In *Diamond v. Chakrabarty*¹ the United States Supreme Court for the first time² included a man-made, genetically cross-bred³ bacterium within the scope of patentable subject matter.⁴

Chakrabarty, a General Electric Company microbiologist,⁵ filed an application⁶ to patent a genetically engineered bacterium⁷ capable of...
cleaning oil spills. The Patent and Trademark Office examiner rejected claims to patent the bacterium, and the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals affirmed. Although the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reversed and granted the patent, the court later vacated its judgment because of a subsequent Supreme Court ruling on degradative pathway. \textit{Id.} The plasmids usually take the form of a closed loop of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), and can direct the synthesis of complex molecules that in turn determine specific attributes of a plasmid. Bent, \textit{Living Matter Found to be Patentable}, 11 CONN. L. REV. 311 (1979).

Naturally occurring bacteria, identified in the past, could degrade some, but not all, oil components. Chakrabarty had earlier discovered that the plasmids control the oil degradation abilities of certain bacteria, and that some of these plasmids can degrade camphor and octane, two components of crude oil. 100 St. Ct. at 2205 n.1. See note 8 infra.

8. Prior to Chakrabarty's discovery, oil spills were treated with combinations of natural bacteria. Because bacterial strains tend to compete with each other, the effectiveness of the degradation of oil elements diminished. See Bent, supra note 7, at 312.

Chakrabarty developed a process in which four different plasmids that were able to degrade four different oil components could be transferred to and maintained in a single Pseudomonas bacterium. The Pseudomonas, as it appears in nature, cannot degrade oil. 100 S. Ct. at 2205, 2206 n.11. The genetically cross-bred Pseudomonas could then degrade oil components unlike any natural bacterium. Bent, supra note 7, at 311-12. See generally Drazek, \textit{Ownership of Living Organisms—In re Bergy}, 29 DE PAUL L. REV. 215, 221-22 (1979); \textit{The New Biology}, 150 NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC MAGAZINE, no. 3, 355, 374-75 (Sept. 1976); Comment, Bergy, Flook, and Microorganisms As Patentable Products, 29 CATH. U.L. REV. 485, 497-98 (1980).


The examiner granted Chakrabarty's claims for the process and carrier material used in developing the bacterium, but the examiner denied the claims to the bacterium itself reasoning that, (1) the bacterium is a product of nature, and (2) as a living thing, the bacterium is not patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). 100 S. Ct. at 2206. See note 6 supra. But see 596 F.2d 952, 971 (C.C.P.A. 1978). See also 91 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1358 (1978); notes 11, 41 infra.

11. See 35 U.S.C. § 134 (1976) (provides an appeal to any patent applicant whose claim has been twice rejected by an examiner). The Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals (P.T.O. Bd.), agreeing with the examiner that living things are not patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976), denied Chakrabarty's claims to the bacterium itself. See 100 S. Ct. at 2206 (citing the unreported decision of the P.T.O. Bd. of Appeals). See also notes 6, 10 supra.


13. \textit{See In re} Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40 (C.C.P.A. 1978). The C.C.P.A. reversed on the authority of the original decision in \textit{In re} Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1977), \textit{vacated sub nom.} Parker v. Bergy, 438 U.S. 902 (1978), which held that the living nature of an invention has no significance for purposes of the patent law. 563 F.2d at 1038. See also note 14 infra.

14. The Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks petitioned the C.C.P.A. to vacate its decision in \textit{In re} Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40 (C.C.P.A. 1978), because of the Supreme Court's vacation
ing that further delineated subject matter limitations of patentability. On rehearing, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals approved the patent. The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari and held: A living, man-made bacterium is patentable under the general patent subject matter statute that provides patent protection to any new manufacture or composition of matter.

The patent clause of the United States Constitution, in conjunction with the necessary and proper clause, grants broad congressional power to patent inventions. The patenting of inventions provides in-
centive for innovation and research24 although the duration of a patent is limited.25 Congress historically has used broad language in patent legislation.26 The judiciary has interpreted patent legislation liberally,27 recognizing both the constitutional patent mandate and the language used by Congress in exercising this mandate.28 The breadth of the patent subject matter statute, however, has been a source of controversy.29

Conflicting rules of statutory interpretation,30 which the Court has implemented31 in defining patentable subject matter, fuel this controversy. In United States v. Dubier Condenser Corp.32 the Court warned

---


25. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1976) sets 17 years as the maximum duration of a patent. During this period, the patent holder obtains the right to prevent others from making, using, or selling the invention. Id.

