A Context and Stakeholder Focused Exploration of the Sustainability of Local Organizations in Development

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A Context and Stakeholder Focused Exploration
of the Sustainability of Local Organizations in Development
by
Brad Tucker

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of Washington University in
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# Table of Contents

List of Tables .............................................................................................................................. vi
Acknowledgments ....................................................................................................................... vii
Abstract of the Dissertation ......................................................................................................... ix

Chapter 1: Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1
  1.1 Problem Statement .................................................................................................................. 2
  1.2 Research Questions ............................................................................................................... 15

Chapter 2: Background and Significance ..................................................................................... 17
  2.1 Local Organizations in Development Practice ....................................................................... 17
    2.1.1 Definition of Key Terms .................................................................................................. 17
    2.1.2 Claims of Comparative Advantage ................................................................................ 21
  2.2 Overview of Primary Study Concepts ...................................................................................... 31
    2.2.1 Organizational Effectiveness (OE) .................................................................................. 31
    2.2.2 Organizational Sustainability (OS) .................................................................................. 38
    2.2.3 Community Philanthropy (CP) ...................................................................................... 43
  2.3 Theoretical Contributions to the Understanding of OS/OE ...................................................... 52
    2.3.1 Resource-Based View (RBV) of Organizations ................................................................. 52
    2.3.2 Social Exchange Theory (SET) ...................................................................................... 54
    2.3.3 Contingency Theory (CT) .............................................................................................. 55
    2.3.4 Servant Leadership Theory (SLT) and Transformational Leadership Theory (TLT) ...... 57

Chapter 3: Methods ....................................................................................................................... 63
  3.1 Reprise: Research Questions .................................................................................................. 63
  3.2 General Approach ................................................................................................................... 66
    3.2.1 Qualitative Research ....................................................................................................... 66
    3.2.2 Action Research .............................................................................................................. 67
    3.2.3 Partner Agency ................................................................................................................. 68
    3.2.4 Grounded Theory (Theorizing) ...................................................................................... 70
  3.3 Data Collection and Participant Description .......................................................................... 71
    3.3.1 Research Questions 1 and 2 ............................................................................................ 72
    3.3.2 Research Questions 3 ...................................................................................................... 81
    3.3.3 Research Questions 4 ...................................................................................................... 85
3.4 Data Analysis ........................................................................................................................................ 85

Chapter 4: Research Question 1 – Part A ..................................................................................................... 91

4.1 Essential Components and Influential Factors ....................................................................................... 91

4.1.1 Good Governance (An Engaged and Effective Board of Directors) ................................................... 93
4.1.2 Capable and Well-Managed Human Resources/Staff .................................................................. 98
4.1.3 Effective Management/Leadership ................................................................................................. 103
4.1.4 Access to and Sound Management of Financial Resources .......................................................... 108
4.1.5 Commitment/Adherence to the Organization’s Vision and Mission ............................................. 112
4.1.6 Effective Networking and Partnership Skills .................................................................................. 116

4.2 Conclusion............................................................................................................................................ 119

Chapter 5: Research Question 1 – Part B .................................................................................................... 121

5.1 Essential Components and Influential Factors ....................................................................................... 121

5.1.1 Public Perceptions, Proliferation of Organizations and Resulting Impact on Internal CSO Operations ......................................................................................................................................................... 124
5.1.2 Kenyan Views of the CSO Board of Directors (BOD): What we have vs. What we wish we had! .................................................................................................................................................. 143
5.1.3 The Projectized Approach to Development in Kenya ....................................................................... 146
5.1.4 Community Ownership ................................................................................................................... 152
5.1.5 Symbiotic Relationships Between CSOs and Politicians ................................................................ 161
5.1.6 Capacity Building ............................................................................................................................ 169

5.2 Conclusion............................................................................................................................................ 184

Chapter 6: Research Question 2 ................................................................................................................ 185

6.1 Summary of General Views on Local Fundraising ............................................................................. 185
6.2 Current and Past Experience in Local Fundraising Among Study Participants .................................. 187
6.3 Primary Challenges to Local Fundraising: Pervasive Negative Public Perceptions of CSOs/NGOs .................................................................................................................................................. 205
6.4 Primary Challenges to Local Fundraising: Internal CSO Management Issues .................................. 210
6.5 Primary Challenges to Local Fundraising: What is behind the success of the few well-known local fundraising Campaigns? ........................................................................................................ 214
6.6 CSO/NGO Suggestions for Improving Local Fundraising and Their Own Future Fundraising Plans .................................................................................................................................................. 220

6.7 Conclusion............................................................................................................................................ 232

Chapter 7: Research Question 3 ................................................................................................................ 234
7.1 Reprise: Sampling Methods for Key Informants Interviewed for this Research Question 234

7.2 Motivations and Reasons for Giving ................................................................. 235

7.3 Preferred Causes and Targets/Recipients of their Giving ........................................... 239

7.4 Awareness and Sensitization: Learning About Social Causes, Needs, and Individuals in Need 247

7.5 Giving Related Decision-Making .............................................................................. 251

7.6 Common Practices and Modalities of Giving ............................................................. 254

7.7 Giving to Local CSOs/NGOs ..................................................................................... 261

7.8 Improving the Success Rate of Local CSOs/NGOs Soliciting Public Contributions .... 268

7.9 Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 272

Chapter 8: Research Question 4 .................................................................................. 274

8.1 The Art of Theorizing ............................................................................................... 274

8.2 Interpretive Frame 1: Underlying the OS/OE of Local Organizations in Kenya is a self-Defeating System of Ineffctual Relationships ...................................................... 276

8.3 Interpretive Frame 2: The System Underlying OS/OE is Dominated by the “Projectized Approach” to Development That Does Nothing for Long-Term Organizational Viability.... 283

8.4 Interpretive Frame 3: Dynamics Within the System Underlying OS/OE Prevent the Development of Strong Organizational Identity ................................................................. 288

8.5 Interpretive Frame 4: The System Underlying OS/OE is Highly Politicized and Characterized by Adversarial Relationships Between Local CSOs/NGOs and Government. 292

8.6 Interpretive Frame 5: The Position that Development/Social Service Organizations Hold Within the System Underlying OS/OE Has Made Social Service/Development Work a Lucrative Profession that can Enhance Social Status .............................................................. 298

8.7 Interpretive Frame 6: The System Underlying OS/OE – Without International Donor Funding – Cannot Support Local CSOs/NGOs as They Are Currently Structured .......... 302

8.8 Summary ..................................................................................................................... 310

Chapter 9: Implications and Conclusions ..................................................................... 313

9.1 Discussion and Implications for Future Scholarship .................................................. 313

9.2 Implications and Recommendations for Practice ....................................................... 326

9.3 Limitations and Strengths ........................................................................................ 330

9.4 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 333

References/Bibliography/Works Cited ....................................................................... 335
Appendix A ................................................................................................................................................. 349
Appendix B .................................................................................................................................................. 351
Appendix C .................................................................................................................................................. 353
Appendix D .................................................................................................................................................. 354
List of Tables

Table 1.1  Number of NGOs per country in 1977 vs. 1990..............................................................17

Table 3.1  Summary of Core Research Methods...............................................................78.

Table 3.2  Descriptive Data – Organizational Participants.........................................................94

Table 4.1  General Concepts of Organizational Sustainability (OS) & Effectiveness (OE) and How They are Actualized in the Kenyan Context......................................................105

Table 5.1  Part 1: Context-Specific Concepts of Organizational Sustainability (OS) and Effectiveness (OE)..................................................................................................................136

Table 5.1  Part 2: Context-Specific Concepts of Organizational Sustainability (OS) and Effectiveness (OE)..................................................................................................................137

Table 6.1  Primary Challenges to Local Fundraising: *Internal CSO Management Issues*........226

Table 6.2  Primary Challenges to Local Fundraising: *What is behind the success of the few well-known local fundraising campaigns?*..............................................................230

Table 6.3  CSO Suggestions for Improving Local Fundraising & Their Own Future Fundraising Plans..............................................................................................................................236

Table 7.1  Motivations and Reasons for Giving.................................................................251

Table 7.2  Preferred Causes and Targets/Recipients of their Giving..........................................255

Table 7.3  Primary Drivers of Giving Related Decision-Making Among Study Participants...267

Table 7.4  Primary Practices and Modalities of Giving...........................................................270

Table 7.5  Preferred Giving Patterns.......................................................................................275

Table 7.6  Participant Suggestions for Improving CSO/NGO Success in Local Fundraising...284

Table 8.1  Possible Interpretive Frames for Understanding Study Data.....................................292

Table 8.2  Ladder of Citizen Participation (Arnstein, 1969, p. 217)..............................................326

Table 9.1  Comparison of Study & Literature Concepts re: OS/OE (Tucker/Lecy et al.)......332

Table 9.2  Comparison of Study & Literature Concepts re: OS/OE (Tucker/Gustafson)...........333
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Brad Tucker

Washington University in St. Louis

August 2017
Dedicated to my parents.
Abstract of the Dissertation

A Context and Stakeholder Focused Exploration

of the Sustainability of Local Organizations in Development

by

Brad Tucker

Doctor of Philosophy in Social Work

Washington University in St. Louis, 2017

Professor Carolyn Lesorogol, Chair

The design and development of this study emerged as the result of the investigator’s work with local nonprofit organizations (NPOs) in the Global South – particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. Through experience and study, the investigator observed: 1) The conceptualization and the study of organizational sustainability and effectiveness (OS/OE) – both in scholarship and in practice – are fragmented and, while emphasizing the critical importance of context, do not explain how context impacts sustainability. 2) Existing conceptualizations of OS/OE lack the perspectives of key stakeholders – namely the management and staff of the local NPOs themselves. 3) There is a considerable disconnect between the level of investment in organizational development (through international funding and capacity building) and the expected level of return (in the form of enhanced organizational performance/effectiveness) of that investment. 4) There seems to be an increasing belief in the potential of community philanthropy/local fundraising to enhance organizational sustainability/effectiveness of local nonprofits even in the often resource-constrained countries of the Global South. These four observations gave rise to several questions this study was designed to address. Kenya was chosen as the specific context in which to address these questions due to the investigator’s previous work experience and contacts there.
1. How do the directors of local civil society organizations and organizational development professionals perceive organizational sustainability/effectiveness in Kenya?

2. How do the directors of local civil society organizations and organizational development professionals perceive the role of local fundraising/community philanthropy in the sustainability/effectiveness of CSOs in Kenya?

3. What is the profile of the individual Kenyan giver?

4. Using an interpretative, grounded-theory approach to data analysis, what possible theoretical assertions can be made to explain stakeholder-focused and context-specific conceptualizations of organizational sustainability of local organizations in development?

Using a qualitative, action research approach – in partnership with the Aga Khan Foundation East Africa’s (AKFEA) Yetu Initiative – this study underscored the critical importance of context to the sustainability and effectiveness of local organizations in development. However, this study went one step further than most scholarship to demonstrate how a specific context and the realities/dynamics within that context directly impact OS/OE. While such elements as good governance, effective management and access to financial resources, etc. were highlighted as important factors of OS/OE; this study revealed six context-specific dynamics that impact OS/OE that the study of generic variables such as ‘effective management’ and ‘good governance’ could never capture. These included, 1) the impact of public perceptions on CSO viability; 2) particular Kenyan views regarding the function of a CSO’s board of directors; 3) the dominance of the ‘projectized’ approach to development in Kenya; 4) actualization of community ownership of local organizations in the Kenyan context; 5) the impact of symbiotic relationships between CSOs and politicians; and 6) the unique role of internationally funded capacity building for OS/OE in Kenya. This study also concluded that, given the lack of success local CSOs/NGOs have had raising funds from local sources in Kenya, and given the perspectives of typical individual Kenyan givers toward CSOs/NGOs; local fundraising targeting individual Kenyan givers is not likely to be substantial enough to reduce local CSO/NGO
dependence on international donor funding to any degree in the near- or medium-term future. However, the typical individual Kenyan giver seems surprisingly willing to give to local CSOs/NGOs but they are not likely to give to these organizations as they are currently structured and operated in Kenya.
Chapter 1: Introduction

In many peoples’ minds, Kenya evokes images of giraffes walking slowly across the savannas of the Maasai Mara as the sunsets or jubilant singing and dancing of Maasai warriors around a roaring campfire. While these human and natural wonders represent some of Kenya’s greatest assets – assets the country has very effectively used to advance national development – not many realize that Kenya is one of the poorest countries in the world. Consider that Kenya’s capital city – Nairobi – is home to Africa’s largest slum – Kibera. Approximately half (2 million) of Nairobi’s population of 4 million (CIA World Factbook, 2015) currently live in Kibera where they have inadequate housing, sanitation, safe drinking water and little or no access to quality healthcare and education (BBC, 2009 and Amnesty International, 2009). Poverty in Kenya, however, is not limited to Kibera.

Forty-six percent of Kenyans or approximately 44 million people live below the poverty line. Nearly half of Kenya’s population lives on less than $2 per day. (BBC, 2009 and Amnesty International, 2009). Forty percent of all Kenyans are unemployed. The Kenyan National Bureau for Statistics estimates that 51% of Kenya’s rural population lives below the poverty line (KNBS, 2013). The more dire conditions found in the rural parts of Kenya mean the famed Maasai that so many in the West are familiar with are some of the hardest-hit communities. (BBC, 2009, Amnesty International, 2009, and KNBS-Online, 2015). Nearly 8% of Kenyans are HIV-positive. Kenya has woefully inadequate infrastructure to support robust economic growth. Eighty percent of Kenyans are dependent on small-scale agriculture for their livelihoods – a fact that makes the Kenyan economy precariously dependent on agriculture.
These sobering facts, among others, have led to the United Nations’ (UN) ranking Kenya 147th of 187 countries assessed in its 2014 Human Development Report (HDR) (UNDP, 2014). Unfortunately, Kenya is just one of many countries facing similar circumstances. The UN HDR ranked 187 countries of the world from most to least developed. The HDR has four ranking categories – very highly developed countries, highly developed countries, medium development countries and low development countries. All but 8 of the 43 low development countries are in sub-Saharan Africa. These countries were categorized as low development countries, in part, because average life expectancy of citizens in these countries is 59; most receive just 4 years of education; and most earn approximately $2904 U.S. Dollars (USD) per year (HDR, 2014, p. 163). These statistics may not mean much until they are compared to the same statistics in the very highly developed countries where average life expectancy is 80; average years of education is 12; and average annual income is $40,046 (HDR, 2014, p. 163). So, people in very highly developed countries live an extra 20 years, benefit from 8 more years of schooling and earn 20-times more per year than those living in low development countries.

1.1 Problem Statement
Tackling poverty and other socio-economic challenges of the nature and magnitude faced by Kenya and many other countries in similar situations is extremely challenging. All sectors of society – government, the private sector and the nonprofit or social service sector – have critical roles to play if any progress is to be made. Scholars and professionals alike, however, increasingly recognize the role local nonprofit organizations (NGOs or CSOs) can play in responding effectively to such seemingly insurmountable problems. Activists and academics
around the world, who employ their experience and talents fighting poverty in its various forms, have specifically noted the importance of engaging local/indigenous nonprofit organizations (NPOs) in the struggle against poverty in countries like Kenya and urban capitals like Nairobi. In this struggle, Jennifer Lentfer – a development practitioner who has experience working with over 300 grassroots organizations in East and Southern Africa – argues that local, indigenous organizations should be “regarded as the fundamental unit of effective development aid… (The Broker, www.thebrokeronline.eu, 2011, p. 1).” Lentfer argues that local organizations constitute a web or network of organizations throughout developing countries that make them the single best vehicle for scale-up of development programming.

Etzioni (1972) and Kotler and Murray (1975) (as cited in Weerawardena, McDonald and Mort, 2010) have concluded that nonprofit/non-governmental organizations emerge to fill a particular gap in the fight against poverty and other social ills that neither government nor the private sector can play. Government cannot fill this gap because it lacks the political/popular support to effectively and efficiently address these issues. The private sector cannot fill the gap due to insufficient financial incentives and a general unwillingness to take-on levels of risk that might threaten profitability. Etzioni’s and Kotler/Murray’s conclusions are echoed in the works of numerous other scholars who note that both international and local nonprofit/non-governmental organizations often emerge to make-up for the shortcomings of the state – particularly in parts of the world such as post-colonial Africa (Bradshaw & Schafer, 2000, Chaplowe & Englo-Tjega, 2007, Makoba, 2002, and Marcussen, 1996). In this environment, NGOs/CSOs seem to have a unique and necessary role to play – a role that only they can play.

Scholars have underscored the importance of nonprofit/non-governmental organizations in social progress, development and advancing public welfare in numerous ways. Chaplowe (2007),
citing a 1999 article in the Economist magazine, notes that in 1999 non-governmental organizations provided more aid to developing countries than all the UN agencies combined. In his study of civil society in 35 countries, Salamon (2003) determined that civil society organizations (including nonprofit/non-governmental organizations) represented a $1.3 trillion industry, collectively constituted the world’s 7th largest economy, and employed approximately 39.5 million full-time workers. Bradshaw & Schafer (2000) provide some interesting statistics regarding just the numeric growth of nonprofit/non-governmental/civil society organizations in Africa alone:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of NGOs 1977</th>
<th>Number of NGOs 1990</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRCongo</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>538</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Looking more specifically at Kenya, Bradshaw and Schafer report that “nongovernmental organizations have taken over responsibility for more than two thirds of all secondary schooling, more than one third of all health care, and a wide array of other social services and development initiatives in both urban and rural areas (p. 100, citing Bratton, 1989).” From these scholars’ perspectives, the importance of nonprofit/nongovernmental organizations in social progress and development is evident just by their sheer economic/financial impact on society, their numbers, the depth/breadth of the impact of their activities, and the degree to which they have woven themselves into the socio-political-economic fabric of many developed and developing nations.

Other scholars are more directly in sync with Lentfer’s thinking – claiming that local nonprofit and nongovernmental organizations may actually be more effective and efficient at tackling
poverty and facilitating development because they have several comparative advantages over public and private sector organizations. Local NPOs, for example, are generally more nimble and can often be more flexible in their activities because they are not as burdened by rules and bureaucracy. They are usually more ‘rooted’ in community and have a greater ‘presence’ in and among the groups of people they are trying to serve. They, therefore, have a deeper understanding of the needs/desires of community members and a clearer perspective on what works and does not work in any given community context. NGOs/NPOs may also be more innovative and cost effective. (Deolalikar et al., 2002, and Lewis/a in Forsyth (Ed.), 2005). Beaucleark (2011) also agrees with Lentfer – stating that local, civil society organizations “have the legitimacy, roots and capacity to transform their own society (p. 871).”

In a study of the impact of the growth and spread of international NGOs in 75 countries between 1975 and 1990, Bradshaw and Schafer (2000) concluded that the expansion and involvement of international NGOs in development programming a) reduced the harmful effects of rapid urbanization, b) significantly and positively impacted economic development and economic growth, and c) was positively associated with access to clean and safe water. While Bradshaw’s study focused on international NGOs and not local NGOs, his conclusions are applicable to the broader set of civil society organizations that includes local NGOs that often operate similarly to international NGOs.

The group of scholars, whose research and thinking is in-sync with Lentfer, agrees, in essence, with the group discussed previously. However, to this second group, it is not simply the size of nonprofit sector or its economic value that makes it an important contributor to development and social progress, but the conclusion that local organizations active in the nonprofit space have
specific characteristics that place them in an advantageous position over other actors in the struggle against poverty.

Assuming that NGOs/NPOs – and local organizations in particular – 1) have a vital role to play in development; and 2) may be more efficient and effective in advancing development objectives; any individual or group who cares about social progress and development in the developing world should be concerned about the sustainability (i.e., organizational viability/survivability, performance and effectiveness) of these critically important development actors. The rapidly increasing focus of donors and international development organizations on building the capacity of local organizations is evidence that many actors involved in development work have concluded just that (Kuhl, 2009, Sobeck, 2008, Sanyal, 2006 and Wing, 2004).

Many official donor agencies, international development organizations and a substantial portion of the public at large also believe that local non-profit organizations are more efficient and effective at reaching the poor than government or other sectors of society. (Meyer, 1992; Sollis, 1992; and Vivian, 1994 as cited in Omona and Mukuye, 2013). Their conclusions are articulated in their policy documents and approaches to development practice. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), for example, is one of many institutions to have concluded that active engagement of local organizations in anti-poverty efforts is necessary because a) programs implemented by local organizations are more sustainable; b) programs implemented by local organizations are less costly; and c) local organizations are more effective at facilitating change because of their rootedness in community and resulting knowledge of local culture and society (USAID, 2013 and WTW, 2013). The French and British official development agencies (DFID and AFD respectively) also emphasize the importance of working

*Catholic Relief Services* (CRS) – the international relief and development agency of the U.S. Catholic community directed by the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops – states in its strategic plan that “local partnerships foster greater understanding of local needs and context, and allow for more appropriate equitable and sustainable solutions.” ([www.crs.agency-strategy/pdf/CRS-Agency-Strategy-download.pdf](https://www.crs.agency-strategy/pdf/CRS-Agency-Strategy-download.pdf)). *PACT* – often considered the pioneer of programs to develop the capacities of local NGOs/CSOs states in its mission statements that “real change is sustainable only when led by local individuals and groups” ([www.pactworld.org/how-we-work](http://www.pactworld.org/how-we-work)).

*Oxfam International* “sets local communities and the voices of women, men and young people at the center of change. It is these voices that are the best hope for ending discrimination, exclusion and the injustice of poverty.” Oxfam is an international confederation of 17 organizations working in 90 countries. Its work is primarily done in partnership with local organizations. ([https://www.oxfam.org/en/node/4019](https://www.oxfam.org/en/node/4019)). A coalition of 50 US organizations, known as *Women Thrive Worldwide* (WTW), partners with 100 grassroots organizations in 34 countries. WTW has chosen to work with local organizations, in part, because local organizations are part of the society and culture they are working in so they are the most effective change agents due to their in-depth knowledge of local culture, and local social mores. ([http://womentthrive.org/sites/default/files/images/country-ownership.pdf](http://womentthrive.org/sites/default/files/images/country-ownership.pdf)). Finally, *SNV*’s 2011-
2015 Strategy Paper states that, “Effective and sustainable solutions can only be achieved if local actors have and drive their own agendas. Our work focuses on enabling the four factors we have learnt are essential for successful development: inclusion, local ownership, contextualized solutions and systemic change.” SNV is a large Dutch NGO much respected in the development community.

(http://www.snvworld.org/node/2346).

From 2004 to 2013 Kenya received approximately $17.3 billion USD in development assistance funds (Global Humanitarian Assistance Country Profiles, Available: http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org). This sum does not include private, philanthropic, charitable or religious development assistance that may have also been provided to various entities or individuals in Kenya during the same period. Nearly $7 billion of the $17.3 billion USD was provided just between 2010 and 2013 (Kenya-Aid At A Glance, 2015, Available: http://www.oecd.org/countries/kenya/aid-at-a-glance.htm and Global Humanitarian Assistance Country Profiles, Available: http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org). Given the emphasis, outlined above, among both donor organizations (USAID, DFID, AFD, etc.) and implementing organizations (CRS, PACT, SNV, etc.) on working in and through local organizations, much of this assistance was likely provided to specifically strengthen the capacity and enhance the sustainability of local organizations and local systems.

With this level of commitment and investment in the effectiveness and sustainability of local NGOs/CSOs in Kenya and other developing countries, we would expect to see a corresponding
level of progress in development conditions of the countries where these newly capacitated
organizations operate. Unfortunately, the scholarly literature addressing this subject exists but is
quite limited. Many development organizations and development professionals, however,
conclude that while positive changes can be identified; a level of transformation that corresponds
to the level of investment has not materialized. Johns Hopkins University’s (JHU) Global Civil
Society Index (GCSI) gave Kenyan civil society a score of 33 on a scale of 0-100. Among the
34 countries scored using the GCSI, the Netherlands had the strongest community of civil
society organizations scoring 74/100, while Pakistan had the weakest sector scoring just 19/100.
The index includes measurement of the sector’s size and level of effort (capacity), the sector’s
ability to sustain itself over time (sustainability) and an assessment of the sector’s impact on the
nation’s social, economic and political life. (Salamon & Sokolowski, 2004 and JHU GCSI,
Available: http://ccss.jhu.edu/publications-findings/?did=360). In spite of its low score on the
GCSI, Salamon and Sokolowski highlight that Kenya actually has one of the largest civil society
sectors among developing countries. They nonetheless conclude, however, that Kenyan civil
society organizations – even after the significant investment described above – still lack critical
organizational and professional capacity. A 2007 study commissioned by the Aga Khan
Development Network (AKDN) supports and adds detail to Salamon & Sokolowski’s
conclusion. AKDN concluded that Kenyan CSOs:

1. Lack necessary fundraising and resource mobilization capacity
2. Lack appropriate governance and accountability structures
3. Are weak in organizational development
4. Do not use development approaches that are sustainable
   (Salamon & Sokolowski, 2004, p. 36)
The central objective of many if not most capacity building initiatives is enhancing the performance, effectiveness and sustainability of local organizations (NGOs/CSOs). The term organizational sustainability among the non-profit/development community is essentially synonymous with the terms organizational performance and organizational effectiveness. These terms, however, are extremely challenging constructs to define and measure. In academic literature, for example, Lecy, Schmitz and Swedlund (2011), describe the study of non-profit organizational (NPO) effectiveness as fragmented and spread across too many disciplines. In their view, this fragmentation has “undermined collaboration and the sharing of insights” (p. 437). Baruch and Ramalho (2006), underscores this incongruent and unclear conceptualization of organizational effectiveness stating that, “…many papers treat the subject as if almost nothing relevant has been attained previously” (p. 39). It is difficult to conceive how an organization’s effectiveness can be strengthened or how the capacities necessary for effectiveness and sustainability can be reinforced when these concepts are, themselves, unclearly defined and scholars disagree on how the constructs should be operationalized in practice. Missing almost entirely from the both the scholarly and professional discussions of these concepts is 1) specific attention to context – social, cultural, political, economic, etc. and, more specifically, how context shapes organizational sustainability/effectiveness; and 2) the perspectives of several key groups of stakeholders – namely the management and staff of local NGOs/NPOs and the pool of individual potential local donors.

One element that is common to many, if not most, studies of organizational sustainability and related concepts is the central emphasis many scholars place on ‘access to financial resources’ and ‘financial stability’ if an organizational is to be successful in the long term. An organization without the resources it needs to pay its staff, rent office space, implement programs, etc. is –
just based on common sense – is not going to be sustainable or effective in the short or the long term. The next chapter of this dissertation will address in greater detail the role financial resources and financial sustainability plays in overall organizational sustainability. (See Chapter 2, Overview of Primary Study Concepts). All of the studies reviewed in Chapter 2 regarding both organizational effectiveness and organizational sustainability identify financial resources/financial sustainability as either a stand-alone component of OS or as part of the broader ‘sound management’ variable that they identify as a critical factor for OS/OE.

Given the critical importance of access to resources and financial stability to overall OS/OE, local CSOs/NGOs are increasingly exploring a variety of approaches to shore-up their financial strength in ways that do not rely on grants and contracts from international development donors. Along with stand-alone income generating activities, a variety of fee-for-service models and the development of new forms of social service/development organizations such as the social enterprise; community philanthropy (CP) seems to be an increasingly popular means local NGOs/CSOs around the world are using to enhance organizational sustainability and effectiveness. While the literature regarding CP, its use and impact on development seems to be quite limited, the relevant scholarly and practitioner literature that does exist contains numerous descriptions and definitions of the concept of community philanthropy – each with its own somewhat unique understanding of the term and its practice. Williams, West and Klak (2011), for example, define CP simply as members of a community giving their own resources to promote the well being of others. Feurt and Sacks (2016) define community philanthropy as “local individuals coming together to create permanent resources for their communities… (p. 7)” The New Nation of Bangladesh (2015), however, makes no distinction between community philanthropy and community foundations. It defines CP as a foundation that is funded and
controlled by the members of the community it serves in order to address the community’s needs. Community members control and manage the foundation’s assets as well as all decisions over how development funds are spent within the community.

Despite these seemingly rather different understandings of CP, nearly all of the literature reviewed supports a core set of basic assertions regarding the concept. Community philanthropy, in essence, is the mobilization of resources (financial, time, skills, space, etc.) from within a community to respond to needs and development challenges within that same community. In other words, CP is simply ‘raising money’ locally from local individuals and businesses in order to ‘spend the money locally’ – on projects designed to address local needs and development challenges as identified and prioritized by community members. This form of philanthropy may be informal and occur through individual-to-individual donations of time or money, etc., contributions made at a fund-raiser held by a local nonprofit or through somewhat more organized, yet still informal, self-help groups, pooled savings schemes and mutual aid societies. More structured entities or even formal organizations such as community foundations may be established to receive and manage community contributions. In close partnership with the community, the established organization or foundation decides on what, when and how the funds should be spent to advance the community’s most pressing development objectives. (Aga Khan Foundation-USA, 2016; Bernholz, Fulton & Kaspar, 2005; Feurt & Sacks, 2016; GFCF, 2016; Harrow & Jung, 2016; Knight, 2012; New Nation, 2015; Sacks, 2000; and Williams, West & Klak, 2011).

Most of the studies that explore the role of community philanthropy in development have favored the more formal, structured and organized view of CP over the more informal modalities that could be described as community care, reciprocal relationships, or simply ‘looking out for
your neighbor.’ These studies demonstrated this preference by focusing almost solely on the community foundation as their primary unit of analysis (Carman, 2001; Council on Foundations & The Aspen Institute, 2013; Harrow & Tobias, 2016; Hodgson, Knight & Mathie, 2012; Knight, 2012; Lowe, 2004; and Ostower, 2007). These scholars and practitioners regard community foundations (CF) as a form or expression of community philanthropy. This approach is so prevalent that it could be concluded that the terms CP and CF are nearly interchangeable. Harrow & Jung, 2016 (citing Sacks, 2014) and GFCF, 2016 both underscore this point by concluding that the CF is the dominant form of community philanthropy around the world. In most discussions of community philanthropy and community foundations the term community is generally used to refer to a geographic place. However, there are numerous definitions of the word community used in the literature. For the purposes of this study the term community refers to the nation-state Kenya. Further examination of the conceptualization of CP and CF as well as the interconnectedness of the two terms will be taken up in the Background & Significance sections of this dissertation.

Frederick Goff – a banker living in Cleveland, Ohio – established the first community foundation in 1914. Goff’s foundation, known as the Cleveland Foundation, collected donations and contributions that a select group of local leaders administered and used, in line with donor directives if any, to address community needs. This model of community philanthropy was dubbed the Cleveland Plan and used by Goff to promote the establishment of community foundations around the United States. Goff’s marketing of his Cleveland Plan led to the creation of 8 CFs in the US in 1915 alone. (Berhnolz et al., 2005 and Feurt & Sacks, 2016). The growth of CFs around the country exploded in the 1920s, slowed in the 1930s/1940s due to the depression and WWII, but rebounded in the late 1940s/early 1950s and has been steadily
increasing ever since (Feurt & Sacks, 2016). However, the CF movement did not take root outside the US until the mid-to-late 1990s. The first CFs in Europe were established in Germany (1996), Poland and Russia (1998), Italy (1999) and Ireland in 2000 (Greene, 2001). The first CF in Kenya was established in 1996 as the Kenya Community Development Foundation (KCDF) (Sacks, 2000). There were 905 CFs worldwide in 2000. From 2000 to 2010, approximately 70 new CFs were established each year leading to a total of 1680 CFs by 2010. Most of this growth occurred in Europe and N. America but a number of CFs established in the global south are growing, evolving and beginning to influence the heretofore-dominant conceptualizations of community philanthropy and form of community foundations. (Knight, 2012).

Following their study of philanthropic practices among impoverished and marginalized communities in the Arkansas Delta, Williams, West and Klak (2011) claim that community philanthropy is a relatively new practice. Hodgson, Knight and Mathie (2012) explored the development of CFs in the global south, and note that there is very little literature on CFs and other forms of CP institutions/structures in the developing world. They also note that there is little literature that assesses the added value or specific contributions of CP to development. After a series of round-table discussions among experts and practitioners held in Washington, D.C., Johannesburg, and Dhaka, Knight (2012) goes on to state that the study of community philanthropy is underdeveloped as is its use to advance development objectives.

Notwithstanding the relative newness of the concept and the fact that not much is known about the impact of community philanthropy/community foundations on development organizations and their programs, private foundations such as the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, the Ford Foundation and the Aga Khan Foundation-USA have invested significant resources in promoting community-based philanthropy (Greene, 2001 and Knight, 2012). Between 1981 and 2001, the
Mott Foundation spent $75-million to establish and or strengthen CFs around the world. Since it began awarding grants in 2006, the Global Fund for Community Foundations (GFCF) has awarded a total of $3.5-million to 162 community foundations or community foundation-like organizations in 54 countries (Available: [http://www.globalfundcommunityfoundations.org/grants-awarded/](http://www.globalfundcommunityfoundations.org/grants-awarded/)). Almost all of the scholarly and practice-based literature reviewed indicate that the interest in community philanthropy and the popularity of community foundations emerge, in part, simply from the natural human impulse to care for our neighbors, respond to people in need and practice generosity (Lowe, 2004; Knight, 2012; and Sacks, 2000). However, there is some evidence that suggests that community philanthropy/community foundations enhance the sustainability and effectiveness of local organizations and local development efforts. CP/CF has also been shown to positively contribute to local and community development. (Knight, 2012; Harrow & Jung, 2016; and Hodgson, Knight and Mathie, 2012). Discussion of this evidence continues in the Background & Significance section of this dissertation.

1.2 Research Questions
The weaknesses in the conceptualization and study of organizational sustainability/effectiveness, the seeming incongruence between level of investment (i.e., international funding and capacity building) and level of return (i.e., enhanced organizational performance/effectiveness), and the growing convictions regarding the potential of community philanthropy/local fundraising to enhance organizational sustainability/effectiveness raises several questions that warrant further examination. The research questions addressed in this study are:

1. How do the directors of local civil society organizations and organizational development professionals perceive organizational sustainability/effectiveness in Kenya:
a) What are the essential components of OS/OE in Kenya; and  
b) What context-specific factors influence the sustainability of local CSOs in Kenya?

2. How do the directors of local civil society organizations and organizational development professionals perceive the role of local fundraising/community philanthropy in the sustainability/effectiveness of CSOs in Kenya:  
a) Have Kenyan CSOs engaged in local fundraising/community philanthropy? If so, what fundraising activities have they pursued?  
b) How successful have their efforts been?  
c) What challenges have they faced?  
d) What do they think local CSOs can do to promote/encourage more local giving and what are their future local fundraising plans?

3. What is the profile of the individual Kenyan giver?
   a) Why do they give? What are their primary motivations or reasons for giving?  
b) What ‘social causes’ or ‘issues’ do they prefer to give? How do they become aware of these needs?  
c) Who are the preferred recipients or beneficiaries of their giving?  
d) How do they make giving-related decisions?  
e) How do they give – What specific modalities do they use?  
f) To what extent do they give to local CSOs/NGOs?  
g) In what ways could CSOs/NGOs be more successful in their appeals for these individual Kenyans to give to them?

4. Using an interpretative, grounded-theory approach to data analysis, what possible theoretical assertions can be made to explain stakeholder-focused and context-specific conceptualizations of organizational sustainability of local organizations in development?
Chapter 2: Background and Significance

2.1 Local Organizations in Development Practice

2.1.1 Definition of Key Terms

Civil Society Organizations/Non-Governmental Organizations. The terms Civil Society Organization (CSO) and Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) will be used synonymously and interchangeably throughout this dissertation. CSOs or NGOs represent the largest and somewhat of a ‘catch-all’ category of organization involved in international development work. Following a study of the literature, Martens (2002) developed what he described as a “comprehensive definition” of NGO. “NGOs are formal, professionalized, independent societal organizations whose primary aim is to promote common goals at the national or the international level (p. 282).” The public welfare goals or social causes that are most often the focus of these organizations include economic development, human rights, public education, health and agricultural development, income generation, social services, etc. (Clarke, 1998 and Jenkins, 2012).

Borrowing extensively from Martens (2002) and Salamon et al. (1997 & 2003) and key elements highlighted above, for the purposes of this study, CSOs/NGOs are those organizations that possess the following characteristics:

• **Organized and Structured:** They have formalized structure, legal status/registration, governing documents/policies that outline operating procedures, etc.

• **Private:** They are not affiliated with a government, government entity, quasi-government entity/parastatal or a political party. These organizations ‘emerge’ from the private or social sphere.
• **Professional:** They have a professional staff with the necessary training and skills to execute the organization’s mission effectively. CSOs/NGOs, as defined here, do not include more informal organizations and/or membership-based associations such as community-based or grassroots organizations that do not exhibit the traits listed here.

• **Non-Profit:** While these organizations may generate revenue; revenues in excess of expenses are not distributed as profits to owners/directors of the organization. Revenues in excess of expenses (or ‘profits’) are re-invested in the organization’s operations or programming.

• **Socially Oriented:** The core business or mission of these organizations is advancing public welfare, promoting public good, etc. These organizations are most often focused on economic, social and community development, humanitarian/emergency relief, the advancement of broader socio-political objectives such as quality improvement of government-provided housing or the promotion of greater rights for indigenous people groups, etc.

• **Multiple Operating Environments:** The focus of operations and activities of this broad category of CSOs/NGOs may be international, regional, national or sub-national.

**International Non-Governmental Organizations.** *International NGOs* (*INGOs*) are those organizations that exhibit the six characteristics of the CSOs/NGOs outlined above but specifically “maintain headquarters in economically developed countries [while carrying-out activities] in developing countries (Bradshaw and Schafer, 2000, p. 98).” INGOs often receive funding from the governments of the countries in which they are headquartered, in addition to funds from private donors, philanthropic foundations and other entities, to facilitate development activities in a developing country often labeled as the recipient or beneficiary country.
(Marcussen, 1996). INGOs may have operations in any number of countries other than their country of origin. INGOs include such organizations as CARE, Habitat for Humanity, Save the Children, Doctors Without Borders, etc. (Bradshaw & Schafer, 2000). Instead of directly implementing projects in a developing country/countries, INGOs often support or build the capacity of national and sub-national organizations, with local-roots, to carry-out development activities. In this regard, Marcussen (1996) describes INGOs as “facilitators or catalysts… [that support] the creation and strengthening of an enabling environment” in which development can occur (p. 408).

**Local Non-Governmental Organizations.** Local NGOs (LNGOS) are terms used to refer to a second sub-group of CSOs/NGOs. Like INGOs, local NGOs exhibit all of the characteristics of CSOs/NGOs as portrayed in the synthesized Martens/Salamon framework developed above. However, local organizations have their headquarters in the same developing country in which their operations and activities are carried-out (Chaplowe & Engo-Tjega, 2007) and they can be described as ‘local’ or ‘indigenous’ to that country. A local NGO may have operations throughout its home country, in one or more region/area of the country, or in just one community or locality (Willets, 2001 as cited in Kim, 2011). In the investigator’s experience, LNGOs may receive funding from any number of sources including directly from an international donor agency, from an international donor agency channeled through an INGO, or directly from the resources of the INGO itself. Local NGOs typically, but not always, work closely with grassroots communities to accomplish shared development objectives. However, it should be noted that INGOs might themselves function as intermediary NGOs – working directly with grassroots associations and community-based organizations to implement development projects. INGOs may also partner with local NGOs to implement development projects largely developed
and directed by the INGO itself. In some cases, INGOs may develop and directly implement their own programs and projects with virtually no input from local NGOs or grassroots communities/community-based organizations. For some LNGOs, the connection with community and with the grassroots is more apparent than others. Those LNGOs that are member-based tend to have a greater community orientation and can be said to be more ‘representative’ of community – organizational/community members have some authority over the organization or at least are more directly and significantly involved in decision-making. However, those organizations that are member-based often choose to register in Kenya – and elsewhere – as cooperatives, associations, or community-based organizations.

As a starting point for this study, the term local NGO refers specifically to a definition of local organization developed by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and taken directly from section 201.II.b of the agency’s policy directives:

**Definition of “local organization”**— To be considered a “local” organization for purposes of USAID reporting, an entity must:

- Be organized under the laws of the recipient country;
- Have its principal place of business in the recipient country;
- Be majority owned by individuals who are citizens or lawful permanent residents of the recipient country or be managed by a governing body, the majority of whom are citizens or lawful permanent residents of a recipient country; and
- Not be controlled by a foreign entity or by an individual or individuals who are not citizens or permanent residents of the recipient country.

The term “controlled by” means a majority ownership or beneficiary interest as defined above, or the power, either directly or indirectly, whether exercised or exercisable, to control the election,
appointment, or tenure of the organization’s managers or a majority of the organization’s
governing body by any means, e.g., ownership, contract, or operation of law.

However, this definition was modified somewhat, due to sampling and other practical
considerations, as this research project was carried-out. Further explanation of these
modifications and resulting adjustments in study approach will be outlined in the Methods
section of this work.

The investigator’s rationale for the selection of ‘local organizations’ collective as the subject of
this research project and primary unit of analysis, begun in the preceding sections, is further
explained below.

2.1.2 Claims of Comparative Advantage
Despite the lack of targeted and rigorous research that demonstrates that the work of local
‘indigenous’ organizations leads to greater impact than other types of development
organizations; there appears to be near unanimous consensus in the development community that
local organizations bring several distinct advantages to the development process and therefore
warrant a more central and influential role in the development enterprise. The exact genesis of
this view is unclear. However, a review of relevant academic literature as well as working
papers, theoretical/conceptual essays/articles and practitioner produced reports and
organizational materials, offers several possible explanations, and some evidentiary support, for
the widespread adoption of this position within the development community. Coupled with the
information presented in the introductory section above, the body of work reviewed here, further
supports the need for enquiry beyond the specific scope of this study regarding the role of local
organizations in development.
Empirical Support for Comparative Advantage. The very limited amount of research evidence either supporting the oft-asserted comparative advantages of local organizations, or drawing conclusions regarding the relationship between these presumed advantages and development impact, warrants a more in-depth examination, than is typical in a literature review, of the following 5 studies. The breadth and depth of the first study reviewed makes it a particularly interesting case. In 1991, the Johns Hopkins University Center for Civil Society (JHUCCSS) launched a project, which seems to still be operating to date, to analyze the role, structure and funding of the nonprofit sector in 40 countries around the world. The latest available working paper that discusses outcome/impact-related results from this study is from 2000 and draws conclusions based on findings from 29 field studies in 11 countries – France, Ireland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Israel, Australia, Japan, the United States, Romania, Columbia and Argentina. (Salamon, Hems and Chinnock, 2000). The study’s primary unit of analysis was the nonprofit sector as a whole. Salamon and his colleagues defined the nonprofit sector as a set of organizations in a country that are self-governing, nonprofit, private, nongovernmental and voluntary “to some meaningful extent (2000, p. 4).”

The Salamon et al. study reached the following conclusions (p. 20):

- Services offered by nonprofits cost less than services provided by other sectors in 15 of 29 field studies.
- Services offered by nonprofits were of higher quality in 17 of 29 field studies.
- The nonprofit sector was rated as demonstrating medium to high degrees of equity in its service provision in comparison to other sectors providing services in 23 of 29 field studies.
- The nonprofit sector was rated as demonstrating substantial innovation in the approaches it used.
• The nonprofit sector was rated as demonstrating substantial or high levels of innovation in the type of service offered or specific client group reached.

The findings of over 50% of the 29 studies in the project at the time of the report lend some support to practitioner arguments that nonprofit, and specifically local, organizations have comparative advantages in their role as provider of social services. However, the study’s unit of analysis was the nonprofit sector and not individual, groups or categories of organizations that constitute the sector. So, claims that study findings are specifically applicable to ‘local’ organizations have to be made with caution. Nonetheless, study authors did specifically refer to sector organizations as those ‘in-country’ and ‘embedded’ in community. Ordinarily local, indigenous organizations are more embedded in community and therefore more likely to exhibit the advantages highlighted in this study.

In a 2010 study, Gaventa and Barrett, assessed the impact of the relationship between citizen engagement and ‘democracy’ and ‘development.’ Their specific research question was ‘what difference does citizen participation, voice, and engagement have on responsive governance and development?’ While citizen engagement can take place a variety of ways, in 29% of the cases studies, the authors found that citizen engagement happened through participation in local associations. Ninety percent of the outcomes of citizen engagement activities through these local associations were positive. As a form of local indigenous organization, the role of ‘the local association’ in facilitating these positive outcomes was clearly substantial. In another 29% of the cases, citizen engagement happened through social movements and campaigns – additional forms of informal and/or formal organization/s. Seventy-one percent of those activities produced positive outcomes.
Gaventa and Barrett reached their conclusions following a 10-year study where they conducted 100 in-depth case studies, in 20 countries examining 800 specific outcomes of citizen engagement. Near the end of the 10-year study, the authors completed an inductive meta-case study analysis of the 20 country-cases to reach conclusions about the broader impact of citizen engagement on responsive government and development. This meta-analysis revealed that 75% of the 800 outcomes of citizen engagement were positive. Citizen engagement resulted in:

- Greater access to social services and key development-specific resources;
- Greater recognition and achievement of rights;
- Enhanced responsiveness and accountability of the state;
- Greater social cohesion across groups; and
- Inclusion of new actors and new issues in public dialogue (Gaventa & Barrett, 2010).

As facilitators or conduits of citizen engagement local organizations in the form of constituent-based associations seemed to play a significant role in the attainment of positive development outcomes.

‘Localizing aid’ or simply transferring development assistance funds to national rather than international entities was the focus of a series of in depth country case studies led by Glennie, McKechnie, Rabinowitz and Ali (2013) of the Overseas Development Institute (ODI). The authors hypothesized that localizing aid would increase the capacity of national entities – including the state, private sector and civil society – as well as enhance the sustainability of development programming and outcomes. The ODI study consisted of an extensive literature analysis as well as 3 in-depth country case studies conducted in Guatemala, Liberia and Uganda.
Local actors in both the private sector and civil society denoted organizations that planned “to do their business indefinitely in the country (Glennie, et al., 2013, p. 45)” and were “required to register in-country per company, charity, NGO or taxation laws (p. 45).” The authors were most interested in civil society organizations (CSOs) known in country as non-profit or non-governmental organizations (NPOs or NGOs) and those that engaged in development activities.

Glennie et al. (2013) found that localizing aid led both to the enhancement of state capacity and the accountability of government to its citizens. In their discussion of ‘localizing aid,’ the authors did not differentiate between aid provided directly to private organizations and aid provided to government entities on the condition that it is channeled through government procurement systems to local organizations for implementation. Whether aid funds were transferred directly to private organizations or channeled through government entities, the Glennie et al. study showed that localizing aid increased the gross output of local private sector firms “by increasing the size of the market for publicly financed goods/services (p. 63).” The ODI team discovered that localizing aid was likely to reduce the cost/expense of development programming and increase both the capacity and organizational functioning of civil society organizations. While this study did not focus on the relationship of localizing aid to development outcomes or impact, it perhaps helps to explain some of the impetus behind the development community’s emphasis on working in and through local organizations as potentially better facilitators of development objectives.

The fourth study, which provides particularly relevant insight worth thorough review, was led by Satterthwaite and Sauter of the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) in 2008. Satterthwaite and Sauter conducted 6 individual case studies, as well as a meta-case analysis, of CSOs/NGOs in Puerto Rico, Peru, Zimbabwe, Pakistan, Argentina and Tanzania
examining the contribution of local organizations to environmental management. Local organizations included local community-based organizations (CBOs), local NGOs, local government and local enterprises “seeking to provide some developmental benefit on the ground (p. 6)” and specifically targeting low-income populations.

Satterthwaite and Sauter (2008) concluded that, “Development depends on effective, pro-poor local organizations (p. 6).” The authors reached this conclusion after their analysis revealed that a) what the poor need to escape poverty must be sourced and provided locally – i.e., education, healthcare, water and sanitation, access to land, etc.; b) much of the social and political change that had taken place in the 6 cases studied – and had direct benefits for the poor – was the result of local innovation and pressure exerted by local organizations and grassroots associations; and c) many of the obstacles to poverty-reduction were local – i.e., local power structures, bureaucratic regulations, practices and policies around land-ownership, etc. – so could, therefore, only be overcome through effective local organizations. More specifically, the authors determined that development required the engagement of local organizations because…

• They have thorough and personal knowledge of local context (culture, language, history, etc.);
• They can provide greater accountability to communities in poverty;
• Working in and through local organizations keeps costs low and thereby increases the impact of each dollar spent;
• Local organizations are better placed to combat local obstacles to poverty reduction;
• They can commit to the protracted, extended engagement that poverty reduction efforts requires; and
• Local organizations are better placed to generate greater citizen or community buy-in.
In the fifth and final study, Zyck and Krebs (2015) employ field research and the consultations of a tasked working group to review the possible comparative advantages national and local development organizations may have over their international counterparts in responding to disasters and humanitarian emergencies. These authors conclude that local organizations can provide the timeliest response in a crisis situation. Because these local actors are often part of the affected communities, they can capitalize on local input and provide directly relevant, contextually appropriate responses. Zyck and Krebs also conclude that local organizations have a significantly deeper understanding of local history, culture and language; they already have inroads into affected communities and, as such, can usually avoid many of the missteps international agencies often make when entering a relatively ‘unknown’ context. Finally, local organizations are often more likely to spend their funds on locally procured items used in their crisis response. This financial choice helps strengthen local businesses and supports regional economic growth.

Although the five studies reviewed here may not provide ‘generalizable findings’ in the traditional statistical conceptualization of the term, they do provide empirical grounding for deeper understanding of the role of local organizations in development. These studies also provide greater insight into the possible comparative advantages local organizations may have in development practice.

**Theoretical Support for Comparative Advantage.** New Institutionalism (NI) provides a convincing argument that local organizations may have a comparative advantage and, thus, should be given a central role in the development enterprise. There seems to be as many ‘institutionalisms’ as there are social science disciplines (Hodgson, 2006 and Powell & DiMaggio in DiMaggio & Powell (Eds.), 1991). The specific NI of interest here is generally referred to as ‘NI in organizational analysis/studies’ and can be traced back to the works of

Hodgson (2006) describes institutions as structures that “matter most in the social realm (p. 1).” Deephouse & Suchman (2008) describe institutions as norms, laws, social and cultural understandings, as well as principles and practices in society that are “taken for granted” (in Greenwood, Oliver, Sahlin, & Suddaby, Eds.). Numerous scholars use the term institutions to refer to norms, values, beliefs and socially/generally acceptable behaviors and practices (Boxenbaum & Jonsson 2008, Powell & DiMaggio, 1991, & Zucker, 1977). In their discussion of NI, DiMaggio & Powell raise a very interesting question that is very useful to understanding what an institution is and how it functions: “Can individual choices and preferences… be properly understood outside of the culture and historical frameworks in which they are embedded (p. 10).” Perhaps North (1990), however, offers the simplest, most straightforward description of institutions as formal and informal “rules of the game” (p. 3); “humanly devised constraints on human interaction” (p. 3) that provide structure to everyday life.

Scott (2008) discusses what he calls the 3 pillars of institutions. These pillars represent the sources within society from which institutions emerge. Regulative institutions generally emerge as the result of formal laws, policies, ordinances, etc. but they can also develop as the result of underlying informal/unwritten rules of conduct. Normative institutions evolve out of social norms, codes of conduct, unwritten expectations people have of one another, etc. Cultural-cognitive institutions stem from broader cultural frames, socio-cultural belief systems, etc. From these three sources, institutions govern all aspects of social life. Institutions provide stability.
They both constrain and allow certain behaviors/practices in social life. The extent to which institutions directly impact perspectives and choices depends on a) the cost of monitoring adherence to the existing institutional framework in a given society as well as b) the incentives/disincentives/sanctions associated with ‘compliance’ or rejection of the institutional dictum. (North, 1990, Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008, Hodgson, 2006, and Scott, 2008).

The central tenet of NI that is most applicable to the study of the role of local organizations in development is the theory’s assertion that organizations are conceived and established as a result of existing institutions. More specifically, the form, structure, governance and standard operating practices of any organization are profoundly shaped by the prevailing social institutions of the time in which the organization was started. Furthermore, the “legitimacy” in society of any established organization and the likelihood of its long-term survival and success are significantly determined by the extent to which the organization’s form and structure, etc. are rooted in its institutional environment. (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, DiMaggio & Powell, 1983 and Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). Legitimacy is achieved when an organization’s vision, mission, and practices are ‘in line’ with social-cultural understandings, worldviews, mores, values and beliefs that have been described here as institutions (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). These authors add that legitimacy – or the degree of an organization’s synchronization with its institutional environment – enables the organization to improve its performance, enhance its effectiveness and increase the likelihood of it achieving its goals.

