The Current Status of the Right of Adult Adoptees to Know the Identity of Their Natural Parents

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Adoption is an ancient practice\(^1\) that developed to guarantee the continued existence of the family as a social and economic unit.\(^2\) Today the primary concern of adoption is the welfare of the child.\(^3\) Thus, any consideration of the needs of the natural parents or adoptive parents is secondary to "the best interests of the child."\(^4\) To protect the interests of those involved and to encourage the continuance of adoption, the law deems all adoption proceedings, records, and papers confidential and orders them sealed once the court decrees the adoption final.\(^5\) The state protects the adoptee from any encroachment from the past, giving the child a new identity, severing all bonds with natural parents,\(^6\) and

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1. Chambers, The Adoption of Strangers, 16 INT'L J. COMP. SOC. 118 (1975). For a thorough historical analysis, see Brosnan, The Law of Adoption, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 332 (1922) and Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L. REV. 743 (1956). Chambers notes that the form of adoption practiced in the United States is quite different from practices of other cultures. Adoption among other cultures historically did not obliterate the identity of the adoptee and most often involved the adoption of adults rather than infants. Chambers, supra, at 119. The American pattern is also distinctive because marital pairs who already have natal children may adopt, adults almost never adopt other adults, and a family may adopt more than one child. Id. at 118.

The most unique aspect of the American pattern of adoption is that it focuses on the infant and in particular the unwanted infant. Many cultures, both ancient and modern, practiced infanticide rather than showing concern for the unwanted child. W. SLINGERLAND, CHILD PLACING IN FAMILIES 28 (1918); Presser, The Historical Background of the American Law of Adoption, 11 J. FAM. L. 443, 446 n.18 (1971), citing 1 Howard, A HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS 78, 79, 87 (1904). See N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1857, at 8, col. 1 for the reaction of nineteenth century American reformers to the practice of infanticide.

2. Huard, supra note 1, at 743. See H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 130 (10th ed. 1901) stating that without the practice of adoption "society would scarcely have escaped its swaddling clothes. It commanded the approval of the greatest number of archaic societies and has proven to be the most durable of all artificial relationships designed to prolong the continuity of family existence."

Chinese tradition dictated that a childless male was entitled to claim the first born male child of any of his younger brothers because "[o]ne of the gravest calamities to be apprehended by a Chinaman is to die without leaving a male posterity to care for his ashes and decorate his grave, thereby pacifying his wandering spirit in purgatory." Note, Laws of Adoption in China, 15 CHI. L.N. 362 (1883) quoted in Presser, supra note 1, at 445-46 n.11. See also Brosnan, supra note 1; Quarles, The Law of Adoption—A Legal Anomaly, 32 MARQ. L. REV. 237 (1949).

3. Huard, supra note 1, at 748-49; Presser, supra note 1, at 473-46 n.11. See also Brosnan, supra note 1; Quarles, The Law of Adoption—A Legal Anomaly, 32 MARQ. L. REV. 237 (1949).

4. Huard, supra note 1, at 1, 749.

5. Id. at 752.

clos ing all adoption records.

Adoptees currently are challenging this closure procedure. Many adoptees feel compelled either to seek out their natural parents or to discover information about their background. Statutory closure of adoption records of the court and of the agency placing the child makes adoptees’ search for their natural parents difficult if not impossible. Adoptees argue that closure laws violate their right to know their origins. This demand for access presents the major controversy in the

Supp. 891, 893 (D. Tenn. 1956), aff’d sub nom., Meadors v. Smelser, 244 F.2d 719 (1957); In re Cech, 8 Ill. App. 3d 642, 645, 291 N.E.2d 21, 24 (1972); Jones v. Jones, 215 Kan. 102, 112, 523 P.2d 743, 751, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1032 (1974); In re Adoption of Giambrone, 262 So. 2d 566, 569 (La. App. 1972). Particularly interesting is the court’s comparison in In re Adoption of Bryant, 134 Ind. App. 480, 488, 189 N.E.2d 593, 597 (1963), of an adoption to the death of a child. As one commentator has stated, “it is as though the state has decided that the child was never genealogically a part of anyone.” Note, Recognizing the Needs of Adopted Persons: A Proposal To Amend the Illinois Adoption Act, 6 Loy. U.L.J. 49, 51 n.18 (1975).

Although the goal of the adoption procedure is the severance of the adopted child from the natural parents and the integration of that child into the adoptive family, in some jurisdictions the laws of inheritance seem to counter that intent. See, e.g., Illinois Probate Act, ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 3, §§ 11, 12, 14 (1973). For a thorough analysis of this issue see Kuhlmann, Intestate Succession By and From the Adopted Child, 28 Wash. U.L.Q. 221 (1943); Note, supra note 6, at 52-54. See also Johnson, Inheritance Rights of Children in Virginia, 12 U. Rich. L. Rev. 275 (1978).

Few courts have actually dealt with the question whether adoptees may claim a right to inherit from their natural parents. An Illinois court in In re Tilliski, 390 Ill. 273, 285, 61 N.E.2d 24, 29 (1945), aff’d 323 Ill. App. 490, 56 N.E.2d 481 (1943), held that adoption did not preclude a child from claiming a share of his natural parents’ estates. More recently, Spillman v. Parker, 332 So. 2d 573, 576 (La. App. 1976), held that the ascertainment of an adoptee’s inheritance rights was a valid reason for disclosure of the original birth certificate. See Note, Confidentiality of Adoption Records: An Examination, 52 Tul. L. Rev. 817, 820-22 (1978); note 44 infra and accompanying text.

7. The reference to adoptee throughout the remainder of this note is only to adult adoptees. No commentators, sociologists, or psychologists advocate the disclosure of adoption records to minor adoptees even if an adopted child claims psychological bewilderment. For a discussion of psychological bewilderment see notes 58-76 infra and accompanying text.


9. J. TRISELIOTIS, supra note 8, at xi-xv.

law of adoption\textsuperscript{11} and has generated considerable public and professional response. Legal commentators, focusing on the adoptee’s position on the closure laws, fashioned various constitutional arguments to challenge the closure statutes.\textsuperscript{12}

This Note presents the rationale for adoption closure laws. It also raises the arguments for opening sealed records. It examines the psychological and constitutional claims, and the reasons for their rejection by most courts. Finally, the Note analyzes the current judicial response to the question of disclosure.

