Downham, 17 June 1673; Carr, 31 May; or Brooks, 26 June.

50 11 Feb. See also "those honorable persons that spoke to me in your behalf" after Postmaster Emes of Chippenham offended a different set of gentlemen (17 Apr.); the "great honor I have for our worthy [unnamed] friend" which impelled Whitley to make an offer of legal aid against the enemies of one of his postmasters: Eccleston, 26 June; the influence of Sir Gilbert Gerrard on behalf of Postmaster Hayford at Ferrybrigs in a dispute with Whitley himself over remuneration, 3 July.
Postmaster Rogers of Oxford, dilatory in his accounts, was warned not just that "you must expect no more kindness from me" but that he should "be more careful of . . . the reputation of your friends that recommended you so lately": 24 May. When Whitley attributed various kinds of petty fraud to Captain Baker, postmaster of Chester, the deputy postmaster-general issued the veiled threat, "your friends are too honorable to own you in any unjust action": 21 June.

Houseman, 15 Apr. 1673.

In his Britannia (see citation above), Whitley's contemporary Blome had nothing bad to say about the post office except that it needed more publicity.

In this section I have used letters almost exclusively from 1673. Students interested in further documenting Whitley's use of honor will find BPMA material extending through 1678, a rich vein far too extensive for this project to mine.


In Gertrude Ann Jacobsen, William Blathwayt, a Late Seventeenth Century English Administrator (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1932), for Blathwayt's early post see 66-76; appointment to trade and plantations, 81-82, 84-85. Blathwayt's Dutch was such a valuable commodity that even in the midst of Pepys's Popish-Plot hurricane, "Mr. Blathwayt and I till night [were] translating out of Dutch something out of the book of shipwrightry." This was Nicolaas Witsen's Aeloude en Hedendaegsche Scheeps-houw, which Brouncker had praised to Pepys: Proceedings, 16 March 1680, 96 and 109 n. 74. Blathwayt also procured from Sir William Temple a grim memento for Pepys of the latter's vanished Popish-Plot nemesis, Colonel Scott: 1685, NM, 237-38.

For Blathwayt's urban family background, see Jacobsen, William Blathwayt, 36-7; for his father, 41.

For administrative capacity and emphasis on knowledge see Jacobsen, William Blathwayt, respectively 32 and 101. On this latter characteristic see also Aylmer, Crown's Servants, 45 ("very distinguished administrator"), 53 ("capable and energetic"). In addition Blathwayt was "self-made" (160). For his lack of agility in either the negative situation of verbal sparring or the positive scenario of pleasant banter, see Jacobsen, William Blathwayt, 34. William III's civil servants had a difficult time pleasing their master; if Blathwayt was "dull", the King dismissed Williamson on the opposite end of the spectrum as cloying like "whipped cream": HoC 2, Williamson.

A modus vivendi involving an equitable division of responsibilities was reached within the year: Jacobsen, William Blathwayt, 68-9.
It may seem as if a scion of fiercely independent Massachussets should not be counted an English bureaucrat, but work by David Cressy has shown that personal and economic ties closely bound the Old and New Englands into more than just a theoretically singular polity: *Coming Over: Migration and Communication between England and New England in the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge, Eng., 1987).


Dudley to Blathwayt, 4 May 1684.

Dudley to Blathwayt, 4 May 1684.

Dudley to Blathwayt, 4 November 1684.

Dudley to Blathwayt, 30 May 1686.

Dudley to Blathwayt, 20 June 1686.

Dudley to Blathwayt, 30 June 1686.

See the rest of the Dudley correspondence in the Blathwayt Papers, Colonial Williamsburg Foundation Library, vol. 4, folder 4, which extends well into the 1700s.


For Anne Povey, see Jacobsen, *William Blathwayt*, 35; Thomas Povey and Blathwayt, 43-50; Povey's influence securing Blathwayt his first post, 67; John Povey, 61.


On one occasion, perhaps after a number of prior observations convinced them that this was a man who could well afford it, customs officers insisted that he pay duties on his choices for that year (silks, velvet, and fine china). When he haughtily refused, they impounded his goods. Blathwayt pushed the matter up to the treasury and the duties were waived: Jacobsen, *William Blathwayt*, 62 and 62-3 n. 70.
For the marriage, see Jacobsen, *William Blathwayt*, 53-4; the mansion, 61-3; Blathwayt's will, 65

Quotations on 34-5, 58, and 64; the son's army commission, 60.

References in the following paragraphs are all from the British Library's ordnance letterbook BL Add. MS 61166. For Robert's relation James Lowther on the Board of Ordnance previously, see signatures in Board of Ordnance to [John Churchill], Duke of Marlborough, 3 and 4 June 1706, f. 3.

Alexander to Marlborough, April-May 1709, f. 78.

Lowther to Marlborough, Apr-May 1709 [no day], f. 80.

Eustace to Board of Ordnance, May 1709 [no day], f. 82.

Alexander to Board of Ordnance, May 1709 [no day], f. 98.

Eustace to Board of Ordnance, May 1709 [no day], f. 82. The attachments are "A list of the principal officers of the ordnance and their clerks since the instructions were made and signed by King Charles the 2nd anno 1683," ff. 88-89; "Clerks under the Clerk of the Ordnance," f. 90; "List of clerks dismissed for misdemeanors," f. 100.

Francis Povey to Bd, 12 May 1709, f. 94; Nicholas Whitaker to Board of Ordnance, May 1709 [no day], f. 96; William Phelps [to Board of Ordnance], 3 May 1709, f. 92.

Eustace to Board of Ordnance, May 1709 [no day], f. 82.

Duke of Ormonde, affidavit on behalf of Eustace Alexander, 22 Apr. 1709, f. 86.

Board of Ordnance to Marlborough, 17 May 1709, f. 76-77.

Lowther to Marlborough, Apr-May 1709 [no day], f. 81.

Lowther to Marlborough, 7 June 1709, [no folio number].

Lowther to Marlborough, 16 Aug 1709, f. 104, and 16 Sept., f. 108.

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Conclusion

As William of Orange descended upon England, Lord Dartmouth, the admiral commanding all James II's ships and a man with whom Samuel Pepys had recently fallen out, found himself sharply lessoned in honor competition and hierarchy when he contended that he should receive an allowance of 50 supernumeraries aboard his flagship. Doubtless knowing of Pepys's fascination with naval history, Dartmouth buttressed his argument with several historical precedents. In competitive dudgeon, Pepys refused to acknowledge them: "What they had done before the last solemn establishment in 1677... I know not," Pepys magisterially intoned (the statement will strike scholars familiar with him as rather unlikely\(^1\)). Fifty supernumeraries were allowed only the Lord High Admiral; admirals commanding in his absence but 30. Thus stood the regulation Pepys had written in 1677, and the last word would be that of the secretary—no more than 30 had ever been allowed anyone but James "by any order that passed my hand." That was the end of the discussion. The fleet's commander, de facto Lord High Admiral that he was, lacked the formal designation and did not qualify to display its symbols. Rebellions threatened to blast all of Pepys's achievements, painstakingly built over the course of as hard-won and hard-fought a career as has ever been chronicled, yet there—against the one man who might have been able to avert the looming catastrophe—he stood on his honor over a piece of regulation.

Pepys's response to Dartmouth at such an extreme suggests that his rhetoric of honor be taken seriously as representing genuine motivation that he may not have distinguished from his mental orientation within the plural subject of the community of honor. This dissertation began with the truism that we should not take at face value the statements of an interested actor\(^3\)—and

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we are all interested. But Pepys's consistency and coherence about his honor, demonstrated in thousands of interactions recorded over decades across thousands of pages, furnish a great deal of literal documentary weight for the case that such words formed part of a deeply felt self-identity. And Pepys's editor tells us that he generally got things right: "he wrote honestly . . . omissions and mistakes are few, and on balance unimportant." This makes sense. He of all people knew how easily the right document could disprove a careless assertion.

Sometimes, though, Pepys is clearly an unreliable narrator—yet in these cases the untruths are perpetrated in service of his honor and thus also in service of this dissertation. Mervyn James has written of how, upon Henry Tudor's victory, "[t]he community of honour which had centred on Richard of Gloucester was eliminated." Pepys had a similar impulse: when he returned to the Admiralty after the Exclusion Crisis, he described the retreating administration's legacy as a "general and habitual supineness, wastefulness and neglect of order". J. D. Davies has shown that the Whig Admiralty commission was far from the bumbling group of greedy incompetents Pepys portrayed them to be. But

\[h\]e succeeded so well that one of the greatest historians of the seventeenth-century navy, J. R. Tanner, could describe Pepys's *Memoires* of the years 1679-84 as 'extraordinarily methodical, temperate, and fair'. When Samuel Pepys set out to destroy the reputation of an opponent, the qualities of method, temperance, and fairness were noticeable only by their absence.\[6\]

Pepys's biases, however, strengthen the present argument, since they strongly suggest—perhaps "betray" is not too strong a word—intensely felt motives that would have encouraged him to set down scenes which, whatever their truth, he thought others would find plausible. Thus for the purpose of examining how honor worked and what it meant, even his unreliable documentation remains invaluable.

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This dissertation has sought to take advantage of Pepys's large archive, reliable and unreliable portions alike. The Conclusion is divided into three parts. Diary readers will know that Pepys's used the last entry of each year to look back and take stock; we will follow suit in section 1. The second section considers issues relevant to the debates currently being held by the profession about "modernity", and the third section broadens the view onto wider methodological and theoretical vistas that affect all historians no matter what their chronological specialty. Samuel Pepys, Clerk of the Acts of the King's Ships and then Secretary for the Affairs of the Admiralty, turns out to have a reach as long as the great Britannic navy he helped found.

I

As a full-fledged mentality, honor encompassed a variety of aspects or subvalues, and in that context this dissertation may seem lacking. Generosity and reputation, and to a lesser extent kinship, have figured prominently in the previous chapters. Other major facets familiar to scholars of honor have appeared only briefly, such as gender, gentle birth as opposed to merit, moral autonomy, courtesy, and important sub-factors of generosity such as hospitality and the display of wealth, or conversely the surreptitious care for financial matters necessary to support hospitality or conspicuous display and indeed to support the successful continuance of one's generosity as patron. Additional issues, such as the subtleties involved with connecting the participant-agent's inward sense of honor to the outward opinion of "the world", or the relationship of honor to religion at a time when a great deal of blood was being spilled in the name of God, have received no recognition whatsoever. Pepys's archive could support sustained discussions of all these topics. Unfortunately, the space available here cannot, and the
compositional principle enunciated in the Introduction—of depth over breadth—further constrains choice. This dissertation has therefore concentrated on what were arguably the most important constituents of elite male honor culture: the social structures that sustained men as they attempted to gain honor and the determined "steadfastness" manifested most dramatically in the way of the warrior.

Within these constraints, however, this dissertation has sought to show that honor was hard at work in the Restoration civil service. And it was an honor that late medieval knights, at least, would probably recognize, were they dropped into 1670s London and given time to acclimate. The weft of administration's rational uniformity was tightly woven with ancient honor's aggressive warp, the threads of each running over and under the other's with impressive involution. Regular work habits—not a strict requirement in the genteel world of early modern officeholders—were promoted by the potential to gain honor: soon after Pepys's enthusiasm was fired in 1662 and Coventry gave him the confidence to act upon it, the diarist noted, "one good effect of my being constant at the office [is] that nothing passes without me; and I have the choice of my own time to propose anything I would have." This is not the tone of the selfless civil servant who idealizes duty to the state; it is the orientation of a man on the make, and the evidence in prior chapters has shown that the ambition expressed in this entry was pursued within the context of honor. It came close to what William the Marshal's contemporary chronicler called "conquering worth", the "renown of valor"; it was what Roger Whitley called in his commonplace book "glory" (Chapter 6). The environment and the weapons, of course, were different. The renown to be gained was predicated upon diligent effort—being "constant at the office"—and upon the success that could attend a command of information and its methodical
application: Whitley's "knowing and doing." And "knowing" could also signal honor itself, the reputation by which one was known: as Pepys wrote when he was reaching the diary's midpoint, "I have good content . . . to see myself improve every day in knowledge and being known." The prospect of honor by knowledge, or the shame that a lack of knowledge might incur, prompted corresponding measures. Success brought honor, which stimulated the further effort that resulted in more success, which yielded more honor in a repeating cycle which I have called an "honor feedback loop."

Their focus on personalized reputation perhaps makes men of honor prime candidates to be the progenitors of modern individualism, but honor's renown was only partly selfish: because honor was held to be reciprocal and reflective, it had a large social component. Honor reflected almost automatically to masters above, and if servants below had helped reflect honor onto the master, they would expect due reward and favor. They would perhaps expect even more if they had supported a master's endeavor but gotten little credit from third parties. But the servants in this story often received a measure with which they held themselves satisfied: Pepys was tight with his money, but to his servants he was no skinflint in the mold of George Downing.

The first two chapters on Pepys showed how bonds between master and servant formed a crucial part of the working environment of the later Stuart naval bureaucracy. These bonds proved far too strong to sustain the supposition that patron-client ties were less powerful, at least during the later seventeenth century, than the medieval predecessors of such relationships. When he brought the fallen Pepys into his home at the height of the perils attendant upon the Exclusion Crisis, William Hewer ended his welcome with a statement that a more jaded age might be quick to dismiss as florid and insincere. During the late seventeenth century, they simply reflected the
strength of honor's bond as well as the dangerous political realities making that bond a crucial
nexus not merely of economic but also sometimes of literal survival: "[I am] assuring you
whatever times shall come nothing shall withhold me from making you and your concern my
own while I live." As we have seen, Hewer kept faith with this promise. He repeated it when
fate turned again at William III's victory, writing,

   you may rest assured that I am wholly yours, and that you shall never want the utmost of
   my constant, faithful and personal service, the utmost I can do being inconsiderable to
   what your kindness and favor to me has and does oblige me to. And therefore, as all I
   have proceeded from you, so all I have and am is and shall be at your service.

Once again from the late seventeenth century we hear an echo not of modern but medieval
sentiment, the loyalty that "obliged [a knight] to 'love' his [lord's] lineage more than others, to
'ennoble' it as much as he can, to 'honor' it." Hewer kept his plighted faith—another element of
the honor descending from the Middle Ages into the Restoration bureaucratic milieu.

Pepys's membership in Sandwich's retinue had introduced him to the mutual assistance
and fellowship that a subcommunity of honor could afford, a lesson Pepys lost no time putting
into practice with his early acceptance of William Hewer as an apprentice. Eventually Pepys
created a type of retinue in the bureaucracy with longtime loyal servants such as Hewer, Anthony
Deane, Samuel Atkins, Thomas Edwards, and others, a number of whom lived under his roof for
a time. This network of "deferential friendship" might almost be called a great bureaucratic
"household" despite arguments by scholars that such entities had vanished by Pepys's time. The
strength of the patronage structure was perhaps most clearly reflected in the aid and comfort
given during hard, even perilous times: as a servant, Pepys suffered the negative gaze of honor's
reflection when he lost everything and went to prison for his master James—but he was
accompanied by his own client, Sir Anthony Deane; was refused betrayal by Samuel Atkins; and was filially supported by William Hewer. By then Pepys's "household" was well used to facing aggression: When Gibson helped write up the final defense against Middleton's attack on Pepys and Hewer, or when all Pepys's clerks stood physically behind him as he faced down the rest of the board over Sir John Mennes's disputed contract (Chapters 5 and 4, respectively), the office subcommunity's shield-wall had already become second nature from long practice.

Honor's strength may also have been at work in the persistence of the relationships it had fueled even after all material patronage had ceased. Until Sandwich's death, long after Pepys had no further need of the earl for any real assistance, Pepys seems to have continued considering himself the earl's servant, and he also maintained ties with other old patrons. Most of Pepys's close clients too maintained ties after their master's final fall. In the cases of Sandwich and Pepys, Pepys and Balthasar St. Michel, and Pepys and Hewer (with that relationship's familial overtones), perhaps this is a sign of the continuing importance of kinship in what could still be considered something of a "lineage culture". But this does not explain the rest of the relationships: perhaps ties of honor deepened into affection more often than would otherwise have been the case. And if that is so, honor's rhetoric of faith and friendship perhaps would have had that much greater an impact on bureaucratic work. We may never be able to measure such possibilities at this distance, but even if Hewer was an anomaly, Deane and Atkins's loyalty still calls attention to them with special force.

Whatever the case with affect, this dissertation has shown that honor-inflected patronage was a major component of the Restoration civil service. In the process, my argument challenges another comfortable truism of later seventeenth and early eighteenth-century administrative
scholarship on England, that patronage played a major role in landing government jobs but had little further influence in the new bureaucracies. Chapters 2 and 3 showed how patronage was much more important than that: the growth of a powerful, effective English naval administration owed much, for example, to Pepys's early tutelage as a servant to Sandwich and Coventry. Sandwich may have given Pepys his formative example of how diligent paperwork, not just courage in combat, could simultaneously serve governmental purposes and garner personal honor. If Sandwich did not perform that service, Coventry did by encouraging Pepys's efforts and promoting them further up the line to York.

In the office, patronage's reciprocal exchanges drove the civil service forward as master and servant reinforced each other's work. The master protected and promoted his clients so they could work effectively, gain honor, and reflect that honor back up the chain to him, while he attempted to gain additional honor by spearheading important measures and earning the praise of his own masters—an endeavor in which his clients were also expected to participate. Anthony Deane's ship designs brought honor to both himself and Pepys, but Pepys was the one who received the credit for the thirty new ships of the 1670s armaments program. Yet the Secretary of the Admiralty never would have pushed them through Parliament without Deane's figures, so an important gesture of reciprocity was required; when Pepys was next in a position to act as patron, he gave Deane an exceptionally high level of remuneration on the Special Commission. Not that Pepys was shy about giving credit were credit was due. As we have seen, in Pepys's only published work he portrayed Hewer as an accounting superman. Such accolades brought honor—and had Pepys still been in office, the feedback loop would have switched back into its "effort" phase. Indeed, Pepys had intended exactly that just before the revolution, as his creation
of a special executive position for Hewer and Deane showed.

But that revolution did occur, and Pepys's enemies triumphed with a stark reminder of honor's dark shadow, shame—which paradoxically carried its own benefits for administrative development. The disgrace that came with failure, whether one's own or because of a loss in the competition to gain preeminence inside and outside the office, was as important a hammer in the forge of the early modern English civil service as was the honor attending success. Chapters 4 and 5 showed how honor's warrior ethos, manifesting itself in sometimes highly belligerent office competition, encouraged attention to careful method and precise information. Pepys's final assessment after three decades of experience was, "The life of a virtuous [administrative] officer in the navy is a continual war defensive". From smaller tussles such as his 1662 resolution to "weary [Sir William Penn] out" by working "as hard as I can drive" when the older man was attempting to be "mighty diligent", to larger conflicts that brought Pepys's entire "household" together for a major effort, the competition fostered by honor reinforced the desirability and utility of bureaucratic standards such as attention to detail and the careful retention of records.

Competition, of course, was not an unmixed blessing, and we should also recall the examples of cooperation given at the end of Chapter 4. But competition was a major component of honor, and as one might expect of such a long-running construct—mental or otherwise—it offered compensation for the damage it did. Honor's aggression and the betrayal of the master-servant bond could certainly have disruptive effects, most especially on the continuity of personnel so vital to organizations whose stock-in-trade is information. The loss to the naval bureaucracy of Pepys's hand at the helm and some of his "household" in 1679 surely led to administrative problems, at least in the short term if not of the unconditionally damning nature
Pepys alleged in his *Memoires*. Yet shame and loss too had their purpose. Sandwich's prize-goods opprobrium, the result of failing to follow regulations, vividly showed the young clerk of the acts how a matter of administration could explode into the disaster of disgrace. As we have seen, and as Sir Thomas Middleton learned so painfully, Pepys never stinted to pass on this lesson to his subordinates and colleagues; he might attack and destroy them with it, but then some, at least, would be likely to remember, if perhaps only to gain advantage by it themselves. The cardinal principle of these "large bureaucracies that professionalized and nationalized governance" portrayed by historians as so very modern\(^9\) may thus have been largely an outgrowth of an ancient Germanic warrior ethos.

Once the main point of this project has been assimilated—that old honor assisted in the birth of the new bureaucratic order—Pepys's honor has another ramification: the general concern for knowledge that scholars have seen as growing in England and indeed throughout early modern Europe (see Prologue and Appendix B) was not the direct enemy to knightly honor we have thought it, despite the grumblings of Pepys's captains over paperwork. Many early modern courtesy manuals argued that honor accrued to those whose careers built upon theoretical and abstract knowledge: *Caliope's Cabinet*, cited in Chapter 4, was only one. This kind of material, though it may not have always shouldered along with chivalric values in full comfort (see below), should no longer be considered so immediately antithetical to older attitudes.

And Pepys's honor has much wider implications, for the type of combinatory phenomenon that he and other early modern bureaucrats represent was not restricted to government service. In a well-documented argument that the "urban renaissance" postulated by Peter Borsay and others began at the dissolution of the monasteries (more than a century prior to
Withington's work and this dissertation have now twice exhibited to historians' view the vital role of an ancient mentality in modern development; the rest of this Conclusion will consider the ramifications of this point. The phenomenon surely teaches us that we must take greater cognizance of continuities than is our general habit, a lesson that intimates adjustments both practical and theoretical. It suggests that a much less haphazard use of the concept of longue durée than is currently standard procedure may be in order, and that the distinction which cultural historians have drawn between their practice and that of older political and social history is bad for the profession. And it opens possibilities for further research into the meaning of the historically modern as well as renewing the question of whether "modern" should mean anything at all aside from its standard lay denotation of the current historical moment.
The examination of Pepys's professional life carried out by this dissertation should help to sharpen the somewhat vague parameters with which the debate over "modernity" is being conducted. Pepys might be used to bring the two sides closer together: this charting of his office honor could be used to show historians involved in the modernity debate that the standard characteristics cannot simply be jettisoned. Rules, order, "business," efficiency and the rest were busily being cultivated or manufactured by the pioneering Restoration administrators who laid the groundwork for the fully systematic civil service swiftly implemented after 1689. Pepys proved the perfect warrior for the dawning era in which paperwork was becoming the sword's better half: it was a moment much more deeply symbolic than even he could have imagined when he brought the Brooke House Commission up short on an accusation concerning malfeasance in a purchase order by appealing "to the logical and grammatical construction of the words thereof." Pepys's weapons of choice would henceforth dominate English politics, directing rather than obeying the imperial sword. Historians need to recognize not only that the cultural mentality of England's new age changed much more slowly than its technology (the duel, after all, lived on in England until well into the nineteenth century), but that old—very, very old—parts of that mentality which may seem antithetical to the new instead proved most helpful to it. The seventeenth century's emphasis on knowledge and regulation was adopted into honor's framework, as would, perhaps, any element that helped achieve success and, therefore, garnered honor.

Yet perhaps the old and the new did not run together on wholly frictionless rails. Given the brash self-confidence Pepys projected to the world, when he confessed insecurities to his
diary there is no reason to disbelieve him. He had honorable connections but was not bred to the purple, and we have seen how he had to gain honor by degrees (Chapter 2 and Appendix E). For all his strivings, there are signs that he never quite perfected the balance. For example, in the early modern debate over gentility versus merit he came down on the side of merit with such force that he angered his gentlemen captains. This concern may be illustrated in the bureaucracy by Pepys's handling of James Southerne; it seems odd that Pepys did not take the opportunity of his second stint as Mr. Secretary to wholly ruin his betrayer rather than simply sidelining him with Thomas Hayter. In terms of ability Hayter seems to have been the best of the best among Pepys's servants; he was of the longest standing; we have no record of his colluding in the Whig attacks on Pepys, only passive collaboration with the regime; we have Hayter's apology and his probable praise of Pepys in a manuscript intended for publication to "the world." On Southerne's side we have a servant who, though talented, almost certainly did not match Hayter's bureaucratic brilliance; who had been with Pepys for less time; who had worked to actively damage his master; and for whom there is no record of apology. In the context of honor, the latter type of gesture—and one suitably cringing—has to be assumed in order to explain Southerne's continued employment in the navy, but Pepys's behavior toward Burchett and others suggests that in Southerne's case even the most obsequious penance should not perhaps have sufficed. If this is so, then a different set of priorities may have been at work. "[W]hether . . . I had any resentments thereof or not," Pepys told Hayter when the latter apologized in 1686, "ought not, nor never did, nor should operate at all with me in any matter where the good of the King's service is concerned." This statement seems to put merit above personalized loyalties and would explain Southerne's retention rather better. Pepys's stance could still make sense in the framework of
James II's lordship, as Pepys could have prioritized his role as a royal servant over punishment for injuries to himself; such an orientation might have entailed prioritizing the King's retention of other talented servants. But the "good of the King's service" is an ambiguous phrase and might also entail efficiency and the public weal.\footnote{27}

Yet if rationalizing efficiency conflicted with and trumped honor rather than being stimulated by it in Southerne's case, this orientation, as we have seen, dominated neither Pepys's decisions nor his attitudes. He was proud of his family arms, and early in his career he explicitly aspired to found a landed estate and secure a knighthood.\footnote{28} And he was more than willing to suspend bureaucratic requirements if he felt that his own master’s honor warranted it. When navy co-treasurer Sir Thomas Littleton cited administrative procedure as the reason for withholding a payment that York (then Lord High Admiral) had authorized orally, Pepys dunned the financial officer until the latter backed down. "I have been the more particular", Pepys commented, "in regard of the Duke’s honour concerned therein."\footnote{29} A liminal figure with a foot in two camps, Samuel Pepys may have had to straddle a lifelong psychic rift represented by the way in which the attraction to birth and blood that he could not deny warred incessantly against his principled support for promotion by merit: the red and white dragons of Nennius's Vortigern contained in one head. For the most part Pepys juggled them successfully; others perhaps could not.\footnote{30}

Similar tensions can be seen in Deputy Postmaster-General Roger Whitley's evidence.\footnote{31} In Chapter 6 we extracted from Whitley's commonplace book a selection of items that harmonize well with the medieval view. But a number of his other entries about honor articulate the humanist merit-based argument that honor should have nothing to do with lineage, a stance that most scholars have seen as a harbinger of change. There is a case to be made that this
interpretation should be reconsidered, but if it is correct as it stands, the additional set of Whitley's musings might be read to support such arguments. Honor should come "by acquisition, not blood." Perhaps with disapproval, Whitley writes, "Men do more willingly honor an ancient family which have long been accustomed to it than a new upstart[.]" however worthy the "upstart." And he notes that while "[h]onor is the reward of virtue, yet sometimes [it is] yielded to titles and riches"; referring to the crown's occasional practice of selling aristocratic titles and knighthoods, he writes with apparent regret, "Honor being the prize of virtue, when it comes to be at a price, it loseth its value and makes men lose their courages, so that men will rather lust after wealth which can buy it than after worth and those virtuous qualities which deserve it."

And there is more to Whitley's possible inquietude. Modern scholars have often alleged that "personal interest" destroyed a previously "communitarian" social outlook, while a recent monograph has made "improvement" an especial marker of precocious information-based English progress during this period. Yet Pepys sometimes put "honour and interest" or "improvement" and "honor" together, and so did Whitley. For example, the Deputy Postmaster-General showed a concern for both "the reputation and interest of the employment" and urged a "faithful performance" which included a dual responsibility to "endeavor the improvement and reputation of the office". And for Whitley, the "public" also had something approaching what we take as the modern meaning, but for him as with Pepys it was also the sphere within which honor bulked large. Pepys wrote that his 30 new ships from the late 1670s had the "public ends" of supporting the "honour of the government on shore and support of its ancient, rightful, and envied title to dominion at sea." Whitley's letters contain multiple warnings to the effect that he will not "suffer the office to be thus dishonored and the public abused by your neglect." Yet as
the Prologue demonstrated at length, honor remained as intensely personalized in the early modern period as ever it had been during prior eras, so the involvement of honor in early modern administration meant that the public, however modern, was also ultimately all too personal. When Postmaster Neal's laxity allowed the letters of a large fleet to "escape", they were "carried up and down the town" by freelance deliverers "to the great loss and scandal of this office . . . [and] to the dishonor and damage of one [i.e. Whitley] that trusts you". The Deputy Postmaster-General's rebuke quite understandably ended with a plea for more "care, diligence and fidelity, both by sea and land".42

If what we see here are strains between old and new, then Pepys and Whitley's discomforts would be signs of transition, of history on the edge. From this perspective Whitley's plaint at the loss of Lodge to the customs, "how much I desire that you may still have dependence on me,"43 would be an authentic death-cry: the wail of the mother yielding the ghost in childbirth, her relationships of honor, with their emphasis on faithfulness, cast heedlessly aside by the new fluidity of credit and merit which thinks little of bestowing itself wherever and whenever it calculates its rational interest—however fleeting that may be.

But this obvious story does not seem be the right one, or at least it cannot be so simply told. If there was a fundamental cultural transition it was not just somewhat more but very much more complicated than we have thought, for there remains the not-inconsiderable problem of the historiography that shows honor to have flourished nearly into the twentieth century.44 And then there is the possibility that—as medievalists working on the centralization and rationalization of English government under the dynasty of Wessex might be quick to argue—orderly, rational method and the valuation of knowledge for purposes of governance may extend much further
back than Pepys's time. Indeed, it may be that knights were intended from the beginning to be bureaucrats as much as warriors: it has been argued that fighting "was not [the knight's] main duty, for he had also to administer . . . . the administrative duties of [Carolingian] vassals were the more fundamental even if their military duties were often the more immediately pressing." The familiar tripartite social division should perhaps have labeled them not only "those who fight" but also "those who manage." If the "deferential friendship" medieval historians have described among their lords and knights (see Chapter 3) was similar to the kind of sociability obtaining between Pepys and his "household," perhaps bureaucracy would not have been so alien to some medieval magnates and members of their affinities.

Such about-face in the typical portrayal of knightly activity may be extreme, but even a meeting in the middle would represent a significant shift in the relative importance of allegedly "modern" characteristics to the emergence of a distinct "modernity." Perhaps the kind of struggle waged by Whitley with his postmasters and Pepys with his office colleagues to promote better adherence to rule-bound procedure simply represents an Occam's-razor case of continuous struggle against an entropic human laziness faced by all conscientious administrators in all eras. In other words, perhaps the supposedly new attitudes Whitley intermixed with honor were not a manifestation of some new sociocultural order after all but, like honor, could be found earlier too by scholars who take care to look. If further work reveals a number of Pepyses not only in the early modern but also the medieval era combining sword and pen as easily as Pepys's colleagues and subordinates from Chapter 4—and some historians have claimed to precisely this result—or finds Withingtonian merchants combining democracy with communitarianism, then the profession at large should take another, and very measured, look at the radical positions on
(non)modernity. The body of my project has assumed a conservative position on the broad issues raised in the modernity debate, but that position may be wrong. Here at the end, this dissertation opens a door to more extreme possibilities by answering the call of one anti-modernity radical who insists that "ultimately, no one benefits from our current habits of periodization" and asks, "what if we refused to perpetuate these periodizations, or at least subjected them to . . . rigorous critique"?48 For among his other services to us, Pepys surely shows that we must not let conventions of periodization blind us to the necessity humans face of weaving their future with the sociocultural thread they have to hand in the present, and that, of course, derives from the past. There is no other—howsoever unsuitable our hindsight may make some of those threads seem.