If, as New Institutional scholars assert, organizations are the product of their institutional environments and their survival/success is largely dependent on them being ‘in-line’ with that environment, it follows that local organizations could indeed have a comparative advantage within this kind of paradigm over international organizations. Presumably, local organizations,
by definition would reflect socio-cultural understandings, values, norms, beliefs, etc. of the societies in which they work to a far greater extent than organizations with external origins responding primarily to distinctly different institutional environments.

The core tenets of NI also give rise to several questions that seem critically important to the thorough study of local organizations in development, and more specifically, to reaching a deeper understanding of the comparative advantage local organization may have in the development process:

* What are the boundaries of a local organization’s institutional environment? Is the organization ‘responsible’ to just one ‘set of institutions,’ one institutional environment, or are there potentially numerous institutional frameworks an organization has to contend with? How does an organization handle conflicting institutions or ‘sets of institutions’?

* When international organizations (particularly donors) have assessed the capacities of local organizations have they considered organizational/institutional environment fit? Have INGO capacity building efforts addressed issues of building legitimacy through greater adherence to relevant institutions? Have INGO capacity building efforts been conceived based on the INGO’s most relevant institutional framework and not that of the local beneficiary organization? If so, what impact has this choice ultimately had on survival and success of the local organization?

The NI scholarship reviewed here addresses scenarios where organizations contend with multiple institutions and multiple institutional environments. However, the literature does not appear to apply NI and address these questions in regards to development organizations and the arenas in which they operate.

An additional cornerstone of NI is the concept of isomorphism. Isomorphism is essentially the tendency for organizations operating in the same institutional environment to become increasingly similar to one another in form and structure as they all, over time, respond to the same set of institutions in the environment they all share (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, DiMaggio &
Many, if not most, successful local organizations are essentially dependent on international NGOs and donors for their resources. In such a scenario, what institutional environment is the local organization wrestling with – that of the external donor/partner’s ‘home culture,’ that of the local organization’s ‘home-culture’ or both? To which of these institutional environments must the local organization conform itself in order to achieve legitimacy? Can it conform to both? How does it deal with conflicting institutions? Addressing these questions, through this and future research endeavors, could provide much greater insight regarding the possible comparative advantage of local organizations, the degree of success local organizations have or haven’t had at furthering development objectives in the last 50 years, as well as shed light on why/how decades of capacity building, organizational strengthening work has not had the ‘return’ expected of such an extensive and costly investment. Chapters 8 and 9 of this dissertation discuss how the current study addresses some of these questions in greater detail. As will be explained in Chapters 8 and 9, and illustrated in Chapter 4 and 5; the sustainability of local CSOs/NGOs is significantly hampered by the competing institutional environments of Kenya on the one hand and the international donor agencies/countries they represent on the other.

2.2 Overview of Primary Study Concepts

2.2.1 Organizational Effectiveness (OE)
Scholars and practitioners from a wide variety of disciplines and professions have used numerous terms to describe a nonprofit organization’s ability to a) continue its operations over time or simply ‘survive’ and b) effectively and efficiently achieve its objectives and goals. There seems to be a slight preference in the nonprofit management and international development literature for the terms ‘organizational sustainability and ‘organizational effectiveness’ –
although this conclusion is admittedly subjective given the sheer number of terms used interchangeably to describe similar concepts and the enormity of the bodies of relevant literature. What is perhaps less debatable is the dominance of the term ‘organizational sustainability’ to describe the ideas of survivability and effective/efficient attainment of organizational objectives among international development professionals.

In a 2011 study, Lecy, Schmitz and Swedlund reviewed 64 select studies related to organizational effectiveness extracting each study’s conceptualization of the construct. Using Google Scholar, they completed an initial citation network analysis that grew to 4879 articles. Lecy et al. narrowed that down by pulling articles with the most citations (at least 20). They narrowed their sample even further by focusing on just those articles that address ‘NGO/NPO effectiveness.’ These authors identify several trends in the scholarship around NGO/NPO effectiveness: 1) a general rejection of singular or uniform measures of effectiveness; 2) the conclusion that effectiveness is dependent on context; 3) the scholarship is dominated by multidimensional approaches to measuring effectiveness centered on ‘organizational reputation’ – that emphasizes an organization’s relationship with its stakeholders – and ‘hybrid multidimensional’ approaches such as the Sowa, Selden and Sandfort (2004) approach that is discussed below; and 4) most studies tend to be theoretical, ‘framing,’ and/or argumentative rather than empirical.

Lecy et al. concluded that organizational effectiveness consisted of 4 elements: managerial effectiveness, program effectiveness, network effectiveness and legitimacy. Managerial effectiveness included the capacities of organizational leadership, staff and governing board; stringent financial controls and effective and efficient planning/budgeting processes. Program effectiveness included the resulting outcomes and impact of an organization’s interventions and
the overall efficiency and effectiveness of organizational performance. Network effectiveness included the degree to which organizations leveraged partnerships and other key relationships to achieve desired objectives. Legitimacy included the organization’s name or brand recognition and its affiliation with successful initiatives. This is, perhaps, one of the most comprehensive definitions of organizational effectiveness found in the literature reviewed. This conceptualization captures many of the elements of organizational effectiveness presented in subsequent literature discussed below.

The Lecy et al. study also revealed that while there was general lack of consensus among the authors reviewed regarding how organizational effectiveness is measured; there was general agreement that one-dimensional measures were not particularly useful although widely used in research and practice. Lecy et al. reported that most of their sample attempted to assess levels of organizational effectiveness simply through reputation and perceived effectiveness among key stakeholders and/or through an examination of various program and management variables such as ‘percentage of revenue used for administrative expenses.’

A Bowers and Seashore (1966) study of 40 agencies of a leading life-insurance company focused on examining leadership as a predictor of organizational effectiveness. They developed a four-factor leadership model that included providing ‘support,’ facilitating interaction, emphasizing the setting and achievement of goals, and facilitating work. Bowers and Seashore concluded that their four-factor leadership model could predict organizational outcomes – synonymous, in this case, with organizational effectiveness. They reached their conclusions by testing relationships between each of the leadership factors and performance/effectiveness factors such as business growth, business costs, business volume and staff turnover.
Hartnell, Ou and Kinicki (2011) conducted a meta-analysis looking at the relationship of organizational culture to organizational effectiveness. They apply the Quinn and Rohrbaugh 1983 (as cited in Hartnell et al., 2011) ‘competing values framework (CVF)’ to study the relationship of organizational culture to organizational effectiveness. CVF is a complex understanding of organizational culture. In simple terms, organizational culture emerges as a result of individual and group values/beliefs. There are 4 groups of values that essentially form the basis for 4 types of organizational culture. *Clan culture* is oriented around collaboration, cohesion and participation. *Adhocracy culture* is based on creativity, adaptability and flexibility. *Hierarchy* is focused on control, processes, measurement and efficiency. *Market culture* is focused on competition, productivity, and percentage of profits or gains. (Quin and Rohrbaugh, 1983 as cited in Hartnell et al., 2011). Based on data from 84 empirical studies with 94 independent samples they concluded that organizational culture was positively associated with 3 indices of organizational effectiveness, namely employee attitudes (commitment/satisfaction), operational performance (innovation/quality of products or services) and financial performance (profit and growth).

A particularly interesting and thorough examination of organizational effectiveness was the Baruch and Ramalho structured literature review of 2006. The authors traced the evolution of theory related the study of organizational effectiveness. They concluded that this evolution over time has led to lack of agreement on the conceptualization of terms, general confusion and widespread lack of consensus. However, they note that two basic approaches seem to emerge in much of the literature. The economic approach – originally articulated in Taylor’s 1911 publication *The Principles of Scientific Management* – argues that rational and efficient management of resources is the key to organizational effectiveness. The social view emerged
largely in response to what scholars regarded as the inadequacies of the strictly economic approach. Proponents of the social view of organizational effectiveness focused more on the rootedness of organizational effectiveness in human nature and issues such as competing values and socioeconomic differences. The social view was followed by the development of numerous multi-dimensional approaches to conceptualizing and measuring organizational effectiveness.

The authors studied the operational definitions of organizational effectiveness in 149 empirical studies published between 1996 and 2006 and representing 100 for-profit organizations, 21 non-profit organizations and 28 mixed profit/non-profit organizations. From this structured and systematic review, Baruch and Ramalho concluded that efficiency or productivity; growth or market share; customer orientation; and quality were positively associated with organizational effectiveness among all types of organizations studied. Public image and/or reputation as well as social performance were factors positively associated with organizational effectiveness among 10 organizations the authors identify as ‘externally-focused’ non-profit organizations.

In an article published in the *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, Sowa, Selden and Sandfort (2004) proposed a new model of organizational effectiveness that they called the Multidimensional Integrated Model of Nonprofit Organizational Effectiveness (MIMNOE). The authors survey the literature and explain that MIMNOE intends to build on previous scholarly work. They too, however, note the fractured approach to the study of organizational effectiveness and the lack of consensus around numerous related issues such as the simple conceptualization of the central construct. Sowa et al. also note that scholars tend to either emphasize external factors, such as an organization’s relationship with its key stakeholder groups or internal factors, such as chosen objectives and methods used to achieve those objectives, in their study of organizational effectiveness. The MIMNOE model includes two distinct
components: management effectiveness and program effectiveness – quite similar to the model developed by Lecy et al. Management refers to systems, structures, policies and procedures that an organization puts in place to facilitate the achievement of the organization’s mission. Program refers to the interventions and services delivered or the programs implemented by an organization to directly impact targeted beneficiaries. Management and program effectiveness each have the same two sub-components in the Sowa, Selden and Sandfort model – namely capacity and outcomes. Capacity is defined as ‘how’ the organization, program or intervention operates and ‘how’ systems and structures ‘dictate’ or ‘guide’ action. Outcomes are the specific results produced by either management or program activities. Management capacity and outcomes as well as program capacity and outcomes are measured in MIMNOE using both objective and perceptual indicators. The authors generally recommend the use of self-report measures for perceptual indicators and a review of historical data collected/maintained by the agency for objective indicators.

The Lecy et al. (2011), Bowers and Seashore (1966), Hartnell et al. (2011), Baruch and Ramalho (2006) and Sowa et al. (2004) capture some of the many attempts scholars have made to propose an approach to the conceptualization and measurement of organizational effectiveness in the academic or practice literature. This brief review of the work of these authors to define key elements of organizational effectiveness is meant to expose the reader to different perspectives of organizational effectiveness and underscore the broad and fragmented nature of the study of organizational effectiveness.

Jerry VanSant (February 2000, Originally retrieved from http://www.aidstar-two.org/Tools Database.cfm?action=detail&id=32&language_id=1, Available from the author) of the Center for International Development at Duke University reviewed 8 different tools used by international
development organizations to assess performance or effectiveness of the local/indigenous partner organizations they work with in the field. The creators of these tools and their sponsoring organizations sometimes used the term “organizational capacity” interchangeably with terms such as “organizational performance” and “organizational effectiveness.” So, some of the tools are referred to as “capacity assessment” tools or “indicators of organizational capacity,” etc. Following his review of the 8 effectiveness instruments, VanSant constructed a composite framework for institutional capacity that he believes captures the variables that the 8 tools reviewed use to assess organizational effectiveness or performance. VanSant found a great deal of similarity among the assessment instruments reviewed. He believed these similarities reflect a growing consensus on what the determinants of “effective and sustainable institutions” (p. 1) are. VanSant’s framework for institutional capacity included three broad categories: Institutional Resources, Institutional Performance and Institutional Sustainability. Institutional resources included the four components legal structure and governance; human resources; management systems and practices; and financial resources. Program results; networking and external relations; application of technical knowledge; and constituency empowerment, when taken together, made-up institutional performance. Institutional sustainability included the attributes organizational autonomy, leadership and organizational learning (p. 2).

VanSant explained that the variables from the 8 instruments he reviewed are usually measured using perception scales or indices. Scale responses often range from 1 to 5. The instruments are almost always administered in groups using participatory techniques. For each variable/item on the instrument, an assembled group of organizational leaders and/or staff is asked to assess the organization on a scale of 1 to 5 on the particular variable in question. Groups usually engage in robust discussion before assigning a final, consensus-driven score for the specific item being
discussed. Following the assigning of a score for each component of the measure, group participants are usually asked to identify a set of actions the organization could take to move from the level the group assigned itself on a particular item to the next level up on the instrument. In this way, the assessment/measurement of organizational effectiveness becomes an action-planning process for strengthening the organization.

2.2.2 Organizational Sustainability (OS)
Researchers and development practitioners have typically approached the study of sustainability in one of two ways (Sarriot, Winch, Ryan, Edison, Bowie, Swedberg and Welch, 2004). One group has attempted to identify factors or determinants of sustainability while another has defined sustainability or built models to operationalize the construct. Pathfinder International, for example, has chosen to define sustainability as “the ability of an organization to secure and manage sufficient resources to enable it to fulfill its mission effectively and consistently over time without excessive dependence on any single funding source, including maintaining its ability to continue offering quality services and having an impact long after primary donor funding is withdrawn” (Pathfinder International, 2013).

Brown (1998) identified five major perspectives of organizational sustainability in the literature. Some scholars viewed sustainability as the continuation of program benefits; others highlighted the ability of organizations to cover recurrent costs. A third group focused on the capabilities of the institution. Still others concentrated on organizational longevity/age or the importance of organizational learning. While the Brown study recognized key themes running throughout the study of organizational sustainability, Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (1992) concluded more specifically that engaged leadership and active supportive staff diligently working toward sustainability were key determinants of organizational sustainability. They also noted that good
performance and proactive planning were necessary elements for building sustainable organizations. The Brinkerhoff/Goldsmith study also underscored that sustainability is a continuous process and not an end point.

More recent examinations concurred, in part, with the Brinkerhoff/Goldsmith study but identified additional factors necessary for organizational sustainability. Organizations who were 1) proactive and innovative, 2) had diverse funding sources, 3) whose revenues exceeded costs, 4) who entered into strategic and collaborative partnerships with like organizations, and 5) who were good performers and demonstrated high impact were more likely to be sustainable organizations (Weerawardena, McDonald, and Mort, 2010). Sarriot el al., concluded that project outcomes, organizational vision, leadership vision, local/community ownership/control and organizational social capital were critical determinants of sustainability.

Organizational culture was another variable identified in a 2003 study as critically important to financial sustainability, organizational sustainability and the sustainability of project benefits (Lewis, 2003). Lewis used Handy’s 1988 framework of organizational culture as the primary conceptualization of the construct in his qualitative study (Handy, 1988 as cited in Lewis, 2003). Handy identifies 4 different types of culture: 1) Club culture exists when a group of people coalesce around a like-minded leader whose charisma and perspectives shape group activity; 2) Role culture exists in organizations where staff have very defined roles and associated rules and regulations that together govern behavior that shape what they do as individuals and in relation to one another; 3) Task culture exists where staff members are valued primarily for their specific sets of skills and the various combinations of skills that can be grouped together as needed to accomplish tasks; and 4) Person culture exists in organizations where the staff members view themselves as the primary source of organizational life with little need for additional structure.
Lewis went on to discuss how different types or facets of organizational culture interact with financial sustainability, organizational sustainability and the sustainability of project benefits in different ways.

The concepts of organizational sustainability and organizational survival are essentially interchangeable. Walker and McCarthy’s (2010) study of 304 community-based organization (CBOs) operating from 1991 to 2004 in United States revealed several very interesting determinants of what they described as organizational survival but what could also be labeled organizational sustainability. Organizations who are “embedded” (p. 330) in local environments and who make themselves publicly accountable to their stakeholders are more sustainable than those who are not embedded or not accountable. Organizations that hold public accountability sessions were 8 times more likely to survive than those that did not (p. 330). Organizations who have a wider, more varied programmatic focus are more likely to survive than those who specialize in one particular technical area. Finally, funds raised from local “grassroots” (p. 334) sources had a greater impact on organizational sustainability than funding at large. Receiving government grants was not significantly related to organizational survival but each additional $1000 in income from grassroots fundraising efforts increased an organization’s chances of survival by 2% (p. 334).

One study in particular warrants careful consideration because of both the depth and richness of insight the author provides. Using in-depth case analysis as his chosen measurement tool, Daniel Gustafson (1994) studied 24 organizations working in various parts of South and Southeast Asia, Latin America and East Africa that provide agriculture extension services. These organizations were established by the World Bank based on key principles of institutional sustainability identified by Brinkerhoff/Goldsmith. Gustafson reviewed the results of the World Bank’s efforts
to transition these service organizations off donor money to more sustainable operational models with the objective of highlighting factors critical to promoting institutional sustainability.

Gustafson identified the following 6 lessons-learned from these organizations:

1. **No single ‘correct solution.’** The interface between organizations, their programs/services and their local environments is a key determinant of sustainability. An organization’s structure, approach, technology (methods), etc. must be tailored to local realities.

2. **Support of internal and external stakeholders is critical.** An organization’s external stakeholders are the primary determinants of whether an organization’s products/services are ‘valued’ and deemed to be worth consuming. Support of internal stakeholders is important for the success of any change or strategy the organization adopts to promote sustainability.

3. **Benefits have to be delivered.** Programs and services must be successful and effective. Stakeholders’ assessment of ‘value’ is based on how effective they perceive the organization’s programs/services to be.

4. **Balancing stakeholder interest and best practice.** Sometimes the technical, effective solution is not what some stakeholders want. Organizations must find a stable balance between addressing stakeholder needs/perspectives and effective programming.

5. **Balancing the generalist versus specialist approach.** Stakeholders often advocate for a broader, more varied array of programs and services. Organizations who constantly expand their program portfolios may increase benefits in the short term but this approach often increases complexity and stretches the organization thin. A more ‘sustainability enhancing’ approach could be specializing in a couple core services. This conclusion, however,
contradicts the Walker/McCarthy finding that more varied programming promotes sustainability.

6. Balancing action and learning or reflection and practice. The profound challenges faced by communities in the developing world leads some organizations to act quickly and reactively at the expense of careful analysis and planning. Timely action, particularly in relief settings, is necessary but the conditions for organizational sustainability are optimized when leaders pursue a balanced action and learning approach in their organizations.

The measurement of organizational sustainability is similar, in practice, to the measurement of organizational effectiveness. This underscores the overlapping, essentially parallel meanings of the two constructs. Management Sciences for Health (MSH): Management and Organizational Sustainability Tool (MOST) was one of the 8 tools reviewed in the VanSant study of frameworks for assessing institutional capacity. MSH is a non-profit global health organization that strengthens the capacities of local organizations, invests in innovative health systems and promotes sound public health policy (www.msh.org). MSH has developed its own instrument to assess organizational longevity/survival, performance and effectiveness of its local partners. MSH’s instrument is structured around the concept of organizational sustainability as opposed to organizational effectiveness. MSH’s MOST is self-administered by local organizations generally through participatory workshops where organizational leadership/staff assess themselves and the performance of their organizations on a set of 5 main criteria and 16 sub-criteria. These criteria represent what MSH has concluded are the critical elements of organizational sustainability (synonymous in this case with effectiveness): Mission, Values, Strategy, Structure and Systems.
For each criteria or sub-criteria of organizational sustainability/effectiveness, participants – generally assembled in a workshop setting – are asked to score the organization from 1 to 4 where 1 represents the lowest level of sustainability/effectiveness and 4 represents the highest score possible on the instrument. MOST lists these 4 categories as ‘stages of development and their characteristics.’ For each criteria/sub-criteria, participants are asked to cite evidence used/consulted to arrive at the score assigned. This evidence may be from agency documents, data collected and maintained by the organization, project reports, external evaluations, participant perceptions/experiences, etc. Participatory workshops are usually held to administer the MOST instrument. MSH or other external facilitators often facilitate these workshops. In some instances, external facilitators will use the instrument to assess the organization’s effectiveness separately from the staff’s own assessment. The two assessments are then compared/contrasted and consensus scores are determined through a consultative process.

2.2.3 Community Philanthropy (CP)
Several general assertions common to nearly all of the definitions and conceptualizations of community philanthropy found in the literature reviewed were outlined in the Introduction section of this dissertation. There are, however, more technical and detailed interpretations of the concept used by both scholars and practitioners that merit review. The most repeated of these definitions was developed by the European Foundation Center:

Community philanthropy is the act of individual citizens and local institutions contributing money or goods along with their time or skills, to promote the well being of others and the betterment of the community in which they live and work. Community philanthropy can be expressed in informal and spontaneous ways. It can also be expressed in formal, organized ways whereby citizens give contributions to local organizations, which in turn use the funds to support projects that improve the quality of life (Harrow & Jung, 2016 and Williams et al., 2011).
This conceptualization has since been taken-up by other scholarly and practice-based discussions of the idea (Harrow & Jung, 2016; Knight, 2012; and Williams et al., 2011).

In 2012, the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation (Mott Foundation), the Global Fund for Community Foundations (GFCF) and the Aga Khan Foundation-USA (AKF) convened a three ‘roundtables’ held respectively in Washington, DC, Johannesburg and Dhaka (Knight, 2012). These roundtables brought experts and practitioners in CP together to a) develop a common understanding of CP; b) determine the potential contributions CP could make to development and c) identify ways to advance CP around the world. More than 50 experts in community philanthropy participated in these consultations. They started their deliberations using the European Foundation Center’s definition of CP but concluded that it was so broad it could be applied to almost any NGO/CSO and its activities. So, they developed a list of characteristics that, when taken together, they assert add up to CP. Community philanthropy is:

- Organized & structured
- Self-directed – Community members manage the collection and management of contributions as well as the expenditure of funds.
- Open architecture – A term used in the IT industry that indicates an idea can be ‘added-on to,’ modified, adapted, etc.
- Builds/develops civil society
- Communities/localities using own money and assets
- Focused on building an inclusive and equitable society (Knight, 2012)

The GFCF, based in Johannesburg, claims that the most popular form of community philanthropy is the community foundation (2016). Harrow and Jung (2016) are somewhat more specific noting that the CF is the most prominent form of structured community philanthropy but
the least studied form of philanthropy. What seems to be clear, however, is that advocacy for community philanthropy within the development community as a means to promote the sustainability of local organizations, expand local control over development interventions and enhance the impact of those interventions generally revolves around the establishment and spread of community foundations. In an exploratory study commissioned by the Council on Foundations (COF), Sacks (2000) describes community foundations as organizations that…

- seek to improve the quality of life in a defined geographic area;
- are independent from control or influence by other organizations, governments or donors;
- are governed by a board of citizens broadly reflective of the communities they serve;
- make grants to other nonprofit groups to address a wide variety of emerging and changing needs in the community;
- seek to build, over time, a collection of endowed funds from a wide range of donors, including local citizens, other nonprofits and businesses;
- provide services tailored to the interests and giving capacity of donors;
- help donors achieve their philanthropic and charitable goals; engage in a range of community leadership and partnership activities, serving as catalysts, conveners, collaborators and facilitators to solve problems and develop solutions to important community issues;
- are accountable to the community by informing the general public about their purposes, activities, and financial status on a regular basis (p. 3).

In the relevant literature available, there seems to be a good consensus around the basic building blocks of the Council’s definition of the community foundation (Carman, 2001; Bernholz et al., 2005; and Feurt & Sacks, 2016). Lowe (2004), Ostrower (2007) and Carman (2001) also note that community foundations in the United States are classified as “public charities” per the regulations of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). “Public charities” must meet the “public
support test” and “demonstrate that they receive continuous financial support from multiple donors (Carman, 2001, p. 10).”

With the rapid growth of community foundations and the CF movement in the global south (as described above), scholars and practitioners from beyond Europe and North America are enriching conceptualizations of community philanthropy and adding layers of meaning that appropriate the concept by making it more relevant to and reflective of local context. Within the idea of community philanthropy, University of Cape Town professor, Susan Wilkinson-Maposa (2015), distinguishes between what she calls “vertical” and “horizontal” philanthropy (p. 1). Vertical philanthropy involves the transfer of resources from the rich to the poor and could also be described as philanthropy FOR community. Horizontal philanthropy, which Wilkinson-Maposa describes as philanthropy OF community, involves the transfer of resources from the poor to the poor. The international aid system is an expression of vertical philanthropy where external resources are mobilized for development. Horizontal philanthropy is perhaps best reflected by self-help and mutual assistance where internal resources are mobilized for development. (Wilkinson-Maposa, 2015).

TrustAfrica and the GFCF (2008) used Wilkinson-Maposa’s vertical/horizontal philanthropy framework to discuss the ideas of “philanthropy OF Africa” versus “philanthropy FOR Africa” with 20 African grant-makers from across the continent (Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania and Zimbabwe). The results of a May 2008 consultation with these grant-makers in Naivasha, Kenya reveals key insights into an African understanding/expression of the community philanthropy/community foundations concept. The Naivasha consultation also provided an assessment regarding the growing focus on promoting community philanthropy/community foundations to bolster organizational sustainability and spur
development. Participants noted considerable disagreement in the field about whether the CF model was an expression of philanthropy OF Africa or FOR Africa. They questioned the effectiveness of imposing the CF model – an essentially U.S. form of organized philanthropy – on Africa. Consultation attendees concluded that programs promoting CP throughout the continent have: overemphasized specific models, overemphasized issues – labeled as critical for best-practice – such as CF governance, terms of office, roles/functions of decision-makers, etc., while underemphasizing “local relevance, soft leadership, informal networks and impact (p. 2). (TrustAfrica & GFCF, 2008, Retrieved from: http://www.trustafrica.org/forum/index.php?board=11.0).

Studying community philanthropy – particularly its ‘horizontal’ aspects – may lead some to question if people who are poor can really be ‘donors’ or contribute in a meaningful way through one of the forms described here – mutual aid, self-help, community foundations, etc.

Williams, West and Klak (2011) studied philanthropic behavior/practices in the Arkansas Delta in 2008. They targeted communities that had high rates of poverty, low wealth accumulation and low levels of education. Using mixed methods, they analyzed data from the 16 communities within the Delta that met their participation criteria and responded to their survey. Data were collected from Mayors and/or Town Managers. Within the 12-month period preceding data collection, the 16 target communities had held 300 fundraising events. Four of these communities organized 30 or more fundraising events during the year. All communities reported that their events were attended by a diversity of people representative of all groups in their respective areas. Fourteen of the 16 respondents noted that there were individuals who had made “substantial” charitable contributions in the preceding year. Eleven of the 14 substantial contributors gave their donations to local nonprofits.
In 2013, Charities Aid Foundation of Southern Africa (CAFSA) (2015) surveyed 1252 “ordinary people” living in Gauteng Province as a way of exploring giving and philanthropic behavior in South Africa. South Africa was ranked 116 of 185 assessed by the U.N. 2015 Human Development Report. Gross annual per capita income in South Africa is $12,122. Twenty-five percent of South Africans are unemployed, 36% live below the poverty line and 27% are below age 18. (CIA World Factbook, 2015 and UN HDR, 2015). In spite its ranking as a middle-income country, 80% of study participants (1008 of 1252) had made a charitable contribution of “goods” at least one time in the previous 3 months. Nine hundred or 72% of participants had made a financial donation at least one time in the previous 3 months. Participants who made financial donations did so an average of 2 times in the previous 3 months. The median financial donation was R75 or approximately $5.00. Fifty-six percent or 701 of the 1252 participants gave their time and energy to charitable causes an average of 5.45 times in the previous month with each volunteer period lasting an average of 5 hours.

The harambee self-help, mutual assistance movement in Kenya is well known both in East Africa and to many around the world. The concept of harambee is fairly complex and has evolved over time. Chapter 7 provides a more thorough overview of the concept of harambee as it is more currently understood and practiced in Kenya. In this particular example, harambee, at its most basic, involves communities coming together, pooling resources, providing mutual support, providing reciprocal assistance, etc. to accomplish community and sometimes individually defined social welfare/community development goals. Keller (1983) discusses how the concept of harambee was used an organizing concept in Kenya in the early years after independence to develop a network of harambee schools community initiated and maintained. Through mutual assistance and pooled resources, communities around Kenya constructed
schools and maintained them while the government of Kenya sometimes stepped in at a later point and covered some operating costs and staffed the schools. Keller (1983) describes how in 1963 self-help *harambee* schools – built and operated by poor self-subsistence farming communities (Keller refers to them as peasants) – represented approximately 14% of all secondary schools in Kenya. By 1977, self-help *harambee* schools had increased significantly and had come to constitute more than 70% of all Kenyan secondary schools. This example illustrates quite clearly that households and communities who are poor and even very poor can, through initiatives like the *harambee* secondary schools, give quite generously in various ways that ultimately have important transformative impact on entire societies. While definitive conclusions cannot be made from these three studies alone, they clearly indicate that people who are poor can and do give in multiple ways to better their fellow citizens and their communities.

Evidence from both scholarly and practice-based sources supports the conclusion that community philanthropy increases the health and viability of local NGOs/CSOs and has positive development impacts. Even though the study of CP and the use of CP in development is underdeveloped (Knight, 2012 and Williams et al., 2011), there are a few studies that demonstrate that community philanthropy may be an effective strategy. The Washington, DC, Johannesburg and Dhaka roundtables organized by the Mott Foundation, the GFCF and AKF-USA, as described earlier, concluded that CP has a central role to play in developing civil society and enhancing aid effectiveness. In particular, they noted that CP reduces the dependency and enhances the sustainability of local development organizations and development programming (Knight, 2012). According to these 50+ experts, community philanthropy also strengthens community leadership, builds trust among the community and increases the community’s social
capital. By increasing local ownership and local accountability, roundtable participants concluded that CP improves long-term development impact. (Knight, 2012).

In a 2013/2014 study, Harrow and Jung (2016) explored the relationship of the presence and activity of community foundations in community-to-community development. These researchers partnered with 10 CFs in the UK who regularly assess ‘levels of development’ in the communities they serve. These CFs use the Vital Signs assessment tool developed by the umbrella organization Canadian Community Foundations (CCF). The Vital Signs tool has been described as “measuring and grading a community’s quality of life (p. 134)” and “an annual community check-up (p. 134).” Harrow and Jung conclude that community philanthropy using mainly but not solely local wealth appears to “change local situations for the better (p. 144).” They add that the positive effects of CP on a locality’s quality of life are greater when the articulated needs and priorities of the community are publicized. In spite of the apparently positive impacts of CP on community development, Harrow and Jung observed chronic unmet needs in the communities they studied. This led them to conclude that the ability of CPs and CFs to stimulate fundamental social change or transformation may be limited.

The most detailed and informative examination of the relationship of CP/CFs to organizational sustainability/effectiveness and development comes from Hodgson, Knight and Mathie (2012). These investigators partnered with the GFCF and its 63 grantees (community foundations and similar organizations) to develop a scoring methodology to measure the impact of CP/CF-activity on the capacity of local organizations and on key development indicators. This research partnership scored all 63 GFCF community foundation grantees and their respective communities on a set of 20 indicators using a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 is the lowest and 5 the highest score. Average scores for the group of grantees across the 20 indicators were quite high.
indicating that CP/CF-activity had significantly positive impacts on both organizational and subsequently community development. The lowest average score on any one indicator was 3.4 out of 5. The highest average score on any one indicator was 4.8 out of 5. A sampling of the indicators and associated scores is listed below:

- Building community assets and philanthropy – 4.8
- Strengthening community groups – 4.5
- Building the capacity of local organizations – 3.9
- Strengthening gender equality – 3.8
- Poverty reduction – 3.7
- Strengthening other marginalized groups – 3.7

It seems logical that the score related to the organizational development indicators would be slightly higher than scores for the development outcome/impact indicators because of the difference in time delay from intervention to outcome. Strengthening organizational capacity, for example, could occur much quicker than something like reducing gender inequality or reducing poverty.

The ‘Methods’ section of this work introduces the agency and one of the agency’s specific projects that the principal investigator (PI) partnered with to implement this study. The rationale and design for the agency’s project was based, in part, on the concept of literature-oriented, more academic conceptualization of ‘community philanthropy’ as outlined above. However, in implementation, the agency and project team appropriated the term and in practice use the term to simply mean ‘local giving,’ ‘local fundraising,’ and/or ‘locally generated resources for development and social-service activities.’ In that sense, the project designers and implementing
team – unknowingly following Wilkinson-Maposa line of thinking as described above – developed their own conceptualization of a ‘community philanthropy of Africa.’ Therefore, the terms community philanthropy, local fundraising, generating resources locally, local resource mobilization were used interchangeably throughout this research project as they will be throughout this written work.

2.3 Theoretical Contributions to the Understanding of OS/OE

2.3.1 Resource-Based View (RBV) of Organizations

The resource-based view of organizations (RBV) asserts that the key asset or strength of an organization is the set of resources it controls. Resources can be almost anything that the organization uses as building blocks for achieving its vision and mission. Resources include tangible and intangible assets, personnel, processes, systems, structures, brand names, knowledge, reputation, etc. (Wernerfelt, 1984). Resources are both internal (personnel, equipment, etc.) and external (reputation, stakeholder relationships) to the organization. RBV posits that OS/OE is ultimately dependent on the firm’s ability to effectively, efficiently and with some degree of innovation piece its resources together to form a strategic plan that it then implements to achieve its objectives and attain its goals (Yuchtman and Seashore, 1967).

Yuchtman and Seashore (1967) describe organizations essentially as resource-getting systems. They claim that OS/OE is determined by an organization’s ability to acquire and manipulate (link together to form a plan) resources from its environment either a) before their competitors do or b) manipulate these resources in unique ways that distinguish them from their competitors. The RBV, while not as focused on environmental factors as contingency theory (discussed below), also emphasizes the importance of the relationship between the organization and its
environment. In RBV, organizations acquire needed resources from their operating environments and are engaged in what Yuchtman and Seashore (1967) call “input-output transactions” (p. 897) with the environment. RBV does, however, claim that organizations also share or exchange resources with each other. RBV theorists view competition and interdependence as extremes of a resource continuum. As part of their strategic plans (recipes for how resources will be pieced together to achieve objectives) organizations may choose to either compete for, share or exchange resources (Yuchtman and Seashore, 1967).

Resources that are particularly key to achieving effectiveness are those that are valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable and non-substitutable (Barney, 1991). Valuable resources are those that enable an organization to either exploit an opportunity or neutralize a threat. Valuable resources are those that play a unique role in helping the organization achieve its objectives. Rare resources are those that are difficult to access or difficult to acquire. Resources are considered rare when firms that do not have them are unable to access them. This inability to access resources puts the firms that do not already control the rare resources at a distinct disadvantage to those that do. If a resource cannot be imitated or replicated it is considered to be an imperfectly imitable resource. It can be challenging to find a resource that is truly imperfectly imitable. Imperfect imitability often arises due to the unique conditions and circumstances under which a resource is used. A particular team dynamic, for example, or relationship between an employee and his/her supervisor at a specific time and place under certain conditions is essentially an imperfectly imitable resource. Finally, resources for which no strategic equivalent exists are considered to be non-substitutable. Barney (1991) discusses how a leader and a well-crafted strategic plan could be strategically equivalent resources when he explains that an organization with a clear vision could have evolved either as the result of a skilled, charismatic leader or the
effective roll-out of a strategic planning process. In sum, according to the resource-based perspective, competitive advantage and organizational effectiveness depend on the effective and efficient control of resources that are valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable and non-substitutable. (Barney, 1991).

The primary strength of RBV is the connection it posits between the set of internal/external assets available to an organization and their contribution to OS/OE. While RBV acknowledges the importance of piecing together resources to execute an effective strategic plan, its primary weakness is an under-emphasis on the importance of how resources are used in specific ways to accomplish objectives – i.e., how strategic plans are crafted and executed.

2.3.2 Social Exchange Theory (SET)
Social exchange theory (SET) is based on George Homans’ (1958) assertion that “interaction between persons is an exchange of goods, material and non-material” (p. 597). SET has been applied to the study of organizations and OS/OE but has much wider implications and is relevant to a number of fields and disciplines. SET suggests that individuals act in certain ways based on anticipated or expected reactions/returns. From the SET perspective, people view action through an economic lens and before acting they determine the utility and potential reward of any action they may take. SET stipulates that an action is more likely to occur if a reward is expected as a consequence of the action. If an action produces a reward, that action will likely be repeated. Key concepts in SET include reward, reinforcement, utility, profit, outcome, transaction and pay off. Actions, within the SET framework, are the result of carefully balanced costs and benefits. (Emerson, 1976; Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005; and Homans, 1958).

The SET concept of perceived organizational support (POS) is, perhaps, the most directly relevant component of SET to the study of OS/OE in the context of developing countries. SET
posits that individuals within an organization develop relationships with the organization itself through their interactions with managers, senior staff and co-workers. The actions/reactions of managers and other senior staff are often viewed by line-employees as representative of the organization. Over time, employees develop a “relationship” with the organization via their relationships with organizational managers. It is from these surrogate relationships that employees develop perceptions of organizational support (POS). As social exchange relationships develop between the employee and his/her organization, “an employee who sees the employer as supportive is likely to return the gesture” (Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005, p. 883). Cropanzano and Mitchell’s 2005 systematic literature review of SET scholarly works determined that POS among employees was positively related to organizational commitment, organizational performance and organizational outcomes – terms interchangeable with organizational sustainability/effectiveness.

Emerson (1976) does, however, outline some critical weaknesses of social exchange theory. Humans do not always act based solely on perceived economic utility or anticipated cost/reward. Humans often act without considering the expected or reciprocal action. They may also choose an action they know will not produce a reward but may in fact be harmful. Rationalities, probabilities, utility, etc. is often trumped, therefore, by other factors.

2.3.3 Contingency Theory (CT)
Contingency theorists argue that OS/OE is dependent or contingent on the environment in which the organization operates (Pennings, 1987 and Negandhi and Reiman, 1972). Contingency theory (CT) is also known as situationally-specific theory (Luthans and Stewart, 1976). For an organization to succeed, its structure, mode of operations, policies and procedures, etc. must account for environmental factors that may both positively and negatively shape the organization
and then adjust organizational structure, policies, etc. accordingly. Pennings (1987) postulates that a “lack of congruence or fit [between the organization and its environment] will result in reduced performance” (p. 223). According to contingency theory (CT) a single preferred way for leading an organization or implementing programs does not exist. Organizational structure, leadership modalities, implementation strategies and other organizational attributes must reflect the realities of the environment in which the organization operates (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1969, as cited in Negandhi and Reiman, 1972).

Implicitly borrowing elements from RBV, Luthans and Stewart (1976) described CT as an approach that focuses on “functional relationships between environmental, management and performance variables” (p. 183). The authors developed three sets of variables that mirror the three key elements of their description of CT. Environmental variables are those factors that influence the organization but are ultimately out of the organization’s control. These variables include specific factors such as customers/clients, suppliers, competitors, etc. as well as general factors such as cultural, legal, and political realities. Resource variables are both intangible and tangible factors the organization has more control over and include human resource variables such as number of employees, skills and knowledge base as well as non-human resource variables such as raw materials, capital and products or services. Luthans and Stewart’s set of management variables include elements such as planning, goal setting, and communicating executed by an individual in the organization who has the authority to make decisions regarding the allocation and/or utilization of the resource variables identified above.

Negandhi and Reiman (1972) tested the CT assertion that OS/OE is dependent on environmental conditions by studying 30 manufacturing organizations in India. The Neghandi/Reiman study confirmed the positive relationship between OS/OE and the operating environment. The study
concluded that decentralized firms operating in highly competitive markets were effective while centralized firms operating in highly competitive markets were considerably less effective. CT is probably the most readily applicable of the theories reviewed so far as its primary contribution is to simply underscore the importance of contextual or situationally-specific determinants of OS/OE.

2.3.4 Servant Leadership Theory (SLT) and Transformational Leadership Theory (TLT)
Studies have shown a clear connection between leadership and OS/OE (Bowers and Seashore, 1966 and Yoo and Brooks, 2005). The Bass Handbook of Leadership (Bass, 2008) – whose 3rd and 4th editions have over 5000 scholarly citations – summarizes over 30 different theories, groups of theories or ‘schools of thought’ that each attempt to define or conceptualize leadership. Each theory or framework has its strengths and weaknesses. Each has its advocates and critics. As is often the case, there is most likely some value to be found in each.

Based on the author’s background in Africa and his focus on giving voice to a group of stakeholders – namely the leadership, staff and constituencies of local African development organizations whose perspectives are largely absent from the literature on organizational sustainability and organizational effectiveness – two leadership theories are singled-out as having key elements that are most relevant to the author’s objectives. These theories are Servant Leadership Theory and Transformational Leadership Theory.
The importance of *Servant Leadership Theory (SLT)* to the broader study of leadership seems evident by the fact that “over 20% of Fortune Magazine 100 companies have sought guidance from the Greenleaf Center for Servant Leadership” (The Greenleaf Center as cited in Parris and Peachey, 2012, p. 379). Fortune 100 companies that have shown interest in servant leadership include Starbucks, ID Industries, the Vanguard Investment Group and Southwest Airlines – to name a few (Parris and Peachey, 2012). Robert K. Greenleaf – for whom the Greenleaf center is named – is the originator of the concept of servant leadership and developed his more formal theory of servant leadership between 1970 and 1972.

Parris and Peachey (2012) conducted a strategic literature review of 39 empirical, peer-reviewed studies of servant leadership to assess the relationship of servant leadership and its core components with individual, team and organizational effectiveness. Their review concluded that most studies used conceptual models of servant leadership developed by Spears (1994, 1998 and 2004 as cited in Parris and Peachey, 2012) and Laub (1999 as cited in Parris and Peachey, 2012). Laub describes servant leadership as an approach to leadership that values people, develops people, builds community, displays authenticity, provides leadership and shares leadership. A leader who values people listens to them, believes in them and serves them. A leader who develops people helps people grow, learn and is encouraging and affirming. A community-building leader develops strong collaborative and personal relationships. The authentic leader is open and accountable to people and willing to learn from them. A servant leader takes initiative and establishes goals to strive for. Finally, a servant leader shares power with others – encouraging others to take the lead whenever possible. Parris and Peachey ultimately concluded, “Our sample of empirical studies illustrates that servant leadership is a tenable theory. It is
viable and valuable on an individual and organization level, which can lead to increased overall effectiveness of individuals and teams.”

Due to SLT’s clear emphasis on what could be called relationship-based leadership it is particularly informative for the often relationship-centric developing-world contexts and cultures. Citing Buchen (1998), Bass & Bass (2008) concur with Laub and underscore the relationship focus of servant leaders. Servant leaders are leaders who “build relationships with their followers that help their followers to grow (p. 51).” Northhouse (2015) adds that servant leadership “fosters the development of community… a collection of individuals… who feel a sense of unity and relatedness (p. 229).” Both Bass (2008) and Northhouse (2015) expand Laub’s description of Servant Leadership by highlighting that servant leaders also pay particular attention to those with less power or those marginalized for various reasons in any organizational or community context.

J. V. Downton is credited with the first use of the term Transformational Leadership in the organizational literature in 1973 (Northhouse, 2015). Transformational Leadership Theory (TLT), as a formal theory, was developed and expanded upon a few years later by James Macgregor Burns (1978) and Bernard M. Bass (1985) (Northhouse, 2015). Transformational leaders are leaders who focus on making an emotional connection with their followers and bringing out ‘the best’ in people – helping them achieve their maximum potential. They motivate them. They inspire them. Transformational leaders cast vision for ‘what could be…’ and in so doing leaders and followers grow and develop together as they work toward achieving the vision. These leaders encourage their followers to transcend their own self-interests and find greater value in the collective interests of their teams and/or organizations. Through charismatic personalities and ‘modeling’ behavior that exceeds expectations, transformational leaders ‘tap
into’ their followers’ higher-order desires and needs – their ideals, their values, their aspirations, who they want to be. By focusing on the growth and development of ‘the whole person,’ transformational leaders hope to facilitate their followers’ accomplishing both their immediate and short-term work/professional objectives as well as their deeper, more long-term personal objectives. (Northhouse, 2015 and Bass & Bass, 2008).

In 1985, Bernard M. Bass helped explain his conceptualization of transformational leadership by situating it along a continuum that includes 3 major types of leaders (Bass & Bass, 2008 and Northhouse, 2015). Transformational leadership is positioned at one end of this continuum. Laissez-faire leadership lies at the opposite end of the continuum. Transactional leadership occupies the center position. According to Bass, transformational leadership includes 4 components or practices: Charismatic Leadership or Idealized Influence, Inspirational Motivation, Intellectual Stimulation and Individualized Concentration. Idealized Influence is the term Bass used to capture the leader’s focus on calling followers to be their better selves, tapping in to followers’ intrinsic values, and casting vision for what could be. Inspirational Motivation describes the leader’s efforts to help followers both focus on and achieve their higher order needs – what Maslow would call self-actualization (Bass & Bass, 2008 citing Burns, 1978). Followers are intellectually stimulated when they feel empowered by their transformational leaders, when leaders encourage their critical/independent thinking, when they are provided challenging work/growth opportunities and when leaders inspire in them increased innovation and creativity. Finally, Individualized Concentration happens when the transformational leader relates to each of his/her followers as a unique individual with specific skills, talents and aspirations.

Bass contrasted transformational leadership with laissez-faire leadership and transactional leadership. He described laissez-faire leadership as a hands-off disengaged approach to
leadership. A laissez-faire leader is essentially an ‘absentee’ leader who only engages when absolutely necessary. A transactional leader is one who uses a carrot and stick approach to get what he/she wants out of followers. Followers are rewarded for meeting expectations and punished for falling short. The specifics of a reward/punishment approach could be overtly communicated to followers or the result of negotiations with followers or simply something that emerges more organically as a result of leadership’s reaction to a follower’s work performance. (Bass & Bass, 2008 and Northhouse, 2015). Northhouse (2008) describes a 1996 study where Lowe, Kroeck and Sivasubramaniam conducted a systematic review of 39 studies of transformational leadership. Their review concluded that transformational leaders were more effective and had better work outcomes than transactional leaders.

Transformational leadership theory is, in many ways, similar to servant leadership theory. What is particularly informative for the study of OS/OE and its leadership component in Africa is TLT’s dual emphasis on both relationship/community as well as individuality and empowerment. While cultures of the global south tend to place greater emphasis on relationship and community in and outside the workplace than do cultures of the global north, individual interests, individual advancement and desire to ‘stand-out’ among the crowd appears to be common to all humanity. TLT’s dual emphases seems to take this into account by both highlighting the need for effective leaders to encourage the transcending of self-interest in favor of the good of the whole – something that may resonate with many African communities – and the need to meet individuals ‘where they are at’ as unique with specific needs and individual goals.

In sum, given the often encountered key characteristics of African/global south cultures and communities noted above, SLT’s emphasis on relationship and community as well as TLT’s dual emphasis on both the community interests or the ‘good of the whole’ as well as the theory’s
special attention to individuality provide important touch stones for any researcher to keep in mind when studying OS/OE in developing countries. These particular theoretical assertions perhaps provide indicators of variables and themes that target populations might identify as important building blocks of their mental models of effective leadership.
Chapter 3: Methods

3.1 Reprise: Research Questions

This study was designed and structured to address the following 4 research questions:

1. How do the directors of local civil society organizations and organizational development professionals perceive organizational sustainability/effectiveness in Kenya:
   a) What are the essential components of OS/OE in Kenya; and
   b) What context-specific factors influence the sustainability of local CSOs in Kenya?

2. How do the directors of local civil society organizations and organizational development professionals perceive the role of local fundraising/community philanthropy in the sustainability/effectiveness of CSOs in Kenya:
   a) Have Kenyan CSOs engaged in local fundraising/community philanthropy? If so, what fundraising activities have they pursued?
   b) How successful have their efforts been?
   c) What challenges have they faced?
   d) What do they think local CSOs can do to promote/encourage more local giving and what are their future local fundraising plans?

3. What is the profile of the individual Kenyan giver?
   a) Why do they give? What are their primary motivations or reasons for giving?
   b) What ‘social causes’ or ‘issues’ do they prefer to give? How do they become aware of these needs?
   c) Who are the preferred recipients or beneficiaries of their giving?
   d) How do they make giving-related decisions?
   e) How do they give – What specific modalities do they use?
   f) To what extent do they give to local CSOs/NGOs?
   g) In what ways could CSOs/NGOs be more successful in their appeals for these individual Kenyans to give to them?

4. Using an interpretative, grounded-theory approach to data analysis, what possible theoretical assertions can be made to explain stakeholder-focused and context-specific conceptualizations of organizational sustainability of local organizations in development?
Table 3.1 provides a summary of the specific research methods used to address each question. Following that, a general approach to the study is described that explains the 4 overarching components of the chosen approach – *Qualitative Research, Action Research, Partner Agency* and *Grounded Theory*. To conclude the core content of the ‘Methods’ section, the specific methods chosen to address each question are outlined in greater detail.
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3.2 General Approach

3.2.1 Qualitative Research

This research project employed a qualitative exploratory cross-sectional design. Data were collected using in depth interviews of individual participants. Selection of participants is explained in greater below. However, selected informants were deemed to be the most appropriate and relevant respondents needed to address the central questions of the study and achieve the overarching objective of giving voice to previously underrepresented stakeholders. Qualitative, in depth interviews were identified as the most suitable research method for this enquiry because they are typically intended to solicit rich, detailed information regarding specific issues from select individuals and stakeholders (Kumar, 2011). This study very specifically examined the influence or impact of a particular context on OS/OE by soliciting the perspectives of key stakeholders within that context that are often absent from the literature. Further analysis and investigator conceptualization was applied to assess how these contextually identified determinants might work together in a broader fashion to influence OS/OE. Padgett (2008) notes that qualitative research is particularly well-suited for the researcher who wants to a) address topics that are not thoroughly explored; b) address issues of a potentially social/relational/politically sensitive nature; c) capture experience “from the perspective of those who live it and create meaning from it (p. 16);” and, through qualitative action research further described below, “counter the effects of oppression and social injustice (p. 17).”

The investigator also determined that qualitative research techniques could be particularly effective at soliciting rich descriptions of the strategies Kenyan NGOs/CSOs are using to a) raise local support; b) more broadly promote the practice of community philanthropy in the communities they serve; and c) determine in what ways the strategies employed either motivate
or discourage potential donors from giving. In depth qualitative interviewing additionally allowed for a much deeper exploration, than other research approaches may have, of why people give, what causes they are drawn to and what obstacles prevent them from giving. Using a semi-structured approach to qualitative interviewing also allowed the investigator to ask follow-up questions, probe nuanced responses and pursue lines of enquiry that emerged and were relevant to the study questions by not necessarily anticipated or planned for.

### 3.2.2 Action Research

This study also employed an Action Research approach. Action Research, within the field of social work in particular, is sometimes called Community-Based Participatory Research (CBPR). Action research is an approach to scientific enquiry where the primary investigator (PI) partners with an implementing organization to carry out the study. The PI and the organizational partner become Co-PIs implementing a jointly developed project where collected data is jointly analyzed and mutually useful. Action research approaches are often employed, as in this case, when the study of particular phenomena that builds on both scholarly and practitioner perspectives is deemed beneficial. The intention of action research is not usually wide-scale generalizability but to generate transferable data that can be informative to similar situations and similar contexts. (Herr, 2012).

In July/August 2015 the PI met in Kenya with the partner agency’s Director of Programs for East Africa, the Deputy Director of the Yetu Initiative (see description in Partner Agency section below) and the Monitoring and Evaluation Officer (MEO) for the Yetu Initiative. As a result of these initial consultations, the PI drafted a research proposal that was submitted to the Yetu Initiative management team. The team then submitted the proposal to the Yetu Initiative’s Steering Committee (SC). The SC consists of representatives of all project stakeholders.
including USAID, Aga Khan Foundation-USA and representatives from several other Kenyan organizations involved in the implementation of various components of Yetu. This proposal was approved and a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed between the PI and Yetu leadership.

Throughout the project design, data collection, and analysis process the PI, RA and the Yetu team have been in frequent contact. For the 6 months the PI was in Kenya this contact happened daily for the first month and then multiple times a week throughout the remainder of the data collection phase. The PI met with the Yetu director and/or deputy director at least 6 times throughout the data collection process to provide a report on initial findings, emerging conclusions, challenges/issues, etc. These meetings were interactive dialogues that served to strengthen the project’s approach and subsequent analysis. Since leaving the field, the PI has provided the Yetu team two preliminary draft reports regarding research findings and analysis. A final report will be submitted to the team in the summer of 2017. The PI may return to Kenya at some point before the end of calendar year 2017 to jointly organize and implement a dissemination event. However, plans for this have not yet been finalized.