I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE “BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD” RATIONALE FOR THE CLOSURE LAWS

The law of adoption in the United States\textsuperscript{13} is the creation of state legislatures rather than common law.\textsuperscript{14} In 1851\textsuperscript{15} the Massachusetts

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  \item Katz, \textit{supra} note 9, at ix.
  \item For a general discussion of the history of adoption practices among the ancient civilizations, see Chambers, \textit{supra} note 1, at 445-48. For a discussion of the English common-law view toward adoption, see Huard, \textit{supra} note 1, at 746. See also Hockaday v. Lynn, 200 Mo. 456, 457, 98 S.W. 585, 586 (1906); \textit{In re Estate of Wulf}, 184 Neb. 314, 315, 167 N.W.2d 181, 182 (1969); Kuhlmann, \textit{supra} note 6. Recognition of adoption would have required the conferral of property rights upon the adoptee and thus would violate the English principle that only blood relatives should inherit property. Strangers were accepted into English families and treated as though they were natural children, but the relationship was not formalized and they could not gain inheritance because they were not heirs of the bloodline. Upon occasion, however, children who were illegitimate, as in the case of a child born to a married woman whose husband had been away for nearly three years, were held by the courts to be the legitimate offspring of their parents. \textit{Id} POLLOCK & MAITLAND, \textit{The History of English Law} 398-99 (2d ed. 1911). Adoption finally received statutory acceptance with passage of the Adoption of Children Act in 1926, 16 & 17 Geo. 5, c.29 (1926).
  \item Derdeyn and Wadlington, \textit{The Rights of Parents Versus the Best Interests of Their Children}, 16 \textit{J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCH.} 238, 241 (1977).
  \item Huard, \textit{supra} note 1, at 748 notes that Mississippi did pass an adoption statute in 1846. Massachusetts’ statute, however, is usually recognized as the first because it was more complete. McFarlane, \textit{The Mississippi Law on Adoptions}, 10 Miss. L.J., 239, 240 (1938). Although the Massachusetts and the Mississippi statutes represent the earliest adoption statutes, the case law in

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legislature passed the first comprehensive adoption law,\textsuperscript{16} which purported to establish "an institution to ameliorate the condition of the neglected and dependent child."\textsuperscript{17} The immigration movement in the 1850's and the industrialization of the post-Civil War era increased the number of homeless, abandoned, and parentless children, and exacerbated the plight of the unwanted child.\textsuperscript{18} Orphan asylums and almshouses were unable to accommodate all these children. Religious societies, philanthropic organizations, and local government agencies therefore urged that individual families receive them as their legal children.\textsuperscript{19} Other state legislatures followed Massachusetts' lead and enacted the statutory precursors of our modern day adoption laws.\textsuperscript{20}

Each state currently maintains its own comprehensive adoption law. Despite the multiplicity of these statutes, the basic tenet of adoption law is that the welfare and best interests of the child are paramount.\textsuperscript{21} In addition, the adoption laws seek "to promote policies and procedures socially necessary and desirable for the protection . . . [of] the

\textsuperscript{16} Huard, \textit{supra} note 1, at 748-49. \textit{See} Vidal v. Commagere, 13 LA. ANN. 516 (1858) (adoption authorized by special act of Louisiana legislature that held word adoption derived from Roman Law); Teal v. Sevier, 26 Tex. 516 (1863) (adoption unsuccessful because Spanish law forbade one who already had legitimate child from adopting stranger as co-heir of the legitimate child). \textit{See generally} Brosnan, \textit{supra} note 1, at 332-33; Kuhlmann, \textit{supra} note 6, at 222; Presser, \textit{supra} note 1, at 447-48.

\textsuperscript{17} Kuhlmann, \textit{supra} note 6, at 222. Kuhlmann comments, "It is plain, therefore, that the American institution of adoption was sustained by a current of opinion looking to individual personal needs, especially of the child, rather than to the needs of the larger family or of continuity in property units and management. . . ." \textit{Id.} at 224. \textit{But see} Ben-Or, \textit{The Law of Adoption in the United States: Its Massachusetts Origins and the Statute of 1831}, 130 NEW ENG. HIST. & GENEALOGICAL REG. 259 (1976) for a more thorough analysis of the Massachusetts statute.

\textsuperscript{18} Kuhlmann, \textit{supra} note 6, at 223. Kuhlmann comments, "It is plain, therefore, that the American institution of adoption was sustained by a current of opinion looking to individual personal needs, especially of the child, rather than to the needs of the larger family or of continuity in property units and management. . . ." \textit{Id.} at 224. \textit{But see} Ben-Or, \textit{supra} note 16, at 268 (characterizing inheritance by adopted children as the primary concern of the statute); Presser, \textit{supra} note 1, at 465-70 (noting the "'avowed object' of the Massachusetts act . . . was that of 'securing to adopted children a proper share in the estate of adopting parents who should die intestate.'" \textit{Id.} at 465). The question of the effect of closure of adoption records on the rights of the adoptee to inherit from the natural parents was raised in note 6, \textit{supra}.

\textsuperscript{19} Presser, \textit{supra} note 1, at 477-79.

\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Id.} at 487.

\textsuperscript{21} \textit{See}, e.g., Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650 (1881) in which Judge Brewer defined the best interests rule. He stated that three interests must always be considered in an adoption proceeding: the right of the natural father, the right of the adoptive parents, and the right of the adoptee, but
natural and adopting parents.”22 States have enacted confidentiality requirements to further the protection of natural parents. Originally, the adoption laws did not require confidentiality.23 State legislatures,24 however, concluded that confidentiality requirements would safeguard the welfare of the child, the natural parents, and the adoptive parents. Accordingly, legislation was enacted in the 1940’s25 to seal all records of the adoption proceeding.26

Although modern statutes differ in confidentiality requirements, access to files, and disclosure procedures,27 the underlying rationale for

“[a]bove all . . . the paramount consideration is, what will promote the welfare of the child?” Id. at 654.

Judge Cardozo in Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 433, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (1925), followed Chapsky and declared that the Chancellor “acts as parens patriae to do what is best for the interest of the child.”

These statutes break from the Roman pattern of adoption because they establish the welfare of the child as the primary concern of the law rather than the continuity of the family, and are considered a “uniquely American contribution to the law of adoption.” Huard, supra note 1, at 749.


23. Baran, Pannor & Sorosky, supra note 8, at 532.

24. At present five states’ statutes permit adult adoptees access to their adoption records: ALA. CODE § 26-10-5(a) (1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45-68(e) (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2423 (1972); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 25-6-15 (1976); VA. CODE § 63.1-236 (1980). Four of these states give the adopting parents access to this information: ALA. CODE § 26-10-5(a) (1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45-68(e) (1979); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 25-6-15 (1976); VA. CODE § 63.1-236 (1980).


26. L. BURGESS, THE ART OF ADOPTION 138 (1976); C. PRENTICE, AN ADOPTED CHILD LOOKS AT ADOPTION 62 (1940); Baran, Pannor & Sorosky, supra note 8, at 532; Note, Recognizing the Needs of Adopted Persons: A Proposal to Amend the Illinois Adoption Act, supra note 6, at 63. All states protect the confidentiality of adoption information through statutes of one form or another. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-10-5(a) (1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-117 (1947); MO. ANN. STAT. § 453.120 (Vernon 1977); Note, Confidentiality of Adoption Records: An Examination, supra note 6, at 819.

Three sources contain information concerning the genealogy of an adopted child: files of the agency (or private party) which received the child from the biological parent(s); records of the court that approved the final adoption; and the official local or state repository for birth certificates. Klibanoff, Genealogical Information in Adoption: The Adoptee’s Quest and the Law, 11 Fam. L.Q. 185, 187 (1977).

27. States differ in their treatment of various types of records. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 20.15.150 (1975) (protecting only records in possession of state and private agencies); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-120 (Supp. 1979-80) (protecting records in possession of any person or association); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.162 (West Supp. 1980) (same as Alaska); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.31 (West 1971) (all files and records of the adoption are confidential); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-113 (1943) (same as Minnesota); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-16 (1971) (same as Alaska).