As an example of the kind of work the discovery of Pepys's honor might stimulate, consider the major question of world history raised in Appendix B. Usually considered part of modernity's package, the issue will still need to be faced whether or not we retain "modernity" as an historical classification, and this dissertation's finding of honor as a continuing force at the heart of early modern government may have a direct bearing on the question. If the politics of France, Spain, England, and probably all other European countries ran on the same legitimating principles of good lordship during early modern times, why did France and Spain hang onto their old regimes while England became a constitutional monarchy? The suggestion—highly speculative, of course—offered in Appendix B is that the poor lordship of English kings and the better lordship (at least to titled elites) of their French and Castilian counterparts made much of the difference. Ideals of honorable lordship functioned as an important sculptor of European governments as they began to move out of the early modern period, helping pave the way for
both the spectacular projection of English power abroad and the retraction of the continent's.

III

Whether or not the conjectures in Appendix B retain validity under the microscope of experts on France and Spain, old honor's vital role in England at the heart of "modern" developments has important implications for the perspective we take on those developments. If the present project as a whole does not directly challenge the standard recipe of "modernity," it certainly shows that there are more ingredients in the recipe than we have recognized, so that we have not been cooking the dish right. Furthermore, the ingredients we have known may not affect the flavor in the way we thought they did. The recipe and the grocery list may not have been developed at an elegant five-star establishment but in a mad scientist's laboratory. Perhaps there was much less of the exceptional in England's dramatic tale than has conventionally been thought, and much more of the old mixed with the new in a "modernity" that we should perhaps construe as less a well-proportioned orderly construct than a Frankensteinian agglomeration.

But Pepys's honor does not merely point the way to a more accurate construal of one historical moment: larger methodological implications also ensue. From this dissertation's finding of honor's continuity also derives the additional ramification that scholarly boundaries not just historical but also historiographical are often too rigidly drawn. Cultural historians have often sharply distinguished between their allegedly superior approach and more traditional political and social history. But surely all available tools should be employed in an endeavor as complex as history, a stance the present writer seeks to support by showing how we might profitably abandon such attitudes. Honor, of course, is a cultural phenomenon, and this
dissertation is clearly a cultural history—but when it diagrams Pepys's relationships it is just as clearly a social history. And in Appendix B it seeks to demonstrate that cultural study can suggest a significant alteration in the profession's understanding of the political earthquakes which rightly hold much of our attention.

But it is the burden of this dissertation to look not forward but, like history itself, always backward—a responsibility which a goodly number of practitioners perhaps neglect more than they suppose. Marc Bloch's precept that an historian's job is mainly to explain change has been practically enshrined as our version of the Hippocratic oath, and it is easy to reach the conclusion that many a scholar has ignored important elements of continuity in the course of preparing research for publication. There is, of course, great merit in explaining change. This dissertation has attempted its bit in that regard. But there is another incentive, at bottom economic, to do so: change is more entertaining to read about, furnishing more drama and enabling more powerfully presented arguments than continuity. We may be sure that Bloch himself would not have sanctioned the portrayal of change at the expense of accuracy, but our bias is so pervasive that, perhaps, many of us forget to resist its temptation as we examine and analyze evidence. This dissertation therefore hopes to encourage a more self-conscious alertness to the importance of continuities in the historical narrative. The dissertation does so even with its methodology, deliberately chosen as a means of putting narrative to argumentative work. One of its hopes is that not just the content but the actual form of the exposition (a kind of graph in prose) will forcefully illustrate a crucial finding: that those beliefs did not change but instead stayed the same over the span covered by this project. Aside from being a critical point for the larger issues broached in the Prologue, Appendix B, and here in the Conclusion, the assertion of continuity
will conflict with the ingrained expectation of historians bred up to apply Herakleitos's famous river dictum, Midas-like, to everything they touch.\textsuperscript{50} A presentation more than customarily bracing therefore seemed desirable.

The yearning to discover and deliver significant change may also be embodied in the widespread misuse of Fernand Braudel's \textit{longue durée}, a misuse which has rendered impotent his potentially revolutionary theoretical notions. Braudel's tri-level schema (\textit{longue durée}, conjuncture and event) provides an especially helpful framework for avoiding the trap of teleological inevitability when examining very long periods of time.\textsuperscript{51} To fulfill this function, however, the \textit{longue durée} expands outward to geologic lengths; in Braudel's formulation it arguably requires around a millenium or, at the very least, half of one. But unfortunately the concept has become a convenient hat-rack on which to hang nearly any hypothesis that requires tracking much beyond a hundred years. It is not uncommon to catch historians applying it to periods ranging from two centuries to as short as a mere "long eighteenth century,"\textsuperscript{52} spans which should more accurately be considered "conjunctures" in Braudel's scheme.\textsuperscript{53} If certain cultural phenomena do border on the motionless, even allowing for some change they will (like honor) remain both operative and recognizable for a good deal longer than two or even three centuries—and such phenomena really might require the seemingly hyperbolic "whole reversal" of the historian's attitude which Braudel claims for the \textit{longue durée}.\textsuperscript{54} But such a reversal has clearly not taken place yet, and if historians keep casually gesturing at the \textit{longue durée} to provide a superficial justification for the "long eighteenth," "long nineteenth," or (any day now) "long twentieth century," it never will.

This dissertation's narrative method and heightened attention to historical continuity may
suggest lines along which we can start thinking about how to better use Braudel's concept for social and cultural history. Our misuse of the *longue durée* is partly Braudel's fault; it has been pointed out that his rejection of narrative prevented him from making causal connections between his three chronological categories, a failure that makes his schema hard pressed to paint coherent historical portraits.\(^55\) The French master explicitly allowed that "mental frameworks too can form prisons of the *longue durée*", but— aside from Quentin Skinner, with whom this dissertation began (Chapter 1)—few historians in the English-speaking academy have taken up Braudel's gauntlet.\(^56\) This dissertation does so, at least obliquely, by demonstrating the continuing vitality of one important cultural element at the end of—and perhaps only at a point along—a truly Braudellian timeline. This kind of analysis, as opposed to the much more narrowly focused approaches of much cultural history since the 1980s, offers the potential for uncovering significant ramifications that will go otherwise unnoticed. For example, when set in a genuinely Braudellian framework, the argument offered in Appendix B could be taken even further: the continuity of Western European honor, after all, fell strongly upon the lives of the humblest cottager and the most powerful ruler, the greatest state and the smallest village, from the ancient world of Tacitus's Germans and senators\(^57\) through the 1500s, and then, perhaps, in the seventeenth century helped determine the fate of three kingdoms. Therefore the old mentality of honor may have helped set what were three of the most active imperialist powers in Europe on political trajectories that would, triumphantly, tragically, or both (depending upon one's perspective), affect the entire world from that point to the present as the colonial era began to unfold.

And maybe the *longue durée* of old honor itself has failed to reach its terminus even in
the modern West. The end of English honor rebellion and, a century on, the ancien régimes of
France and Spain—or even the passing of the woolly days of the American West and Hitler's
Germany, whose army was the last organization in this hemisphere to officially condone
duels—did not necessarily push the older style of honor off the stage. Office workers still engage
in bitter rivalries. The moral failings of politicians are still ignored unless public accusations are
aggressively pressed, when, however, the consequences can be severe. Competition is conducted
in a different idiom (the word "honor" has lost a number of its former associations and has added
new moralistic overtones), and its results are generally somewhat less dire. Yet one Europeanist
claims to demonstrate that "honor codes of great antiquity were transmitted remarkably intact to
modern bourgeois culture, where they [have] served as part of the fabric of male sociability
among doctors, scientists, and other professionals." Perhaps a healthy dose—or unhealthy, as the
case may be—of ruthless knightly honor, rather than honor in the virtuous modern sense,
continues to be a potent historical force in even the most fully developed societies to this day.\textsuperscript{58}
Notes to Conclusion

1 That Pepys would be ignorant of the history of any ritual courtesies in the navy is rendered nearly unbelievable by his continuous dealings with such issues throughout his tenure at the Admiralty; consider also the keen historical eye that led him to cite a ledger from Elizabeth's time showing precedents for the navy treasurer's collection of Exchequer fees (BHJ 1 Feb. 1670, 378-9) or, on another issue, documents not only from Elizabeth's successor but also Henry VIII (BHJ 5 Feb. 1670, 386-7).

2 For the the exchange with Dartmouth, see Bryant, 3:278. Created Lord Dartmouth in 1682, this was the same ordnance official against whom Pepys and Coventry had squared off in 1664 (Chapter 2). Pepys considered him an enemy as late as mid-1679: see SP to John Holmes, 15 Apr., and see also a previous letter in which Pepys had insulted Legge directly, describing the recipient as a man whose "friendship [is] . . . uneasy and suspicious", 15 Feb., respectively in FC, 356 and 349. Bygones became bygones quickly, however. It is not clear what occasioned the rapprochement, but both men were among the Duke of York's staunchest adherents (see Dartmouth, DNB). It seems likely that the Duke himself brokered peace, as cooperation would be preferable to competition between two of his most implicitly trustworthy servants. At any rate, by 1681 Pepys and Legge were on friendly enough terms that the former asked the latter's help in securing a position at Cambridge (Pepys was then out of office). The next year Pepys traveled as a tourist with Legge on the latter's yacht for around two weeks, and others considered Pepys to be Legge's friend by that time: see, respectively, Bryant 2:359, 380-1 and 392. For their difference in 1688, see discussion of Josiah Burchett in chapter 3.

3 see Introduction.


7 It may seem apt that one commentator has defined honor in terms of "multi-vocality, even self-contradiction": Cynthia Herrup, "'To Pluck Bright Honour from the Pale-Faced Moon’: Gender and Honour in the Castlehaven Story," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Sixth Series, 6 (1996): 138. This characterization does capture the multifaceted nature of the phenomenon, but the present author cannot endorse the description because it is not at all clear that contemporaries saw it that way. Conflicts there certainly were, and they were recognized readily enough, but conflict is not the same thing as contradiction—especially in an honor culture. In what is
probably a rather unusual case in sets of premodern collective mores, the plural subject of the
community of honor conferred upon its participant-agents explicit permission to differ from each
other by way of moral autonomy (see Chapter 2, note accompanying Pepys's abandonment of
Downing). There is not space here to support the point with evidence, but my impression is that
the moral autonomy of the honorable person allowed so much leeway for individual casuistic
judgment that nearly any conflict between honor subvalues could be resolved to one's own
satisfaction, whether or not onlookers might agree. The personage of honor's task then was to
convince others that he or she was right, and the importance of outside opinion to the honor
system made this a very important matter indeed. But unless someone else persuaded that person
that his or her reasoning was faulty, the disagreement of others might well be a matter of external
consequence only. However crushing such consequences, and whatever the emotional isolation
imposed by the opposing opinion, neither would cause internally felt contradiction if the
individual still felt that he or she was right; s/he would simply construe external opinion as
wrong. Any contradiction would be perceived as lying outside one's own decision-making
boundaries; it would lie between one's own decision and the construal of others, and therefore it
would fail to stimulate cognitive dissonance within the self. If external disagreement prompted
the individual to reconsider, perhaps causing a temporary feeling of contradiction, this experience
was unlikely to last long. Deciding that external opinion was correct, s/he would embrace it and
abandon the previous stance, thus eliminating any abiding sense of internal contradiction.

8 The influence of gender is apparent on almost every one of these pages in terms of the male-
dominated environment being described here, and feminist scholars may be annoyed that the
sexual dimension of honor has not been foregrounded. Please review the caveats in Appendix A.

9 On issues such as merit vs. birth see the discussion below of Pepys and Whitley's possible
ambivalence as figures caught between the old and the new. But one relevant issue does not seem
to me related to such generalized ideological conflict. This is a question often asked by Pepys
scholars and must inevitably be raised when the topic is honor: Pepys never secured a
knighthood, and had he wanted one from either the later Charles and certainly from James II, he
surely could have gotten one. Why did he not? I believe that Arthur Bryant, whose sprawling
biography is unwieldy but suggests that of all Pepys scholars he spent the most effort trying to get
inside Pepys's head (perilous as such attempts are), has come closest to the mark. Pepys grew to
believe that refusing such honors ultimately made him a more effectively faithful servant to his
royal masters because it made him seem less interested in emoluments and more devoted to his
duty. This seeming disinterest gave his enemies one less accusation to hurl: Bryant 2:148. In
other words, as Chapter 4 can be taken to suggest, for Pepys, winning wasn't just everything: it
truly was the only thing.

10 7 August 1662, 3: LATHAMPP.

85.

12 Diary 11 Mar. 1664, 5: LATHAMPP

345
For the values of medieval lordship see Duby, *William Marshal*, 68; the word of honor, 89, and also Maurice Keen, *Chivalry* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 132-33, 174, 249.

See e.g. Anna Bryson, *FromCourtesy to Civility: Changing Codes of Conduct in Early Modern England* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998): "The late medieval social tissue of protection and loyalty . . . expressed in the cult of lordship and institutionally manifest in the life of the 'gregarious' and 'ceremonious' noble household, gradually dissolved." (143) Instead, the urbanizing environment of the seventeenth century created a milieu in which "a gentleman's relationship with 'company', rather than his relationships of lordship and service" was what affirmed status: 136.


Peter Lake and Steve Pincus, "Rethinking the Public Sphere in Early Modern England," *Journal of British Studies* 45, no. 2 (April 1, 2006): 287.

In *The Politics of Commonwealth: Citizens and Freemen in Early Modern England* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), for burgesses foreshadowing "modernity", see 7; backdating the urban renaissance, 5, 12, 17-37; participatory politics in towns, 123, 125-127, 155; political proto-parties, 51, 55, 67-75, 103-112; meritocratic leadership, 119; "democratic agitation", 79 (and note that this furnished a pattern for national politics: 78, 122, 153, 169, 266); individual freedom as harmful, 131, 141, 148-49, 166, 176; commercial competition as harmful, 79, 174-75, 178. For examples of communal reproof and corporate discipline of uncooperative individuals, see the cases of John Warter in York (134-35), Joseph Goften and Arthur Newham in Newcastle-Upon-Tyne (179-80), and others on 176-77. In sum, within this urban framework the "imperative of the public good" was ineradicably opposed to "the dangers of private interest": 256.

Withington, *Politics of Commonwealth*, 174. For communal attitudes and practices, see most citations in previous note as well as 97-99, 170, 183.

For the medieval continuity of town practices and attitudes, see 12, 53, 92, 254, 267; previous scholars' undue dismissal of the medieval corporation, 125; urban institutions constitutive of eighteenth-century sociability, 194 and also 267.

*BHJ* 7 Feb. 1670, 392.
For an introduction to this debate in the navy see J. D. Davies, *Gentlemen and Tarpaulins: The Officers and Men of the Restoration Navy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), chap. 3, especially 33-42 and 62-64; for Pepys see e.g. *TP* n.d. [ca. Feb. 1684], 206-7.

He had fired his butler John James for merely carrying on with one of the maids: Bryant 2:263 and Tomalin, *Samuel Pepys*, 312. For an unidentified malfeasance he removed John Harris, one of the two brothers associated with John James's later confession of false witness, from his place as porter for the Admiralty. Pepys described this as "putting a brand upon him", and the reference to a visible mark proclaiming an outcast seems to have borne some metaphorical truth. When the Secretary of the Admiralty decided that someone had wronged him or the navy, he could hinder their careers as thoroughly as he could further the chances of his protégés. John James found that no navy position was open to him after he left Pepys despite an excellent record of service as a sailor. John Harris was unable to get the wages that were still legally owed him for service prior to his dismissal. John's brother Alexander, also employed by the Admiralty (as head messenger) and on the outs with Pepys, kept his job but lost its perquisites (the secretary had allowed him to be "pinched in the profits of his place" by Parliament instead of furnishing him the protection given other underlings). For John Harris's post, see *AO* 72 and *Proceedings* 104, n. 104; Harris's dismissal, *Proceedings* 24 Jan. 1680, 72, and *AO* 129 (the list of porters on 72 misleadingly implies that Harris was in his post until 1686). For James's exemplary naval record, see C. S. Knighton, editor's introduction to *Proceedings* 64; for James's blacklisting in the navy, *Proceedings* 27 Jan. 1680, 75; the blocked payment of Harris's wages, *Proceedings* 24 Jan. 1680, 73-4; Alexander's post, *AO* 129; the cutting of Alexander's benefits, *Proceedings* 24 Jan. 1680, 73.


I am grateful to Derek Hirst for pointing this out.

For Pepys's hopeful pride in family heraldry see *Diary* 10 Feb. and 23 Mar. 1662, 3:26 and 50; ambition to found a landed estate, 23 Feb., 34; knighthood, 2 Mar., 40.

*NWB* 5 Jan. 1669, 162.

Sir William Coventry, for example, may have given the white dragon of administrative order too long a leash and paid for it with his career—Charles II hated him and seems to have used the Buckingham challenge as a convenient ostensible reason for Coventry's dismissal: J. R. Jones, *Country and Court: England, 1658-1714* (London: E. Arnold, 1978), 167. It is possible that Charles's feeling may have been the result of Coventry's well-known insistence as treasury commissioner that the King economize. (Unlike Pepys, who also urged economy, Coventry had the power to make it happen.)

See Chapter 6 for a discussion of Whitley and Pepys's general similarity in their deployment of honor to help run bureaucracies, but no evidence in this paragraph save one piece, as noted, is duplicated in that chapter.
32 For the humanist position see James 288-89, 338-39, 360-70, 379, 391, and more generally much of the scholarship cited in the Prologue. But because of honor's public aspect, "virtue" was expected from medieval knights as well. Noble blood was held to confer honor but medieval theorists insisted that the honorable virtues still had to be demonstrated, and the converse was also true: common men-at-arms who showed conclusively that they shared knightly virtues (primarily martial prowess, of course) were at times ennobled. So it is arguable that the humanist position, save in its definition of what "virtue" should be, is not as different from the "traditional" position as scholars such as James have argued. James himself also provides the evidence for the older, perhaps not-so-different view: 333-34.

33 Bodleian MS. Eng. hist. e. 312:33.

34 Bodleian MS. Eng. hist. e. 312:13

35 e. 312:33; 313:99.


37 For Pepys adducing "honour and interest" see *NM* ca. 1680, 83, and for "improvement" and "honor" see the letter cited in Chapter 3 thanking Deane for his report on classifying ships.

38 Whitley to Beane, 24 Dec. 1672, BPMA 94/15, and Rodham, 24 June 1673. All citations to Whitley in this paragraph constitute letters by him from this archive, so henceforth only recipient and date are given.

39 For example, he can be found worrying about "the public satisfaction" (Redmane, 29 Mar. 1673, and in same see also Wilson, 11 Apr. 1673; Neale, 30 Apr.; Neal, 29 Sept.; Bellamy, 28 Oct.; Mein, 9 Dec.; Burges, 23 Dec; Neal, 25 Dec.


41 Webley, 14 Dec. 1672. For additional linkages of the public with honor or dishonor see To the Postmasters in Plymouth Road, 22 May 1673 (slow delivery caused "the great dishonor of the office as well as damage to the public in this time of action", the Second Dutch War) or Marsham, 27 Oct 1674 (in which molasses-like deliveries required an unreformed postmaster's "punishment" in addition to dismissal in favor of someone "who will be more concerned for the affairs of state, and public, and honor of this office").

42 11 July 1673, BPMA Post 94/15 and see also Hall, 6 Dec.: "though I have a great respect for you, yet I have more for my own reputation and the public good of the kingdom". For the duty of coastal postmasters to gather and sometimes intercept letters carried by incoming vessels, see
Chapter 6 n.

43 See Chapter 6.

44 Prologue, n. 1


47 Carole Rawcliffe and Susan Flower, "English Nobleman and Their Advisers: Consultation and Collaboration in the Later Middle Ages," *Journal of British Studies* 25, no. 2 (Aprril 1986),157-77, document the fourteenth- and fifteenth-century knights and upper gentry (171) who served as counselors to magnates. These counselors were "expected to turn out with a competent following of men 'diffensibly arrayed' whenever the earl took to the field" (175) and were often as loyal to their lords as chivalric ideals demanded (160-61, 165), even to the extent of supporting the very dangerous endeavor of baronial revolt (175-76). Yet they did not spend most of their time on the battlefield: across England this group comprised "hundreds of conscientious bureaucrats" (160), "professional administrators and lawyers" responsible for the "efficient management" of baronial estates (159), a task encouraging "an obsessive interest in administrative detail" (162), the development of "clearly defined procedure . . . efficiency of record keeping" (168), and demanding "expertise in subjects as diverse as bookkeeping, accountancy, surveying, finance, forestry, and law." (164)


49 This attitude continues to be displayed even though the first flush of the new cultural history's youth is long enough past that no-one calls it "new" anymore; see, for example, Peck, *Consuming Splendor*, 2.

50 Marc Bloch's restriction (cited in Chapter 1, above) was only a disciplinary recommendation, not an epistemological claim; he did not deny continuity as a phenomenon. More recently some theorists have done so; Hayden White is one, and so is Quentin Skinner when he temporarily dons his poststructuralist hat to quote Nietzsche and Foucault. Although there is nothing in Skinner's rhetorical approach requiring that a concept change at any particular point in time, he assumes change as such a deep, abiding, and constant universal as to be necessarily expected at all points, and we must therefore "not merely . . . admit the fact of conceptual change but . . . make it central to our research." (*Regarding Method*,178, and see also 180: "the vocabularies we use to describe and appraise our social world continually wrinkle and slide.") This stance seems
rather contradictory to his explicit support for the longue durée (see below), a problem that may be related to his poststructuralist sympathies as noted in Chapter 1 and Appendix D.


Lloyd Bowen, Review of The English Revolution, c. 1590–1720: Politics, Religion and Communities, ed. Nicholas Tyacke, Parliamentary History 30, no. 3 (2011): 443. This is just one example of the common misapplication of the longue durée to much shorter spans than Braudel seems to have intended.

Prior to settling on his better-known labels Braudel defined his different temporal levels as "geographical time, social time, and individual time": Mediterranean, vol. 1, 21. Later, he offhandedly gave a span of a "half-century" for conjunctures: On History, 29. But this does not comport with the demonstration he furnished in his massive Mediterranean, where the first 350-odd pages deal with the glacial units of the longue durée, "permanent, slow-moving, or recurrent features" (vol. 1, 353), while a fairly standard narrative of events finishes the epic undertaking at vol. 2, page 1237. Sandwiched between the longue durée and the narrative section is the section dealing with social time, a "social history" which, if his compositional structure followed his theorizing, should correspond to a "conjuncture". Occupying pages 355-900, this conjuncture constitutes an extended sixteenth century spanning roughly the years 1450-1650 and involving "the history of groups, collective destinies, and general trends" (353)—yet this is what most historians nowadays treat as a longue durée, perhaps taking license from On History's "half-century" remark. But to ascribe all spans longer than 50 years to the longue durée makes nonsense out of Braudel's descriptions of "the very long time span" (On History, 27) which requires of the historian "a whole reversal of his thinking, a whole new way of conceiving of social affairs . . . which sometimes almost borders on the motionless . . . . These depths, this semi-stillness." (33) Tellingly, Braudel's own examples of the longue durée in On History, even non-geographical ones, never last for less than 400 years (31-33).


Braudel's statement is in On History, 31. For Skinner, see Regarding Method, vol. 1, Visions of Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002): "I attempt to interpret specific beliefs by placing them in the context of other beliefs, to interpret systems of belief by placing them in wider intellectual frameworks, and to understand the wider frameworks by viewing them in the light of the longue durée." (4-5) Skinner's two-volume Foundations of Modern Political Thought (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1978) is one of the few intellectual or cultural histories to have genuinely achieved this tripartite aspiration since Braudel articulated it.

Appendix A: Women's Honor

Analyses of early modern honor have become increasingly gender-oriented—indeed, there has hardly been any other kind for nearly two decades—so feminist auditors will be quick to ask where the many women in Pepys's life have gone in my account. This appendix briefly addresses that question: a gender approach is unnecessary here. And in any case, before it can be productively used it should be retuned for greater historical accuracy where honor is concerned.

Gender accounts are incontestably valuable, but providing one would do little to achieve the goals of this project. The women of the later Stuart civil service—and there were some, in the royal household—should indubitably be the focus of an investigation in terms of their professionalism. And Elizabeth Pepys clearly invites work in her own right: there is an incontestable need for a scholarly monograph to follow up Sara George's fictional Journal of Mrs. Pepys. But Samuel had almost nothing to do with the royal household, and Elizabeth would require a different project entirely. More generally, nobody can dispute the importance of the point that masculine honor was constituted against characteristics attributed to women. It is a crucial element in the understanding of men's honor per se and the subordination of early modern women. However, this by now well-traveled path does not conduce to the present inquiry's destination. Space could be taken to note, for example, that when Samuel verbalizes aggressiveness in a certain way, the verbiage depends on an unreflectively assumed opposition to some characteristic that he had explicitly attributed to Elizabeth the day before. It could then be observed that such oppositions were what constituted the range of choices available to the man of honor and therefore helped lay the deep foundation for the conclusion I eventually draw. But what is important for present purposes are the more overtly held values, those that were reflected upon consciously and which influenced behavior most directly. Plumbing those values' ultimate reason for being constitutes a different endeavor with different purposes, and anyhow that case has already been ably made by a number of writers. There is no need to duplicate their efforts.

More seriously, the standard account of a stark distinction between female and male honor is historiographically fraught. A representative historian writes, "the preservation and acquisition of honor are . . . radically different for the sexes. For a man, honor is a function of physical courage, the keeping of promises, sexual conquest, and the chastity of his female relatives; for a woman, honor is restricted to the maintenance of chastity." It is the sexualized aspect—precisely the element most targeted by gender analyses—which constitutes the problem. Gender analysts seem to have been correct in their finding that a (married) man's control of an ideally well-ordered domestic household was an aspect of his honor; Pepys certainly worried—even obsessed—over Elizabeth's potential for independence. However, the standard assumption that this element of personal reputation was universally analogized outward to higher politics finds little echo in Pepys's record. His concern for order in the bureaucracy or the realm is almost always couched in different terms. (See Appendix C for a discussion of this point with regard to the culture at large.) Similarly, although I cannot speak for the "lesser sort" of man, and I remain uncertain about bachelors, among elite males my impression is that extramarital recreation failed to occasion much buddy-buddy boasting outside specialized groupings where, honor or no, we would expect it anyhow (e.g. Restoration rakes). If amorous ventures worked to
increase a gentleman's standing within any circle of friends or associates (rather than just libertine circles), or in the culture at large, Pepys utterly neglected to employ this resource. Yet he had more than sufficient quantity, and he could have pardonably fudged on the quality with no one the wiser but the women. The reader will soon be convinced, I hope, that he was not the man to miss such a chance. And then there is his direct testimony: on one occasion, after dallying with Mrs. Bagwell and fantasizing about Jane Welsh, the diarist gritted his teeth and determined to "laisser aller les femmes for a month" not only to prevent distraction from work but also because "my honour thereby lies a bleeding."³

As a result of these problems, if "[t]he full force of the affective" in Pepys's life must be "explicate[d]", as it has recently been argued,⁴ a caution must be sounded against binding the effort wholly to the inevitable gender analyses. Other perspectives must be offered for balance in such a project. As a by-product of its main concerns, the present enterprise offers an example of how this may be done by looking at the professional sort of environment most likely to be de-emphasized in studies of affect. In that context, the body of this dissertation suggests, the emotions connecting Pepys's internal sense of honor to its performative projection outward were probably quite powerful. It is hard to see how they could not have been, as the stakes sometimes extended to his career and once his very survival.