3.2.3 Partner Agency
This study was implemented in partnership with the Aga Khan Foundation-East Africa (AKFEA) located in Nairobi, Kenya. AKFEA is an international development organization that implements programs and delivers social services in six East African countries – Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. AKFEA is the East Africa affiliate of the global Aga Khan Foundation (AKF). AKF has offices in numerous countries around the world including North America, several countries in Western Europe and several in South Asia. In North America and Western Europe, AKF functions more like a ‘foundation’ – making grants
to organizations implementing development projects and delivering social services around the world. AKFEA, however, is entirely an implementing agency with much of its funding coming from bilateral development agencies such as USAID and DFID as well as foundational partners such as AKF-USA and AKF-Canada. The global *Aga Khan Foundation*, in turn, is an agency of the *Aga Khan Development Network* (AKDN). AKDN incorporates 10 sister agencies including AKF plus the *Aga Khan Academies, Aga Khan Agency for Habitat, Aga Khan Agency for Microfinance, Aga Khan Educational Services, Aga Khan Fund for Economic Development, Aga Khan Health Services, Aga Khan Trust for Culture, Aga Khan University* and the *University of Central Asia*. (AKDN, Retrieved from: [http://www.akdn.org](http://www.akdn.org)).

AKDN was founded and is currently chaired by His Highness the Aga Khan – Prince Shah Kamin Al Husseini Aga Khan IV. Prince Husseini has held the position of Aga Khan since 1957. He is the 49th Imam of the Ismaili Community of Shia Muslims. According to Ismaili tradition, Prince Husseini is the 49th successor to the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). The current Aga Khan is reportedly one of the richest men in the world and is worth an estimated $800-million USD. He currently resides in London and Geneva but spent a portion of his childhood in Nairobi, Kenya. (AKDN, Retrieved from: [http://www.akdn.org](http://www.akdn.org)).

The investigator partnered primarily with an AKFEA project known as the *Yetu Initiative* (Yetu). Yetu is a Swahili word meaning ‘ours.’ In 2015, AKF-USA and USAID/Kenya entered into a 4-year, $6-million USD public/private partnership to implement the *Yetu Initiative* in Kenya. Yetu’s primary objective is enhancing the sustainability of local Kenyan civil society organizations (CSOs) through community philanthropy and community engagement. Yetu is currently partnering with six Kenyan CSOs and working with them in an in depth sustained way over the project’s four-year lifespan. Additionally, Yetu intends – over the course of the 4-year
project – to directly or indirectly enhance the sustainability of approximately 250 local organizations through its portfolio of project activities. Yetu’s project budget includes allocated amounts for research and program evaluation. Through previous work in East Africa and professional networking, the investigator partnered with Yetu to implement the current research project. This project fulfills two objectives 1) Yetu’s research agenda intended to enhance its ability to accomplish its project objectives as well as the objectives of any future follow-on projects; and 2) the investigator’s doctoral dissertation study. The objectives, chosen methods and implementation of this project is the result of a joint work product between AKFEA/Yetu and the investigator – as is the intention of all Action Research or CBPR endeavors. (Retrieved from: *Internal project documents available from the investigator.*)

### 3.2.4 Grounded Theory (Theorizing)

This project used a grounded theory (GT) approach to analyzing and interpreting data. Grounded theory is an inductive form of theorizing that begins the moment the first data are collected and is built slowly over the life span of the project. At the conclusion of the project, the investigators offer an inductively generated, data-driven theory that serves to both explain/interpret the data obtained from the study and perhaps have application to similar situations and similar contexts. Grounded theory was deemed an appropriate framework of enquiry given the investigator’s desire to specifically capture data generated by key stakeholder groups whose views have not often been included in the scholarship and discourse on OE/OS but who are themselves significantly responsible for implementing the actions and the recommendations claimed to lead to OS/OE. (Charmaz, 2014). Also, given TrustAfrica’s earlier distinction between ‘philanthropy OF Africa’ versus ‘philanthropy FOR Africa;’ grounded theory was identified as particularly appropriate for an exploration of community
philanthropy/local fundraising and its specific relationship to local development organizations in the Kenyan context.

3.3 Data Collection and Participant Description

The investigative team’s approach to interviewee recruitment was based, in part, on the concept of saturation. Schensul, Schensul and LeCompte (1999), use the phrase “sufficient redundancy” to define saturation as “the point when patterns of response begin to repeat themselves and generate no new information (p. 262).” Saturation, as a general rule, is expected between the 8\textsuperscript{th}-12\textsuperscript{th} interviews. In a study that included 60 participants, Guest, Bunce and Johnson (2006) found nearly 100\% of the codes/themes used in their analysis of interview data were present upon completing their review of the 12\textsuperscript{th} interview transcript. However, the Guest et al. study is just presented here as a general guideline. Determining when saturation has been reached is primarily up to the investigator or investigative team. Saturation can also be influenced by a number of factors that make the expectation that saturation will be reached by the 12\textsuperscript{th} interview in all cases somewhat unrealistic. Even when saturation is reached, qualitative research may produce new findings and generate new insights at any point in the research process thereby ‘reopening’ the question of saturation.

For this study, 64 participants were recruited to address research questions #1 and #2. Forty-five (45) participants were recruited to address research question #3. In this study, saturation was reached somewhere between the 15\textsuperscript{th} and 20\textsuperscript{th} interview for data collection related to questions #1 and #2 and between the 10\textsuperscript{th} and 15\textsuperscript{th} interview for data collection related to question #3. For a variety of reasons, the investigative team decided to continue interviewing well after saturation had likely been reached. Throughout the early stages of interviewing—primarily from the time of the first to the 20\textsuperscript{th} interview for question #1 and #2 – the structure of the interview was modified.
in order to improve cross-cultural communication and to make sure the questions asked were generating data closely relevant to the research questions. Along the way, the team also encountered numerous challenges to participant recruitment that required several adjustments to the selection and recruitment process (see discussion below). For example, the initial group of CSO directors selected for interview did not yield the depth of information the study team desired. This was due, in part, to communication issues but primarily to the recruited organization not being at the appropriate stage of development necessary to participate in the interview. So, while data collected from this group was included in the study and was quite informative; the study team decided then it would continue interviewing well past the expected point of saturation to compensate for this complication. Finally, the study team also desired to increase the likelihood that conclusions from the data collected from interview participants were as representative of the larger population as possible. One way of increasing the data’s representative value was to interview a significant number of participants beyond the point of saturation.

3.3.1 Research Questions 1 and 2

1. How do the directors of local civil society organizations and organizational development professionals perceive organizational sustainability/effectiveness in Kenya:
   a) What are the essential components of OS/OE in Kenya; and
   b) What context-specific factors influence the sustainability of local CSOs in Kenya?

2. How do the directors of local civil society organizations and organizational development professionals perceive the role of local fundraising/community philanthropy in the sustainability/effectiveness of CSOs in Kenya:
   a) Have Kenyan CSOs engaged in local fundraising/community philanthropy? If so, what fundraising activities have they pursued?
   b) How successful have their efforts been?
   c) What challenges have they faced?
d) What do they think local CSOs can do to promote/encourage more local giving and what are their future local fundraising plans?

**Selection & Recruitment of Participants.** The investigative team consisted of the primary investigator (PI) and a locally recruited research associate (RA). The PI and RA jointly conducted a total of 64 in depth semi-structured interviews with participants to obtain their perspectives on research questions #1 and #2. Of these 74 interviewees, 54 of them are directors of local CSOs/NGOs from the greater Nairobi area. The remaining 20 participants are organizational development (OD) professionals also from the greater Nairobi area. CSO directors and OD professionals were selected as the most appropriate informants for this study specifically because of their experience/expertise and because they occupy a community or professional ‘space’ that provides them in depth understanding of the factors important to the context-specific conceptualization of the OS/OE of local organizations.

The Yetu Initiative’s primary objective is to “enhance the organizational sustainability of Kenyan CSOs by strengthening CSO ability to communicate effectively and mobilize local engagement and local funding” (Retrieved from: *Internal project documents available from the author.*) The Yetu Initiative was launched in October 2015 with the project team issuing a couple of *Requests for Applications* (RFA) throughout Kenya. The RFAs were issued in order to recruit local Kenyan CSOs interested in participating in the initiative and benefitting from the funding and capacity building it offers. Through the RFA processes, the Yetu team selected 6 local CSOs that would receive intensive capacity building interventions over the 4-year lifespan of the project. The intensive capacity building interventions the Yetu Initiative provides have been specifically designed to strengthen the abilities of these 6 partner CSOs to improve their engagement with local communities/local stakeholder groups as well as improve their abilities to
raise funding from local sources. Yetu initially received 233 applications from various organizations throughout Kenya in response to its RFAs. Through a 5-phase review, scoring and ranking process, the initial group of 233 applications were whittled down to 89, 42, 28, and then 12, respectively. The 6 current Yetu partner CSOs were chosen from the final set of 12 CSOs by the Yetu steering committee in consultation with the Yetu project implementation team.

During the design and planning phase of this research study, the investigator and the Yetu team had several discussions regarding the conceptualization of ‘local Kenyan CSO’ that was being used or might be used by the initiative. It was anticipated that a fairly narrow, specific conceptualization of ‘local organization’ – similar to the USAID definition previously discussed – would ultimately be used by the initiative, through its RFA process, to recruit and select benefitting partner CSOs. As a result, the PI determined that, for the purposes of this study, the Yetu RFA process itself would adequately identify a population of local CSOs from which the research team could then select a group of organizations whose directors could be invited to participate in the study.

Using convenience and purposive sampling approaches, the PI began the participant selection and recruitment process at the start of fieldwork in April 2016. This process began with an examination of the screening/scoring criteria and the documentation the Yetu team used when reviewing applications from the 89 organizations that had passed phase 1 of the review and screening process. This examination revealed that the definition of ‘local Kenyan CSO’ used in the RFA process was not focused and narrow as the USAID definition the PI preferred to use. Rather, the only documented definition of ‘local Kenyan CSO’ found in project records was the much broader and simpler definition – “a Kenyan CSO duly registered.” Since the focus of this study is developing a context-based conceptualization of OS/OE of specifically local...
organizations in development, the definition found in project documentation was deemed insufficient for participant selection and recruitment for this study. An alternative selection and recruitment strategy was then developed while in the field.

The NGO Coordination Board is an agency of the Government of Kenya with oversight responsibilities for CSOs. The Board maintains a list of NGOs, CSOs and CBOs operating in Kenya. The PI reviewed this list and eliminated those organizations that were obviously international or national affiliates of larger international organizations. This initial review resulted in a list of 2916 CSOs culled from the list of nearly 7000 organizations identified by the Coordination Board. The investigative team developed a short 10-question survey intended to distinguish local from non-local organizations (a copy of this survey is attached as Appendix C). The survey included the questions listed below. In order to be categorized as local, responding organizations needed to answer the 8 ‘assessment’ questions with the response desired by the investigative team. The desired response for each question is listed in parentheses after the question.

1. What is the name of your organization? (OPEN)
2. What is your name and job title within the organization? (OPEN)
3. Is your organization duly registered with the relevant government authority? (YES)
4. Was your organization started in Kenya by Kenyans? (YES)
5. Are your organization’s headquarters located in Kenya? (YES)
6. Is your organization a subsidiary or formal affiliate of an international, non-Kenyan organization or known brand? (Examples of such organizations: Save the Children/Kenya, World Vision/Kenya, CARE/Kenya, etc.) (NO)
7. Is your organization majority owned by individuals who are citizens of Kenya or is the organization managed by a governing body, the majority of whom are citizens of Kenya? (YES)
8. Are your organization’s programs and projects implemented entirely within the geographic boarders of Kenya? (YES)

9. What is your organization’s primary area of programming or activities? (OPEN)

10. To what extent is your organization’s governance, its operations and/or its programs influenced by a foreign entity or by an individual or individuals who are not citizens of Kenya? (NO INFLUENCE WHATSOVER or LITTLE INFLUENCE)

This survey was designed and distributed using Survey Monkey. It was sent to the 2916 CSOs culled from the NGO Coordination Board’s list as well as 453 CSOs with which the Yetu Initiative had some degree of contact. One-hundred and thirty-one (131) organizations completed the survey. Survey respondents who answered questions #3-8 and 10 in the manner highlighted in parentheses above were categorized as ‘local organizations.’ Sixty-one organizations met the criteria of local organization as established by the investigative team. The directors of these 61 organizations were sent an email invitation to participate in the study.

Through a process of purposive internal consultations with the Yetu team and other members of the AKFEA staff, the investigative team also determined that 32 specific CSOs from the group of 42 organizational applicants (including the final 6 CSOs selected as Yetu partner organizations) that had reached phase 2 of the Yetu RFA process likely met the criteria for local organization as outlined through the selection and recruitment survey. The directors of these organizations were also invited by email or telephone call to participate in the study. The identification of potential research participants from among the group of 42 Yetu applications was determined based on the ‘personal knowledge’ of the Yetu team, the investigative team and other development professionals with whom the team was in contact. Time, budgetary and staff restrictions prevented the investigative team from completing the thorough – and likely off-putting to the organization – investigation of each potential participating CSO that would have been necessary to assess organizational eligibility with any greater degree of certainty.
Snowball sampling was a final component used to select and recruit participating organizations for this study. At the completion of each study interview, the investigative team asked interviewees to refer the team to similar organizations that also met the selection criteria. Attempts were made to interview the directors of all the referrals the investigative team received. Nearly all of the referred organizations agreed to participate in the study. While it is acknowledged that this may be a weakness of the study’s selection and recruitment process, the identification of and referral to a potential new study participant by an existing participant (at the time) was deemed sufficient evidence to categorize the potential new participant as a local organization. This conclusion was reached for the same reasons as those listed above. A brief description of the group of organizations whose directors were interviewed for this study is provided below.

**In Depth Interviews with Participants.** In depth interviews were conducted to enable the PI not only to identify what factors respondents think have important impact on OS/OE but also to better understand why participants view those particular factors as important and how they might critically impact OS/OE in Kenya. Furthermore, qualitative interviewing also facilitated the investigative team’s in depth exploration of how a select stakeholder group conceptualizes each of the important OS/OE factors the group identified. The investigative team used interview guides that list a number of possible questions related to the topics of interest in this study. However, the interview guides served mainly as repositories of topics the interviewers desired to cover in each conversation. The topical guides were not adhered to strictly or used as ‘interview questionnaires.’ All interviews conducted for this study were conversational, organic and iterative allowing for interesting and unanticipated issues to be discussed. *(Copies of the*
Interview guides are attached - Appendix A for CSO/NGO Directors, Appendix B for OD Professionals.

Interviews were completed between early May and mid-October 2016. Most of the interviews were held at a location chosen by the invited participant. Interviews lasted between 45 and 75 minutes. Interviews with organizational directors were mainly held in their individual organizational offices. Interviews with OD professionals were generally held either in their work offices or at a location the participant and the investigative team mutually agreed to. Interviews occurred throughout the greater Nairobi area. All interviews were recorded, transcribed and entered into MaxQDA qualitative data analysis software for inductive coding, identification of categories and initial theorizing.

On three occasions, the investigative team arrived at interview appointments and discovered that the participant had asked one or more of his/her colleagues to join the interview. In such circumstances, the investigative team went ahead with the interview as planned. It would have been insensitive and inappropriate in this particular context to do otherwise. These unexpected participants are not counted among the 64 participants interviewed for research questions #1 & #2. The responses these individuals provided to interview questions were, however, included in the final transcript for the relevant interview. While the relevant interview transcripts do identify and label when more than one respondent is present and responding to questions, these specific transcripts were reviewed and analyzed as one data source or simply as if one person had participated in the interview. Generally, the invited participant was the primary respondent to interview questions when more than one participant was present.
**Description of Study Participants.** (See Table 3.2) Research participants were guaranteed complete anonymity, for them as individuals and for their organizations, if they agreed to participate in the study. Nonetheless, some descriptive information was obtained about the organizations whose directors participated in the survey. Even so, information was limited for a variety of reasons including the availability/reliability of information requested, respect for individuals and organizations with varying degrees of sensitivity regarding the information requested, and the different approaches to record keeping among the organizations. Lack of similar approaches to record keeping made it challenging to obtain the similar statistics representing the same variables or information for all organizations.

Of the 54 organizations whose directors participated in this study, year of establishment and/or registry is available for 40 organizations. Among the 40, the oldest organization was founded in 1971. The most recently established organization was founded in 2013. Data regarding numbers of staff and annual budgets and/or income is available for 40 and 37 organizations respectively. At the time of data collection, the smallest of the 40 organizations had a staff of just 3 people. The largest organization had a staff of 60 people. The average staff size of the organizations that participated in this study was 13. Among the 37 organizations that provided annual income and/or budgetary information, the most well resourced organization reported an annual budget of KES (Kenyan Shillings) 150,000,000 or $1,500,000 USD. The organization with the lowest annual budget reported the figure of KES 100,000 or $1000 USD. The average annual budget for this group of organizations, at the time of data collection, was KES 23 million or $230,000 USD. The median annual budget was KES 6,000,000 or $60,000 USD. Thirty (30) of the 54 organizations that participated in this study also reported a breakdown of income between what they generated from international sources versus what they generated from local, Kenyan
sources. Five (5) organizations reported receiving 100% of their annual incomes from international sources – namely international bilateral government agencies such as USAID, DFID and AusAID. Two (2) organizations reported receiving 100% of their annual incomes from local sources through selling services and/or products or receiving grants from local philanthropic foundations such as the Kenya Community Development Foundation (KCDF). Nineteen (19) of the 30 organizations that provided data regarding their income breakdown reported that 70%-98% of their income came from international sources – again primarily donor agencies. Finally, 4 CSOs reported that 5%-15% of their income came from international sources with the balance coming from local, Kenyan sources.

Data regarding each organization’s primary technical areas (See Table 3.2) were available for 42 of the 54 CSOs/NGOs that participated in this study. Participating CSOs stated 1 of 12 different technical areas that dominate their program portfolios. Approximately half of the organizations stated that youth development, women’s’ issues or broad-based community development as their primary area of focus. A number of the organizations were involved in more than one technical area but did list one particular field as their primary area of engagement.
Table 3.2 Descriptive Data – Organizational Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Youngest</th>
<th>Oldest</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age of Organization</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Data from 40 Orgs</td>
<td>Founded 2013</td>
<td>Founded 1971</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Staff Size</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Data from 40 Orgs</td>
<td>Smallest</td>
<td>Largest</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Annual Income/Budget</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Data from 37 Orgs</td>
<td>Lowest</td>
<td>Highest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1000 USD</td>
<td></td>
<td>$1,500,000 USD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Average: $230,000 USD ~ Median: $60,000 USD</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Source of Funding</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data from 28 Orgs</td>
<td>Local (w/in Kenya)</td>
<td>International</td>
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<tr>
<td>0% - 5 Orgs</td>
<td></td>
<td>100% - 5 Orgs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2%-30% - 19 Orgs</td>
<td></td>
<td>70%-98% - 19 Orgs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85%-95% - 4 Orgs</td>
<td></td>
<td>5%-15% - 4 Orgs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary Programmatic Area of Activity</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Data from 28 Orgs</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2 Education</td>
<td></td>
<td>3 Human Rights</td>
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<td>2 OVCs</td>
<td></td>
<td>3 Rural Dev/Ag</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 Environment</td>
<td></td>
<td>8 Comm Dev</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Youth</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Literacy</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 Health</td>
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<td>4 HIV/AIDS</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 Disabilities</td>
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<td>6 Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 Disabilities</td>
<td></td>
<td>6 Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>7 Health</td>
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<td>4 HIV/AIDS</td>
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<td>5%</td>
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<td>1 Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10%</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Health</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.3.2 Research Questions 3

What is the profile of the individual Kenyan giver?

a) Why do they give? What are their primary motivations or reasons for giving?
b) What ‘social causes’ or ‘issues’ do they prefer to give? How do they become aware of these needs?
c) Who are the preferred recipients or beneficiaries of their giving?
d) How do they make giving-related decisions?
e) How do they give – What specific modalities do they use?
f) To what extent do they give to local CSOs/NGOs?
g) In what ways could CSOs/NGOs be more successful in their appeals for these individual Kenyans to give to them?

Selection & Recruitment of Participants. Forty-five (45) individual Kenyans were recruited for in depth interviews regarding their perspectives and practices on ‘giving.’ This group of 45 participants was in addition to the 64 individuals interviewed in order to address research questions #1 and #2. These additional 45 individuals were specifically recruited to address research question #3. The investigative team chose to specifically profile the individual Kenyan giver versus local corporate donors or philanthropic organizations. In the original design of this study, representatives of local corporate social responsibility departments and various local foundations were also targeted for interview. Their perspectives as organized, structured ‘givers’...
to local CSOs and NGOs would have been a valuable addition to this study. However, during the planning phase of early fieldwork, the team quickly determined – through consultation with Yetu and AKFEA staff – that recruiting participants from corporate and philanthropic organizations was not going to be possible for a number reasons and complex challenges.

These 45 individual participants were recruited entirely using convenience and snowball sampling techniques. The investigative team used a wide variety of recruitment strategies – including approaching complete strangers, introducing ourselves, explaining our study and research objectives, and asking if the individual would be willing to interview with us. An initial group of interviewees was also recruited by asking Yetu and AKFEA staff members to message at least 3-5 of their friends and contacts asking if they would be interested in participating in the study. Additionally, the project research associate sent a message to all of his WhatsApp contacts soliciting individual participants. Furthermore, through the professional and social networks of several of the Yetu staff members; 12 staff members of 2 non-profit organizations (whose directors had not participated in the study or were even aware of the study) were interviewed regarding their perspectives and giving practices. An additional 7 staff of a large Kenyan company were also interviewed as the result of a colleague’s professional contacts. Finally, a number of restaurant staff, custodial staff, and security guards were approached by the investigative team whenever and wherever opportunities for participant recruitment presented themselves. Nearly everyone asked to interview using this “cold call” approach accepted the invitation. Throughout the data collection/interview process, whenever anyone of these invitees accepted an invitation and completed an interview; that person was asked for names and contact information of any of his/her associates that might be willing to interview with the investigative team. Brief descriptive information of these groups of interview participants is provided below.
**In Depth Interviews with Participants.** As noted above, this group of 45 individuals was specifically recruited in order to develop a profile of the ‘typical,’ individual Kenyan giver. Wealthy philanthropists, corporate donors, etc. were not the subject of this investigation. Investigators wanted to identify ‘who’ givers are, what they give to and why, do they give to local organizations – why or why not, and what incentivizes or dis-incentivizes them to give. Informants were asked to describe their general attitudes; perspectives and feelings toward giving; perspectives toward giving to local organizations if relevant; perspectives regarding what strategies/campaigns had been successful at motivating them to give (if any); and identifying what individuals, groups of individuals, causes or issues they would be most inclined to give to.

The PI and RA jointly conducted all 45 of the interviews of individual Kenyan givers/donors. A second interview guide specifically relevant to research question #3 was developed by the PI and used for these interviews. Again, however, this guide served simply as a reference list of illustrative questions related to topics of interest regarding research question #3 (See Appendix D). These interviews – like those conducted for research questions #1 and #2 – were organic and conversational in nature.

Interviews with individual Kenyan givers were held throughout greater Nairobi at various locations mutually agreed to by the investigative team and each individual participant. All interviews were held in English. On occasion, the research associate offered a very brief explanation/translation to participants who may have had some difficult understanding a particular question that had been asked in English. Interviews lasted approximately 15 to 45 minutes with most conversations averaging 20-25 minutes in duration. All interviews were recorded, transcribed and entered into MaxQDA qualitative data analysis software for inductive coding, identification of categories and initial theorizing.
**Descriptions of Study Participants.** Given the sensitivity of financial issues in general and, more specifically, sensitivities surrounding an individual’s particular motivations for giving or not giving as well as his/her sensitivities around actual giving behaviors; the investigative team was particularly careful not to ask any questions that might present obstacles to having open, organic, informative, and transparent conversations about interviewee thoughts and feelings toward giving. Therefore, participants were guaranteed anonymity and they were not asked for any information regarding their income or socioeconomic status. Instead, the PI and RA devised a three-fold classification system and then, through discussion and mutual agreement, assigned each individual giver interviewed for this study to 1 of the 3 socio-economic status (SES) categories. Category 1 consisted of upper middle-class professionals and wealthy Kenyans. Category 2 consisted of lower middle-class professionals, service professionals in middle-class establishments, and some industrial/manufacturing workers. Category 3 consisted of anyone with an SES below lower middle class – namely security guards, domestic staff, and some self-employed traders/hawkers.

At the completion of each interview related to research question #3, the PI and RA immediately discussed what SES category we thought the participant should be assigned to. All 45 individuals interviewed were employed or engaged in small business/trade. Individuals were assigned to a category based primarily on their employment. For example, management, professional and technical staff, of both nonprofit organizations and for-profit businesses/companies, were assigned to SES 1. Administrative/clerical staff and some new-entry professional staff of organizations and companies were assigned to SES 2. Domestic staff, security guards, restaurant wait staff, taxi drivers and shop-keepers were assigned to SES 3. At various points during the participant recruitment and data collection process it became necessary
to more intentionally seek new participants in a particular category in order to maintain a balanced representation from each SES category. Among the 45 completed interviews, 15 were assigned to SES 1, 15 to SES 2 and 15 to SES 3.

3.3.3 Research Questions 4
Using an interpretative, grounded-theory approach to data analysis, what possible theoretical assertions can be made to explain stakeholder-focused and context-specific conceptualizations of organizational sustainability of local organizations in development?

A distinct set of methods or data collection activities were not employed to address research question #4. Rather, research question #4 was included in this study to provide the investigator the opportunity to review all the data collected for research questions #1, #2 and #3 in their entirety and, thereby, arrive at a ‘higher order’ or more conceptual/abstract way of explaining the data. To address question #4, the investigator took a more macro-view of the data, in order to look for patterns found in the data as well as relationships and dynamics between data and/or among groups of data that might exist. Addressing research question #4 was less about data collection and more about the particular approach to data analysis used in this study. This approach – an application of interpretive grounded theory – is explained in greater detail in the section below on Data Analysis.

3.4 Data Analysis
All study data were entered into MaxQDA – a qualitative data analysis software package designed specifically for use with Apple operating systems. MaxQDA functions very similarly to other more well-known qualitative analysis applications such as Nvivo and Dedoose. MaxQDA facilitated the inductive creation of codes and the assignment of specific codes to portions of interview text. It also permitted the generation of various reports such as frequency of codes used per individual interview transcript, frequency of a single code’s use throughout all
transcripts, etc. MaxQDA also permitted in-document writing of analytical memos to record insights and conclusions reached by the PI that related specifically to portions of text or were generated as a result of data review and comparison.

Analysis of data collected (i.e., participant narratives in the form of interview transcripts) for this study employed an *inductive grounded theory approach* that consisted of a three-step process of creating *initial codes*, then *focused codes* and finally *theoretical categories* (Charmaz, 2014). Throughout the data collection process and extending into the analysis and writing phases of this research project, the PI studied and carefully reviewed collected data by constantly comparing data with data and seeking not just a descriptive, surface-level understanding of the data but, in the words of Charmaz, an “imaginative understanding of the studied phenomenon (p. 231).”

As part of this grounded theory approach, the PI adopted an *interpretive and constructivist approach to theorizing*. Charmaz describes the interpretive approach to theorizing as an attempt by the theorist to ‘interpret’ data or, rather, derive deeper understanding and develop conceptual-level meaning from observed phenomena. The constructivist approach, more specifically, is part of this broader interpretive tradition. Constructivist, interpretive theorizing relies “on the researcher’s view; it does not and cannot stand outside of it (Charmaz, 2014, p. 239).” The grounded theory or theoretical assertions developed from study data is, therefore, the PI’s analytical, conceptual interpretation of the data. The most succinct statement Charmaz makes to explain the constructivist, interpretive approach to theorizing is, “We are part of the world we study, the data we collect and the analysis we produce (p. 17).”

**Investigator Positionality.** In keeping with Charmaz’s point – just quoted above – a brief background of the primary investigator is warranted. The investigator is a development
professional with 20 years of experience working at various levels of development practice. This has included jobs with US NGOs working in the Global South, consulting for local NGOs indigenous to the Global South, working with grassroots community organizations in Sub-Saharan Africa, and serving as Office Chief and Deputy Chief for the country-level policy/program divisions with USAID – a large official bilateral assistance agency. Most of the investigator’s professional work has been in Africa with some time spent in Southeast Asia.

The investigator full acknowledges that his experience working at a variety of levels within the development community has resulted in him developing a personal conviction that community-based, locally controlled and implemented development is the best of a number of nearly always less than optimal approaches to development practice. So, the investigator admits to a) a general dissonance with his involvement with the ‘development industry;’ b) a favorable bias toward local organizations and grassroots led and controlled development initiatives; and c) a great deal of skepticism regarding the contribution the ‘development industry,’ as it is currently constituted, can contribute to true transformation in the Global South. With these biases and framing lens identified and acknowledged, the investigator worked diligently to keep his views and biases ‘in check’ both during the data collection phase and the analysis/reporting phase of this dissertation project. As a practical way of monitoring these biases and personal views, the investigator frequently consulted the project research associate, and on occasion his colleagues in development practice, to solicit their thoughts/perspectives regarding his own theorizing and emerging conclusions as the project unfolded.

Initial Coding. The PI personally reviewed and coded all the data for this study. The PI’s initial reviews of study data led to the development of an initial set of codes that generally consisted of short descriptive phrases of specifically what ‘was happening’ in the data. These initial codes
stayed as ‘close as possible’ to the data while allowing for a limited amount of analytical interpretation. Often times, initial codes were simpler, shorter, summary paraphrases of sections of text. While initial coding was primarily descriptive in nature, it did allow the PI to begin identifying patterns, themes, repeated relationships among data, and derive deeper meaning from the data.

**Focused Coding.** The second step in the coding process involved a more analytical interpretive analysis of the data and, specifically, a more careful review of sections of text that had already been coded during the initial coding process. Focused coding also involved the identification of the most significant codes, the most frequent codes and/or the identification of codes the PI deemed to have particularly useful interpretive value to better understanding the data. Charmaz (2014) described the focused coding stage of data analysis as a process of beginning to “identify possibilities suggested by the data rather than ensuring complete accuracy of the data (p. 120).”

**Establishing Theoretical Categories.** Quoting Glaser & Strauss (1967), Charmaz (2014) describes categories as “conceptual elements in a theory (p. 188).” During this phase of data analysis, the PI reviewed the coding scheme to determine if any of the codes related to one another in ways that might lead to a deeper, more conceptual explanation of the data. Some relationships and groupings of codes were identified and ‘raised’ to the level of explanatory theoretical categories. Additionally, some single, stand-alone codes were identified as having more conceptual explanatory power; so they were elevated to theoretical category. For example, the six codes – 1) *NGOs/CSOs can make you rich*; 2) *NGOs/CSOs are wealthy*; 3) *Getting international donor support for NGOs/CSOs is easy*; 4) *NGO/CSO founders/directors are in it to get rich*; 5) *NGOs/CSOs experience high staff turnover*; and 6) *NGOs/CSOs plagued by founder’s syndrome* – when taken together and relationships among them examined, seem to
indicate that the nonprofit sector and nonprofit organizations have a very different place in Kenyan society than similar organizations in the US or Canada. In Kenya, the nonprofit sector seems to be viewed as a lucrative and rewarding avenue for personal success, social advancement and wealth accumulation. Starting a nonprofit NGO/CSO and or being employed by an NGO/CSO seems to be an optimal career move particularly for those seeking personal enrichment and increased social standing. The potential for personal enrichment and social advancement in the studied context likely attracts types of people that would probably not be drawn to nonprofit work in the Global North. This is possibly because nonprofit organizations and nonprofit work in the countries of the Global North represent very different realities and occupy very different socio-economic space in society than seems to be the case in Kenya.

Theoretical categories could also be called theoretical assertions or the building blocks of theory. Data analysis did not lead to the development of a complete, unified theory that explained the studied phenomenon in a seamless whole. However, data analysis did lead to the development of several building blocks of theory that provide a more conceptual explanation of the studied phenomenon. These categories or components of theory are discussed in chapter 7, which addresses research question #4.

While this 3-step data analysis process is presented here as very linear and sequential; in implementation it is really anything but that! Initial coding sometimes bleeds into focused coding. Ideas for possible theoretical categories or relationships between codes may emerge very early during the initial coding process and are recorded in memos and reviewed later in the data analysis process. During the process of reviewing data for possible patterns/relationships or looking for codes that might be elevated to theoretical categories, the investigator may determine that initial codes need to revised and relabeled. Initial codes may be combined or deleted
altogether. This non-linear, cyclical, organic process that unfolds in a series of fits and starts was the way in which the PI carried out data analysis for this study. Such is the nature of qualitative research!
Chapter 4: Research Question 1 – Part A
How do the directors of local civil society organizations and organizational development professionals perceive organizational sustainability/effectiveness in Kenya:
1) What are the essential components of OS/OE in Kenya; and
2) What context-specific factors influence the sustainability of local CSOs in Kenya?

4.1 Essential Components and Influential Factors
A General Perspective of OS/OE with Contextual Application. Discussions with each study participant regarding his/her conceptualization of OS began at the general level – i.e. identifying the building blocks of OS that respondents deemed applicable to CSOs both inside and outside Kenya. Conversations then proceeded to a more context-specific discussion of OS/OE in Kenya. Initially, the 54 executive directors and 20 organizational development professionals interviewed for this study, identified numerous ‘universal’ factors that they perceived as essential to establishing sustainable local nonprofit/development organizations in Kenya and potentially elsewhere. The most significant factors participants’ identified include: Good Governance (i.e. having an engaged and effective Board of Directors); Capable and Well-Managed Human Resources/Staff; Effective Management/Leadership; Access to and Sound Management of Financial Resources; Commitment/Adherence to the Organization’s Vision and Mission; and Effective Networking and Partnership Skills. Participants asserted that the presence and interaction of these elements either inside the organization or within the organization’s operating environment established the foundation necessary for a local CSO to achieve effectiveness and long-term sustainability in the Kenyan context. (See Table 4.1)

These broad themes have been identified and discussed elsewhere in the literature. (See previous discussions of OS/OE – specifically Lecy et al., 2011; and Sowa et al., 2006). This study provides a distinct overview of how key stakeholders believe these factors are perceived.
Table 4.1 General Concepts of Organizational Sustainability (OS) & Effectiveness (OE) and How They are Actualized in the Kenyan Context

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Key Components</th>
<th>As Actualized in Context</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Good Governance</strong></td>
<td>• Establish vision/mission</td>
<td>• BODs not fulfilling roles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having an engaged/effective Board of Directors (BOD)</td>
<td>• Create/implement strategic plan</td>
<td>• Lack relevant knowledge/capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Oversee establishment of systems, structures, policies</td>
<td>• BODs made up of friends/family</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Fundraise/mobilize resources</td>
<td>• Confuse role with management</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• May be inappropriate org design for Kenyan context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capable &amp; Well-Managed Human Resources/Staff</strong></td>
<td>• Technical skills/expertise</td>
<td>• Orgs w/insufficient resources to hire quality staff</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Commitment, dedication, passion</td>
<td>• Staff overly focused on financial gain</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Effective HR management</td>
<td>• Unusually high staff turnover</td>
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<td>• Poor transition/succession planning</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Effective Management/Leadership</strong></td>
<td>• Vision bearer/carrier</td>
<td>• Conflation of roles between BOD Chair and CEO</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Strong decision-makers</td>
<td>• Founder, owner, chair, CEO often the same</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Empower staff</td>
<td>• Poor transition/success planning</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Delegate to lowest level</td>
<td>• Emphasize ‘relational’ aspects of management</td>
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<td>• Lead by example</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Build team-based culture</td>
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<td>• Passionate/innovative</td>
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<td>• Learning spirit/willing to grow</td>
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<td>• Places org interest above self</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Ensure implementation of strategic plan/adherence to policies</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Access to &amp; Sound Management of Financial Resources</strong></td>
<td>• Sufficient resources to implement plan</td>
<td>• Financial systems often borrowed from ‘capacity builders’ and not tailored to each org.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Manage to annual operating budget</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Recruit/retain financial mgmt. staff</td>
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<td>• Maintain financial records</td>
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<td>• Ensure internal controls such as dual signatures on high expenditures</td>
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<td>• Invest in revenue generating activities</td>
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<td>• Develop/oversee fundraising strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Commitment/Adherence to the Organization’s Vision &amp; Mission</strong></td>
<td>• Requires visionary leadership</td>
<td>• Orgs experience significant mission-drift</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Facilitates staff buy-in</td>
<td>• Shifting donor priorities and orgs ‘following the money’ prevents adherence to vision/mission</td>
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<td>• Strategic plan designed to implement mission/achieve vision</td>
<td>• Opportunistic thinking often dominates original core vision/mission</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Effective Networking &amp; Partnership Skills</strong></td>
<td>• Enables leveraging of org skills/resources</td>
<td>• Orgs operate in silos</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Facilitates mutual learning</td>
<td>• No mutual trust/transparency</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Avoids duplication</td>
<td>• Orgs competitive vs. collaborative</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Increase efficiency</td>
<td>• Significant duplication of effort/waste or resources</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Multiply impact</td>
<td>• Some beginning to recognize the benefits of collaboration</td>
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and actualized in the Kenyan context. This overview will illustrate the importance of context and its impact on how these broad seemingly well-researched concepts are actually operationalized in a specific context. Each of the 6 general factors identified is explored in greater detail – with more specific attention to context where particularly relevant – in the pages that follow.

4.1.1 Good Governance (An Engaged and Effective Board of Directors)
Participants made a clear distinction between the ‘governance’ of an organization and the ‘management’ of the organization. They described governance as the purview and primary responsibility of the organization’s board of directors. There was near unanimous consensus among participants that the role of a board of directors (BOD) is to establish the vision and mission of the organization. Once vision and mission are concretized, an effective board should support the achievement of that vision and mission through overseeing the creation and implementation of a strategic plan. One participant explained that a board of directors is responsible for “the strategic, the overall vision and the oversight [of] the organization.” Another stated simply that the role of an effective board is to “ensure they [the organizations] have strategic plans and [that] they’re followed.”

Study participants perceived systems, structures and policies – particularly human resource policies and sound financial management systems – as the support scaffolding necessary for an organization to implement its strategic plan. They felt that the creation and oversight of an effective set of systems and policies was another principal role of an organization’s board of directors. One interviewee explained…

…the board… they are more at policy level… they are supposed to give strategic direction, policy direction, that this is the way we want [the] organization to be managed. They are also… developing policies that would oversee financial management, the management of itself [the board], the recruitment processes, [the] fundraising strategy… They are the ones that drive that process for the organization to be sustainable.
An additional component of good governance that participants described as a critical function of an effective board of directors is resource mobilization or fundraising. “You need a board that is effective; people who are qualified… you need a board that is self-sacrificing… [and] a board that is strong in decision making capacity,” notes one study participant. This individual went on to say…

...they [board members] have ability to fundraise, and if possible, are able to even contribute. If they are able to have the capacity to contribute, but it’s not a must, but it is [they must have] the ability to also mobilize resources, ability to avail themselves. So a strong effective, competent board is a key ingredient of an organization that is likely to be sustainable. So those can help an organization improve its sustainability, because it holds – those things hold the organization and can actually take the organization somewhere.

According to study participants, the ‘good governance’ of local CSOs – carried-out by an engaged and effective board of directors was one of the most essential components of organizational sustainability and effectiveness in Kenya. In sum, establishing organizational vision and mission, creating and implementing a strategic plan, establishing effective and efficient systems/structures/policies and fundraising were the primary functions of an effective board of directors governing a local CSO. At a more abstract level, however, participants believed that good governance also required board members who are deeply concerned about the well being and success of the organization. One participant noted that boards must see themselves as “custodians of strategy.” Another stated that board members must be so passionate and committed to the organization that they are willing to “pursue organizational interest even without pay.”

As interactions with participants transitioned from discussions about their general perspectives regarding the role of a CSO’s board of directors to a deeper level – where participants discussed their individual experiences working with and for boards of directors – a set of factors emerged
that expose a more realistic picture than the preceding overview of how the general concept of
good governance through boards of directors is actualized in Kenya.

Overall, there was exceptionally strong agreement among study participants that boards of local
CSOs in Kenya are not fulfilling their intended roles as described above. Several participants
asserted that, in their views, this breakdown is due to lack of knowledge or lack of capacity
among board members. One participant described his/her perspective this way…

Because looking at most non-profits, you will see a trend that sometimes the board is just
for – to fulfill the mandate, so that the organization can be able to say we have a board of
directors. But, really, they are not involved in the – most of them don’t even know what
the organization stands for.

Another participant explained…

You find that many organizations in this area would have a board that is very committed
to the goals of the organization. But, you find that they don’t even know how to conduct
themselves as a board. They don’t even know what their responsibility is as a board.
And that is, basic… just… ignorance on their part. You find that they have the interests
of the organization at heart, but they don’t know that they too have a responsibility; they
don’t know what exactly their roles are in ensuring that the organization moves to the
next level in terms of attaining the goals of the organization. For me the first thing is to
put the board, the governance of the organization in order.

A second group of respondents, while not disagreeing that local board members often lacked the
capacity and understanding to do their jobs effectively, chose to place more emphasis on the
approach CEOs/directors used to establish or constitute their respective boards. This group also
stated that board members are often selected for the wrong reasons. Individuals asked to serve as
board members may not only lack the necessary skills but also have questionable motives for
joining the board. One interviewee stated bluntly, “We get board members who are our friends.
We really don’t try and look at the governance structure and how it impacts the organization.”
Another questioned the motives of many board members who serve by noting, “not very many
people want to sit in boards when they are not walking out of the board with money.” One of the
organizational development experts interviewed summarized his/her work with boards of local CSOs in Kenya in this way…

[Sometimes] board members remain board members on paper but [are] no longer active so that the boards that we normally meet, when we start partnering with an organization, has so many weak areas that you find that perhaps the board members – all people belonging to one family; maybe a man, his wife, his child. Maybe a board has just one strong member and the other board members are just villagers who do not have any expertise or any strength…

Another context-specific factor that participants perceived as impeding the ability of boards of directors to effectively govern local organizations was described as a conflation of roles specifically between board members and the CEO as well as other senior staff of the organizations. “When you cannot differentiate the two, especially if you cannot divorce management from the board,” notes one respondent, “that’s where organizations really stall and it’s a key issue that most people grapple with.” Two other respondents provided these explanatory details. “At times, you’ll find the board interfering with the organization actually reaching the goal or going towards the vision that the organization aspires to go.”

The board is supposed to be an oversight type of body. Most of the boards we have in the local CSOs, are administrative boards whereby the board is the one that implements all the projects. These projects at times need some expertise, an accountant; qualified person; you need someone who can do monitoring and evaluation; you need someone who can manage the program. We may have this expertise within the board and if we do that’s a plus because that person can actually volunteer and continue. But the separation between the board and the management is very, very important. It doesn’t really act as the checks and balance to ensure that there is transparency and accountability. Because without that, the organization can’t actually go… I mean these are the people who the management and the staff should be reporting to. And if there is no one to do that then there are no checks and balances. Remember that the board is the face of the organization. They are the owners of this organization.

A third and final context-specific reality identified through this study is what participants described as the inappropriate adoption of western models of organizational governance in the Kenyan context. This theme was not particularly prominent in the data but does merit some
attention here. The presence of this theme, at minimum, highlights the need for further study of “organizational design” and its relevance/suitability for specific contexts – especially in the Global South. Organizational design ultimately has a critically important impact on an organization’s long-term sustainability and effectiveness.

While several respondents articulated the view that the role of an organizational board of directors, as previously described, is a western conceptualization of organizational governance and one that they thought ill-suited for the Kenyan context; they struggled to identify an alternative model or approach that they thought would be a match for Kenyan socio-cultural realities. An organizational development expert, with many years of experience working with local CSOs in the greater Nairobi area, explained it this way…

We have a lot of culture, which has come from the western world… then we have our own. So, sometimes, we don’t have a good identity. We get lost. There is some identity crisis… that is the way I can put it… but the CSO mainly has been more driven by western laws. So, most of the things we try to mimic… we talk about governance… we talk about it in the western context… we have not tried to contextualize it…

This same participant then attempted to posit one possible alternative form of organizational governance that he drew from Kenyan Meru culture…

“Njuri Ncheke” is like a council of elders… and this was the governance structure of the Meru. And the rules were very clear, they were not based on such kinds of things, they were now based on your age… You know, you could go to that council if you were of a certain age… you go to that council if you have managed to raise so many children, so you are seen to be successful in your social life. [You go that council if] You have so many cows and you have been a mediator in a… so there [are] those other traditional criteria that people used. And this was very effective. They resolved conflicts, they managed… that was the government actually and their rule was very different from what we have today. But the problem is it is difficult to go back that way, you can never go back that way…

The application of the specific Meru-based approach to governance that the respondent describes above to the governance of local CSOs is not particularly obvious or straightforward. The time and limited scope of this study did not allow for a deeper exploration of this theme. However,
this theme and the illustrative quotes used here, at minimum, raises the question, ‘Is the concept of a board of directors and its role in OS/OE as described in the preceding pages ultimately a suitable/relevant construct for Kenyan CSOs or should an entirely different organizational design and approach to leadership be identified that is, from the perspective of key stakeholders, more rooted in Kenyan socio-cultural realities?’ While participants identified good governance as essential to building sustainable/effective CSOs in Kenya and while they articulated the various components of ‘good governance’ that have been identified elsewhere in the literature, the actualization of this construct has been significantly impacted by contextual factors as outlined above.

4.1.2 Capable and Well-Managed Human Resources/Staff
Study participants underscored the critical importance of a capable and well-managed staff to the long-term sustainability and effectiveness of local CSOs. Participants described capable staff members as individuals who have the technical skills and expertise necessary to effectively perform their assigned roles and job functions in the organization. Effective performance by staff members is essential to OS/OE because it enables the organization to achieve its vision and mission. One of the CSO directors interviewed for this study described how the sustainability/effectiveness of his/her organization depended on “having well trained staff who are able… to undertake its [the organization’s] vision and mission. The staff must be well-trained, educated, [and] knowledgeable in those fields…” A second CEO concurred, “You must have qualified, professional staff who understand the vision of the organization, the mission of the organization… who are well-trained; have the relevant qualifications and can help the organization deliver on its mandate.”
However, participants ultimately found commitment, dedication and passion to be more important characteristics of the capable, effective staff member.

…the other aspect [of staff capacity] would probably be less tangible but is essentially the evidence of the dedication and commitment that they have to doing… to what they do and the drive… whatever drives them to excel… for them to make sure they do a good job… someone who strives for that excellence and is someone who really believes in what the organization does… and some of those things are not necessarily tangible… but you can see their passion on how they [go] about their every day…

A sizeable number of participants expressed their more specific sentiment that passion, commitment and especially organizational ‘buy-in’ are a more important characteristics of the capable staff member than technical skill or financial remuneration.

I think the first one [building block of OS/OE] is a sort of… I don’t want to use the word motivated because it’s very cliché; but it’s a workforce that is passionate about what you’re doing. Because I have found a lot of the times, that even more than money, if you have a team that understands… -- know what they are supposed to do but above that are switched on about whatever cause you are on. So, I think the first thing is to be able to recruit but also to be able to continuously be able to get really well-trained, well-skilled but very motivate, very switched on labor force.

Study participants also emphasized the importance of effective human resource management when discussing the role of staff capacity in facilitating OS/OE. Analysis of study data revealed that the way staff members were recruited, trained, managed, and mentored; the way staff members transitioned out of the organization; and staff relationships with their supervisors and organizational executives were all critical determinants of organizational sustainability. Four study participants shared their perspectives regarding the vital importance of effective human resource management…

(P1) It is the quality of the human resources… So you have talked about the financial, but the human come together to drive that strategy. And we are starting to find that given how our external environment is changing we need more out of the people we recruit to deliver and to drive and to implement strategy. So, you know it is working out effective resource systems from recruitment to retention to exit… all of it coming together to complement financial resources to get where you are going.
First if we begin from the staff themselves... staff being facilitated to provide leadership in terms of... to be on top of what they do. Being empowered to be able to make decisions about... ‘this I think is what my employer is expecting of me, and is how I can support the employer to meet the expectations.’

We have to nurture... like the organization’s board has to ensure that the staff is able to work towards those goals to grow them and to nurture them; to continuously train them, and continuously try to retain and you know, to recruit and retain the best of the staff in the environment. Then that is the only way they’ll be able to be to actually be financially sustainable.

Then those ones [staff members] who have shown exemplary leadership, they take them and they employ them, then they continue mentoring them along the way to take up these positions, and for me that’s a very effective strategy that works so well. Of course it has its own weakness, in which after doing that some of them may go for greener pastures, but for me that was effective.

At a more conceptual or theoretical level, the actualization of the OS/OE construct, ‘capable and well-managed staff,’ in the Kenyan context, was shown to be the result of a complex interplay between a CSO’s financial resources, transition and succession planning within organizations, seemingly extraordinarily high levels of staff turnover within organizations, public/key stakeholder perceptions of civil society/CSOs, and possible career/personal-advancement opportunities in the civil society sector. These dynamics will be discussed in greater detail in the next section of this chapter. That section will address a series of more context-specific OS/OE building blocks than the more general/cross-cutting ones reviewed here. Nonetheless, in their comments regarding the relationship of a capable and well-managed staff to OS/OE, many respondents were quick to point-out 3 challenges they identified as specific to – or at least particularly relevant in – the Kenyan context that they believed hampered a CSO’s ability to recruit, retain and effectively manage quality staff.

Numerous interviewees claimed that local Kenyan CSOs do not have sufficient resources – or sufficient decision-making latitude with the mainly internationally sourced resources they do
have – to be able to hire and incentivize high-quality employees. Many respondents cited donor policies as the primary reasons for not having the resources necessary to hire quality staff. According to one CSO director, “A lot of these donors… they restrict the amount of money you can… the percentage that goes to staff. So you can’t get the real technical, good people, the professionals. So you end up getting half-baked people.” One of the organizational development experts concurred with the director…

One area that I have felt the nonprofit sector has not been strong [in]… is managing staff… human resource. [The] nonprofit sector doesn’t usually get the most high caliber staff… that is the first thing… and I argue it because they don’t have [the] discretion in financing to be able to get, you know, to spend the kind of resources you want to spend to get the right people. If you don’t get the right people, you have got to use what you have but you have also got to use it well. It becomes an egg and a chicken kind of thing… because you might not even have the internal capacity to know how to use what you have.

In addition to resource limitations, a significant majority of study participants noted the serious impact, of what they perceive as an unusually high rate of staff turnover, on a local CSO’s ability to retain and effectively manage skilled/trained staff. One participant does a good job at describing one of the causes for high levels of staff turnover…

…you find staff trained by the partner organization [usually international donor or international capacity-builder]... and after their training and their capacity – or the capacity of the organization which has been built – you find the people who have been trained actually getting opportunities of greener pastures elsewhere in other organizations and probably those international organizations… which again creates a bigger gap and a bigger problem because these are trained personnel who are now able to support the organization further, but because there is no funding… then they’ll [the newly trained staff] go where the funding is.

In addition to this participant’s particularly insightful comments, many other respondents identified other causes of unusually high staff turnover in Kenyan CSOs. These additional factors include certain widely held public perceptions of civil society/CSOs and the view among many Kenyans that nonprofit/CSO work provides lucrative opportunities for career/personal
socio-economic advancement. At various stages throughout this work, the impact of high staff turnover in Kenyan CSOs on their sustainability and effectiveness will be explored in greater detail. Additional factors that contribute high staff turnover will also be identified and discussed further.

One final impact of context on a local CSOs ability to hire and effectively manage capable staff is what many interviewees described as **poor transition/succession planning** among Kenyan CSOs. Many Kenyan CSOs, according to study respondents, were started by an individual or by the individual and a small group of his/her family and/or friends. Study data reveals broad agreement among participants that many organizational founders are passionate about a social concern, passionate about the organizations they have formed to address the social concern, and passionate about managing the projects their organizations implement to address these concerns. However, passion/dedication, from participant perspectives, seems to be insufficient to achieving lasting, effective organization. They described how organizational founders often manage their organizations for long periods of time and then leave without having spent enough time and effort on developing a cadre of skilled, committed people to take the founders place and continue to pursue the organization’s vision and mission. One participant described this sequence of unfortunate events in this way…

I think… the kind of work civil society does… is based on personal passion. So what we have is a lot of organizations start off with an individual and what they believe in. So the guy who founded my organization [name of organization redacted] believed in what the organization is about… started this organization, drove it, championed it… got guys on board… won [over] some people who believed in it… Now that person leaves, so there is a problem of mentoring and passing on the dream, and getting people to believe in what you do and all that. That is a major, major problem. We discussed it for many years in civil society among executive directors, how are you passing on this thing, how are you getting others to believe in it, how are you making sure that you're not the only voice… If one of the team members was asked to present the organization would they say the same things you would say, you know that kind of thing. We are not selling insurance, it is
very easy to tell a guy this is what the product is, this is how to pitch properly, put a straight face, talk, believe in yourself. You know, [but this work] is not the same thing. And so there is a very poor culture of passing it on.