There is regulation concerning the timing of the confidentiality requirement. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-311 (1973) (restricting inspection after adoption petition filed); TENN. CODE
confidentiality remains the same—the protection of the adoptive triad. Confidentiality assures the natural parents that adoption will occur without becoming public knowledge. In addition, closure statutes encourage and facilitate appropriate investigative procedures required in an adoptive proceeding. The procedures assure the natural parents that proper parties will receive the child. Confidentiality guarantees the adopting parents privacy and protects them from any interference from the natural parents. Such interference could prevent the adopting parents from becoming physical and psychological substitutes for the child's natural parents. Confidentiality also over-

- **Ann. § 36-130 (1977)** (regulating access to adoption information only after the final order or decree of adoption); Wyo. Stat. § 1-22-104(d) (1977) (same as Tennessee).

  Adoptees do enjoy a right to see files and records in some states. *See, e.g., Ala. Code §§ 26-10-4, -5(a) (1975) (adoptee has absolute right to see files and records); S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 25-6-15 (1976) (right of adoptee to see records not absolute until maturity reached).*


28. See *In re Anonymous, 89 Misc. 2d 132, 133-34, 390 N.Y.S.2d 779, 781 (1976).*


30. *In re Anonymous, 89 Misc. 2d 132, 133, 390 N.Y.S.2d 779, 781 (1976).* “Adoption proceedings” refer to the procedural steps that precede a final decree of adoption. These steps include the initial adoption petition, agency investigation, the actual hearing before a judge, and the interlocutory adoption decrees. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 18.3 (1968).


33. Psychological parenthood is "the mutual interaction between adult and child described in such terms as love, attention, basic trust and confidence, considered essential for the child's successful development." *In re Adoption of Child by P, 114 N.J. Super. 584, 594, 277 A.2d 506, 571 (1971). See Note, Adoption: Psychological Parenthood as the Controlling Factor in Determining the Best Interests of the Child, 26 Rutgers L. Rev. 693 (1973).* The court held in *In re P* that, under

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comes the adoptive parents' concern that the birth status of the illegitimate child will be revealed and used to harm them or the child. Finally, closure promotes the best interests of the child by protecting the adoptee from the stigma of illegitimacy or abandonment and guaranteeing that the relationship with the adoptive parents will develop fully in a loving and natural environment.

Once the adoption and birth records are sealed, the records are no longer available for public inspection. A new birth certificate is issued to the child naming the adoptive parents as the biological parents. Statutory provisions that permit the opening of the records exist, but vary widely from state to state. 

For psychological parenthood to develop the adoptive parents must be free from any fear that the natural parents will reappear and interfere in the child's rearing. Thus, adoptive parents argue that the state has "an active interest in protecting and nurturing the growing family relationship it has statutorily created." Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 308, 372 A.2d 646, 649 (1977). See People v. Doe, 138 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309 (1955); Note, Sealed Records in Adoptions: The Need for Legislative Reform, supra note 12, at 212-13.

For further discussion of psychological parenthood, see Smith v. Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977); J. Goldstein, A. Freud & A. Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (1973).


39. Katz, supra note 9, at xi-xv.
All states provide for some access to the records on court order. The majority of states, however, require a showing of good cause. Fraud in the adoption proceeding, a need for medical records or information, knowledge of genealogical background in order to claim an inheritance, a claim of emotional benefit, or a grand jury investigation of private adoptions meet the good cause requirement. Mere

40. See Note, A Reasonable Approach to the Adoptee's Sealed Records Dilemma, supra note 12, at 544.

41. See GA. CODE ANN. § 74-417 (Supp. 1980); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178 (555.67) (1) (Supp. 1980-1981); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 40-8-126 (1979); W. VA. CODE § 48-4-4 (1976). See also Hubbard v. Superior Ct., 189 Cal. App. 2d 741, 11 Cal. Rptr. 700 (1961) in which the court denied a charity's request to inspect adoption records for the purpose of determining the devolution of property upon the termination of a trust. The court concluded that "the legislature has expressed a firm state policy that the statutory closure is never to be broken save in exceptional circumstances and for good cause approaching the necessitous." Id. at 748, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 704.

42. In re Wells, 281 F.2d 68 (D.C. Cir. 1960).

43. Chattman v. Bennett, 57 A.D.2d 618, 393 N.Y.S.2d 768 (1977). The Chattman court felt that any request for medical information should be freely disclosed and allowed the adoptee to inspect her adoption and medical records as well as those of her biological parents. The court, however, directed that nonpertinent information, such as the names of the biological parents, be deleted. Id. at 618, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 768-69. The medical information in this case was contained in a separate and distinct document. New York law does not, however, require a separate medical schedule for the biological parents. Thus, if the child's medical report contains no mention of the parents' medical history, essential information may be denied if the court adheres to its plan to delete the names of the biological parents.

The majority of states do not make the biological parents' medical information readily available. Note, Confidentiality of Adoption Records: An Examination, supra note 6, at 845. Recently, however, states have begun to require the biological parents' medical history. IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.8(1)(c) (West Supp. 1980-81).


45. In re Carol S., 172 N.Y.L.J. 31 (Sup. Ct.). The petitioner was able to establish that her preoccupation with obtaining information about her biological parents had an adverse affect on her social adjustment. In addition, the adoptive parents were dead and the records contained only sparse information about her natural parents. The court found that "[w]hile petitioner has not succeeded in establishing the strongest case of good cause, she has established that some emotional benefit may accrue to her by revealing to her what little information is available." Id. at col. 7.

But see In re Maxtone-Graham, 90 Misc. 2d 107, 393 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1975). In Maxtone-Graham the court permitted access after the natural mother, whom petitioner had previously located and contacted, appeared in court and gave her consent. The court, however, refused to disclose the names of foster parents who had cared for petitioner prior to adoption, despite psychiatric testimony, on the grounds that it served no useful purpose and might disrupt the relationship between the child care agencies and foster parents.

46. Weiner v. Morgenthau, 4 Fam. L. REP. (BNA) 2110 (1977) (confidentiality requirement need not be complied with where grand jury seeks to obtain records while investigating private adoption business). But see People v. Doe, 138 N.Y.S.2d 307 (1955) (grand jury's request for all adoption records too broad and failed to show good cause).
ADULT ADOPTEES 685

curiosity\textsuperscript{47} or assertions that the information is required in a paternity suit\textsuperscript{48} or an action for criminal conversation\textsuperscript{49} do not constitute "good cause."

A minority of states merely require "cause."\textsuperscript{50} Some allow disclosure only if it promotes the welfare of the child or the public.\textsuperscript{51} A few states have no standard and require only a court order for release of information.\textsuperscript{52} Other states give adoptees an absolute right to inspect either the original birth certificate or the adoption files and records.\textsuperscript{53}

The overall effect of these statutes is the creation of an "almost impenetrable wall of confidentiality"\textsuperscript{54} around all records of the adoptee's birth and the adoption proceedings. In an effort to confront this barrier, adoptees and legal commentators are asserting legal challenges to the existing statutory procedures and their rationale.