26. See 100 S. Ct. at 2207.


28. See notes 21-22 supra and accompanying text.


31. Justice Frankfurter noted: "Insofar as canons of construction are generalizations of experience, they all have worth. In the abstract, they rarely arouse controversy. Difficulties emerge when canons compete in soliciting judgment, because they conflict rather than converge." Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, reprinted in 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 544 (1947).

32. 289 U.S. 178 (1933).
against reading unexpressed limitations into the patent laws.\textsuperscript{33} The Court in \textit{Graham v. John Deere Co.}\textsuperscript{34} similarly held that a narrow interpretation would undermine the intent and goals of the patent laws.\textsuperscript{35} The Court in \textit{Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.},\textsuperscript{36} however, preached judicial caution regarding liberal interpretation of patent laws by demanding a "clear and certain signal from Congress" before expanding patent rights.\textsuperscript{37} The Court, therefore, has been alternately willing\textsuperscript{38} and reluctant\textsuperscript{39} to liberally interpret the patent laws.\textsuperscript{40}

Other canons of legislative interpretation exacerbate the controversy that arises when statutes coexist within the same area of law.\textsuperscript{41} The Court's legislative interpretations have yielded the following maxims:\textsuperscript{42} Congress is presumed not to legislate superfluously;\textsuperscript{43} courts should read statutes dealing with the same subject matter in unison to ascertain congressional intent;\textsuperscript{44} courts cannot apply the intent of one Con-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{33} Id. at 199.
\item \textsuperscript{34} 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
\item \textsuperscript{35} Id. at 7-10. \textit{See note 24 supra} and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{36} 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
\item \textsuperscript{37} Id. at 531.
\item \textsuperscript{39} \textit{See} Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gotschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1973); Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972); Funk Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948). \textit{See also note 49 infra} and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{40} Although the Constitution and congressional enactments encourage patents, the Court has been consistently unwilling to allow patents in certain areas, such as products of nature. \textit{See note 5 supra} and accompanying text. Justice Brennan noted: "The patent laws attempt to reconcile this Nation's deep seated antipathy to monopolies with the need to encourage progress." 100 S. Ct. at 2213 (Brennan, J., dissenting). \textit{See note 24 supra} and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{41} Whether there is companion legislation to the general patent subject matter statute is itself a matter of interpretation. \textit{See note 4 supra}. In 1930 and 1970, Congress enacted legislation allowing patents for certain types of plants. \textit{See notes 52-59 infra} and accompanying text. Because these Acts permitted the patenting of specific living things, and because Chakrabarty's bacterium is living, it is arguable that it too needs a congressional act to be patentable. Compare 100 S. Ct. at 2209-10 (no reason to exclude living things from patentability) \textit{with} 100 S. Ct. at 2213-14 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (if living things patentable, Plant Acts superfluous). \textit{See notes 79-91 infra} and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{42} \textit{See} notes 30-31 supra.
gress to the intent of another;\textsuperscript{45} specific terms prevail over general terms in a statute or companion statutes;\textsuperscript{46} and the inclusion of one subject in a statute implies the exclusion of other subjects from the statute or companion statutes.\textsuperscript{47}

Conflicts also arise when courts determine whether the scope of patentable subject matter encompasses living things.\textsuperscript{48} Although courts consistently have held that products of nature are not patentable,\textsuperscript{49} the courts have issued numerous patents for inventions utilizing products of nature, including living things\textsuperscript{50} used to create these inventions.\textsuperscript{51}


\textsuperscript{47} EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352 (6th Cir. 1975); Arley v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 379 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1967).

\textsuperscript{48} See notes 4 \textit{supra}, 50-59 \textitinfra.\textsuperscript{49}


\textit{Latimer} is the seminal case for the proposition that plants, as products of nature, are not patentable. The Court in \textit{Chakrabarty} reasoned that because the organism in question is not a product of nature, but a man-made invention, the \textit{Latimer} presumption against the patentability of living things was overcome. 100 S. Ct. at 2208-10.

Congress approved patents on certain living things in the Plant Patent Act of 1930, which authorized patent protection to breeders of specified asexually produced plants. In 1970 the enactment of the Plant Variety Protection Act brought certain sexually produced plants within the scope of patentable subject matter. The 1970 Act also provides an express exclusion of bacteria from patent protection. Courts have not interpreted the 1930 or 1970 Acts to allow patenting of any living things, except plants themselves.

51. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1976) defines "process" as "The . . . process, art, or method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material." See Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876) for a definition of "process" as a "mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or series of acts, performed on the subject matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state of thing."

The examiner approved patents for the process used by Chakrabarty to breed his bacterium. See also note 10 supra.

52. Courts previously had allowed patenting of a process utilizing living things, but not a living thing itself. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.


55. 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1976) provides patent protection to inventors of any new asexually reproduced plant, including cultivated spores, mutants, hybrids, and newly found seedlings, other than a tuber propagated plant, or a plant found in an uncultivated state. See generally R. Allyn, The First Plant Patents (1934); 3 A. Deller, Walker on Patents ch. IX (2d ed. 1964).

In In re Arzberger, 112 F.2d 834 (C.C.P.A. 1940), the C.C.P.A. held that bacteria are not plants for purposes of the 1930 Plant Patent Act. See note 58 infra and accompanying text.


In *Diamond v. Chakrabarty* the Supreme Court reasoned that because a genetically cross-bred bacterium is not a product of nature, but a manufacture or composition of matter under the general patent subject matter statute, the bacterium is patentable subject matter. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, analyzed the history of the patent laws, and concluded that although Congress intended the laws to be interpreted liberally, it did not intend courts to interpret them without limitations. The Court determined that because Chakrabarty's bacterium does not occur naturally, it is therefore patentable. The majority held that neither the 1930 Plant Patent Act nor the 1970 Plant Variety Protection Act demonstrate a legislative intent to deny patentability to living things unless expressly permitted by congressional act. Moreover, the Court determined that an absence of legislative history regarding the exclusion of bacteria from patentability in the 1970 Act does not demonstrate a legislative intent to exclude bacteria from patentability under the general patent subject matter statute.

60. 100 S. Ct. 2204 (1980).
61. Id. at 2208. See note 49 supra.
64. 100 S. Ct. at 2212.
65. Id. at 2205. The decision was 5-4.
66. Id. at 2206-08.
68. 100 S. Ct. at 2208. See note 49 supra.
69. 100 S. Ct. at 2208.
72. 100 S. Ct. at 2208-10. Chief Justice Burger, after discussing the legislative history of the 1930 Plant Patent Act, concluded that Congress realized the distinction between patentable and unpatentable subject matter is "not between living and inanimate things, but between products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made inventions." Id. at 2210. The Chief Justice reasoned that the 1930 Act was needed because plants had only recently come within the scope of "human-made inventions." Chief Justice Burger found the 1970 Plant Variety Protection Act inconclusive for similar reasons. Id.
The majority dismissed warnings of judicial usurpation of congressional powers and potential dangers of genetic engineering by claiming that the Court simply performed the judicial function of interpreting existing legislation. The Court concluded that although Congress may enact legislation in the future that forbids patenting of man-made life forms, the general patent subject matter statute presently encompasses such life forms.

Justice Brennan in dissent felt that the majority misread the applicable legislation. Justice Brennan viewed the 1930 and 1970 Plant Acts as evidence that Congress intended to exclude living things, particularly bacteria, from patentability. He objected to the implicit assumption of the majority that Congress acted superfluously in passing the Acts. Justice Brennan concluded that the majority extended the patent system beyond its intended scope.

Although all the Justices agreed that courts should interpret the patent laws liberally, the majority's inclusion of man-made bacteria

---

75. 100 S. Ct. at 2211-12. See note 3 supra.
76. 100 S. Ct. at 2212.
77. Id. Congress has, however, had the opportunity to address the question of the patentability of living things other than plants but has failed to act. When Congress enacted the 1952 Patent Act, ch. 950, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792, (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1976)), no mention was made of patenting living organisms. See generally Bent, Living Matter Found To Be Patentable: In re Chakrabarty, 11 CONN. L. REV. 311, 325 (1979).
78. 100 S. Ct. at 2212 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan was joined by Justice White, Justice Marshall, and Justice Powell.
79. Id. at 2213 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent viewed the 1930 Plant Patent Act and the 1970 Plant Variety Protection Act as evidence that Congress had included some specific life forms, i.e., plants, within the scope of patentable subject matter, thereby excluding other life forms. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
80. Justice Brennan saw the 1970 Plant Variety Protection Act's exclusion of bacteria from the scope of protected subject matter as dispositive. 100 S. Ct. at 2214 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Although admitting the majority's point that the 1970 Act gave no reason for the exclusion of bacteria, Justice Brennan did not take this as giving the Court a "license to invent reasons." Id. See note 73 supra.
81. 100 S. Ct. at 2213 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 2214 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
83. The majority noted that "Congress plainly contemplated the patent laws would be given wide scope" and adhered to this premise throughout its opinion. Id. at 2207. The dissent, relying heavily on the warnings of Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), and Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972), to exercise caution when extending patent rights, refused to
within the purview of patentable subject matter is unwarranted. The Court dogmatically adheres to liberal canons of construction\textsuperscript{84} to reach its conclusion, and fails to recognize that other maxims of legislative interpretation become relevant when companion legislation exists.\textsuperscript{85}