The final difficulty with the gender approach (as it currently stands) to early modern honor has to do with the failure to enlarge it for elite women. The narrow scope of women's honor as constituted solely by chastity has to date been widened only by a few scholars, two of whom have confined their more expansive version of female honor to non-elites. Two have allowed elite women's honor a few more dimensions but continue to limit their role to the domestic sphere, and this pair of treatments—comprising mere parts of essays—have been far too brief to achieve much notice.⁵ Aristocratic and gentry women therefore remain straitjacketed. Yet anthropologists have now found that their predecessors' seminal work on Mediterranean honor, the work that has undergirded our subsequent historical accounts, failed to accurately characterize the societies under study. The failure at issue involves the role of women: though covered by a patriarchalist veneer, they play a much more prominent and powerful role than is apparent at first.⁶ I have come to believe that this is also true, if not quite so marked, in medieval and early modern Europe.⁷ The necessary revision deserves a full-length treatment of its own rather than a halfway measure grafted onto something else. I hope to provide this revision in future work; it cannot be adequately undertaken here. But a few examples may serve to indicate that there are arguable grounds for my position.⁸

For a start, consider the case of Philip, Lady Roos, who implied that her honor sprang from her blood and made no accompanying mention of sexual propriety. Philip began adult life as the spouse of Thomas, Lord Roos, a prominent Lancastrian commander during the Wars of the Roses. After Roos's attainder (1461), then capture and execution (Battle of Hexham, 1464), Philip was bereft of support and quickly married a prominent northern squire, Edward Grimston. Once the immediate crisis of subsistence was over, she set about trying to retrieve the property which was properly her own but which had been absorbed by the Yorkist crown along with Roos's estates. In a joint petition, the Grimstons reminded Edward IV that Philip was of high birth, indeed close to the sovereign himself. She therefore required assets sufficient to sustain "her and her children according to her honour and worship"—for which Edward Grimston's own
resources, the couple could apparently claim with plausibility, were inadequate. In other words, the text bases Philip's honor precisely upon her gentility, which by definition means that it was not wholly dependent upon her chastity, and an initial crack mars the surface of the prevailing view.9

And premodern aristocratic European female honor could go well beyond blood inheritance, expressing itself in ways allegedly limited to men. Scholars who continue to accept honor-as-chastity for elite women may respond to the case of Philip that of course a gentlewoman would be considered honorable by birth; the key point is that she would have to maintain that honor with chastity alone, as opposed to the various means which gave husbands such as Thomas or Edward a much broader field of endeavor. After all Philip does not seem to have taken the field alongside her first husband. But, in fact, some women did take the field. During the fourteenth century in France, after Jean de Montfort was captured by Charles de Blois in the fighting over who should inherit the dukedom of Brittany, Lady Montfort assumed leadership of the family cause. Not only did she strengthen fortresses, preside over councils, and negotiate with other magnates, but she directed battles. In addition, she donned armor to lead a party of knights in combat on horseback at least once; she also personally wielded a sword multiple times at sea. It seems clear that the same honor values of family loyalty and the preservation of its interests, of steadfastness and combative aggressiveness, were held not only by the lord but also the lady. To be sure, a patriarchal hierarchy with fairly well-defined gender roles was also operating, else under normal circumstances lord and lady would have taken turns doing the fighting; what is significant for the present argument is that when the lord was removed and the hierarchical order disrupted, the lady did not remain meekly within a castle, consoling herself with sexual purity. Other values immediately took precedence, and she could not have applied them so decisively if she had not already held them.10

Elite premodern women could clearly exercise honor-based authority in a manner that should be nonsensical given the current view. Montfort was not alone; Cicely, lady of Antioch, had sufficient honor of command in her own right to personally dub a number of knights before battle in 1119. And this sort of phenomenon was not restricted to the the Middle Ages. Of course, neither Montfort nor Antioch gives license to deny that when a premodern woman held a superior position, gentle male inferiors would sometimes accuse her of gender-based weakness behind her back, and would perhaps argue with her more often than they would have with a male lord or patron. But those men still regarded their duty as her servants, and her reciprocal obligation to them as mistress, in the same terms of honor that were applied to male superiors. Perhaps more importantly, such women can be shown to have regarded their inferior dependents and retainers in the same light of honorable obligation. Elizabeth I is probably the best-known example during the early modern period, but there were others. Elite premodern women could clearly exercise honor-based authority in a manner that should be nonsensical given the current view. Montfort was not alone; Cicely, lady of Antioch, had sufficient honor of command in her own right to personally dub a number of knights before battle in 1119.1 And this sort of phenomenon was not restricted to the the Middle Ages. Of course, neither Montfort nor Antioch

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1 Keen, *Chivalry*, 80.
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Perhaps more importantly, such women can be shown to have regarded their inferior dependents and retainers in the same light of honorable obligation. When Jane, Lady Berkeley, set down her 1601 instructions concerning procedures at the family seat, Condover Hall, she was not directing menials but rather "my gentlemen in household" whose elevated behavior would hopefully "procure the meaner sort of my servants in calling to amend their faults by your good examples". The lady's gentlemen were commanded "to be diligent and reverent in their services to my lord and me" (as opposed to only "my lord"). When "I shall walk any way out of the park as into the fields, as more or any of my" (this time no mention of "my lord's") "outward grounds, then would I have the gentleman usher and the rest of my gentlemen be in a readiness to wait upon me." During dinner and supper, "my pleasure" (again, no interpolation of "my lord's") is "that the gentleman usher and the rest of my gentlemen shall with due reverence and great diligence wholly give their attendance to wait upon us, and none for those times to go to rest themselves in other places or to be absent, but to wait diligently". When finally given leave to depart, they were "to behave themselves civilly like gentlemen", which meant refraining from practicing their swordplay "in the hall which . . . gives cause of offense by the great noise that comes by that means"; it also meant refraining from "great play [i.e. for high stakes] neither at dice, tables, nor cards; for excess of gaming impoveriseth your estate". Instead they should bowl or "chiefly exercise of your long bow wherein I take great delight." What Lord Berkeley might have been willing to tolerate from these retainers appears to have been immaterial.12

Jane Berkeley's purview also extended to oversight of the magnanimous hospitality by which the honor of noble households was demonstrated. If "strangers" of high station were visiting, "then my pleasure is that the gentleman usher and all the rest of gentlemen shall presently put on their livery coats for the first night and all the next day following," which was apparently somewhat uncomfortable as Berkeley gave them her gracious permission to wear normal cloaks thereafter if the visit lengthened. But they needed to remain alert: "my pleasure is that they both after dinner and supper and at other times, both the gentleman usher and the rest of my gentlemen shall keep most in the dining chamber to make show of themselves both for the honor of my lord and me and to be ready to do such service as shall be commanded them." They were also to see "all strangers well entertained for my lord's honor and mine;" but the entertainment should be carefully tailored to the visitor's social place. No-one was to be served in livery "in my house under the degree of an esquire of an hundred pounds a year of an inheritance at the least". To sum up, "even as you all tender my favour, the gentleman usher and all the rest of my gentlemen [are] to frame yourselves to the obeying of these reasonable orders". Within obvious limitations, this is a powerful and commanding woman who well understood, and acted
upon, the premodern principle that courtesy, hospitality, display, and due deference to nobility were mainstays of authority and power. Explicitly adduced multiple times, Berkeley's honor, like Henrietta Maria's, certainly had more dimensions than the single element enshrined in current scholarship.  

So did the honor of Charlotte Stanley, Countess of Derby, who evinced the same martial propensities as Lady Montfort hundreds of years previously. Stanley personally directed the 1644 defense of Lathom House, the Stanley seat and the last royalist bastion in Lancashire. The king requested that her husband command troops elsewhere, but even as the earl received these orders, the Stanleys were apprised of an impending attack upon their outpost. Raising a force of untrained locals from the family estates, the earl wrote that he was "[l]eaving my house and my children, and all my concerns in England, to the care of my wife, a person of virtue and honour equal to her high birth and quality".  

Lest scholars valiant in the cause of chastity mistake the kind of "virtue and honour" Derby meant, the countess's subsequent actions furnish sufficient illustration. The earl gone, she organized her raw levees into troops under seven officers who apparently had some combat experience, appointing one "Captain Farmer . . . major of the house," but the chain of command was clear: "he received his orders from her ladyship." Sir Thomas Fairfax, one of the most able foes of the Royalists (he would soon be appointed Lord General of all Parliamentary forces), besieged the castle. The countess conducted negotiations herself rather than delegating them to a male. Before Fairfax's entrance,  

her ladyship caused all her soldiers to be placed in very good order, under their respective officers, from the main guard in the first court, down to the great Hall, where her ladyship had ordered Sir Thomas Fairfax to be received; and had placed all the rest of her men in open sight upon the walls and the tops of the towers in such manner that they might appear to be both numerous and well disciplined[.]  

At the parlay, Fairfax asked for the countess's surrender, promising that she would retain fully half of the family estates if she did so. She responded that she could not do so on her own initiative. Not only did she owe "loyalty and faith" to her husband, who had left the family property in her care, but she owed allegiance directly to the king in his cause. If she obtained both permissions, she might yield, but otherwise she would "preserve her honour and obedience, though in her own ruin." Whatever echoes of chastity might resonate in her phrasing, Stanley's sexual morality was far from its main focus and had nothing at all to do with the kind of "ruin" at issue. The context of armed combat makes it perverse to interpret the countess's "loyalty and faith" primarily as anything but an expression of the same type of steadfastness that would have been expected of a man of honor had Lord Berkeley asked, say, a prominent local squire to defend his interests.  

After the negotiations, Lady Stanley conducted her defense with competence and decisiveness. She contrived to deceive Fairfax concerning her intentions, troop numbers, and supplies in a way which makes one suspect that she had more than a passing familiarity with Machiavelli's *Art of War*. Convinced by Stanley's intriguing that he had but to wait two weeks
until she would give up, the Parliamentary commander sat on his hands while the countess used the precious time to train her forces. When Fairfax realized he'd been had and sent her an ultimatum, she replied that because she retained "faith to her lord" and "allegiance to her prince" she could not yield the fortress, and "they must never hope to gain it, till she had either lost all these or her life in defense of them." Parliamentary forces attempted various means of taking the castle; sorties were made, a mortar shell exploded in the hall where the lady and the officers were dining, and a cannonball smashed through her bedroom window. But "the lady and her officers" here or "the lady and her commanders" there conferred and carried out successful counterattacks. In one particularly "sharp and bloody fight, the heroic and most undaunted lady governess was without the gates, and sometimes near the trenches, encouraging her brave soldiers with her presence". Toward the end of the siege, after Fairfax had repaired to less frustrating and more productive zones of combat, the new commander sent a peremptory note threatening "the utmost severity of war" unless the castle was given up. Stanley refused to dignify the communiqué with a written response. "Tell that insolent rebel Rigby," she instructed the hapless courier, "that if he presumes to send any other summons to this place, I will hang up the messenger at the gates."

Charlotte Stanley was no figurehead, functioning solely as a passive focus for loyalty: more than merely an inspiring leader, she was an active and effective one who demonstrated honor in as "male" a manner as did any of her fellow civil-war commanders, and more than many. The siege at Lathom lasted four months before it was raised by Prince Rupert, during which time, we are told, the Roundheads lost around two thousand men. Even if the number is highly exaggerated, the countess was clearly not to be trifled with. True, words such as "obedience" in Stanley's diction may imply overtones of the feminine subservience Queen Elizabeth had used so skillfully during her foreign marital games of a generation before. But this interpretation's very congeniality in terms of its utility for postmodern political agendas (that Stanley must still be defined principally as a victim of patriarchy) should engender doubts concerning its adequacy as the whole explanation. For the countess's stance toward her husband and her king embodies the same orientation of faithful service adopted by Pepys toward an immediate patron such as Sandwich and, simultaneously, toward the king as ultimate master (see Chapter 2). As argued in Appendix C, this behavior reflects not a patriarchal or paternalistic culture but one of lordship or patronage. Also like Pepys (and Lady Berkeley), Stanley commanded in her own right; like him, she took counsel from her servants, but this was not a sign of female inferiority—it was simply what a man or, yes, woman of honor in a position of leadership was expected to do. Overall her conduct at Lathom was characterized by "courage, prudence, and steady resolution", the virtues of the ideal general.

Whatever "female" overtones the honor of the countess of Montfort, Cicely of Antioch, Queen Mother Henrietta Maria, Lady Berkeley, and the Countess of Derby may have carried, they also held in their honor elements that we have heretofore considered "male", including that ultimate bastion, the virtue of command and bravery in war. The goddess Fortuna willing, in the future I will show that these women were not alone.
Notes to Appendix A


3 Diary, 23 January 1665, 6:20. There are additional similar pieces of evidence in his archive. He was uncomfortable at being told "scurvy stories" about Edward Mountagu and his brother Ralph, heir to the barony of Boughton, "which troubles me to hear of persons of honour": 8 March 1662, 3:43. He approved of Lord Dartmouth's admonition to a dissolute colonel: when this officer mentioned his sexual exploits, "my lord very worthily answered but that was not necessary for him to publish to everybody as if it were a thing to be boasted of:" (TP 23 October 1683, 98) Pepys also disapproved of naval commanders who spent money "in vice, to the dishonour of the King":7 March 1684, 207. When one of those commanders on leave in London wrote to his admiral inviting the superior officer to town and promising to furnish him a prostitute for the visit, Pepys felt it was "to the great [dis]honour of the service and both Adm. and Capt. be it spoken [publicly]." (TP 25 April 1684, 322) For evidence outside the Pepysian archive, see Ferdinand's promise to Prospero that he will not lie with Miranda until safely married. Shakespeare set this in a form that implies fornication as dishonor not just to the maid but also the man: "the strong'st suggestion," the prince insists, "shall never melt / Mine honour into lust": The Tempest, 4.1.28-30. Mervyn James was rightly more circumspect in this regard than most of
his successors have been, noting that a gentleman could commit adultery (and also lie, cheat, steal, or murder) without his honor coming into question not because those acts were honorable but because honor lay chiefly in public reputation. Therefore as long as a public accusation did not issue for any such act, honor was not impugned: James, 339-40. The obvious implication is that if a man's affair did become public knowledge, honor might well be questioned rather than affirmed. And this is in fact what happened to one earl in the mid-1660s (see Sandwich's Chelsea affair, Chapter 2). Only two scholars writing after James, so far as I am aware, have followed his cautious lead in this matter: Elizabeth A. Foyster, Manhood in Early Modern England: Honour, Sex and Marriage (London: Longman, 1999) and Bernard Capp, "The Double Standard Revisited: Plebeian Women and Male Sexual Reputation in Early Modern England," Past and Present, no. 162 (February 1999): 70-100.


7 For preliminary gestures in this direction, though not invoking honor as a mentality for women, see for the medieval period Susan M. Johns, Noblewomen, Aristocracy and Power in the Twelfth-Century Anglo-Norman Realm (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), and for the early modern era the citations in Sharpe and Zwicker, "Introducing Lives," 14 n. 18 and in the same volume Annabel Patterson, "This Girl Hath a Spirit Averse from Calvin: Reading the Life,
Hearing the Voice(s)," 255-73. See also the work cited above on women serving in the early modern royal household.

8 This initial foray accepts sources uncritically. This procedure would be unacceptable in a more lengthy argument, but the purpose here is not to make a definitive case. It is simply to suggest that an important question exists and needs to be addressed.

9 Petition of Edward Grimston and his wife to the king, ca. 1471, in HMC Verulam, 12.


11 Keen, Chivalry, 80; Memoirs of Sir John Reresby: The Complete Text and a Selection from His Letters, ed. Andrew Browning, Mary K. Geiter, and W. A. Speck, 2nd ed. (London: Offices of the Royal Historical Society, 1991), 76. For Reresby's attendance on the queen mother in France see 20, 27, 29, 30-32; and during a 1660 visit to England she checked to see whether her son had "done anything for me, and [asked] what I desired, that she might speak on my behalf." (36)


15 In Seacome, History of the House of Stanley, for the countess's organization of her men, see 123; negotiations, 124-5.

16 In Seacome, History of the House of Stanley, for hoodwinking Fairfax, see 125-6; dining-hall explosion, 129; quotations indicating Stanley's active role, 128 and 129; presence in battle and overall characterization of her leadership, 130; brusque dismissal of the final insistence on surrender, 131.

17 For the raising of the siege see Seacome, History, 132, and for Parliamentary losses, 131.
Appendix B: European and English Parallels

England's dual metamorphosis into great power and modern Europe's trailblazer (see Prologue) has always attracted notice, though perhaps the sheer drama has distracted historians of England from the comparisons upon which the narrative relies: it gets much of its verve from placing England alongside neighbors powerful enough to be its rivals. For all the noise that continues to be made about the mistakes of Whig history, a consensus still portrays a literally enterprising—in the sense of capital-driven—people who, standing firm as the major Protestant bulwark against the might of the Catholic superpowers, developed the freeborn vigor necessary to outrun lethargic continental contemporaries weighed down by topheavy absolutism: a "tale of the unique triumph of Protestantism, parliamentary sovereignty, and law over absolute monarchy and Counter-Reformation Catholicism through civil war and glorious revolution."¹ This comparison—implied if not explicit—is what gives so many textbook titles their piquancy: England was different from the absolute monarchies in ways that conduced to pathbreaking developments and measures. England moved ahead because it had characteristics they lacked or lacked characteristics they had.²

Within this juxtaposition of England and continent lies a difficulty, for research during the past four-odd decades by Europeanists has yielded results which efface some of those differences and question the significance of others. England and her bigger neighbors certainly followed disparate paths into the modern era, but we need to bring the contrast back for a second interrogation. After a short prefatory discussion this appendix raises the question with two sections, the first considering commonly posed social and cultural distinctions, the second surveying relevant historiography on politics and administration. The appendix then finishes by offering a (highly speculative) new answer for the differences in trajectory between England and the continent.

Europeanists, to whom the right of objection to English exceptionalism surely belongs, have fired a few brief comments of warning across the bow but only a single direct broadside (the arguments of which have gone mostly unnoticed by the target anyhow).³ Instead, historians of the continent have usually agreed with claims of early English arrival on the scene of the modern. No less a figure than Fernand Braudel put his stamp of authority on the interpretation, its consequences exemplified by another French historian whose explanation for fewer duels in seventeenth-century England than France features the now-familiar commercial consciousness of the English "noble class", a business club whose members tended to avoid dueling because there was no money in it. French gentlemen, by contrast, still thought and acted in more antiquated terms.⁴ The English mindset augured accomplishments that eluded their continental co-equals with disastrous consequences for the latter's failure. "Of all the European landed elites, only the English captured the central government," writes an admiring historian of the island kingdom. "Only in England did the state not develop into an entity separate from the elite and in conflict with it."⁵ Contemplating the results of 1689, one opposite number across the channel laments what might have been if the French nobility had also risen to the early modern occasion: "If the state was going to remain the national political community, French elites [too] had to seize control of its right to make law, to levy taxes, and to borrow money." But unlike their English
counterparts, they did not. The guillotine followed.\(^6\)

A similar weakness is held to have plagued the Spanish elite, though this group exited with a whimper rather than a bloodsoaked bang. Pointedly lacking the English peer's "willingness to heed public opinion as voiced by the Commons", seventeenth-century Castilian aristocrats allowed the abeyance of the Cortes to pass without protest—until too late. When the weight of the eighteenth-century Bourbon yoke settled full upon their shoulders they finally called for the assembly's renewal. But the moment for such action was past, and they took their country with them into insignificance.\(^7\)

Continental revisionists have bustled too energetically about their own tasks to lift their eyes across the channel for more than brief glances, most of which also reaffirm English exceptionalism,\(^8\) but their evaluations of early modern society and politics nonetheless have ramifications that do much to erode England's preeminent status. They have downplayed even the significance of the contemporary phrase "absolute power," arguing that rather than denoting royal arbitrariness it simply meant that the sovereign had no legal superior and for that reason did not require the consent of others to make law, and that he embodied the last resort of justice for his subjects: there was no appeal outward to some transnational jurisdiction such as the Pope's. It has even been argued that authoritarian propaganda constituted absolutism's only real substance.\(^9\)

Anti-absolutist revisionism has gone on long enough that post-revisionism has now begun on the French side of the issue, but how far this new phase remains from the old absolutist wisdom may be judged by a recent post-revisionist survey of government by a senior authority who jettisons the term "absolutist" altogether in favor of "monarchical state".\(^10\) Occasional arbitrary government action of the type often alleged by contemporary English diatribes against France or Spain can certainly be dredged up, but scholars of the continent will now often counter that those represent chances opportunistically seized by governments solving problems on an ad-hoc basis rather than self-consciously trying to establish a new type of authority. Even the importance of the most quantitative building-block of English exceptionalism may need reconsideration, as the English demographic expansion (see Prologue) is offset by France's claim, whatever its rate of growth, to be "the most heavily populated country in Europe throughout the [early modern] period."\(^11\) However loud the demographer's assertion that the English hare managed to pass the French tortoise, a cautionary note concerning the significance of this juxtaposition should at least be sounded. And other differences, lacking a bulwark of careful statistics, slide much more easily toward convergence.

The legal contrast between English and continental nobilities is a topic on which the revisionists have contributed little of direct moment, but (as will be seen below) so many of their findings narrow the gap in social and political terms that the power of the legal formalities might well be questioned first. This has been an important plank in the exceptionalism platform. England, writes one historian, made a "striking contrast with . . . the continent, where a title of nobility conferred favours so enormous" that its holder was not merely marked off but almost completely "cut off". "Britain," wrote another, "had no nobility in the sense of the other European
countries.\textsuperscript{12} but the privileges at law available to English peers were by no means inconsequential—they could not be arrested for misdemeanors except breach of the peace, for example, which made them immune not only to the embarrassment of prosecution for minor indiscretions but also to debtor's prison, the scourge of more than one wealthy merchant or successful artisan who became overextended; they could not be tried before a common jury, but only one of fellow nobles; and if convicted, as in France they had the right to decapitation in cases of capital punishment rather than hanging. In an age where political machinations easily brought the death penalty, this was perhaps rather more comforting to members of the group most likely to engage in such intrigue than it might seem to modern readers.\textsuperscript{13}

The alleged gulf between the aristocracies of France and England is further flattened by a more careful consideration of what seems the stark contrast between the fairly easy derogation of French titles for economic reasons and the much more cumbersome attainder which was required to strip an English title, and for reasons much weightier than money problems.\textsuperscript{14} But a second look reveals the French impulse also quite alive in England. Although the statute is not well known, English law too allowed nobility to be taken away if the holder could not sustain the requisite lifestyle, and it is arguable that only an accident of legal form prevented this from occurring with the French frequency.\textsuperscript{15} Certainly a related English practice confirmed the shared prejudice: at least until Elizabeth's accession, nobles without the means to maintain themselves expansively were not summoned to sessions of Parliament—but if they managed to regain their means, they (or their heirs) would find themselves summoned once more.\textsuperscript{16}

The England-France parallels in privileged treatment extended beyond the former's title nobility down to the squire, the equivalent of the \textit{écuyer}.\textsuperscript{17} Along with title-holders in both their own country and France, after 1591 the sons of squires and knights could take advantage of reduced degree requirements at university. Although the gentry lacked most of the other formal privileges accorded titled nobles (which on the continent extended to their equivalents in the lesser nobility), they enjoyed considerable informal protections. Physical punishment, for example, was so widely held incompatible with their dignity that they almost never suffered it.\textsuperscript{18} The nearest English equivalent to the French surveys of nobility known as \textit{recherches} were the herald's visitations, but English gentry tended to see the crown's attempt to verify their status an insult. So did lesser French nobles, but unlike them, English squires had sufficient power that they often simply refused to comply. Crown control of gentle status proved unenforceable in England, and the visitations were abandoned after 1688.\textsuperscript{19} This difference between England and the continent points up an arguably more important similarity: rather than being a sign that the French \textit{écuyer} was somehow more (or less) privileged than the English squire, the comparison can just as easily be interpreted as showing that each was powerfully and clearly a member of the gentleman's club, the Frenchman by his formal status and privileges, the Englishman by the real power he had to either refuse or cooperate, as he chose, in the affirmation of that status and the privileges he enjoyed despite lacking a legal tag.

Such parities make it unsurprising that a crisis of the old military aristocracy has been argued for both Spain and France, bounded by almost exactly the same years as the one famously proposed by Lawrence Stone in England. All three crises share the same outline, a loss of wealth and political power accompanied by a forced demilitarization as armored knights became outmoded, then featuring a similar recovery, especially in France by way of the sword's
equivalent of English embourgeoisement as well as an extension in both France and Spain that might be termed "enrobement." Revisionists working on this issue in France have turned with something of a vengeance to Norbert Elias's hypothesis of absolutist balance between sword and robe, indeed so strongly as to tip the theorist sideways. Elias was more correct than he knew when he argued for a continuous merging of bourgeois and elite manners, but the process settled into a configuration rather opposed to his portrait of a horrified noblesse d'êpée assiduously and continually redrawing the line between itself and the usurping robins. Despite occasional protests on the part of either side that each was superior to the other, the sword mingled much more closely with the robe than was once thought, internmarrying, securing administrative posts for younger sons, and at lower levels of nobility sometimes occupying official posts themselves. Indeed, Many historians hold that there eventually occurred so complete a merger that no essential difference remained between the two. Some scholars argue that this process may have reached completion as early as the mid-seventeenth century. In some provinces most families seem not to have merely intermarried but switched back and forth between robe and sword careers so often that to speak in terms of lineages who specialized in one or the other makes little sense. Even in regions not so homogenous, halfway through the seventeenth century sons of locally prominent sword nobles such as the comte de Souvigny could choose a judicial career without shame.

Less work has been done on aristocratic culture in Castile, but significant interpenetration between letrado and espada seems to have occurred there also. Intermarriage between old noble and high letrado families was apparently common. Hidalgos, the Castilian equivalents of gentry, had long dominated the ranks of the pen by the late sixteenth century when it also became common for younger sons of the greater nobility to join them. Conversely, sometimes letrado families rose, gained titles, and then abandoned their roots, becoming noble military dynasties; and perhaps coming close to making such efforts moot, a royal decree of 1677 gave civil servants "the same right to bear arms and all the exemptions and privileges of the fuero militar." Some hispanists agree with their colleagues in French studies who argue for a full transformation: the sixteenth-century nobility "withdrew more and more from its primal function, war," and by the first quarter of the seventeenth had substantially completed a turn to "public offices . . . for direct participation in power".

If civic influence had anything to do with such changes, the Castilian switch had been much longer in the making than the English. Aside from the Italians, Castilian elites were perhaps the earliest to urbanize in Europe: they never moved into cities because they had never been outside them in the first place. The maintenance of captured territory during the Reconquista had been served best by the establishment of fortified towns, so Castilian society was urban-centered from the very beginning; Castile had no provinces or counties, only municipalities. "Agricultural life was urban life" because it was the township that had immediate administrative authority over the surrounding countryside. Almost without exception aristocratic seats and ancestral homes were in major towns or in castles right beside them. Castilian nobles thought of their lordship first not in terms of arable land and peasant farms but in terms of towns. The establishment of municipalities ranked second only to the premier honor value of physical courage in a seventeenth-century historian's praise of the marquis de Cañete's New-World accomplishments: "he exercised the profession of arms . . . fighting and defeating brave and
indomitable peoples, risking his person in serious dangers, and founding eight cities." Sons of
grandees often cut their administrative teeth on town councils before moving on to high office or
military command. 29

The French could not match Spanish civic enthusiasm but nonetheless by the 1600s even
many a provincial seigneur owned a local urban residence: the lesser French landholding elite
had beaten their English equivalents to town by about half a century. Peter Borsay recounted a
homogenization in England where gentlemen consorted with the towns' higher echelons on fairly
equal terms, going so far as to intermarry on a frequent basis instead of following the previous
practice of snubbing burgesses as not truly gentle. 30 But this did nothing to set England apart
from its neighbors. Once in town, French seigneurs anticipated the English by consuming
novelties and entertaining themselves within mechanisms of social equalization; the salon has
been celebrated as a relatively egalitarian site, and the same types of leveling activities
characteristic of England's urban renaissance, including balls and gambling, are interpreted as
imparting similar sorts of "civilizing" effects in France. 31 In fact, throughout the early modern
period the English largely copied continental civility rather than developing their own models. 32

The civility inculcated by towns in England led to an important hardening of social
distinction—but this development detracts from rather than supports English claims to
chronological priority. Stimulated by the new urban surroundings, argued Borsay, English elites
lengthened the distance between themselves and poorer neighbors by such means as Palladian
architecture, which imposed a much more sharply demarcated separation of gentry owners from
their servants and tenants than had previously been the case—one more instance of modernizing
Weberian differentiation. 33 But this also occurred earlier, by at least a quarter-century and
perhaps more, in France and Spain. 34 The French development is particularly well documented:
French country-house architecture had incorporated exclusionary backstairs for servants since the
sixteenth century, and the most private of the new Palladian rooms, the cabinet, was brought
from France—where it had obviously been in use for some time already—to England by former
Cavaliers at the Restoration. 35 Meanwhile, French carnival, once participated in by all, had also
been abandoned by elites; "from at least the mid-seventeenth century onward the literate classes
were in a quite different cultural world from that of the lower orders." At about the same time,
unsurprisingly, the French sword finally fell under the sway of rationalistic humanism. 36

Accompanying all this, as in England, was an increasing comfort not only with estate
exploitation but full-blown commerce. Legal prohibitions against commercial endeavors by
French and Spanish aristocrats have often been cited as evidence for the gulf between them and
commercialized English gentlemen, but the underlying sentiment held good in England too. Well
into the Restoration plenty of scorn was poured by the gentle, or writers representing their
attitudes, on the accumulation of wealth by the "ignoble" methods of trade and craft despite the
universally accepted commercialization of the English landholding elite. And more than verbal
bias reared its head in England: former city merchant Lord Craven was one of only two Caroline
peers of the top ten wealthiest who never secured a lord lieutenancy (the other was a Catholic). 37

In their own gentilesse historians of France now observe the same combination of anti-
commercial rhetoric and commercial outlook. The French sword's did not last for centuries, but
in this case England was the tortoise. Like England, during the 1500s France had undergone "the
spread of a money economy and capitalist relations in the countryside . . . . the seigneurial system
of the seventeenth century was very different from the medieval system.\textsuperscript{38} If in England the bond between lord and retainer turned into the patron-client business arrangement, the same happened in France with that of "protector-creature".\textsuperscript{39} Soon épée investment in capitalistic ventures was no more confined to the robins and their merchant cousins than were such endeavors monopolized by the business community in England, and by the early 1720s France was marching perfectly in step with the English foe: staring each other down across the channel after two decades of exhausting war, the bluebloods of the one were as quick to buy into John Law's system as those of the other into the South Sea Bubble (the two collapsed at nearly the same time).\textsuperscript{40}

The scholarship on elite demilitarization also takes aim at the difference between England and the continent. The personal armies retained by French magnates into the seventeenth century are commonly enlisted to make the case that the French sword was blunted significantly later than the English, the implication being that such forces were no longer available to the latter. Yet even during the reign of James I a survey reported that nobles (including Anglican bishops!), quite apart from any militia commands they might also hold, could raise private forces 24,000 strong should military need arise. A few decades later, almost simultaneously with the Frondeurs, English gentlemen on both sides of the civil war were still bringing tenants with them to the battlefield, the king even issuing feudal-era Commissions of Array.\textsuperscript{41}

If the demilitarization hypothesis for England seems less certain, what then of the educational propensity said to have contributed so much to the decline of English arms? It does appear that English gentility—at least aristocrats and the upper tiers of the gentry—represents one of the first European landed elites to broadly and enthusiastically embrace civic humanism. Indeed, what many scholars still think of as early-sixteenth-century timing may be a hundred years late, as K. B. McFarlane has argued that the English nobility was fairly literate by the early fifteenth century. But the timing involved rather seems beside the sword's point at which the elites of all three kingdoms accepted the new learning. It has been too little remarked that educational works written for English gentlemen tended to temporize with traditional attitudes, selling humanism not by assaulting warriorship but by mapping humanism onto it. Even during the heyday of what was once called the "Puritan Revolution" one of these treatises entitled itself Heroick Education and declared that classical history would make students resolute in all accidents. Perhaps more surprisingly, philosophy too would prepare students for the traditionally honorable vocations of counselor and warrior: after all, [i]n counsels they do nothing but reason, and argue . . . . [and] war is a continual reasoning. Sir Philip Sidney, perhaps the most accomplished Elizabethan humanist of the highest social strata, and his intellectual heir the earl of Essex, would both have applauded—and Sidney was the hero of Zutphen, while Essex, to whom Sidney left his sword, is notorious for staging the last aristocratic rebellion against an English monarch.\textsuperscript{42}