II. THE ARGUMENTS FOR OPENING THE SEALED RECORDS

The arguments in support of free access to adoption information are grounded on two premises: first, that the closure statutes are destructive to the adoptee's mental and emotional development\textsuperscript{55} and second, that the states' refusal to allow access to this information denies the adoptee constitutionally guaranteed rights.\textsuperscript{56}

A. The Psychological Argument\textsuperscript{57}

The legislature considers closure of birth and adoption records to be

\textsuperscript{47} In re Carol S., 172 N.Y.L.J. 31 (Sup. Cl.).
\textsuperscript{48} In re Minicozzi, 51 Misc. 2d 595, 273 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1966).
\textsuperscript{49} In re Glasser, 198 Misc. 889, 100 N.Y.S.2d 723 (1950).
\textsuperscript{50} See I PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 505 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81).
\textsuperscript{51} See, e.g., D.C. CODE ENCYL. § 16-311 (West 1966) (welfare of child); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-26 (1976) (welfare of child or public); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-132 (1977) (same).
\textsuperscript{52} See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.162(2) (West Supp. 1980); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.570(1) (Baldwin 1975).
\textsuperscript{53} ALA. CODE § 26-10-5(a) (1975); IDAHO CODE § 16-1511 (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2279 (1976).
\textsuperscript{54} Note, Recognizing the Needs of Adopted Persons: A Proposal to Amend the Illinois Adoption Act, supra note 12, at 63.
\textsuperscript{56} See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{57} The courts in the adult adoptee cases have accepted the psychological-need argument despite their frequently asserted hesitancy to accept psychological or sociological data as a basis for their decision making if the asserted need is supported by psychiatric testimony.
in the best interests of both the child and the adoptive and natural parents. Whether closure continues to be in the best interests of the child once that child reaches adulthood is the basic question raised in the "right to know" debate. Open record proponents argue that closure is not in the best interests of the adult adoptee because it may be detrimental to the adoptee's mental health. These theorists rely on a series of mental health studies that indicate a significant incidence of mental disturbance in adopted persons and suggest that the adopted child is more susceptible to emotional and social problems than the nonadoptive. The studies attribute this higher incidence of disturbance among adoptees to "adoption stress," caused by the adoptee's lack of knowledge about their origins and the confusion and uncertainty accompanying that ignorance.

This genetic identity crisis, or "genealogical bewilderment," primarily affects the individual's development of self-concept. Successful identity development provides a positive self-image, enabling an

61. Committee on Adoptions, American Academy of Pediatrics, Identity Development in Adopted Children, 47 PEDIATRICS 948 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Committee on Adoptions]. But see B. JAFFE & D. FANSHEL, How They Fared in Adoption: A Follow-up Study (1970); Elenon & Schwartz, A Longitudinal Study of Emotional, Social, and Academic Functioning of Adopted Children, 48 CHILD WELFARE 72 (1969); Kirk, Jonassohn & Fish, Are Adopted Children Especially Vulnerable to Stress?, 14 ARCH. GEN. PSYCH. 291 (1966); Stephenson, The Emotional Implications of Adoption Policy, 16 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCH. 363 (1975) (each study found that despite the added stress factors related to adoptive status, there was little or no difference in ajustments between adoptees and nonadoptees).
64. Frisk, Identity Problems and Confused Conceptions of the Genetic Ego in Adopted Children During Adolescence, 31 ACTA PAEDO PSYCHIATRICA 6 (1964); Sants, supra note 63, at 133.
65. See Sants, supra note 63, at 133.
66. Committee on Adoptions commented that identity development is a major psychological goal: "The most important thing a human being can learn in life is to be conscious of himself as an individual and to be aware of who and what he is." Committee on Adoptions, supra note 61, at 939.
individual to function effectively and confidently in society. 67 Completion of this process occurs when the individual achieves emotional independence from the parents. 68

During the developmental period, individuals seek knowledge of their origins and the sense of identity that such information provides. 69 Because adoptees lack knowledge of their roots, they are unable to resolve the problems presented by this developmental period. Thus, the adoptee frequently experiences a sense of emptiness 70 and an increased susceptibility to feelings of isolation and alienation. This condition often manifests itself in various emotional disturbances. 71 These stresses, as well as the normal tensions of adulthood, often cause pain and difficulty, thus intensifying the confusion and uncertainty adoptees feel about their identity. 72 Numerous mental health experts, 73 social workers, 74 and legal commentators 75 argue on the basis of the evidence presented in these studies that the best interests doctrine mandates that

67. Sants, supra note 63, at 134.
69. Id.
71. J. TRISELIOTIS, supra note 8, at 81. He comments that:
   The general picture that emerged from an examination of the adoptees' self-perception was that those who portrayed a negative, non-adjustive picture of themselves, perceived their adoptive home life as depriving, they were mostly searching for their birth-parents; and they were given no information or only negative type of information about their origins. Being placed at a year or older seemed to carry considerable risks.
   Id. at 84. See also Sorosky, Baran & Pannor, Identity Conflicts in Adoptees, supra note 55, at 24.
   Alternative explanations, however, of the disproportionate incidence of psychological problems among the adopted are available. For example, deprivation of a close affectionate relationship with a parental figure during a "critical period" in the first two or three years of development can cause adjustment problems. Adopted children are more likely to experience this deprivation, especially if they spent significant time during the critical period in institutions. This phenomenon might account for the greater incidence of adjustment problems among children adopted after one year of age that Triseliotis noted. See Goldfarb, Effects of Early Institutional Care on Adolescent Personality, 12 J. Experimental Educ. 106-29 (1943). See generally J. BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND LOSS (1969); S. PROVENCE & R. LIFTON, INFANTS IN INSTITUTIONS (1962).
73. J. TRISELIOTIS, supra note 8; Sorosky, Baran & Pannor, The Effects of the Sealed Record in Adoption, supra note 55; Sorosky, Baran & Pannor, Identity Conflicts in Adoptees, supra note 55. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
74. Anderson, The Sealed Record in Adoption Controversy, supra note 8; Baran, Pannor & Sorosky, Adoptive Parents and the Sealed Record Controversy, supra note 8; Cominos, Minimizing the Risks of Adoption Through Knowledge, 16 Soc. Work 73 (1971).
75. See Katz, supra note 9; note 12 supra and accompanying text.
adooptees have access to information about their origins on reaching majority. 76

B. The Constitutional Arguments

Adoptees, individually and through "right to know" organizations, 77 contend that open access to their birth and adoption records is both a "natural right," 78 justified by a universal need to know one's identity and the identity of one's ancestors 79 and a fundamental right, protected by the Constitution. The adoptee's proclivity toward an identity crisis, or even more severe psychological problems, provides the underlying rationale for the "constitutional" arguments. 80 Thus, the adoptee organizations assert that this denial of genealogical information violates constitutional rights including the first amendment right to receive information, the right to privacy, and the fourteenth amendment equal protection guarantees. 81

76. None of the commentators advocate revealing the biological parents' identity to the child adoptee. Most commentators do urge that the child be informed of the adoption.

77. The two major organizations are ALMA (Adoptees' Liberty Movement Association) founded by Florence Fisher, in 1971 and Orphan Voyage, founded by Jean Paton, in 1954. For a discussion of their philosophies, see Baran, Pannor & Sorosky, Adoptive Parents and the Sealed Record Controversy, supra note 8, at 531-32; Note, A Reasonable Approach to the Adoptee's Sealed Record Dilemma, supra note 12, at 542-43; Note, Discovery Rights of the Adoptee—Privacy Rights of the Natural Parent: A Constitutional Dilemma, supra note 8, at 65. Recently two more organizations have been formed for similar purposes: Yesterday's Children, whose philosophy is documented in Note, Sealed Records in Adoptions: The Need for Legislative Reform, supra note 12, at 220 n.57, and Adoptees in Search.