This study is not the first to identify ‘capable and well-managed staff’ as a critical component of OS/OE. However, this study reveals, as described above, the high impact context-specific factors such as limited resources, high staff turnover and poor transition/succession planning have on the sustainability and effectiveness of local CSOs in Kenya. These context-specific elements must be given greater attention than they are usually given in order to fully understand the construction and actualization of OS/OE in a specific context like Kenya.

While an organization’s approach to managing human resources and recruiting/retaining high caliber staff is often included in more general discussions of organizational-level management and leadership, study participants nearly unanimously chose to address staff capacity and management issues as distinct from broader organizational management. Effective organizational-level management is the next building block participants consider fundamentally important for creating sustainable local CSOs in Kenya.

### 4.1.3 Effective Management/Leadership
In general, participants used the terms management and leadership interchangeably. They, nonetheless, made some distinctions between the two concepts when definitions and conceptualizations of good leadership specific to the Kenyan context were discussed. At this point in this review of study findings the two terms will also be used interchangeably. However, the important distinctions between to the two concepts will be addressed at various points in later sections of this chapter.

A considerable majority of the 74 participants interviewed regarding research question #1 identified good leadership/management as essential to establishing and sustaining effective local
CSOs. One participant highlighted the critical importance of good leadership to organizational sustainability in this way,

For organizations that are doing well, first of all leadership is key. Number one is all about leadership… the kind of leaders that you have, especially, the executive director being at the forefront or the chief executive officer or country director whatever it is, top leadership is very, very, very key…

One of the organizational development experts interviewed added this more thorough explanation, from his/her perspective, of what good leadership/management is and the important relationship it has to the sustainability and effectiveness of local CSOs in the Kenyan context…

I think the success of any institution or any organization, purely really falls on the leader, within an organization. So the leader is someone who is supposed to inspire the vision, to inspire the effort among the teams to ensure that they rally behind the vision. And so I think, leadership forms a key, key integral part in ensuring that an organization is sustainable, and looking at the African context for example, I think the reason why most of our institutions or CSO’s are not thriving as compared to the rest of the world, for example in the first world countries, is mostly largely because of the leadership, not about the human capital in terms of their skills but the ability then to be able to mobilize those skills towards a certain objective. So leadership really forms the determining factor in attaining organizational success. So I think that forms one of the key factors that affect the sustainability of an organization based on the African context. So probably we have an area to work on in-terms of our leadership practices, what then defines us, what leadership is, what are the principles of leadership that will enable an organization to achieve its objective. That becomes a very important part I think.

When woven together, the in-depth interview data obtained through this study present a rich picture of participant perspectives of what a good leader/good manager is and the contribution he/she makes to the sustainability and effectiveness of local development organizations. Good leaders are decisive, strong decision-makers. Yet, they empower the people they work with to make their own decisions. In this study, participants defined empowerment as delegating decision-making and authority in an organization to the lowest level possible. Good leaders are the ‘vision bearers’ or ‘vision carriers’ in their organizations – working to rally their colleagues around accomplishing the core social-change goals of their organizations. Good leaders lead and
manage by example. They work to build a team-based culture of mutual respect in their organizations. One participant described the good leader-manager as…

…the one who steers and gives the vision of the organization. But the leader needs to also be careful not to be overshadowing everything and is at the center of attention and everything… So, it’s also good to let the rest of the team kind of take leadership in their own areas because you have given them that responsibility and that authority… It also gives them that motivation or a sense of [I] am part of this. So, it’s not just I’m working for this person… but we are all working together. So, leadership really in terms of taking the whole team with you but not being the only person who is at the front and in the limelight. So, that’s very crucial if you want to have a team that is going… actually going in the same direction with you.

Participants largely agreed that the primary operational or managerial role of a good leader is to spearhead the development of the organization’s strategic plan and then to lead his/her team in the implementation of that plan. Good managers must work to ensure that structures, systems, policies are put in place (once established and approved by the BOD) that facilitate the successful implementation of the strategic plan. Good managers must then ensure his/her team’s adherence to organizational policies and plans but do so in a non-authoritarian and motivational way – functioning more in the role of a coach than a director. “…The role of [the] director of the manager [is] to use those resources effectively and within the key objectives of the organization and the projects that the organization is coming [up with].” “Having just the minimum systems, structures, processes, policies, guidelines – whatever we call all those operational stuff – and making sure they are implemented the way they should be – is key for management.”

Good leaders/managers have “learning spirits” and a “willingness to grow.” Good leaders put organizational interests above their individual interests. Finally, study participants emphasized the necessity of passion and innovation for good leadership and good management. “One thing that is very essential is… leadership that is driven by passion.” “Especially for the nonprofit you will find that they are leaders who are passionate. I know we can’t measure passion, but they do
understand what the organization stands for and they are **visionary**. They are quite passionate about what they are implementing.” One participant described the innovative leader as one who, …catches up with the emerging trends so that you can be a leader other than just being a manager. A leader is somebody who is trying to catch up with innovation. Trying to stir up those programs that you are running, whether it’s funding or whether it’s fundraising, or whether it’s programming or whatever, just make sure that you are always on toes, catching up with the emerging trends. The world is really changing; we need people to be innovative and catching up with whatever that is coming up with the world.

As noted in the beginning of this chapter, in-depth interviews conducted for this study began with participants’ general perspectives regarding the essential components of and context-specific influencing factors on OS/OE and then proceeded to a more focused discussion of context-specific influences on those building blocks. So, conversations around more Kenya-specific actualizations of good leadership/management are explored in later sections of this chapter. Nonetheless, a few context-specific issues emerged in participants’ broader general discussions of good leadership/management that warrant addressing here.

Numerous interviewees described a complex dynamic within local Kenyan CSOs where there is significant conflation of roles between the board chair and the organizational director or CEO. This dynamic was discussed above using study participant perceptions of good governance and the relationship of BODs to organizational sustainability and effectiveness. Participants again noted here – in their discussions of effective leadership/management – that many present-day organizational directors/managers are often the founders of their organizations. These founders/directors/managers often sit on their boards as full voting members and have significant influence over board decisions if not very direct control over board activities. In many cases, directors serve concurrently as board chair. Where directors founded the organization but do not serve concurrently as board chairs, they continue to exert undue influence because they are often deferred to as ‘founder/owner’ of the organization. This conflation of roles creates a dynamic
that most participants believe is unique to the Kenyan or at least the African context and negatively impacts organizational sustainability and effectiveness. One participant provided this detailed explanation,

And that brings into a very sharp focus one of the key challenges I see in the Kenyan context. Most organizations are founded by guys who happen to be either the CEO or maybe a strong person in the board – probably the board chair. And when it comes to recruiting people to serve the organization then it happens to be ‘who knows who.’ So you find the staff then are employed and are providing a service to please… as opposed to… [or] because their conscience tells them this is the right thing to do. And the CEO, if he is the CEO, because he is the founder, he is the owner of the organization then the board is not able to provide effective oversight. And if it’s the board, the board doesn’t even want to leave the organization because it is its organization. I know one of the key, like a prominent personality with the civil society sector, who would say his actions influence what other players in the sector could do. He has been a board chair for an organization he founded, since it was founded. Yet he is in the forefront for pushing the government for good governance. And so the question is, you are not exercising it yourself, you are this learned, you are a leader in the sector, so what do the other organizations learn from you in terms of what is right to do for the civil society sector. So that generally then affects the type of leadership we want to see driving the civil society forward. So leadership in terms of being able to help the organization adapt [to] the evolving external environment.

Another individual added,

Yes, so there is a lot of that founder mentality going on especially around local organization and people will tend to view the founder as the owner of the organization, and they say, “He owns the organization, so what can we do?” and everybody now will fear the founder. So things are done according to his approval, or according to the way that he wants it to be done. And that kills an organization, yes, because then to me you don’t work towards a certain goal. You are working to please the founder/founders, but you are not working to actually build the organization.

Situations where the same individual is founder, CEO and board chair of the organization, according to study participants, often leads to woefully inadequate transition/succession planning as well as demoralized, dispassionate staff. These challenges, in turn, significantly threaten the organization’s potential for long-term sustainability and effectiveness.

Several participants also highlighted the context-specific importance of relationship and community in Kenya. They described how good leaders/managers have to take into account the
importance Kenyan society and cultures place on relationships and interpersonal dynamics if they are to effectively lead a CSO to long-term sustainability. Participants felt this emphasis on relationship and community is particular to the Kenyan context though they noted similar dynamics probably exist in many other parts of Africa and throughout the Global South. They were, however, in agreement that this emphasis on relationship and communitarianism is sharply distinct, in their views, from that found in societies of the Global North. A couple of study participants describe how this socio-cultural dynamic plays-out in the workplace,

(P1) Remember I told you… relationships… so [you] are seeing people not just as staff… so when you have to sign a letter telling somebody ‘I’m sorry, this is going to be your last month,’ you are not just signing a letter… that person there… they are actually… probably have 5 or 6 months that are not going to get an income to provide for them…

(P2) One of the things… relationship… Ok, in an African context… Kenya… you do have just to note that, you have staff people working here, they are not just staff, numbers, peoples that……so there are relationships… so you do have to take cognizance of their family scenario; how they are operating etc. so that if somebody for instance has a brother who is very ill, then you would… you will tell them look, take time off, go and deal with your brother…

4.1.4 Access to and Sound Management of Financial Resources
Not surprisingly, the access to and availability of funds was identified by nearly all respondents as critical to the sustainability and effectiveness of local CSOs – both in Kenya and elsewhere. Most, if not all, readers will concur that finances are essential for the creation and operation of any organization – be it nonprofit, public or private, in the global north or the global south. This indispensable reality – as shown by the statements quoted below – was emphasized numerous times and at multiple points during each interview throughout the data collection period.

(P1) Financial resources, I think, is the soul of other things.

(P2) You must have funds – funds for the project, and then core funds, which will take care of the personnel, the human capital.

(P3) I think to me there are many aspects of sustainability, but the one I think is most important, one that would drive the others is financial sustainability.
(P4) Then, there is the big bit just about resources that will enable them to continue existing. So, do they have the financial resources or do they have a good pipeline of resources that will enable them to continue doing their work.

(P5) I do believe that sustainability is a very complex term. Many people including myself identify sustainability with financial stability.

(P6) Look at most of the CSOs, when you ask them, what is sustainability, they look at ability to have enough finances to run this organization beyond expected timeline. It means that once we have money to run organization, this money is supposed to last us within the project time and also we are supposed to have a strategy to continue getting more and more funding. And I think that is very, very critical and that is the most challenge that most organizations face, financial sustainability.

With the same degree of emphasis and fervor, study participants also stressed the importance of sound, effective and efficient management of financial resources within local organizations. From participant perspectives, sound financial management requires a financial system with policies and procedures that are not only “in place” but are strictly adhered to by all staff. Participants described the primary purpose of financial policies, procedures and systems as accounting for all income and expenditures the organization incurs in such a way that the internal and external stakeholders can be provided a complete, transparent overview of all the organization’s financial activities. Using established financial systems to be accountable to donors and provide all stakeholders a transparent “paper trail” of all of the organization’s financial activities was described in revealing detail by one interviewee…

So, we know at the CSO level there is no real accountability. [So we need to ensure that they] have strong management systems. There are internal controls. That there are financial systems that support inflows of cash and the outflows… [This] becomes a very critical part because what happens is… a few of the NGOs we are working with don’t have even mechanisms of recording that we paid this amount to certain people during a training. And so the money comes in they pay out, and they say, ok, we have done it, and these are the pictures and we have given this amount of money. But no records, nothing, you cannot trace the trail of money coming in, coming out. So I think financial management forms a key pillar in ensuring that one, corruption is minimized, and the objective… that at the end of the day corruption becomes zero practice.
Sound financial management, as described by a large number of study participants, included a variety of routine/operational financial practices such as

- developing an annual operational budget and managing to the budget (i.e., running a balanced budget);
- recruiting and retaining financial management staff with the relevant training and experience;
- ensuring that regular audits are conducted, by an external entity, of the organization’s financial records;
- having various internal controls such as requiring two signatures on all expenditures above a threshold amount;
- and investing a portion of organizational income in a fund/activity that is income generating.

In addition to the aforementioned generally routine financial management activities, participants underscored three key elements of sound financial management. 1) Organizations with sound financial management should have, according to study participants, a fundraising plan or strategy in place that focuses on diversifying the organization’s sources of income. “So, that’s another key ingredient… that they [CSOs] should have fundraising strategies.” In addition to creating/implementing strategies and operational plans, participants stressed that local CSOs should employ staff solely dedicated to fundraising and resource mobilization. Numerous interviewees felt that given current socio-political realities in Kenya, local CSOs desiring to be financially sustainable need to be particularly innovative in their fundraising strategies.

To sustain funding interest [of] donors and to get new ones… that is quite important, especially now when funding has shrunk everywhere… [Organizations must have] the ability to innovate – the ability to innovate in terms of how you link up with these individuals or organizations that hold the key to those fundings. Because, if you remain the same then you’ll basically be left out because the requirement for funding is also very—it is evolving very fast. And new targets, and new requirement…. external factors are popping every day, so you need to be flexible.

However, participants noted that most local Kenyan CSOs do not have a resource mobilization strategy nor do they have dedicated fundraising/resource mobilization staff.
2) Study participants were also keen to point out that financial systems and procedures not customized to each organization’s particular needs are largely ineffective at facilitating long-term organizational sustainability through sound financial management. They explained that many of the financial systems currently in use among local CSOs are ‘borrowed’ from other countries or other organizations within Kenyan and not tailored to their specific needs and program objectives. Two CSO directors shared the following…

(P1) I can … in terms of systems I think we have systems like for example if its financial resource [systems] but it’s not customized to the organization... So we tend to borrow… So and so has a very good system so let’s pick it up. But we don’t get the system and look at it and see how it functions for [our] organization. So yeah, so that customizing and making it work for the organization is what really lacks most of the time… however much you might get very beautiful documents.

(P2) So you might have CSOs that really have very skilled persons but they don’t have the financial capacity. There are also those who have conducted training on financial accounting and financial management, but again like I said earlier they tend to be inclined to offering tools that are just for their purpose. So that they offer - they already come with prescribed formats that they want you to abide by. This might be beneficial for that particular project but it might not work out for other projects. Or it might not relate to the organizations financial requirements and needs beyond that project.

3) Finally, the data highlighted the importance of local CSOs using their financial resources as effectively and efficiently as possible. According to study participants, effective and efficient use of financial resources meant that local CSOs could carry-out their respective missions and accomplish their visions with as little expense and wasted resources as possible. More specifically, participants explained that administrative or operational costs should be kept at a minimum thus allowing for the greatest possible share of all income to go to programmatic investments in carrying out the organization’s mission.

(P1) I think the expenses need to stand at the minimum. Because for our organization, our expenses are very minimal. They are very minimal. The moment you have minimal expenses for the organization, that one also attracts the donor funding. Yes, because [the] moment you have high expenses for your organization... the donors are kind of, is it [our money for] you the organization, or the community, or the people in need. So you find that is another thing to look at.
We tell them, look at the bottom line. So, don’t necessarily bring on people full time. That will just create… blow up your overheads. But, look and see what needs to come in. So, outsource where it is required. Collaborate where it is possible. Because, in many cases you really don’t have to pay… or necessarily have to dish out money… but you can cooperate with another entity to get that expertise.

One participant very succinctly summarized the overall importance of financial resources and financial management to organizational sustainability and effectiveness with this statement…

I think financial management also forms the key aspect of organizational sustainability. It is the ability to be able to raise resources and use those resources effectively and efficiently in achieving its organizational mandate. So, I think that is, in a nutshell, what sustainability means.

4.1.5 Commitment/Adherence to the Organization’s Vision and Mission
The development of clear vision and mission statements, and ardent adherence to those statements by CSO leaders and staff, was also identified by a majority of study participants as an indispensable component of long-term organizational sustainability. One participant noted that, “for an organization to be sustainable, they first need to have a very clear vision. They need to know what they want to do and have that very clear in their minds.” Participants described vision and mission statements as important tools because they help build cohesion among organizational staff and enable them to focus on the shared purpose around which the organization was built. Without them it would be difficult to build and maintain a unified sustainable organization. Without cohesion, unity and a ‘rallying point,’ the viability and success of local organizations would be nearly impossible.

The absence of well-crafted vision and mission statements or the failure to use the statements as the roadmap guiding all organizational planning, projects and activities causes organizations, according to respondents, to focus on short-term gains and opportunities at the expense of long-term institutional stability. The lack of vision and mission also prevents CSOs from building strong organizational identities that staff can ‘buy into’ thereby ultimately jeopardizing
organizational sustainability and effectiveness through lack of commitment to and personal ‘investment’ in the organization. A number of participants described what they believe is a very close link between organizational vision/mission and an organization’s strategic plan. Some used vision/mission and strategic plan more or less interchangeably. Some described strategic planning as the process organizations use to develop vision and mission statements. Others felt that strategic plans are created to implement organizational vision and mission. One participant, in particular, provided these key insights into this dynamic…

Then the other element that I feel is critical is also that you need to have a very coherent and robust strategic plan for an organization because actually this is the heart of the blood of the organization. Simply because if you do not have a strategy, then you [can] not be able to achieve your objectives and then you’ll be working [in] what I call, a piecemeal way. In that, anything that comes across your way if you find a donor coming into your way, you just pick that money because I need money. But if you have the strategic plan, it has mission, vision, all these values that I’ve talked about, management, all these kind of thing, you find that you’ll be sustainable. But if you do not have a strategic plan, then the organization would just be Dick, Harry and Thomas, you just do everything here, which is not good. So basically in a nutshell, I think those are the factors that I feel is critical when it comes to organization sustainability.

Many study participants agreed that the development of and adherence to an organization’s vision and mission most often requires strong visionary leadership.

(P1) I think the leader, at the end of the day, is the one who steers and give vision [to] the organization.

(P2) I think it takes vision… That would be one of the first things I would say… and usually embodied in one or two people that, you know, are willing to go in… I think and that is something that I would have said in most organizations… if you have got a team – you know somebody that can really have that vision for where the organization needs to go, what its possibilities are…

However, a number of study participants claimed that Kenyan CSOs often lack well-articulated vision and mission statements as well as the visionary leaders to develop and implement them. “So, I think the commitment of leadership – the visionary – you know, being able to be a
visionary and being able to see and believe in… the cause for which you set up the organization isn’t always there…”

While the absence of visionary leadership is a critical road-block to organizational sustainability, the greatest challenge, in the Kenyan context, to the development of and adherence to organizational vision/mission, according to respondents, is shifting donor priorities and the manner in which funds are provided by donors (primarily bilateral foreign assistance agencies and large international NGOs) to local CSOs. The relationship between local CSOs and their predominantly international donors is explored in much greater detail later in this chapter. However, since donor funding priorities and practices, according to study participants, are the greatest cause of organizational ‘mission-drift,’ this dynamic will be briefly addressed here. Participants described situations where local CSOs were formed specifically because of the availability of funding in a particular technical area at that time or because the founder was aware of shifting donor priorities and he/she wanted to have an entity positioned to apply for the downstream funding that would result. Participants added that while ‘positioning an entity for downstream funding’ could be the result of commitment to a particular cause, it often stemmed from the founder/directors search for financial reward. Rather than building their organizations around a core vision/mission that the founders were committed to; they established their organizations based on the most well funded technical sector of the day. Other organizations may have developed around commitment to a specific vision/mission but growing donor funding in areas different from their core businesses either enticed, or perhaps forced out of financial necessity, a shift in focus. This pattern was particularly strong, according to respondents, during the height of the HIV/AIDS crisis in East Africa.
So the challenge I find with the Kenyan CSOs is the lack of... very few of them understand their purpose of existence. Why am I saying that... You are doing HIV, for example, and tomorrow you get another donor who has a lot of money, who wants to do environment, and you find CSOs, especially local CSOs, trying to align to the environment to get this funding. And only a few organizations will say our core mandate is HIV, and we don’t do environment. So please take this money to somebody else. Very few will say no to finance.

You say you have a strategic plan, but does it guide your operational plan. Does it guide your day-to-day planning, if a donor came today with 200 billion Ksh [Kenyan Shillings], will you change your ideas? Or will you stick to your vision? So that has been the crisis...

I’m hearing [that] funding for things like maybe constitution issues, maybe civic education, electoral issues is so much available right now because we are going to an election year, next year. That’s what people are saying out there, ‘That if you want to get money now, do something political or something electoral related.’ So people will change.

I think [about] the issue of mission drift... So there’s a reason why the organization exists, but because they need to get funding from [a] certain organization, you tend then to meet their goal and kind of ignore yours.

In the views of the CEOs and organizational development experts interviewed for this study, a lack of unwavering commitment to organizational vision/mission encourages short-term, opportunistic thinking and hampers the pursuit of long-term institutional stability. Constantly ‘following the money’ regardless of an organization’s core business as articulated by its vision and mission statements, prevents the development of organizational identity and organizational buy-in by staff. The pursuit of funding also produces organizations that have sufficient experience in a number of technical areas to provide service and implement programs, but lack the depth of expertise necessary to facilitate fundamental transformation in any one technical area. These conditions work together making it extremely challenging for local CSOs to achieve long-term sustainability. Consider the following exchange between the investigator and a study participant...
Respondent: I think maternal health became very big because it was in the MDG goals… They were not achieving the indicator. So for them now everyone [was] running towards it, but they were not internally - they didn’t have those capacities. So, it took time to first build the capacities so that they can be able to implement. Yes. I don’t know if it makes sense…

Investigator: It sounds like you are following the money… basically.

Respondent: Yes

Investigator: It gets back to what you said in the beginning… like what’s your vision, what’s your purpose. So if your vision is fistula and your purpose is fistula but suddenly there is a windfall with HIV... So you are running over here, how you can sustain an organization - because that will change. It already has…

Respondent: It already has…

4.1.6 Effective Networking and Partnership Skills

Networking and the development of organizational-level partnerships and consortiums was also identified as an essential building block of OS/OE both in the Kenyan context and beyond. Participants described numerous ways in which networking and collaboration among local CSOs could help strengthen organizational sustainability and effectiveness. In their views, networking facilitates mutual learning among organizations – preventing them from wasting time and resources using the trial and error approach to mastering various strategies, tactics, interventions, etc. that other organizations have already tackled. One participant stated his belief that OS/OE can be enhanced by organizations that seek to know from their peer organizations, “What it is that they are doing very well… what is [it] that you can borrow… instead of working as though you [the organization] are in a cocoon.” Another participant concurred by noting the importance of an organization “finding [its] place within the space [it] intends to operate in and maximizing on the strengths that are already available from other existing organizations.”

The CEOs and OD professionals interviewed were particularly enthusiastic about networks and consortiums of local CSOs enabling participating organizations to increase their chances for
sustainability and effectiveness. Leveraging each other’s strengths and capacities, for example, was critical in their views to reducing the professional skills, technical competencies and programmatic expertise each individual organization needed to develop internally. This, in turn, would reduce administrative overheads, increase efficiency and thereby increase the probability of long-term organizational sustainability. One participant shared this simple example, “[If] an NGO wants to undertake [the] building of some dams or something… Now, one of the things it may need to do is to mobilize the people… But, somebody else can do that mobilization because maybe that is not their core area…” Another respondent provided a similar example in reference to 5 specific CSOs he/she had been discussing,

They don’t have [to] have an in-house capacity all of them at once… they can jointly come together and then get that extra resource together. Let’s say they want an advocacy person… that person will not do one, with only you, for you alone... you can share one resource to do that. You do not need to have [one] office here, another one in another bush and another one, this. Why not come together and say we’ll have this space in Nairobi, and then this the centralized kind of thing that will do X, Y, Z for us. This is the direction that will make a difference for CSOs. It will be like in the long run a merger, but they will see the benefits, they’ll look at it and see...

Networks and collaborations, according to study participants, facilitate the leveraging not just of organizational expertise and experience but of in-kind and financial resources also. One CEO described her organization’s partnership with several other organizations to provide training in informational and communication technologies (ICT) to poor and marginalized youth throughout Nairobi…

We are …partnering with Techno Brain and the partnership reduces our cost. Their contribution to the partnership is their curriculum and their trainers who are already trained. We bring in the management of the youth and training at local level. SummerSauce is also the partner where we are bringing those skills to online training for our ICT trained youth.
Finally, and perhaps more importantly, study participants believed that networking and partnerships could multiply organizational impact and further positive social change. One participant believes that increased impact could be achieved by referring beneficiaries to organizations with the greatest capacities to address their particular challenges...

We are surviving through networking... [When] we have a case that we cannot handle, we know who can handle [it]. If it [is] something which needs a legal service we can send to FIDA or COVAW. If it’s something to do with child abuse we know where to send [it]. Now, we are networking with so many organizations... So we are doing what we can. But what we cannot... we share. We refer to other organizations that can manage.

Despite the many ways in which collaboration and partnership could strengthen an organization’s sustainability and effectiveness, participants largely agreed that local CSOs in Kenya were very isolated from each other, not transparent or trusting of each other, and relationships among them were most often competitive rather than collaborative. Local organizations were described as unwilling to collaborate with peer organizations out of the fear of losing a funding opportunity to them. So, many organizations, according to participants, refuse to share or seek out information that might strengthen their development interventions. This competition and lack of collaboration has contributed to a proliferation of organizations and facilitated duplication and wasteful overlapping of programming.

(P1) There are too many organizations focusing on the same thing as opposed to collaborating... and it is not just at that level... even for us... there is a lot of competition amongst ourselves, that we don’t see why we need to come together to supplement our efforts. So there is a lot of wastage that comes with that... mind set.

(P2) So you find, currently it’s like people are competing for funds, you know, such that for example, in our case, we work with the criminal justice system. You will go for a meeting and people don’t want to talk, because they don’t want to know who are their funders or—then you go to a prison, and you find you’re all doing the same thing, you are all duplicating activities, yet if only we could be open with each other, this is what our funds can be able to do, you could help. So, that is really affecting the work, so you feel like you’re not making any impact, because you are overdoing the same thing all of
you. So we are just like selfish people there, not really helping. So that does not help at all, yes. So those contexts that I think have really affected negatively the work of civil society and NGOs, yes. That’s what in my mind I am thinking.

Participants noted that ineffective government bodies originally established to promote collaboration among CSOs actually contributed to, rather than dispelled, the high levels of distrust and competition among organizations in Kenya’s civil society sector.

*In other countries we have strong umbrella bodies that enhance coordination of the civil society. In Kenya, I mean, it’s been a struggle to get that umbrella body working. Basically the NGO council has been struggling for as long as I have known it, over ten years. It’s not been straight...*

Despite the more competitive nature of relationships among CSOs in Kenya, study participants stressed the critical connection between partnership/collaboration and OS/OE. Although this view was not widely shared among interview participants, one interviewee shared his/her sentiment that Kenyan CSOs were beginning to see the potential benefits greater collaboration could bring to the civil society sector.

So, bringing in different synergies to complement each other in Kenya; I think that is one way that most organizations now are going, believing that together we can bring about the difference, we don’t need to work in silos or in isolation, but we really need to build networks and linkages amongst ourselves, yes.

### 4.2 Conclusion

Chapter 4 has outlined a series of variables or factors that interview participants identified as essential to the sustainability and effectiveness of all organizations in any context they might operate in. In some instances, participants shared particular ways in which these factors ‘played out’ in Kenya but they were primarily focused on identifying general characteristics they think might apply to all CSOs/NGOs around the world. Chapter 5 will explore additional variables that participants believe are more particular to the Kenyan context. To some degree participants
also build on the information reported in this chapter by further ‘contextualizing’ some of the elements presented here.
Chapter 5: Research Question 1 – Part B

How do the directors of local civil society organizations and organizational development professionals perceive organizational sustainability/effectiveness in Kenya:
   a) What are the essential components of OS/OE in Kenya; and
   b) What context-specific factors influence the sustainability of local CSOs in Kenya?

5.1 Essential Components and Influential Factors

A Context-Specific Perspective of OS/OE in Kenya. (See Table 5.1 – Parts 1 and 2). At various points during the interviews with CSO directors and OD professionals, the focus of conversation shifted from a broad, potentially more widely applicable, discussion of organizational sustainability to one more explicitly and narrowly focused on Kenya. Participants were asked to identify the building blocks of OS/OE that they thought were unique or at least particular to the Kenyan context. They were asked what factors or variables, from their perspectives and based on their experiences, shaped OS/OE and influenced their efforts to build long-lasting, effective local organizations in the Kenyan context.

An initial analysis of the data obtained through these conversations did lead to the identification of several context specific components or influential factors necessary for local
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<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Key Components</th>
<th>Key Sub-Components</th>
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| **Public Perceptions, the Proliferation of Organizations & Resulting Impact on Internal Operations** | • CSOs are corrupt, misuse resources  
• Donor money relatively easy to obtain  
• CSOs receive a lot of external funding and are ‘wealthy’  
• Starting a CSO/working for a CSO is a lucrative, income making opportunity | • Perception of possible financial reward leads to insular/controlling leadership among CEOs  
− Insular/controlling leadership obstructs staff buy-in  
− Insular/controlling leadership hinders succession planning  
− Insular/controlling leadership leads to unusually high staff turnover  
• High staff turnover impedes knowledge mgmt./retention |
| **Kenyan Views of the CSO Board of Directors (BOD): What we wish we had vs. What we have!** | **What we wish we had…**  
• Provides strategic policy direction  
• Focused on long-term org viability  
• Mobilize resources and/or give  
• Hire/manage CEO  
• Responsible for OS/OE | **What we have…**  
• Unqualified BOD members  
• Don’t understand their roles  
• Overly involved in mgmt. or AWOL  
• Seek financial reward/gain  
• Chosen for technical skills not ability to network, fundraise, lobby, etc.  
• Composed of org founder/CEO familial/personal connections |
| **The Projectized Approach To Development in Kenya** | • Donors fund development through projects  
• Projects are time-bound, series of activities, implemented to budget with short-term usually quantifiable outputs | • Leads to high staff turnover – project funded staff  
• Insufficient time allotted for true change  
• Encourages CSOs to ‘follow the money’ looking for the next project  
• Does not invest in org structures, systems, processes  
• Not oriented toward org OS/OE  
• Undermines CSO core mission/encourages mission drift |
| **Community Ownership** | • ‘Buying-in’ to a project  
• Participating in project design  
• Being consulted for input re: felt needs, desired change  
• Some degree of beneficiary participation/decision-making  
• Some sense of emotional commitment  
• Requires implementers to conduct needs assessments  
• Requires permission/blessing of gatekeepers | • Community ownership encourages community support following project end  
• Generally ownership is informing/consultation – Arnstein’s ‘tokenism’  
• At best ownership is… Arnstein’s ‘placation’  
• Rarely, if ever, ownership reaches Arnstein’s level of ‘citizen power’ |
| **Symbiotic Relationships Between CSOs & Politicians** | • CSOs must have good relationships with relevant agencies and technocrats  
• This is something deeper and more complex – interdependency between CSOs and Kenyan politicians | • Politicians can ‘make or break’ CSOs  
• Politicians see CSOs as ‘threats’ or ‘opportunities’  
• CSOs must curry favor of politicians but not be co-opted by them  
• Politics, ethnicity and CSO-politician relationships are intricately connected |
Table 5.1 – Part 2  Context-Specific Concepts of Organizational Sustainability (OS) and Effectiveness (OE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Intended/Desired Outcomes</th>
<th>Fundamental Flaws that Hinder OS/OE</th>
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| The Role of Capacity Building (CB) in OS/OE in Kenya | • CB has improved CSO skills  
• CB has helped CSO achieve objectives  
• CB has taken the form of training, educational activities and technical assistance as Sobeck and others articulate | • In appropriate/ineffective **CB DELIVERY PARADIGM**  
  - Top down; donor rather than demand driven  
  - Too generic; not tailored/personalized to context and organization  
  - Too theoretical; not practical  
  - Delivery too ‘classroom centric; should be hands-on, on the job, peer CSO to peer CSO  
  - CB approach expert-teacher – uninformed student; should be learning through discovery, coaching, mentoring |

**CB IS A JOURNEY, PROCESS OVER TIME**  
- Requires time, repetition, extended investment  
- Iterative, journey of fits and starts  
- 2 steps forward, 3 steps back

**5 DONOR CB APPROACHES HINDER OSE/OE**  
- Donors pay ‘lip service’ to OS/OE through CB; not serious or genuine commitment  
- Donors do not provide resource mobilization training as part of CB  
- Each donor/capacity builder has its own standards, definitions, etc. – one of them always thinks we’re ‘lacking’ or there’s a ‘gap’  
- No funding to follow-through on CB outputs, results  
- No funding for core operating expenses – the things that would really make a CSO sustainable

**CB PROVIDED FOR PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION, NOT ORG DEVELOPMENT**  
- Donors build capacities necessary to implement their projects  
- CB never an ‘end;’ always provided as part of project implementation

**CB LEADS TO HIGH STAFF TURNOVER**  
- Funding for projects allows for hiring only project-tied staff  
- Projects end – staff let go – CSO back at square one  
- CB makes staff more marketable; staff leave for better paying jobs – often with the INGOs
organizations to be sustainable and effective in Kenya. However, a more in depth, multi-layered analysis revealed that the sustainability/effectiveness of local CSOs in Kenya is ultimately determined by a complex, organic, fluid interplay of factors and relationships that cannot be easily broken down into a set of distinct factors – as was a bit easier to do with the previous discussion of participants’ more general perspectives on OS/OE. Participant perspectives regarding contextual influences on the sustainability of local organizations in development are probably best presented as an unfolding process more akin to a “story” than a set of static factors, themes, or variables, etc. It is the process, the complex interplay of variables or, more simply, the “story” on the whole that determines organizational effectiveness/sustainability in Kenya rather than influences of individual components of the “story.” In some cases, in the pages that follow, the contextual influences on OS/OE will, therefore, be presented as a “story” or unfolding process – an exploration of how variables, factors, components, etc. work together to impact the long term sustainability of local CSOs – and in other cases findings will be presented more simply as straight-forward building blocks of OS/OE in Kenya. (See Table 5.2 – Part I & II)

5.1.1 Public Perceptions, Proliferation of Organizations and Resulting Impact on Internal CSO Operations
According to nearly all of the participants interviewed for this study, there is a pervasive perception among all strata of Kenyan society that CSOs/NGOs are “corrupt,” “cannot be trusted,” are “not transparent or accountable,” and frequently “misuse resources.” Using simple straightforward language, one participant explained that the prevalent “mentality out there” is “NGOs just eat the money and enrich themselves.”
Participants identified a number of ways that corruption – in its various forms – impacts the sustainability and effectiveness of local CSOs. They noted how misuse of resources negatively impacts an organization’s ability to mobilize resources. “We are sometimes not credible because we are not accountable. Sometimes we are not transparent. So even if somebody wants to give you some money, there is always that fear factor.” “You also have the big issue of corruption… maybe that is one reason that people don’t feel sufficiently motivated to give because they are not so sure about how their money will be used.” Participants explained how fraud and other diversions of resources for personal gain often impacts the quality of programs/services delivered to beneficiary communities. “Our beneficiaries feel that we receive a lot of money that we do not give back. Sometimes you are seen that you are not giving quality… its more of quantity.” By reducing the quality of their programs and interventions, donor-mandated quantitative targets may still be met while dishonest CSOs pocket the difference between the amount budgeted for the quality program and the amount actually spent on an ultimately inferior program. “The money does not trickle down to supporting the target group that it is supposed to benefit. That happens quite often – giving half-baked packages to the people that you are supposed to be benefitting.”

CSO directors and OD professionals interviewed for this study highlighted various developments in society that they identified as evidence for just how pervasive they feel corruption is in Kenya writ large. Firstly, they noted how numerous for-profit corporations that have developed an interest in philanthropy and corporate social responsibility (CSR) have started their own organizations to implement programming because “they do not trust us [CSOs] or we are [too] relaxed or something.” Secondly, some respondents claimed that it is fairly common for some CSOs to ‘bribe’ donor/funding representatives and government officials in an effort to win grants
and contracts; for politicians to channel resources to CSOs in exchange for ‘organizational support’ for their campaigns; or to ‘pay’ journalists to highlight the ‘successes’ of the CSOs’ programs.

(P1) Corruption is a big one. Fraud is a big one. Unethical practices [are] very common in civil society. You really have the extremes. You have organizations that will do things the right way – will follow the book; you know do audits, and you know account for every shilling and everything. Then you have another side – organizations that really just want the money of the donor. Then, when the money is in, ok now, can we just build a house for the director? You have both sets. You have a lot of corruption in terms of being able to access certain things… Like if you want media coverage, and you want to shine in the media, get journalists on the take. If you want to access government support and government buy in and be known as the organization that donors should work with, buy some guys. So there is a lot of money changing hands because it is very competitive. Civil society is competitive in a different way.

(P2) There are local partners whom even if they open a window for funding, even if you make an application, you cannot succeed. The reason being, there are key people in that organization that you have to liaise with for you to be able to have an opening. If there is nothing like that, then if you make an application at the end of day you don’t see anything. In such a case, you have to collude with such key people in that organization so that you also become corrupted – [in order] for you to benefit from their funding because basically… what you are looking [for]… is their funding for your organization to be sustainable. Therefore corruption is also another key factor that has hindered development.

The scope of this study did not allow for an in depth exploration of participant perspectives on why they felt corruption and misuse of resources was as pervasive in Kenya and among Kenyan CSOs as they claim. However, several participants provided one cause or source of perceived corruption. They noted that certain categories of organizations in Kenya are not subject to the same level of government oversight as others. According to study participants, organizations registered as NGOs, for example, are required to submit regular reports to a government regulatory agency and submit to annual audits by an external party, while community-based organizations and other emerging forms of organizations in Kenya (foundations, trusts, etc.) are not subject to these same regulations.
(P1) Most of our CSOs are not really required by law to submit their annual returns or to be audited because they are at that community level until they graduate to the level of NGOs. That is when they have the statutory obligation to be audited. So what happens down there cannot really be told. Because people get resources. They cannot account for them. No one is there to audit. No one is there to ensure that they are able to account for the resources that come in and so a lot of money is lost. There is a lot of pilferage, a lot of loopholes here and there. That is where, now, after enough money has been made, an NGO just closes, a CSO at community level just closes, because there was no mechanism to check the resources coming in. So the amount of corruption… the amount of theft becomes magnanimous. You cannot even quantify because you don’t know how much has come in and how much has been used in achieving the objectives of the organization.

(P2) You find that if corruption is taking place at national level; everybody else assumes that it is ok. After all, nothing happens to you, so it becomes an ok thing, yet it is wrong. And then the thing is they know that there are no laws. There are no laws that actually would ‘reprimand’ the CSOs. After all, out there, nobody is reprimanding others. Why should we be reprimanded even if laws did exist? However, when it comes now to NGOs, they are very careful when that happens because we have the NGO board that really polices the NGOs. So yes there might be some corruption but it’s less. But at CSO level, it could be more because of what is happening externally.

Through conversations with the directors of the 54 CSOs interviewed for this study, the investigator concluded that while each organization is distinct they are similar in mission, structure and operation. However, they had a variety of ‘official’ registrations (eg: Non-Governmental Organization, Community-Based Organization, Association or Foundation), which, on paper, highlight distinct differences between registration categories, but these differences are difficult to identify ‘on the ground.’ So, an organization choosing to pursue one ‘registration’ over another appears to be a way to avoid some measure of regulatory oversight. Other participants claimed that modalities donors often choose to deliver funding facilitates or at least provides greater opportunity for corruption by focusing almost exclusively on deliverables/outputs. “Basically, what I’ve seen is… with some international NGOs… they don’t care. It is… Can you deliver?” Donors, according to some participants, can focus on targets being met, outputs produced with little to no attention on process-issues or ‘how’ outputs were generated.
While participants expressed great frustration at the degree of corruption they feel exists in Kenya and particularly within the Kenyan civil society sector, several adamantly expressed the need for local CSOs to adopt a pragmatic realistic approach if they wanted to make any progress toward achieving their missions. Consider this very direct yet very insightful narrative from one study participant…

(P1) I don’t think that you can live in this country, run an organization, and work with the public as it were – because what we really do is provide public service – without coming into contact with corruption… without either being dragged into corruption… without having to resist getting involved in corruption… and some of those will kill it. It doesn’t matter how good you have planned or what good your vision or mission is. And in situations where you must work with government, as in 90% of development for me yes almost 100% of development work, you must work with government then you must come face to face with corruption. I think that is one of the biggest things we have to deal with, yes.

(P1) continued…) I have been in this for over 30 years and I have struggled every year, yes. Every year, you come face-to-face with it. Sometimes you have to give in and you have to give out something in order for you to move on. So what a lot of people do, who want to remain clean, is you develop the belief that giving is less sinful than taking. So you make sure you don’t take, but once in a while you have to give. And some of it is very straightforward. Some of it is basically, ‘I want you to go and inspect something, I’ll buy you lunch.’ You know darn well, you shouldn’t be buying him lunch. He doesn’t deserve lunch. He is doing his job. But still you do that. I’ll provide you with transport. I’ll do this… I’ll do that… So it may not be directly giving out in cash. So for me that is [a] very important thing, I think, in the Kenyan context.

(P1) continued…) [Additionally], I think we need to look at what are the issues that [my colleague] faces. [He/she’s] on the ground… as opposed [to] what’s the theory of good organizations. And if you look at a lot of what USAID would give [i.e., training/capacity building]; it would be a lot of what’s the theory of good organization, governance, this, that. But really if you look at what is happening on the ground… people know that… but that’s not working. You are doing your best. You are running organizations very well. But to get work done, you must provide lunch, you must do this, you must do that; and very soon people start losing that [the theory]. That’s why I’m saying that you have to be darn strong to survive some of those things. And the USAIDs and whomever it is who provide that capacity building must change the approach. Must look at what’s happening on the ground and try to help us to deal with that. Because I don’t think that they have a solution. But if we can sit down and honestly discuss it — I have seen where we sit and down and honestly discuss it. It doesn’t leave that bar. It stays there. Because tomorrow you go and try it, you’re on your own.
Participants also identified 3 more-specific public/stakeholder perceptions that they believe have particular and direct impacts on the sustainability/effectiveness of local organizations. These perceptions include, a) funding from international donors is relatively easy to obtain; b) local CSOs receive significant amounts of funding from these donors and are, therefore, ‘wealthy organizations;’ and b) starting a CSO or NGO, or simply working for one, can make the founder/director and staff rich. Numerous study participants described scenarios they knew or had heard of where capable individuals would write a relatively short yet simple and compelling project concept paper; submit it to an international donor and, with relatively little planning, organization or on-the-ground infrastructure, receive funding. While many participants noted that obtaining funding in recent years has become increasingly difficult, one interviewee stated, “I think when NGOs and civil societies [CSOs] started in Kenya, I think there was a history that it could make easy money. There were no questions being asked. You simply needed to make a case out there and money will be sent to you.” Another concurred noting, “I think initially, when the NGOs started, possibly… there was a lot of money, and possibly… if you just put a small concept, even if you are not registered, you would get the money.” Several participants further explained that in times of crisis or emergencies designated by international organizations as “humanitarian crises,” funding has often been even easier to obtain. Participants recalled how humanitarian tragedies such as the HIV/AIDS crisis and post-election violence (2007) in Kenya provided key opportunities for local organizations to obtain funding and in many cases to be constituted with the sole purpose of obtaining this “easy” funding. The director of a large Kenyan CSO described these scenarios this way, “The funding… it was simple. You only go to the national television then in Kenya – which was KBC – and you say, ‘We are people living with HIV,’ and tomorrow somebody is looking for you with money.” During the post-election
violence of 2007, one respondent described how a very prominent officer of a well-known international organization reached out to him asking “Are your people suffering…?” “I’ll send money.” These funds were apparently then disbursed to the local organization with relatively little due diligence or requirements placed on the recipient CSO for reporting or other forms of financial and programmatic accountability.

Coupled with the perception that donor funding is easily obtained, study participants described a widely-held belief among Kenyans that CSOs are “wealthy.” If you want to make it big in Kenya, nonprofit civil society work is ‘the place to be!’ As will be explained in the pages that follow, whether or not this perception is an accurate depiction of reality does not lessen its tremendous impact on the sustainability of local CSOs. Respondents were nearly unanimous in highlighting the important influence of this perception on OS/OE. One of the executive directors interviewed for this study captured participant perspectives regarding the pervasiveness of this perception and how the actions of CSOs themselves serve to reinforce this widely-held perception…

That’s the way it’s always been. So if I go to my village today and tell them I work for an NGO, there’s a certain image that they’ll instantly get: A) that I’m making lots and lots of money; and B) that I’ll probably be able to give them lots and lots of money to do all sorts of things, because that’s the way NGOs are perceived. And that has come from just the history of—you know the aid worker mentality, that’s where that has come from. So the big SUV’s, driving around in air-conditioned Toyotas, and so that is where that has come from. I mean, it’s changed now, because you get more and more small CSOs working in the community, which presently aren’t rich but it will take a while before that mentality shifts. In the mean time when you say the word NGO, the first word that comes to most Kenyans is you’ve got lots of money and you’re going to help me, well help me means that you’re going to give me money.

Another participant recalling his/her own experience working for a newly formed HIV/AIDS program recounts this telling albeit disheartening story…
When I was working for HIV aids program, it had just been declared a national disaster. So there was a lot of money coming into the country to address HIV AIDS issues. I had never seen so many institutions formed… in people’s kitchens, …in peoples’ bedrooms, …in their back yards. We had you know someone would... at the front you would see a sign of an organization, behind you see a sign post, why? Because there was money… that is why the institutions were formed. Where I was working in the North Rift region, they had no clue what this HIV is, yet we were giving money out every day, checks in my office, people would be queuing for checks, and all they were doing is singing, buying instruments to create awareness… you know singing in churches, in functions because to them HIV aids was just something. People were funded for the wrong reasons, and because of that, they did not go through the processes of institutional formation from the very beginning. All they did is that, you called your friend, your classmate, most of these people had no qualifications, to set up institutions, but registering a community-based organization and a self help group was very easy then, you need just to be 12 people, you register an organization.

According to study participants, the Kenyan public believes that many, if not all, CSO directors and especially organizational founders established their organizations or ‘got into the development/social-service’ business to “get rich” or at a minimum because they saw it as a good, respectable, potentially honorable way to “make a living.” Of course, among the people who hold this perception are the would-be or potential organizational founder/directors themselves prior to actually taking the step to establish their organizations. Participants stated that the Kenyan public generally assigns CSO founder/directors to one of two groups. The first group includes those who view development/social service as a business and who joined or founded their organizations for the selfish purpose of “getting rich.” Both groups are perceived by study participants, and in their views the Kenyan public at large, negatively. Consider the three statements below drawn from interviews with different individuals. These statements illustrate the dynamic participants described as pervasive among the founder/directors categorized in group 1.

(P1) An NGO becomes a vehicle to get money. An NGO is a formalized way of getting external money. There are people who look at the whole field as a business. They also know you can sit with your laptop and write… [get] money and convince people. And
you get money… You buy a car and you do a lot of things… and respond to whomever and life would go on.

(P2) It is not so much that you are being driven by the social mission; it is more about, your own sustainability… Your income… There is a guy who I used to know who used to go out with proposals in his briefcase. So he would come here talk to Brad, if you are a donor, ...I know …ok you are doing child [focused on children’s issues] Hold on, goes to the reception, [and brings back] a proposal for child or whatever or HIV/AIDS so you are just… It’s really not geared towards social mission. So, there is that big, big issue in Kenya, yah.

(P3) When the PBO* thing was going on, you would switch on the radio and you are listening in to the radio and everybody is calling in and saying yah that thing should be passed, those guys are just eating money, we don’t even what they do, and they just drive big cars. [*PBO refers the Public Benefit Organizations Act, now held-up in the Kenyan parliament that limits the amount of funding a local CSO may receive from an international donor to no more than 15% of its total annual budget.]

The 2nd group of CSO founder/directors are those who may have more altruistic motives and may be passionate about a particular social cause but still view joining or establishing a local CSO as a way to make a living, make ends meet, obtain employment, etc. Participants view – and say the public views – this 2nd group of founder/directors with slightly less disdain but nonetheless views their motives and actions as largely negative. A participant explained,

And so what happens [is]… people start CSO’s for different reasons. There are those who are there to make a living, and so they start a CSO. Yes, they say we are here to support the community… We are here to support the overall objectives of the people we are living around [and] with in the community and all that. But, then they clearly… Now this is a platform for me to be able to make my monthly living or to meet my ends. And so that opens an avenue for people to just start NGO’s for the wrong reasons or CSO’s for the wrong reasons, and they use that as an excuse, or as an avenue for them to be able to raise resources.

Several participants described how retired professionals – particularly civil servants or former directors of NGOs/CSOs – become a part of this 2nd group of founder/directors often through the active encouragement of international donor agents.

You retire as civil servant. You have gone back home. You are the only educated person in your village. You are like… I know Lucy who works with donor X and she can help me get some funding. And so that is how it starts. So you get the money, you start the
organization. Sometimes… you are good in whatever institution you are in. Then a donor approaches you. Maybe they don’t like the structure of that organization, [i.e., some other organization the donor is working with] they don’t like the way things are happening, so what they do is they pull you as an individual [and say] start off your own organization… we will fund you.

Although this third widely-held perception has the two distinct aspects described above – one slightly less egregious than the other; participants claim that the Kenyan public widely believes that CSO directors, founders and founder/directors are in the development/social service business to advance their individual economic/financial interests in one way or another.

This perception that “CSOs can make you rich” is not just applicable to founders and founder/directors, but also to employees – particularly professional staff. It is widely known that working for international development organizations or for the local organizations they fund is widely regarded in the Global South as providing a major pathway to greater financial stability and household wealth. Which social service professional in North America, Western Europe or the developed nations of the Pacific could envision saying something similar to what one study participant said, “First of all, being a nonprofit we are always looked upon like you guys have money…” Several participants further underscored this very interesting dynamic that characterizes the social service/development sector in Kenya and, likely, other parts of the global south…

(P1) And there is a major belief that there is money in civil society. That donors are giving money to these guys. So there is a livelihood conversation to it. We were doing our organization sustainability training for UNDP, so they are [UNDP’s] grantees, and we discussed and I kept asking them a single question – if this organization of yours folded up today, who would cry? Who would weep, who would say, oh my God that thing has folded. Honestly, honestly let’s be sincere. We came down to the staff… they are the number one people who will cry. Truth be told, they are the major stakeholders who have a stake in the survival of that organization.

(P2) I hear it much with other organizations. I guess again it all comes from your recruitment process, what are the kind of people you are getting into the organization in
the first place. Because many times you find people who say yes they are looking for jobs but not really because they care about the work they are doing, they are coming in because they need a salary at the end of the month.

(P3) So one major reason why the NGO sector in Kenya is so attractive is because there is huge amount of donor funding pumped into Kenya. It’s huge.

The data very clearly suggests that the 3 perceptions described above – donor funding is easy to get, CSOs are wealthy and CSOs can make their founder/directors and even their employees rich – in addition to the widespread belief that CSOs are corrupt; are widely held beliefs among members of Kenyan society and they significantly contribute to the proliferation of local CSOs throughout Kenya. As a result of these widely held beliefs – among other factors that will be discussed in subsequent sections of this chapter – individual Kenyans or groups of Kenyans have sought to start CSOs or sought careers working for CSOs hoping constantly to advance in the ranks and perhaps eventually direct or found and direct their own organizations. These perceptions also appear to impact key internal dynamics within local CSOs that, in turn, affect organizational sustainability and effectiveness in a variety of ways. While the impact of these perceptions on internal CSO operations and ultimately on OS/OE is not linear but rather iterative and organic, this dynamic appears to unfold as follows.

These 3 publicly held perceptions lead to a proliferation of civil society organizations. As a result, founder/directors of these organizations often adopt an insular/controlling style of leadership because they are ‘in it for the money’ so they have to maintain tight control over the organization in order to yield maximum benefit for themselves. This style of leadership a) obstructs staff ‘buy-in’ to and ‘ownership’ of their organization’s vision/mission, and b) results in poor leadership-related succession/transition planning. These 3 perceptions also appear to lead to what participants perceive as unusually high staff turnover. High rates of staff turnover
then lead directly to poor knowledge management and knowledge retention at the organizational level. All of these factors together make it next to impossible to build a sustainable, effective local organization in Kenya. This complex interplay is further explained in the paragraphs below.

**The Impact of Public Perceptions on Internal CSO Operations: Insular/Controlling Leadership Among Founder/Directors.** As a result of the perceived possibility for socioeconomic advancement and financial reward, many Kenyan CSOs, according to study participants, were started and are still led by individuals who either founded the organization themselves or played substantial roles in its founding. Often times, they did so with potentially questionable motives. With “getting rich” or “making a living” as a core component of the founder/director’s reasons for starting the organization, he/she often “runs it [as] his[her] own personal business.” Participants described how the founder/director’s dependence on the organization for his/her livelihood breeds a style of leadership among many founders/directors that is insular, controlling, unwilling to share or delegate decision making to organizational staff, overly guarded and protective of information he/she deems vital to organizational survival, and perceives other organizations as competitors for limited resources or even potential threats to his/her organization. One OD professional interviewed provided these insights…

> With time… you [the organization] are growing. You are getting a few staff coming on board. [But], you find that you don’t want to let go. You sort of want to run this thing like it’s a personal business. While you get people to come and join you; they never really get a chance to grow or to really help the organization grow because everything depends on you. If you don’t like something, you know, it won’t pass. And so people won’t make decisions without you because, if they do, then there will be repercussions and that sort of thing.