In this blending of humanism and war the French nobility met their English compeers halfway. The former may have kept much humanistic learning at one arm's length for longer, but with the other they eagerly gathered any that conferred an advantage in war—which included, as Heroick Education prescribed for the English, a good deal of classical history. And some Frenchmen of the sword had gone further earlier. Sidney's contemporary Charles de Gontaut, duc de Biron, once expounded a Greek verse that proved above the capabilities of several present
robins. Biron quickly extracted himself from the conversation, embarrassed at being seen by his military peers as having greater learning than men of the robe, but his associate, Marshal of France Henri, duc de Bouillon (ruined in Biron's conspiracy of 1602), no humanist slouch himself, openly bemoaned his lack of additional learning in Latin and philosophy. The Spanish military aristocracy, in their turn, were humanists at least as precocious as the English. A steady stream of impeccably battle-seasoned nobles had begun promoting to their peers the combination of armas y letras long before Sir Thomas Hoby's translation of Castiglione fired English enthusiasm: "knowledge does not blunt the iron of the lance", wrote the Marquis of Santillana to his future king in 1437. This movement gained significant momentum under the Catholic Kings—Isabella, even more than Elizabeth of England two generations later, was a highly educated classicist who established academies for the nobility's education at court during the 1490s, her clear message that she wanted her fighters smart. The chroniclers of her reign insist that she rewarded only nobles who combined the two endeavors, and by the time of her death the desirability of at least a basic Latin humanist background was an accepted facet of grandee upbringing which spread outward to the hidalgua.43

Isabella's stimulus may have steered aristocratic education too far in the direction of pure letters, as Castilians proceeded to either overleap or equal English gentility in the various aspects of cultural modernization discussed in the Prologue. By 1583 Philip II found it necessary to turn his predecessor's precedent on its head, establishing a royal academy for aristocrats teaching practical military subjects such as artillery and hydraulics. The academy did not detract from the high noble enrollments of the universities and Jesuit colleges, however, where proportional rates surpassed those of English peers and gentry, and Castilians tended—again like the English—to specialize in law.44 They also took each other to court as assiduously as the English; both peoples gave their kingdoms a near-simultaneous great age of early-modern litigation (recurrence to law became more popular in France too, though perhaps by a smaller amount). Spain's grandees retained groups of lawyers numbering as much as twenty (not including clerical support staff) and even their peasants filed large numbers of suits.45 In addition, while elite Spaniards seem to have taken the standard anti-merchant rhetoric more seriously for longer than the English and French, they too had their commercializing landlords, beginning to appear at the end of the sixteenth century and advancing by the end of the next to the point of openly "abandoning the old ideal of protection of their vassals".46

In sum, if in England agriculture had become a commercial enterprise in which beneficence to tenants was no longer a desideratum, and if humanism had displaced chivalry, the same types of factors "had taken [the seventeenth-century French nobility] well beyond the warrior culture of its medieval predecessor". And aristocratic cavalry charges against the Alpujarras rebels at the end of the sixteenth century were, like their contemporary Don Quixote, anachronistic symbols of "a Spain which was passing into history".47 But perhaps, as we have just seen, humanism did not in fact have this effect—perhaps, indeed, rather the opposite. Whatever the modernization scorecard reads between these various realms, in one endeavor the early modern award for the most intense drive toward cultural rationalization incontestably goes not to England but to Spain. Guided by Aristotle's principle of conocimiento de la cosa por su causa (knowledge of a thing by its cause), mid-sixteenth-century Castilians pressed the kind of intellectualized warriorship promoted by Heroick Education to its logical endpoint in a ruthlessly
geometrical rapier technique characterized by mathematically precise footwork (using Pythagorean diagrams painted on practice floors) and featuring a distinctively upright stance with the sword-arm held straight from the body at a right angle. Although the stance and a few geometrical ideas were desultorily borrowed by theorists of other nationalities, nobody else in the early modern West ever came close to matching the humanist rigor of the Spanish destreza, though it was well enough known abroad—"fencing by the book of arithmetic," Shakespeare mockingly described it. But it seems to have worked. Though reputed to be less quick on the draw than the French, when Spanish duelists finally took the decision to unsheathe, they were widely regarded as the deadliest swordsmen in Europe.⁴⁸

II

If the English elite's readier adoption of Renaissance learning and its associated cultural changes seem not to have been so singular after all, the same can be said of state formation. Rationalized political endeavors such as the English poor law came not ahead of but merely in step with the rest of Europe. Slightly before Samuel Hartlib, Hobbes, and the political arithmeticians began to answer Bacon's call to reason during the 1640s and 50s, René Descartes published pioneering work on that most fundamentally practical branch of mathematics, geometry, in the same year as that most rationalistic of all early modern works, Discourse on Method (1637). It should therefore be unsurprising to find that the Restoration government's much-touted head for facts was more than matched, and simultaneously, in France:⁴⁹ Louis XIV's ministers, mindful of "the mathematical certainty so dear to Descartes . . . . clearly understood that the first precondition of modern government is information. They set out to obtain massive amounts of detailed, statistical information in order to act more efficiently."⁵⁰

If English method was neither precocious nor unique, the same was true of governmental organization. Even accepting the original strong form of Sir Geoffrey Elton's famous argument (widely attacked and which he himself later attenuated) for a "Tudor revolution in government," thus allowing England an earlier centralization than France, the central Castilian administrative apparatus, having already undergone its era of significant innovation, got there first by a very large margin (the late fourteenth century).⁵¹ Neither is it clear that landholding-yet-urbanizing humanist prodigies steered England more quickly toward constitutional monarchy and participatory government than otherwise would have been the case. Well-schooled even sooner than the Spanish was the urbanized Italian nobility, yet the latter produced the earliest west-European rulers traditionally classified as absolutists—⁵²—and it was a later member of that coterie who drew from Machiavelli The Prince (whose author, it is worth remembering, was a renowned humanist).

One difference extolled with particular vigor between England and the continent has been that of representative assemblies. The unique English bicameral structure, it has been argued, "go[es] far towards explaining why it was specifically in England that modern capitalism was so spectacularly to triumph."⁵³ Instead of following the standard tricameral model divided into the three familiar medieval estates, the English bicameral structure plucked those who fought but lacked noble rank (the group that became known as "gentry" during the later Middle Ages) out of the upper house where sat their fellow warriors, instead placing the untitled knights of the shire.
with the townsmen in a lower house. Meetings of the English Parliament, then, worked as social mixers that slowly accustomed burgesses and knights to a more amicable partnership in political matters than was the case on the continent, a predisposition that would, it has sometimes been mooted, smooth the way for many a rural squire to side with city merchants against Charles I.

Adding to Parliament's anti-absolutist impact was, paradoxically, England's exceptional medieval centralization (see Prologue). While contemporary Europe featured many assemblies, most served only a region, not the kingdom. By preventing the formation or continued existence of such regional assemblies, the Normans established a relatively tight, permanent political order that eventually forced their subjects to transcend local differences in the only assembly they had, the national. By early modern times the English Parliament, though, had by that time long been a body in which members conceived of themselves as representing the nation, the "community of the realm," rather than merely their county. This notion made united opposition to the monarch much easier than it was elsewhere, allowing that body to better defend the liberty of the subject (or, depending on the historian, upper-crust interests) than was possible under continental monarchies.

The salience of the English Parliament's structure, however, has now been significantly undermined. If England's unique parliamentary organization conduced to a more socially homogenous, less hierarchical attitude among its members, then assemblies elsewhere should also have created cultural effects corresponding to their structures. This requirement posed no problem when scholars supposed that assemblies in other realms generally divided themselves into the three estates, but recent work shows that the regional and national assemblies of Europe through the early modern period exhibited a much wider organizational variety. Therefore, if the structure of representative assemblies had the social effect that the cooperation hypothesis holds for England, medieval Europe should have boasted a much more variegated set of social structures than it seems to have possessed.

The most important supporting detail of the structural cooperation thesis, the argument that the mixing of English knights and burgesses led to MPs' conception of themselves not primarily as representatives of their locales but as representatives of the nation, also faces a serious problem uncovered by recent work. Certainly town members and knights of the shire proffered petitions in terms of the whole kingdom's welfare, but such rhetoric can be noteworthy in this comparative context only if there was a lack of such rhetoric in other late medieval and early modern European national assemblies. Unhappily for English historians so confident as to claim that their assembly "could be called 'the body of the whole realm" but that "there was no equivalent in the Iberian Peninsula; and the Estates-General in France never acquired such authority or significance", members of not just the Spanish and French bodies but almost all the others likewise held themselves to represent their kingdoms en toto. It is hard not to agree with perhaps our most eminent authority on early modern European assemblies when he writes, "Historians have often made rather too much" of the English structure, which would be better regarded as "simply [one] among the many variations in the development of representative institutions in medieval Europe." England's parliamentary peculiarities remain peculiarly English, and they may well have helped stimulate a sense of nationhood among the elite. But since kingdom-wide awarenesses were also widely expressed elsewhere, the characteristics of England's assembly can no longer be held up as a unique case of uniqueness when set beside the
welter of distinctly structured assemblages described by the most recent survey of early modern European representative bodies.\textsuperscript{58}

The continent's historiographical sappers have also been digging away at the notion that a centralized nobility of service helped rulers become authoritarian, offering instead a new interpretation of absolutist rulers as much more constrained than was traditionally thought, even at the heart of their governments. Formal lawmaking, for example, in a sense proceeded the same way in France and England, the roles of legislator and consultant or validator simply being placed on the other realm's opposite arm of government. In England, the ruler did not make the most important laws. He or she could certainly issue proclamations, but these had a good deal less legitimacy than parliamentary statutes. Skillful parliamentary management could give the ruler a good deal more influence than the formal early modern constitutional machinery allowed, yet the English monarch, proposing, approving, or vetoing laws passed by Parliament, was clearly more of a consultative partner than a legislator. The reverse obtained in France, where the ruler made the laws and the parlement of Paris "registered" them, an act without which the potential law was not actuated (almost amounting to a passive veto).\textsuperscript{59}

Louis XIV did curtail the parlement's power of registration in 1673, and traditional historiography made much of this event, but the measure is now seen as much less "absolutizing." Afterward the Sun King trod lightly with the still-powerful parlementaires, adding to their administrative influence in compensation (Louis and Colbert's judicial reforms of 1667 and 1670, though containing some provisions that angered the Parisian court, mostly comprised measures that had been proposed by the parlement itself). And while circumvention of registration removed one of Louis's annoyances, it did little else; in place remained "other, equally important procedures the judges had used effectively in the past to oppose royal policies." Throughout the rest of Louis's reign he and his council worked as hard to manage the parlement of Paris as the more successful of the early modern English ministries worked on Parliament, while the parlement itself continued to insist "that one of its central functions was to preserve customary rights from an arbitrary exercise of royal power". This was no idle boast; most of the time Louis and his council compromised with the judges on important matters, and when Louis pushed the Parisian body too hard on a major constitutional issue toward the end of his reign, the parlement stood its ground, won the showdown, and formally "resumed its position as the prime defender of gallican liberties."\textsuperscript{60}

For all the parlement of Paris's newly recognized chutzpah, Spain probably built the strongest institutional safeguards against despotism. The king did get his respect—"it will be necessary to obey by serving him as the absolute and despotic lord of our persons and property that he is"", wrote a councilman of Salamanca in 1697, and during the previous reign, another local worthy simply said, "the command of the prince is law". But there was also other law. Two great digests, Alfonso X's Siete Partidas and Philip II's mid-sixteenth-century Nueva Recopilación, had come to serve as a "written constitution" which the king could not trump without a good deal of trouble.\textsuperscript{61} The Cortes played a part in this,\textsuperscript{62} but (perhaps to the non-hispanist's surprise) not the most important; the real bastions of "liberty" in Castile, though previously interpreted as the opposite, were the royal councils. Castilians had a saying that amounted to a national legal maxim, and they acted upon it when they felt the king was going too far: obedézcase, pero no se cumpla (obey but do not comply), signaling reverence for the kingly
office accompanied by point-blank refusal to follow its orders until a formal supplication to the
crown wended its way to the highest of the councils, the Council of Castile, also simply referred
to as the royal council. There the worrisome proclamation would be rescinded if it failed to pass
muster a second time, and under the greater scrutiny of a challenge, such passage was unlikely to
be a pro forma affair. Much more consistently assertive toward its monarch than the English
privy council, the Castilian body was not only the highest political and administrative unit of the
kingdom but also its supreme tribunal, and it saw itself "as having a responsibility to the law that
was independent of the king". Holding itself an intermediary between sovereign and subject, the
council sought to ensure "the legitimacy and respectability of royal resolutions". To that end it
wielded "a right of remonstrance (replicar) reminiscent of the French parlements" and was
generally viewed by contemporaries as a bulwark of "due process against arbitrariness . . .
actively resisting any recourse to extraordinary or irregular procedures and consistently defending
established rights and contractual obligations".  

The Council of Castile was not the only Spanish barrier against arbitrary government,
only the greatest; the Spanish empire's central government comprised no less than twelve
councils at the top (only two, war and finance, had reputations for arbitrary dealing). This
conciliar structure hindered potential authoritarianism with more than just a care for
constitutionality: the cause received inadvertent aid as councilors took advantage of overlapping
jurisdictions to pursue more material concerns. When adversely affected by a new royal policy
being executed under the direction of one council, the aggrieved party could appeal to a
competing council which would be only too happy to undercut its rival's authority. Undeniably an
administrative headache for the Habsburgs, this competition supplemented the conciliar
solicitude for lawful procedure, both features combining in a system that worked as "a sort of
official, internal opposition, a channel for the expression of grievances, and a protection for
individual and corporate rights". One foreigner visiting in 1611 summed up rather perplexedly,
"although their government is absolute, their kings do nothing without the councils, they sign
nothing without them, and even the most minor questions of public policy they do not resolve
alone."  

The old view of the robe has therefore been given a hard shake. Clearly Castilian
bureaucrats were far from the royal yes-men of historiographical yesteryear. In addition,
revisionists have contended that ownership of French office conferred a level of job security that
allowed not only judges in parlements but administrators in other bureaucracies to obstruct their
kings. This picture still allows room for the old idea that venality of office, fostering
timeserving corruption and the top-heavy bloat of sinecurists, ultimately dragged down the entire
ancien régime. But as part of an attack on the revisionist argument for obstructionist
administrators, post-revisionists working on France have a strongly restated the notion that
absolutist bureaucracies were effective despite venality, thereby putting continental
administration back on par with England's. Either way, this contrast crumbles.

Another contrastive notion under attack is the allegedly more thorough cowing of the
continental nobilities. A major theme of continental revisionism has been that insofar as absolute
rulers succeeded, they did so only because they procured the willing cooperation of their
aristocracies—including not just the higher nobility but also the equivalent of English county and
parish gentry. Some conventional historians of absolutism were not unaware of this phenomenon
but tended to dismiss it by describing kings as having bribed their nobilities into giving up independence. Yet the very policy implies that continental aristocracies retained a significant amount of power (otherwise no bribes would have been required).

Revisionists, though sometimes employing the older pejorative diction, have been much more sensitive to the ramifications of such "bribes". They have found that the aristocracy as a whole remained a potent, if not strictly military, force throughout the ancien régime. The major Castilian "military" families dominated some of the royal councils (notably war and state) and monopolized viceroyalties throughout the seventeenth century. It is true that some historians working on France continue to employ the robe-sword dichotomy, and most retain the portion of Elias's argument which postulated the sword's cultural transformation. Yet the new historiography holds that this shift entailed little loss of political clout. Far from being "emasculated by an avaricious monarchy," the French noblesse d'épée still "enjoyed enormous power" right through the reign of Louis XIV; indeed, "many of the traditional forms of their power remained important, and were only partially modified to meet shifting demands of seventeenth-century society and politics."

Much of the continental aristocracies' power owed itself to continuing involvement in provincial politics—involvement that undercuts the significance of the common assertion that a decentered model of English governance by local elites kept their king on a short leash. In contrast to the supervision maintained in the "strongly centralized and bureaucratized European absolutisms" by such officials as corregidores and intendants, historians of England are fond of insisting, the English peer served his own county as lord lieutenant. The squire stood alongside him as the homegrown justice of the peace, both combining to decenter their government. However, Europeanists' work on provincial government has yielded a judicial and administrative picture similar to that of France and Castile's oppositional centers, leading to the conclusion that the continental kingdoms were as decentered as England in their different ways. Entrenched local institutions have always been recognized as important but were usually painted as hindrances to modernizing economic growth and the kind of untrammeled national assembly that secured English freedom. A full appraisal of provincial structure on the continent now also shows it derailing monarchical attempts to establish full-scale central control, as effective collectively as the English parliament ever was singly.

Part of the reason for this effectiveness in France lay with a regional political structure which paralleled that of England but left even more power with magnates. The continental match to the lord lieutenant was the governor, and the latter had greater autonomy and authority over a larger territory than the former (like lords lieutenant, governors were nominally military officials but exercised a much broader administrative reach than that classification implies). Lower down, the French écuyer and Castilian hidalgo often, like his English equivalent, fulfilled the role of local magistrate or other official. He furnishes a corrective for the historian to the contemporary English conceit (apparently first promulgated by Fortescue but often repeated later) that the common law's accretion of precedent, executed by local JPs, stood as a bulwark unique in Europe against central tyranny. Varying legal traditions in different regions certainly had that effect in France. "All localities," even under Louis XIV, "were ruled by elites which intermarried and whose horizons rarely extended much beyond the province. . . . Local dynasties were formed . . . they built up their power over generations by the acquisition of offices and astute marriage
alliances." Behaving much like the gentry revealed in English county studies, these rural elites administered "customary law [which] so severely circumscribed the king's law that its jurisdiction resembled island fortresses in a vast sea over which Louis XIV had no more control than Knut." The Catholic King was no better off, his attempts at legal centralization becoming hopelessly lost in a "Cretan labyrinth" of *fueros* (customary jurisdictions) stubbornly upheld by local elites.⁷³

Absolute monarchs genuinely intending to govern arbitrarily must have been disheartened to observe that when they did score the occasional centralizing success, it often failed to augment their authority. Like the councils in Madrid, regional royal courts often decided against the Castilian crown.⁷⁴ They were also known to decide with peasants against their lords, but those lords were hardly disadvantaged. The crown was supposed to oversee seigneurial exercise of authority, but since the king often turned oversight back to the lords themselves, central "mechanisms of supervision . . . were short-circuited".⁷⁵ In terms of administration other than the legal, Louis XIV did attempt to strengthen the centralized system of *intendants* but soon realized that he needed to respect local institutions; in 1668 he began regularly instructing *intendants* to seek the help of governors when attempting to implement central policies, and during the same decade Colbert took care that *intendants* should refrain from interfering with the power of other governing authorities, be they legal or administrative, national or local.⁷⁶ "[N]o attempt was made to rationalize the labyrinthine judicial and financial administration with its multitude of competing jurisdictions," one analyst concludes. "[T]he policy of the government appeared to be to achieve some sort of harmony and discipline by regulating the relationship between them and ensuring for each its legitimate functions."⁷⁷ The same could be said of absolutist Castile, where local men tended to secure low-level crown posts and "local resistance" was often able "to thwart the execution of royal policies."⁷⁸

If England outgrew this kind of localism during the latter half of the seventeenth century, the island nation did not don the emperor's new centralizing regalia any faster than its competitors. The English lord-lieutenancy may have changed from a position in which magnates took note of the periphery's interests into a government post often filled by men of lesser status who cared less for local concerns (see Prologue), but Castile had its parallel at approximately the same time. There the already long-urbanized greater aristocracy began "abandoning their local allies" under central pressure, scaling back activities even in their patrimonial towns and cities as a prelude to concentrating almost solely on central politics in the eighteenth century.⁷⁹ France's similar development came earlier. During the Wars of Religion, provincial governors found that the "medieval principle of personal clientage" no longer served to maintain order, and when the turbulence subsided with Henry IV's ascension, they began to leave their provinces to congregate at court. There they became exemplars of the new urbanity, spurning old-style violence in favor of "exploits in the bedroom, ballrooms, and at the gaming tables", and after the accession of Louis XIII they increasingly left local matters to the centrally appointed *intendants*. These officials are described as throwing lordship aside, using "a new, more legalistic principle of authority" to introduce "bureaucratic procedures into local government", imposing "routine supervision and control".⁸⁰

III

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If the sociopolitical effects of English parliamentary structure can no longer be presumed to have set England so very far apart from the continent; if historians of all three monarchies rather than just the English can speak confidently of their respective seignorial nobilities being bound more closely "to the authority of the state" by the new civility; if, conversely, all three retained, as a group, significant strength vis-a-vis their respective monarchs, and the Habsburgs and Bourbons were often forced to allow their nobilities a good deal more local and national influence than the absolutist interpretation held; if there was much less difference between the European robe and sword than used to be thought, the sword becoming "embourgeoisified" (or at least "enrobed") at more or less the same time as, if not earlier than, the English landowning elite; if the entrenched local institutions once portrayed as hindrances to the kind of national body that secured English freedom actually did much to slow the establishment of continental "tyranny"; if French and Castilian elites, like JPs and lords lieutenant, continued running their localities without much supervision from the national government for most of the period, and if the regional English appointees then "centralized" themselves just as the continent's did; if the oft-demonized tyrant of Castile labored under a written quasi-constitution more tangible and usable, for all its clumsy bulk, than England's vaunted but and confused scattering of uncollated statutes, common-law cases and ad-hoc precedents from (telling phrase) "time out of memory"; if absolutist administrators did as much to hinder central power as to help it, or if the continental bureaucracies worked well enough despite venality of office; if the new rationalizing impulse of the early modern period was competently realized in all three societies and governments more or less simultaneously rather than first or most fully in England—then most, perhaps all, of the old interpretive legs have been chopped to pieces and the comparative stool has collapsed.

Yet for all that, there remains the stark difference in the paths taken by England and the continental regimes heading into the (arguable) enlightenment of fully modern times. The undeniable difference still needs to be explained. The suggestion offered here lies in lordship, good and bad, although what follows should be regarded as highly speculative, designed to provoke debate and further research rather than being a genuine answer. These issues are clearly too far-reaching for a single article-length effort to do more than lay the groundwork for further investigation, while to make a serious attempt at the continental case, which lies outside the expertise of this writer, would represent an act of hubris. I will therefore offer only brief thoughts on France and Spain but will pause to consider the case of England for a few pages, as the latter also has the added benefit of shedding light on one of the most vexed questions in early modern English history, the nature of the Glorious Revolution.

Perhaps even more than work on the 1640s, scholarship on 1688-89 has been starkly divided. When the revisionists got hold of the latter, it went from Glorious to almost inconsequential, a conservative pothole rather than a progressive milestone. Within roughly the past two-and-a-half decades, post-revisionists have replied that conservative elements may have been at the forefront of the Glorious Revolution but the eventuation was politically momentous anyhow, settling matters "decisively in Parliament's favor". But this revived Whiggish scholarship has not managed to convincingly overcome the main revisionist contentions that "most propertied men," however resentful of James II's policies, "were too fearful" to push opposition to rebellion; that once rebellion occurred, its elite protagonists were too divided to
agree on any constitutional alterations; and that the statutory Bill of Rights was but a shadow of
the Declaration, and even if the Convention did come together long enough to draft the latter and
read it to William and Mary, "how could it be enforced? . . . The subjects had no way to remove
an arbitrary king in the aftermath of 1688" except the way they'd always had: pressure, usually
involving force, by men of honor.  

Viewing these issues from the perspective of their honor may help clear away the
historiographical underbrush. The revisionists of the civil wars a half-century earlier offer a
helpful pointer by gesturing insightfully at the "conciliar tradition of English constitutionalism . . .
. . back through the Lords Appellant . . . and the Lords Ordainers . . . to Simon de Montfort". The
revisionists' consequent argument is that whatever the civil wars evolved into later, they were
started in large part by a group of landowning elites operating within the framework of this
"conciliar tradition" of honor rebellion.  Even these scholars, however, failed to take seriously
their label of "constitutionalism," as shown when one of their number described 1642's outcome
as an "extra-constitutional form of redress".

This is arguably a misidentification. However much monarchs might have begged to
differ; however discreetly their barons might have targeted oppositional rhetoric at evil
counselors rather than rulers directly; and however carefully everyone might have spoken (or
refrained from speaking) about the phenomenon, a case can be made that the raising of arms by
men of honor against sovereigns widely perceived as bad lords was indeed a pragmatic part of
the premodern English Constitution. Quite aside from the numerous precedents accumulated by
1500—and precedent was crucial in the unwritten English constitution—the original version of
Magna Carta had made rebellions to curb dishonorable kings an explicit part of that constitution.
Formal machinery was laid down in which the crown was to take counsel from 25 barons elected
by the rest of the peerage. The king agreed that "if we or our justiciar, or our bailiffs, or anyone
of our servants shall have done wrong in any way toward anyone," any four of the 25 barons
could insist that the wrong be righted. If the king or his representatives failed to do so within 40
days,

the aforesaid four barons shall refer the matter to the remainder of the twenty-five barons,
and let these twenty-five barons with the whole community of the country distress and
injure us in every way they can; that is to say by the seizure of our castles, lands,
possessions, and in such other ways as they can until it shall have been corrected
according to their judgment[.]

Setting aside the structure of 25 elected barons, this is pretty much what was done thereafter
when a sufficiently large section of the baronage came to feel that the king needed to be
reminded of what good lordship meant. Even the ending clause was attempted in succeeding
centuries: "and when the correction has been made, let them devote themselves to us as they did
before."  Henry III was not killed, and the original intent was not to kill Edward II or Richard II
either. Their baronial opposition set up constitutional structures to restrain each of them at first,
and the same process was exhaustively tried with Charles I. It was even begun with James II and
abandoned only after he fled the second time. Is it any wonder that by the seventeenth century,
the English had made their propensity to use force against their rulers into a joke that—if
wryly—exalted the tough freeborn islander over the abject subjects of continental despotism.

From the long perspective taken here, 1688-89 did not see the first modern revolution but rather the last honor rebellion. This may need some arguing: while scholars have debated whether the first civil war at mid-century comprised the last aristocratic revolt, or whether Essex's prior uprising against Elizabeth should be awarded the laurels, very few think the Glorious Revolution should hold the distinction. Perhaps we should accept the statements of participants. For example, Arthur Herbert famously cited his "honour and conscience" as justification for refusing to support James's abrogation of the Test Act, but when Herbert subsequently delivered the formal invasion request to William of Orange, insulted honor seems to have weighed more heavily on his scales than conscience. And the duke of Grafton, who also had ties to Herbert, was deeply offended when his uncle made Herbert's enemy Dartmouth the home fleet's admiral in 1688; as Vice-Admiral of England, Grafton was closer to the high office, a hierarchical inconvenience James confronted by simply abolishing Grafton's position. Grafton wasted no time in making a trip to the Netherlands. When William landed, nobles such as the duke of Norfolk, the earl of Devonshire, Danby in Yorkshire and Lord Delamere in Cheshire raised their counties just as they had been raised for centuries. Norfolk's exhortation to the local gentry adduced his, "your own[,] and your county's honor". The gentry of Nottingham invoked England's long history of resistance to "tyrants" by placing their support of William within the ancient-constitutionalist framework of "free born liberties and privileges descended to us from our ancestors".

The main character in this dissertation's story certainly supports an honorific view of 1688. As Pepys waited anxiously for Dartmouth to intercept William's invasion fleet, the secretary described the scenario as "A pinch wherein the very being, as well as the honor of his [James II's] crown and government is at stake." The personal basis of politics ("his," not "the," crown and government); the all-or-nothing stakes in which one of the subcommunities would be rubbed out; and above all, the telling closeness of honor with the "very being" of existence; arguably the most thoroughgoing bureaucrat and epitome of the self-made man of seventeenth-century England, the "father of the English civil service," sounds positively medieval on the eve of the century that was allegedly to usher in modern times. The subsequent attempt to stop William's invasion, the final act of Pepys's professional life (the administrative handover under William must be considered an inconsequential coda) was as honor-bound as any feud between medieval barons: Pepys's subcommunity of honor on one side, with his friend Henry Shere, Hewer, Atkins, Gibson, favorite captains such as Booth, and Dartmouth all making appearances in the secretary's documentation; and on the other, a subcommunity comprising his enemies Herbert, Harbord, Harbord's brother-in-law Edward Russell, and other old associates of Buckingham and Shaftesbury, carrying on the fight even though their great masters were gone. Samuel Pepys became a casualty. The new navy administration seems to have been specially staffed with his enemies: William did away with the office of Lord High Admiral and once again put the Admiralty into commission with Herbert as its chief. Joining him were two more old enemies of Pepys's, Sir Thomas Lee and William Sacheverell.

Honor rebellions, however, were surely becoming more difficult to mount than before. Despite the results achieved by Danby, Devonshire, and other nobles, lordship was no longer quite what it had been in 1485; the "modernity" scholarship surveyed in the Prologue has not
documented a complete chimera. Technology would also have played its part—the military revolution had made it far too expensive for individual nobles to build competitive fortresses or maintain arsenals of up-to-date weaponry. This problem may go a long way to explaining the exhaustive politics of 1639-42, the sustained nature of which was surely unprecedented; the nobles described by J. S. A. Adamson might well have been just as happy to ride against the king several years earlier than they did. Instead, they met in secret with their servants in the Commons, politicking until Charles's arbitrary imposition of bishops on the kirk furnished a secondhand army. The plotters jumped on the opportunity to use it as leverage, and events snowballed. Forty-nine years later the situation was even worse, at least partly explaining why so many fewer landowning gentry and nobles involved themselves in the preparations for William's invasion than had petitioned and debated from 1640-42. Now the erstwhile warrior elite (and Roger Manning has shown in detail that it still was a warrior elite) had to invite in yet another outside army to oppose the standing one enjoyed by James II, and an appropriate force was available only because of a perfect coincidence of contingent dynastic, religious, and political factors. Once that force actually landed in England, though, much of the political nation flocked to it.

After the dust of 1688 settled, the English realm's community of honor had been forcibly reminded, some members twice within their lifetimes, of how desirable it was to enforce the requirement—repeatedly stipulated but never voluntarily obeyed by truculent monarchs—that kings heed the formal procedures of counsel that had usually been set up in similar cases. The Declaration of Rights with its statutory Bill represented the institutionalization of this final rebellion, but the revisionists are right when they point out its enforcement weakness. And they are right to call attention to the Revolution's conservative, divided character: its means of enforcement was decidedly not innovative. One of the very few measures the antagonistic Whigs and Tories could agree on, it was a very old friend indeed, an important factor in Parliamentary politics since Edward I: "it became abundantly clear that no Triennial Act . . . no Declaration of Rights and, perhaps, no Magna Carta," writes one of our foremost authorities on early modern government finance, "could be a more effective guarantee of parliamentary monarchy and the rule of law than effective control of the sovereign's purse." Right from the start William was deliberately crammed into a fiscal straitjacket. It had taken well over half a millennium of intermittent conflict, but England's elite had used armed force, one of their two time-honored methods for making princes behave honorably, to solidify the other—granting supply. The goal of honor rebellion had finally become permanent. The ancient mentality, long welded to the Parliamentary tradition of consent to royal supply by the doctrine of counsel to one's lord in the form of redress of grievances, would now help propel Englishmen and women headlong into world empire.