78. Note, Sealed Records in Adoptions: The Need for Legislative Reform, supra note 12, at 220 n.57.

79. Id. "’[I]t is a universal human need to know your true identity and the identities of your forbearers. We propose that because it is a human need, it should be recognized that it is a human right to meet that need.’" Id.

80. See notes 58-76 supra and accompanying text.

81. See note 10 supra and accompanying text. Adoptees in Yesterday's Children v. Kennedy, 569 F.2d 431 (7th Cir. 1977), also asserted a thirteenth amendment claim. Plaintiffs argued that, upon adoption, they were put into a "chattel status" and the state's continued maintenance of that status into their adulthood constituted a thirteenth amendment violation. The district court did not respond to this argument because it returned the case to a more appropriate state court forum. Id. at 433. Most recently this thirteenth amendment claim was asserted in Alma Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, in which plaintiffs argued that the good cause requirement "is a badge or incident of slavery because it is the equivalent of the sale and separation from their parents of slave children too young to remember who their parents were.” The court dismissed this argument as frivolous. Alma Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 459 F. Supp. 912, 916, aff'd, 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 531 (1980).
1. The First Amendment Right to Receive Information

Commentators argue that closure statutes violate an individual's right to receive information and ideas.\(^82\) Interference with this right undermines one's freedom to participate in and contribute to social and governmental decisionmaking processes.\(^83\) Such participation requires a healthy mind, free from emotional and psychological stress. Adult adoptees cannot fully participate in the decisionmaking process\(^84\) because the inability to learn their biological heritage has damaged their emotional and psychological development.\(^85\) Thus, the first amendment's guarantee of the right to receive information gives adoptees the right to require access to their adoption records because the receipt of the information is essential for their self-fulfillment.\(^86\) The commentators contend that any restriction on access to information is unconstitutional. The restrictions impede the individual's mental growth and thus deny meaningful participation in social and political decisionmaking.\(^87\)

2. The Right to Privacy

The right to privacy guarantees an individual both privacy in the

\(^82\) Note, The Adult Adoptee's Constitutional Right to Know His Origins, supra note 12, at 1205. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Gotkin v. Miller, 379 F. Supp. 859 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 514 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1975). See also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (asserted for the proposition that the first amendment protected the free flow of information from one person to another in, e.g., Application of Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Mo. 1978)).

\(^83\) Id. at 1201-03. See notes 66-67 supra and accompanying text.

\(^84\) Id. (commenting that the information is important to the individual in his personal life as well as in his public life, i.e., decisionmaking). Without this information, the individual will not develop into a fully integrated, healthy person, capable of intelligent social and political participation. Id. One commentator characterizes this as a right to control one's body and cites the Supreme Court's comment from Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891): "[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all other restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestioned authority of law." Note, Confidentiality of Adoption Records: An Examination, supra note 6, at 828.

\(^85\) Id. at 1207 (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), for the proposition that the Supreme Court is willing to extend first amendment protection beyond the area of societal decisionmaking to that of individual concerns).
most fundamental aspects of life\textsuperscript{88} and the right to make choices about personal matters.\textsuperscript{89} Commentators assert, based on the rights emanating from the fundamental guarantees of the first, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments,\textsuperscript{90} that the privacy right must protect the individual's identity development\textsuperscript{91} because an individual's ability to make decisions is governed by identity formation. Any restriction on an individual's emotional growth is viewed, therefore, as a denial of "the autonomous control over the development and expression of one's intellect, interests, tastes and personality."\textsuperscript{92} In addition, these commentators argue that closure statutes prevent dissemination of the very information that the adoptee requires to make the fundamental decisions protected by the right to privacy,\textsuperscript{93} \textit{i.e.}, marriage,\textsuperscript{94} procreation,\textsuperscript{95} contraception,\textsuperscript{96} family relationships,\textsuperscript{97} and childrearing and education.\textsuperscript{98}

These critics also challenge the state's claim that the natural parents'
right to privacy overrides the child’s right to know. They contend that the natural parents have deprived the adoptees of the use and ownership of this information. These critics conclude, therefore, that tort law provides greater protection for the welfare of the natural parent than state closure statutes.

3. *Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection*

The adoptees argue that a requirement to obtain a court order to gain access to birth records violates the fourteenth amendment because a nonadopted person routinely has access to those records. Although the equal protection clause does not require all persons to be treated equally, the clause does require legislation to be reasonable or to bear a substantial relation to the object of the legislation. The adoptees assert that the closure statutes do not meet these standards. Adoptees contend, based on psychological data, that the statutes are contrary to their best interests. Thus the statutes embody no rational

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100. *Id.*

101. *Id.* at 1217-20.

102. Note, *The Adoptee's Right to Know His Natural Heritage*, supra note 12, at 144. See Application of Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. 1978).


106. Note, *The Adoptee's Right to Know His Natural Heritage*, supra note 12, at 144. But see Note, *Discovery Rights of the Adoptee—Privacy Rights of the Natural Parent: A Constitutional Dilemma*, supra note 8, at 70-71. (Author believes that adoptees' chances of success under rational basis test would be very limited, but under the substantial relation test the evidence of identity crisis and psychological deprivation would render a contention of state interest illogical.).

107. See notes 58-76 supra and accompanying text.

108. *Id.*
basis or substantial relation to justify their continuance.

The right to know proponents also claim that the adoptees are a suspect class, and thus argue that strict scrutiny of the statutes is appropriate. Although the Supreme Court has not designated adoptees as a "suspect class," several decisions suggest that status at birth may support a suspect classification. Application of strict scrutiny would uphold closure legislation only if the statute promoted some compelling state interest. Fundamental rights also trigger strict scrutiny, and commentators argue that courts should afford constitutional protection to the adoptee's right to know consonant with the protection afforded to marriage and family relationships.

4. No Compelling State Interest Argument

Statutory closure will prevail over judicial acceptance of the adoptees' fundamental right to know or the adoptees' suspect class cat-

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109. See note 104 supra and accompanying text.
110. See note 105 supra and accompanying text.
111. See note 106 supra and accompanying text.
113. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 103; Note, Developments in the Law—Equal Protection, supra note 103.
114. The Supreme Court has clearly recognized only the following as suspect classes: race, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); alienage, Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); and national origin, Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948). Each case, however, involves some condition of birth from which the argument is generalized.
115. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685-87 (1973) (suspect classes are those that suffer from "an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth" and have had a history of the relegation of the class to an inferior status); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 109 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[D]iscrimination on the basis of birth—particularly when it affects innocent children—warrants special judicial consideration."); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) ("[I]mposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our legal system that burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing."); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968) ("Why should the illegitimate child be denied rights merely because of his birth out of wedlock? . . . How under our constitutional regime can he be denied correlative rights which other citizens enjoy?").
egorization if the legislation promotes a compelling state interest. The state predicates its interest on the belief that closure laws are in the best interests of the child and promote the institution of adoption. Open record proponents argue that the state's interest, which may be compelling while the adoptee is a child, naturally diminishes once the adopted child reaches adulthood. Supporters of open records reject the claim that closure laws enable parents to abandon their children with anonymity.