Other participants provided further insight into this destructive leadership style that many asserted is the result of the founder/director who seeks financial reward through the organization
or is dependent on it for his/her livelihood. One of these participants also included specific information about ways in which this founder/director leadership style impacts organizational staff.

[In organizations] where you have a founder, you know, that never leaves, you know has been there the last 15 years... started the organization... has not gone anywhere... It is stifling. You know, you will find that the staff feels most of the time that they have so much to give, but they are not allowed to by the founder. Or their ideas are not listened to. They wait to be told what to do. Sometimes they are over worked because, you see the organization is run at the discretion of the -- at the whims director. So today maybe you were implementing an HIV program then the director decides, the money is coming to an end. We need to get something, so again the vision is not followed up, you get staff [that] are very demotivated, and they are always looking to leave, and they don’t actually last in the organization and where they do stay in the organization you will find only a couple, like a clique of three, four people who are close to the director, who will be in the organization for a long time, and it’s because they are the only ones making decisions. They are the only ones probably benefiting or whatever. Yah, you can tell the staff are not being fully utilized and where they are ...sometimes they just feel that they are not being utilized well.

This insular, controlling leadership style is one of several factors, addressed later in this chapter, that negatively impact the sustainability and effectiveness of local organizations in a couple of key ways: 1) It obstructs staff ‘ownership’ or buy-in to the organization’s vision and mission and 2) It hinders effective succession/transition planning.

Public Perceptions Leads to Insular/Controlling Leadership Which Then Obstructs Staff Buy-In and Organizational ‘Ownership’. Study participants are nearly unanimous in their conclusions regarding the importance of staff ‘buy-in’ and ‘ownership’ to organizational sustainability and effectiveness. One participant said simply, “Sustainability is more of ownership. When these people own it as a group – it’s not about a one person show – then that means there will be some sense of ownership and resource mobilizing also.” Many other
participants concurred by noting how important elements like ‘satisfaction,’ ‘feeling motivated,’ and ‘being driven to excel’ feed into the broader constructs of ‘buy-in’ and ‘ownership.’

It [the sustainable organization] tends to have a very motivated… well-switched, you know, sort of well-switched on staff, and I can’t tell you what difference that makes… So you find that it’s really important to make sure that—that’s why I started with a well-switched on… motivated—and motivation for me is not just about money, it’s also the idea of being sold to the goal that the organization is trying to achieve because again the organization I’m referring to the first one, the big one, they pay their staff a lot of money, but that doesn’t translate to a very motivated, switched on staff. So I think it’s hugely important. In fact I ranked it first [among the context-specific building blocks of OS/OE]. I would say it’s the most important.

Another participant described the importance of staff buy-in and organizational ownership to OS/OE with these words…

The other aspect [important building block of OS/OE] would probably be less tangible but is essentially the evidence of the dedication and commitment that they [the staff] have to doing …to what they do… and the drive, whatever drives them to excel for them to make sure they do a good job… Someone who really believes in what they organization does, and some of those things are not necessarily tangible, but you can see their passion on how they [go] about their every day you know…

Although they emphasized the important relationships between buy-in/ownership and organizational sustainability, participants concluded that what happens in Kenya is that this often insular, controlling leadership style adopted by founder/directors prevents buy-in/ownership of the organization from happening and thereby threatens any hopes of long-term OS/OE. Specifically, this insular/controlling leadership style leads to staff who do not understand what the organization’s vision/mission is and what their roles are in implementing the vision; lack focus; are dissatisfied; are not willing to put more than minimal effort into their jobs; do not strive for excellence and are always looking for another job opportunity hoping to find what they have not found in their current leader-dominated organization. One participant described staff that have not ‘bought-in’ to their organization’s vision/mission and do not feel a sense of
‘ownership’ as “lazy” – not because they have an inherently poor work ethic, but because this lack of ownership and buy-in is profoundly demotivating and results in a measure of perceived ‘laziness.’ It does not require much explanation to understand how dissatisfied unfocused staff with little attention to doing their best work and constantly on the lookout for better working conditions could seriously threaten organizational sustainability and effectiveness.

Public Perceptions Lead to Insular/Controlling Leadership Within CSOs Which In Turn Hinders Succession/Transition Planning. Perspectives of CSO directors and organizational development professionals interviewed for this study are nearly unanimous in their opinions that the widely-held insular/controlling leadership style of founder/directors prevents organizations from ensuring that plans, systems and processes are in-place to facilitate a smooth transfer of leadership responsibilities from an outgoing founder/director to his/her successor. Participants described how leaders who are in ‘CSO work’ to either make money or earn a living are very reluctant to share power and involve others in decision-making because they believe doing so would potentially threaten their efforts or even their personal livelihoods. Consequently, organizations emerge that revolve around the founder/director and become totally dependent on him/her to operate at the organizational level and implement programs or provide development/social service interventions. Many participants noted particularly how CSO directors – who used their socio-political connections to found organizations as their post-retirement income generating activity and are dependent on those organizations – are especially reluctant to leave their organizations of their own volition; or may even deliberately work to position themselves so they can leave their organizations at some point with little care or regard for what becomes of the organization. Numerous participants referred to this dynamic of insular/controlling founders refusing to share leadership responsibilities, reluctant to leave the
organization under any circumstances, and paying little attention to succession planning as “founders syndrome.” Participants’ use of the term “founders syndrome” here is consistent with is use in academic literature. Block and Rosenberg (2002), for example, define “founders syndrome” as,

…the influential powers and privileges that the founder exercises or that others attribute to the founder. The use of the word syndrome further suggests unhealthy organizational situations in which founders are more heavy-handed and indifferent about the imbalance of their control over organizations.

Two individuals coming from drastically different socio-economic realities and engaging in very different spaces within the social service/development enterprise summarized the impact of insular/controlling founder/directors on succession planning and ultimately organizational sustainability in notably similar ways. Consider the two narratives below. The first is from an educated, upper middle class organizational development professional. The second is from the director of a very small community-level CSO operating in a poor marginalized community in Nairobi whose office is a tin shack in one of Africa’s largest slums.

(P1) I think with our experience working with now over 30 CSO’s in the last 2 years, the one key challenge in leadership that has been cross cutting is the aspect of having a leader who wants to hold on to that seat in as much as the organization has grown, and probably outlived his vision. So there is no clear succession plan of who is going to take over after I leave. So leaders want to hold on to their positions. They want to ensure that whether we have funding or not, I am still the head of the organization and no one can remove me from there. My opinion will always prevail and there is no system, no structure, even if we induct a new board, that board cannot overrun my responsibilities as the CEO of a CSO. So leadership has become an aspect where people look at it as just the power, you want to have the power, you want to have the glory of being the founder, and so the challenge is basically the founder syndrome. We call it the founder syndrome, where the founder wants to remain at the core of everything, and if they leave they want to join the board which is the next level of governance, and to ensure that they still have the privileges they were getting as the CEO, or even the pay they were getting as the CEO, where as they are at board member level. So I think that is one of the key challenges we have seen in most of the CSO’s in Kenya – where they still want the leaders… the people who came up with the vision want to still hold on to the power and run with the organization whether it is failing or falling whether systems have been put in place or not. They want to hold on to that power, so that is one thing that I think probably we as
Kenyans want to learn from the rest of the world, in ensuring that there is a clear succession plan, knowing that we need to groom other people who will take over, after sometime, when the vision outlives you, or when the organization grows beyond your reach.

(P2) So, most founders do not actually even understand the term founding. Yes, so they tend to stick onto those organizations. The vision got lost along the way. They did not realize that the vision got lost. They did not want to mentor upcoming people within the organization to grow and again they also do not want to expound their mindset and go found something else. Yes, so there is a lot of that founder mentality going on especially around local organizations. People will tend to view the founder as the owner of the organization, and they say, “He owns the organization, so what can we do?” Everybody now will fear the founder. So things are done according to his approval or according to the way that he wants it to be done. And that kills an organization. Yes, because then to me you don’t work towards a certain goal. You are working to please the founder/s, but you are not working to actually build the organization. I always envision it as a dictatorial kind of leadership; where it was the founder who had the vision, the founder who knew what to do, it was the founder who had rapport with other networks and organizations, and so people trusted the founder. The founder did not think it necessary that he should share his vision with his staff within the organization. So the founder suddenly decides, I’m getting old I need to retire and travel and he exits the organization. So you are left with these people who are stuck and once people are stuck, then the organization is also stuck because now they don’t even know where to move, yes.

Public Perceptions Impact Internal CSO Operations by Encouraging Unusually High Staff Turnover. Insular and controlling leadership among founder/directors, as described above and mentioned in several participant narratives, results in staff always looking for other job opportunities in the civil society sector where they might have greater job satisfaction, more responsibility and greater participation in decision-making. However, the widely-held perception among Kenyans that CSOs are wealthy and that working for CSOs can provide both directors and line staff opportunities to “get rich” and “make a good living” appears to be the more prominent cause of what study participants perceive as unusually high turnover among CSO staff.

One participant describes NGOs as “money-making tools.” Another said, “To me, an NGO is a ladder to making it.” He added, “The mindset that is in our country is that whoever works in an
NGO or whoever owns an NGO automatically becomes financially stable.” A third participant noted that, “…lots of people want to come in because they feel there is money in the NGO sector and so they are all coming in to see what stake they can get out of this…” In sum, this possibility of “making it” and the often insular/controlling leadership styles of CSO founder/directors leads many line staff to first very intentionally seek ‘lucrative opportunities’ through initial employment with a CSO/NGO and then, once employed in the sector, always be on the lookout for the “so called greener pastures.”

Numerous additional participants concurred with these sentiments. “You find so many of us are looking for opportunities out there. The minute you get it, you leave… and because you know the pay would be better, you probably will be better placed to support your family.” Another participant described his/her belief that staff turnover is high among Kenyan CSOs because Kenya is “flooded with so many donors and so organizations are coming up every day who are competing for the same staff who have the experience…” Commenting on both his own experience and his perspective of staff turnover among Kenyan civil society organizations, one CSO director added…

Staff turnover is especially high – especially in the NGO sector. I came here in 2010… and probably… I’m past my years here. I should have left if it was in the ordinary Kenyan way of doing business… Because why are people working? To pay your bills. Yes, people don’t work because it is Organization A, people work to pay their bills.

Public Perceptions Lead to Unusually High Staff Turnover Which Then Impedes Knowledge Retention & Knowledge Management Within Organizations. High staff turnover impacts OS/OE by impeding adequate knowledge retention (or institutional memory) and management at the organizational level. In general, participants spoke of the difficulty organizations face transferring ‘individual level’ skills to the organization as a whole; although
they try to do so through the establishment of systems and/or cross-training. Participants described specifically how this challenging process ultimately threatens organizational sustainability and effectiveness.

(P1) When they leave, they leave a vacuum behind. So it seems organizations are not looking at that element of institutionalizing the skills. Skills are with individuals, when they happen to leave in the course of the project the organization becomes weakened in a way.

(P2) Sometimes an organization will score highly today [on an organizational capacity assessment]. Two years down the line, you go, [and] they are back to square one. You know, to zero... because probably the person who was there, the finance person or something, left. No institutional memory... nothing was learnt. So they are back to square zero. The program person, who was very good, left ... either poached by another organization – even the grant making organization – or another person who is paying them better salary or something you know... So then they go back to the bottom again where they started. So there is very little learning that happens...

(P3) Knowledge management... That's one thing I have also been thinking [about] a lot... The [director] who was there before me was in the organization for over 20 years, maybe 25. She had this wealth of knowledge. So if the organization has not known how to capture that knowledge, structure it in a way that learning for those of us who come later is easier... then it's wasted. So our knowledge management just needs to improve, to change.

In summary, this section of the chapter is entitled *Public Perceptions, the Proliferation of Organizations & Resulting Impact on Internal CSO Operations* because it provided an overview gleaned from study data where 4 specific perceptions of CSOs and CSO work – prevalent throughout much Kenyan society – have resulted in a proliferation of civil society organizations in Kenya and have impacted internal CSO operations in ways described above that threaten their long-term viability. These dynamics must be considered when conceptualizing organizational sustainability and effectiveness in the Kenyan context and perhaps other similar Global South contexts. Founder/directors of these organizations were described as often adopting an insular/controlling style of leadership. This style of leadership was explained as obstructing organizational buy-in and preventing the development of effective transition planning. This
section also noted how 3 of the public perceptions of Kenyan CSOs has led to unusually high staff turnover and subsequently to poor knowledge management and retention at the organizational level.

5.1.2 Kenyan Views of the CSO Board of Directors (BOD): What we have vs. What we wish we had!
Brown (2005) concluded that an active and engaged board, providing strategic oversight to its organization, was critically important to organizational performance. He explained that effective boards are those that provide strategic guidance to their organizations by “developing plans to enact priorities and consistently monitoring the implementation of priorities into action (p. 333).” Monitoring implementation of priorities into action involved boards working to ensure that their organizations had the necessary resources to carry out their plans. The CSO directors and OD experts that participated in this study strongly concurred with Brown’s findings. One noted the vital importance of a nonprofit CSO in Kenya “having a board that is visionary and a board that believes and is passionate about what the organization does.”

In general, study participants described an effective board as one that provides strategic and policy direction, to its organization, and focused on the long-term viability of the organization. Effective board members are “well-connected” and willing to tap into their personal and professional networks in ways that benefit the OS/OE of their organizations. Effective board members actively engage in fundraising and resource mobilization for the organization. They hire the CEO and hold him/her accountable for efficient and effective use of resources raised. Two participants underscored the emphasis that nearly all study participants placed on the important relationship between having an active/engaged board and organizational sustainability/effectiveness with these statements...
For you to be sustainable, we believe that if the top of the organization is strengthened, then that can be escalated to other systems within the organization. So the governance, the board of governors, the board of directors can be able then to channel that vision to the other key arms of the organization. But they have to be effective and sustainable. Governance and leadership has to be there. Because regardless of the amount of money that comes into the organization, if there is no direction, if there is no sense of focus, then that organization cannot be sustainable. So that becomes the core fabric.

I think one of the mandates that the board should have is indeed issues around sustainability and then strategically providing stewardship towards where the organization is going. That stewardship must be concerned about where we would be going to get resources? What kind of resources for what kind of programs? The board must also, even though at a distance, be engaged in what the money is doing in terms of programs. So it’s not just raising money, but also getting interested in how the money gets used. And the board must then be interested in accountability and all of these processes for the resources that we do. So, in summary, I think we have, we are saying the board must be interested in resource mobilization, must be interested in stewardship, must be interested in the vibrancy of the organization itself including representation.

Study participants ably described the strong connection they perceive between an active and engaged board and the sustainable/effective organization. As just explained, data clearly portray widespread agreement among participants regarding the key characteristics of an active and engaged board member. However, participants were also in agreement that the actualization of this important component of OS/OE – having an active/engaged BOD – in the Kenyan context is drastically different from what they think it should be in order to build and sustain vibrant civil society organizations.

Participants made clear distinctions between the boards ‘they wish Kenyan CSOs had’ and the boards ‘Kenyan CSOs actually have.’ They described the board members of most local organizations as unqualified to serve, completely unaware of their roles and responsibilities, and largely inactive. “When people are picked to serve on the governing body most of them don’t understand their roles, so they end up not steering the organization in the right direction.” “They are board members but they do not understand what they are supposed to be helping you with.”
This lack of understanding often leads to boards being either overly involved in the daily management of the CSO to the point of stifling and controlling the senior staff or having a hands-off approach where they add little if any value to sustainability and effectiveness of the organization. “If you cannot divorce management from the board I think that’s where organizations really stall and it’s a key issue that most people grapple with.” “Well, technically in a normal organization, the board should be considering issues of policy and of course we do that. However, I don’t know what the staff thinks of it, but we do interfere a lot in the management as well.” “They [board members] don’t know their roles; they will think that when you are elected as a board member of an NGO or CBO [community-based organization], they always confuse [their role] with [the role of] a staff member.”

Participants noted that many board members frequently serve with the same objectives as the CSO founders, directors and employees described above – i.e., they are “in it” to “get rich” or “make a living.” “Like now, my own board members, they think there is profit. I had a board meeting recently, I told them – ‘this is not a business enterprise.” “If you have a board that maybe came just to take allowances, and just sit and warm chairs, then I think that also is a challenge.” Even in cases where board members are genuinely committed to their organizations, its goals and board members desire to help the organization succeed, they were often chosen based on specific technical skills and not a more strategic ability to network, lobby, advocate and mobilize resources for their organizations.

One of the things we’ve had to look at is the skills – the skills that are relevant to what we’re doing. The ability to understand, you know what civil society’s work is about. We also look at connections; you know how people are connected out there and how that would be of value to our institution. And therein lies our mistake. For example we have a board that is heavily dominated by people from public health and development sector. We do not have people from a legal background, we do not have people from the banking sector, and we do not have people from communication or advertising sector.
Participants stated that many nonprofit boards in Kenya are composed of individuals with personal and/or familial connections to the founder/s which, participants claim, often leads to the organization being run like a personal business rather than a public benefit organization (PBO).

“We tend to have organizations with board members that are not probably qualified, or we get board members who are our friends. We really don’t try and look at that governance structure and how it impacts the organization.” “It’s an exclusive club that I start. I bring my friends to pretend that they are my board, but in actual fact I am paying them little bits to keep them.”

Finally, a large number of participants stated that many CSOs in Kenya form boards simply due to donor demands and funding requirements and not because they are committed to what they often view as a western form of governance and organizational structure.

(P1) We have a lot of culture, which has come from the western world. Then we have our own. So sometimes we don’t have a good identity. We get lost. There is some identity crisis. That is the way I can put it. But the CSO mainly has been more driven by western laws. So, most of the things we try to mimic. We talk about governance; we talk about it in the western context. We have not tried to contextualize it, you know.

(P2) So boards are just people you bring on board that will not question you as the executive director. So they do not have a say over you because most times boards don’t fundraise. They are just there to hoodwink everybody that you have a governance structure that is above board. I have been through enough organizations so I know. So the structure that is proposed for NGOs is flawed in Kenya.

5.1.3 The Projectized Approach to Development in Kenya
Development is a complex and contested term (Schafer 3 al. (2012). A deeper exploration of the term is beyond the scope of this work. However, to better understand how this context-specific factor – the projectized approach to development – impacts CSO sustainability/effectiveness in Kenya, it is important to anchor this next discussion on one of the most widely-used definitions of development in current practice. The United Nations (UN) Human Development Report (HDR) defines development both as a ‘process’ and an ‘ideal end state.’ The first HDR,
published in 1990, described development as a ‘process’ by explaining that “the basic objective of development is to create an enabling environment for people to enjoy long, healthy and creative lives (p. 9).” Development was also defined as an ‘ideal state’ or set of socio-economic conditions to be realized. “Human development is a process of enlarging people’s choices. The most critical ones are to lead a long and healthy life, to be educated and to enjoy a decent standard of living. Additional choices include political freedom, guaranteed human rights and self-respect (p.9).” This definition, first articulated in 1990, was repeated again at the beginning of the first chapter of the 2014 HDR. Most people reading the UN HDR’s definition of development and then juxtaposing it against the state of world affairs both now and over the past 50+ years, would likely conclude that development – as conceptualized in this definition – would require focused commitment over a protracted period of time and dedication to fundamental, sustainable and transformational change. Most people would probably also conclude that haphazard, more tactical than strategic, activities focused on quick wins are not likely to procure freedom, guaranteed human rights, long and healthy life, education and a decent standard of living for all.

All of the 54 CSOs whose directors were interviewed for this study receive funding from international bilateral/multilateral agencies, international NGOs, and/or individual international donors for the purpose of advancing development in Kenya more or less in line with the UN HDR definition noted above. Nearly all (over 3/4ths) of the CSOs that participated in the study receive 80% or more of their total annual operating budgets from international sources. The majority of these organizations would not likely exist, and in their present form could not continue to exist, absent international funding. Nevertheless, nearly all of the CSO directors and OD experts claimed that the ‘projectized approach to development’ – essentially the general
donor approach to development; the way in which international funding is provided; and the technical and programmatic requirements placed on recipients of that funding – actually works against, rather than for, CSO sustainability and effectiveness.

Participants explained how international donors take, what they described, as a ‘projectized approach to development.’ By that, they mean that donors see development as the result of a series of implemented projects. Participants described a project as an intervention that includes a bundle of activities implemented within a certain time-period, in accordance with a stipulated budget, and intended to generate a set of specific near-immediate outputs. Participants noted that international donors often favor outputs that are easily quantifiable and therefore easier to account for and report on. One participant shared his/her perspective regarding the desirability of easily quantifiable, project-based outputs,

It is about reporting back to the donor on the number of trained girls… 10… output. And that is as far as it goes. Because probably the person who as funded, just wants to know… did you or did you not? I did, how many? 10? Good. Check, that’s it. That is as far as it goes.

One CSO director recalled how one of his donors arbitrarily limited its investments to specific time frames even when the director’s organization had achieved the results the donor agency desired.

Charles we supported you in 2012, or 2013, that’s it. ‘We are not allowed to support on organization throughout the five years. Even despite the fact you’re doing good.’ I even gave them, out of the mentorship session, these are the number of children who performed well and they still remember what you did, and they are like, ‘Okay, thank you, thank you Charles. Thank you. Bye bye.’

According to study participants, when donors support local CSOs, their funds are attached to a project that the donor designed and desires to accomplish. These projects come with objectives, activities, time frames (usually 3-5 years), and budgets that are stipulated by the donor with little,
if any, consultation with the recipient local organization. “Donors are more interested in the project objectives being met, commensurate to the budget.”

Participants also explained how this ‘projectized approach to development’ hinders OS/OE by contributing to high rates of staff turnover. Donors provide sufficient funding for local CSOs to hire the staff they need to implement the donor’s funded project. Donors generally do not provide funding for long-term permanent organizational staff members who are not spending all or the majority of their time on the donor’s specific project. This means that when projects come to an end, staff employed to implement those projects are almost always forced to look for jobs elsewhere. One of the CSO directors interviewed for this study noted,

I find that my people leave when the project ends, because my staff are project based. If the project ends what am I supposed to do? I want to keep my staff, but if the project that they are working in is ended, then I can’t keep them. And then, when a new project comes, they might, or might not be available. It’s a bad thing, but I don’t have a choice about it, yes. So it’s a challenge, I can say. It’s an ongoing challenge in an organization like ours, you lose staff.

Another CSO director recognized the critical importance of building a core team that would remain with the organization for the long-term regardless of how many donor funded projects the organization was working on. The director noted that building this core team is key to building a sustainable organization but was at a loss as to how to accomplish this with all of his/her funding almost always tied specifically to project implementation.

How do you want to ensure that you move away from project-based staff to maybe building up a core team, that are not necessarily project specific, so that you end up losing them as projects end, and you get people on board again. That’s an area that also means that the organization then needs to start thinking through funding certain positions for a longer time, or committing to keep certain positions for a longer time if you need skills.

According to study participants, it is both the projectized approach to development, along with the prevalence among Kenyan CSOs of an insular/controlling leadership style that leads to
unusually high staff turnover. High staff turnover – as noted above – leads to poor knowledge retention/management and forces organizations to lose, re-hire and retrain key staff each time a project ends and another begins. Here again yet another context-specific factor encourages high staff turnover that negatively impacts organizational sustainability by limiting organizational capabilities, preventing knowledge management/retention and increasing operational expenses as organizations must recruit, retrain and replace departing staff members.

The wide-spread availability of international donor money that is relatively easy to obtain, as discussed in a previous section, delivered through the projectized approach to development has helped breed a cadre of local CSOs focused primarily on effectively implementing projects according to donor specifications and delivering the short-term results donors want to see with little attention to their own organizational development and long-term viability. One of the CSO executive directors interviewed explained this dynamic this way…

So the whole sustainability element has not been embedded in the structure of the organizations. Because most organizations are trying to win - to write a proposal, get a grant, implement that project. So not many organizations have now embedded that sustainability element into their structure.

An OD professional provided deeper insight and greater detail regarding how the international donor projectized approach to development has seriously hampered the emergence of a community of sustainable and effective local CSOs in Kenya…

This huge USAID funding, global fund funding, pushed organizations away from themselves to implementing programs. Actually civil society organizations in Kenya have not grown, as they should have because of these huge USAID monies that have been coming around. The challenge with these huge monies [is] that organizations have become more program [project] related. We have never invested in organizational capacity. [If] you can hire [a] few people who can manage programs, you are set to go and anybody evaluating you will see you are doing a great job because the targets are being met, the results are being met. These are the organizations that once the program ends there is actually nothing in these organizations – with completely nothing if you look at the structure, the system… there were no systems there. So long as you are able
to get the money, give it to the program, they are able to account for it, you are able to write reports… that was done.

With the majority of their resources provided by international donors and these resources focused on project implementation and project-based outputs, local CSOs are unable to invest in the institutional structures, systems, processes, etc. necessary to achieve and maintain sustainability and effectiveness. “I think an organization is more than an activity. There are systems that need to be enhanced in that organization. There are skills that need to be enhanced. These players [international donors] have been a bit inclined to their objective and mission [rather] than the overall wellbeing of the organization.” The donors are “willing to support you in terms of the activities [but] you don’t get any core funding. Your activities go on and they keep happening but there is no direct money coming to you.” One participant described how the projectized approach to development negatively impacts CSO OS/OE by undermining the CSO’s core mission…

I think [of] the issue of mission drift. So there’s the reason why the organization exists, but because they need to get funding from certain organizations, you tend then to meet their [the donor’s] goal and kind of ignore yours. So after the period of the project, say three years, that project will not continue because this partner is not there to fund it, and it’s not necessarily what the organization exists to do, so that dies. Then you start another project and that dies, and another one. So the organization ceases to exist basically, and you’re busy following projects.

Lastly, another participant offered this interesting comparison between how select donors – mostly private foundations – have chosen to approach and fund development versus how the majority of governmental bilateral/multilateral agencies and international NGOs have adopted the projectized approach to development.

There are unique exceptions. I mean, I have a lot of respect for foreign foundations… maybe Rockefeller who sometimes invests heavily in building individuals and institutions. That makes a difference because you are investing because you believe that these people have a vision, they have a mission and they are clear. They understand their space. They may have gaps, [but] you come in and you support them to address some of
those capacity gaps and then you kind of make them fly. So they are now able to figure out where else will our resources come from? Whereas...the model of development delivery... if you look at how [the] EC [European Commission] gives its money. If [you] look at maybe how DFID has largely been funding especially local NGOs – not necessarily the ones that are in the UK, which sometimes they have given unrestricted monies to support their strategy and development establishment. So you find that the model of delivery is very different and skewed and so that also makes civil society organizations to [be] living day to day. That in itself affects how you perceive the future because you are always fighting fires to enable you to exist or planning more short term because that is perspective that is more real to you. The bigger term or the longer term stuff is a bit more distant, you can’t relate with it well. Even within your board and other people they can’t... and the donors who you have are also looking at time frames of 3 to 4 years max. If you are fortunate to get a five-year grant, yes you are very fortunate. If you are able to get an open ended grant that will take you to 10 years then it’s almost nonexistent. So you find yourself always in these cycles of 2 to 3 years, again 2 to 3 years, and that affects how you even perceive your own very existence and your own capacity to be able to grow expand and do amazing things.

5.1.4 Community Ownership
Study participants described “community ownership” in a variety of ways but were in complete agreement that it was a primary influential determinant of organizational sustainability and effectiveness in Kenya. From the perspectives of study participants, community ownership referred first and foremost to the beneficiaries of any development intervention having a sense of “ownership” over the planning and design of the intervention, its implementation, and the assessment of its effectiveness at achieving community determined goals. Community ownership was also described as communities “buying in” to the development intervention. A number of participants, however, were aware of some of the shortcomings of the most commonly held conceptualizations of community ownership among Kenyan CSOs and recognized that the way many organizations pursue development interventions makes community ownership virtually impossible to achieve. A discussion of participant views regarding this essential component of OS/OE – community ownership – unfolds below focused first on participant conceptualizations of the term and its components; secondly on participant views about a way in
which community ownership impacts OS/OE; and finally on a few of the ‘challenges’ that participant conceptualizations/experiences of community ownership highlight in varying degrees.

Participant explanations of the two concepts “ownership” and “buy in” reveal their views of these concepts as ultimately abstract, intangible constructs that characterize the relationship developed between a community of beneficiaries and an ‘external’ local development organization implementing a project in the beneficiaries’ community. “Ownership” and “buy in” happen, according to study participants, when a) communities view implementing CSOs as “legitimate;” b) communities have a degree of emotional investment/commitment to the project and its intended outcomes; c) communities have some measure of decision-making power during project development and implementation; and d) communities both participate in project implementation and feel included by project implementers.

(P1) Are you legitimate? Does your community – the beneficiaries – identify with you? do they support what it is you are doing? Your legitimacy… is really key to making sure that you are sustainable. Because then, essentially, you might find that you are either implementing programs that are helping nobody… so nobody will care to work with you, to sustain them beyond your current funding… or you will just find that essentially once your money is gone really nobody cares to hold your hand or walk with you. So that legitimacy that comes from having a constituency that believes in what you are doing, a constituency that supports what you are doing, is also like really key to ensure an organization’s sustainability.

(P2) I feel local organizations will never gain what I call true legitimacy until they have sufficient buy in from the people they claim to be serving whether it is the community or it is the nation. I feel that it helps connect; it helps cement some type of relationship between the organization and its beneficiaries… and the belief of the beneficiaries that this institution must survive because it makes a difference for us.

(P3) The good will of the community. I think that’s also critical, because when an organization doesn’t involve the community, then it will not be sustainable. If they involved the community, when it [the project] wound up, the community is really the one that’s holding it, you know.
CSO directors and OD professionals interviewed for this study also described community ownership as the community and the implementing CSO being in a “partnership” or a “relationship” of “trust.”

(P1) There should also be that good relationship with the community because you have to liaise hand-in-hand with the community for you to be able to implement your project, to realize an impact and create that sustainability.

(P2) I would think it’s [about] building partnerships with the community. Because from what I’ve realized, if you are not working with the community then you don’t get to achieve a lot. You just become this hollow organization that is talking about these things that they are doing but has no impact on the people on the ground.

One participant highlighted the importance of simply “sitting” and “listening” as a way for project planners to cultivate a sense of ownership among the communities they seek to work in…

Its time, even from [when] the word baseline is mentioned, that the beneficiaries are included. I’ll compare that with the lady I told you about from the US. She was doing dialysis. She wanted an organization that would do medical stuff. She told me, ‘In the US, I know the problem, just get the machines people will come in.’ I told her, ‘It’s a bit different here because one, the issue of you as a foreigner coming in with a solution to their problem may not be very welcome. They want to sit and engage in the definition and development of the solution to their problem… and then you don’t even talk. Sit, listen and then once they have defined that then now you will only suppress them if you have a superior solution to what they have already suggested. They will listen to you.’ So I told her, ‘Go sit. Go talk to some stakeholders in Naivasha, where you want to implement this – doctors, sit down with them and listen and definitely you are going to come up with a solution of how you are going to approach this.’

In more concrete, specific terms, study participants described 2 elements that are both necessary steps in a process intended to achieve “community ownership” as well as evidence of “community ownership” being realized. These 2 elements are: 1) implementing CSOs conducting needs assessments before they begin a project; and 2) implementing organizations obtaining permission/blessing from community leaders and ‘gatekeepers.’ Each of these facets of community ownership is explained in greater detail below.
Identifying A Communities’ Felt Needs. Study participants highlighted the importance of implementing CSOs conducting community needs assessments prior to conceiving, designing and/or implementing a project. Participants felt that a “needs assessment” was a focal step to gaining community buy-in of the project under development. They also thought that identifying community needs during the early stages of project development would ensure that the implementing organization responded to needs the community actually believed are important and a worthy investment of their own time and support. Responding to a community’s ‘actual’ or felt need was a way, according to study participants, of obtaining community good will that would contribute to project and organizational sustainability.

So it starts from doing the needs assessment and also mobilizing the community to participate in bringing solutions to some of these problems. There’s an example of this community in the northern part of Kenya where women go and fetch water very far away. This organization came in. It was a local organization. They never consulted so they just assumed that these women are really struggling – you know going to fetch water everyday and walking all those kilometers. So they mobilized resources and built a well. Then they told the women, ‘Okay here is the well, and so you have more time to yourselves to do the things that you women like doing.’ But, the women never used the well. They still kept going back to river where they would fetch water before. The organization got concerned and they asked them, ‘Why are you going to fetch the water? We brought you clean water here next to you.’ Then the women were like… ‘Who told you that we need water? We actually enjoyed going to the river because that is the only time we meet as women and discuss our issues away from our husbands or children and it’s a safe space for us. So now that you’ve brought the well nearby, they expect us not to take a lot of time fetching water, so we don’t have enough time to discuss our issues.’

Another interviewee shared a similar story after explaining how he/she had reached a decision to tackle a drought/famine challenge in northern Kenya through a livestock-breeding program. He/she recounts how he/she conceived the project and then entered the target community to begin implementation.

I am currently doing animal breeding — it’s not a concept now because it is in discussion with DFID. I tell you… I sat down, I went, I live there [drought/famine stricken area of northern Kenya], I have a home there, I saw what is happening. I decided, it is possible to upgrade the local breeds. [I reached this conclusion] after I had gone to ILRI, IRLI is a
research organization here in Kenya and I had learned how they are doing it. For me it was a solution to what my people were going through. Because you have that local cow, who is giving you half a liter everyday and it’s not worth it. You’ve spent so much time on it and it just gives you half a liter. So I came and sat down with guys and I even took them out and sat them [down] and they gave me all the information. I had to read and come up with a concept. When I started seeing some light at the end of the fundraising, I sat down with some community leaders and you know the first question they asked me? They asked, ‘Who told you that we wanted different types of cows other than the ones we have?’ And I’m telling them, ‘No, the cows I’m trying to tell [you about] are better in this aspect and this aspect.’ Instead of embracing that, they are now asking me questions, ‘Who told you that this is the kind of cows we want? Number two, where are we going to get food? Where are we…’ All those kind of questions... So, I had to shut up and now pretend that we are developing it [the project] a fresh. So, all those dynamics and some other – many unwritten things – will define how an organization survives [in] this country.

The two narratives above showcase the important emphasis study participants placed on CSOs conducting a needs assessment and responding to actual/felt needs in order to achieve community ownership and buy-in which are, in turn, necessary building blocks for “an organization to survive in this country.”

**Permission/Blessing from Community Leaders & Gatekeepers.** The second element – identified by study participants – as an important facet of community ownership is the implementing CSOs seeking permission/blessing from key community leaders and ‘gatekeepers’ prior to project launch. Study participants did not explicitly define or identify who community leaders/gatekeepers are. However, in their discussions of the role community leaders/gatekeepers play in fostering community ownership of development projects, participants indicated that leaders/gatekeepers are those individuals as well as institutions and their representatives that command the respect and ear of community members and who can negatively or positively impact both project implementation and help determine whether a community embraces/owns a project or not. “One of the key things is to make sure you [implementing CSO] pay a visit to the gatekeepers. Let the gatekeepers understand what it is
that you’re doing and how will what you’re doing benefit the community.” One study participant shared the story of a CSO representative who recognized local churches and their pastors in a targeted community as key leaders/gatekeepers in the predominantly Christian communities of central Kenya and sought entry into the community through the church…

There’s an organization and I know about its start up. It was also a lady. She went to… she visited the churches and sold her vision. What I know she did was she went to the churches and she talked to the pastors and asked them to give her space to speak to the congregation in church. She networked with existing organizations to help her really establish and also talk to the gatekeepers in the organization. So I guess that was how she was able to root herself in the community as an NGO.

According to study participants, it is the two specific elements described above – conducting a needs assessment and obtaining permission/blessing from gatekeepers – coupled with the more abstract concepts also described of “buy in,” “partnership,” “relationship,” and “legitimacy” that constitute the key components of community ownership. The CSO directors and OD experts in this study also identified one particularly important way that community ownership, as explicated here, impacts OS/OE in Kenya – and this is the subject of the next section.

Community Ownership Encourages Community Support Following CSO Disengagement.

As previously described, CSO projects are most often funded by donors who place strict time and budget constraints on project implementation. Once project time frames have been met and budgets expended the project is to be closed-out. However, participants explained…

…that for all the projects that we have worked and spent energy and time, building community ownership, we have been able to run those projects even without money because the community has come around and even given their time pro bono to ensure the work we are doing with those communities continues even through dry periods when the resources are lacking.

Participants noted that fostering and achieving a true sense of project ownership among the targeted communities encourages community members to invest their resources – financial, in-
kind, time/energy, etc. – into the project both as it is being implemented and later in order to sustain the project and/or its benefits even after the implementing CSO has disengaged. One participant shared an example of how fostering/achieving community ownership in a project he/she worked on led to active community participation in daily implementation activities.

   I know a project in Kibera. It’s an education project and what they have done [the input the community has made] is for human resource – you know just the cooking for the children and everything is done by the parents of the children who they support. So, the parents have a duty roster. So they come in every day… There’s a different set of parents [that] come in to cook for the children and wash dishes and clean up and do all that so they [the project/implementing CSO] don’t have to hire extra help for that. So, that cuts down on the costs. So the parents actually volunteer to do different things in the school and that cuts down on expenses and they are able to channel the money that they get from the donors just to the core business which is the education for the children. So, we’re getting more and more local organizations in Kenya that are beginning to think of sustainability and thinking outside the box and not depending just on donor funding.

These types of scenarios, according to participants, shore-up the ability of local CSOs to continue operating in local communities even after external donors have ended their project support. So, in this way, community ownership is a critical building block of OS/OE in Kenya.

**Challenges to Participant Conceptualizations/Experiences of Community Ownership.**

Arnstein (1969) developed a ‘ladder of participation’ that she and many scholars and practitioners since then have used to categorize levels of citizen/community member participation in a project or any other community-wide initiative. The ladder included 8 rungs. The bottom two rungs, Arnstein labeled as “manipulative” and “therapy.” These two levels are “non-participative.” Arnstein described them as efforts made by an external entity’s to “educate” community members (p. 217). The 3rd and 4th rungs of the ladder – “informing” and “consultation” – are labeled as “tokenism.” These levels of participation involve the powerful listening to community voices or seeking community input but not necessarily following through on community recommendations (p. 217). Level 5 is “placation,” which Arnstein described as a
continuation of “tokenism” but where community members have a more formal role of “advising” decision-makers. They do not, however, have any power to ensure that their opinions are abided by. The 6th, 7th and 8th rungs of the ladder – partnership, delegated power and citizen control – represent varying, but increasing, degrees of “citizen power.” Citizen control is the stage when maximum level of citizen/community participation is achieved through community members moving into decision-making roles (p. 217).

Interviews conducted for this study did not discuss Arnstein’s ladder of participation. On occasion, however, some participants recognized that their understanding/experience of “community ownership” as explicated above somehow falls far short of what it could or should be in order to be accurately described as “community ownership.” Had interviews included the use of Arnstein’s ladder to help explain what study participants meant by “community ownership,” they may have categorized the level and type of participation reviewed above, and present to some degree in Kenya, as “consultation” (level 4 degree of tokenism) or at best “placation/partnership” (levels 5 and 6) – the stages where communities possibly achieve a minimal degree of power. One participant seemed to recognize the difficulties of ever achieving genuine community ownership when a CSO enters a local community with a pre-packaged project concept that it is seeking buy in for. This participant stated,

I guess the most important component that I see now which I had not seen earlier… but am looking back now and am seeing it… is the kind of model that organizations either develop or adopt – models that have the component of community participation and community ownership. Especially so with the beneficiaries. If the beneficiaries own the program, if the beneficiaries participate, are included, you know an all inclusive kind of a model, then you know, sustainability in terms of human resources and in terms of up-scaling the transformation… that happens… that works very well.

How “community ownership” is defined and how it is actualized by local CSOs in Kenya appears – from previous discussions here – to be simply presenting a community with a project
concept and seeking buy in or at least a ‘green light’ for the implementing organization to proceed unimpeded by community members. Arnstein would likely label this ‘kind’ of community ownership/participation as tokenism or placation. One respondent described the top-down approach of trying to sell a project idea to a community as “the roundabout way – so you start the organization then you start bringing in the community to come and feel like part of the organization…”

A few of participants indicated that community ownership of a development project is almost impossible with the current way CSOs are formed and operate in Kenya – where a CSO is started by an individual or small group and, once funding is obtained, it seeks to implement development interventions in communities the organizations deems ‘needy.’ This small group of study participants indicated that community ownership could really only be achieved if organizations were formed from the grassroots up – that is, by the community to respond to community identified needs. One participant explained his/her perspective in this way…

So I’ll start with the normal organization. People who come together normally do something in order to solve a problem or overcome a certain way of—or momentum to be able to get change. From that kind of a movement the basis is normally community. So once they come together to do this, it’s normally based on self-sustenance models, before these other aspects of coming to look for formal funding is reached. As we continue to formalize organizations in the formal setups of the international settings then it gets away from that grassroots approach. Once that happens then you get into the catch of trying to get funding after funding, [it becomes a] project based kind of thing. So the way I will look at it is we can flip it the other way first. We look at the structures where organizations come around. So sources of funding whether it is from a local place, from a diaspora connection or any other international donor organization, should be now revolving around how best can we solve this kind of problem, now that this organization has come on board, this kind of way. But normally it is the other way round, it is the donor or the other international organizations that have setup, now calls the shots because they have the money, they now change the approaches which organizations have come up. So, if community comes together then, they already know what they want and why they are solving this kind of problems.
Another participant recalled an organization he/she worked with being formed by community members who identified a need and rallied together to start what eventually became a local organization to address that specific communities felt needs.

So if you talk to the mothers around there they will tell you ‘we have contributed to establishing of this organization.’ So you see that now gives it a basis of why this organization comes together, what is it coming [together] to solve, and how do you go forward. So from that perspective, now you can look at it from one, now communities say they want to solve this problem and they start doing it themselves and therefore they own it. Once that ownership is there, then sustainability is assured. Once it is the other way round where now you start looking for funds from outside then reliance moves away from coming with sustainable models to things that are being done to just meet a means. So funding becomes a means to an end and sourcing outside while the other way it is completely different.

A degree of token “community ownership,” but not Arnstein’s level 7/8 “community ownership,” is perhaps one of the reasons why Kenyan CSOs continue to struggle for sustainability and effectiveness even after decades of ‘capacity building.’ CSOs recognize the critical connection between community ownership and OS/OE but the way they conceive of it and are pursuing it is fundamentally flawed. Therefore, while there was widespread consensus among participants that “community ownership” is a crucial building block of organizational sustainability and effectiveness in Kenya; some participants recognized that the current model for CSO engagement in Kenyan communities makes achieving community ownership a significant challenge and that “ownership” itself must be more than just tokenism or placation.

5.1.5 Symbiotic Relationships Between CSOs and Politicians

Scholars and practitioners have often stressed the important role key stakeholders play in a CSO’s long-term sustainability and effectiveness. An organization’s key stakeholders generally include its targeted beneficiaries, its donors, its staff, other organizations with similar missions, and government entities – especially those with oversight/regulatory responsibilities. (See Baruch & Ramalho, 2006, Lecy et al, 2011, Sowa et al, 2004, and VanSant, 2000). Nearly all
participants in the current study expressed a particular conviction that Kenyan CSOs could not be sustainable or effective if they were not in compliance with government policy and did not have good working relationships with government agencies that had jurisdiction of some nature over their structures and activities. Numerous participants made statements that echo what a few specific participants said…

(P1) Of course you must be in the right books with the government. Like for us annually, we must make returns to the council [NGO Council] of the things we are doing.

(P2) Partnership with government… specifically because government is there, whether the other organizations are there or not. So, sometimes when you anchor your activities or your work around the existing structures of the government, then beyond the existence of this organization, it’s likely that those projects or programs will continue.

(P3) For us, most of our work, we work with the youth and women. So we have built relationships with the officers at the ministry responsible for that. Also, the Directorate of Youth Affairs – that is one office where we have really kept it going. Then we work with the ministry responsible for East African Affairs. We’ve been doing a lot of work in [regional] integration. So I think that is another office where we really have a good relationship with the officers – so those two ministries. And I think, for most organizations, it’s at the ministerial level and the directorate that is responsible for your area of work [that you need to engage with]. So if you’re dealing with trade, then you make sure that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – you know, you have people there who help you, especially in terms of all these international agreements that are being forged and all that. If you’re working with the area of agriculture, you need to have people in the Directorate that deals with Agriculture. So those are the people we deal with.

While respondents agreed with oft-held scholarly and practitioner perspectives that positive technical/administrative relationships between CSOs and relevant government entities are critical to OS/OE; participants explained that the sustainability and effectiveness of local CSOs in Kenya is more significantly impacted by a deeper more complex CSO-stakeholder relationship that goes beyond the typical CSO-bureaucrat administrative relationship to what could be called a “symbiotic relationship between CSOs and relevant politicians.” “(P1) Politics is very critical to sustainability. You must always be on the right side of politics.” “(P2) Let me tell you… In Kenya you cannot run away from politics. For us, we are in politics for development. If you
don’t talk with a sitting MP [Member of Parliament] and maybe you are in a constituency, there is no way you will be able to prevail.”

In essence, participants claimed that politicians may come to see CSOs that develop widespread goodwill among the citizenry as ‘opportunities to take advantage of’ or ‘threats to eliminate.’ Participants noted that the Kenyan politicians who are the most likely individuals to get swept up in this dynamic include Members of County Assemblies (MCAs) (equivalent to members of state legislatures in the US); County Governors (equivalent to state governors in the US); Members of Parliament (MPs) (equivalent to national parliamentarians in Canada or the UK); and politically appointed or elected officials of the national government such as Ministers and other representatives of line ministries (eg: Education, Public Works, Agriculture, etc.). MCAs and MPs were the most frequently mentioned politicians in participant descriptions of this ‘symbiotic relationship between CSOs and Kenyan politicians.’

Participants explained that CSOs that deliver needed services to community members and are seen as making substantial and positive contributions to community welfare can develop a strong following in the communities they serve; become very influential in many aspects of community life and; as a result, their directors and senior staff members intentionally or unintentionally assume unofficial leadership and ‘gatekeeping’ positions in the community. According to study participants, CSOs that obtain this degree of power and influence in community life often draw the attention of local, regional and even national politicians. One participant described his experience of this dynamic in this way,

You know… Somebody who is in the community, you know I have more - I have more what, how do you call it? Not really powers. I have more influence; yes, I have more influence than him [a politician]. So if he wants maybe to be voted in, you know they have to pass through us, because we are the people on the ground.
As a result, these politicians, as described by respondents, become interested in organizations for one of two possible reasons. The first possibility is that the politician thinks that by funding and/or co-opting agency activities he/she can claim to be ‘providing’ the community with needed services and thus curry favor with voting constituents. Numerous study participants described how politicians often use official occasions like ‘project launches,’ or ‘groundbreaking ceremonies,’ etc. as a means of trying to hijack development projects/organizational activities for their own political gain.

(P1) They [politicians] become a guest of honor. You [the politician] invite yourself and you come with your monies. Perhaps… It’s not even real money. You just make a commitment. Then after you make the commitment you want to be identified with that organization. So, the politician will come and say, ‘you see like Org A, I have capacitated Org A to do 1,2,3 things. Like you see that playground, it is me who gave them money to do that. So increasingly, because they [politicians] have the platform, Org A is put in the back burner and the politician sort of takes over. So it is something that happens quite a bit. Publicly you can’t [correct them] because of the powers that be… especially if it is a prominent [figure].

(P2) Every time you go and mobilize communities in an area, the local politicians will always want to use that platform either to talk whatever they want to say. You know, there’s a saying in our country which says, ‘When politicians see people, whether it’s in a burial or anything, they just see votes, so they just want to talk.’ So they would want to come and even invade your meetings and so on and so forth. And you have to be very careful, not to let him not to speak because if he doesn’t speak, you refuse him to speak, then he’ll use his influence to slow down or even to put you off on whatever you’re doing. And if you let him speak, you have to control him not to, you know everything, so again that becomes—you have to very wise how you are going to deal with that.

A third participant summarized participant views more simply by adding that, “when a politician sees a group, they see votes. So, they would like to come and affiliate themselves [with the organization]. They’ll view it… It’s like a carrot [and] stick… We’ve decided to give you a project, but when it comes to voting make sure that you vote in this direction.”

The second possibility is that sitting politicians, from the districts where these powerful/influential CSOs operate, feel threatened by the amount of good will the organization is
garnering and begin thinking that the CEOs might use the organizational platforms they have to vie for political office or ‘campaign’ against the sitting politician and/or his/her political interests.

(P1) We have seen situations where you go to a community and you want to initiate a project. The local politicians will want to actually interfere in terms of feeling that probably you are bringing in a project there to actually get the support of people or you have an agenda – a future agenda that is also a threat to their survival. Because if a local leader within a particular community is not development conscious, and you as a leader of an organization brings in initiatives that actually encourage development, you also will be confronted by the local politics, yes?

(P2) Sometimes you find that if politicians don’t support what you do, that will affect your sustainability at that very local level. Because they will likely fight you or they will block any attempts you make to undertake any development projects. They [will] probably turn the local leadership…. they will turn the communities against you.

Nearly all of the directors and OD professionals interviewed for this study described how this symbiotic relationship between CSOs and politicians has the power to make or break organizations. According to them, CSOs must themselves, on the one hand, have the support and favor of various politicians to access and work in communities in their respective constituencies. However, CSOs must also take great care to protect their independence, not be co-opted by ‘their’ politicians and succumb to being the politician’s agent in the community rather than implementing their organization’s vision and mission statements.

(P1) We cannot really underscore the role of politics in ensuring the success of an institution or a CSO. Because [I] think the success of a CSO at a community level purely lies [in] the political good will. So the success of the CSO basically depends on how you align politically and how you are able to press the right political buttons, as you achieve your objective. When you are not well aligned to the dynamics of the day then you will not survive because they have the power; they have the resources to be able to squash your agenda.

(P2) Politicians or politics is one of the key factors that affect sustainability of an organization. So for an organization to be sustainable, it’s very important to involve these politicians or administrators in one way or the other. Like in Kenya we have the devolved governments now, the County Governments. When you involve the politicians, you have their blessings. They will support the implementation of these projects. They
will also sensitize the community that whatever this organization is doing is benefiting the local community. If there are funds from the government, the politicians now will be ready or willing to roll it down to the community. That is one key, then the other thing, they will also sensitize the community to own this project. It is theirs, not for the organization. So that they can understand [that] it is addressing issues, which are affecting them. But if you isolate them and then the politicians, because many Kenyans they hear politicians more than the other people, they even may abandon the project or even destroy it. Like here in the slum, there is a big possibility that they can come and destroy it if they are not involved.

While many participants confirmed that numerous local CSOs succumb to the negative aspects of the ‘symbiotic relationship with politicians’ that they have; numerous study participants also shared how some CSOs and politicians have managed these relationships in a balanced, fair way. One participant shared a story of how one local organization gained support from local politicians but ultimately resisted the politicians’ efforts to co-opt the organization.

Let me give an example of a local initiative back home where I come from. The community realized that they had a challenge with water. So they went out of there… they got… they garnered resources. They brought resources together and got this company to dig a borehole for them. So that is a community owned project and [now] they have water in the community where they had a challenge in terms of water. Along the way they say, ‘You know… this is our project. They got the governor to come and commission it. The reason why they did that is because they know that if they don’t involve the governor of the area then they may not go too far with this project. The governor did come… and the area MP …and the MCA – those local, you know, leaders – they came. One of the things they [these political leaders] were trying to do is own the project. And so they kept saying ‘my project’, ‘my initiative.’ Even when they go out there they kept on talking about it. The community said no, it is ours. They [the community] have these very strong leaders who stood up and said ‘no, it is ours, and you cannot use it as a political tool to garner votes and campaign.’ So for the politician to get votes in that community he had now to stoop low and agree with the community… ‘I agree with you, it is yours and I will support you. If anything happens and you need repairs… Should anything happen, I will definitely support you.