The much different trail followed in France and Spain was blazed by the comparatively better lordship of its rulers (better to their nobilities, at any rate). These kingdoms, too, had their moments of violent opposition between the king and his men of honor, but by the second half of the seventeenth century, the continental "absolutists" seem to have acquired, and to have impressed upon their successors, a fine-grained understanding of corporate good lordship (perhaps acquired by paying attention to their predecessors' experiences) and either the sense of duty or the pragmatic acumen to honor it. There the monarch rather than the nobility took the
initiative. In France, what many historians have interpreted as a "cooption" or bribery of the aristocracy might arguably be better seen as Louis XIV's beneficence; after all, he provided stipends for many of his nobles. Despite his absolutist rhetoric, he rarely acted arbitrarily, almost never moving against families or factions he hated unless he had unimpeachable justification, and he set noble privilege so firmly in stone that it became one of the great grievances of the French Revolution. Noble privilege was likewise supported by Castilian kings, and when Philip III had his confrontation with the aristocracy over Olivares at the same time Charles I was tussling with Parliament, the Spanish sovereign bowed to the community of honor, heeding counsel instead of stubbornly insisting on having his way. His successor went even further, initiating a policy that Spanish specialists call variously "devolution" and even "refeudalization" in which the crown sold back to aristocratic houses many of the old legal jurisdictions it had been siphoning off for two centuries prior. In neither kingdom did the elite of the century's second half have much cause for complaint about monarchical policy, and they seem to have reciprocated by containing most unrest from lower down. In both countries during the seventeenth century what became formalized was not the ruler's duty to heed honorable counsel, but rather a rigid structure of good lordship in which the monarch was systemically bound to uphold the status privileges of elite men of honor no matter what other costs might be incurred.

One episode in the Glorious Revolution strongly suggests the continuing awareness of the noble tradition of revolt and its potential consequences. This involved the decision facing George Legge, Baron Dartmouth, chief admiral of the English fleet, as William sailed into English harbors. In the final hour the commander of James II's artillery, Dartmouth's client and Pepys's old friend Sir Henry Shere, wrote the admiral a remarkable letter which replicates closely the type of counsel given to potential aristocratic rebel Leonard, Lord Dacre, during the Elizabethan period by his follower Richard Atkinson who advised the baron to save his lineage by telling Elizabeth that he would give up his hot-headed brother. Shere could boast a blooded warrior's credibility when he presumed to give advice about honor, so it is all the more significant that what he tendered was a tortuous path through a classic honor dilemma. "You have now a part to act, my lord, which to my weak discerning is by much the most important of your life." The king, Shere continued with the standard trope of the evil counselor, "has been cursed with fools to his counsellors and knaves in his bosom... Now, my dear lord, what will you do? I know you are a man of honour and I pray God keep you in that mind." But here was a conflict of honor worthy of legend, "an insuperable task". Malory had not imagined a greater dilemma in his breaking of the round table; James's army was disintegrating around Shere, who seems to have seen which way the wind was blowing. Therefore if Dartmouth were to "remain firm in your obedience and faithful to your trust", he would end up on the losing side, reaping "envy, enmity and indignation" that would cast "a fatal aspect on your fortune and future state" with dire consequences for "your family and circumstances". But should you quite depart from your duty and allegiance in the high station wherein you now are, you will then be undone to your self, for it would give you pangs of remorse that would haunt you to your grave. If you contribute in any wise to the bringing in foreign force, you are undone without redemption.
On the right hand of loyalty lay the implacable enmity of the opposing subcommunity of honor which would lead to the loss of the "fortune and future state," the economic foundations necessary to support an honorable line, so piquantly summed up in the phrase "family and circumstances". On the left hand of betrayal lay the shame that would be blotted out only in death, recalling Mervyn James's oft-quoted citation of the earl of Northumberland's objection to rising against Elizabeth: "I will never blot my house, which hath been thus long preserved without staining." Dishonor threatened no matter which way Dartmouth stepped.

These were straits through which at the moment honor provided no clear track, and after lamely suggesting that Dartmouth might "shun these rocks by artfully keeping the fleet for some days at sea", shutting himself off from communication by either party, Shere was forced to conclude, "I am at my wits' end . . . you know what an aching heart I have for you". Fortunately, the answer to the problem presented itself in James's own lack of honorable steadfastness. Dartmouth felt that the king's command of December 3 to take the infant prince to France would expose the country to the constant threat of future French invasion and make of him (Dartmouth) a traitor; he begged the king to reconsider. For a moment the king listened, but famously weakened on the ninth, and then the king himself abandoned the nation. The twin blows created a clear and compelling argument that he could no longer be served with honor. Dartmouth's wife wrote him forcefully from London that the king's "interest" was "quite extirpated" and "this town [h]as been mighty unquiet since the king's departure" with riots and vandalism. She then reminded the admiral of the lineal imperative embodied in the responsibility to be "wise to yourself and family". After exclaiming, "what could make our master desert his kingdom and his friends?" Dartmouth finally saw his course opened by James's refusal to function as the realm's protector, clearly making him a bad lord. Doubtless to his great relief acceded to William's request that he help secure the "liberties of England"; and it may have been at least some consolation that the Prince of Orange promised to take "care of the honour and dignity of this nation".

The foregoing ruminations on the respective paths followed by England and the continent into the modern era, once again, are offered only as an example of the kind of future work that might grow from this dissertation's focus. What this dissertation itself does is to reconsider England's own path to the modern, or at least one directional marker on that path. For the comparative problem suggests that there perhaps exist significant pieces of the national puzzle that historians of England have failed to recognize—and perhaps these pieces might be important for her neighbors as well, although historians of the continental powers will have to make that determination. But even if further work fails to substantiate the possibilities raised here, the similarities between early modern England and the continent must no longer be ignored.
Notes to Appendix B


2 For typical textbook titles see Stephen Bartow Baxter, *England's Rise to Greatness, 1660-1763* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); Holmes, *op. cit.*; or Wilfrid R. Prest, *Albion Ascendant: English History, 1660-1815* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). It could also be argued that the English were exceptional because they maintained their course on the high seas of power where the other early modern pioneer of "proto-modernity", the Netherlands, faltered: Jan de Vries, *The Population and Economy of the Preindustrial Netherlands*, *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 15, no. 4 (Spring 1985): 661–682, quotation on 682, and see also Jan De Vries and A. M. van der Woude, *The First Modern Economy: Success, Failure, and Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500-1815* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997). However, the literature almost wholly ignores this comparison in favor of the absolutist. David Underdown, *A Freeborn People: Politics and the Nation in Seventeenth-Century England* (New York: Clarendon Press, 1996), may stand as a representative example of English history that portrays a populace conscious of its liberties, both subject and historian opposing ancient-constitutional rights to continental authoritarianism; cf. the contemporary vilification of Spain before mid-century (32) and the author's gesture at "despotism on the French model" after the Restoration (115).

3 The only sustained objection is Nicholas Henshall, *The Myth of Absolutism: Change and Continuity in Early Modern European Monarchy* (London; New York: Longman, 1992), 80-119, whose dismissal of 1689's significance in England (108-12) goes too far but who otherwise offers a judicious synthesis of revisionist work up to his publication. The book's unfortunately low level of influence on historians of England may be gauged from the fact that the current writer only stumbled across it after work on this introduction was mostly done, thus the scarcity of citations to what would otherwise have been the obvious foundation for the following section. To the present writer's knowledge only one scholar specializing in England has offered a substantive acknowledgment of the kinds of problems discussed below, and that only partially even though the context was fully comparative: see John Miller, *Bourbon and Stuart: Kings and Kingship in France and England in the Seventeenth Century* (New York: F. Watts, 1987), 14 and 128-9 for the acknowledgment, and from the same see 251 as well as some of the citations below for the limited impact Miller allowed this caveat to have on his interpretations. For a similarly short objection by scholars of the continent, see the editor's conclusion to Philip T. Hoffman and Kathryn Norberg, eds., *Fiscal Crises, Liberty, and Representative Government, 1450-1789* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1994), 299.

32-3, who asserts that by the first quarter of the century so saturated had England become with "capitalism, free enterprise, and freedom of thought" that "English gentlemen . . . conducted themselves like accountants."


8 See, for example, Croft and Thompson, "Aristocracy and Representative Government," or David Parker, The Making of French Absolutism (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1983), 15, 106, and 112; for Parker's revisionism, see citations below.

The post-revisionist is James B. Collins, *The State in Early Modern France*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009). Collins's arguments imply that the revisionists went a bit too far, but many of his judgments tally with their general thrust, and he agrees that "absolute monarchy" is still too often interpreted anachronistically by modern scholars (xix and xxii); for "monarchical state," see ix. For revisionist commentary on the latter point, see e.g. Parker, *Making*, 91, or Roger Mettam, "France," in *Absolutism in Seventeenth-Century Europe*, ed. John Miller (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 43; Mettam's position is stated at length in *Power and Faction in Louis XIV's France* (Oxford, UK; New York: B. Blackwell, 1988), but the article offers a lucid summary of his position and will be used in the present dissertation for the sake of convenience.


For a list of aristocratic English legal privileges, see Stone, *Crisis*, 54.


English nobility was not derogated but completely degraded: instead of merely being suspended until the affected family could once again support the honor, the rank was held to be utterly nullified, as if it had never been conferred. This finality may well be the truly important difference, doubtless accounting for why, after the medieval period, only Parliament could command such a degradation, and why this took place only once in England's history, when George Neville, duke of Bedford, lost his dignity during the reign of Edward IV by an act of Parliament: Thomas Edlyne Tomlins, *The Law-dictionary: Explaining the Rise, Progress, and Present State, of the British Law*, ed. Thomas Colpitts Granger, vol. 2, 2 vols., 4th ed. (London: J. and W. T. Clarke [etc.], 1835), s.v. Peers, section II.

For provincial French sword nobles as the equivalent of English landed gentry, see Mark Edward Motley, *Becoming a French Aristocrat: The Education of the Court Nobility, 1580-1715* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), 6, 11; for French levels of nobility see William Beik, *A Social and Cultural History of Early Modern France* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 77. Note that while the term applied only to representatives of families who could boast three or more generations of legal rank (*écuyer* or better), the French
gentilhomme, like the English "gentleman," denoted the foundational property of all nobleman from greatest to most humble, their most common denominator. In Castile so did the Spanish caballero, but this term can cause confusion because it was also, as its French cognate chevalier, the word for "knight." In France confusion might stem from écuyer, which some theorists held to be a sign of nobility so basic that all nobles retained it despite any superior titles, such that (for example) a prince of the blood was not only a gentilhomme but also an écuyer in addition to being (usually) a duc: Mousnier, Society, 122.

18 For university degrees, see Stone, Crisis, 32; informal legal deference paid to gentry, 29.

19 For the most notorious of Louis's inquisitions, the Grande Recherche, see Ford, Robe and Sword, 25; Mousnier, Society, 135-38; and for other recherches, Jay M. Smith, The Culture of Merit: Nobility, Royal Service, and the Making of Absolute Monarchy in France, 1600-1789 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 60-63. Louis also issued nine "revocations of nobility" (1643, 1664, 1666, 1667, 1669, 1692, 1705, 1706, 1715), under which the recently ennobled had to purchase dispensations to retain their status (Ford, Robe and Sword, 12-13 and Mousnier, Society, 128-29). On crown control over noble status in general, Ford, Robe and Sword, 23. For visitations see Keith Wrightson, English Society, 1580-1680 (New Brunswick, N.J: Rutgers University Press, 1982), 24, and cf. also Felicity Heal and Clive Holmes, The Gentry in England and Wales, 1500-1700 (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1994), 38.

20 Here, this term refers to mainly to an increasingly commercial orientation in fiscal affairs (see Prologue).

For the old the notion of robe-sword opposition see notes for discussion of traditional absolutist historiography in Prologue. The strongest of recent Eliasian accounts in this regard, though in other respects perhaps the first revisionist salvo, is Roland Mousnier's magisterial two-volume work on *The Institutions of France Under the Absolute Monarchy, 1598-1789*; for a critique, see J. H. M. Salmon's discussion of the question during revisionism's early stage, "Storm over the Noblesse," *Journal of Modern History* 53 (1981), 245-7. Elias held that absolute monarchs allowed the sword to retain carefully measured doses of power in order to keep the robe, too, in check, so that neither could master the other and then challenge the king himself. For all that it was a mainstay of traditionalist French historiography, this argument has a significant logical flaw. The scheme requires that absolute monarchs be consistently exceptional rulers, sociopolitical high-wire acrobats continuously balancing on a tightrope that would surely have demanded such genius in government as to be remarkable in any single person, doubtful in his or her descendants, and statistically unbelievable in their contemporary opposite numbers on other thrones. Yet the kings of Spain, France, Sweden, Brandenburg-Prussia and others maintained their dynasties over several generations. A divide-and-rule argument may be plausible for Louis XIV but only if spread over more factions than Elias allowed, thereby reducing the likelihood that any single group could upset the balance: Campbell, *Ancien Régime*, 68. But against this see the argument for the convergence of robe-sword interest, even if the two groups never merged, in Robert R. Harding, *Anatomy of a Power Elite: The Provincial Governors of Early Modern France* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), 181-82. Harding's revisionist portrait of robe and sword renders the problem moot.


"[Eventually] all that remained of the division was the choice of two careers—and this certainly by the mid-seventeenth century everywhere except in some corners of the court and amongst the families of the most ancient higher nobility": Campbell, *Ancien Régime*, 26. A number of other writers place the robe-sword melding in the eighteenth century but very few save Mousnier deny that it took place at all. For the later date, see Ford, *Robe and Sword*, 202-5, 214-15, 248; Albert N. Hamscher, *The Parlement of Paris After the Fronde, 1653-1673* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976), 36-53, 59-60; Jonathan Dewald, *The Formation of a Provincial Nobility: The Magistrates of the Parlement of Rouen, 1499-1610* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), 69-112; Motley, *Becoming a French Aristocrat*, 11 n. 17. One of the recent supporters of the more traditional distinction argues that seventeenth-century sword education was geared toward making its youths witty and martial as opposed to ponderously learned like the *robins*; the goal was (as in Restoration England, where wit was also at a premium) to inculcate *civilité*, which used dress, behavior such as table manners, and other markers as "an elaborately codified means by which to display publicly the rank or status of an individual": Motley, *Becoming a French Aristocrat*, 11, and see also 8, 13, 42, 57, 68-9, 79, 139-
42, 148-9, 167, 179 for the relationship of education to sword civilité. But civilité after all had originated with the civic humanism so highly prized by the robe, so the distance between robe and sword educations might easily be overemphasized: a fundamental commonality of outlook could easily have been created, especially since, as that author admits, sons of both robe and sword often attended the same institutions: Motley, Becoming a French Aristocrat, 100-2, 110-11, 132-4 as well as Jonathan Dewald, Aristocratic Experience and the Origins of Modern Culture: France, 1570-1715 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), who documents the same curricula for both robe and sword youths until the mid-teens (81-4).

25 For de Souvigny see Dewald, Aristocratic Experience, 22. For an example of how two regions succumbed to the same melting-pot in the end despite critical differences in elite backgrounds (though those differences did dictate the manner in which each area reached the point of relatively little distinction between robe and sword), see Bohanan, Crown and Nobility, on the strong assimilation in Provence where "as circumstances dictated . . . . families shifted from the sword to the robe, and vice versa" and even most old noble families, portrayed in traditional historiography as inevitably noblesse d'épée, never had restricted themselves in that way (11, 72-3), while in Brittany, most families bore the classic hallmarks of sword nobles because the robe never grew very large, whereupon the existing lineages assumed the robe's stereotypical role, producing a large number of parlementaires (131-2).

26 For intermarriage as well as hidalgo and grandee sons becoming letrados, see Richard L. Kagan, Students and Society in Early Modern Spain (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), 86-7. For more general commentary on how traditional aristocratic families began to hold state office during the seventeenth century, see Bartolomé Yun Casalilla, "The Castilian Aristocracy in the Seventeenth Century: Crisis, Refeudalisation, or Political Offensive?" in The Castilian Crisis of the Seventeenth Century: New Perspectives on the Economic and Social History of Seventeenth-Century Spain, ed. I. A. A. Thompson and Bartolomé Yun Casalilla (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 289-94.


28 Ignacio Atienza Hernández, "Refederalisation' in Castile During the Seventeenth Century: A Cliché?" in The Castilian Crisis of the Seventeenth Century: New Perspectives on the Economic and Social History of Seventeenth-Century Spain, ed. I. A. A. Thompson and Bartolomé Yun Casalilla (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 256. for perhaps the argument's most powerful statement see José Antonio Maravall, Poder, Honor y Élites en el Siglo XVII (Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno de España, 1979) 184-96, 248; for his argument that the
nobility became demilitarized, 201-14.

29 For an overview of Castile's medieval urbanization see Nader, *Liberty in Absolutist Spain*, 8 n. 14 and 15, 24-5, 27-8, 33-40; the close connection between town and countryside, 13-14, 25, 39, quotation on 9; aristocrats in towns, 29-30, 38; de Cañete's exploits, 41; and see also James Casey, *Early Modern Spain: A Social History* (London; New York: Routledge, 1999), 120.


31 Some accounts argue that even during the seventeenth century there were areas in which seigneurs had no town residences: Bohanan, *Crown and Nobility*, 24. Another view, however, holds that while regional differences certainly influenced how much time per year provincial nobles spent in town, in most parts of France the "nobility of the sword was neither an entirely rural group nor a fully urban one, for it was customary to have . . . by the seventeenth century often a grand residence in town": Campbell, *Ancien Régime*, 25-6, and see also Mousnier, *Society*, 182. C. G. A. Clay and Derek Hirst report an earlier beginning than Borsay for the English urban renaissance: Clay, *Economic Expansion and Social Change: England 1500-1700*, vol. 1 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 187 and Hirst, *England in Conflict, 1603-1660: Kingdom, Community, Commonwealth* (London: Arnold, 1999), 64. But even on this account it developed slowly outside London and does not seem to have equaled the level of elite urban commitment then exhibited in France, let alone Spain. For French aristocratic consumption of exotic imports as a marker of "advancing levels of education, refinement, and civility", see Bohanan, *Crown and Nobility*, 25; for leveling between French urban and rural elites, including increasing gender as well as social equality at the gaming table which Borsay also noted for England, see Dewald, *Aristocratic Experience*, 164-7; for salons see Carolyn C. Lougee, *Le Paradis Des Femmes: Women, Salons, and Social Stratification in Seventeenth-Century France* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 1976.

32 After the phenomenon's inauguration (if Norbert Elias's narrative is accepted) with Erasmus's seminal treatise, English elites bought Italian and Spanish manuals as well as Erasmus's production; at around the turn of the seventeenth century, French manuals began to dominate and

33 In Borsay, English Urban Renaissance, see culture previously held in common between gentle and lesser sorts (285), lower-middling and lesser sorts encroaching on the new elite culture (291-3 and 301-2) and their exclusion by fees and legislation (303-5) as well as other means (286-91, 294-6, 306-7). For the transformation of elite interior layouts and its social results, see Mark Girouard, Life in the English Country House: A Social and Architectural History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), 120-3, 135-43, 189. Corroboration from a much different perspective for a significant late-seventeenth-century split between the elite and the lesser sort can be found in David Underdown, A Freeborn People: Politics and the Nation in Seventeenth-Century England (New York: Clarendon Press, 1996), 128, while Keith Wrightson sees a similar division between the middling and lesser sorts (English Society, 222-3), and for a summary of work fleshing out this assertion see Steve Hindle, The State and Social Change in Early Modern England, c. 1550-1640 (Houndmills, UK: Macmillan Press, 2000), 29 and citations on 247-8 n. 128-30.

34 In Girouard, English Country House, see 126 for the importation of "the French arrangement" to Restoration England (for details, see 128-9 for the cabinet and 138 for backstairs). For the French cultural split more generally see Campbell, Ancien Regime, quotation on 45 but main discussion (including carnival) on 41-2; Motley, Becoming a French Aristocrat, 210; and Bohanan, Crown and Nobility, 14.

35 For the cultural split in Spain see Hernández, 'Refeudalisation,' 267 and cf. also Kagan, Students, 25-6.

36 The timeline of French sword-noble acceptance of humanism in all its facets as beginning in the later sixteenth century and becoming widespread by the mid-seventeenth century is in Campbell, Ancien Regime, 25 and 44; Dewald, Aristocratic Experience, adjusts the majority's embrace of humanism upward to approximately the last fifth of the seventeenth century (80-1) but also offers the sixteenth-century examples of Biron and Bouillon (see below).


38 Campbell, *Ancien Regime*, 32. Mousnier may have denied the robe-sword assimilation, but he agreed that sword "gentilhommes . . . were on the way to becoming bourgeois", discarding "military honor" in favor of "the wealth obtainable from trade and industry", though he views this as an eighteenth-century development: *Society*, 187-92, quotations on 190 and 192. William Beik now updates this view, synthesizing a number of local studies showing that old noble families who did not adapt to changing early-modern commercial circumstances simply went bankrupt and vanished by the mid-to-late seventeenth century, while the rest had already become "careful managers of their inheritances", many by the mid-sixteenth: *A Social and Cultural History*, 31-5, quotation on 74.


40 For French noble involvement with Law see Dewald, *Aristocratic Experience*, 162, and for general aristocratic commercialism, Campbell, *Ancien Régime*, 34; for example, from at least the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Breton nobles who dominated the provincial Estates assiduously protected merchant interests because the former "often cooperated with merchants in commercial activity"; James B. Collins, *Classes, Estates, and Order in Early Modern Brittany* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 217.

41 For French noble forces, see Collins, *State in Early Modern France*, 36; for private English retinues into the Stuart period, see Penny Williams, *The Tudor Regime* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1979), 128-9; for civil-war recruitment, James Scott Wheeler, *The Making of a World Power: War and the Military Revolution in Seventeenth-Century England* (Stroud: Sutton, 1999), 76. But the argument that English peers had long lost such a capacity contained cracks that should have been apparent from the beginning; even as he articulated the demilitarization thesis, its foremost exponent, Lawrence Stone, offered evidence that during the later years of Elizabeth’s reign, in the middle of their alleged crisis, English peers could still raise substantial forces on their own initiative and maintained significant stockpiles of arms (*Crisis*, 206, 208-9, 212, 220-2; a sympathetic but scrupulous reader once veiled Stone's explicit argument about mid-Tudor demilitarization in diplomatic silence and instead gave him credit for "shattering the legend of a Tudor peace"! C. S. L. Davies, The Enfant Terrible?, in *The First Modern Society: Essays in English History in Honour of Lawrence Stone*, ed. A. L. Beier, David Cannadine, and James M. Rosenheim [Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989], 2). Similarly, Corrigan and Sayer interpret the 1573 establishment of county militias as ultimately destroying the nobility's military usefulness: "The aristocracy . . . ceased to have any military function", a statement that raises eyebrows with its appearance on the same page that notes the occupation of
lord lieutenancies by aristocrats and the officering of the militia by their allies among county
gentry: Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer, *The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural
Revolution* (Oxford, UK; New York, USA: Blackwell, 1985), 64. A gesture at the lord
lieutenant's "royal commission" does not save them from the charge of inconsistency, since
national military service had also occurred upon the royal summons during medieval times. On
this issue see also the warning against overenthusiastic arguments for sixteenth-century
demilitarization in Williams, *Tudor Regime*, 436-8 (though he seems to reverse position on 463).
For a general corrective to the demilitarization hypothesis see Roger B. Manning, *Swordsmen:
gentlemen did begin to use the law for disputes in cases that previously would have been
resolved more directly, but such a trend does not necessitate the devaluing of more directly
martial endeavors.

42 For early education among English aristocrats see K. B. McFarlane, *The Nobility of Later
1973), 41-47 and Chapter 6, "The Education of the Nobility in Later Medieval England"; I. B.,
Gent[leman], *Heroick Education, or Choice Maxims and Instructions . . . for such as undertake
the charge, to govern the young Nobility and Gentry* (William Hope: London, 1656), n. p., book
2, chap. 10 for history and chap. 11 for philosophy.

43 For French sword humanism, see Bohanan, *Crown and Nobility*, 13; for Biron and Bouillon,
Dewald, *Aristocratic Experience*, 83, and on the issue more generally, chap. 2. See also Smith,
*Culture of Merit*, 19. For the fifteenth-century Santillana, Castilian aristocratic humanism, and
Isabella, see Kagan, *Students*, 34-6, quotation on 34; sixteenth-century humanist education of
noble children by tutors, 36-7.

44 For Philip's academy see Kagan, *Students*, 38. At first Kagan thought high-aristocratic
education so overwhelmingly private that "only a handful of the titled nobility attended
university" (37), but reversed his verdict later: "many of Castile's nobility were trained in the
law" (*Lawsuits*, 144, where he also estimates that up to a third of Castile's *hidalgos* were
pursuing legal studies toward the end of the sixteenth century). The comparison to England (in
which Castile is ranked as "possibly the most educated society in Western Europe at that time")
is in Kagan, *Students*, 200; see also *Lawsuits*, 160 for the similarity of English and Spanish
legalistic noble humanism.

45 For the rise of Castilian litigation during the sixteenth century, see Kagan, *Lawsuits*, 11-17, 77
and ff. through 161, and its ebb during the seventeenth, 214-20; by the turn of the eighteenth
century, Castilians had stopped recurring to the law in such numbers, but by then "a new
'professionalized' legal culture" had sent down deep roots (246). For the same chronological arc
in both France and England, see respectively Harding, *Anatomy of a Power Elite*, 177-8 and
Michael J. Braddick, *State Formation in Early Modern England, c. 1550-1700* (Cambridge:
For Spanish proscription of any commercial involvement to high-ranking judicial officials see Kagan, *Lawsuits*, 180-1, but for what another scholar calls Spain's 'precociously 'modern' elite' focusing on the commercial potential of their properties by the mid-sixteenth-century, see James Casey, *Family and Community in Early Modern Spain: The Citizens of Granada, 1570-1739* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 65. For general consideration of "increasing seigniorial pressure on their vassals and on society at large" beginning with the later sixteenth century see Yun Casalilla, "Castilian Aristocracy," 282-3; for quotation concerning the more blatant exploitation a century later, see Casey, *Early Modern Spain*, 110; for inequitable exploitation of the surrounding countryside by the oligarchic nobility of Cordoba, see Jose Manuel De Bernardo Ares, "Fiscal Pressure and the City of Cordoba's Communal Assets in the Early Seventeenth Century," in *The Castilian Crisis of the Seventeenth Century: New Perspectives on the Economic and Social History of Seventeenth-Century Spain*, ed. I. A. A. Thompson and Bartolomé Yun Casalilla, (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 216–19, and for a similar example, see Nader, *Liberty in Absolutist Spain*, 203-5, wherein see also chap. 2 for an account of the minute though apparently not exploitative attention one powerful noble family paid to estate management in the early sixteenth century. For seventeenth-century enclosures by others, see Ruth Mackay, *The Limits of Royal Authority: Resistance and Obedience in Seventeenth-Century Castile* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999)., 109-110, 114-16.

For French changes, see Bohanan, *Crown and Nobility*, 25, and for Spanish, Casey, *Family and Community*, 12. And if in England the old common weal of the organic body politic gave way to the more abstract, modern ideal of "the public good", in a striking parallel at approximately the same time, the literal translation of the phrase, *le bien public*, was beginning its career in France: Bohanan, *Crown and Nobility*, 111.

For discussion of the *destreza* see Egerton Castle, *Schools and Masters of Fence from the Middle Ages to the End of the Eighteenth Century* (London: Bell, 1910), 68-73 and 121-9; for the high reputation of Spanish fencers throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 71; for Shakespeare, 73. For an early proponent (though it is unclear whether he founded the school), see Jeronimo de Carranza, *De la Filosofia de Las Armas y de Su Destreza y la Aggression y Defensa Cristiana* (Sanlúcar de Barrameda, [1569] 1582), whose work was continued by disciples such as Luis Pacheco de Narvaez, from among whose other publications see *Libro de las Grandezas de la Espada* (Madrid, 1600). Gérard Thibault d' Anvers, *Academie de l'Espée* (Leiden, 1630), is the most carefully illustrated and diagramed fencing manual ever produced but was simply a presentation of the Spanish style, a last gasp of the only vogue it ever had outside its own borders, a short-lived French fad under Henry III. Its appeal was severely undercut by the formidable footwork comprising a number of complex patterns required for *ganando los grados al perfil* (gaining the profile [for a successful lunge] by degrees) and also, to name just one additional example, the need to memorize the 83 possible angles into which the human torso and limbs may combine. In England the widespread esteem for Spanish skill was affirmed by London master of arms George Silver, though he attempted to debunk it and prove the superiority of traditional English techniques: *The Works of George Silver: Comprising Paradoxes of Defence and Bref Instructions Vpo My Paradoxes of Defence*, ed. Cyril G. R. Matthey (London: G. Bell,
For the non-precocious nature of English administrative advances, see Slack, From Reformation, first and last chapters.

Collins, State in Early Modern France, 80 and 135. Louis's "rationalizing measures" included not merely "the social statistics collected by intendants and ministers" but also "ordering . . . the army, the drafting of regional maps, the clarification of social status, the illumination of Paris, and the elaboration of a system of court etiquette" as well as "the increasingly efficient lines of communication between Versailles and distant points in the realm": Smith, Culture of Merit, 149, 150, who then concludes, "Two salient features of modern political culture—a reified administrative state and a regulated society subject to state surveillance—made their appearance in the age of Louis XIV" (184). Among a set of personal guidelines, Louis included the goal of amassing as much information as possible pertaining to issues upon which he had to pronounce: Andrew Lossky, 'Maxims Of State' In Louis XIV's Foreign Policy In The 1680s, in William III and Louis XIV: Essays 1680-1720 by and for Mark A. Thomson, ed. Ragnhild Hatton and J. S. Bromley (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1968), 9.

For the fourteenth century as Spain's most important pre-modern period of institutional change, the Catholic Kings only tinkering and augmenting, see Kagan, Lawsuits, 165-6 and citations in n. 1, and see 192-3 for examples of judicial dynasties with family members continuously serving from that time into the seventeenth century.


Corrigan and Sayer, Great Arch, 85.