III. THE COURTS' RESPONSE

Although the "right to know" movement originated in the 1950's,

118. See notes 35-36 supra and accompanying text.
119. See notes 30-34 supra and accompanying text.
120. Note, The Adult Adoptee's Constitutional Right to Know His Origins, supra note 12, at 1211-12.
121. Id. noting that the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, 210 U.S. 113, 162-63 (1973) established the proposition that the nature of the state's interest varies over time and commenting: Justice Blackmun explained that Texas had legitimate interests in protecting the health of the pregnant woman and the viable fetus and that these interests intensified during the course of the pregnancy until they became 'compelling.' Prior to the point when they became compelling, however, the woman was free under her right to privacy to make the decision whether or not to abort. Thus, it is conceivable that the interest underlying the confidentiality statutes may be compelling at its initial application and yet lose that status with time.

123. Id.
124. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
125. Scotland, Finland, Israel, and most recently England and Wales have statutes providing for access to adoption records by means of a reunion registry when the adoptee reaches majority. A Canadian governmental commission in Ontario has also recommended such legal reform. Klibanoff, supra note 26, at 188.
it did not receive attention from legal commentators until the early 1970's. Presentation of the proposed constitutional arguments in a judicial forum did not begin until late 1976. \textit{Mills v. Atlantic City Department of Vital Statistics} best exemplifies those arguments.

In \textit{Mills}, four adult adoptees, seeking access to their adoption records, challenged the constitutionality of the New Jersey closure statutes that required the sealing of the adoptee's original birth certificate and a showing of good cause before a court would break the seal. The adoptees asserted that the statutes violated first amendment rights to receive information, rights to privacy, and rights to equal protection under the fourteenth amendment. In addition, they claimed that the state could demonstrate no compelling reason to justify the legislation. \textit{Mills}, and subsequent decisions, have rejected each of these propositions. Moreover, adoptees in \textit{Alma Society, Inc. v. Mellon} unsuccessfully attempted a thirteenth amendment challenge to the constitutionality of the sealed record statutes.

A. The First Amendment Right to Receive Information

The \textit{Mills} court recognized that adoptees have a right to receive in-

128. Baran, Pannor & Sorosky, supra note 8, at 532; J. Triseliotis, supra note 8; Note, The Adult Adoptee's Constitutional Right to Know His Origins, supra note 12, at 1196 n.3.
129. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
131. Id. at 306, 372 A.2d at 648.
132. Id. The statutes challenged were N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8-40.1 (West 1964) (requiring the state registrar to seal the original birth certificate of any child adopted) and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-31 (West 1976) (only a court order can break the seal of secrecy provided that good cause is shown).
134. Id. at 309-12, 372 A.2d at 650-51.
135. Id. at 315-17, 372 A.2d at 653.
136. Id. at 311-12, 314-16, 372 A.2d at 651-52, 653-54.
137. Yesterday's Children v. Kennedy, 569 F.2d 431 (7th Cir. 1977); Application of Gilbert, 563 S.W.2d 768 (Mo. 1978); Application of Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. 1978); Alma Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 459 F. Supp. 912 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 531 (1980).
138. See notes 134-36 supra and accompanying text.
140. Id. at 1236-38. The appellants claimed that the thirteenth amendment prohibition of slavery and involuntary servitude gave them an absolute right of access to their adoption records. Id. at 1236. The court summarily dismissed this argument.
formation,141 but stated that no constitutional or personal right, even a first amendment right, is so absolute as to exclude the rights of other individuals, i.e., the natural parents.142 The court found that the adoption records required protection and held the good cause requirement a reasonable method of protecting the records.143 The assertion of a right to access, based on a constitutional right to receive information, did not, therefore, override state policy.144

B. The Right to Privacy Argument

The Mills court responded to the right of privacy argument by comparing it to the first amendment right to speak and to receive information. The first amendment right is also not absolute.145 An adoption statute would be valid unless it is unreasonable, arbitrary, and has no rational relationship to a permissible state objective.146 The court asserted that “Constitutional and other personal rights may be limited for the protection of other individuals or the public, and where the absolute exercise of the right harms these other elements it may be restricted.”147 Characterizing the natural parents’ right to be left alone as “the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men,”148 the Mills court noted that natural parents not only have the expectation of confidentiality, but also an actual statutory assurance that they will be shielded from public disclosure.149

Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Alma Society, Inc. v. Mellon150 viewed the adoptee's privacy argument as an assertion of a right to personhood.151 The court found that the New York good cause requirements simply acknowledged the rela-

142. Id.
145. Id. at 310, 311, 372 A.2d at 650, 651.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 311-12, 372 A.2d at 651-52 (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)).
149. Id. at 311, 372 A.2d at 651-52.
150. 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 531 (1980).
151. The court said: “What appellants assert is a right to personhood. They rely on a series of Supreme Court cases involving familial relationships rights of family privacy, and freedom to marry and reproduce.” Id. at 1231.
tionship of the natural and adoptive parents. The court upheld the statutes despite the claim that the sealing of the adoption records "imposed lifelong familial amnesia . . ." 152, stating that they "do not unconstitutionally infringe upon or arbitrarily remove appellants' rights of identity, privacy, or personhood." 153

C. The Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Argument

The adoptees in Mills claimed that the court should apply strict scrutiny because their rights were fundamental. 154 The court in Mills rejected that argument and declared that "while information regarding the heritage, background and physical and psychological heredity of any person is essential to that person's identity and self-image, 155 nevertheless it did not fall under the protection of the Bill of Rights." 156 The court found that the statutory objective of shielding natural parents from public disclosure was reasonable and that the statute bore a rational relationship to that objective. 157

The court also rejected the characterization of the adoptee as a member of a suspect class by analogy to the legitimacy cases. The adoptee's status does not result from an accident of birth, but from a legal proceeding that is designed to protect the adoptee's best interest. 158 Similarly, in Application of Maples, 159 the court treated adoption as a factor not usually present at birth, 160 holding the claim that adoption is a status at birth erroneous because many of the adoptees challenging the sealed records statutes were not adopted until several months after their birth. 161 The Maples court characterized the adoption process as conferring special advantages on the child, rather than relegating the child

152. Id.
153. Id. at 1233.
155. Id. at 310, 372 A.2d at 650, citing Reynolds, Eismitz, Chiappise & Walsh, Personality Factors Differentiating Searching and Nonsearching Adoptees, paper presented to AM. PSYCH. Ass'n (Sept. 1976); Sorosky, Baran & Pannor, The Reunion of Adoptees and Birth Relatives, 3 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 195 (1974).
157. Id. at 311-12, 372 A.2d at 651-52.
158. Id. at 315-16, 372 A.2d at 653.
159. Application of Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. 1978).
160. Id. at 765.
161. Id.
to an inferior status.\textsuperscript{162}

In \textit{Alma Society, Inc. v. Mellon},\textsuperscript{163} the court refused to apply the level of scrutiny afforded illegitimate children even though a majority of children adopted by nonrelatives are illegitimate.\textsuperscript{164} The finding of a suspect classification for illegitimates is predicated on a conclusion by the court that "the state has employed a questionable trait to distinguish those whom the law should burden from those whom the law should not."\textsuperscript{165} The court concluded that the strict judicial scrutiny of discrimination against illegitimate children is justified because society has imposed a stigma on an illegitimate child. This rationale is not applicable to adoptees, however, because they do not suffer the same legal and social disabilities.