Complicating the complex symbiotic relationships with politicians that CSOs have to carefully manage in order to be sustainable and effective in Kenya is the issue of ethnicity and the very central role it plays in Kenyan politics. The intricate relationship between ethnic identity and political affiliation in Kenya is well known (See Holmquist & Githinji, 2009, Kwatemba, 2008,
and Githinji, 2012). Kenya’s primary political parties have most often been dominated by various alliances among Kenya’s primary ethnic groups – the Kikuyu, Luhy, Luo, Kalenjin and Kamba. In the 2007 presidential elections, for example, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) was supported primarily by the Luhy, the Luo and Kalenjin while the National Alliance was supported by the Kikuyu and the Kamba (BBC, 2016. Retrieved from: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-21692738). Current parties contesting for national power in the 2017 elections in Kenya have different names and configurations but the two main parties are still organized along similar lines but with slightly different ethnic affiliations.

Study participants reported that this connection between ethnicity and politics has impacted relationships between CSOs and Kenyan politicians in numerous ways. For example, organizations whose directors are of one ethnic group may not be welcome to work in communities dominated by a different ethnic group. A politician who represents a constituency largely made up of members of his/her own ethnic group may actively resist the development activities of an organization directed by someone from a different ethnic group. This may happen simply out of the politician’s fear that the director could use the good will his/her organization garners in the community to compete for the seat the current politician holds. When an organization whose board is dominated by one ethnic group applies for grant funding from a county government dominated by another ethnic group, it may find that its application languishes in a bureaucratic maze until the submission deadlines passes. Numerous study participants shared perspectives very similar to the following narratives…

(P1) Politicians can initiate hostility against an organization because of the people who have started it, not because it is not supporting them. For example, [there was a] project in Kibera. It was started for a good cause but because of the people who started it and not being from the government – from that community… The politicians in the area did not support it. Although it was a good cause they rejected it.
For instance, if I come from a particular part of Kenya and I am CEO in an organization that operates along either the Coast or Eastern or any part of Kenya, you find that it has some negative impact, because I would not feel not comfortable [to] continue working in that area and that kind of thing. This is in the Kenyan context it plays that way and it also has influence in terms of the perception of the people from that area – how they look at that NGO. If you are not from my region, what happens then, why should you come from another part to come and run a program within our area? So there’s sometimes that kind of mistrust.

They see us on the ethnicity part of it, because some of our politicians are not from my community. So they are already seeing, even though this NGO is growing, but it doesn’t really affect me. But the moment they see you have become very strong, they also want either to align with you or to try and destroy you. They can... especially if they find as you’re growing there is somebody else who might be his competitor or her competitor is aligned with you. So the only way to make it hard is to bring you down so that the other politician doesn’t make some mileage.

The single most discussed context-specific component of OS in the current study was this symbiotic relationship between CSOs and politicians and how critical these relationships are to organizational sustainability and effectiveness. The ability of a CSO and its senior leadership to engage politicians – because they cannot afford not to – while not compromising or short-changing their organizations’ missions, was identified by study participants as one of the greatest challenges to developing thriving local organizations that make positive lasting contributions to the development of the Kenyan communities in which they work. The role of a socio-cultural variable like ethnicity/ethnic-based politics, according to respondents, increases the complexity of this symbiotic relationship and its resulting impact on OS/OE. In its impact on OS/OE, this symbiotic relationship explicated above, would generally be categorized as part of a dynamic scholars refer to simply as ‘networking,’ or ‘managing relationships with stakeholders’ or ‘be in good standing with political authorities,’ etc. However, it is hopefully clear to the reader that when general constructs like ‘networking’ and ‘managing stakeholder relationships’ are understood as they are actualized in the Kenyan context, a very different reality is revealed than
would be otherwise known absent the contextual lens. The inherently political nature of
development in Kenya and other countries of the Global South is discussed at greater length in
Chapter 8 of this work. In Kenya, and often elsewhere in the Global South, local CSOs/NGOs
are political actors whether they want to be or not. It places CSOs/NGOs established and
operating in the Global South in a very different position that most established and working in
the United States or other northern countries.

5.1.6 Capacity Building
Both scholars and practitioners use the terms capacity building (CB), capacity development,
capacity strengthening, institution building, etc. more or less interchangeably. There seems to be
rather widespread agreement, however, that these abstract/intangible terms – like the terms
organizational sustainability, effectiveness and performance – are difficult to define and
measure. This difficulty has led to numerous conceptualizations and definitions of these terms
both in scholarship and in use among professionals. (See Angeles, L. in Forsyth, T. (Ed), 2005,
J. & Aguius, E., 2007, and Wing, K. T., 2009). In their review of relevant literature, Lusthaus et
al identified several definitions of the term capacity building. Peter Morgan (1996) defined
capacity building as,

…the ability of individuals, groups, institutions and organizations to identify and solve
development problems over time.

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (1997) defined capacity development as,

The process by which individuals, groups, organizations, institutions and societies
increase their abilities: to perform functions solve problems and achieve objectives; to
understand and deal with their development need in a broader context and in a sustainable
manner.
The World Bank (1998) defined *capacity* as, “the combination of people, institutions and practices that permits countries to reach their development goals;” and *capacity building* as, “investment in human capital, institutions and practices.” (Lusthaus et al, p. 3). Each of the above explications of capacity building and capacity development is relevant to the present study. However, for the sake of simplicity, terms such as capacity building, capacity development, etc., when used in this study, refer to “training and educational activities that aim to build the management skills of staff or focus on organizational processes that are necessary to promote growth and demonstrate effectiveness (Sobeck, J. L., 2008, p. 50).” Capacity building activities may include, “operational funding, coaching strategies, peer networking, information and education sessions, technical assistance or technology (Sobeck, J. L., 2008, p. 50).”

Participants interviewed for this study identified *capacity building* as a key building block of or influential factor on organizational sustainability and effectiveness of local CSOs in Kenya. Over half of the participating organizations claimed to have received some form of capacity building intervention in the histories of their organizations. Most, if not all, of these capacity building interventions were, according to participants, implemented at the behest of an international NGO or an international donor agency. While, in general, participants agreed that the *capacity building* interventions that they had received did “improve their skills” and “help them achieve their objectives;” there was near unanimous agreement that the interventions ultimately had very little positive impact on their sustainability and effectiveness. In many cases, participants claimed that the capacity building interventions received had actually *harmed* or at least diminished their chances of long-term viability and success.
The CSO directors and OD professionals identified five reasons why they feel the capacity building interventions they have received have been ineffective and actually served to undermine their sustainability and effectiveness. These are:

1. **CB Delivery Paradigm.** The approach and modality of delivery of the capacity building interventions have often been inappropriate and ineffective.

2. **CB is a Journey, Process-Over-Time.** Effective CB takes time. It is a process, an iterative journey and not an event. Interventions have often taken the form of one-off ‘trainings.’

3. **CB and Internal Donor Dynamics, Approaches and their Consequences.** Participants claim that donor funded and/or implemented CB interventions have been based on a set of policies and approaches that CB recipients have found unsuccessful at building sustainable local CSOs.

4. **CB for Project Implementation, Not Organizational Development.** CB interventions have almost always been tied to funds CSOs receive to implement donor projects. The CB provided is, according to study participants, usually focused on enhancing the organization’s capabilities to effectively implement the donor’s project and not on the long-term viability and success (OS/OE) of the CSO itself.

5. **CB Leads to High Staff Turnover.** Study participants asserted that the capacity building interventions they have received have made it harder for them to retain good staff and actually encouraged unusually high levels of staff turnover.

Each of the issues that study participants identified above is explored in greater detail below.

**CB Delivery Paradigm.** Study participants noted that, from their perspectives, the paradigm within which most of the CB interventions are delivered is fundamentally flawed in several ways. First, participants claim that the CB interventions they have received or are familiar with have been almost always been top-down and donor rather than demand (receiving organization) driven. This has led to the receiving CSOs feeling little sense of ownership over the CB process or its intended outcomes. CSO directors, in particular, expressed frustration with capacity builders implementing interventions without first assessing CSO needs or identifying organizational priorities. Instead, participants claimed, capacity builders identify and respond to
organizational capacity gaps as they perceive them. The perspectives shared by a couple of CSO directors underscore this important point…

(P1) I didn’t have a very high opinion of some of these capacity buildings. I remember we had the capacity building something... I can’t remember exactly the details, but I felt they were coming to give us capacity without finding out. You can’t build my capacity by force. We need to agree... initially agree on what we are working on then that way I’ll be able to own the change that comes with that capacity building.

(P2) Most of those programs, when they are outside driven, they don’t take time to interview the recipients and find out what are the areas that they are struggling with. What are the areas that they are struggling with? The program is written up and funded before finding out the actual needs in the organizations. So there [are] lots times when that capacity goes to waste. They are built and the organization does not utilize it. I guess it has everything to do with the mismatch between what has been invested in and what the actual needs are… that mismatch between the two.

Several of the organizational development practitioners concurred with the directors – noting their own personal shortcomings as OD professionals as well as those of their international colleague-capacity builders…

[In] working with the organizations, I think, the other thing that we have done is to prescribe, you know a certain system, probably that is working in the western world, and say, these are the systems that should work in this organization. Some very grass root organization probably in West Pokot... We are just bringing and saying this is how we want you to work. We are not actually looking at what are their priorities, what do they want to see in their organization, you know... So they will not even appreciate the process. So they want you to do your project, implement, you are done, check. [Then,] they forget about you. Another 5 years comes, somebody else comes in with the same thing they have not done anything about it. It’s because we want to take them from here to here, prescribe a system that for them, is not really a need. So they just let you go ahead do it and they move on because they don’t appreciate... They don’t own it. It is a prescribed system coming from another area and probably that is not their main need.

The second flaw in the CB delivery paradigm, according to interviewees, is the capacity building they have received has been too generic and not specifically relevant to their individual organizations. Participants asserted that CB interventions should be more tailored and personalized for each recipient organization.
This kind of institutional strengthening comes in and sort of like wants all organizations to like be the same. There’s a standardized package of how things should be. So they want all organizations to like… be like this… to be the same… forgetting that here… there are a little of dynamics here and there. So, for me, it should be custom-made so-to-say… so tailor made to fit the needs of each and every organization. What is our weakness is not another organization’s weakness. So just focus on building us as an individual organization and focus on what we really need… not being standard or being like another organization, you get? Of course it’s good to have standards, but still, that individualized package that meets our needs and focuses on our weaknesses and try to—you know, that for me is what should be done differently.

Thirdly, participants claimed that the CB interventions they have received have been too theoretical and need to be more practical. Connected to this conclusion, participants also asserted that capacity building has been too ‘classroom-centric’ and should rely more on “hands on,” “on-the-job,” and “peer CSO to peer CSO” approaches.

(P1) I know there has been a lot of capacity building all through, but we have been doing so much of theoretical. I feel like we tend to do a lot of theoretical. We give you… this is the concept… this is how you do it but we don’t tell you this is the context you are working in. I think if you work it this way, this is what will happen. You know, making it customized to that place. So I think it’s the way we have been building the capacity of local organizations that has, I mean it has not been impactful.

(P2) So that one… [CB interventions] I noticed mostly, it’s done at classroom setup. Once that happens either you receive a certificate… you’re given and that’s all. But when you go down to the practicality of it, especially when you’re implementing programs, you need to be told how to connect with the end user who is the grass root community.

(P3) When we talk about capacity, every organization would like to do capacity to your organization. But now the question is: what capacity is this? Apart from books, apart from writing, apart from papers… Yes, I can have a finance officer; he has gone to school, he has been to that level of going to school; then you want to come and capacity build him on what? Capacity is not only in theory, theory kind of ideas, but how are you helping; how are you supporting that organization. Because you can do capacity for five years… You can do capacity for ten years if it’s helping… Yet you are not taking hand or being a lead in helping that organization to realize its capacity.

The fourth and final flaw that participants identified in the CB delivery paradigm is related to the nature/format of the teaching/training delivered as part of a CB intervention. Participants noted that most CB teaching/training has employed a traditional teacher-student approach where an
expert teacher’ informs the ‘uninformed, unknowledgeable student’ what he/she is supposed to do and how he/she is supposed to do it. Participants claimed that this approach is often viewed by recipients as condescending and one that has been largely ineffective, according to participants, at producing substantial change in levels of organizational sustainability and effectiveness. Participants believe “coaching” and “learning through discovery” would be more appropriate approaches to teaching/training for capacity building. Numerous participants shared perspectives similar to the three below…

(P1) Very often, it [CB] is even on-the-job training; it is more of a coaching, mentorship type of approach... Sometimes it is an exposure to someone else who has cracked what you are dealing with and you having the opportunity to sit with him spend time with him so that you are...maybe them mentoring you. First of all, it is relevant to me, it is based on where I am, and me moving now, and me defining it… driven by the person who needs help. So most programs are not designed like that.

(P2) When you coach somebody, they suddenly give you all the solutions. You know people are not allowed to really think through their own problems. We have been made to wait for someone to come and bring solutions. We have been trained to wait for the expert to come. Once you coach somebody… I have tried coaching a few people and I realize now… they do not want to hear anything from me… [they think to themselves.] I think I am going to handle this matter.

(P3) Capacity things should be more discovery-oriented... The people are discovering these issues. We have too much information that we bring and it really …...it just bounces off you know... It just bounces off... It is very intellectual, you know. If you are people who have gone to school we could relate to it. But majority of the people we work with they don’t, they haven’t gone to those... and ironically some of the most effective CSO’s in the rural areas are those very local.

According to the CSO directors and the organizational development professionals interviewed for this study, the flawed CB delivery paradigm as outlined above is one of several reasons why decades of ‘capacity building’ in Kenya and in similar countries in the Global South have failed to produce a robust community of thriving, sustainable and effective local CSOs. In their views, this flawed paradigm has contributed to Kenya continuing to score low on various measures that assess the strength of civil society and civil society organizations in particular. Johns Hopkins
University’s (JHU) Global Civil Society Index (GCSI) gave Kenyan civil society a score of 33 on a scale of 0-100 while the Netherlands, for example, scored 74/100 (JHU GCSI, Available: http://ccss.jhu.edu/publications-findings/?did=360).

**CB is a Journey, Process Over Time.** In addition to the more ‘mechanical’ flaws of capacity building delivery paradigm, participants strongly agreed that capacity building – if it is to be effective and transformative – requires time, repetition, extended investment. It is a journey; a complex process over time. Participants asserted, however, that capacity builders have viewed and approached capacity building more as an episodic event rather than a journey of fits and starts, ‘two steps forward and three steps back.’ In their views, capacity builders have been unwilling to invest sufficient amounts of time and resources into a level and type of capacity building that could facilitate the emergence of sustainable local organizations – choosing instead to focus on capacity building through training workshops, seminars, conferences and short-term consultancies.

(P1) I would say the first one is that… First of all they [the capacity builders] think it’s [CB] a silver bullet. After they come and do it, they expect the capacity will be built, which is a misnomer in the very sense of it. Capacity building is not an event. It takes long.

(P2) Commitment… Capacity building is a process. It is like dating, courtship, you know, it is a whole long thing. So if you are coming to do capacity building which most agencies… we don’t have that… the patience. Because it takes a lot of time and it is a soft skill.

(P3) I also tend to believe some of the trainings are very short – like maybe two, three days. So, people don’t really go deeply into some certain aspects – things like fundraising and financial management, which are very important for an organization. But [the capacity builders] just touch, just like tips on icebergs, and therefore when people go back to the organization they are still struggling and facing a lot of challenges, like what do we do?
CB and Internal Donor Dynamics, Approaches and their Consequences. Study participants also made strong claims that five specific policies, approaches or positions taken by most funders/implementers of capacity building interventions had significant negative impacts on CSO potential for sustainability and effectiveness. One participant described the first of these five ‘approaches,’ or ‘positions,’ etc. with these words, “I think, first and foremost from my experience, donors are paying lip service to capacity building. You say, you’re building capacity, but you are not addressing the real issue.” This individual echoed a widely held sentiment among participants that capacity builders were not sincere or genuine in their desires to build the capacities of local CSOs to be sustainable. If capacity builders were committed to building local organizational capacity, participants felt that they would invest in the core business processes and ‘infrastructure’ of the organization rather than channeling most of their resources to service delivery and project implementation with just a token amount allocated for capacity building. Two additional participants shared their perspectives regarding this ‘position’ they perceived donors taking regarding capacity building…

(P1) And then there was a struggle between compliance and [a] real capacity development agenda. So that if we have guys from USAID visiting an organization, the things that they get particularly more keen to see happening are how are you spending the money, the procurement, etc. As opposed to… how is your board happening, how are your systems, are your staff happy, what training have your staff undergone recently, how do they feel about the skills that they are getting, you know such like…, so that as they look more as a policing thing.

(P2) To me, what I think is the most important factor is that most of the partners who are donors act in their own interests and not in the interests of the organizations that they are supporting. [They do not] include in their funding package an element of sustainability in terms of actually helping the organization’s future when the funders are not there. That is actually very, very critical, because you find a partner coming in and supporting an activity for a period of five years and you ask them for funding to actually support the organization in one way or another for the future sustainability of the organization, and even if there are funds left you’ll find you have to return the funds back to the partner, which actually leaves the organization even worse than it had been before.
The second position that donors often adopt in their delivery of capacity building preventions, and which participants find to be ultimately detrimental to OS/OE, is donors usually do not provide training in resource mobilization. “(P1) What has not worked well is the area of resource mobilization and ensuring that really the organization is properly sustainable, financially sustainable.” “(P2) “We’ve been capacity build, but we’ve not been capacity built in mobilizing local resources.”

The third donor approach that negatively impacts local CSO sustainability was described simply as each donor/capacity builder having different priorities, approaches and standards in the way they define ‘capacity building,’ ‘sustainability,’ ‘capacity,’ etc. as well as the way they assess organizational progress toward realizing these constructs. Participants described how some capacity builders would rate their organizations as high performing in certain areas while other capacity builders would rate them as low performing in the same domains.

(P1) I can tell you for sure, if you have like three organizations doing capacity to one organization… their mode of capacity building is different and strengthening is different. Let’s say, for example, I will come and do you a capacity building on leadership or governance. The way my governance and leadership skill is, is different from another organization. So when another organization comes to assess that organization [to identify] where they have capacity, according to them; they are not at par.

(P2) And what happens is that you will come up with this improvement plan – they have 1000 of them. Donor X has his. The other one has… so they never consolidate these plans. It is because… sometimes it is difficult because… donors also want to be… they are selfish. So they want their own plan. They will come and monitor their plan. The organization doesn’t see this as an institutional plan. They see it as a PACT plan, an Aga Khan Foundation plan. So you come and unleash your plan… So lets check. What have we done? Yah, we have done this, you know, we tick, and we are good. You go and report that you have trained my finance person.

The CSO directors and OD professionals interviewed reported that, in their experience, donors and capacity builders generally do not provide funding to implement or follow-through on capacity development the local CSOs have received. This lack of funding to implement/follow-
through is the fourth position donors take that hinders the OS/OE of local CSOs. Essentially, participants expressed frustration that donors/capacity builders would often build organizational capability and strength but not provide funding to the organization to be able to ‘do anything’ with their newly acquired capacities. While it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for an external entity to assess the motivations/intentions behind a statement an individual makes, some participants seemed to express this frustration out of a broad, self-interested desire for more funding for their organizations. Others, however, were more specific about the need for targeted funding so that the outputs of a capacity building process could actually be implemented by the recipient organization in order to strengthen its OS/OE.

(P1) The disconnect is sometimes identified when there is no financial support to actually enable that particular organization, whose capacity has been built, to actually be able to develop the sustainability plan, because the sustainability plan also needs to be supported in one way or another.

(P2) Yes, give us all the policies, give us all the systems and no money. So what do we do with those policies and systems without money that keeps the organization moving, money to fund our programs, and core funding for the organization? (P2 quoting one of his/her fellow CSO directors who is also an OD professional.)

The fifth and final approach that donors employ in their capacity building interventions, that participants viewed as detrimental to organizational sustainability, is the unwillingness of donors to provide ‘core funding’ – i.e., funding to cover and organization’s core administrative/operating expenses such as office rent, utilities, salaries, etc. Participants stated that the lack of funding to cover their core expenses is perhaps the greatest challenge to building sustainable and effective local organizations.

(P1) Now what donors tell us is that they don’t even want to pay our core functions. Even my salaries, sometimes is a problem. So if every donor wants to pay 5% of my time, we need twenty projects, you know, to pay my full salary. And that’s not only me… with my other core funding… like HR, finance manager, you know, those guys who have to be there whether there is donor funding or not.
Yes, somebody pays for the activities. We’re seeing a lot of donors wanting to pay for the activities. Of course that works to our disadvantage a lot of times, but sometimes that’s what you work with, just to sustain yourselves because you still need to run your programs. So, in fact, that has been one of our biggest challenges, whereby you don’t get any core funding, but your activities go on, and they keep happening, but there is no direct money coming to you.

And also in terms of investing or supporting an organization to invest in sustaining its own core business. That has been an area that no donor would want to… most times they would not build your capacity towards let’s say giving you a seed fund for example. There was a time I was having a discussion with Elton John AIDS foundation, where I was exploring with them that if you have some huge resource that you want to invest in an organization like [ours] to run for the next five years, and the money is available, can [we] discuss with you that you do an upfront funding for the whole five years? [We] pump that money into some… either structure… infrastructure… and co-manage it. Then… now what comes out of that is then what we run programs with. So we will be able to meet our monthly, quarterly, annual targets. But, at the end of the day, after five years, we can say; you don’t need to fund us again. We’ll continue running our programs. Most donors would not look at it in that perspective. But to me, that’s another way of looking at issues around capacity building of institutions.

According to the CSO directors and organizational development professionals interviewed for this study, 1) donors paying “lip serve” to capacity building; 2) donor capacity building not including training on resource mobilization; 3) different donors/capacity builders employing different definitions of, approaches to capacity and capacity building; 4) donors not funding follow-on activities to capacity building interventions; and 5) donors not funding core operating expenses are five characteristics of a general approach to capacity building among donors/capacity builders that study participants have experienced or observed. These five positions, approaches, etc. have, according to participants, created a challenging context for building sustainable and effective organizations in Kenya.

**CB for Project Implementation, Not for Organizational Development.** Closely tied to the ‘projectized approach to development’ previously discussed is a trend participants have experienced and observed of donors specifically linking their capacity building interventions to
the projects and services that each specific donor is funding. Study participants explained how capacity building linked to project implementation often works in Kenya and how this approach to capacity building ultimately has very little impact, from their perspectives, on the long-term success and viability of the local CSO.

(P1) So the investment has been project based, it has been not oriented in to the organization.

(P2) In terms of building local sustainability through capacity building I think there has been a lot of hype around it. Sometimes the approaches have left organizations more vulnerable than really even prior... because you find that most of the models are around projects.

(P3) I mean for a certain – what has not worked quite well – is organizations want to build your capacity either in program delivery, in skills... but they tend not to do much in terms of capacity building for sustainability... capacity building to support long term sustainability especially of the core of the organization.

(P4) They [the donors/capacity builders] tend to be inclined to offering tools that are just for their purpose. So that they offer - they already come with prescribed formats that they want you to abide by. This might be beneficial for that particular project but it might not work out for other projects. Or it might not relate to the organizations financial requirements and needs beyond that project.

It seems clear that in the minds of study participants, donors have worked to build the capacities of local CSOs to implement the projects designed and funded by the donors but have made relatively little direct investment in enabling the organization itself to exist as a sustainable and impactful organization that is ‘something more’ than just a group of projects in various stages of execution. While concurring with the perspectives illustrated by the four narratives above, some participants added, however, that CSOs will often eagerly accept donor contributions linked to capacity building but have no intention or serious commitment to the capacity building received actually resulting in positive organizational change.

A lot of the capacity development... This is how it works... We are going to get a grant from CIDA [Canadian International Development Agency]. So, they tell you our grant policy says we must invest in your organization as part of the grant that we are giving
you. So, above and on top of this money we are giving you, we want to give you money to develop your organization. What are your needs? So civil society organizations are smart. They want the grant more than the institutional development that is just a fact. They want the grant. And so this is just another additional thing I need to do to access the grant. So you write up this, you know, training of project management, staff training on institutional development… You know, give us computers and laptops… If you are lucky, give us a car… Depending on the size of what they have given you… you do this thing… but it is ad hoc, it is broken, it is not strategic.

So, while study participants overwhelmingly placed ‘blame’ on donors/capacity builders for an approach to organizational capacity building they viewed as wholly ineffective; a number acknowledged the contributory role CSOs often play in undermining their own chances of long term sustainability by not taking advantage of the opportunities afforded them by the capacity building they receive.

**CB Leads to High Staff Turnover.** The fifth and final reason study participants feel that capacity building interventions, which target local CSOs in Kenya, have been ineffective and actually served to undermine sustainability and effectiveness is the **likely unintended** consequence of facilitating unusually high staff turnover within the recipient CSOs. The CSO directors interviewed explained that they are eager for the capabilities of their organizations to be strengthened and they are particularly enthusiastic for their staff members to receive training. This enthusiasm stems from the directors’ expectations that newly trained staff will become a more valuable to asset to the organization and its programming. Instead, participants explained, newly trained staff members with their newly acquired skills become more marketable, can demand higher salaries, and so often leave the organization through which they were trained as soon as a more lucrative opportunity avails itself.

(P1) And another factor is that within the funding period you find staff trained by the partner organization and after their training and their capacity – or the capacity of the organization – which have been built; you find the people who have been trained actually getting opportunities of greener pastures elsewhere in other organizations and probably
those international organizations. [This] again creates a bigger gap and a bigger problem because these are trained personnel who [could have been] able to support the organization further, but because there is no funding, then they’ll go where the funding is.

(P2) When organizations come to train or come to improve an organization, not many organizations look at the organization itself. Very many people, very many people will look at the staff. They would want to train [this one], they would want to train [that one], they would want to train the other guy, you know. They want to improve the skills of the accountant; they want to improve the skills of the program coordinator, okay? So what happens, when [I am] trained and I’m doing very good and [this organization] is doing very good and SIDA is actually looking at the reports I’m writing to them? Some guy walks to me from SIDA and tells me, “You know you’re getting X shillings in terms of your salary, what if we offered you Y?” Yes, [I am] not born of Farm Practice. I am going to go.

In addition to capacity building leading to more marketable staff, which, in turn, leads to high turnover, participants explained how both the ‘projectized approach to development’ and ‘the linkage of capacity building to project implementation’ also contributes to high staff turnover – as discussed earlier in the chapter. Participants described how funding tied to a specific project allows recipient organizations to hire the staff necessary to implement that specific project. The majority of CSO staff members are, therefore, project-funded staff. When the project ends and/or project funding ceases for other reasons, the organization most often has to lay off the individual/s it hired. Even in instances where an individual’s salary is covered by percentages drawn from multiple projects; the loss of just one of those funding streams could put the person’s job in jeopardy.

It is there, actually, and 90% of organizations in Kenya get [experience] that. This is because of maybe like projects. If you are doing a project for 3 years, and then there is no other funding, and there is no sustainability to keep that skill within that organization, so you have to let that somebody go. Generally, it’s about the fundings that are limited, that are not long term, yes, and that’s why we have a lot of turnover.

Study participants also highlighted what they described as a weakness within CSOs to institutionalize the new skills/capacities their staff members acquire so that when the staff
member leaves the organization sufficient knowledge is retained so the organization is not unnecessarily negatively impacted.

(P1) They left, they moved on to other things and they didn’t care to pass it down. So may be [the] thing is that we have not institutionalized… made sure that we pass it down… that there is a process by which organizations that have particular skills or capacities at this point in time are actually being able to transfer them to the next generation of leadership.

(P2) Sometimes an organization will score highly today [re: level of capacity/OS/OE], two years down the line you go and they are back to square one. You know to zero, because probably the person who was there… the finance person or something left… no institutional memory… nothing was learnt so they are back to square zero.

(P3) There is a lot of turnover of staff. So the people you assessed five years ago… the people you built the capacity of 5 years ago have probably already moved. These are a new generation of people in that institution. So they probably don’t have the same kind of knowledge.

In sum, the CSO directors and organizational development professionals interviewed for this study do think the capacity building interventions their organizations have received, or CB efforts they are familiar with, have strengthened local organizations and enhanced certain organizational capabilities to some extent. However, participants were in near unanimous agreement that capacity building, as implemented in Kenya, had done little to advance the sustainability and effective of local organizations for five reasons:

1. The modality of CB deliver has been inappropriate and ineffective for the Kenyan context.
2. CB has been conceptualized as an ‘event’ or a time-bound intervention rather than a process or journey over time.
3. A set of approaches, positions, etc. adopted by donors in their implementation of CB has contributed to its lack of success at building sustainable local CSOs.
4. Donor provided CB has focused on building capacity for project implementation and not organizational development.
5. CB interventions have made it harder to retain good staff and encouraged high staff turnover.
5.2 Conclusion
The 54 CSO directors and 20 organizational development professionals identified a number of influential factors, essential components and/or building blocks that work to impact – even determine – chances of a local CSO in Kenya becoming a sustainable and effective organization in the long-term. These factors are a combination of what participants perceive to be general elements of sustainability/effectiveness with some potentially unique contextual application and several factors distinct to the Kenyan context – in the minds of study participants. While the interplay of these factors is complex, it is hopefully clear how these factors both impact CSO sustainability/effectiveness directly and through their relationships with other context-specific factors. In a subsequent chapter, elements identified here as well as others addressed later will be used to theorize conceptualizations organizational sustainability and effectiveness in Kenya. Scholars and practitioners in national and community settings similar to Kenya may be able to draw useful implications from this conceptualization in their own work and practice.
Chapter 6: Research Question 2

How do the directors of local civil society organizations and organizational development professionals perceive the role of local fundraising/community philanthropy in the sustainability/effectiveness of CSOs in Kenya:

a) Have Kenyan CSOs engaged in local fundraising/community philanthropy? If so, what fundraising activities have they pursued?
b) How successful have their efforts been?
c) What challenges have they faced?
d) What do they think local CSOs can do to promote/encourage more local giving and what are their future local fundraising plans?

6.1 Summary of General Views on Local Fundraising

Nearly all respondents – both CSO directors and organizational professionals – expressed mixed or conflicted views about local fundraising and the potential for local fundraising to enhance organizational sustainability and effectiveness in Kenya. On the one hand, respondents think that local fundraising could ‘work’ to a certain extent. They believe that a fervent focus by local CSOs on local fundraising could eventually succeed at reducing dependency on unreliable external funding and increasing the likelihood of their organizations’ long-term viability and impact. Respondents could identify a variety of ‘success stories’ where Kenyan organizations – often backed by prominent local personalities – had been surprisingly successful at raising money from local sources to fund a particular social cause or a greatly publicized emergency need. A number of CSO directors also shared their own experiences of successful ‘more grassroots’ local fundraising efforts. Beyond that, successful or otherwise, many participants emphasized the urgent need for local CSOs to focus more effort and energy on at least trying to mobilize resources locally to make up for, what respondents perceived, as rapidly shrinking international donor monies.

However, on the other hand, nearly all respondents expressed a good deal of skepticism about the value of local fundraising, the ultimate value of their ‘return on investment’ in local
fundraising, and, ultimately, the degree of impact it might have on OS/OE. Reasons for this skepticism will be addressed later in this chapter. When expressing their ‘beliefs’ and ‘hopefulness’ that local fundraising could be successful and positively impact organizational development in Kenya, study participants often qualified their statements in a variety of ways. Numerous respondents agreed with one participant who said that local fundraising could work but only by, “supplementing not sustaining an organization.” Many of the ‘questions’ and ‘doubts,’ participants expressed, echo many of the points made in the preceding chapter regarding context-specific factors that hamper the prospects of Kenyan CSOs becoming sustainable and effective in the long-term.

One of the CSO directors interviewed for this study shared the following perspective that captures both the positive belief regarding local fundraising as well as the skepticism. While his/her views are a little more positive than many respondents, this individual portrays, in this one narrative, many if not all of the primary views participants expressed regarding the challenges CSOs face trying to raise funds for their activities and services from within Kenya. After expressing his/her perspective that local fundraising could be successful and could enhance OS/OE, he/she added these comments…

That said though, it’s going to take time. At the moment, if you look at say, a lot of the campaigns – I would put aside Kenya for Kenyans because that was unique. If you look at the others, it’s mostly been an urban affair. It’s mostly been people on Twitter, Facebook, which are really people in Nairobi and Mombasa and Kisumu. We haven’t really gotten to the point where your local farmer in Uasin Gishu is sending 200 shillings in MPESA. We haven’t gotten there yet. That’s where you find that mentality of, “NGOs give us money.” So, it will take time for that to change but I think once it does, once that changes, it’s going to unlock… it might even change the whole funding model of CSOs… At the moment the model is – you write to USAID; you get money; you report; the whole process has very little to do with the actual beneficiary. But at this point when I say, I’m raising money from [an individual] to start a library in [that person’s] village, the whole thing around accountability and impact changes. Because [then] it’s not just a report… yes, I will give a report, I will put the statistics online, but
[this person] still gets to go to the village and see whether that’s functioning. And I think that will change the dynamics of how projects are executed, how projects are reported on, and even what kinds of projects are fundraised for. Because you find that a lot of the things that organizations do are not necessarily what the community wants to do. And if you then have a situation where the beneficiary community is the one that is contributing, then you’ve moved closer to a corporate model where the market demands what it wants.

6.2 Current and Past Experience in Local Fundraising Among Study Participants

Forty-six (46) out of the total of 54 CSOs that participated in this study reported that they were engaged in some form of local fundraising effort/activity at the time of their participation in the study; or they had, at one or more points in the past, engaged in some form of local fundraising effort/activity. As a result of their current and past fundraising efforts, 26 or approximately half of the participating CSOs reported having received cash contributions. Thirteen (13) of the organizations reported that they had received in-kind contributions. Four (4) of the CSOs interviewed reported receiving the donated services of individual volunteers. A significant majority of CSO fundraising initiatives or events fell in one or more of the following 5 broad categories:

1. **Income Generation.** Fundraising through income generation or income generating activities (IGAs) includes a variety of activities that all involve CSOs selling a product or service for profit and then investing the profit in the social services/development initiatives administered by the CSO.

2. **Proposals & Formal Appeals.** Proposals and formal appeals involve submitting formal written requests to local funding agencies such as local grant-making philanthropic foundations and the corporate social responsibility departments of various local for-profit corporations. This is done both through CSOs responding to ‘requests for proposals/applications’ (RFPs or RFAs) published by the donor agencies or through unsolicited requests submitted to the donors by the requesting CSOs.

3. **Traditional Fundraising Activities.** Fundraising activities in this category include raffles, sponsored runs/walks, fundraising dinners, and other activities that are thought of as the ‘traditional’ fundraising activities of many nonprofit agencies in North America.
4. **Social Media/Internet.** Fundraising through social media, to date, has been limited primarily to CSOs using social media outlets – particularly WhatsApp, Facebook and Twitter – to publicize a need and raise awareness for a need, cause, concern, etc. A significant majority of organizations did not use the Internet or social media based technologies to receive cash contributions via ‘Donate Here’ or other types of embedded services.

5. **Word-of-Mouth (WOM)/Individual Asks.** WOM and individual asks involved CSO directors, board members and other stakeholders soliciting contributions from their personal and professional networks. This was most often done through person-to-person conversation, phone calls, email and letters.

Income generation/income generating activities was the most widely used approach to local fundraising among the group of CSOs interviewed for this study. Proposals and formal appeals as well as traditional fundraising activities tied as the 2\textsuperscript{nd} most widely used approach. CSOs engaged in the next 2 categories of fundraising activities in the order in which they are listed above – social media followed by WOM. Additional details regarding the specific experiences participating CSOs had pursuing each of the 5 types of fundraising activities and illustrative examples are outlined in the pages that follow.

**Income Generation.** The approach most widely used, among the 54 CSOs interviewed for this study, is some form of income generation or income generation activities (IGAs). Twenty-seven (27) of the participating organizations reported that they were or had at one point engaged in income generation/IGAs. Twenty-one (21) of the 27 CSOs reported that 0\% to 30\% of their annual incomes were sourced locally (within Kenyan). The average amount of ‘local income’ among these organizations at the time of data collection was 16\% of total income while median ‘local income’ was 20\% of their total organizational incomes. Six (6) of the 27 organizations claimed that the percentage of their total annual incomes obtained from local sources was 50\%, 66\%, 80\%, 85\%, 100\% and 100\% respectively. The specific percentages of locally sourced
income that could be directly attributed to income generation/IGAs was not investigated. A significant majority of CSOs engaged in income generation described their IGAs as successful. However, whether this ‘success’ was based on revenue generation or actual profit is unclear. A deeper investigation into the business acumen of CSOs engaged in small enterprise and whether distinctions were made between ‘revenue’ and ‘profit’ was beyond the scope of this study.

CSOs engaged in various forms of income generation/IGAs. However, a significant majority of their revenue producing activities, at the time of data collection through in depth interviews, fell within one or more of the following categories – in order of most widely to least widely used:

1. Fees for core services
2. Sale of handicrafts; sale of agricultural products
3. Consultancies and training workshops/seminars
4. Rental of event equipment – chairs, tables, tents, public address systems, etc.
5. Membership dues

Organizations that operated schools or provided services like voluntary counseling and testing (VCT) for HIV/AIDs reported that they often charge fees for their services. These fees are usually minimal and offered on an income-based sliding scale where the poorest households are provided the services for free while wealthier households are charged fees based on individual or household income. “Now we run this place [a school] up to 73% is from local income – from parents who can pay the full fee and from parents who can pay only partial or no fee at all. And this total collection covers our 73% of running costs. The deficit therefore… the 27% is funded by my colleagues in [Europe].”

Numerous organizations – especially membership-based organizations – engaged in various forms of commercial enterprise most often around the sale of either handicrafts or agricultural products. One of the CSO directors, for example, uses his/her artistic abilities and his
organization’s outreach activities to local schools to generate some income for his organization, which the organization then reinvests in the schools it serves.

If I touch about talents… also in the schools we are going… I teach art. I had said earlier I am a professional in art. So in the schools we are going we start art craft, you know, the art craft and music. So when we go and create art craft we try to develop a project, which will generate money. Right now we have card making projects. Every art craft child must make two cards, then those cards we sell to our members to promote or to generate money instead of borrowing money from our members. So we are able to buy our own materials… to buy books for those needy children and through that project we can say that we are generating money and if we are supported we can do more, we can reach different schools. So far the schools, which we have already visited are around fifteen schools so far and they are making cards.

Another organization made an attempt to grow and sell vegetables. When that did not succeed, they purchased goats with the intention of selling milk at a profit and reinvesting the profits in organizational programs and services. “We bought a greenhouse several years ago which was producing vegetables, onions, tomatoes for sale. But with time it’s worn out. It’s worn out now. And then we also bought some goats to produce milk.”

A group of CSOs described using their accumulated in-house experience and expertise in various areas of social service and development to train other organizations and interested parties. These training workshops or consultancies were provided for set fees usually adjusted in some way according to the recipient organization or student’s ability to pay. One organization that focuses on developing entrepreneurial skills among disadvantaged youth shared that in addition to its core programming, it operates, “…two social entrepreneurs institutes, whereby money that is coming from those institutions, they go towards supporting our projects. Most of the students that are being trained there, they are graduates of our program, so we just charge them at a very minimal charges. But again, other people from outside and the community, who get in to get those services… they pay.” Another organization reported,
So we try to be creative. We’ve tried to do consultancies here and there – although that is once in a while. We say this is what we work with… If we can offer you this service—especially we send our resource persons… When there are issues to do with [the area of work we specialize in] [redacted to prevent organizational identification], because we have people within the organization who have been trained on that. So when there’s an organization that wants trainers, we send our own trainers. So we do that, yes.

Numerous organizations interviewed reported purchasing ‘event-related’ supplies and equipment such as party tents, tables, chairs, public address systems, etc. that they would rent-out to private individuals/parties at market-based rates. However, several of the organizations that chose to engage in this particular enterprise reported similar experiences to this one…

We bought tents and chairs for renting out, but they are now worn out, yes. Most of them are broken and the chairs are broken. They were plastic chairs and those tents have holes. So other people have come in with new tents, which people prefer than hiring ours, which are old.

Nearly all of the organizations interviewed that described themselves as membership-based organizations (i.e., associations of persons living with HIV/AIDS, youth groups, women’s groups, various disability-focused organizations, etc.) reported collecting dues from their members as one means of generating local income. However, nearly all of these dues-collecting organizations noted that the fees they charged were minimal and insignificant. Additionally, the CSOs reported that most of their members were in arrears in their dues payments.

There is a membership fee but unfortunately most of the members don’t renew their membership fee. Some believe that once I’ve paid like one time that should serve the lifetime, yes. But we are trying to change the perceptions of our members, yes, to start thinking in the sense that the organization is ours, we own the organization, so we need to give in much more than just membership.

In addition to the 5 basic income generating activities pursued by a majority of the 27 CSOs that reported income generation as a chosen means of obtaining local revenue, 3-4 organizations reported that they had pursued real-estate investment and/or various forms of investment in financial markets as means of local income generation. A couple of the CSOs reported…
We recently invested in a conference facility… Though it is [in the] form of a loan… a bank financing us. For the moment, the income from there is mainly servicing the loan, but our long term expectation is that once we are done with that then the income from that should be able to support our program.

We have an endowment fund, where we get interest. It was given by an international organization. So it’s in the bank, you can’t get it, you only get interest from that fund.

**Proposals & Formal Appeals.** As noted above, 26 of the 54 CSOs interviewed for this study reported that they had submitted proposals or made formal written appeals to local ‘donor agencies’ agencies as one of their local fundraising strategies. Most of these ‘donor agencies’ are corporate social responsibility divisions or foundations related to for-profit companies operating in Kenya. Eleven of the 26 organizations reported that their appeals had been successful. Ten of the 11 successful organizations received cash contributions while one organization received in-kind use of Serena Hotel facilities for one of the organization’s events. Participating CSOs reported making appeals to Kenyan corporations or affiliates of international corporations operating in Kenya that include,

- Barclays Bank
- Chandaria
- Delmonte
- EcoBank
- Equity Bank
- Kenya Commercial Bank Foundation
- LG
- Naivas Supermarket
- Safaricom
- Safaricom Foundation
- SuperLoaf Bread Company
- Unilever
- Various unnamed mining companies on the Kenyan coast
- Zuku Corporation

A couple of the CSOs that had made successful appeals to corporate donors expressed frustration that corporate engagement with their organizations, although initially successful, was a one-time event. The corporate donors were not interested in developing a long-term ‘relationship’ with the CSOs or making multiple investments in the CSOs’ activities.

I want to believe I gave a nice report out of this. I documented and told them, “Thank you so much.” I submitted a letter to appreciate this, but that was it. That was the end of it. As much as I would really want to continue giving them a report, I would
want to continue building the relationship. Actually I would even want one of them to sit in my board. But you find there is a dis-link, “Charles we supported you in 2012, or 2013, that’s it. We are not allowed to support on organization throughout the five years.

(P2) We’ve also done a bit of CSR – Corporate Social Responsibilities – with the banks. We did one with one with Cooperative Bank. We got also support from EcoBank, and also once, I think, we did get support from Unilever, but those are one-off.

In general, a number of organizations interviewed for the study expressed similar concerns. While CSO appeals may, on occasion, be successful, participants were skeptical that local corporations or local outlets of international corporations could be relied on as long-term partners engaged in development/social service delivery hand-in-hand with the implementing CSOs. One of the OD experts agreed with the directors… “The only challenge I have is this is not a sustainable source of funding. These are fundings that are given to you once or twice; and you cannot rely on them.” This sentiment, however, may also be due to CSOs inaccurately applying the same donor-recipient relational paradigm they have experienced with official bilateral and multilateral donor agencies to these ‘new’ relationships they are trying to develop with corporate donors.

One CSO, that operated a school and provided other educational services, shared of an interesting public-private partnership that it had benefited from. The Zuku Corporation – one of Kenya’s major internet and satellite TV service providers – “and the county government went into a pilot project, looking at 250 schools that [could] be connected free of charge. They did a very thorough interview and we qualified. Many, many schools, including public schools did not qualify and we did for whatever reason. So that is one thing that we have. And we are using that to ride on that to go to that level.” Numerous other organizations expressed their beliefs that, with political devolution and the creation of county governments in Kenya, these new governments have vast quantities of resources that local CSOs can tap into. Not many study
participants, other than the one mentioned here, described situations where they had applied for and successfully obtained – in one way or the other – county-level funding for their activities.

Several of the CSOs, that had tried to raise funds from local corporate sources but were unsuccessful, attributed their lack of success to their own lack of capacity or specific experience/skill in relating to corporate donors.

(P1) We’ve done that, but is has not worked well for us. We’ve tried that but honestly it hasn’t worked for us. Yes, yes, it never worked. Because I believe also—I think sort of like, it’s also the issue of capacity. I think that’s one area that we will need a little bit of capacity on that, on how to fundraise locally, because I’m sure there’s what local donors are looking for.

(P2) I understand Safaricom has been useful in supporting some of the local initiatives. Other corporations that help… like of course private sector are… if we are given a list of them, especially those which are resourceful we can try… because I write proposals. So if we are given a list we can give them a trial and see if they can help. We don’t know exactly who to approach, because sometimes when you go to internet you need to follow a certain procedures in order to reach out to some of these people, so we need actually to be educated on how to reach out to some of the local private sector organizations.

Numerous study participants expressed skepticism at the motivations and objectives of corporations that contribute philanthropic sums to local development/social service organizations. One CSO director “believes there’s a catch to it…” Another director said, “Safaricom has nothing to gain from that [its sexual abstinence and delayed pregnancy activity that it was seeking funding for at the time], therefore, would not give us money unless, you know, unless we are splashing its colors all over the world.” Others concurred, noting that corporate donors would only ‘give’ if there was something ‘in it for them’ or something for their companies to gain. Several of the OD experts, and a couple of the CSO directors, interviewed for the study, noted that one of the primary weaknesses they identify in CSO fundraising efforts directed toward local corporate outlets is, what could be described as a nonprofit/social service mindset that is reluctant to acknowledge and accept that corporations give with, at best, dual
motives – a) giving for public good or benefit and b) increasing corporate profit through positive social marketing. Organizational development experts claimed that CSOs need to learn to market their programs in such a way that incentivizes local corporate outlets to contribute. Corporations need to see that their contribution to the local CSO will both advance development and ultimately boost the corporate bottom-line.

(P1)-OD Expert) …With private sector, I insist the nonprofits must look for win-win relationships that go beyond you giving me money. What can you bring on the table to the company that they will run with you for the next 10 years because they know this thing is going to make them money or make a difference for them?

(P2-OD Expert) And companies are increasingly looking at social things as an area for growth. So there is such a potential for win-win relationships if there was just a little more creativity on the side of civil society organizations.

(P3-CSO Director) And I think the kinds of issues we’re presenting to them are probably not giving them the kind visibility or returns on investment that they would imagine that they could get. So we want to do a family planning program in the coastal region and we want [a corporate] to fund it. And they probably don’t see what that would help them with. But it could also be the way we structure our appeals, the way we formulate our application. We are from the NGO world, so we may just be thinking NGO and they think differently. So we need to think about how corporates think about the work we’re doing, and how do they think we should approach them.

**Traditional Fundraising Activities.** Due to the sensitivity of ‘income’ and other financially oriented questions, the current study did not explore issues of organizational income in great depth. Nonetheless, limited income data were obtained for just over 50% (29 organizations) of the CSO participants. Of that number a significant majority reported that the percentage of their annual operating budgets derived from local sources is between 15% and 30% per year. A significant majority of local income raised is from income generating activities (as previously discussed) and donations from local corporate outlets with just very minimal amounts coming from what could be described as ‘traditional community-oriented fundraising activities.’
Twenty-six of the 54 CSOs interviewed stated that they had engaged in traditional fundraising activities. Most often, chosen activities were fundraising dinners and fundraising walks/runs.

(P1) Like right now we are doing a barbeque fundraiser. So we will have kind of like fun stuff that we do to raise money through that… and then also through those activities we also get new donors to register and say we want to give on a regular basis. So mainly we have either that or have evening events; we dug into anything depending on the season. We would have like community nights, we set kind of dinners in our home, we just raise money in many different forms and also, because we depend again on our networks, our friends and family people who we kind of know who would be able to raise funds.

(P2) We did dinners… several dinners and a walk. Yes, we’ve done dinners and a walk, and so we’ve had many people, many corporates and individuals, a dinner table being 2,500, or 3,000. Or a corporate table going for like… depending and we gave some incentives… we will put you in our annual report, we will do this, we will do this, we had some incentives. And then we put in also media profile. Kenyans need a media profile, you know. Like when they see that thing, or they see, “now they are on television about the dinner they talked about, I saw the letter,” they begin to respond, yes. So they need… We did it for a couple of years, and then the need has changed.

Frequently, CSOs that attempted to raise funds through dinners and/or runs/walks did so by selling individual tickets to the dinner or getting corporations to purchase whole tables for their staffs and/or stakeholders. CSOs also often asked various hoteliers and restaurateurs to provide venues and other in-kind donations and services to support their fundraising dinners. Walks and runs typically generate revenue for the organizations that engage in them through participants buying T-shirts and other small-scale marketing products on the day of the event. “We’ve done like fundraising walks whereby we’ve sold t-shirts, pens, bracelets and all that, to raise money.” None of the organizations that operate walks/runs reported charging participating walkers/runners a fee or asked participants to recruit sponsors for each kilometer/mile he/she walked or ran in the event.

While dinners and walks/runs were, by far, the most common fundraising activities employed among those CSOs that do engage in traditional fundraising activities; several organizations
described interesting and somewhat more innovative – relative to the group of interviewed CSOs – activities or events that they have implemented that have been, according to participants, pretty successful. For example, one organization – dedicated to community development and advancing the rights of one of Kenya’s minority ethnic groups – has held a series of “cultural” or “festival days” designed to educate other Kenyan groups about this particular community’s culture and history. During the events, members of the minority community sell arts and crafts they have made and perform traditional dances and folk songs. This organization is a membership-based organization so portions of the revenue generated at the events is given to the organization. The director of this particular CSO reported that these events – whose costs were initially born by the CSO itself – have been so successful that local community members have become enthusiastic about the festival days and have begun investing their own resources to make sure the events continue. “Because the others say, ‘next time I will give one of my bulls to be slaughtered during the cultural day.’ Another one says, ‘no, I will give…’ Some of the members, like last time, somebody gave 20 crates of soda, coca cola and the rest… 20 crates is quite some money. So we get things done by the community even if we get external support.” In addition to getting community investment in the event, and raising money by selling traditional arts and crafts; this ethnic membership organization also seeks corporate and other philanthropic donors, including larger NGOs, to ‘sponsor’ its cultural days.

Another CSO reported some fundraising success placing a ‘fundraising tin’ at the tills (check-out lines) of a local supermarket. “We also tried something that is also working. Somehow it has worked… You know those donations tins, in the supermarkets that you see…? Yes, we did it but with one supermarket. We’ve done it but with only one supermarket. We didn’t raise much, let’s say about 10,000 every month, yes.” A third CSO has been successful on at least two
occasions at getting a local car dealership to donate a vehicle for a raffle prize. The dealership agreed that the CSO could keep a portion of the raffle ticket sales but required that a minimum amount be returned to the dealership.

(P1) Yes, organizing raffles and just teaming with a local company and telling them, yes we are a charity organization and this what we are doing… If you give us a space… if you give us one of your cars or whatever… We can put it somewhere in a particular center, perhaps Sarit Center or Yaya Center and then we put our individuals there, just to make sure that they sell your car at a particular price. Then, based on the agreement that you have with the car company, you get some bit of money that goes to supporting your project. We’ve done it like twice, it’s a new thing that we just started, and we’ve just done it like twice.

While nearly 75% of the 26 CSOs that reported engaging in traditional community-oriented fundraising activities were successful at raising some amount of revenue, most did not make a profit and many actually took a loss – meaning, the amount the organization spent to carry-out the fundraising activity was actually greater than the amount the activity raised. Other times, the activity managed to generate some profit but not nearly the amount expected or desired. On numerous occasions the manner in which many participating CSOs appeared to calculate total cost and total profit of a fundraising effort was incomplete. On several occasions, for example, the investigative team concluded an interview wondering if the CSO had accurately costed-out all of the inputs the organization actually made to implement a fundraising activity – i.e.,:

percentage of staff time spent on fundraising or monetary-value of an in-kind input, etc.

(P1) All the times that we have done a fundraiser, it has given us a profit which might be minimum, maybe like between 25% to 50% of our expectations, of our goal.

(P2) Yes, we tried dinners… it never worked. We went at a loss. After people eating, what we got didn’t even give us back what we put.