Quotation in G. O. Sayles, *The Functions of the Medieval Parliament of England* (London; Ronceverte, WV: Hambledon Press, 1988), 43. The Commons was solidly established and conceiving itself in this manner by the 1350s (44); for its further structural development and members' presentation of local bills in terms of the good of the "community of the realm," see 45-48.

Michael A. R. Graves, *The Parliaments of Early Modern Europe* (Harlow, England; New York: Longman, 2001), 162-9. In Aragon, for example, as in England, the greater and lesser nobility were divided, but instead of sitting with burgesses, Aragonese gentry had a chamber all to themselves. And as if structures differing from country to country were not enough, the structure of even long-established assemblies could change in mid-stride: the French Estates General, though summoned in terms of the three estates, was unicameral until 1560 (162).

Williams, *Tudor Regime*, 12.

The survey is Graves, *Parliaments*, in which see also 160 and 176-9 for the claim of nearly all European assemblies to represent the "whole body of the realm". Statement on the relative importance of England's parliamentary structure is in H. G. Koenigsberger, "Parliaments and Estates," in *The Origins of Modern Freedom in the West*, ed. Richard W. Davis (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1995), 154. Instead of seeing assembly organization as influencing culture, Koenigsberger holds essentially the opposite, that medieval assemblies tended to reflect the idiosyncrasies of local elite social formations, but he then argues that social structure cannot have been a decisive factor in parliamentary destinies because despite the similar social structures within which some assemblies were embedded, "their political histories were very different": "Parliaments in the Sixteenth Century and Beyond," also in *Origins of Modern Freedom*, 270-1.

This particular comparison of the French judicial body and Parliament has not been aired elsewhere as far as the present author knows, but a number of others that also bring the general impact of the *parlement* closer to that of the English assembly can be found in Henshall, *Myth of Absolutism*, 101-8.

The method Louis used to deal with parlementary registration is instructive: he made a convoluted legal end-run around it. A *parlement* that refused to register a given law was required to tell the king why so he could amend it accordingly. The king used this requirement to impose a catch-22 on the *parlementaires* by first decreeing that laws must be registered before the *parlement* could send him objections to it, then subsequently setting a short time limit beyond which, if the *parlement* had not registered a law, it was held to be automatically registered anyhow (see references to Hamscher below). The point important for present purposes is that not even Louis XIV could abolish a parlementary power by fiat. For brief overviews of the *parlement* of Paris's traditional capacities, continuing influence, and Louis's compromises with it, see Parker, *Making of French Absolutism*, 24 and 138-9 (quotations concerning preservation of rights on 147, defending liberties on 139), Campbell, *Ancien Régime*, 48, and Mettam, "France," 48-9 and 53-7. But the authoritative works on this issue are the two that made Albert N. Hamscher one
of the earliest revisionists, both Parlement of Paris (mainly chap. 6, especially 182-91, 194-5, and summary on 199-202; quotation regarding oppositional procedures on 201) and The Conseil Privé and the Parlements in the Age of Louis XIV: A Study in French Absolutism, Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 77, pt. 2 (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1987), which is strong on Louis's management of and compromise with the courts.

61 Quotations from Castilians on their monarch's absolute nature are in Thompson, Castile, 86. For the legal compilations as the leyes del reino, including various legal justifications for suspending and rescinding royal orders, see I. A. A. Thompson, "Castile: Polity, Fiscality, and Fiscal Crisis," in Fiscal Crises, Liberty, and Representative Government, 1450-1789, ed. Philip T. Hoffman and Kathryn Norberg (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), 148-9, and in the same author's "Castile," see 72 for the king's subjection to the law's "directive" force.

62 For an example of the Cortes negotiating with king and councils much more forcefully than traditional accounts would have it, see Mackay, Limits of Royal Authority, 49-54, and on the same issue see also Thompson, "Castile," 80-2.

63 For obedézcase, pero no se cumpla see Thompson, "Castile," 77, or Thompson, "Castile: Polity, Fiscality," 148 and in same for the royal council, see 149. For more on the royal council see also Kagan, Lawsuits, 123-6. Quotations on the council's responsibility to law, the legitimacy of royal directives, el derecho de replicar, and concern for "due process" are in Thompson, "Castile: Polity, Fiscality," 149 (all but the last repeated from his earlier "Castile," 78). For an example of the council standing on constitutionality when the king tried to do away with fiscal consent not merely of the Cortes but also that of the city ayuntamientos they represented, thus attempting to impose truly arbitrary taxation, see Thompson's "Castile: Absolutism, Constitutionalism and Liberty," in Fiscal Crises, Liberty, and Representative Government, ed. Hoffman and Norberg, 216. On the Spanish conciliar system in general see Thompson's "Castile," 77-9 and "Castile: Polity, Fiscality," 149-50.

64 Quotations in Thompson, "Castile," 79 and 87. For an example of the kind of conciliar tussles that kept absolutism from being very absolute, see Mackay, Limits of Royal Authority, 28-32. In same for a convenient overview of all the issues raised in these two paragraphs, including a reiteration of the national maxim on non-compliance, see 1-2. See also Thompson, "Castile: Polity, Fiscality, and Fiscal Crisis," 145 for the king's legitimacy as founded in a contract with his people.

65 For French bureaucrats as sometimes not-so-loyal crown servants, see Campbell, Ancien Régime, 56-7; Hamscher, Parlement of Paris, 190-1; Mettam, "France," 43; the documents in Mettam, ed., Government and Society in Louis XIV's France, (Toronto: Macmillan, 1977); Miller, Bourbon and Stuart, 242; Bohanan, Crown and Nobility, 38; and Julian Dent, Crisis in Finance: Crown, Financiers, and Society in Seventeenth-Century France (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973), 50. For Castile see Thompson, "Castile," 78.
For the "topheavy" view see Miller, *Bourbon and Stuart*, 243-4 and James, *Origins of French Absolutism*, 52-54; for the contrary, with an example of one bloated branch of French administration that nevertheless managed its business "in what was, for the time, a remarkably orderly and efficient fashion", see Collins, *State in Early Modern France*, 128-36, quotation on 132.


Hernández, "'Refeudalisation'," 256-8.

The premier embodiment of Elias's transformation in France was the Prince de Condé. The prince began as the court's knightly antagonist during the Fronde but then asked Louis XIV's pardon, remodeled himself has the consummate courtier, and was thereafter "celebrated as an ideal noble, no longer for his pride and independent military strength, but for the qualities of good taste, refinement and obedience to the king": James, *Origins of French Absolutism*, 80, in which see also statement on non-emasculation. For sword retention of power, see Motley, *Becoming a French Aristocrat*, quotation on 5 and see also 8, and Mettam, "France," 46.

Quotation on the contrast between absolutist and English local officials is in Corrigan and Sayer, *Great Arch*, 90 (and see citations on 90-1). For the weak English center see Stone, *Crisis*, 503; Williams, *Tudor Regime*, 107; G. R. Elton, *Policy and Police: The Enforcement of the Reformation in the Age of Thomas Cromwell* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 382; and Hindle, *State and Social Change*, who notes "the woeful inadequacy of the police powers available to the crown" (76) and argues that such organs as Star Chamber were mostly ineffective as top-down instruments of government, exercising their reach much more often in privately initiated litigation (93 and chapter 3, *passim*).


Collins, *State in Early Modern France*, 137; for an overview of the provincial French judiciary see 137-42, including an observation that even provinces with neither an estates nor *parlement* forced kings to "cut deals" with lesser courts on 141; see Campbell, *Ancien Régime*, 55 for provincial institutions as general hindrances to the crown, and for seigneurs as magistrates and local dynasty-builders see, respectively, 32 and 57; and see Mettam, "France," on the general issue that "the crown was . . . not the only power in the realm" (43) and "the policing of the kingdom was in the hands of numerous local bodies" (57).

Kagan, *Lawsuits and Litigants*, 31. For an extended description of the *fueros* see 23-24 and 28-31 (unsuccessful attempts by medieval monarchs and Philip IV to eliminate them on 24 and 31); jurisdictional competition between seigneurial courts, *fueros*, royal courts, and different instances of the latter, 32-36 and 238; Philip IV granting new *fueros* and other jurisdictions exempt from the royal system, 226-27.

Hernández, 'Refudalisation', 266. In Kagan, *Lawsuits*, for royal courts and *campesino* litigation against señores see 11; successful examples of such litigation, 99-103 and 114-15; local autonomy growing rather than declining during the seventeenth century, 224.


Parker, *Making of French Absolutism*, 138. Parker's remark may be somewhat hyperbolic; for a contrasting view on this general issue as well as an attack on the specific argument that the parlement of Paris remained an effective check on Louis XIV see John J. Hurt, *Louis XIV and the Parlements: The Assertion of Royal Authority* (Manchester, UK; New York: Manchester University Press; Distributed in USA by Palgrave, 2002). But Collins, while acknowledging the centralizing efforts described by Hurt, dismisses them as agents of full-scale control and essentially sides with Parker and Hamscher (*State in Early Modern France*, 137-8); see also Michael P. Breen, "Law, Society, and the State in Early Modern France," *The Journal of Modern History* 83, no. 2 (June 2011): 364. For a succinct statement encompassing almost all the restrictions on the French monarchy described in the previous few pages, see James, *Origins of French Absolutism*, 94.

For lesser royal posts in Castilian localities see Thompson, *Crown and Cortes*, III.24; quotation on local resistance to royal measures is in Thompson, "Castile," 79, and see also "Castile: Polity, Fiscality, and Fiscal Crisis," 149.


On France's parallel see Harding, *Anatomy of a Power Elite*: the failure of traditional lordship, chapter 3, quotation on 107; governors moving to Paris, 171-5, 201, 216, quotation concerning the turn from violence to more civil pursuits on 172; postwar reliance on intendants, 207-10; the difference between the old gubernatorial lordship and the intendancy's bureaucratic approach, 190 and 212; a convenient summary of these arguments, 6.


Harris, *Revolution*, 353. Given the uncertainties recently chronicled by Derek Hirst, "Of Labels and Situations: Revisionisms and Early Stuart Studies," *Huntington Library Quarterly* 78, no. 4 (2015): 595-614 which surround the labels "traditionalist," "revisionist," and "post-revisionist," I use these terms advisedly for purposes of convenience when speaking of civil-war scholarship, and I acknowledge that the same should doubtless be the case for Glorious-Revolution scholarship as well. For a summary of post-revisionist scholarship until Harris's writing, see 309-
10. Subsequently see the books reviewed in Tim Harris, "James II, the Glorious Revolution, and the Destiny of Britain," *The Historical Journal* 51, no. 3 (2008): 763-75; and also Stephen Taylor, "Afterword: State Formation, Political Stability, and the Revolution of 1688," in *The Final Crisis of the Stuart Monarchy: The Revolutions of 1688-91 in Their British, Atlantic and European Contexts*, ed. Tim Harris and Stephen Taylor (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2013), 273-304. After a bit of adjustment, most post-revisionist work can be harmonized with the perspective offered here, but the most recent major monograph cannot: Steven C. A. Pincus, *1688: The First Modern Revolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009). Pincus downplays Tory support for William to quit is almost certainly an intolerable level of historical inaccuracy in order to make 1688 more modern, returning to a broadly Whiggish interpretation with a level of vengeance that might take Macaulay's breath away. But no more than previous post-revisionists has he convincingly faced the most trenchant revisionist challenges.


84 Conrad Russell, *The Causes of the English Civil War* (Oxford [England]: Clarendon Press, 1990), 159. See also Morrill, *Nature*, 268 into 99-302, but by far the fullest statements are in J. S. A. Adamson, "The Baronial Context of the English Civil War," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* (Fifth Series) 40 (1990): 93–120, and same author, *The Noble Revolt: The Overthrow of Charles I* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2007). And the case for traditional honor's large role in the inaugural stage of the civil wars has become even stronger now that Richard Cust has ably shown why not all of the nobility followed Warwick, Bedford, Essex and Pembroke into armed opposition. Charles did make explicit attempts to be a good lord to the nobility in general, even if he negated those attempts often enough when interacting abrasively with peers on an individual basis. If it was hard to be wholly convinced of the king's good lordship, neither did many apparently feel that they could simply reject the overtures: *Charles I and the Aristocracy, 1625-1642* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). the perplexing field of choice confronting the realm's topmost men of honor at that juncture might well have made them wish they had rather less of the moral autonomy that honor was held to confer.


86 Of course monarchical apologists—which included all Anglican clergy by default, as the monarch was their head—preached total nonresistance: Morrill, *Nature*, 295-96 and Tim Harris, "Did the English Have a Script for Revolution in the Seventeenth Century?," in *Scripting Revolution: A Historical Approach to the Comparative Study of Revolutions*, ed. Keith Michael Baker and Dan Edelstein (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2015), 34. But as
Mervyn James has noted, if religion conflicted with premodern honor's demands when honor was at stake, religion would often find itself silently sidelined: James 316-17, 320. If necessary for conscience's sake, casuistry could be called in: Harris, "Did the English Have a Script," 35-39.


88 Harris, "Did the English Have a Script," 25.


90 Of course I am not arguing that the Glorious Revolution can be simply reduced to an honor rebellion, any more than can the civil wars.

91 David Hannay, A Short History of the Royal Navy, vol. 1 (London: Methuen & Co., 1898), 456. As even Herbert's own family were surprised to find him claiming a conscience, honor was probably preponderant: J. D. Davies, Gentlemen and Tarpañils: The Officers and Men of the Restoration Navy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 111. Bishop Burnet, who had plenty of opportunity to hear Herbert's complaints while closeted with him over invasion plans, attributed the admiral's defiance of James to "his private quarrel with the lord Dartmouth, who he thought had more of the king's confidence than he himself had": G. Burnet, Bishop Burnet's History of his Own Time, ed. M. J. Routh (Oxford, 1823), 3.95-96. In addition, James's wholesale promotion of Catholic officers posed a significant threat to Herbert's ability to act as a naval patron. Herbert even had cause to resent James's direct treatment of him: one of Herbert's perquisites was a post as Master of the Robes, and the king had ordered the relevant accounts audited. Davies, Gentlemen, 204; and Bryant 3:199. In this context it is worth noting that Dartmouth attempted to duel Herbert late in the game: Davies, "James II, William of Orange, and the Admirals," in E. Cruickshanks, ed., By Force or by Default? The Revolution of 1688-9 (1989), 88.


93 For Norfolk see Edward L'Estrange, Minutes of Norfolk Deputy-Lieutenancy, 3, 13, and 15 December 1688, in J. P. Kenyon, ed., The Stuart Constitution, 1603-1688: Documents and Commentary, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 508; For Danby, Delamere, and Devonshire see Tim Harris, Revolution: The Great Crisis of the British Monarchy, 1685-1720 (London; New York: Allen Lane, 2006), 284-85; for Nottingham gentry see Anon., The Declaration of the Nobility, Gentry, and Commonalty at the Rendezvous at Nottingham, Nov. 22, 1688 ([London]: n.p., 1688) and Harris, Revolution, 286.

94 Qtd. in Bryant 3:298.
During James's reign Pepys had continued to move against his enemy Arthur Herbert, alleging, for example, that after capturing a group of slaves, Herbert had starved them to death: Bryant 3:85. (Pepys varied the number: TP, n.d. [ca. Nov. 1683], 209 reports 100 slaves; 7 Mar., 225 reports 500). Harbord, by early 1688 a known enemy of James, was serving in the English regiments that William famously refused to send back to England upon James's request: Bryant 3:238. Russell had been involved in the assault against Pepys during the Popish Plot (352).


Cf. the lack of preparedness for conflict described in Hirst, *England*, 202; the same would have been less true for the King but even more true for his opponents in 1688.

Artillery played only a small role in the civil wars until 1645 and until then there were only a few new-style forts in England. But after a few years artillery began to be used with effectiveness and more modern defenses were built: Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 28-29. By the beginning of the seventeenth century only governments could afford to undertake these expenses. The nobles plotting against Charles would have known about the major role played by these costly items in the contemporary Thirty Years' War, but the only way to acquire small arms in the amounts required for an armed insurrection, let alone heavy weapons, was from government arsenals.


This was not wholly unprecedented, but the baronial importation of the French dauphin in 1216 was not due to a lack of sufficient military supplies or troops but solely to the lack of a suitable replacement for John.

Henry Roseveare, *The Financial Revolution, 1660-1760* (London: Longman, 1991), 31. But this scholar surely mistakes the case when he also argues that "it took much time and considerable agonising to reach agreement" on the principle of financial control (as opposed to the details of its application). In many sittings of Stuart Parliaments each representative of that family had been faced by insistence on redress of grievances before supply. By 1689 the principle itself needed little cheerleading; contention was caused by the details. Volumes 9 and 10 of Grey's *Debates of the House of Commons* record MP after MP rising to make such declarations as "If you give the crown too little, you may add at any time; if once you give too much, you will never have it back again" (William Williams, *DoC* 20 March 1689, 9:177) or "If you settle such a revenue as that the king should have no need of a parliament . . . we do not our duty to those who sent us hither." (Paul Foley, *DoC* 27 March 1690, 10:10). And small wonder. See the care with which the iron-willed Longshanks treated the opposition led by the earls of Norfolk and Hereford in 1297, formally articulating the principle that taxation "could only take place with the assent of
the representatives of the realm": Ann Lyon, *Constitutional History of the UK* (London: Cavendish Pub., 2003), 76-77. See also the financial strictures imposed by the Lords Ordainers (85); the refusal of the 1327 Good Parliament to grant a subsidy even to Edward III (107); or the platform of the Yorkists in 1460 (139). By the time of James I one of Parliament's main objections to his Great Contract was that it would furnish the King a reliable revenue outside Parliamentary control (203). By 1621 James accepted MP control of finances to the extent not only of acquiescing to the traditional subsidy targeted at a specific purpose but to its handling by Parliamentary appointees (204).

102 Some scholars argue that if it had not been for William's wars, control of the purse might not have been a lasting solution: Coward, *Stuart Age*, 360. However, by this time MPs were so paranoid that they immediately placed William in a stranglehold: Geoffrey Holmes, *The Making of a Great Power: Late Stuart and Early Georgian Britain, 1660-1722* (London: Longman, 1993), 267 and Tim Harris, *Revolution: The Great Crisis of the British Monarchy, 1685-1720* (London; New York: Allen Lane, 2006), 353. And it has recently been argued that the "for longer time" clause in the Bill of Rights gave Parliament a greatly augmented ability to punish ministers and was the most important plank in Parliament's platform of control over the monarch: Gary W. Cox, "Was the Glorious Revolution a Constitutional Watershed?" *The Journal of Economic History* 72, no. 3 (2012): 575-86. Finally, even if control of the fisc was not a wholly reliable instrument, historians must rest with what happened, and what happened was that the English elite kept rebelling and kept applying the power of the purse until finally the method would never be needed again. As one participant wrote, "before [Elizabeth's] time our ancestors had many successful contests with their sovereigns for their ancient right...yet what did those successes amount to?...[I]t is to the revolution only we owe the full possession of what, 'till then, we never had more than a perpetually contested right to": Colly Cibber, *Memoir of the Revolution*, in Steven C. A. Pincus, *England's Glorious Revolution, 1688-1689: A Brief History with Documents* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 49.

103 Even at his height Louis XIV remained careful not to move against nobles he disliked until they gave him the kind of blatant justification created in 1685 by the heir of the Bouillons, who neglected to ask royal permission when he went on crusade against the Turk with the Princes de Conti. Having long been annoyed at the Bouillons for reaching above their grasp, Louis lost no time in disgracing the family: Motley, *Becoming a French Aristocrat*, 195. The grip of previous kings had undeniably been looser, but Louis still took care not rebuke a noble house and withdraw his largesse even when he wished to unless they were publicly seen to make the kind of misstep that contravened some portion of his own honor.

104 Yun Casalilla, "Castilian Aristocracy," 282-96.

105 James 275-77.

106 Shere is better known to historians for designing the massive mole in the harbor of Tangier: E. M. G. Routh, *Tangier, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, 1661-1684* (London: J. Murray, 1912), 352. However, he had been a part-time soldier even as an engineer, switching roles much like
Pepys's colleagues and subordinates (see Chapter 4). He helped lead troops on a dangerous scouting mission on 20 September 1680, and when one of Tangier's outlying forts was under attack about a month later by the Algerians, a colonel reported to one of the secretaries of state that Shere was "a principal instrument both by his valour and advice of the victory we obtained": Routh, *Tangier*, 188 and Colonel Tollemache [no first name given] to Lord Sunderland, 30 October 1680, qtd. in Routh 197. Shere fought later as an artillery officer during Monmouth's rebellion: *DNB*.

107 See the conflicts of honor described in James 276-77, 341, 354, 358.

108 Shere to Dartmouth, 24 November 1688, *HMC Dartmouth* 3.133-34.

109 James 325.

110 Shere to Dartmouth, 134.

111 Dartmouth to James Stuart, 3 Dec. 1688, in *HMC Dartmouth* 1.275-77.

112 Barbara, Lady Dartmouth to Dartmouth, 12 Dec., in *HMC Dartmouth* 1.232.

113 Dartmouth to Lord Feversham, 16 Dec., in *HMC Dartmouth* 1.279.

114 William to Dartmouth, 16 Dec., in *HMC Dartmouth* 1.235.
Appendix C: Problematic Patriarchalism and the Paternalistic Fallacy

"Fatherly," "paternal," and "patriarchal," especially the first two, were the words used in England during most of the seventeenth century for the metaphorical linkage between political authority and a male head of household's legal position—when, that is, such linkage was made, which seems to have occurred much less often than historians assume nowadays. There are also other problems with their deployment by modern scholars. The least of these, though not negligible, is that early modern usage of "patriarch" and its derivatives can easily confuse students approaching primary readings for the first time: these words were much more commonly employed by contemporaries in discussions of the biblical patriarchs or the Greek Orthodox leaders who bore that title formally. In fact, from the Anglo-Saxon era downward "patriarch," "patriarchal," and so on do not seem to have been extrapolated to politics until the 1632 composition of Sir Robert Filmer's Patriarcha, and nobody else did it until Patriarcha's publication set the example approximately five decades later—so for most of the early modern era, the word was not thus used. Even if other isolated writers turn out to have employed it a few times before that, they must be regarded as exceptions proving the Filmerian rule. "Patrimonial" also seems to have been very seldom, if ever, used in this sense even though its denotation of inheritance would have lent itself to the European system of inherited lordship. After Filmer, other authors slowly followed suit with "patriarchal," but at least through the first few decades of the eighteenth century, beyond which this study does not presume to reach, "fatherly" and "paternal" still seem to have been as common. As an umbrella term for the activities involved in early modern governance, "good lordship" might be thought a better candidate, but it has its problems. If the OED is any guide, none of the synonyms for fatherhood enjoyed even close to the amount of usage that "lordship" did. Extremely few relevant applications—that is, extrapolation outside the bounds of kinship—of the other three terms are cited prior to the nineteenth century save for "father". This latter was used to designate a lord, though not often, and the word was employed yet more rarely in other extrafamilial political contexts. And throughout most of the early modern period lordship remained a potent political force in England, still powerful enough to enable rebellions during the second half of the sixteenth century. The Prologue shows that good lordship's ideals retained a good amount of force at least through the end of the next century as well, but "a good amount" is not the same as "hegemonic". By the mid-seventeenth, the concept no longer seems
fully adequate (see discussion in Chapter 1). Thus no single term may adequately catch all the nuances of early modern political authority after 1660, but if there is one, it is none of the three targeted for criticism in this appendix. Despite its limitations, increasing as the seventeenth century wore on, good lordship is the best label on offer at the moment—a function which, incidentally, emphasizes the type of continuity for which this dissertation argues. I therefore occasionally use it in this project as such. As Chapter 1 makes clear, however, this represents a fallback position; the purpose of this appendix is to defend the procedure negatively by showing that the more common alternatives are still less defensible. Pepys and his fellows did retain "lordship" as a term of political mastery under certain circumstances, but they did not, so far as I have been able to discover, use "patriarch" or related terms in such a context.

There are good reasons behind early modern political and social commentators' reticence to press the synonyms for fatherhood into political use. Certainly the Bible encouraged a patriarchalist interpretation of the male-dominated medieval and early modern hierarchical social and political structure, but patriarchalism's seminal chronicler found almost none of it in medieval thought and, despite the fermenting of new perspectives on politics and the family in the vat of the Reformation, only half-formed variants in early modern times on the continent; "a patriarchal theory of political obligation seems to have been peculiar to the England of the seventeenth century". Yet there not even basic preaching enjoined patriarchally based political obedience until the mid-sixteenth century. Plato had extrapolated paternal authority into the realm of wider politics, but the last thinker to follow his lead before Filmer seems to have been Chrysostom. The (approximate) millennium between the latter two gave precedence to the Aristotelian conceptualization that accepted the father-dominated family as the unit from which larger political bodies had evolved but nevertheless denied the relevance of domestic obedience "to obligation in the polis". Augustine, for example, his neoPlatonism notwithstanding, explicitly separated what he saw as the natural human association of the patriarchal family from other types of political power, which he viewed as socially constructed and therefore of a wholly different kind. With the Reformation in full swing Erasmus did come close to extracting the notion that authority in those family-derived political groupings was patriarchal by extension, and after him catechisms, sermons, and a few Tudor commentators such as Sir Thomas Smith began preparing the ground for full-scale Stuart patriarchalism. Nevertheless even at the end of the sixteenth century by far the more typical approach was that of Richard Hooker's Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, which viewed the appellation of "father" to kings as a kind of intellectual window-dressing that signaled no substantive relationship whatsoever between the types of power wielded by literal fathers and political leaders.3

When extra-familial patriarchy, or patriarchalism, finally did arrive, historians should take care not to overestimate the headway it made. The concept seems to have been mostly put to work for "absolute" monarchy, most particularly to argue against any right of political opposition or resistance. But this authoritarian rhetoric had much less substance than its proponents hoped in any of their kingdoms (see Prologue). Even in its Stuart-English heartland—indeed, especially there—the opinion of such as the earl of Huntingdon that a man's household "in proportion doth nearest resemble the government in public offices" was vigorously opposed by many writers, including of the very highest intellectual stature (e.g. John Locke), who maintained the traditional view that paternal authority had nothing to do with governance outside the family. It is simply
invalid to baldly state, as one recent author has, "Patriarchy in this [larger political] sense was central to late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century political thought which approached kingship in terms of paternal rule, through analogy with the household". In his dialog Plato Redivivus, Henry Neville stated the more common view, late in the Restoration when Tory writers had begun pushing the fatherly notion during the stresses of the Exclusion Crisis. After an interlocutor wonders why the argument for paternal authority had not yet been aired in their conversation, the English Gentleman answers,

Really I did not think it worth taking the notice of . . . if we could trace all foundations of polities that now are, or ever came to our knowledge since the world began; we shall find none of them to have descended from paternal power; we know nothing of Adam's leaving the empire to Cain, or Seth: it was impossible for Noah to retain any jurisdiction over his own three sons; who were dispersed into three parts of the world . . . and as for Abraham, whilst he lived, as also his son Isaac, they were but ordinary fathers of families, and no question governed their own household as all others do; but when Jacob upon his death-bed did relate to his children the promise Almighty God made his grandfather to . . . give his posterity a fruitful territory, he speaks not one word of the Empire of Rueben his firstborn, but supposes them all equal . . . . So that I believe this fancy to have been first started not by the solid judgment of any man but to flatter some prince, and to assert, for want of better arguments, the jus divinum of monarchy. 4

The English Gentleman thus destroys not just the generic analogy of fatherly authority but any resort to biblical patriarchy as well. Even with regard to the continent, where there was perhaps not so much overt opposition to paternalist and patriarchal rhetoric—but also where it seems not to have been developed as fully—scholars might wish to pause before making such confident declarations as, "In many regions, political power in larger administrative units was said to be organized in an analogous way to the governance of households: the lord, the priest, and the magistrate held paternal power over his subjects . . . . Even though some contemporary political thinkers attempted to theorize more impersonal forms of political authority, their royal patrons continued to practice and rely on patriarchalist powers." A closer look may reveal that more than just "some" thinkers and subjects felt that monarchical authority was neither patriarchal nor paternalistic.

Consider "paternalism" first, for scholarly purposes the most objectionable of the words being discussed here. The label is borrowed from political science and denotes a relationship which is not only hierarchical but non-reciprocal. The superior is supposed to be beneficent but the inferior has little to no power over, input regarding, or influence concerning what forms that beneficence should take or how it should be dispensed. 6 In seventeenth-century England applications of paternalism seem to have been restricted to occasional godly discipline (prior to the Restoration) and political theorizing (as well as theorizing about the family itself, of course). Outside these contexts paternalistic pronouncements are extremely hard to find, doubtless because they failed to articulate a recognizable reflection of daily life. The only example anywhere in early modern England of elite conduct that might accurately be described as truly paternalistic (of which the present writer knows) is toward the end with Sir Ambrose Crowley in
eighteenth-century Durham. Crowley not only felt a duty to act with beneficence but to micromanage his ironworkers with an appropriately iron fist, imposing and enforcing rigorous discipline. Crowley's clerks had it almost as bad as his manual laborers, supervised by a monitor who ensured that they put in eighty hours per week "after all deductions for being at taverns, alehouses, coffee houses, breakfast, dinner, playing, sleeping, smoking, singing, reading of news history, quarrelling, contention, disputes or anything else foreign to my business" (with rewards promised to informers who spied any such malfeasance that escaped the watcher). But even in what the authors call "Britain's first industrialized society" their other examples of "paternalism" do not come close to that level of technical fit. More appropriately than these scholars realize given the argument of this dissertation, they finish their study by noting that "to a very large extent, social relations were conducted in an older idiom, adapted only slowly and partially to the realities of new structural contexts." To blunt the force of this conclusion would require more than just a few additional examples of Crowleyism. Lesser sorts certainly owed deference to individuals of higher status and were expected to honor the social hierarchy in general, but this obedience was far from passive (see Prologue).

In addition to enjoying little company, paternalist writers were vigorously opposed. It is true that theorists as far back as Lydgate saw the protest of the multitude as inevitably non-rational; the body-politic metaphor of society could not logically allow differences of political opinion (how could one body part reasonably disagree with another?). Furthermore, elites from the king downward regarded askance the people's "monster with many heads". Paternalist writers took the next step, denying reciprocal obligation altogether and almost attempting to will into being the passivity of inferiors. Henry Bullinger viewed his flock as dumb beasts who would be docile sheep if "carefully led" but which, "left to themselves," would "degenerate into bloody wolves". But such articulations had their countercurrents, though the stream ran underground after the mid-sixteenth century. William Tyndale asked, "what commons was ever so evil that they rose against their heads for well doing?" while a tract written for Edward VI argued that "the commotions of the people are necessary" because elites might sometimes abuse their power. Intellectual historians hold that attitudes toward dissent by the poor hardened immediately after Kett's rebellion, yet during the widely resented rule of Northumberland, one published dialogue placed its expression of full-blown paternalism in the mouths of thoroughgoing villains: the leaders who would not even "give folk leave to think" were the Vices.