\subsection*{D. No Compelling State Interest Argument}

The \textit{Mills} court addressed the compelling state interest issue even though the failure of the constitutional arguments rendered it unnecessary.\textsuperscript{166} The court noted that "an adopted child . . . is not a 'normal' child."\textsuperscript{167} The state's creation of a new home life for the child has inextricably involved the state in the life of that child. The state's concern for the child is compelling. Therefore, its decision to use the "statutory shield of confidentiality" to protect that child is valid.\textsuperscript{168} The court thus accepted the requirement of confidentiality as an essential ingredient in the adoption process, and upheld the constitutionality of the closure statutes.\textsuperscript{169}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{162} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{163} 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir. 1979), \textit{cert. denied}, 100 S.Ct. 531 (1980).
\item \textsuperscript{164} \textit{Id.} at 1234.
\item \textsuperscript{165} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{166} Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 316, 372 A.2d 646, 653 (1977).
\item \textsuperscript{167} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{168} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{169} \textit{Id.} "The State has more than a rational basis, it has a compelling interest in regulating the access sought here." The court found no abridgement of any fundamental right nor a creation of a suspect class, but rather that the placing of reasonable limitations on the adoptees' access to their birth records protected a rational state interest. \textit{Id.}
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
IV. The Courts' Solution to the Sealed Record Controversy: How to Present a Successful Challenge

Despite rejection of constitutional arguments, courts uniformly recognize that the right to know issue is a valid legal question. The courts are currently developing a procedural and substantive framework to adjudicate the rights of all involved parties. Adjudication of the right to know hinges on judicial recognition that the adoptee is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Statutory procedure generally requires the adoptee to petition the county clerk or registrar. The clerk or registrar enjoys the right to reject any petition, and often delivers an immediate and summary denial. Although the adoptee may appeal, the judge usually dismisses the petition without a hearing.

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals in In re C.A.B., held that an adoptee who seeks to inspect the adoption records must receive a full evidentiary hearing before a court can render a decision on the petition's validity. The court stated that "the time has come for the courts of this jurisdiction to come to grips with this touching and recurring social question on the merits." The court thus recognized the existence of social complications and risks to the adoptee and natural parents.

Courts have retained the statutory good cause requirement before

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172. In re Adoption of Spinks, 32 N.C. App. 422, 423, 232 S.E.2d 479, 480 (1977) (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-26 (1976)) which requires the filing of a motion before the clerk of superior court of the county in which petitioner is resident for access to the sealed information; see In re C.A.B., 384 A.2d 679 (D.C. 1978).
174. Id. See In re C.A.B., 384 A.2d 679 (D.C. 1978); Application of Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 761-62 (Mo. 1978).
175. Id. at 761 (citing Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.120 (1978)) which provides that the adoptee apply to the court for a hearing to obtain access to closed records because only the court has the full power to order records opened.
179. Id.
permitting the opening of records.\textsuperscript{180} Courts have found good cause when: the adoptees' search is inspired by religious beliefs requiring them to trace their ancestry and perform certain religious services for blood relatives;\textsuperscript{181} the adoptees desire information to establish their rights to inherit from natural parents;\textsuperscript{182} and the adoptees are motivated by well documented emotional or psychological disturbances.\textsuperscript{183}

The \textit{Mills} court, in dicta, stated that a court should routinely grant requests for information concerning medical, hereditary, or ethnic background unless the state shows a compelling reason for denial.\textsuperscript{184} A recent District of Columbia case\textsuperscript{185} held that a request for medical information constituted a legitimate reason to open adoption records especially if the adoptee has children. Adoptees must be free to obtain accurate information directly from natural parents because parents often possess medical histories that only they can provide.\textsuperscript{186} Courts have suggested that a compelling reason can never exist for denial of access to medical histories.\textsuperscript{187}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{180} Application of Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 765 (Mo. 1978) (burden remains on adoptee); Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 317, 372 A.2d 646, 654 (1977) (requirement applies only when adoptee is a minor; burden shifts to the state once adoptee reaches adulthood).
\item \textsuperscript{181} Application of Gilbert, 563 S.W.2d 768, 770 (Mo. 1978).
\item \textsuperscript{182} Spillman v. Parker, 332 So.2d 573, 576 (La. App. 1976).
\item \textsuperscript{183} Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 318-21, 372 A.2d 646, 654-56 (1978). \textit{But see In re Adoption of Spinks}, 32 N.C. App. 422, 429, 232 S.E.2d 479, 483-84 (1977). The trial judge accepted applicant's testimony of emotional disturbance without supplementation by expert witnesses. The appeals court, however, vacated and remanded the action for a full factual determination hearing on the ultimate issue whether release of the information would be in the adoptee's best interest.
\item \textsuperscript{185} \textit{In re Adoption of Female Infant}, 5 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2311 (1979). The District of Columbia statute requires a showing of cause before records can be opened. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-311 (1973).
\item \textsuperscript{186} Numerous hereditary diseases exist which do not become evident until the third or fourth decade or even later. Perhaps the most common is the onset of adult diabetes mellitus. A British study of 1,307 diabetics and 859 nondiabetic controls showed that 21% were found to have a first degree relative with diabetes, as compared with 7.5% for nondiabetics: a frequency of diabetes in close relatives three times greater for diabetics than nondiabetics. J. STANBURY, J. WYNGAARDEN, & D. FREDICKSON, \textit{The Metabolic Basis of Inherited Disease} 85-86 (3d ed. 1972) \textit{citing College of General Practitioners: The Family History of Diabetes}, 1 BRIT. MED. J. 960 (1965).
\item \textsuperscript{187} \textit{In re Adoption of Female Infant}, 5 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2311, 2312-13 (1979). Chattman v. Bennett, 57 A.D.2d 618, 619, 393 N.Y.S.2d 768, 768-69 (1977). In \textit{Chattman} the court released all pertinent medical information but the name of the natural parents. \textit{See} note 43 \textit{supra} and accompanying text.
\end{itemize}
The burden of showing good cause usually falls on the adoptee.\textsuperscript{188} The \textit{Mills} court, however, shifted the burden of proof to the state once the adoptee attained maturity;\textsuperscript{189} until that time, however, the burden remained with the adoptee.\textsuperscript{190} A court should, however, approve requests routinely if the natural parents have filed a consent to identification at the time of adoption.\textsuperscript{191}

Even though the \textit{Mills} court eases the adoptee's task by shifting the burden of proof to the state, access to records is not immediate. The rights of natural parents also require consideration.\textsuperscript{192} The \textit{Mills} court felt that the question required a weighing of the adoptees' needs against the natural parents' rights.\textsuperscript{193} The \textit{Mills} court decided that an intermediary agency must locate the natural parent to solicit consent for release of the information because natural parents are not before the court and are, therefore, unable to present their arguments.\textsuperscript{194} The court concluded that this procedure effectively protected the rights of all parties\textsuperscript{195} although it imposed a burden on the state. This burden is justified, however, because the state originally created the adoptive tri-

\textsuperscript{189} Id. at 318, 372 A.2d at 654-55.
\textsuperscript{190} Id. at 317, 372 A.2d at 654.
\textsuperscript{191} Id. at 318, 372 A.2d at 654-55.
\textsuperscript{192} Id. at 319-20, 372 A.2d at 655; Application of Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 763 (Mo. 1978).
\textit{See also} Application of Anonymous, 89 Misc. 2d 132, 134, 390 N.Y.S.2d 779, 782 (1976) in which the court noted:

\begin{quote}
[A] determination of what constitutes 'good cause' pursuant to the public policy purpose of section 114 of the Domestic Relations Law must include not only a determination of the rights of the adoptive child and his adoptive parents, but also necessarily must include a determination of rights conferred by this statute on the natural parents of the child, together with any common-law rights available to them.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{193} Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 319, 372 A.2d 646, 655 (1977). \textit{See In re Adoption of Spinks}, 32 N.C. App. 422, 427, 232 S.E.2d 479, 482 (1977) (requiring that the best interests of the child take precedence over interests of either the natural or adoptive parents). In \textit{Spinks}, the court held that it was unable to consider the effect of the revelation of this information on the natural parents because their identity was unknown to the court. The court revealed the records, however, to the adoptee because she had the consent of her adoptive parents and had presented evidence of mental torment resulting from her ignorance of the true identity of her biological parents. \textit{Id.} at 480-81.