(P3) We used to do a lot of that especially the dinners and the fundraising events and they were not cost effective. You would use more than the money than you would get. Many organizations are no longer doing that.
While just over half of the CSOs interviewed for this study reported carrying-out various forms of traditional community-oriented activities and well over half of that number have been successful at raising revenue through these means, most often these efforts are not cost effective and do little to sustain an organization for the long-term. However, the data indicate these kinds of fundraising activities do earn some income and could therefore be part of a more holistic package of efforts a CSO could implement in Kenya to increase the percentage of its income raised locally and reduce its financial dependence on external, non-Kenyan donors. Conclusions and implications of these findings will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent sections of this work. It appears, however, that CSOs might benefit from a very targeted package of interventions focused specifically on a) assisting CSOs raise funds through these types of traditional community-oriented fundraising activities but also coming to terms with the likely reality that sustaining CSOs from local sources will require downsizing not only in ‘size’ but in goals, objectives and mission.

**Social Media & the Internet.** Just 22 – less than half – of the CSOs interviewed for this study reported using social media applications and/or Internet sites/services in their efforts to raise revenue from local sources. While a number, but less than half, of the 22 organizations acknowledged having organizational websites; when asked about their use of social media and other online outlets for local fundraising, their directors focused almost exclusively on 3 social media platforms – Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp. Nearly all of the 22 organizations used their social media platforms and organizational websites primarily to distribute information about their organization and projects. Many, however, did use these various media to make specific appeals for donations and contributions to their organizations. Many of the study
participants shared very similar perspectives to three of the CSO directors whose perspectives are shared below…

(P1) Right now, if you have Internet, it’s easy to send whatever plea to the public. Maybe that there's [a] particular cause, there’s this particular problem that you want to address. When you log on to the internet and you find this organization is in the internet, there is always more credibility because it is easy for you… either if you have a Twitter… you can either link it to Twitter account… you link it to maybe Facebook and that kind of thing… Then, you ask the people to discuss [a] particular subject matter. If it touches the entire public it is easier for people to contribute towards that channel, so I believe technology is of paramount significance.

(P2) Yes… We of course… Definitely, we are very much active on Facebook since 2012, and Twitter. So [as] an organization we are definitely, but we’ve used it previously for updates and educating people what we do [rather] than to raise resources.

(P3) Yes, [we have used social media but] not by direct way of asking people to support us but by sharing information so that anybody wanting to support us can come in and support and that has happened. You share information about what we do and then donors out there come in now to support our work

When sharing project information and/or making financial appeals using social media and/or Internet outlets, most of the group of 22 CSOs directed potential donors to make their financial contributions via the mobile-money platform MPESA.

While nearly all interviewees – of the 22 that use social media and internet/mobile applications noted above – expressed enthusiasm at the potential contribution the Internet and social media ‘fundraising’ could make to their organization, not many of them reported a successful fundraising experience directly linked in some way to their organizational social media and/or online presence. Those organizations that did share stories of successful fundraising campaigns that incorporate online and social media messaging, also noted that a portion of resources raised (perhaps the majority?) came from sources outside Kenya and even outside Africa. So, while in these particular cases, the use of the Internet and social media in fundraising had some success, labeling that endeavor a successful “local” fundraising campaign is perhaps inaccurate.
We have a website. We have a Facebook. Of course, we try to post. The last time I did this in our Facebook and of course we got some donation, [but that] was not from the local partners. We had a volunteer who was here from the US and was like, “Wow, we can tap local resources, where is your website?” And we posted so many information, and we opened a PayPal account and those who could be able to see about... Actually we were mobilizing for some children who were going to high school and they totally lacked school fees. There was no corporate institution that was going to give them opportunity. But to us, to our level of assessment, we felt these orphans are very needy. So we mobilized through that and there was a donation out of that. Unfortunately, there was no local philanthropy or individual who donated to that site, but we got donations from other countries, more so European countries, yes. But we have a Facebook; we have a component of ‘donate here.’ We have a Facebook we share out what we do and we’d want to go more into digital, yes...

The organization whose director was just quoted above was somewhat unique among the group of 22 as it was 1 of the 2 or 3 that had embedded “Donate Here” functionality in their various media platforms – mainly websites. This functionality had just ‘gone live’ prior to the organization’s participation in this study so its experience with the “Donate Here” function was very limited. Three of the group of 22 organizations reported that they had made use of the US-based crowd funding website, www.globalgiving.org, in their efforts to raise funds “locally.” The director of a 4th organization shared that his/her organization was in dialogue – at the time of data collection – with Global Giving to have the organization profiled on the crowd funding site. Two of the 3 organizations with prior experience using Global Giving noted that their efforts were not successful. One of their CSOs, however, felt that she had pushed her team to use the site before they were ready and prepared to “go live’’ with the campaign. This organization planned to give Global Giving a 2nd try once they had “sat-out” the mandatory 18-months before an organization can make a 2nd attempt at a crowd funding campaign. However, the 3rd of the 3 organizations in the study that had experience with Global Giving reported that it had been successful more than once and was looking to expand its resource mobilization through the
crowd-funding site. “Yes, with Global Giving, we’ve reached the target like twice and expanded it.” Notwithstanding the organization’s two-time success using the Global Giving platform, unless the donors to this campaign can be identified as Kenyan and donating from within Kenya; this campaign – successful though it may be – again in this case cannot be described as a successful “local” fundraising effort.

A couple of the organizations felt that their lack of success in using social media and the internet to mobilize resources for their organizations was due to lack of ability to develop and maintain an appealing online/social media presence and/or the lack of follow-up and routine maintenance/use of their various platforms following their set-up. “(P1) When we’ve tried to do fundraising… maybe it’s the profile on our Facebook page… it hasn’t also been very successful.” “(P2) We have our system website, but people have not been contributing to it, because it’s all about how its presented…” This 2nd individual continued…

So instead of presenting it the way it is, then it will be good to have different portfolios to it, and say this line—don’t just say [our organization] does the whole of this world. You just need to say this is the key project… This is what it entails… This is thing we want to achieve – let the end be able to be seen. That’s the way I look at it. So if we can have several strands of activities, then we can say it’s linked to this fundraising… is what we want to do for this specific project… This is how it will be done… This is how it will be sustained. This blanket saying that you want support in this kind of mission, which people can’t see the end of the tunnel, they just see a small light in it, but they can’t see the end of the tunnel holistically… This is what people will be able to contribute from an African setting. The current approaches, which we are using, are made up on the Western. So now let’s look at what is happening in the MPESA model, if it’s to happen, this is for a specific project, timelines can be seen it’s very clear. So those are the best ways to do.

These particular examples perhaps indicate the need among some CSOs for specific education and training about how to make the maximum use of social media and internet platforms in local fundraising campaigns, but do so in a way that is appropriate and tailored to the specific Kenyan context as identified and described by the CSOs themselves.
Finally, one of the group of 22 organizations mentioned that it was exploring the possibility of developing a fundraising campaign using the Kenyan crowd-funding site M-Changa, \texttt{http://changa.co.ke}. M-Changa is a website developed and hosted in Kenya that is similar in functionality to Global Giving and other widely-used crowd funding sites. It was developed by the Kenyan-based company Safaricom and appears to integrate seamlessly with Safaricom’s widely used mobile money MPESA application. The director of the organization in contact with M-Changa noted…

M-CHANGA, is another area that we are focusing [on]… and a lot of our people, friends or people who are well wishers have been donating money through… M-CHANGA is an online kind of fundraising, and basically, it’s based in Kenya, it’s a Kenyan thing. It’s like Global Giving, yes, but it’s a Kenyan thing. The only difference is that M-CHANGA, once somebody donates money into your project, M-CHANGA will send you a text, that this kind of money has been donated by this kind of a person, yes. M-CHANGA… we are still coming up… We’ve not reached the target yet, but we’ve been hoping that we’ll reach it again [as they did 2x with Global Giving].

\textbf{Word-of-Mouth (WOM)/Individual Asks.} The fifth and final strategy that CSOs said they employed to raise funding locally was word-of-mouth and individual asks. This nearly always took the form of CSO directors and perhaps board members using their own personal and professional networks to make appeals for donations of various kinds to their organizations and respective projects. These ‘appeals’ generally happened via face-to-face meetings between the director and the targeted potential donor, through phone calls between the director and/or organizational staff and potential donors and through emails and letters sent to various organizational contacts. Approximately 20 of the 54 organizations interviewed for this study indicated that they had made use of this WOM/individual asks approach. Nearly the entire group of 20 claimed success at raising at least some amount of income from these direct, more personally oriented appeals to personal and professional contacts of the organization and its
senior staff. Several organizations shared their experiences making fundraising appeals through individual asks to their personal and organizational contacts…

(P1) When I need to do something like for the project, I talk to a lot of people face-to-face – the ones I know and I share the idea. I think that’s a very good way of fundraising honestly. It’s a very good way of fundraising, because whenever I’m doing a project and I’m doing local fundraising, I share with the word of mouth to my friends and we are able to meet in the groups and out of it they are usually very successful.

(P2) [I raise funds] …from my personal friends. I get on the phone. If a school needs some desk, I get a on the phone and I tell them, “You guys we need to—there are these kids and this and that is needed.” Yes. Yes, I always have a target. I call friends. I tell them, “I need this money. I need this amount of money.” Because it depends how you relate with the friends.

(P3) I have personal friends and friends for the organization. Maybe about 200. And they always give – like [I’m] usually impressed like people wait to be directed to a need, yes. A lot of people they want to give, but they lack information where to give. Yes, they lack information where to give. They are mixed people, they are mixed. They are middle, then there are a few wealthy Kenyans also. Most of them they are middle, but they are in urban… Let’s say like in Nakuru or in Kisumu or in Nairobi, yes.

(P4) I spend a lot of time on it even to this day I spend a phenomenal amount of my daily life doing that so I am committed and passionate and people know it. We have used more contacts and more connections and largely my own connections in this market. I knew quite a large number of people and I also operate – get involved in other NGOs. So I get to know what is happening when I get to approach people.

Some of the organizations interviewed for this study sought funding from various local sources in a variety of ways. Some pursued funding from local county governments. Others tried to raise contributions from among their own staff members. A couple tried to raise funds using emerging online gambling/betting forums. However, a significant majority of the organizations that said they sought locally source funding with some degree of intentionality pursued that funding in one or more of the five ways identified above: 1) Income Generation; 2) Submitting Formal Proposals/Written Appeals to Major Local Donors; 3)‘Traditional’ Fund-Raising Activities; 4) Social Media/Internet-based platforms; and 5) Word of Mouth/Individual Asks. Success at generating the desired funds from these approaches has been mixed. The income
organizations have been able to raise via one or more of these 5 approaches has been limited, however, to a small portion of the amount that most organizations are able to ‘raise’ overall. In other words, CSOs state that just 16% (on average) of their total annual operating budgets is sourced locally.

6.3 Primary Challenges to Local Fundraising: Pervasive Negative Public Perceptions of CSOs/NGOs

In the previous chapter, a set of specific public perceptions of local CSOs/NGOs was described as pervasive among the Kenyan populace. As noted in that chapter, study participants claimed that these perceptions have a significant, primarily negative, impact on the possibilities of building sustainable and effective local nonprofit organizations in Kenya. The primary way these perceptions negatively impact, and even threaten, the long-term OS/OE of Kenyan organizations is by significantly hindering CSO abilities to raise funds from local sources – be they individual donors, philanthropic institutions, and/or corporate social responsibility departments. Study participants identified 3 of these widely-held public perceptions, collectively, as the greatest challenge Kenyan CSOs face in their efforts to decrease their dependence on external funding and increase the percentage of their incomes derived from Kenyan donors. These perceptions are,

1. CSOs have lots of money! They are wealthy organizations.
2. CSOs give to us (the Kenyan people); we do not give to them!
3. CSOs are corrupt and cannot be trusted. We (the Kenyan people) do not know what they do with our money when we do give it to them!

**CSOs have lots of money! They are wealthy organizations.** Study participants explained that Kenyans generally believe that CSOs are major recipients of large grants and other financial contributions from large international organizations headquartered in the wealthy countries of the Global North. Participants explained that Kenyan communities – correctly or incorrectly – have
developed a mental model of CSOs and their work that involves the CSOs acquiring these large sums and implementing projects in communities where the benefits, at least in the short-term, are seen and/or experienced by large groups of people. As these organizations carry-out their projects and activities, the choices they make – such as choosing to drive gas-guzzling 4x4 Toyota Land Cruisers in urban neighborhoods where a Toyota Corolla would do just fine – communicate to communities not only that the CSOs are wealthy organizations but that they are wealthy enough to spend their resources somewhat frivolously. Kenyan communities, themselves most often living from day-to-day, observe these activities and the choices these organizations make and conclude that they must have plenty of funding from outside the country. So they question why they – struggling to make ends meet – should contribute to such wealthy, externally funded organizations. Study participants added that communities will often become suspicious of CSO motives if from their positions of perceived wealth, they ask poor communities to contribute to a development or social service project. Organizations who are well resourced, drive expensive vehicles but still ask struggling communities to contribute in any way must have a hidden agenda.

Many of the CSO directors and the organizational development professionals shared very similar versions of this ‘mental model’ that many Kenyans seem to have formed of CSOs over the last several decades, as explained above, and how this model directly impacts their perspectives on giving to these organizations.

(P1) I think for me it’s more about a public perception about civil societies. You know in Kenya when you talk about an NGO such people have access to big monies from out there. Donors. Why should we give them?

(P2) They are speaking to their neighbors who are local… Now we have the Land Cruiser syndrome – where I walk into a community with a Land Cruiser and I am saying I want to fundraise… Forget it! You are going nowhere! You are going nowhere with
that project. You want me to add money to money…?!?!? You, you have a Land Cruiser. I don’t even own a bicycle… You want money from me?

(P3) You know the other thing is that they see NGOs [and] they think we have a lot of money. So why would [an] NGO come asking us – selling to us a plate of food for 2000 shillings? When they have a lot of money from the donors?

(P4) I think it’s also how we have positioned ourselves generally as NGOs. We look like these big organizations that have a lot of money. So we actually look like we give money rather than we ask for money.

(P5) I think the first thing is there is this notion that CSOs or NGOs have a lot of funding and money, which they are squandering. So talk to Kenyans and stop anybody outside here they’ll say, “That organization has a lot of money. They have a car, they have this…” So there is that mindset that NGOs have a lot of money, and that we [the NGOs] are the ones who are supposed to go outside there and not people [who are supposed to be] supporting the work of the organization.

CSOs give to us (the Kenyan people); we do not give to them! According to study participants, CSOs have typically not asked for any kind of financial investment by community members into the projects they are implementing in their communities. Participants also explained that local CSOs have usually not attempted to raise much if any of their funding from local sources – choosing instead to rely on grants and contributions from international donors, international NGOs and individual western donors. It is only in recent years, participants say, that local CSOs have begun to seek funding from local sources. The organizational directors and OD professionals interviewed explained that this focused increase on local fundraising is due, from their perspectives, to what the CSOs perceive as quickly shrinking international donor engagement and/or international donor resources and CSOs desiring greater autonomy and sustainability through resource diversification. This reliance on external funding with very little attention to local, Kenyan investment has helped build the mental model noted above by leading many to conclude that poor and marginalized Kenyan communities are the recipients of CSO
Engagement and services funded by wealthy external parties. One participant explained this dynamic this way…

You cannot take an organization for instance, now CSO A, and expect that the community can give [to] them. When they [the organization-CSO A] have been known over the years to be the ones giving communities money. Changing that is going to be a bit difficult. So, the perception that NGOs are the ones with big money… We should receive from them as opposed to giving… I think that has to change first before this happens.

Many of the respondents repeated these same sentiments with some of the CSO directors sharing experiences of their own failed attempts at raising funds locally due, in part, to the widespread perception that CSOs give to individuals and communities. Communities and individuals do not give to CSOs.

(P1) I mean Kenyan context is very unique. The way civil society works… We are always seen as donors to our beneficiaries.

(P2) As we make our strategies for fundraising, sometimes we say, “hey we could approach the community, this is about them. They can chip in.” But, the reality of it is, that for us… Maybe [for] some people it worked… But, for us, it [attempts at local fundraising] didn’t pick at all. It collapsed completely. Because, they [the community/individual Kenyans] more of expect us to be the ones who provide this to them.

(P3) First of all, they think NGOs have a lot of money. They think NGOs have a lot of connections. In fact, you [the NGOs] are the ones who are supposed to be giving us not… So, that kind of mentality – that ordinary Kenyans should give to NGOs – I think they will find it very funny. If it is for [the] church… yes. But they think NGOs have a lot of money… And it’s all of them. They have a lot of money.

CSOs are corrupt and cannot be trusted. We (the Kenyan people) do not know what they do with our money when we do give it to them! The third widely held perception among the general Kenyan public about CSOs is that they are corrupt, cannot be trusted and are not good at financial transparency and reporting to back to stakeholders regarding how the funds they have received have been used. This perception appears to be the most widely held perception among the 3 identified here. It, therefore, has the greatest negative impact on the ability of local
organizations to raise funds for their activities from local sources – “A lot of communities have a fear or distrust in a number of NGOs and community based organizations.” A significant number of study participants mentioned the lack of trust among Kenyans regarding local CSOs. Participants were adamant that if CSOs, NGOs, community based organizations (CBOs), or other forms of nonprofit/public benefit organizations want to raise funds locally they must first deal with the trust, transparency, and accountability issues. The skepticism that many of the study participants have regarding the potential for local organizations to enhance their sustainability and effectiveness through local fundraising was due, in large part, to their belief that surmounting trust and transparency issues would be very challenging.

(P1) They don’t give to CSOs, because they don’t trust CSOs, yes. So CSOs, must also handle the trust issue, yes, CSOs must not to be seen as tumbocrats! [Tumbo is a Swahili word for stomach.] So, if civil society wants money, the reason has to be convincing. The reason why they are raising the money must be convincing. The people who are being asked for money must feel that their funds are safe, and then, yes.

(P2) One thing that makes these fundraisings not successful… One of the aspects is corruption. Somebody might think this person wants to fundraise and later on we don’t see the impact. So, it’s the caution of impact… that there was some precedent in the past… that people fundraise and they do not see the work you have done.

(P3) I think there should be a lot of education on what the impact of NGOs do, because the mentality out there is NGOs just eat the money and enrich themselves. An average Kenyan will just tell you, “You guys don’t do anything.” So to change that mentality, it’s very difficult. But as I said, a lot of education and a lot of demonstrable impact, you must go out there and say this is what we are doing, and yes, it’s just like marketing. You have to do a lot of marketing to change that impact and persuade people to actually contribute to the cause. But as long as people think that the donor world is full of money to flash around then it’s quite…?

(P4) But I think, when it’s an organization, people possibly want to know… How are we sure that that money is going to help other people? I think mistrust, we don’t trust each other, but I think it’s what has happened out there. You’ve have heard of all these cons that have happened in Kenya – even pyramid schemes. So there is a lot of fear that we shall give money yet it won’t go to where it’s supposed to be going. So, that’s I think where we are headed because we are in a fix. What do you do? You’re not getting money from outside there [from external donors] then you have to try and find how Kenyans now can help each other. So I think the most important point is mistrust. We
don’t trust our own that we can actually manage this. But it has happened; as so-and-so is
given money she goes and buys a plot or something for herself. That has happened
before, so why would they give me now, what has changed?

The data obtained for this study are very clear. Study participants conclude that the public
perceptions among large numbers of Kenyans that CSOs are wealthy; CSOs give money away to
Kenyan communities, they do not solicit funding from Kenyan communities; and that CSOs are
corrupt and cannot be trusted, when taken collectively, present a major obstacle to organizational
efforts to raise money locally. By hindering the possibilities of local CSOs to diversify their
income streams through increased local donations, the long-term viability and success of local
organizations is potentially jeopardized. This set of 3 public perceptions coupled with several
other issues, explained in greater detail below, present major challenges in the years to come as
Kenyan CSOs ramp-up their efforts to raise operating and programmatic funds from local
sources.

6.4 Primary Challenges to Local Fundraising: Internal
CSO Management Issues

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<th>Table 6.1 Primary Challenges to Local Fundraising: Internal CSO Management Issues</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Lack of internal CSO capacity in resource mobilization and marketing.</td>
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| • Applying to international donors for funding is much ‘easier’ than other forms of
fundraising. |
| • Time spent on applying to international donors for funding has a much higher ROI than
time spent on other forms of fundraising. |

The CSO directors and organizational development professionals interviewed for this study
identified a set of management and operational issues, mostly internal to local CSOs, that they
described as primary challenges to local fundraising efforts (See Table 6.1). In-house capacities
in resource mobilization and marketing were portrayed as a critical shortcoming of many, if not
most, local CSOs that participants are familiar with. Marketing skills do not just include specific
capacities in fields such as advertising, public speaking, communications and messaging, etc.; but also an organization’s connections, networks, and socio-political position in society. Participants explained that technical skills were necessary but not sufficient unless they are coupled with a certain level of visibility, profile and access to certain strata of Kenya society to make local fundraising efforts actually worth the investment of CSO time and their very limited resources. Study participants also identified full-time staff member/s specifically dedicated to resource mobilization and marketing as an absolutely necessary element of in-house fundraising/marketing capacities.

(P1) It [local fundraising] has not been successful because I think we don’t have the technical competencies to actually do an event and fundraise for money there. I think that’s something that is lacking.

(P2) What I have seen is… If you are a normal NGO, you don’t have full time skilled staff. That is another thing, not many staff are skilled in even knowing how to do an event… the things… how you sell, how to put an idea in very simple language… All those are things we are struggling with. So what capacity is there for a small NGO…?

(P3) We have organizations that are at the grass roots level. They do a good job, but they don’t make noise on what they do for others to see what they do. You will go to a community and find a small self-help group, for example, or a CBO; they do quite a lot of work, they are experts. You talk about home-based care, for example, for people who live with HIV AIDS. The guys who do… the INGOs… the others here… they do not know really how to nurse somebody who is bed ridden down with HIV. But this community group knows how to do it. They are the experts. Nobody talks about it. So it is about what they tell their story, how they communicate their story which is important, because when I know, when I know about you, I will come. And when it comes to resources, people give to the people they know, right. So it is only through when you make noise about the good thing that you do that people know about you. That would develop a lot of interest and come. They will come with resources. Others may come with technical capacity. Others will come with opportunities for partnerships and things like that, which makes organizations.

(P4) So how do I develop an event that will touch the hearts of people and they give? So it’s all about lacking that capacity to try out new things. Basically we are afraid to go that way, because we’re thinking, how do we do it? How do we mobilize people? Will they buy in to our idea? You know, yes. But for us as a local, small NGO where do we start? Where we do we start? I mean, if I go Nation Media, they’ll look at me like, “Who are you? But we’ve never heard you.” So it’s all that.
A number of study participants described local fundraising as extremely challenging simply because they see it as very hard work! They described it as more difficult, more challenging and time-consuming than simply submitting proposals to international donors. “(P1) So it’s much easier to stick to the proposal route and write proposals and what have you. So, I think the reason why they [local CSOs] don’t do it is because there is an easier way of getting money.” “(P2) It’s very hard to ask someone to take a harder path when there is an easier path. People will lean on that side, it’s natural, it’s human.”

Not only is donor money easier to obtain, writing proposals much less taxing on organizational staff, and requires significantly lower investment of organizational resources to complete; the amount of funding a successful proposal will yield is significantly greater than any local fundraising effort study participants had tried or could envision.

As long as I can write a proposal to Brad and I get a million dollars as opposed to developing a complicated message; going out on Twitter; struggling for months and getting probably 100,000 dollars; I’ll take the easiest route, which is the Brad route. And so as long as you have got the USAIDs and what have you out there, the tendency will always be, “Let’s go to that easier one.”

One of the organizational development professionals interviewed for this study shared her view that many local CSOs have become accustomed to operating at funding levels made possible by these large, relatively easy-to-obtain investments from international donors. Even if a CSO’s local fundraising efforts are successful, they will not likely – at least in the near to medium term – be able to generate the same level of revenue as that provided by international donors. If this is true, the implications are clear. A reduction in external, international contributions in favor of increasing local investment may require that local CSOs either downsize or cease operating altogether.
Let’s say all the international donors packed and went. Then you tell an organization like mine to look for resources locally to implement its programs. They [would] probably wind up. The reason being; there are no local donors who can give monies to the level that the international donors give for these organizations to succeed.

CSOs directors also clarified that, in many instances, local fundraising is not a sound management decision particularly when the amount of organizational resources (staff time, programmatic opportunities lost, financial resources, etc.) put in to the effort is weighed against the return CSOs actually realize at the conclusion of the fundraising effort. Specifically, participants noted that a CSO’s return-on-investment (ROI) from a local fundraising effort is minimal – i.e., the organization may not reach its target goal – or the organization will actually take a loss. “(P1) I think people have always tried, but the experiences we have is that sometimes you invest more than what you will get.” “(P2) So we attempted that [a festival day and selling tickets to a theatrical performance]. Our input was much bigger than what we got out of it.” “(P3) Yes, we tried a dinner; it never worked. We went at a loss. After people eating, what we got didn’t even give us back what we put. So after that experience now we said, no dinner, now we are not going to do dinner.” In addition to agreeing with her fellow study participants that the ROI on local fundraising was often not worth the effort; one CSO director pointed out that the initial investment required to implement a local fundraising effort is so high that it is often beyond the reach of many local CSOs. In her comments below, she also identified the oversight her organization made by not considering the monetary value of pro-bono time when calculating the amount of expenses and profit from her organization’s fundraising initiatives.

I’ve told you that if you want to raise a lot of money, you [need an] initial investment [that is high] to get a lot of money. For these other ones you get little money… like the walks; I’ve done walks. I’ve done dinners. I’ve done charity – what do you call them – we’ve done event shows, you know, with calling in artists. I’ve done crazy things. I mean… I’ve done everything! I mean, I’m telling you this thing; [the profit] is little
when you compare [it to] the amount of time. In fact, the only reason it worked was because we gave pro bono time. I mean, all these [people] coming in are all giving their time pro bono. If I were paying a consultant or workers to do this work, there would be no profit because everybody who has worked is not being paid. So even when you say there is profit, it is profit in quotes.

Study participants, in general, perceived the internal CSO management/capacity issues identified above as presenting serious obstacles to the possibility of local fundraising contributing to organizational sustainability in any substantial way. At best, local fundraising could supplement international funding to a limited extent. Nonetheless, a number of participants expressed the view that relevant socio-political dynamics – although not necessarily welcomed by many local CSOs – will eventually strengthen the long-term viability and sustainability of local organizations by forcing increased reliance on locally sourced funds. Several participants shared the sentiments expressed by the following two study participants…

(P2) Well, I think it’s harder, but I think it will get easier, but it will also force organizations to change, to change their priorities, to change the way they work, to change how they fundraise, and I think they’re scared of that change.

(P2) I think because of the whole legislative process that’s coming up and all that; I think that will force organizations to change. But I think if they had no alternative, they would actually do it, because at local level that’s how people fundraise. So if I have a medical bill, I don’t write proposals to Organization X, I go to my friend, I go to you as an individual… But because organizations like mine have always had an alternative – an easier alternative if you ask me, then they’ve always done that. But I think if they don’t have an alternative… I don’t think it’s actually hard. Well, I think it’s harder, but I think it will get easier. But it will also force organizations to change… to change their priorities… to change the way they work… to change how they fundraise… and I think they’re scared of that change.

6.5 Primary Challenges to Local Fundraising: What is behind the success of the few well-known local fundraising Campaigns?

Table 6.2 Primary Challenges to Local Fundraising: *What is behind the success of the few well-known local fundraising campaigns?*
• Campaigns had the backing and engagement of prominent, well-known Kenyan personalities.
• Campaigns had the backing and engagement of well-known, reputable and well-resourced organizations.
• Campaigns focused on emergency, crisis issues that had a high level of emotional appeal.

During data collection for this research project, many of the study participants as well as a number of other Kenyans the research team was in contact with, shared stories of a few local fundraising campaigns that seemed to be well known across the greater Nairobi area and widely viewed as resoundingly successful. In many of the same conversations where study participants enumerated the various challenges and obstacles they perceive to local fundraising by Kenyan CSOs; they also described the tremendous successes that they had seen, or at least heard, of various local fundraising efforts. One of the fundraising campaigns often mentioned during study interviews, and nearly always described as successful, is known in Kenya as Bring Zack Home.

While many of the study participants had heard the phrase Bring Zack Home, were vaguely aware that Zack was confined to a wheelchair as a result of a criminal incident, and knew that he had raised millions of Kenyan Shillings for medical treatment; they were unfamiliar with the specific details of the story and, in many cases, their stories differed from one another. In short, during a 2004 road trip between Nairobi and Kikuyu, Zack Kimotho was carjacked while stopped at an intersection. His attackers shot him at close range shattering both his shoulder and spinal cord. Doctors told Zack that the bullet had severed his spinal column; he would never walk again and be required from that point forward to use a wheelchair for mobility. A few months after the incident, Zack joined the Kenya Paraplegic Organization (KPO). Zack then met Tim Wanyoni who was also confined to a wheelchair as the result of a carjacker’s bullet. Mr. Wanyoni later became the executive director of the KPO and a member of the Kenyan national
parliament representing the Westlands district of Nairobi. The KPO, in partnership with a variety of donors and public relations firms, designed and carried-out the Bring Zack Home campaign. The objective of the campaign was to raise money for the KPO to build a treatment center for spinal cord injuries in Kenya. The nearest center, at the time, was in South Africa. The KPO organizing team asked to use Zack Kimotho as the face of their fundraising campaign and thus the Bring Zack Home campaign was launched.

The campaign started by advertising that Zack was going to wheel his way to South Africa in search of care from the nearest spinal cord treatment center. Zack began his journey in the company of media personnel, an ambulance and a security team. Kenyans were asked to donate to the KPO for construction of the spinal injury center in Kenya so they could “bring Zack home” for his treatment and care. According to newspaper reports, the KPO campaign team never intended for Zack to wheel further than Kitengela – a small town approximately 31 kilometers from Nairobi city center – because they expected to have raised sufficient funds for construction of the Kenyan treatment center before that time and Zack’s ‘journey’ was simply a part of their planned campaign. Zack reached Kajiado – approximately 62 kilometers from Nairobi – when the media and the general public diverted their attention away from the campaign to a helicopter crash that killed the former Internal Security Minister George Saitoti and 7 of his colleagues. Up to that point, the KPO had raised approximately KSH 73 million Kenyan Shillings or $709,000 USD of their KSH 250 million goal. The Bring Zack Home campaign then essentially fell apart. Campaign organizers decided to continue fundraising for the treatment facility in phases. As of January 2016, the Government of Kenya had pledged to invest KSH 98 million in the KPO treatment center. The Kenya-based company, Chandaria, also committed to invest KSH 30 million in construction of the center. The center has since been
named the *Kenyan Paraplegic Organizational Chandaria Spinal Injury Rehabilitation and Trauma Center*. The center’s foundation stone was laid in August 2013 by the Deputy President of Kenya, William Ruto, but the current status of the center is unknown. (Nairobi Wire, 2013, March 25; The Daily Nation, 2015, April 20; and Standard Digital, 2016, January 3.)

*Bring Zack Home* was one of several ‘famous’ local fundraising campaigns that many of the study participants were aware of. Others campaigns mentioned included those known in Kenya as *Kenya for Kenyans* and *The Jadudi Campaign*. Participants were asked why they thought these efforts had been so successful – at least in their eyes and in the eyes of many Kenyans – while their own CSOs’ efforts had not had similar levels of success and had faced the numerous challenges as described in the previous section. Respondents concurred that these various campaigns succeeded, where they had not, because of 3 elements these ‘successful campaigns’ all had in common (See Table 6.2).

**The engagement and backing of a prominent well-known personality.** Many of the respondents noted the participation of a famous political or media personality as one of the primary factors for the success of the well-known local fundraising campaigns.

(P1) Probably I can say Jadudi worked so well because Steve Biko was behind it, Zawadi Nyong’o was behind it. So, those are credible people who we know are… probably might not do anything other than the right thing… probably. I think it’s the person behind it. And Steve Biko keeps on writing I can say very good blogs in different magazines.

(P2) If it wasn’t Zawadi trying to raise money for this guy, you wouldn’t have probably seen the same response.

(P3) There are those who hate him, but they will give to Maina Kageni, you know, and anything that Maina Kageni promotes will sell; the same for Churchill the comedian.

(P4) One of the key factors is… who is behind the whole thing? Kenya is a very political country. Is it the wife of the president who is behind this? Because all the big boys will want to associate with that. So once you can get somebody… a public figure… a
celebrity… a business mogul… or a political connection… If he is supporting you, then you make all the money. That is why all the time we try to do things… trying to get somebody. That is how you get your things done and get your money, so the thing can work very well but then you need to have very good political or business connections…

The engagement and backing of a well-known and reputable organization. Study participants identified the Kenyan Red Cross and Safaricom as two organizations that are well regarded and widely respected throughout Kenya. These two organizations – one a nonprofit and the other a for-profit corporation with a fairly sizeable social responsibility portfolio – are viewed as “local” “Kenyan” organizations that are well managed, transparent and maintain a high degree of operational integrity. Local CSOs, on the other hand, are generally perceived as corrupt with their directors and staff members seen as being in the nonprofit/social service ‘business’ simply for personal gain. Participants claimed that any fundraising effort or public appeal for assistance that involves the Kenyan Red Cross and/or Safaricom is likely to be successful – or, at least, enjoy a level of success most local CSOs will, according to study participants, likely never attain.

(P1) Like the Red Cross… like Safaricom… Today, if Safaricom says, “We want to do this,” everybody will go for it, and so it depends on that. Even during the post election violence; I was with Red Cross. The Red Cross, even though the supermarkets were closed, even though people didn’t have food in their houses, Red Cross got so much food from Kenyans just because it is the name Red Cross. I stay like 10 minutes walk from town. So normally I used to walk from the Red Cross office to the house because there were no cars anyway, the nearest stage [bus stop] was already my stage. The amount of money that I got by just walking with the Red Cross jacket on the road by people calling you, “Hey, come. I have seen your work. Kindly take these ones to me for the office.”

(P2) And you know, organizations like Safaricom, the big organizations have created trust within the community because they also give. So, when they want from the community, the community will readily give because they have seen Safaricom give.

(P3) You know Red Cross for many years… People attribute Red Cross to saving of lives, saving of people in disaster. So, if they send such an appeal, automatically people would be willing to do that. The other thing is during that time; I think Safaricom was also the key driver in Kenyans for Kenya at that particular time. So Safaricom—and you
know Kenyans as somebody said have peculiar habits. Kenyans identify themselves with that Safaricom.

While many Kenyans, according to study participants, seem to view the Kenya Red Cross as a “local” nonprofit organization, it does not meet the technical definition of local organization used in this particular study. While it is an independent, Kenyan governed and operated organization, the 2015 constitution of the Kenya Red Cross (KRC) states that the KRC was recognized by the International Committee of the Red Cross in 1966; is part of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and has been a member of the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies since 1967. Additionally, the organization’s constitution states that the KRC must abide by various statutes of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and is “bound by” (p. 10) provisions found in the constitution of the International Federation. Additionally, the KRC was formally established by an official act of the Kenyan parliament in 1965. This combination of factors led to the investigative team categorizing the KRC as a quasi-governmental international nonprofit organization rather than a “local civil society organization.”

The causes or needs around which these campaigns were organized were very often emergencies and personal interest stories that have significant emotional appeal. The final reason that participants gave for the success of famous local fundraising campaigns like Bring Zack Home and Kenya for Kenyans was due, in part, to the fact they were “all emergencies and they touched peoples’ hearts and [made] people want to give.” Respondents described how these famous campaigns made “passionate appeals” – “It’s about the appeal, the passion of the appeal, yes. You give because there is something you can feel. You don’t give because there’s something you are not feeling. If you look like Kenya for Kenyans, it was a very passionate appeal.” [Kenya for Kenyans was a fundraising initiative launched in 2011 to combat famine and
drought in Northern Kenya. It was spearheaded by the Kenya Red Cross Society, the Kenya Commercial Bank, Safaricom Telecommunications and local media mogul. The initiative encouraged Kenyans to donate to the Red Cross using Safaricom’s mobile money platform, MPESA. The initiative was extremely successful and raised approximately $3,650,000 USD. See http://www.kenyaredcross.org/index.php/kenyans-for-kenya.]

In sum, study participants viewed these well-known fundraising campaigns as built on elements that they, as local CSOs, could not duplicate. So, while they acknowledged their ‘success,’ they also viewed them as somewhat exceptional experiences within the civil society sector. Participants identified the factors they thought made the campaigns successful, but they think the lessons they could learn and apply from these campaigns is quite limited.

6.6 CSO/NGO Suggestions for Improving Local Fundraising and Their Own Future Fundraising Plans

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<th>Suggestion</th>
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<th>Planned</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase use of the Internet, social media and mobile-based technologies and applications.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invest more time and resources in building trust among the Kenyan populace at large and increasing community ownership of CSO stakeholder groups.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invest in income generation activities and reinvest profits in social service/development programming.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve CSO marketing and communications skills and products.</td>
<td>X</td>
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The CSO directors and the organizational development professionals interviewed for this study identified a battery of strategies, tactics and action items they felt local CSOs could take to improve their own local fundraising efforts and encourage their fellow Kenyans to increase their giving to local CSOs. Participants recommended that CSOs take the following steps:
• Develop comprehensive long-term resource mobilization strategies.
• Recruit and hire dedicated resource mobilization staff.
• Provide more opportunities to potential givers to ‘engage/participate’ in CSO work – i.e., ‘get their hands dirty.’
• Take risks and be willing to change.
• Be more creative and innovative.
• Partner with other organizations both to mobilize resources and expand program reach.
• Focus on the reality that ‘people give to people’ – not organizations or programs.
• Target specific population groups, specific socio-economic strata in society with appropriate and targeted messaging.
• Identify and pursue multiple resource mobilization strategies/approaches at the same time.

The list above is just half of all the various suggestions key informants had for their fellow CSOs and others in positions to influence the management of local CSOs. Unfortunately, due to interview time constraints, discussions with participants did not examine in detail the specific steps that CSOs could take to operationalize each of the recommendations participants made. Nonetheless, among these various recommendations, four specific approaches or tactics stood out more than those listed above or others found elsewhere in the data. Participants believe that local CSOs should emphasize a) increasing their use of Internet and mobile-based technologies; b) build greater trust and ownership/buy-in among community stakeholders; c) invest a portion of their income in various types of income generation activities (IGA) and d) improve their marketing abilities and their marketing products.

**Increase Use of Internet and Mobile-Based Technologies.** Participants were particularly enthusiastic about fundraising opportunities the use of the Kenyan mobile-money application, MPESA, could potentially provide local CSOs. While a number of the CSOs interviewed reported that they had used MPESA to collect contributions and donations for some of their programs; overall, participants felt like use was low among the CSO community and there are a number of still untapped ways the mobile-money application could be used to raise funds
specifically from local sources. Study participants recommended that CSOs first secure MPESA paybill numbers for both their organizations as well as their various projects. Paybill numbers are essentially account numbers used to identify various organizational users of the MPESA application. Having a specific paybill number for an organization or one of its projects enables potential donors to send monetary contributions directly to the designated organization/project from mobile phone to mobile phone. Participants noted that CSOs should make sure that paybill numbers are included on all their print and digital fundraising and promotional materials. Since MPESA is a mobile, cellular-based technology and not a web-based application, participants emphasized that the service enjoyed much wider use among the Kenyan population and there were few if any parts of the country where MPESA did not have coverage. Web-based technologies and social media, which participants believe are also great potential fundraising tools, do not enjoy the same level of penetration into the Kenyan market as MPESA and other mobile-based applications.

It [MPESA] can work. It will work, because even at the village level the elderly people right now have mobile phones where they can just send that money to a particular paybill number. They send… whether it’s Kshs.10, Kshs 50, Kshs. 100. But if you look at the power of numbers… If let’s say like 100,000 people give like fifty shillings, I think if you multiply times 100,000 people that is good amount of money, but if you look at it in terms of Kshs. 50 per one person it may be insignificant. But technology has a place and it’s going to revolutionize fund raising from across the country especially here in Kenya, it’s possible.

Some participants also feel that MPESA, much more so than web-based technologies, has somewhat of an equalizing/democratizing effect by enabling Kenyans of every socio-economic strata and in various parts of the country to participate in fundraising campaigns. Additionally, because of the ‘success’ that the famous campaigns mentioned above have had in the country – largely through very small donations from individual Kenyans via MPESA – participants felt
like increased use of MPESA and mobile-based technologies communicates to all Kenyans that everyone’s contribution no matter the size is needed and welcome.

Look at MPESA. It is doing very well. And you find people using MPESA up to the local area, village level. For example, 80% of Kenyans have phones and they receive calls, SMS. It’s only that their gadgets… they have local phones. We call them "mkulima,” it’s not smart.

While MPESA was described as a potentially excellent vehicle for enabling donors to easily and quickly give directly to local CSOs and their projects; a major shortcoming of MPESA, however, is that most private users, be they individuals or organizations, are not able at this time to use the application to send ‘marketing’ or other type of promotional messages to potential donors seeking their contributions for a cause. MPESA’s parent company – Safaricom – appears to be able to ‘push’ SMS style messages through the MPESA application to end users but it has not yet made that service available to the public at large. To compensate for this, several participants encouraged local CSOs to market their programs and make appeals using web-based social media, TV and radio.

(P1) The radio station was raising money through MPESA… a paybill number… so MPESA is very key. People would just want to give their one thousand shillings without having to travel to—they are in Kisumu and they like this idea, they just send their 1000. So that’s a good platform.

(P2) So for me it’s a strategy that I’ve seen work elsewhere, but I don’t know how effective it can work here in Kenya. But also, you know, just having, using the MPESA platform… It is part of technology and just mobilizing people to make sure that the shilling or ten shillings that they give will make a difference on somebody’s life. So driving such kind of a campaign, but how to do it still remains a question, how do we do that? But basically that’s what I’ve been thinking… having a paybill number where we say, “This is the basket… we want to raise 10million shillings. This is the reason we want to do ABC— it becomes spiral, you know, it touches people’s heart and they can contribute to it, and then also having a response to account back to them. “This is how we have used your money.” I wish they could do that more and more and have the capacity of the staff built to make sure that they can be able to spearhead such events.
In addition to recommending increased use of MPESA and other mobile-based applications in order to enhance their local fundraising efforts, participants were nearly, though not quite, as enthusiastic about the potential positive impact increased use of web-based technologies could have on their efforts to raise funds locally. Participants focused most of their comments around the potential use of the social media applications WhatsApp, Facebook, and Twitter in that order of their potential positive impact fundraising efforts. They also placed some emphasis on the use of organizational websites as secondary promotional and fundraising mediums.

(P1) People are getting more into the digital platform. Most organizations will have a Twitter handle, they will have a Facebook page, and they’ll have a WhatsApp, because that’s how communication has gone. Before this time, there was the issue of sending out bulk SMS because that was, you know, the equivalent to what we have for WhatsApp now. You know it keeps evolving. WhatsApp, I think, is just one of those now… that any message you want to send… you can send to whoever you really need to send to.

(P2) Many people don’t want to write. But if they can prepare a picture and prepare short stories on social media and share them out to the globe; that will increase our visibility, increase the impact of the work we’re doing and it could be one of the easiest ways to raise resources for the work that we are doing. So honestly, I think, we have not exploited those platforms to the level that we should.

Despite their enthusiasm for the potential of mobile and web-based technologies to boost CSO efforts to raise funds from Kenyan sources, participants were quick to point-out a few challenges the CSO community would have to overcome in order to make full use of these tools. Several participants claimed that many local CSOs lack both the information technology (IT) and the marketing/advertising skills to maximize their use of Internet and mobile-based applications in their fundraising efforts.

(P1) We don’t have that expertise. I think CSOs just need to invest in IT, train them pretty well, invest in good-- even if it’s good computers, good network systems, because that also lets people down. The systems are not even there, you don’t even capture your data, that means if someone is asking you for statistics you don’t have because maybe you just do manual keeping of data. It can be a huge investment, which I think people didn’t think it was important. But now moving forward you have to, you really have no choice. So for example, right now I think our funds next year mostly will go into our IT,
because we have realized we can actually make money if we improve that system, if we have proper data, if you have a proper website people will actually read and see this is what you are doing, you can even raise funds through that website, people will support, but very few people will have that kind of facility. So I think we just have to invest in that moving forward.

(P2) It’s a fast, diversifying and changing field, which needs for us to equally respond by having people who have the skills, the understanding, the flexibility and the ability to exploit that window. Because I don’t think it is going to be a window for long. It’s going to close at one time. So we need to think when people are still interested in these approaches. How can we take advantage of the window?

One of the organizational development experts cautioned, “We have seen technology being misused as an avenue to mobilize resources. People start fictitious accounts; people start funny things. People request for money from all avenues, in different kind of ways, but in the wrong ways.” One of the directors of a local CSO questioned how prevalent Internet access and the use of web-based applications really is in Kenya beyond middle- and high-income groups and outside the major urban centers of Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu, etc.

The only problem is the local community. They have not exposed so much on the social media. The social media… you know we have the high class and middle class. The high class and middle class are the ones who understand and benefit from the social media, or from the IT. But the local community, they are in the millions… they are many… have not really understood it very well. They've not been exposed to these… the IT frameworks.

One final potential shortcoming of increased use of web- and mobile-based applications in CSO fundraising efforts was not directly mentioned in the data, and perhaps, not even recognized by study participants as a ‘potential shortcoming’ of increased IT use. Nonetheless, it warrants mention here because it has direct impact on assessments of CSO efforts to raise funds from ‘local’ sources. Applications like Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp and others have global reach. A Kenyan CSO, for example, that tweets a request for contributions to its community-based campaign to fund construction and maintenance of various sanitation and toilet facilities in one of Nairobi’s slums could, quite literally, be seen by people around the world. In fact, in several
cases where local CSOs reported some success at using social media outlets to raise funds for their projects, it seemed quite clear that the majority of the funds raised actually came from international sources and were mobilized as the result of international contacts tapping into their own personal/professional networks outside Kenya to give to the cause they now found themselves interested in and championing. So, while the use of web-based and mobile-based technologies might increase funding for local CSOs and help them diversify their revenue streams, it may not actually result in increased resource mobilization from local, Kenyan sources or increase giving among Kenyans and Kenyan philanthropic organizations/agencies. So, success on the one hand could actually mask little or no impact on efforts to increase local investment in local CSOs.

(P1) And you also use Facebook, because I’ve seen some individuals who could influence some of the friends from the US or these other countries and they can give some support, however on small scales. That can be a good source of funding.

(P2) So we’ve been introduced to Global Giving… There’s a lady from the US, who introduced us to Global Giving. She said, if we register our name, she’ll do a fundraiser back home and then people will donate online. So we are in the process of getting registered on that; that will be it. [Global Giving is an Internet crowd-funding site that profiles CSOs and their projects around the world and solicits contributions on behalf of profiled CSOs. www.globalgiving.org.]

Among the future local fundraising plans that participating CSOs identified, increasing their use of web- and mobile-based technologies was the primary action CSOs planned to take. “This is one area we are looking at, working towards—we want to revamp our website to have provision for the use of such social media to get people to contribute.” Unfortunately, as stated earlier, the scope and time allotted for this study did not permit a more in-depth exploration of specifically how CSOs planned to use social media, the Internet, and mobile-based applications to raise funds. However, in general, data obtained from this study regarding all of a CSOs ‘future plans’
in various areas seemed to be, at the time of interview, generally in the idea or conceptual stage rather than actual formal budgeted plans.

**Build Trust and Community Ownership.** The previous chapter highlighted the deep distrust of local CSOs that, according to study participants, is pervasive among many segments of Kenyan society. The critical need to address this deep distrust was foremost on the minds of study participants when they recommended that local CSOs, seeking to mobilize resources locally, focus on building trust among the Kenyan populace at large, among their various stakeholder communities, and work to strengthen community ownership of/engagement in CSO activities. Building trust and fostering greater community ownership was essentially tied with increased use of social media and information technology as the most important action local CSOs should take in order to increase the likelihood their local fundraising campaigns would be successful.

(P1) Once that trust is built within the community, then the community will be able to support this organization and also support the initiative that the organization is doing within that particular community.

(P2) You have to establish trust, obviously, and be very upfront about what you’re doing and how you spend the money.

Study participants made numerous comments similar to the two CSO directors quoted above. However, portions of three specific narratives – the first from an OD expert and the other two from CSO directors – are probably the most insightful commentaries generated through this study regarding the importance of local CSOs building both trust and greater community ownership of their activities among Kenyans in order for CSOs to increase local investment in their organizations and programs.

(P1) OD EXPERT It is the trust, the trust! Our social capital is very weak. We don’t believe in our neighbors. Once you retreat into that thing they call a CSO – because I
think most CSOs didn’t just emerge out [of] the need that was just felt. A community
didn’t say now let’s start. It is a family somewhere that stood up and said I think this is
what we should do and the CSO approach is better. So community did not inform that.
They only felt, although they were within the community, they felt that we should be the
ones pioneering this. And so that ownership comes from the family rather than the
community. And that becomes the tricky bit because someone says why should we give
to them? They are just a family in the community and we can go and support this family,
in a fundraising and we will see the change directly. Instead of saying we want to
program, we want to see the output, we want to see the finances. No, it’s important that
we build that house for them, and they can stay, instead of funding this CSO. So that trust
and the ability to believe in what the CSO does.

The particular narrative above refers back to the discussion in the previous chapter regarding the
widespread belief in Kenya that local CSOs are often started by individuals or groups of
individuals in order to advance their own financial and economic interests. If local CSOs are –
correctly or incorrectly – perceived as vehicles for personal enrichment then building trust is of
paramount importance to those ‘legitimate’ CSOs that are seeking greater local investment in
their activities. This narrative also highlights how incredibly difficult it will be to build trust and
community ownership in a setting where this particular narrative appears, according to study
participants, to be so entrenched.

The second two narratives more specifically highlight the importance of community ownership
of or, at least, engagement in CSO activities.

(P2) CSO DIRECTOR  Now, you want to talk to me from your big air-conditioned
Prados? I think there needs to be an engagement. It needs to be… not the traditional
NGO-recipient sort of conversation. It needs to be a little more respectful. Respect in the
sense that it’s not just, “I want this, because USAID has stopped giving me money.” It
has to be a position that says as an organization we bring certain strengths that we can
bring to play in your community that would be beneficial. But for us to be able to do that
we need some help from you and we need your input on what you need. So it needs to be
a very respectful conversation. Not, “You need mosquito nets. There you go, got
mosquito nets,” and so people go and use them to fish, so that’s one.

(P3) CSO DIRECTOR  I think for them to be successful, the CSOs will have to re-orient
their projects to fit what the community wants. I think right now a lot of the CSOs do
stuff that their donors want. If their donors will change to become the community, then
those projects would change as well, they can’t be the same things. And you’ve probably seen from the responses on—so if you compare say Jadudi, Kenya for Kenyans, Bring Zack Home, with say what Yetu is doing. There’s obviously a certain level of success that those other ones have achieved that Yetu hasn’t achieved. It could possibly be that the community does not recognize our projects, either as urgent as say Jadudi or as important. Because if you use money as a reflection of how the society gauges the project to be, then clearly they don’t gauge say [what we are trying to do] as important. So the onus is then the on to us, either to change our projects to the things that the community thinks is urgent, or persuade the community that this is urgent. So something has to change; so either the projects or the messaging, but that has to change, and that has to be us the CSOs in our conversations. So that has to change. But I think also there has to be a conscious effort to move away from the traditional donors, and it’s a bit like we’ve gotten spoilt, because of the traditional sort of USAID type of funding. In many ways having an Act that says 15% only from international sources… will help. Because it’s very hard to ask someone to take a harder path, when there is an easier path. People will lean on that side, its natural, it’s human.

These second two narratives also refer back to a subject addressed in the previous chapter – Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of participation. These narratives highlight that if local CSOs desire to mobilize resources from local sources – particularly local communities – they will have to determine what level of participation constitutes ‘community ownership’ and how they can foster community ownership of the organization and its activities and, thereby, encourage local investment. CSOs that were started by individuals or groups with financial motives or even those started by families with more altruistic motives but ones that have maintained tight family control of the CSO will likely find it very challenging to secure local investment in their institutions and their activities unless they are willing to make some pretty significant changes.

**Income Generation.** Study participants also suggested that CSOs invest in income generating activities (IGAs) as a means of local revenue generation. Income generation is also a resource mobilization strategy (after increased use of social media and IT) that the study participants themselves plan on pursuing in their own organizations as they attempt to raise funds locally. From participant perspectives, IGAs include a great variety of steps/activities organizations
could take to generate revenue. A number of IGAs specifically mentioned by several participating CSOs include charging fees for agency services where possible; engaging in small-scale enterprise particularly the sale of handicrafts and agricultural produce; the establishment of conference and meeting venues for hire; and procuring event/party equipment and supplies that could also be available for hire. The CSOs’ intentions are that profits generated from these activities could be used to cover the CSOs’ general operating and program costs.

(P1) Some NGOs have actually moved to what we call IGAs – income-generating activities. I think this has done well. I worked with [a local organization] and they moved into a few things, and strangely, they are actually making a lot of money. So to me that would be a better option, until our local resource base can start providing some sustainable or continuous funding.