Actual leaders filling government posts under Northumberland might have frowned worriedly at this tract, but it is likely that many would have rejected pro-paternalist arguments as a counterweight. The full-blown anti-paternalist perspective admittedly fits uncomfortably with the sometimes harsh government responses to the protests of the poor, responses exemplified by executions ordered after the riot at Maldon (see Prologue). But the paternalist theorizing, though more contemporaneous with Maldon, corresponds even more poorly, especially when the initial government forbearance is factored in. One strain of writing, however, matches with near perfection. This may be represented by William Baldwin's Myrroure For Magistrates (1559), which had prescribed exactly the middle way followed by the government: repression might be necessary to preserve the body politic (in which dissent was a disease requiring purgation) but nonetheless rebellion tended to signal a failure of lordship that had to be remedied. Thus not only punishment but more substantive action to address the poor's grievances followed the last
The looser, and ubiquitous, way in which scholars deploy "patriarchal" to describe a less well-defined sort of authority, assumed to have been analogized from fatherly power outward, is an unhelpful response to the failures of "paternal". Among other objections that might be raised, such usage ignores the significant early modern opposition to the notion that paternal authority could be thus expanded; we need to ask why so many writers held an anti-patriarchalist attitude.

One reason may have to do with the logic of early modern social structure. That logic certainly makes questionable the current scholarly use of "patriarchal" and "paternal" to denote, as Michael J. Braddick puts it, "a pattern of hierarchy and subordination which subsumed class, status, and gender relations" as well as "presumptions about age." This formulation would place patriarchy on a par with or in a position of superiority to honor. Paternalists such as Filmer or Huntingdon, of course, lend credence to this claim. However, the most fundamental characteristic of patriarchy remains the subordination of women to men. Without this basis, patriarchy loses its force as an analytical heuristic. Any other "subsumed" elements must be viewed as extrapolations from that point of origin, and since those elements are secondary, in practice hierarchies of class, status, and age should have been trumped by gender hierarchies. However, in this society an adult male peasant was inferior to a younger female aristocrat, and even in situations where adults of lesser rank were temporarily given authority over higher-ranking youngsters for very specific purposes (such as tutoring), the adult generally had to step carefully. In modern parlance, "class"—or more contemporarily appropriate, "sorts" or "orders"—and status within such groups trumped gender and (though at times to a somewhat lesser extent) age: early modern norms of neighborliness and deference operating between members of differing socioeconomic groups made sense first within the broader social hierarchy justified by the culture of honor with its emphasis on lineage, on kinship, on the blood. The more narrowly targeted attitude subordinating women and children exercised its force mainly within each level of that hierarchy, transcending levels rarely and only in a few strictly limited scenarios.

The structural alignments of status and "class" as opposed to other sociocultural elements strongly suggest that during the early modern period lordship was a concept which held primacy over patriarchy, so that even paternalists such as Huntingdon should be seen as providing allegorical support for lordship rather than lordship's ideological foundation. These considerations also suggest that lordship, with its emphasis on the reciprocity that secured the consent of the governed, rather than patriarchy, functioned as the primary theoretical justification for early modern rule. Patriarchy per se—not the currently fashionable expansion of the term, but the subordination of women and children to men within the same social level—and the culture of honor certainly ran parallel to each other for a good distance, but the former by no means gave the latter most of its purchase. The relationship between the two was, at most, one of mutual reinforcement at certain (and by no means all) points. Braddick's exposition implies this conclusion when he writes of "other values" separate from patriarchy, "such as those of neighborliness and harmony". Since he identifies them as separate from patriarchy, patriarchy could not have subsumed them (in his formulation, at least), so lordship—which did subsume them—and patriarchy had to constitute separate sets of sometimes-overlapping attitudes.

Further support for lordship's supremacy may be found in the observation that authors on both sides of the seventeenth-century English debate accepted paternal authority as given within Maldon riot. The
the family, but anti-patriarchalists specified and even patriarchalists implicitly conceded that authority in and of itself was the more fundamental term. Patriarchalist authors sometimes felt it necessary to assert that fathers were not merely engenderers of families but also lords thereof, an articulation logically requiring that patriarchy arise from lordship rather than the other way around (even though they were attempting to argue the latter). And if mastery did not stem from fatherhood, it had to be conferred by some other source (usually because God designated fathers as masters).\textsuperscript{17} That patriarchalist apologists made distinctions so logically antithetical to their case suggests that they felt a need to meet halfway readers who did not so unthinkingly view fatherhood and generic mastery as synonymous. On these etymological points Hobbes's \textit{Leviathan}, atypical in so many ways, serves as an all-the-more instructive illustration for its representativeness in this matter. One of the many contemporary political theorists who were not patriarchal absolutists, Hobbes uses "paternal" to mean only domestic authority, which he takes care to stipulate does not arise "because [the parent] begat [the child]" but for more contractual reasons (xx.4). Readers encounter neither "fatherly" nor "patrimony" or its derivatives in his text; "patriarch" and its derivatives are used only in the purely biblical sense; authorities outside the family (and setting patriarchalism on its head, even inside) are denoted by "lord" or "master".\textsuperscript{18} Since contemporaries could not agree that "paternal" or "patriarchal" applied to their political system, historians should approach these words and their derivatives with hesitation.

To temporarily re-tighten the focus to "paternal" and "paternalism", the case against these labels—as material on reciprocity demonstrated in the Prologue—is especially strong. The consequences of using this word group as unreflectively as is now the case might be profitably illuminated by considering the regrettable precedent set by Schochet, patriarchalism's intellectual historian. Schochet interpreted the patriarchalism he chronicled in paternalistic terms, taking early modern English religious texts as the final word on the idea of political obligation understood by the Stuart lesser sorts. Political (i.e. non-biblical) patriarchalism, he argued, taught by the church from a parishioner's earliest memory beginning at around Erasmus's time, inexorably formed "the unstated prejudices of the inarticulate masses",\textsuperscript{19} at least "to the extent that the problem was one on which they were capable of reasoning" in the first place (81; complete discussion on 65-70 and 73-80). He admits that the idea of reciprocal contract was contemporary with patriarchalism but holds these simpletons incapable of comprehending the former "in terms of limits . . . on authority and the source for personal rights and claims" (82). Yet these people were articulate enough not only to address their superiors as "my lord" or "your honor," but to demand lordship's reciprocity with petitions and grain riots.

No historian today means to condescend in Schochet's fashion, but we retain the attitude's supporting nomenclature. Inadvertently giving the victory to the wishful paternalist writers, even the best of scholars commit what might be called the paternalistic fallacy: Braddick reiterates the active nature of servant or tenant status, observing that deference and obedience "clearly [involved] a degree of negotiation", but then elsewhere identifies offices in local government as conferring "paternal responsibility". Derek Hirst offers evidence that tenants protested bad lordship and offers insightful commentary on the "reciprocal nature of authority and subordination" but still speaks of the system as constituting "paternalism". The reciprocity described by Braddick and Hirst ensures that the relationships at issue will not be misunderstood by their readers, but the term is inaccurately applied and likely to mislead in the hands of less
meticulous scholars. For instance, Norma Landau uses "paternal," and despite quoting a contemporary observation concerning a superior's reciprocal "return" for an inferior's loyalty, reinforces the impression of lower-sort passivity. She discusses at length JP actions and their cultivation of local "interest" but, as far as a reasonably careful reading by the present writer can determine, furnishes no examples in which the lesser members of such an "interest" actually did anything to uphold it.

While Landau's case is ambiguous, other writers seem to believe that lordship was indeed truly paternalistic, and we need to register the serious weakness of this proclivity. For Phil Withington, a town-based "conception of citizenship" which he sees as "[r]ooted in . . . reciprocity" stood opposed to a "very different . . . unquestioning deference of hierarchy and degree associated with" rural landlords; elsewhere he describes the landlord ideology as comprising "concepts of lordship, honor, and paternalism held by those 'Gentry who do not live in the city'". Another example is Craig Muldrew, who views regulation of grain prices in times of dearth as decidedly "paternalistic . . . superiors decided what needed to be distributed to inferiors" in a process that (from his description) appears to have left the inferiors passive. But these stances cannot be sustained in the light of the findings by Braddick, Slack, Walter, and Wrightson cited in the Prologue. The final word on the understanding of authority held by the great unwashed and (allegedly) religiously brainwashed should be allowed to the crabby Elizabethan Lancashire goodman who heard the name "Jesus Christ" and responded, "I think I heard of that man you spake of once in a play at Kendal, called Corpus Christi play, where there was a man on a tree and blood ran down." No doubt, as his interpreter avers, his doctrinal vagueness was exceptional, but nonetheless "there were frequent complaints that parishioners preferred sports to church on Sundays, and were ignorant of the teachings of religion". Perhaps such peasants willfully chose not to attend paternalist sermons; as the Prologue observed, they were certainly not so ignorant of what they clearly felt were their rights to justice under the ideology of lordship.

There is more at stake in avoiding the paternalistic fallacy than denotative accuracy regarding social behavior, let alone mere semantics—or, rather, semantics are not "mere", for historical interpretation can turn upon them. Steve Hindle, for example, uses "paternal" liberally in one of his books (probably well over a hundred times throughout) as a label for traditional early modern elite political ideals and behavior "the moral authority" of which "was eroded" and gave way to a new "participatory political culture". Along the way, despite presenting evidence to the contrary such as James I's 1607 proclamation not only condemning enclosure protests but also pledging to "graciously lend our ears to humble and just complaints", Hindle insists that "the regime misguidedly assumed that the poor were incapable of independent political action."

Probable misdiagnosis of the monarch's sense of the potential for peasant action is only one of the difficulties arguably caused by Hindle's paternalist entrapment. Defensibly enough he continues, "[the government's] instinctive reaction when confronted with even the most trivial disorders was to seek out the men of standing who must bear responsibility for such 'outrages'. The problem lies in his immediate assumption that this policy signified paternalism. While cases in which the government blamed local gentlemen for such protests could be interpreted as the castigation of paternalists whose irresponsible laxity allowed their unthinking charges to break loose and rampage unchecked, these instances might well be better explained as the admonishing
of bad lords whose grasping ways prompted the disturbance, or of good lords who led their
tenants on terms of loyalty (the latter was the view of Henry VIII and his councillors on the 1536
Lincolnshire disturbance). Even on Hindle's own evidence the second interpretation more
closely fits both the ameliorative measures or statements with which the center normally responded
as well as the harsh treatment of lower-sort leadership sometimes accompanying the conciliation.
Contradicting the unqualified assertion that the state blamed local elites (in paternalistic terms)
for such protests rather than the poor, at another point Hindle rightly notes that "where protest
really did threaten social order . . . the state readily condoned summary execution [of lesser-sort
protesters] to the terror of all other offenders." But this makes no sense if the regime truly
thought the poor incapable of action on their own, always blindly following their betters, for it
followed that, if carefully supervised, the lesser sort would always work their farms quietly no
matter how badly they were treated. Under that assumption—which early modern governments
English and abroad clearly did not embrace in practice, whatever rhetoric they might have aired
occasionally—punishing a rioter would make no difference in the poor's behavior one way or
another.

Finally, paternalist assumptions may have caused Hindle to miss a crucial beat at the
heart of his argument about increasingly participatory government. He never shows why his
favored cause of novel proto-democracy, comprising private individuals who vexed local rivals
with malicious suits in Star Chamber, was any more conducive to political participation than
other contemporary sociocultural elements might have been. The group protest by way of grain
riot is an almost glaringly obvious alternative, and it is hard not to suspect that the paternalistic
fallacy imposed blinders that prevented Hindle's clear judgment on this issue. After all, if the old
morality was paternalistic, then by definition it excluded participation. Therefore the
riots—which were conducted under the old morality's banner—cannot be construed as
participatory; ergo, some other, newer factor (for Hindle, litigation) must perforce be adduced as
a foundation for expanding political consciousness. The semantics of the paternalistic fallacy can
have a significant effect—and not necessarily one conducive to accuracy—on historical
scholarship.

In sum, the terms currently used to describe the early modern English political system
have various disadvantages, and scholars of other kingdoms may also wish to reappraise their
terminology. "Paternal" and its derivatives are inaccurate as a descriptor of most early modern
political behavior and should be discarded save when discussing contemporaries who actually
used the word or who explicitly forbade all (not just violent) protest or petition to humbler
subjects. (The linguistic-turn cuteness that some authors, especially students of literature, seem
unable to control will doubtless lend itself to such locutions as "paternalistic phallusy"; the
present writer can only plead that these supplement rather than replace scholarly attention to
detail).

Not quite so urgent but still of significant concern are "patriarch" and its derivatives. As
we have seen, there is a strong argument to be made that they should no longer be used as
catchall terms for the early modern sociopolitical order. The "patriarchal" point is perhaps more
open to debate than is "paternalism", but such debate must occur and better justifications should
be offered. Until then, when the "patriarchal" word group must be used for technical purposes by
scholars conducting gender analyses, those writers should clearly distinguish between a) Max

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Weber's application, b) their somewhat different theoretical usage(s), and c) the term's explicit employment, and more importantly the lack thereof, in the period's political—as opposed to strictly religious—thought. In other words, it was one thing for Richard Grassby to write about "the patriarchal character of society", working as he was within the context of the family;\textsuperscript{27} it is quite another to adduce the patriarchal character of government.

Two other words related to "paternal" and "patriarchal", one of which is sometimes (though much less frequently) enlisted in a similar manner, must also be dismissed. The term sometimes substituted for the main pair is "patrimonial", and it is perhaps the least objectionable of these labels. Its strong legal connotation of direct inheritance can be confusing when the word is applied to extrafamilial contexts, however. This may be the reason for which it was rarely used in the latter way by contemporaries. The other word that proponents of "patriarchal" might wish to substitute is "fatherly". This term still retains similar connotations, at least superficially, as it had then, but these are emotional rather than structural, so the term does not lend itself to the necessary scholarly precision and anyway seems to have been nearly as uncommon then as now.

What about contemporary terms which denoted leadership and were unrelated to fatherhood? The most widely used early modern term for all types of authority was "master" and its derivatives, and this word group is certainly useful, but that very ubiquity is a weakness in this context: "mastery" has such broad application that it cannot replace "patriarchal" and "paternal" as currently deployed, while "mastership," though sometimes used during the early modern period,\textsuperscript{28} would confuse modern readers by implying only a single, specific contemporary relation because of its unavoidable semantic invocation of "apprenticeship."

But does not the term I am tendering, "lordship," have competition from "patronage," an opposition outlined in Chapter 1, so that we should begin speaking of "patronal" government? Perhaps during in the eighteenth century, especially after Walpole implemented his system, but not during the period covered by this study. The right descriptor for the relationship between lordship and patronage is not opposition but rather supplementarity. Pepys's urban authority requires the different nomenclature of "patronage" for the sake of structural accuracy in his bureaucratic context, but "lord" still legally applied to anyone who was lord of a manor, which included even the lowliest parish gentry (and, lacking sons, their widows). The local power these figures exerted was often considerable; the churchwardens of Rufforth (Yorkshire) in the 1630s, for example, refused to present a nearby gentleman to the ecclesiastical courts for fathering a bastard because he was the "lord of the town".\textsuperscript{29} This kind of influence remained strong even during the later seventeenth century (indeed, into the nineteenth). The general assumption that patronage is an outgrowth of lordship seems to me correct.\textsuperscript{30} adaptation was necessary in a growing urban environment featuring an increasing fluidity created by both cultural and economic factors.\textsuperscript{31} But I find it odd that scholars should think the acorn to have fallen so far from the tree: precisely because of this developmental connection many parallels remain. Restoration patrons and clients acted very much like lords and retainers, the differences being in degree and nuance caused by environmental factors (see Chapter 1 and the five chapters on Pepys). Yes, "lordship" must be increasingly qualified and becomes inapplicable in certain urban contexts, such as Pepys's office, as the seventeenth century lengthened. Even where lords were indubitably involved in these contexts, patronage permeated and perhaps supplanted lordship; thus I speak even of princes as "patrons". But because patronage and lordship both ran on
underlying rails of honor, we should expect a good deal of ideological similarity below the structural differences, and precisely because of this compatibility, a good deal of permeability. Contemporaries may have failed to register a difference. And most of the elite were still landholders; therefore, despite its growing limitations toward the end of the period, "lordship" is the best broadly applicable term we have—if we must have one—for generalized elite rulership as described in the Prologue.

"Lord" and "lordship", then, are the only labels left standing. For purposes of teaching, they have no connotations past or present that would unduly interfere with modern students' perceptions. In the European religious context, then as now "lord" retains its standard secular sense of authority and power, merely being augmented to a greater dimension when applied to Christ as lord of lords, surely a less confusing hurdle for students than the two differing religious identifications that attend "patriarch." For purposes of scholarship, "lord" and "lordship" are quasi-structural terms the specific connotations of which make them well-suited to denoting the nobility and gentry's hierarchically based social and political formations and behaviors. The word will sometimes be used as such in the present argument. Nonetheless, by the later seventeenth century "permeable" is the watchword: at times it is necessary to speak of figures who were definitely lords—such as the king—as patrons. But however lordship and patronage split the sociopolitical stage during early modern times, they left little room for patriarchalism and none at all for paternalism.
Notes to Appendix C


2 *OED* 1st ed. For instances of "father" designating a lord, see "father," n., s.v. 4.a. For the even less common other nonkin usages, see the scattered single examples under "father," v., s.v. 3, "fatherhood," s.v. 3, and "fatherly," s.v. 3. In marked contrast to these sparse examples, "lordship" has its own entry a column-and-a-half long dating back to 897 with a substantial number of examples from the seventeenth century (even "father," n., s.v. 4.a extends to only ca. one-sixth of a column). The larger section dedicated to "lord" and its variants, most specimens in which are similarly relevant, runs much longer than any of the other word groups (well over four pages).

3 For the nearly complete lack of patriarchalist political ideas during the Middle Ages and their inchoate appearance on the continent in the early modern period, see Schochet, *Patriarchalism*, 24-35, quotation on 36; for a (literal) look at one of these less well-formed continental instances, see the last chapter in Kristin Eldyss Sorensen Zapalac, *In His Image and Likeness: Political Iconography and Religious Change in Regensburg, 1500-1600* (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1990). On the appearance of patriarchalist exhortations in England during the mid-sixteenth century, see Schochet, *Patriarchalism*, 6; for Plato, 20-21. For Chrysostom, see Quentin Skinner, *The Age of Reformation*, vol. 2 of *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought* (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 156. For the intervening dominance of Aristotle's nonpatriarchal framework, see Schochet, *Patriarchalism*, 23 and 25 (quotation on 23); for Erasmus, 30; for his successors, 38-9, 42-4, 46-7, 49-51; and for the much more normally applied alternative represented by Hooker, 52. Schochet's findings are confirmed by Quentin Skinner's magisterial survey of early modern political thought, which adds only that a few prescient Spanish anti-absolutists foresaw the need to rebut patriarchalist theory before it had even been properly formulated and that Bossuet on the continent should be considered as fully patriarchalist as Filmer: Skinner, *Age of Reformation*, 116, 118, 156, 326, 347. For fairly full yet still conveniently brief example of historians' orthodox view of this issue, see Christopher Hill, *Society and Puritanism in Pre-Revolutionary England*, 2d ed (New York: Schocken Books, 1967), 458-462. Hill's discussion makes typical assumptions about "the attraction of the patriarchal theory of politics through its long life" (458) which have hardly changed in the half-century since his original publication.
4 Henry Neville, *Plato Redivivus, or, A Dialogue Concerning Government Wherein by Observations Drawn from Other Kingdoms and States Both Ancient and Modern an Endeavour Is Used to Discover the Present Politick Distemper of Our Own with the Causes and Remedies* (London: Printed for S. I., 1681).


6 What made the paternalist authors truly paternalist rather than merely patriarchalist is that they insisted on "authority and duty without reciprocity": Schochet, *Patriarchalism*, 83.


8 For Lydgate see James 265. For the body politic's logic see Derek Hirst, *England in Conflict, 1603-1660: Kingdom, Community, Commonwealth* (London; New York: Arnold; Oxford University Press, 1999), 1, and James 460-1, 464-5.

9 The characterization of massed peasants as a ravenous, multi-headed beast was common: see e.g. Einstein, *Italian Renaissance in England*, 298; Christopher Hill, *Change and Continuity in Seventeenth-Century England* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), 185-7, 200; Morrill, *Nature of the English Revolution*, 371; or Peltonen, *Classical Humanism*, 72. Matthew Parker spoke for many when he fretted, "What master shall be sure in his bed chamber" if subjects had the right to decide whether a monarch was a tyrant who needed overthrowing: qtd. in Williams, *Tudor Regime*, 356, and along similar lines see also Jones, *Tudor Commonwealth*, 43-4.


11 Tyndale (and others with a similar stance) qtd. in Jones, *Tudor Commonwealth*, 51; the "Discourse" for Edward (by Thomas Williams), 50; the Vices, 22.
For the Myrroure see Jones, Tudor Commonwealth, 49, and for similar recommendations, 52-5 and 92; see also James 193 and 264. This stance was complemented by a broader current of political theory. Sir Thomas Elyot's Boke of the Governour condemned rebellion but reminded governors that all parts of the body politic, including the plebeian belly (or feet), should be treated with equity, for "the common people oweth very many things to thee, but thou oweth all things to them": Jones, Tudor Commonwealth, 18, and see 20, 106-7 for other works promoting theoretical reciprocity on the basis of equity, even though not allowing the poor to redress grievances themselves. Somerset accepted the implications of those precepts, emphasizing the elite's duty "to receive poor men's complaints, that findeth or thinketh themselves injured or grieved" (idem, 33, quotation cited from A. F. Pollard, England Under Protector Somerset, 215-16). Cf. also Thomas Lever, who denied rebellion to the poor but insisted as a corollary, "so can the rulers have no redress of rebellious people by oppression": quoted in G. R. Elton, "Reform and the "Commonwealth-Men" of Edward VI's Reign," in The English Commonwealth, 1547-1640: Essays in Politics and Society, ed. Peter Clark, Alan G. R. Smith, and Nicholas Tyacke (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1979), 30. For increasing intolerance of outbursts by the poor in published sources, see Jones, Tudor Commonwealth, 56-9 and 218-19, but this seems to have had little impact on the standard response at least until the civil wars of the next century. Directly after Kett's uprising (1549), the earl of Arundel stopped a countywide swell of enclosure riots in Kent by putting a few "mutinying varlets" in the stocks but also, in open court at Arundel castle, ordering oppressive landlords to reform themselves, "which they apparently did"; similar guidelines were followed in 1596 when an Oxfordshire conspiracy not only to raze enclosures but seize weapons and join angry London apprentices achieved a government investigation of local enclosing: Williams, Tudor Regime, 430 and 328.

Braddick, State Formation, 102, 163.

Filmer might have made the intellectual argument that some lines of descent, especially royal lines, derived more directly than others from the first father (Adam), and therefore the greater status of women from those families rested upon a patriarchalist foundation. But his reasoning was unavailable until 1680, and even then it did not command anything like the immediate, widespread acceptance that would be necessary to explain everyday behavior. Small wonder, as Filmer was dredged up for publication only because he happened to buttress the High Church Tory reaction to Whiggery during the Exclusion Crisis. (I am grateful to Derek Hirst for pointing this out to me.)


Braddick, State Formation, 165.

See e.g. Schochet, Patriarchalism, 110-11, and for this type of phrasing from Filmer himself, 142.
Ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co, 1994). For Hobbes's use of "paternal", see xx.4; an example of "patriarch", xxxviii.4; an example of "lord", x.51.


Williams, *Tudor Regime*, 290.

Hindle, *State and Social Formation*, the new "culture" on 68; the traditional "paternalist" view of the poor on 76; James's proclamation and government reaction on 63.

Hindle, *State and Social Formation*, 63.

Mervyn James, *Society, Politics, and Culture: Studies in Early Modern England* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 196. There may well have been a degree of deliberately wishful thinking involved in blamed local gentry, as it would have been comforting for magistrates to tell themselves that peasants wouldn't act without elite provocation or leadership. But such an attitude need not presuppose paternalism: it could just as easily assume good or bad lordship on the part of the local lord or lady and *reciprocal* reaction on the part of tenants.


Qtd. in Hill, *Society and Puritanism*, 391.

Ancient Roman practices may also have influenced the practice of early modern patronage (see Chapter 1), but the similarity of Stuart-era English patronage to Rome's could just as easily signal a case of parallel evolution in response to similar environmental factors. And even if Rome's influence was direct, that does not somehow nullify the simultaneous influence of the much more
omnipresent practice of lordship. Honor values remained the same in both practices, and indeed much the same between classical Rome and medieval Europe (see Conclusion for brief commentary on this issue).

31 See Prologue for urban development, print, and economics including (though not limited to) the early modern explosion of print and the economic dislocations and developments unearthed so ably by Craig Muldrew.
Appendix D: Theoretical Rationale

The purpose of this appendix is to set forth the most foundational\(^1\) of the theoretical rationales underpinning the present project. The past three decades have seen history transformed into a highly theory-conscious discipline. I am not averse to this development, but I am averse to the particular theories that have tended to dominate it: the profession as a whole generally contents itself with theory filtered through literary studies rather than paying attention to philosophy proper, especially Anglo-American philosophy, so most historians remain unaware of significant philosophical objections to and important philosophical arguments against the theories they accept. As an alternative, I accept ontological individualism as a basis for the plural subjectivity of individuals acting as participant agents. Solid reasons can be cited for preferring this approach as a basis for sociocultural analysis.

Perhaps the most common theoretical basis employed by historical work that focuses on one person's archive unfortunately entails significant theoretical problems. This is the "linguistic turn" (now calling itself, misleadingly in my view, the "cultural turn") based on the structuralist and poststructuralist conception of reality as linguistically constructed.\(^2\) This is the approach most historians associate with the word "theory," and it does enable scholars to connect individual thought to larger cultural constructs. In the poststructuralist view, language contains culture within itself, so reality as humans perceive it is socially constructed; talking of society's construction by either language ("nothing outside the text") or by culture is to speak of synonyms in the context of these semiotic theories. And if individual minds are constituted wholly by culture (language), then \textit{a priori} whatever they think is in a strong sense representative of some aspect of that culture. Therefore it is reasonable to represent cultures by examining individuals. But quite aside from the well-known epistemological barrier poststructuralism places in the way of scholars seeking to understand a past reality on its own terms, both structuralism and poststructuralism fall for a trap in which terminate all very strong social-constructionist stances: they logically imply the real and independent existence of such entities as hive-minds or self-conscious and self-activating, unitarily reified nations (this despite the denial of reification in much poststructuralist writing).\(^3\) As a correlate of this problem, these approaches share what has rightly been called the "principal weakness of most theories of society . . . their denial of individual agency."\(^4\)

The most widespread philosophical alternative to poststructuralism for underpinning sociocultural explanations is probably methodological individualism, but unfortunately this approach goes to the opposite extreme. Fairly strong in some parts of social science and arguably implicit in the approach of many historians who fail to articulate it, methodological individualism holds that social groupings do not exist as such—talk of groups is merely convenient shorthand—so collective action must be understood only by virtue of a group's constitutive atoms, i.e. individual agents. This position impoverishes understanding not merely by neglecting but by implying the nonexistence of social or collective attitudes.\(^5\) We now know that this is not a valid position, for collective attitudes have been empirically demonstrated by social psychologists. They have found that individuals in a group, when thinking of themselves as part of the group, sometimes hold, and act according to, attitudes which run contrary to attitudes they
hold when not considering themselves as members of that group. Yet this tendency does not push
the theoretical pendulum all the way to back to the other side and suddenly render strong social
constructionism a viable solution. Social-psychological collectivist thinking is by no means all-
encompassing. Humans can and often do leave groups, including, if rarely, their societies en toto
(the colonialist phenomenon of "going native"). But strong social constructionism entails a
collectivist determinism the iron grip of which would preclude such breakaways. Thus, even
setting aside the philosophical objection regarding group minds, strong social constructionism
cannot be correct either.

It is possible to thread a way through the Scylla of methodological individualism and the
Charybdis of poststructuralism by regarding groups as comprised of singular thinking agents but
posing a group entity nonetheless, a "plural subject" that can be described as having attitudes
and performing actions without ontological embarrassment. This type of entity allows
sociocultural explanation in terms of collective social units but avoids the pitfall of strong-
constructionist determinism because the behavior encouraged by the "plural subject" arises from
ontological individualism, the specification of an ontologically constitutive set of subjects who
retain their individual agency. That agency is the reason for which a plural subject is not logically
obliged to reify itself into a group mind. Each member, qua individual, attributes certain beliefs
to the other members of the group, whether or not s/he personally holds those beliefs, and the
phenomenon of peer pressure—not at all confined to children and teens—furnishes a powerful
incentive to construe these beliefs as valuable and valid within the context of the group.

The benefits of this theoretical orientation can be most clearly seen in the potential for
detailed analysis of social fault lines, as detail is the rock upon which most theories shatter. In
cases where an individual's personal attitudes conflict with the group's, agents acting within a
plural subject have various choices. They may decide that the group is correct and deliberately
abandon their old belief, but in most scenarios they retain their old attitude. In such cases they
may "suspend [internal] judgment" and temporarily act under the sign of the group belief, swept
along by enthusiasm for a cause. Or, more vaguely, they might regard the group value as
contributing to some greater, more abstract good for which means justify ends. Another possible
response is the temporary bracketing of the personal attitude with a mental shrug underwritten by
the notion that the more people hold a belief, the greater the chance that it is correct or
worthwhile—a short-term, secular version of Pascal's wager. Toward the extreme, close to the
psychological border at which a decision to leave the group might be taken, the agent may
strongly wish that s/he were not under pressure to follow the prescribed course of action. Here
the type of group becomes important. If it is a unit basic to the culture, a group to which, for
example, everyone of a certain status is presumed to naturally belong as a condition of
being—such as the community of honor comprising all those of gentle birth in early modern
England—leaving the group voluntarily might be construed as impossible by most of its
members. In such cases even highly unpalatable courses of action might be regularly followed
out of fear for the adverse consequences of not conforming. More subtly, unpalatable courses
might also be followed because the individual may question her or his own intuitions as opposed
to the perhaps-greater wisdom of the group; but if feelings about both the intuition and the
group's viability are strong, severe psychological disturbance may follow.