\textsuperscript{194} Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 320-21, 372 A.2d 646, 655-56 (1977). \textit{See Application of Maples}, 563 S.W.2d 760, 766 (Mo. 1978) in which the court required consent from the natural parents before granting permission to open the records. \textit{But see} \textit{Id.} at 766-67, in which Judges Bargett and Seiler recommend in their concurring opinions a less rigid process than that elaborated by the majority.

angle and has an overriding interest in the adoption process.\textsuperscript{196}

The Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, in \textit{In re Daniel Doe},\textsuperscript{197} established a similar procedure for contacting natural parents.\textsuperscript{198} The court required that an investigator, either an appointee or a friend of the court, contact the biological and adoptive parents, deliver notice of the pending action, and inform them that a court would release the records in the absence of evidence of “substantial harm.”\textsuperscript{199} The biological and adoptive parents could then intervene and demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that “substantial harm” would occur if the court released the information.\textsuperscript{200} In the absence of such a showing, the court would order the adoption records opened.\textsuperscript{201}

In \textit{Application of Anonymous},\textsuperscript{202} a New York court announced a variant of the \textit{Mills} and \textit{Daniel Doe} approach. The court declared the natural parents necessary parties to the litigation. The court thus required notice and an opportunity to litigate.\textsuperscript{203} Because service of process on the natural parent was impossible, the court appointed a guardian \textit{ad litem} to protect the natural parents’ interests in the litigation,\textsuperscript{204} and to locate the natural parents and advise them of their rights.\textsuperscript{205}

Connecticut, by statute, requires the probate court to follow a procedure similar to that imposed by the \textit{Mills}, \textit{Anonymous}, and \textit{Doe} courts.\textsuperscript{206} Recently, the court in \textit{Sherry H. v. Probate Court},\textsuperscript{207} not only defined the appropriate procedure to determine whether disclosure is permissible, but also indicated the form that a denial of disclosure by the genetic parents must assume to maintain closure of the files. In \textit{Sherry H.}, the probate court had dismissed plaintiff’s petition because

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{196} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{197} No. 76-Co. 2436 (Cir. Ct. Cook County, Nov. 22, 1977) (cited in \textit{Yesterday’s Children v. Kennedy}, 569 F.2d 431, 433 (7th Cir. 1977)).
\item \textsuperscript{198} \textit{Yesterday’s Children v. Kennedy}, 569 F.2d 431, 433-34 (7th Cir. 1977).
\item \textsuperscript{199} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{200} \textit{Id.} at 434.
\item \textsuperscript{201} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{202} 89 Misc. 2d 132, 390 N.Y.S.2d 779 (1976).
\item \textsuperscript{203} \textit{Id.} at 134, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 782.
\item \textsuperscript{204} \textit{Id.} at 135, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 782.
\item \textsuperscript{205} \textit{Id.} The New York court that issued the \textit{Application of Anonymous} opinion noted the novelty of its approach. \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{206} \textsc{Conn. Gen. Stat.} \textsection 7-53 (amended by Public Acts 1975, No. 75-170) requires the Probate court or its designee “to conduct a timely investigation into what effect examination of the adopted person’s birth records would have upon the welfare of the adopted person, upon the welfare of the adopting and genetic parents and upon the public interest.”
\item \textsuperscript{207} \textsc{5 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA)} 2525 (1979).
\end{itemize}
an earlier contact by Family Services with the genetic mother\textsuperscript{208} led the probate judge to conclude that the parent would never consent to disclosure. The judge therefore denied the petition. On appeal, the court faulted the lower court's reliance on a single telephone call and held that the probate court's investigation of the effects of disclosure on the adoptive triad must be "calculated to elicit the present desires of the parties."	extsuperscript{209} The probate court thus failed to meet the appropriate statutory standard. Current, timely, and independent information is essential for the court to properly apply legislative intent and to carefully evaluate the interests of all parties\textsuperscript{210}.

A North Carolina court of appeals appreciated the need for a balancing approach and commented: "[W]e think the judge should carefully weigh the interests of the child \textit{and} the public, including the interests of the adoptive parents and the natural parents."\textsuperscript{211} In addition, the court must consider the importance of confidentiality to the entire adoption process. Despite potential adverse effects that an opening of the records would impose on natural parents,\textsuperscript{212} the court maintained that the best interest of the child remained paramount.\textsuperscript{213} This court's application of the best interests rule required the adoptee to present the ultimate fact issue: whether release of the information is in the best interests of the child.\textsuperscript{214} The court "weighed the totality of the circumstances,"\textsuperscript{215} and rejected the notion that natural parents must receive summons and notice.\textsuperscript{216}

An alternative proposal would allow the adoptee access to records that falls short of revealing the identity of the natural parents after a showing of good cause.\textsuperscript{217} If a court applies this approach, the judge determines the extent and nature of the revelations.\textsuperscript{218}

\begin{thebibliography}
\bibitem{208} Id.
\bibitem{209} Id. at 2526.
\bibitem{210} Id.
\bibitem{211} \textit{In re Adoption of Spinks}, 32 N.C. App. 422, 427, 232 S.E.2d 479, 482 (1977) (emphasis added).
\bibitem{212} Id. at 427, 232 S.E.2d at 483. The judge noted that protection of the natural parents' identity was a major state concern since a failure to protect the identity might offer unwed girls an abortion alternative rather than adoption as a solution for their problem.
\bibitem{213} Id.
\bibitem{214} Id. at 428, 232 S.E.2d at 483.
\bibitem{215} Id.
\bibitem{216} Id. at 425, 232 S.E.2d at 481.
\bibitem{217} Application of Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 766 (Mo. 1978).
\bibitem{218} Id.
\end{thebibliography}
V. CONCLUSION

Despite rejection of constitutional challenges, courts remain willing, on a case by case basis, to consider whether adoptees should enjoy access to their files. The recognition by the court of the significance of this information to the adoptee is well documented. The court, however, must reach a decision that benefits both the adoptee and the natural parent.

The adoptee who seeks information short of the actual identity of natural parents may be most successful. The courts seem receptive to a variety of causal arguments documented by evidence of emotional and psychological disturbance. In addition, most courts have required an intermediary to contact the natural parents and obtain their consent.

The law in the area of adoptee's rights is developing slowly and cautiously. The courts, however, are willing to hear the adoptee's cause and respond positively if the natural parents receive no injury from recognition of the adoptee's rights to open files.

Kathryn J. Giddings

219. See notes 127-69 supra and accompanying text.
220. See notes 58-76 supra and accompanying text.
221. See note 192 supra and accompanying text.
222. See notes 217-18 supra and accompanying text.
223. See notes 184-87 supra and accompanying text.
224. See notes 193-205 supra and accompanying text.