Liberal interpretation of the general patent subject matter statute is proper if companion legislation does not exist\textsuperscript{86} because the broad congressional language and the goals of the patent laws would warrant broad construction.\textsuperscript{87} Because companion legislation does exist, however, courts cannot consider the patentability of a man-made bacterium in a legislative vacuum.\textsuperscript{88} Courts must acknowledge the 1930 and 1970 Plant Acts because the Acts further delineate the limits of patentable subject matter by defining the living things that are patentable.\textsuperscript{89}

Congress is presumed not to legislate superfluously.\textsuperscript{90} Justice Brennan in dissent\textsuperscript{91} properly argued that if living things were patentable under the general patent subject matter statute, the 1930 and 1970 Plant Acts would have been unnecessary.\textsuperscript{92}

\textsuperscript{84} See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1966); United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 199 (1933). See also notes 32, 34 supra and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{85} See notes 43-44, 46-47 supra and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{86} If the statutory interpretation involved only 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976), the broad language Congress used in that section would justify a broad interpretation. See note 4 supra. But as the Court said in Platt v. Union Pac. R.R., 99 U.S. 48, 66 (1879), statutes must be construed “in connection with all the other provisions made by Congress, endeavoring to give effect to every part.” See note 44 supra.

As the dissent noted, the 1930 Plant Patent Act and the 1970 Plant Variety Protection Act added to the scope of patentable subject matter. If 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) covered plants, the 1930 and 1970 Acts would have been superfluous. 100 S. Ct. at 2213 (Brennan, J., dissenting). But see note 45 supra and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{87} 100 S. Ct. at 2207.

\textsuperscript{88} Id. at 2213 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Court in Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974), refused to interpret legislation without considering “the whole statute or statutes on the same subject . . . .”

\textsuperscript{89} 100 S. Ct. at 2213.

\textsuperscript{90} See notes 43, 86 supra.

\textsuperscript{91} 100 S. Ct. at 2212 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

\textsuperscript{92} Id. at 2213 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated that even if the 1930 Plant Patent Act and the 1970 Plant Variety Protection Act are not evidence of congressional intent to exclude bacteria from patentability, the warnings of caution by the Court in Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), and Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972), see note 83 supra, not to extend patent rights would be dispositive. “I should think the necessity for caution is that much greater when we are asked to extend patent rights into areas Congress has foreseen and considered [such as the patentability of living things] but has not resolved.” 100 S.Ct. at 2213 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See notes 43, 86 supra.
The Court also should have followed other relevant canons of construction. The Court should have read the general patent subject matter statute and the 1930 and 1970 Plant Acts together to ascertain congressional intent. The specific inclusion of living things in the 1930 and 1970 Plant Acts implied the exclusion of living things from the general patent subject matter statute even though courts cannot apply the intentions of one Congress to another.

Congress not only failed to include bacteria within the scope of patentable subject matter in the 1930 and 1970 Plant Acts, but also expressly excluded bacteria from patentability in the 1970 Act. In *Deepsouth* the Court demanded a "clear and certain signal" from Congress before expanding patent rights. The *Chakrabarty* Court argued that a lack of legislative history on the exclusion of bacteria in the 1970 Act renders the exclusion impotent. This assumption undermines the *Deepsouth* requirement because Congress clearly and certainly excluded bacteria from coverage in the 1970 Plant Act.

The Court could have avoided confusion by recognizing numerous maxims of interpretation that arise when companion legislation exists, and by adhering to the *Deepsouth* requirement. Because all of the Justices agreed that Congress will send a "clear and certain signal" to the judiciary regarding the patentability of genetically-bred life forms in the future, precedent compels patience.

93. See notes 43-47 supra.
94. See notes 44, 86 supra.
95. See note 45 supra. As the Court in United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960) noted, "the views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one." See notes 48-49 supra.
98. Id. at 531.
100. See notes 43-47 supra and accompanying text.
102. 100 S. Ct. at 2212; id. at 2214 (Brennan, J., dissenting).