The foregoing list is not meant to be an exhaustive catalogue of the ways in which
individuals react to friction between their beliefs and a group's; the point is that plural subjectivity can explain such responses while retaining a person's individuality. The person's group-oriented behavior can be called "participant agency", and it retains the agency of the individual because, at least in cases of conflict, the agent is consciously aware that her/his act of will (a thought, an action, or both) as part of the plural subject is validated in terms of the beliefs of others, or of the group's beliefs as abstractly conceived, rather than his/her own. In this sense those beliefs truly are the beliefs of an abstracted group; the person holds, and acts upon, those beliefs only as one of its members, not as a lone individual.6

The combination of ontological individualism with plural socio-psychological subjects allows a scholar to steer the theoretical Argo between the jaws of methodological individualism and the whirlpool of poststructuralism. Maintaining this heading, an historian can explain—as a strong social constructionist cannot—why a subject can offer resistance to cultural ideals in the first place.7 And it furnishes the tools to explain much more easily than a methodological individualist why an agent might hold a belief and yet act against it without coercion—why, for example, some early modern elite males could inveigh against duels and even publically mock the entire constellation of honor yet draw steel to defend their honor anyhow (Charles II's favorite Buckingham furnishes a well-known example). Of course in many cases there will be no conflict between the individual's attitudes and "groupthink"; such concordance creates the illusion that the strong constructionists are right. And the structualist method of "thick description," associated with constructionism, has been a highly profitable approach for historians. But a scholar need not accept structuralism and poststructuralism's hermetic view of language to acknowledge that symbols, linguistic and otherwise, are the medium we use to communicate our meanings. And if that is so, "thickly" describing a system of collectively used symbols goes a long way to understanding a culture or subculture (and thus behavior within a society). We may not be able to take individuals as unproblematically representing some slice of a culture or subgroup, or its discontents, with the easy confidence of the strong constructionist, but ontological individualism, its agent participating in one or more plural subjects, furnishes theoretical license quite sufficient for inferring a strong linkage.

Chapter 1 retails another theoretical orientation, that of Quentin Skinner, and some readers might decide that the present writer has a pandectical fetish; is not one set of ideas enough? But ontological individualism and plural subjectivity give scholars neither theory nor method for interpreting the symbols used by participant agents (or non-participant agents, for that matter). Additional, more superficial theories must be pressed into service for that purpose. And while Skinner has apparently remained unaware of participant agency, his methodological writings need something like it as a warrant. Although he has sometimes been accused of linguistic-turn relativism, Skinner in fact deliberately refuses to engage in systematic debate over the most fundamental epistemological problems thrown up by the linguistic turn, simply disclaiming strong relativism at opportune points by dismissing the position as "untenable" or "fantastic." But precisely because he took inspiration from some linguistic-turn authorities for his position, he is vulnerable to the charge of inconsistency (and if he did not occasionally gesture toward those authorities, he would doubtless be charged with philosophical naiveté).8

Fortunately, Skinner's rhetorical theorizing and its methodological consequences do not depend upon the linguistic-turn philosophies that he praises. His personal route may have
originated in that starting-point, but his results can also be reached by following other philosophical paths. Ontological individualism's fusion with plural subjectivity is one platform which provides a non-vicious basis for Skinner's theories, allowing historians to apply his rhetorically based methods while avoiding both the Parmenidean trap of logically negating agency (and thus change) altogether as well as the Herakleitian trap of an extreme individualism affording such a welter of confusion that larger vistas of reality cannot be seen. Skinner's linguistic web is powerful, on the one hand, but on the other not fully deterministic. In his view it is possible for individual speakers to combine old "resources" in new ways, and such changes made by one participant have the potential to be accepted by others and thereby change the system. Thus Skinner furnishes the kind of rationale for historical change omitted from systems of strong social construction such as those offered by poststructuralists. But precisely because he seems to have begun with a poststructuralist or perhaps a late-Wittgensteinian foundation (which amount to much the same thing in terms of end result), in strict logical terms Skinner's ideas should be abandoned unless they are given a different basis. Ontological individualism and plural subjectivity provide that basis in this dissertation.
Notes to Appendix D

1 More superficial—in a formal, not a trivial, sense—are the rhetorical and narrative theories described in Chapter 1.

2 These theoretical approaches are more familiar to many in the profession as "postmodernism," though that term encompasses a great deal more than these historians mean when they use it.

3 In order to avoid losing the distinctive theoretical heuristics that furnish the practical rationale for using it, strong social constructionism, no matter how a theorist arrives at it, requires an impossible phenomenon philosophers have labeled "downward causation". There is no space to explicate this problem here, but downward causation is what a fortiori requires the science-fiction fodder of group minds and other such autonomous, independent collective entities: Tor Egil Førland, "Mentality as a Social Emergent: Can the "Zeitgeist" Have Explanatory Power?" History and Theory 47, no. 1 (2008): 46-49, 53-55. Except as otherwise specified, the remainder of this paragraph and the next are mostly based on Førland's article (complete pagination 44-56). Førland condemns poststructuralism only in passing, however, and it needs to be acknowledged that poststructuralist theorists and their followers often insist that their doctrines do not lead to such extremes, just as they often argue that they have been misread as nihilistic relativists. That recognition duly given, another philosopher of history has observed that such attempts by poststructuralist sympathizers to make their favored ideas palatable to a larger audience are blatantly disingenuous. These scholars continue to claim philosophical significance—and that claim has rested from the beginning on theoretical consequences (indeterminate meanings, linguistic slippage, antiessentialism, and so forth) derived from strong language-based social constructionism and entailing a radical relativism: John Zammito, "Historians and Philosophy of Historiography," in A Companion to the Philosophy of History and Historiography, ed. Aviezer Tucker (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 68. But if their epistemological back-pedaling is taken at face value and they are only weak social constructionists and thus moderate relativists after all, then there is little distinctive about their arguments except the neological jargon and obscure writing styles for which they have become famous. In that case they pose no threat to the philosophical stance taken here and can be ignored, as they offer no methodological benefit not already provided by the heuristics adopted for this project.


5 For a sympathetic overview of methodological individualism as it applies to history, see Lars Udhen, "The Ontology of the Objects of Historiography," in A Companion to the Philosophy of History and Historiography, ed. Aviezer Tucker (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 209-19. However, scholars who assume this position usually do so without reflecting on its practical
consequences, for (although this does not affect the position's theoretical validity) methodological individualism poses severe problems of execution for sociocultural analysis. If its implications are to be taken seriously, explaining the action of even a small crowd for an extremely short time—say, five people for a single minute—would require an entire chapter or lengthy article, and Robert Darnton's famous cat massacre would have to be expanded to several hefty volumes (Førland, "Mentality as a Social Emergent," 50). Furthermore, historians, as opposed to scholars performing social-science analyses in the present, often lack the depth of data needed to provide such an explanation even if they wished to (51).


7 In that middle phase of his career which remains highly influential among historians, Michel Foucault, a strong social constructionist until quite late, attempted to address this limitation by describing cases of "contestation" and "negotiation" within the hegemonic "discourse" of power-knowledge which reincorporated these irruptions and thereby neutralized any resistance: see mainly Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), but also The History of Sexuality, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978). This may seem to account for cases such as Buckingham's (see immediately below), but it is inconsistent with the strong-constructionist foundation Foucault laid to underpin his analyses. Within that context, resistance should never even get started. When strong-constructionist thinkers have attempted to account for resistance to dominant ideologies or "discourses," their solutions to date have invariably proven incompatible with their architectonic constructionism. For Foucault's failure specifically, see Fitzhugh and Leckie, 66-68.

8 For Skinner's praise of "post-modern cultural criticism" see Regarding Method, 5, as well as 19 and 177-78. In addition, many philosophers would strongly contest Skinner's benign delimitation (20-21) of W. V. Quine's arguments on indeterminacy. For Skinner's denial of relativism despite these influences, see e.g. 51-2. Skinner worked within what I call the "postmodern compromise" and therefore—though I lack the space to argue the point here, and in addition find it surprising for such a sophisticated analyst—he fell into the trap I term "foundational inconsistency". The foundational inconsistency scholar expresses support for the poststructuralist position, which famously includes the proviso that there are no foundations for any kind of objective truth, yet continues to practice history as if such foundations unproblematically exist. For descriptions of foundational inconsistency, though the phrase is not used in these works, see among others Frederick A. Olafson, "Hermeneutics: "Analytical" and "Dialectical, , History and Theory 25, no. 4 (December 1986): 41–42; Michael E. Hobart, "The Paradox of Historical Constructionism," History and Theory 28, no. 1 (1989): 43-58; or Fitzhugh and Leckie, 64-66 and 73-74. It is arguable that poststructuralists truly committed to their position, if logically consistent, would simply give history up or at least call their work something else more transparent to the layperson such as "past presentism": cf. Andrew Beards, "Reversing Historical Skepticism: Bernard Lonergan on the Writing of History," History and Theory 33, no. 2 (1994): 198–219.

9 Regarding Method, 118: "any successful alteration in the use of a concept will at the same time constitute a change in our social world." Thus "agency deserves . . . to be privileged over
structure in social explanation. Language, like other forms of social power, is of course a constraint . . . however, language is also a resource, and we can use it to shape our world."

*Regarding Method*, 7. See also Skinner's sarcastic description of work in intellectual history that fails to take the individual into account: "The fact that ideas presuppose agents is very readily discounted, as the ideas get up and do battle on their own behalf": "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas," *History and Theory* 8, no. 1 (1969), 11.

^10^ Poststructuralist historians have attempted to coopt Skinner's solution to the problem of change, but their linguistic hermeticism does not logically allow such a move: see discussion of Patrick Joyce in Fitzhugh and Leckie, 68-70.
Appendix E: An Internship in Honor

While Samuel Pepys enjoyed a circle of kinship that included persons of honor who gave him his start, he was not born into a gentle household nor bred to the courtesies of genteel honor. He had to learn honor, sometimes stumbling embarrassingly, and thus represents a liminal figure. Quite aside from the importance of this characteristic for the present project's thesis, Pepys offers a rare opportunity to actually study what most writers on early modern society merely mention: social mobility from the middling sort—and lesser middling sort, in this case—into gentility. Pepys rose to become one of the most prominent of the new urban pseudo-gentry in all of seventeenth-century England, moved in the highest circles of honor, and considered himself (and was considered by many others) to be a man of honor. This appendix briefly surveys the process by which he learned to move in those circles.

Sir William Coventry was a patron with whom Pepys could work enthusiastically in harness (see Chapter 2), but Coventry was simultaneously, and not coincidentally, important to the development of Pepys's personal honor. Sandwich was not only a titled noble but temperamentally inclined to maintain a certain distance with all his associates. Carteret was greater gentry, almost a peer himself and one of the most renowned of Cavalier war-heroes, and he had 34 years on Pepys to Coventry's five. Coventry approached these men in status, himself a well-connected member of the middle-tier elite (son of a former Lord Keeper of the Great Seal) and closer to the royal brothers than either Sandwich or Carteret, so he also could function as a patron well-born and bred. But he was closer to Pepys's own age and a good deal more approachable than the other two. Coventry was the man Pepys singled out early in July as "most ingenuous" and "good company" during an amiable evening at Whitehall where the earl was also present.¹ As Coventry and Pepys went about naval business, Sir William could therefore show Pepys not just the ropes of efficiency and zeal but also of honorable behavior in a straightforward and even companionable manner—and as we shall see below, there is a good circumstantial case that he did.

The clerk of the acts badly needed such guidance. In 1661 he had been nonplussed when, staying overnight at a dockyard storekeeper's house, he "was there most prince-like lodged, with so much respect and honour that I was at a loss how to behave myself." He made some halting steps toward filling the shoes of his new status a few months later: "it was a great pleasure", he wrote of an overnight stay at Chatham, "to see how I am respected and honoured . . . and I find that I begin to know now how to receive so much reverence, which at the beginning I could not tell how to do." But the hesitance of "I begin" remains palpable even with these dockyard subordinates. Not yet could he "bear the . . . countenance of a gentleman" of which Sir Thomas Smith had spoken in his survey of early modern English culture.²

The month following the latter incident, however, Coventry began to sit with the board, and Pepys's development accelerated. For example, during the inspections inaugurated by Coventry (see Chapter 2) the navy's clerk learned how to rebuke erring underlings: when a slothful captain failed to embark on the appointed day, Coventry "was cruel angry and did threaten to go today to the Duke at Hampton Court and get him turned out because he was not sailed. . . . [We then] went down on board the [lazy captain's ship] Rosebush . . . and find all
things out of order; but after frightening the officers there, we left them to make more haste".  

Thus might inferiors be corrected if in the wrong; and in the way he stroked Pepys's ego, Coventry set an example of the courtesy with which important servants, at least, should be encouraged to greater loyalty and effort when they did well. When Pepys and Coventry held their mid-July conference, Pepys's new patron behaved "with much frankness and respect to . . . myself particularly." At another meeting (September) between the two, Pepys designated him "my most true friend in all things that are fair. He tells me freely his mind of every man and in every thing." And Coventry did more than talk. After an educational visit with Coventry to the Deptford yard to learn about "making of cordage" and conduct "several experiments of hemp," the pair returned to London by boat, and "I being hot, he put the skirt of his cloak about me". But honor, of course, required that kudos be given in front of others. Thus during an August conversation with Sandwich, "comes in Mr. Coventry to us . . . and did tell my Lord that I was indeed the life of this office, and much more to my commendation beyond measure." At the board's regular weekly meeting with York, "Mr. Coventry did do me the great kindness to take notice to the Duke of my pains in making a collection of all contracts about masts, which have been of great use to us." Two weeks further on Coventry must have compounded his efforts somehow, as Pepys recorded, "I find myself more and more obliged to Mr. Coventry, who studies to do me all the right he can in every thing to the Duke."  

With this kind of praise and encouragement it can be no coincidence that Pepys suddenly gave increased attention to bearing the "port" of a gentleman. One of the most important ways in which the early modern English elite could manifest honor, writes Lawrence Stone, was "the aristocratic virtue of generosity. . . . It involved wearing rich clothes, living in a substantial well-furnished house . . . and above all maintaining a lavish table" for those "of the right social standing".  
Pepys of course knew of these standards already; in 1661 he had ruminated on his inability to be merry, at least in the company of equals or superiors, when he was "not . . . neat in clothes", citing a courtesy manual's "rule for a gentleman to spare in all things rather than in that." But upon the issue of Coventry's patent to the board on May 14, the clerk of the acts began making a greater effort to live up to the ideal. Within the limits imposed by his mid-level salary, he immediately expanded his fashionable wardrobe with a "a velvet cloak . . . . It will cost me £8 10s . . . but it is worth my money"; a "riding cloth suit with close knees, the first that ever I had" and another first purchase about a week-and-a-half later, a "slashed doublet, which I like very well" (in this year he had not recorded the purchase of any similarly significant articles of clothing prior to this point).  

Fortuitously, probably spurred by the mounting enthusiasm stemming from early in the year, by April Pepys had also decided to add a second story to his home. During the Jacobean period Thomas Wentworth had insisted that a gentleman whose house was "not suitable to your quality" had to rebuild, and Pepys followed suit with a major project that began in July, took well over three months, and bit deep into carefully hoarded savings. Finishing touches included "a new fashion knocker to be put on my door . . . getting my outward door painted, and the arch", along with £12 worth of new furnishings happily purchased by Elizabeth (an entire years' average income for a contemporary husbandman). Redecorating then took seven days.  

An honorable habitation made possible honorable hospitality. Offering food to guests as an act of hospitality is a human universal practiced in all cultures of which we have historical
record, so it is no surprise to find Pepys hosting dinners even at the outset of the diary within his then-limited means. If Stone is correct in his estimate of food's relatively greater importance in the scheme of gentle liberality, it might also be expected that Pepys would prioritize hosting dinners, as far as he was able, above making other honorable displays. But what set the elite apart was their combination of Stone's factors (rich clothing, house, and table together), and the display of all three.

After his house was finished, Pepys could finally cross that combinatory threshold. Up to this point when the Pepyses entertained they almost always invited friends from Pepys's time before the clerkship of the acts, Pepys's more elevated close relations, or fellow Navy Board members. On December 18, however, Coventry invited himself to the Pepys's. The roving commissioner's presence betokened a change; Coventry was a fellow board member but he was also a patron. In addition, his family background and position as York's secretary put him in a grade above anyone else on the board except Carteret. Pepys had not previously hosted anyone of such status, and he endorsed the event with the gloss, "of which I was proud". It is tempting to speculate that Coventry deliberately forced himself upon the Pepyses in this way because he knew they would be hesitant to extend an invitation and he wanted to continue his client's induction into gentle behavior. Whatever the case, a lesson was certainly learned. The mutton and capons, unfortunately, "were not done enough, which did vex me; but we made shift to please him, I think; but I was, when he was gone, very angry with my wife and people." The contrast with the next dinner Pepys hosted could not have been more marked. This early January 1663 event also involved guests a cut above his and Elizabeth's previous norm, including among others the Clerkes, upper-middling sorts at whose home Pepys had eaten but whom he had never hosted himself. It was an occasion marked by the coupling of Pepys's fine new dwelling with what must have been as lavish a spread as he felt he could afford:

I had for them [at a mid-afternoon main meal], after oysters, at first course, a hash of rabbits, a lamb, and a rare chine of beef. Next a great dish of roasted fowl, cost me about 30s., and a tart, and then fruit and cheese. My dinner was noble and enough. I had my house mighty clean and neat; my room below with a good fire in it; my dining-room above, and my chamber being made a withdrawing-chamber; and my wife's a good fire also. I find my new table very proper, and will hold nine or ten people well, but eight with great room. After dinner the women to cards in my wife's chamber, and the [men] in mine . . . At night to supper, had a good sack posset and cold meat, and sent my guests away about ten o'clock at night, both them and myself highly pleased with our management of this day; and indeed their company was very fine[.]

The house and the dinner came together in a display for this more elevated "company" in an effort clearly designed after the aristocratic ideal (it does not seem too far a stretch to presume costly apparel as well). And the earlier gaffe with Coventry was rectified two days later when Pepys treated his patron, though informally, to a now fully cooked "wild goose roasted, and a cold chine of beef and a barrel of oysters." These were not to be the last of such occasions, nor especially rare ones. As the diary went on he continued to increase the opulence of his home with additional furnishings and to host impressive dinners, working toward a level of munificent
hospitality sufficient in 1669 to present two earls and a high-ranking diplomat with a meal that would not often be seen "better[ed] anywhere else, even at the court . . . . the best of its kind and the fullest of honour and content to me that ever I had in my life".10

The company Pepys kept at other times during the latter half of 1662 began to rise in "quality" as well. He had recently been made a Younger Brother of Trinity House,11 and he lunched there on September 4 "where we treated, very dearly, the officers of the Ordnance". Setting aside Sandwich, the clerk of the acts had never formally dined with such august company, and given his reaction to the earlier dockyard "respect" in the company of inferiors, these superiors could easily have made him nervous. But the diary reveals no sign of unease, merely "good music" and good conversation from Sir William Compton whom "I heard talk with great pleasure". This was the Master of the Ordnance, privy councillor and son of the earl of Northampton, and the assemblage also included wealthy lieutenant of the Tower Sir John Robinson, then serving as Lord Mayor of London. After these estimable men, Coventry, and "the best of the rest were gone, I grew weary of staying with Sir Williams both" (Batten and Penn)—Pepys's social sensibility had developed to a point where "the best" company became a pleasant stimulus rather than an occasion for worry, and the company of equals, if disagreeable, was not worth the trouble. Therefore "I stole from them and to my office, where I did business till 9 at night". The next morning he "mustered the yard and looked into the storehouses" at both Woolwich and Deptford, then "by invitation, I alone of all our company of this office" ate with "the officers of the Customs, very grave fine gentlemen, and I am very glad to know them; viz.—Sir Job Harvy, Sir John Wolstenholme, Sir John Jacob, Sir Nicholas Crisp, Sir John Harrison, and Sir John Shaw: very good company." Indeed. Pepys's lunchmates were again some of the most elevated companions that could have been cherry-picked from Restoration London.12 Back at the navy complex after this animating afternoon, Pepys gloated, "it pleased me to see how jealous Sir Williams both are of my going down to Woolwich, etc., and doing my duty as I nowadays do, and of my dining with the Commission of the Customs." And once again, as on the previous evening, "to my office, and there till 9 at night".13 Now in full sail, and after keeping such exalted company not stinting to finish the day with an evening of paperwork, Pepys seems to have clearly recognized that his ascent in honor depended not merely upon a patron's goodwill and his own position as a civil servant but also upon his effectiveness in that position. How much of the latter recognition was due to Coventry is impossible to tell, but given the focus of York's secretary on running the navy right, Coventry must at least have reinforced the point.

Pepys quickly absorbed the various leads Coventry was giving him. By September the diffident tone in which he previously clothed remarks on social comportment had changed to one of strength, if still of novelty. Lunching at the Woolwich dockyard, he wrote what is easily one of the most self-satisfied entries in the diary to that point: "dined well, being chief at the table, and do not see but everybody begins to give me as much respect and honour as any of the rest [of the board members]." That night he was accompanied partway home "with three or four armed men to guard me . . . it being a joy to my heart to think of the condition that I am now in, that people should of themselves provide this for me, unspoke to." Pepys was not only accorded the deference automatically given members of the honor-bearing elite, but—equally important for the display-conscious stratum he was breaking into—he was steadily gaining the apposite composure. It was at this time that Sandwich secured Pepys the Tangier treasurership (Chapter
2), so Coventry had overseen Pepys's internship in honor just in time; the fellow commissioners Pepys would now regularly deal with included York, Prince Rupert, the Duke of Albemarle, and the earl of Peterborough, "which I take for a great honour to me."^14

Pepys was also beginning to combine honorable composure with generosity external to one's home and table. In December the navy's Clerk of the Acts of the King's Ships donated a set of expensive books to his alma mater, careful to record its price at £4-plus in the diary. Two months later when he visited the school upon Apposition Day (featuring speeches by the most talented pupils), that bird came home to roost, and he could not help crowing over its price again: "Dr. Crumlum did me much honour by telling many [other visitors] what a present I had made to the school, shewing my Stephanus, in four volumes, cost[ing] me 4l. 10s". Pepys had arrived, and he was determined to show it.^15
Notes to Appendix E

1 Diary 8 Jul. 1662, 3:134. For Sandwich's reserve see the note concerning his secrecy in Chapter 2.

2 The evidence of Coventry's genuine affection for Pepys is conveniently summarized in Tomalin, Unequalled Self, 134; see below for further development of this personable relationship. For the earlier occasion when Pepys was "at a loss" see Diary 12 Jan. 1661, 2:12; tentatively asserting more confidence, 9 Apr., 68. For the gentleman's "countenance" see Smith, De Republica Anglorum: A Discourse on the Commonwealth of England [1583], ed. Leonard Alston and Frederic William Maitland (Cambridge University Press, 1906), 40; this is a different usage than that mentioned in Chapter 2 in the discussion of the royal brothers' patronage.

3 For Pepys's performance as a master see Chapter 3. For the Rosebush's captain and officers see Diary 31 Jul. 1662, 3:150.

4 Treating Pepys with "frankness and respect", 11 Jul., 136; confiding in Pepys "freely", 14 Sep. 1662, 197; courteously draping Pepys, 8 Aug., 160. For Coventry promoting Pepys's abilities to Sandwich, 20 Aug., 171-72; to York, 1 and 15 Dec. 1662, 272 and 283, and see also 8 Oct., 216. It might also be noted that Coventry later also promised to tell Pepys "of my faults also . . . . if there were any occasion for it." (29 Jan. 1666, 6:28)


6 For the standard of gentle liberality see Lawrence Stone, The Crisis of the Aristocracy, 1558-1641 (Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon Press, 1965), 42; for greater detail see 549-55 (great houses), 555-62 (hospitality), and 562-5 (clothing), and in Felicity Heal and Clive Holmes, The Gentry in England and Wales, 1500-1700 (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1994), for "costly apparel" see 139; Wentworth on genteel dwellings, qtd. 137; hospitality and generosity, 100, 139, 282-88. For a briefer statement see Barry Coward, The Stuart Age: England, 1603-1714, 2nd ed. (London: Longman, 1994), 46. To these three criteria Stone also adds "keeping plenty of servants", but by this he meant the huge retinues of retainers that had mostly disappeared by the time of James I (cf. Heal and Holmes, Gentry, 140). Stone also argues that the other three criteria vanished as well due to "changing standards" (187), but as the Restoration and Augustan aristocracy were still lavish at the board, built fancy houses, and wore clothes that cost a great deal more than those of their inferiors, much more caution must be exercised. Heal and Holmes, Gentry, is a better guide to the longevity of these practices. The details and scale of implementation changed but the ideals themselves remained vital. Hospitality, for example, was no longer "open" in the sense that great lords had once fed all comers of gentle status without question, but at the end of the seventeenth century plentiful dinners were still expected by "friends" of all sorts and the scraps were still expected by the poor (286-88). For Pepys's early worries over clothes, see Diary 19 Oct. 1661, 2:199; the cloak, 17 May 1662, 3:84; the suit, 12 Jun., 106; slashed doublet, 22 Jun. 116, and for the same attitude in the negative see the
exceptionally cold spell a few months later which caught Elizabeth unprepared to dress in sufficient style, owning only a taffeta "winter gown" while "all the world wears moyre[mohair]". This gave Pepys "great pain" (perhaps having a mohair gown made was deemed ineffective because the weather would change too quickly): 29 Dec., 298. See also Pepys's "first new laceband" on 19 Oct., 228.

7 For the remodeling see 5 Apr., 59; construction began on or a little before 14 July, 138. Elizabeth had to stay in the country for two months (20 and 28 Jul., 141 and 148), and once his roof was off Pepys slept in the rooms of Penn, the next lowest-ranking board member (30 Aug., 182). Pepys kept careful track of progress: see e.g. 31 Jul., 150: "Up early and among my workmen and ordering my rooms above—which will please me very well." Or 15 Aug., 165, "about seeing how my work proceeds, and am pretty well pleased therewith; especially my wife's closet will be very pretty." Construction was not finished until the end of November (the last recorded work was Pepys's "order to the plasterer now to set upon the finishing of my house", 27 Nov., 236). For the knocker and door, see 22 Nov., 263; interior furnishings, 18 Nov., 261; redecorating, 20-27 Nov., 262-267, passim, but in the end Pepys was happy with the result, "now very pretty" (27 Nov., 267). Pepys lamented over construction costs in 30 Nov., 271 and 27 Dec., 296.

8 For hospitality at the diary's beginning see Chapter 3; the bungled meal with Coventry, Diary 18 Dec. 1662, 3:285-86.

9 Diary 13 Jan. 1663, 4:14. Dr. Timothy Clerke was physician to the King's household and a founding member of the Royal Society (DNB and Diary vol. 10, Companion). See also later occasions such as the one in which Pepys rented a boat for a picnic on the water on 6 Jul. 1664, 5:197.

10 For the success with Coventry see Diary 15 Jan. 1663, 4:14; impressive dinner in 1669, 23 Jan. 1669, 9:424. The latter event included a formal presentation in which "dinner was brought up, one dish after another, but a dish at a time, but all so good . . . eight dishes, as noble as any man need to have". But even more impressive, "above all things, [was] the variety of wines, and excellent of their kind, I had for them, and all in so good order that they were mightily pleased". The guests included (among others) Sandwich; the earl of Peterborough, with whom Pepys had worked on the board of Tangier (DNB and entry in Diary, vol. 11, Index); and Sir William Godolphin, who had worked under Sandwich on a successful Spanish embassy and would go back as the ranking ambassador in two years (HoC 2, DNB.). The significance of Pepys's larger outlays on clothes, the house, and hosting meals is thrown into high relief by his constant worry about saving money and spending too much. For an example (culled at random from hundreds) of his attitude toward saving, see Diary 30 Jan. 1663, 4:29, "making up my month's accounts, which to my great trouble I find that I am got no further than 640". For similarly random examples of Pepys's reluctance to part with the money thus saved either on his own or Elizabeth's behalf, see 2 Apr. 1662, 3:58, "Met Mr. Sanchy, Smithes, Gale, and Edlin at the play, but having no great mind to spend money, I left them there"; and 26 Mar. 1664, 5:100, "My wife found her gown come home laced, which is indeed very handsome, but will cost me a great deal of money,
more than ever I intended, but it is but for once."

11 Trinity House was (and remains) a royally chartered institution designed to regulate lighthouses and certify pilots; Coventry was an Elder Brother while Pepys had been elected a Younger (essentially a junior member of the board of directors) in February. For Trinity House over the course of Pepys's career see Knighton 47-8.

12 Harvy remains unknown, but Wolstenholme was a bosom friend of Lord Chancellor Clarendon; Crisp, a fabulously wealthy pioneer of the African gold trade, would become a Gentleman of the Privy Chamber in 1664; Harrison was an old Royalist of high standing at court, of a type similar to Carteret; nearly as rich as Crisp, Shaw was famous for having lent the King great sums during the years of "travel". In addition to their customs posts, Crisp and Shaw both also sat on the Council of Trade and the Council for Foreign Plantations. Jacob and Crisp were both baronets; Wolstenholme and Shaw would join them in 1664 and 1665. For Compton, Wolstenholme, Crisp and Shaw see Diary vol. 10, Companion; for Harrison see HoC 2; for Compton, Robinson and Crisp see DNB; for Jacob see the borough of Rye in HoC 2; for Wolstenholme, Jacob and Shaw see Diary and Correspondence of Samuel Pepys, ed. Mynors Bright and Richard Griffin (Baron Braybrooke), vol. 2 (Dodd, Mead, 1901), 330n. For a similar occasion during the same month see 18 Sept. 1662: "Sir G. Carteret, Mr. Coventry, and I by invitation to dinner to Sheriff Maynell's, the great money-man; he, Alderman Backwell, and much noble and brave company, with the privilege of their rare discourse" (200). Francis Meynell and Edward Backwell were great goldsmith bankers, the cornerstones of Charles II's finance until the stop of the Exchequer in 1672 (s.v. in Diary, vol. 10, Companion, HoC 2, and DNB). Occasions similar to these early soirees with prominent figures would continue to be recorded in the diary from this point forward, e.g. Diary 2 Sept. 1663, 4:294.

13 Diary, 4 and 5 Sept. 1662, 3:187-89.


15 For the day at Woolwich see Diary 19 Sept. 1662, 3:201; the books to St. Paul's school, 24 Dec. 1662, 3:290, and the subsequent "honour", 4 Feb. 1663, 4:33. For more on such giving see Chapter 3.