(P2) The other strategy would be to then… In as much as CSO’s are structured in a manner that they should be non-profit making… They should come up with innovative ways of making money. Such that, that money directly… the profit they make from the other income generating activities… channel [it] directly to the program that they roll out. Not enhance any other thing, but to enhance the programs. So its profits… then it’s transferred back to the programs.

Although IGAs were a big focus of participant plans for the futures of their own organizations and a step they strongly recommended their fellow CSOs take in order to increase their sustainability and effectiveness, several participants highlight the possible shortcomings of an increased engagement of local CSOs in entrepreneurial activities. These particular participants wondered if local CSOs and their staffs have the sufficient experience and expertise to run a profitable business or moneymaking enterprise. They also wonder if increased engagement in ‘business activities’ could divert CSOs from their core social service, social-good oriented missions.

(P1) Income generation has been an area of weakness for civil society. It has not been done well. I know this because I have worked with many organizations to think through income generation. Often it is a knee-jerk reaction – my donor is leaving me, how are we going to survive, we need to… So, it was never thought through for the long term. Income generation takes long and it takes strategy. Now, you are entering into the forte
of another guy called the private sector. You are going to market… What do you bring here that is uniquely preferred? What is your value proposition. It is a different language. It is a different approach. We have seen some good work. I think it is still an area of great potential, but it is just us to prepare.

(P2) So, the Presbyterian Church… Yes, it has gone into the hotel industry. And it is running… Yes, it is running Milele Beach hotel. It is running Milele hotel in Nairobi. It is running Milele I think wherever… All those Mileles belong to one church. It seems to be making quite huge amount of monies. Is that where we want to go for local institutions? Do we have the expertise? Or is it just big money? Now, The Kenya Red Cross is doing the same thing. Because it has built all of these Boma hotels across the country. And it seems to be very successful. Kenya Red Cross has bought over 100 ambulances and is leasing these to the county governments for an amazing 700,000 schillings per month. Are these models working? Is this the way that civil societies should start thinking about sustainability or should we think about just writing proposals every day?

Better Marketing. “I think it boils down to communication and how a word is able to pull it and to appeal.” For their fourth and final recommendation, study participants suggested that CSOs should improve their marketing and communications if they desire to mobilize resources locally. Many participants described local CSOs as being particularly weak and ineffective at communicating to the general public about their activities and, more specifically, about the positive change they are helping to facilitate in communities around Kenya. Participants noted that CSOs lacked a level of creativity and innovation in their approaches to marketing and communications. Numerous participants suggested that local CSOs needed to focus more on tapping into people’s emotions or work at specifically appealing to their emotions as a means of increasing local giving. In order to do this, participants think CSOs should focus less on raising money for organizations and causes, and more on raising money that will directly change the lives of targeted beneficiaries. In other words, participants recommended that their fellow CSOs use more human-interest stories in their efforts to promote themselves and market their activities.

(P1) Don’t do what everybody else is doing; or don’t do it the way everybody else is doing it. Seek to do it differently. Know who your target audience is. I mean there are
some things that just won’t appeal to the older people that will appeal to the youth. Who are you looking to give? If you want money from the older people then stop targeting the youth. Concerts are one of the popular ways of fundraising in the country, but if you go and do concerts and you are seeking to make money out of that, the youth don’t have the money. So, how are you going to link that to those parents whose children are here? How will you appeal to their emotions so that they give? So that these youth—much as the youth are enjoying it, they are seeing the benefits to the youth you’re reaching. So it’s really just strategic thinking, innovation… Don’t do the same thing this year and next year and expect next year to raise the same money you raised this year.

(P2) The last one I knew of… They tapped into the Road Safety Campaign. They had a specific place where they put a heap of old shoes. They said these are shoes of the people who have died on the road. They connected the road carnage with the need for blood and that was a campaign that really sold. They were able to raise quite a bit because of just thinking it through. These shoes represent real people who died on these roads and these are people who really need the blood. Could they have been saved by the blood that you give? So they appealed to the emotions of the people and they are able… So it’s the strategy, and thinking strategically, and not thinking generally. I think that’s a weakness we have as Kenyans. Somebody goes and starts an MPESA shop and is doing really well, and the next day there is somebody else with an MPESA shop right next to them. Not thinking differently.

6.7 Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to capture the primary experiences local CSOs have had with local fundraising and similar attempts to mobilize resources for their operational and programmatic costs from local sources. The chapter has also highlighted various perspectives local CSOs and OD professionals have regarding the potential of local fundraising as a vehicle for enhancing organizational sustainability and effectiveness. In short, participating CSOs have attempted to mobilize resources locally through income generating activities; submitting proposals and writing formal appeals to local philanthropic organizations; implementing fundraising activities such as marathons and dinners; using social media, the Internet and mobile-based technologies to raise awareness of their activities and appeal for support; and tapping into personal and professional networks by making word-of-mouth appeals and direct individual asks. In general, participants believe that local fundraising could be successful but they have strong reservations
about the contribution it could make to the long-term sustainability and effectiveness of local CSOs. Pervasive negative public perceptions of local CSOs and local fundraising being much more challenging and far less lucrative than seeking international donor support are two of the primary elements on which participants base their skepticism of local fundraising as a viable strategy for building a thriving community of local CSOs. As they move forward in an era where they envision shrinking resources from international donors, participating CSOs plan on a) increasing their use of social media and mobile-base applications and b) increasing their income generating activities as the two primary means of trying to mobilize resources locally. Participants also suggested that their fellow CSOs adopt the same two approaches moving forward in addition to working to increase community ownership of their activities and improve their marketing/communication skills.
Chapter 7: Research Question 3

What is the profile of the individual Kenyan giver?

a) Why do they give? What are their primary motivations or reasons for giving?

b) What ‘social causes’ or ‘issues’ do they prefer to give? How do they become aware of these needs?

c) Who are the preferred recipients or beneficiaries of their giving?

d) How do they make giving-related decisions?

e) How do they give – What specific modalities do they use?

f) To what extent do they give to local CSOs/NGOs?

g) In what ways could CSOs/NGOs be more successful in their appeals for these individual Kenyans to give to them?

7.1 Reprise: Sampling Methods for Key Informants Interviewed for this Research Question

Forty-five (45) individual Kenyans were recruited from the greater Nairobi area for in depth interviews regarding their perspectives and practices regarding ‘giving.’ These 45 individual participants were recruited entirely using convenience and snowball sampling techniques. The investigative team used a wide variety of recruitment strategies including – approaching complete strangers, asking Yetu and AKFEA staff members to message at least 3-5 of their friends, and the project research associate asking his WhatsApp contacts to solicit individual participants. Whenever anyone of these invitees accepted an invitation and completed an interview; that person was asked for names and contact information of any of his/her associates that might be willing to interview with the investigative team. The PI and RA devised a three-fold classification system and then, through discussion and mutual agreement, assigned each individual giver interviewed for this study to 1 of the 3 socio-economic status (SES) categories. Category 1 consisted of upper middle-class professionals and wealthy Kenyans. Category 2 consisted of lower middle-class professionals, service professionals in middle-class establishments, and some industrial/manufacturing workers. Category 3 consisted of anyone with an SES below lower middle class – namely security guards, domestic staff, and some self-
employed traders/hawkers. Due to sensitivity issues and privacy, demographic information was not asked or retained on these participants.

All 44 individuals interviewed for this profile of Kenyan givers reported giving in a variety of ways and with some degree of regularity. They give financially. They give in kind. They give their time, talents, experience and expertise. They give to individuals, families, friends, community groups, churches, mosques, large national social campaigns and, to a much lesser extent, organizations. The concept of giving was intentionally not defined for this study out of concern that doing so could unnecessarily restrict or broaden the respondents’ understanding of giving. Study investigators anticipated that respondents would internally define the concept of giving themselves as they responded to interview questions. Individual interviewees were asked straight-forward open-ended questions like “How do you give?” and “Describe the ways in which you give?” or “We know Kenyans are givers; tell us how you give and what your giving practices are?” In some instances, examples of ‘giving’ were provided when further explanation was sought regarding interview questions. These examples were provided using statements like, “Giving your tithes in church,” “Giving zakat during Ramadan,” “Giving to a child on the street who asks you for food,” or “Sending money back home to your family in the village.” Other than these types of explanatory statements, no additional definitions of giving were provided to study participants.

7.2 Motivations and Reasons for Giving

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<th>Priority</th>
<th>Motivations / Reasons</th>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>How giving makes me feel, benefits me?</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>I have received; so I give back.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Makes me feel good.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>I want to help.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>I feel I have helped solve a problem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>My faith, spirituality or belief in God.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>I feel satisfied; deep sense of satisfaction.</td>
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</table>
Nearly all of the participants expressed the sentiment that they, as individuals, had in various ways benefitted from the generosity of others. “I feel like I owe the world. I had a fair advantage… I don’t deserve it.” They often described how their family members, their friends, their communities had ‘invested’ in them at numerous points throughout their lives. Many used the word ‘blessed’ to describe the generosity they had received in the past. Many also noted that the ‘good,’ ‘positive’ or ‘blessed’ situations they found themselves in at that point of time was the result of the investment others had made in their lives through their giving. “I went through a school that was a charity school, myself, and therefore I benefitted from other people’s giving.”

As a result of this sense of ‘having received’ or ‘having been blessed,’ many study participants said their primary motivation or reason for giving is ‘giving back’ – investing in others at their points of need as members of their own social groups had invested in them at critical times in their lives.

(P1) Again me, as I grew up, people supported me. I didn’t grow up from a very… a rich family. It was just an ordinary struggling family. People helped me differently in paying [school] fees, buying me clothes. So, I believe it is important to support because as I lacked and how I felt when I didn’t have, I also feel these other people are also feeling the same. And they would need to be supported.

(P2) It is that kind heart… and I feel when someone doesn’t have… because there was a time I didn’t have. Yeah, I have gone through such problems. So, I know when you say you don’t have school fees; I know what you are talking about. Or you didn’t have food, or clothes, or shoes; I know what you are going through, yeah.

(P3) I think there are different motivations; but the primary one is I feel very fortunate about my circumstances. I feel that [things] have really worked out well for me. I feel, would say, blessed, is the word that many Kenyans would use. I feel a connection to giving back all these fortunate things that have come my way. I feel that somebody else deserves to get a break or deserves to just have my contribution.

(P4) Well, one we have been born in a community. We have been educated, however little, by the community. So the community needs us to stretch the hand back, yes, because tomorrow if you pass [it] on the community will do the same way to you or to those whom you have left, yes.
The second most common reason people gave for giving is simply a desire to “help.” More specifically, many of the study recipients expressed a desire to help people “in need” and people “less fortunate” than themselves. “I really feel that these people need help. There are people out there… you see people suffering and you think if you could help them it is good. That is how I usually feel and that is why I help them.” A number of the participants shared sentiments very similar to the two individuals quoted below…

(P1) It is just my feeling… If you are generous you are generous. You need to have that feeling that you can give and help the other person who doesn’t have yeah… to support him so that he can’t go without food… Yeah, you give out, yeah.

(P2) It’s human. It is humanitarian. I give out because I am privileged and the person is not privileged. I think when I see the person… for instance, his child cannot go to school and my child is in school… I know that child has potential just like my child, so, it is just human, that I have a feeling for human help.

A strong desire to ‘give back,’ an equally strong desire to ‘help’ those ‘in need’ or ‘less fortunate,’ coupled with the third most common reason people gave for giving – a deep faith, spirituality and/or belief in God – represent the primary motivations nearly all study participants shared regarding their perspectives on giving as well as their giving practices. Many participants described how their spirituality or religious beliefs required them to give. So, they gave out of a sense of duty, obligation and/or devotion. None of the participants, however, described this ‘duty’ as onerous or burdensome. Rather, their expressions, body language, tone of voice in addition to their actual answers to questions conveyed a clear sense that their spiritual framework compelled them or ‘called’ them not only to ‘give’ but to give generously.

(P1) As a Muslim, there is that obligation of giving to the poor. There is a compulsory one and there is charity. The compulsory one is towards Ramadan – they call it zakat. And there is the charity the one that you give to people who are needy – it falls mainly to close family members.

(P2) I am a spiritual guy. I am not a religious guy if I may say that. I believe that the universe is abundant. That’s what I believe. If I give you a pen, it doesn’t mean the pens
are over, they are millions! I come from that abundant mentality. So that giving and the way I look at it is that... You know you give. You surround yourself with abundance [and] it tends to come [to you]... You even get more. I don’t have, sometimes, okay. The universe is there. The universe is there.

(P3) Giving. I guess it’s my background... giving. I’m brought up as a Christian. So my initial giving was offertory in church. So I grew up knowing that you have to give. We give a lot to God. We pay the tithe. We do many, many harambees*. All the church projects are funded from people’s pockets. So every once in a while you will be invited for those harambees*... as a guest of honor at times... or just as a participant of that village or that church. So I do it for my church in Nairobi and back home – mostly back home in terms of harambees*. They are needier than Nairobi, yes, that’s one form of giving. [*Harambee is a Swahili word that means ‘all pull together.’ It represents a ‘traditional’ concept of community-level giving that will be explained later in this chapter.]

(P4) You know, like I told you, I am just a Christian. If you are a Christian, and you read the Bible; there is a verse saying that you can give the people... they need to give... and maybe you can give the people... the poor. So, if I go for that verse... and then I said that anyway I have... If I don’t have, is okay... but if I have I feel good to give. Yeah, and I know maybe God is going to... when I come here to work and then my boss said, “I am going out... maybe to baby sitting or baby sit... or you work for overtime and then I pay you extra.” So I will be happy... because the God he see I give and then he just giving me back! Yeah, just giving me back. Yeah.

Study participants were also asked how giving makes them feel; if they derived any benefit from giving; or if there was anything “in it” for them. Nearly all of their responses included one or more of the following 3 sentiments: a) Giving makes them “feel good;” b) Giving makes them feel like they “helped solve a problem” or been part of “a solution to a problem;” and c) Giving makes them feel “satisfied” or provides a sense of “satisfaction.”

FEELS GOOD. (P1) So I feel good when I see... Say we’ve said we will do toilets for a public primary school... nice toilets. You see the progress and you see how happy these kids [are]. If we say we raise money... we want to buy sanitary towels for a school or something... you just see how happy... Or, we raise money for books and you go and give... how it makes me so... So I like seeing the end of it and I see very happy faces, and it makes me feel good.

I’VE HELPED TO SOLVE A PROBLEM. (P2) I find that giving is about solving problems... and impact in the world. So you go to a community where there is a problem and you solve the problem. You feel you know, you’ve done your part in solving problems.
SATISFACTION. (P3) It’s a sort of satisfaction that you can’t even describe. I really
don’t know how it feels. It feels, it sort of, I don’t know how it feels. But it feels like,
like, I don’t know whether it’s relieving…? You feel like, “yeah, I’ve done it!” It’s not
[the] “I have done it of achievement.” It’s not that sort of success. It’s something like,
you feel like wow, I’ve had to say thank you. And I’ve done what I’ve wanted to do.
You know. Yeah.

7.3 Preferred Causes and Targets/Recipients of their Giving

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<th>Priority</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>Family</td>
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<td>Education</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Social Network, Community, Friends</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Medical, Healthcare</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Faith-Based, Church, Mosque</td>
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<td>Children</td>
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Nearly all giving among the individual donors interviewed for this study is directed toward one
or more of the following groups: 1) members of their immediate and extended families; 2) members of the various communities they belong to as well as their own personal social networks; and 3) faith-based institutions they are affiliated with such as local churches and mosques. Participants almost always placed giving priority on family members and their issues, followed by community connections and community causes, and then faith-based/religious/spiritual giving. A significant majority of participants stated that their giving revolved around activities such as paying for a niece or nephew’s school fees; supporting aging parents and other relatives in their villages and towns of origin; contributing to community fund-raising efforts such as a neighbor raising funds for his daughter’s wedding or needing to pay his son’s hospital bill before the boy could be discharged; and tithing to their churches or contributing to a church-sponsored cause such as caring for orphans and vulnerable children in the community.
When explaining their giving practices toward their family members and family-related issues, many participants engaged in very similar giving activities to those described below…

(P1) I support my parents back at home. I support my brother and his family who are not working. I support one who is working here, but still not very stable. Yah, and I support my grandmother as well.

(P2) Like extended family… like our parents they are back at home they depend on us to give them whatever, whichever way we can help them cause they are old and they need food, they need clothing, they need people to take care of them. So we have to do all those. We share with family members so each person knows whatever he needs to do.

(P3) To my family members. Okay, I take care of my younger siblings. Yeah I take care of them. I buy some stuff for them. I come from a humble background… I advise them which if you ask me is really important in life. You know… if someone tells you this is the right direction to follow it is really important. I also help solve family problems yeah, that is strictly confidential, I can’t tell you about it.

(P4) I have paid college fees for my two brothers; high school fees and college fees for my two sisters. I have paid fees for one of my nieces – that’s my sister’s daughter whose father passed-on very early also and left my sister with six kids. My sister earns very little income and I have taken over my sister, my nephew and niece. Right now, I am actually completing fees, this is my last, the last term for one of my nephews and in return I also receive, I receive a lot from them.

However, many participants went deeper than simply describing their giving ‘practices.’ They explained that this level of giving – giving to support family member and even members of their social networks and the faith-communities they belong to – is second nature, it is part of who they are as people, who they are as members of their ethnic communities, who they are as Kenyans and who they are as Africans. Several participants noted that giving to these three groups of people in these ways is usually not perceived as ‘giving’ but just a part of what it means to belong to those particular social groupings. Several individuals explained this dynamic with these particularly insightful comments…

(P1) Actually, in terms of giving money… I think every month… I mean, my income every month is not mine alone. Part of I – because of the African setting you know we have these large families and these day of MPESA we have no excuse… [Sometimes] I mean [it’s] not even family… I have just remembered there is someone, not even, we
just met him long time [ago] once but he has been unwell. It is kind of I have not even met him for a long time but we have these telephone contacts… But every other month I have that call to support him with medical bills, the medical so basically mostly will be on medical.

(P2) I mean like, it’s almost natural being an African to give, because in… Africa is basically social. If you have and your neighbor, your brother, your sister, your sister’s kids don’t have; it’s almost like your responsibility to give. It’s not something you think about. It’s almost becomes natural. So you find like if you are… you are an income earning member of the family and there are other, others in the family who are not earning, then it’s like they are even entitled to your, to your support. It’s also most like natural, you kind of have to, have to support if you have siblings or if you have nephews or nieces, it goes that far to your auntsies, to all those people. And giving starts with food, money, shelter, love… I mean accommodation… I would say that it is almost like a natural thing in Africa, it is also most like a natural thing.

(P3) I think in this part of the world we give many times only that that we don’t see it as giving. That we give for health care… you know relatives coming to you they need to go to that hospital. Or their kid wants to go to school or there is a school that is being built, so we need to, we need to give… And when it comes to giving for infrastructure it goes beyond just money but also communities give in kind. People donate land, people donate materials… people donate their time, yeah.

Another major practice that nearly all study participants engage in is, for lack of a better term, ‘community-oriented giving’ – i.e., giving to members of the various community and social groups to which an individual belongs. Individuals often mentioned giving to their neighbors at various points of emergency or crisis in their lives; giving to work colleagues on similar occasions; and giving to their friends and members of their broader personal and professional social networks. This type of giving may happen directly when a concerned individual makes a cash or mobile-money contribution to the individual in-need, but among study participants it often occurs in a more formal manner. Participants described how in a time of need, the individual in need or someone close to him or her will pass around a sign-up sheet to his/her neighbors, friends and colleagues. After explaining the need or problem, individuals will be asked to sign their names and the amount they would like to contribute toward the need. The person being asked to contribute may either make the donation immediately or contribute at a
later point, but is now ‘on record’ so-to-speak as having made a commitment to ‘the cause.’ This giving through ‘passing the sign-up sheet’ – often referred to by study participants as “the proforma” most often occurs to cover funeral expenses, to cover wedding expenses and to cover various medical/health-related emergencies. One study participant shared this example of his own experience…

A few months ago… I had a lady friend. We stayed on the same block. She happened to have got a child and the child passed away. The situation was that she wasn’t able to pay for the hospital bills and the mortuary bills. So, we called upon a small contribution so that we can raise some money and be able to help her out so that she can get the corpse from the morgue and take home for burial. Luckily enough most of the neighbors and friends were so cooperative. It’s all about life and these are just situations that we meet in life. It might be me, today, tomorrow it is somebody else. So we did the fund raising. I was able to group up the people. We came together and they were generously contributing and we were able to make a good sum of money that we even took the initiative of going to do the clearance of the bills. After clearing the bills, we were now told to organize for some time and take the corpse from the morgue, paying the final bills, and we organized also for transport and she was able to have the problem solved.

Another individual, from a very different part of the country, shared this similar example…

I used to stay in Mombasa. There was a lady neighbor. She was expectant. So it came to a time she is in labor pains and it’s at the middle of the night. It was at night, she cannot walk by herself to go get a taxi, then pay for it, and go to the hospital. So, I and my neighbors we were able to go get a taxi, took the lady in, we took her to the hospital. It was around 2.00 am. So, on going in the morning to check on how she was doing we found she had delivered. So, in that sense, I felt I saved the lady’s life and I would save the innocent child who was unborn now she is born. She was able now to breathe to have a life. And the lady she is a very, very good friend a family friend to me cause I went door to door waking up the neighbors, “so and so, she needs help, what can we do?”

Participants from all walks of life reported experiencing and participating in these one-on-one “passing of the proforma” giving practices on a frequent and somewhat regular basis.

This ‘community- or social network-oriented’ giving also often takes place, according to study participants, through harambees. An in depth exploration of what harambees are, how they function in 21st century Kenya, origins of the term, historical evolution and use of the term, etc.
is well-beyond the scope of this work. However, the use of the term among study participants warrants a brief examination here. *Harambee* is a Swahili word meaning “collective effort” or “pull together.” (Mbithi & Rasmusson, 1977, p. 14). According to Mbithi and Rasmusson, the term *harambee* was historically used to represent, “ideas of mutual assistance, joint effort, mutual social responsibility and self-reliance (p. 14).” These authors explained that the *harambee* concept has its origins in Kenya’s five dominant ethnic communities with each community having a word for *harambee* in its relevant language: *Konyir Rende* in Luo; *Obwasio* in Luhya; *Ngwatio* in Kikuyu; *Mwethia* in Kamba and *Ematonyok* in Maasai. The *harambee* concept in practice included communities coming together to work each other’s farm fields, build or repair houses, or raise funds for various community causes and concerns. Among study participants, the concept of *harambee* involves a gathering of people/an event who have some kind of community-connection, often spearheaded by a convener, coming together at a fund-raising event and being asked to contribute to a featured cause, need, etc. Kenya’s first post-independence president – Jomo Kenyatta – appropriated the term *harambee* and it came to connote a national movement of self-help oriented development encouraged by the government. At that time, *harambee*, represented a more formalized socio-political movement. This study does not define or use *harambee*s in that sense. Again, as with the ‘passing of the proforma’ giving practice, nearly all study participants reported having been invited and/or participating in a *harambee* giving event. Several participants shared these additional examples of both ‘passing the proforma’ giving as well as ‘*harambee*’ giving and sometimes some combination of both…

(P1) The Kenyan society… people give when people are in trouble. Normally they go round [they pass the proforma]. I remember like here we got some colleague who is having some issue. I think the last on… one of my staff here had an issue and I mobilized a lot of people when I was here. We had to take somebody outside [the country] that kind of thing. And for me is… especially the last one which happened about December and if I can say that form of giving is not necessarily the money but
people coming together as a family. I mean, helping a cause in a way that I didn’t expect. You know why, I didn’t expect people to come so loud. But then Kenyan society is such that we give, just help, help people generally. Cards come [i.e., invitations to harambees or passing the proforma] what have you, that’s more of giving.

(P2) I’d say the bulk of my giving is community related, informal sort of giving. So, what I mean is someone says, “Oh, I have a Harambee,” for one or the other reason. Then you send them a 1000 or 2000. Or someone comes and says, “Oh I have a wedding,” so it is… it’s that kind of giving.

(P3) At least, let’s say, there is always a request a month anyway, there is always a request. I will not go through a month without somebody asking for something. That is the best way to put it. There are times when you have three or more but every month there is a request. There is one right now I’m considering a guy… His calls have been consistent. So I answered his call the other day, “oh mister, sorry to come to you I have fallen to bad times, I am even unwell right now, I am in bed, please help send me something” so I am still considering.

(P4) So, I find myself giving a lot of time… At the same time in this country we have. You know, you’re probably familiar with harambee and we, you know, we are constantly you know, asked for all manner of donations left, right and center… for ailments or for bereavements, or for all manner of… So, giving is something I find myself doing all the time. And then there is weddings, there’s burials, there’s hospital this, hospital that, and these days of course with MPESA people don’t have to physically connect with you for you to give to them, so you know constantly then you have to, you know you’ve got all these requests coming in, and every so often you have to make a decision to give something out.

(P5) Absolutely. Budgets could be different, but it is happening every time, everywhere. It is happening in the villages. It is happening in the slums. It is happening in city center Nairobi. It is happening everywhere. It’s happening in big hotels, when big people die.

(P6) In fact, the real story of fund raising in this country is not the Kenyan for Kenyans. The real story of fund raising in this country is what happens every day. And every week, and I can tell you if you go to… maybe you should. If you go to the All Saints Cathedral on a Wednesday evening, all those rooms are booked by little committees that are planning a funeral and they are fund raising. Fund raising for a funeral without medical bills will be half a million shilling. If there’s a medical bill it gets bigger. All those rooms every week are raising anywhere between half a million to a million, shillings every weekend that is repeated every time everywhere. If you open a newspaper and look at the bereavement pages, for each of those pictures there is a fund raising story going on somewhere.

Study participants also noted the importance and priority they place on faith-based giving.

While they did not describe faith-based giving as prominent as giving to family members or
community-oriented giving; giving to religious institutions like the churches and mosques they belong to was noted as a significantly important part of their giving practices.

(P1) I do give on a regular basis on a religious platform. So I sort of take it up on myself to give through church, to give through church projects. My church, for example, has a regular second collection either for a project here or for some regular sort of you know giving for the poor and so on. I'll probably dig in my pocket 10 times a month, I think. There is a regular one which is say a Sunday giving

(P2) The first level of giving is in church. You know, due to the—what are they called—the offertory, and for me it’s important to make sure that I participate regularly in that, because I figure out that that’s how we sustain church. And when I look at church, I think it’s an important part of the society, in just making sure that things are functioning in a particular way especially in a society that is becoming more and more capitalistic and materialistic. So that’s one of the ways that I give.

(P3) I also give time, I also give time. Mainly in my church I do a lot of work there, yeah, which could be equivalent to a job but it’s free. I volunteer my services to church; I volunteer my services, yeah to support some family programs.

In addition to identifying the primary recipients or targets of their giving, study participants were asked if there were any ‘causes’ that they were particularly concerned about or any ‘social issues’ they would be more likely to give toward than others. Nearly all participants listed education, medical/healthcare and children, or a combination of the three, as the social causes they are most interested in and concerned about.

Among the three causes/issues that participants listed; education was of utmost importance.

(P1) For me, education… I find it as really the key to anything out there to opening doors, you know… And, a lot of the time, opportunity or exposure to education… I always say if I could, I could empower so many other people to access education that is the one thing.

(P2) I think I will tell you something… I like giving to education. Because, when I was in… I think I was in secondary school; I had a fee problem. Fees, I couldn’t raise fees and the school came and helped me. I think that education in itself the way I look at it, most of the times, by and large, if somebody coming from challenging circumstances, and they are able to go through education, the opportunity, the options, the opportunities increase. You don’t have to take the… it depends on a lot of things. You come from
college and you don’t end up anywhere, but I think that your options increase dramatically.

(P3) Most of my giving is through education, because I am passionate believer of education for your people, my community. Especially, where I believe so long as you have a good education you can survive anything.

Interest in education and children-related giving often overlapped as many participants expressed a particular preference for using their funds to pay school fees for school-age children. For example, one participant noted, “During my working life, I can’t remember a time I didn’t have a kid, somebody else’s kid I was educating.”

The second most important cause or issue that motivates study participants to give is children. Participants listed a variety of interests that they give to related in some way to children. Many mentioned that their giving was often directed to children who had been orphaned.

Like me… If you give me to go to any problem I see outside there, I can go to the Children Home, I go to donate there. Because there, because I am sure there is some kid there they need it. Yeah, because our church we have something like that. Children Home, they can take something like clothes… the clothes and then they come they say that if you have the clothes you don’t wear… I have my grand child… I don’t know if you’ve seen her, she was running here… If you have the clothes for her and my girl they so big now you give is for us, and you can see.

Other participants mentioned giving to children in need such as homeless children or children begging on the street and/or toward children’s educational expenses. Often, as was the case with the individual whose narrative was just quoted above, issues of importance to these givers such as faith/church and children overlapped.

(P1) You find a child in the street, asking you, “give me five shillings.” When you look even at the child, him or herself, she is malnourished first of all, she is… She looks… She is worn out totally, yeah, it touches, it touches.

(P2) I also volunteer my time in children’s homes. I have an adopted daughter and that is how I met her. I used to volunteer in a children’s home and spend time with the children,
and finally I decided I will do this. And even after that I still continued giving to that home like I used to before, in terms of time, diapers, clothes, things like that.

The third and final cause that study participants identified as important to their giving practices is any medical or health concern an individual or family might be facing. Participants noted a particular concern for medical related issues when there were emergency or crisis situations. In emergencies – which many of the health related issues that participants give to are – the emergency medical issues tend to dominate their giving priorities and practices above giving to education or children’s needs. However, as previously noted, giving priorities often overlap such as when a child experiences a medical emergency.

(P1) Okay for me, I give to the needy sick people, personally.

(P2) Also important is for hospitals. Maybe someone… their person are sick, and then they took to hospitals. Then they, they didn’t have enough money to pay, to pay for the hospital, I think that one is also important.

(P3) Another way of assisting… You can walk in the hospitals, visits hospitals while there are patients… assisting maybe to give prayers… assisting to give things like bread and milk. Other ways… There are so many ways.

(P4) Okay, coming to time. I do spend my time… Sometimes, more so on weekends, maybe I go to one of the hospitals in my area and I visit those people who are feeling unwell. I pray for them. That is some weekends when I am off duty, yes.

(P5) Because you give me for three different and then I say for somebody to come and look for the job… He can wait. And this one he is in the hospital; she will go and pay the bill for the hospital. Yeah.

7.4 Awareness and Sensitization: Learning About Social Causes, Needs, and Individuals in Need

Study participants identified a number of ways in which they learn about people in need or about social causes and various fundraising appeals. Several of the ways ‘fundraising appeals’ or simply ‘requests for assistance’ were relayed to study participants include advertisements in newspapers and magazines; advertisements on television and radio; and widely
broadcast/circulated text message blitzes. However, nearly all participants reported learning about the causes they give to, as well as the persons to whom they give, through personal connections and individual/word-of-mouth ‘asks’ and through the Internet and social media.

As part of the ‘word-of-mouth’ and ‘individual asks’ modalities for acquiring information regarding potential giving opportunities, nearly all study participants explained that the specific requests and appeals – that actually result in them giving – come to them, first and foremost, as a result of a personal experience, a personal communication, personal connection or relationship of some sort. This seems to be logical, given that the primary recipients of participants’ giving, as noted in the previous section of this work, include participants’ family members and members of the various social groups to which they belong. It seems reasonable, therefore, that individuals with a familial or friendship-based connection to the participant would approach him or her with a funding/assistance request in a more direct, personable manner.

Participants described personal experiences as those times when they came face-to-face with a ‘need’ – i.e., encountering a homeless child on the street who asked the participant for money or going to visit a friend across town only to find out that he/she was sick and lacked the funds to purchase necessary medicines. Participants reported often feeling compelled to give as a result of these types of direct ‘personal experiences’ or personal encounters.

(P1) So there are those that you see like the lady who was a neighbor friend. There are those that you see, and you just automatically see somebody has a problem, he or she is devastated, confused, not knowing where to begin from. That one, I personally intervened and spoke to the lady with my friends. So, she was stuck. She was automatically stuck and she wasn’t in a position maybe to even just to think. So we sat down first, we spoke to her, and after speaking to her we were able to come up with a suggestion that led to a decision that was perfectly met.

(P2) I went to visit the home and then I saw the need. So, I was there to see the need. Not being told.
Study participants also noted receiving ‘word-of-mouth’/individual asks through text messages and phone calls from family members, friends and other members of their various social networks directly requesting assistance for themselves or for a particular need/cause the requestor was aware of.

(P1) They can communicate from home using the phone, yeah. They tell you about the problem and how they have organized to solve the problem and the amount you can contribute to help solve the problem.

(P2) Most of the time is through, yes, usually through a one-on-one conversation.

(P3) First of all, directly from the person themselves or himself. Then I will check with his friends or mine of the situation… [to see] if it is true… just one or two calls and confirmation if it is a real need.

(P4) In terms of medical… that again is by word of mouth. You know a relative… like one is a relative, one is a friend, another is someone else’s relative. So it is by word of mouth where we spread to each other, “oh there is this, the other…” Again social media has also been doing a lot in this area where they post a situation.

Numerous participants added that they also frequently become aware of various needs and causes they deem worthy of their giving through their various social networks. Participants explained that they were more likely to trust that their contributions would be used in the way they intended them to be used and not squandered, if the request/appeal came to them through a trusted, personal contact. Oftentimes, the social networks study participants said they belong to include church groups, work colleagues, WhatsApp social media groups and other member-based associations such as the Rotary Club. Participants stated that they are much more inclined to respond positively to a fundraising appeal or request for assistance when it is communicated to them through their well-established social networks.

(P1) I think going back to this example of this individual… It came to me through an existing network. So, for example – and you’re probably familiar with this – you know, everybody in this country is in some network or another. So I have a regular Rotary meeting. I have a regular sort of breakfast meeting with friends of mine. I have a regular
sort of Friday evening hang out with a smaller group of friends. So we sort of have all these little groups that we belong to and these, a lot of these, a lot of the information that I sort of dig deep into comes through these networks.

(P2) Professional network is the best somehow, because you know there is then the trust.

(P3) Networking basically. Networking can be in so many ways. If I just speak on specific examples, you know, we talk and we network. We share groups be it on very different platforms and at times that is how you get to know “like, hey, we are going to crack this thing.”

In addition to participants receiving information through personal connections and individual asks, many participants highlighted the more general and important role the Internet and several social media applications have in transmitting fundraising appeals and requests for assistance. While participants did assign becoming aware of need and fundraising appeals through social media applications such as Twitter, Facebook and WhatsApp to the ‘personal connections/individual ask’ category; they described a broader role the Internet and these particular social media outlets play in informing them of appeals and needs that are more removed from them than those shared by their immediate social connections.

(P1) Social media I think is pretty powerful. Most of the other… you know like, those not really organized givings is what you find on social media – either on Twitter, Facebook or on a web page. Then there is this advert posted and you read it, and then you see whatever it is and you give the little that you have. So, to me, social media has been very impactful actually more than even appears on TV.

(P2) Now that social media space is very interesting for several reasons. One, it is in my face. I’ll spend more time on social media whether it is Facebook or Twitter or WhatsApp, I will spend more time there. But, beyond that… the social media platform, is already a referral platform. So, when I see something on Facebook; I am seeing it because one of the people who are in my circles has seen it. So my own sense is that Facebook, I mean, social media, will work better. If something shows up, on a WhatsApp group that I’m in, it’s already significant because the WhatsApp group I’m in is really a small extension of my existing networks. So people who are in that group are people I know, I can ask a question, you know, it’s already inside, you are already home like ‘one foot in.’ So social media for me will be, not will be, is very interesting and basically it is cheap of course.
However, some participants commented that not all segments of Kenyan society or parts of Kenya have access to the Internet and these social media outlets. Due to this possibility, one participant noted his/her preferred way of receiving and transmitting information regarding fundraising appeals and requests for assistance, “I think [it] should be [through] radio. For social media, it also depends with class… Twitter has a different class. Facebook and Instagram…” Another participant noted his/her concern that while social media may ultimately reach a greater number of Kenyans, the people it reaches may not be “the givers.” “I think social media gets a bigger audience than even newspapers. I don’t know, but sometimes the audience on social media might not necessarily be the givers. They will elevate, they will like forward and it will reach more people, but maybe not givers.”

7.5 Giving Related Decision-Making

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Primary Drivers of Giving Related Decision-Making Among Study Participants</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Personal Connection/Relationship with Solicitor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Individual Deliberation – Careful Decision-Making, Weighing Pros/Cons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Emotional Appeal, Emotional Reaction, ‘Touching,’ ‘Moving’</td>
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A significant group of the individual Kenyan givers interviewed for this study reported that the primary driver of their decision-making regarding who and/or what to give to is the existence of a personal connection of some sort to the recipient or organization seeking assistance. From the perspectives of respondents, personal connection most often includes social and familial relationships with individuals, professional relationships with individuals and groups, and other personal linkages developed through the social networks the respondents belong to. Having a personal connection of some nature to the individual or organization requesting assistance engendered a greater sense of trust in the potential giver that his/her money would be used in the manner in which the giver intended and not misappropriated by the recipient. A degree of
personal connection also, in the minds of many participants, allowed the giver to ‘stay informed’ regarding the status of the need to which the giver responded. Through the personal relationship the giver has with the recipient, he/she can better know and personally assess if his/her contribution has had the desired impact on the person in need and/or the social issue being addressed. One of the best explanatory narratives from the data that illustrates the important impact ‘personal connection’ has on giving related decision-making among study participants came from the following individual,

If it is a person in your community and they come to you and say, “My child is sick. Here is the thing for the chemist. I need 500 shillings.” So that is one. Then the other one is you see a signboard and that signboard says “send your 100 shillings to this pay bill number and we collect all that money and we go and buy medicine for children.” Which one do you think maybe is going to be more corrupt? Maybe you don’t know? Like you don’t know either of them but which one do you want to give to…? Maybe I will give the person who has sick children because I am sure maybe her children are sick.

Numerous participants in this study echoed sentiments found in the quote above and made similar statements to the two individuals quoted below…

(P1) What motivates me to give? Fundamentally, linkage with the thing that I am giving about or to the person I am giving about. This could be a relative. Mostly it is… it is easier for me to give to someone I know I do not know but a friends knows, yeah. So if a friend wants to give, they can ask me to help them give and that means bringing together resources so that it is given to the third party,

(P2) A lot of it has to do with the relationship I have with the person that I am giving [to]. Mostly because it is about ...it is mostly to individuals. So really it comes… it does boil down to whom it is I am giving [to]. It is about my relationship with the person I am giving, and sometimes, not often but sometimes the reason why I am giving. If it is something that I feel is urgent something that needs to be done, then I will give.

A second group of study participants focused on the important role ‘deliberation’ plays in their giving related decision-making. Participants shared experiences where they carefully studied a potential giving scenario; weighed the pros and cons; considered the likely impact of their gift and how their money might be used; and then came to a well-thought out decision. When
considering giving to organizations or social causes, many participants noted that a part of their deliberation process included an examination of the organization’s strategies, plans, management and track record at achieving desired positive change in the communities where the soliciting organization works.

(P1) So I have… does it all align with my personal passions? But then, having aligned, then I am able to, to do the deep dive in terms of information and strategies they are following. Basically, spend time together talking about it, and then I can see where they are going. So it is not just… it’s not like I’m going to email, or I saw a flier, or I saw a billboard, it’s, having identified that they are working in the space that I’m in and then we do a deep dive conversation… Say this is exactly what we are doing, and this is how I think you can support us, and this is, you know, how much support we need and then me I can say how much I am able to support.

(P2) What would you do? You have to walk me through your plan. Because by the end of the day I need to see the results. And you have to tell me how I’m engaged so that I can see you didn’t pocket the money. Because Kenyans are very corrupt. They eat money. So you have to appeal to me in a way that I will be able to trust you, yes, and if I don’t, I am walking with you in that journey. Not necessarily being an executive, or a member of your NGO or whatever, but participating in what you are doing, such that I have the freedom to come and check you out. By then end of the day, it’s the kind of work I do, results are important for me; the impact.

(P3) I tend to weigh the situation before getting myself involved and if I feel there is a genuine need and I can help then I help.

(P4) You will try to investigate and to look very clearly if you want to be sure that, yeah, there is a proof, yeah, there is a problem and in need of some help. Yeah.

The third and final group of participants stated that a major driver of their giving related decision-making is the emotional appeal of the issue and/or individual need the potential giver is considering – does the request for assistance ‘appeal to the heart?’ In the words of several study participants – is the request/need “emotive;” is it “touching?”

(P1) If it is something that I find emotionally engaging, then I would, I would give. Speak to my emotions. Yeah, simply, that. Show me what your cause is in a way that it will touch my emotions.

(P2) It has to touch—whatever it is, it has to touch my heart. I give from my heart. I don’t give from my head, no. it is has to touch me in a special way, such that I feel—yes.
(P3) How can I say it, how it touched me depends and also my financial status at the
given time also, plays a big role.

For some of the study participants, these three primary drivers of giving-related decision-making
overlapped with some individuals stating that at different times different drivers played a greater
influence on their decision-making than others. Nonetheless, these three drivers – personal
connection, deliberation, and the emotional appeal were the three main factors that influenced,
on-the-whole, the group of individual Kenyan givers interviewed for this study.

## 7.6 Common Practices and Modalities of Giving

**Table 7.4 Primary Practices and Modalities of Giving**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Practice</th>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Modality</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Financially – Money</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Cash, MPESA Mobile Money to:</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Family, Friends, Close Contacts</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Harambees – Funerals, Weddings, Illness</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Volunteering – Time, Expertise, Labor</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Counseling, Mentoring Advising</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Family, Friends, Close Contacts</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Children’s Homes</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Youth Programs</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sick Family Members, Friends</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>In-Kind – Food, Clothes</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Children’s Homes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Food, Clothes</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Family Members’ &amp; Friends’ Basic Needs</td>
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Study participants were asked a series of questions regarding the more logistical and practical
details of their giving practices. These questions included: a) Do you mostly give financially, in-
kind or through volunteering your time and services? b) When you give financially, do you give
cash, through a mobile-money application like MPESA or by some other means? c) When you
give, do you give on your own, as an individual or as part of a group brought together for the
purpose of charitable giving? d) Have you heard of the famous fundraising campaigns in Kenya
such as *Bring Zack Home* and *Kenya for Kenyans*? If so, did you contribute to those? Why or
why not? Etc. These types of questions were asked just to develop a better understand of some
of the very practical, although more mundane, aspects of the various ways in which giving takes place among study participants. A few of the most interesting and useful findings as a result of this battery of questions are reported below.

Nearly all 44 study participants interviewed in order to profile the typical Kenyan giver said they give both financially and by volunteering their time, services and expertise. Approximately half of the study participants said they gave in kind donations to individuals in need and/or social causes sponsored by organizations soliciting in kind contributions. Some of those who reported giving in kind might also give financially and through volunteering but their preferred and most frequently used giving modality is in kind contribution. As was explained in a previous section of this chapter, most of the participants who give financially direct their monetary contributions to individuals in need who are their family members and/or members of the various social networks the participants belong to. Portions of their monetary contributions also go toward traditional “passing the proforma” community-based causes/issues – also explained above – and to harambees. Participants’ donations are most frequently given to cover such expenses as school fees and other education expenses; religious giving/tithing; medical/hospital expenses, funder/burial expenses and weddings.

(P1) Mostly, the little I have given… I think I have given money. Making some, sometimes anonymous contributions to some education institutions. Sometimes I used to have, before I came here, I used to have a standing order [auto pay]. I just send a donation to a school account… I pay school fees to I don’t know who… but that comes… I think that’s mainly what I have done.

(P2) Once in a while, here and there, maybe like money I am usually give for instance in churches when we have Harambees… For instance, when they want to go build schools, hospitals, or when we have some gatherings… maybe youth, young people being trained or taught a few aspects of life. So, I usually, I am always called to be the guest to give.

(P3) Other than that, the other giving like you say, in the office where, when there is something, when somebody is bereaved or somebody is fundraising for a wedding,
somebody has a medical fundraiser, maybe they are going to India or seeking further medical things abroad, I do, if I can.

(P4) Ok, normally, when maybe in the estate [neighborhood/community], or in the village where am staying, you find somebody he has got a problem. Maybe he has somebody who is sick in the hospital and the bill is too high. You find maybe he is going, for example, the person who is sick needs operation kind of… You come back to the village and you will ask people, somebody like me will come again and will take the proformas. I will have to go around, collect them from my colleagues, and I will contribute the money. We get the amount and then we go help the person to get out from the hospital. Sometimes again you will find that there is somebody that who has been… For example, somebody has been having some problem… like he wanted to transfer his family back to the upcountry, and you find maybe he has no money, maybe he has been sacked kind of, and he has no way he can go back, he has to come back to us… We go again, we contribute, and then we give the money and then we help him travel back up country.

Participants who gave financially do so either using cash or through the MPESA mobile money application. In general, participants decided on whether to give ‘in cash’ or ‘via MPESA’ based on the giver’s proximity to the receiving individual or entity. “Now it depends with the distance where the person is. When somebody is a little bit far from where you are; definitely we use MPESA, but if he is near you can just go straight… you give the cash.” Participants also noted that specific giving scenarios often dictate whether a donation is made ‘in cash’ or via MPESA. For example, one participant stated, “When I am coming to job in the morning… you know you find those people with something like a plate… you give maybe something like 50 bob, 20 bob [bob is slang for shilling]. When I’ve given them cash I may get a reward. Immediately I come to job, I find somebody, he tells me, ‘Wash my car,’ and he gives me 200. So something like that. I do give cash when I have, yes.” In these and similar situations, participants identified MPESA as an inappropriate vehicle for their giving – or simply entirely irrelevant because the receiving party does not have a smart phone or an MPESA account.
Study participants who highlighted volunteering as one of the ways they give reported that their volunteer time consisted primarily of one or more of the following activities: a) providing advice, counsel and mentoring to friends and colleagues; b) visiting children’s homes and spending social time with the kids; c) tutoring and working with young people on skills development; and d) spending time with the sick or ‘comforting’ those who are ill.

(P1) Another aspect of giving out… but in the form of advice. A young man calling me said, “I came across your article, I would like to have a session with you, I am interested in pursuing a degree in XYZ.” I spare time… I meet them either here… although it is not official, it’s my place of work, or I meet them outside. I tell them that these are the do and don’ts. If you are interested in doing this you can do this. These are the advantages, these are the disadvantages. [Later on] they come back, they appreciate, and I am happy to see that quite a number of them are doing very well.

(P2) And I also give my time in church… And also give my time to children homes once in a while. But that I do yearly with my family… my children… maybe to just go take them some food, just to spend time with them… for them to feel like… a little bit like their friends.

(P3) Okay, well, I give in various ways. So first is my time. So I do volunteer with lots of organizations both religious based and non-religious based institutions. I also, at times, volunteer as a tutor when I do have the time to do so and mentor younger kids and youths. And I also do give monetary gifts when I can, yes.

(P4) I give even my time, maybe someone is sick I just go there we chat, I comfort them, many participants reported that their preferred form of giving, or the form of giving they most frequently engage in, is in kind contribution/donation. Participants who reported giving in kind often give used clothes to children’s homes and other persons in need; food and essential toiletries/personal hygiene supplies – also most frequently given to children’s homes; supplies and materials needed to care for people who are ill; purchasing and donating school uniforms; and purchasing and giving various items that an individual or organization identifies as a specific need.
(P1) I give a lot for the elderly… especially clothes. I usually get – there are those people who cannot get clothes to take to people so sometimes I get clothes from people who are looking and don’t have anywhere to take.

(P2) I do offer food, for instance especially this month of Ramadan where we have a lot of poor people who we are supposed to feed. So, I’m collecting food from well-wishers and give out to the poor.

(P3) I also give in terms of… If I see a blind person in town who doesn’t have a white cane, I buy. I know where to source it for them. I buy it for them. Get the number… I buy for them the white cane and I will deliver it, yeah. Because I know it is not expensive but sometimes they think it is expensive and they don’t know the importance of a white cane, as opposed to a stick, cause a white cane reflects during dark. When it is dark, its cover lights up and also the noise it makes when it taps on the ground is different than a stick. Yeah, so in that way, that is how I give.

(P4) There are those we also buy uniforms for them and support them for the fee balance that they have; we also support paying that or doing for them shopping when they are going back to school.

Approximately one-third of the study participants stated that they prefer to give on their own, as individuals to another individual, a group or an agency raising funds for a social cause. One-third of study participants said that they prefer to give as part of a group or as part of a collective effort. Group giving, according to participants, generally consists of group members pooling their resources, making a collective determination of how to spend their pooled resources and then making the contribution to the selected individual/s or cause/s. The remaining one-third of study participants reported that they engaged in both individual and group giving and did not have a particular preference for one or the other. (See Table 7.5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7.5 Preferred Giving Patterns</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1/3 – SOLO</strong></td>
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<td>One-third of study participants prefer to give ‘on their own’ – as individuals.</td>
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</table>
Study participants who expressed preference for giving as individuals and not as part of a group or collective effort shared sentiments similar to the two narratives quoted below…

(P1) When I’m ready, I do it on my own. At times, when you depend on friends it has never happened. Because if we say, “This Saturday, let’s take unga [Kenyan staple food – corn flour] to these people,” somebody is available, another one is not. Somebody gives the money for that, others don’t. I think it is almost personal, because when you try to mobilize people to do it, some might just give because you are pestering. I don’t know, because you keep reminding them. But, I prefer sometimes to do it on my own or to even engage my siblings and do something.

(P2) The best, I think, is as an individual because some people if you give… and he realizes others have realized that you have said that you lent a hand to him… they feel shy. So the best is you give and nobody knows. It becomes a secret, yes.

Many of the participants who expressed a preference for group-giving or giving as part of a collective effort noted that the group dynamic has a multiplier-type effect on the amount of money any one individual could contribute to a cause or need and, thereby, a greater impact on the cause or need the group has decided to target. Participants that engage in group-based giving also assigned importance to the motivating, ‘rallying’ and ‘energizing’ effect that they feel group participation has on their giving. Some expressed some degree of ‘social pressure’ to give when participating in group-giving. Generally, however, study participants seemed to view this ‘pressure’ as positive – leading to increased giving.

(P1) We are in an investment group. We keep saving. One of us introduced something that was very innovative for me. We have decided that a small percentage of your saving – just 2% of your saving per month – goes into a kitty just meant for giving back to the community. So the idea is… we have a small portion of the savings that we have that go into that. We have committed that as our investment group the percentage of giving also will grow that has not happened yet but that is what now we plan.

(P2) Yeah, that will be easy by the way ‘cause you feel like you are many people who are giving. You don’t feel the pinch that “me I am giving too much.” So you are like 5, which is unity in numbers. So, I will feel like you are giving as a group. So I think that will be good. That will be better than individual, yeah.

(P3) Okay, so I took an initiative of mobilizing people. Yeah, so each and every person will come with anything they feel they can contribute. I personally contributed mine and
then we put it at the table. So, we had a book that we write your name, the amount you’ve contributed and the signature. So this book… we will circulate it then we will do the final tally and ask the treasurer to give us the final tally is how much relating to the number that we’ve written down. Yeah, so it was successfully done.

(P4) This is not what you want to do alone. If you want to do it yourself, it’s because you love yourself. You need to be with others so that you sit and decide what to do, get together, and exchange ideas on how to do it best.

Among the 44 individuals interviewed for this profile of the average Kenyan giver, approximately half of the group had both heard of the various famous Kenyan fundraising campaigns such as Bring Zack Home and Kenya for Kenyans and contributed to one or more of the campaigns. Participants provided a variety of reasons why they chose to give to these particular ‘famous’ campaigns when a large portion of the Kenyan public generally expressed a great deal of skepticism and suspicion toward organized, CSO-spearheaded fundraising. Their motivations for giving were so varied that none can definitively be said to be more prevalent in the data than any other. Nonetheless, a sense of empathy among the participants, the emotional appeal or the ‘emotional tug’ of the issues, and the crisis/emergency nature of these specific well-known appeals are motivational perspectives widely shared among many study participants.

(P1) It’s usually quite sad you know. Most of these stories… People have problems out there I tell you. Somebody told me once, it’s not the amount… It is actually the nature of problems that change. Even those that have so much; it’s just the nature of the problems that will change from one to another.

(P2) There are situations that are emotionally, emotionally capturing. We don’t go to investigate who is behind this. We give because of the situation.

(P3) I think one, Kenyans are very emotive. They are very emotional. You hear disasters… people run… they give.

Three of the study participants provided interesting, somewhat unique, reasons they gave to the famous fundraising campaigns. One participant, for example, explained that he saw the Bring Zack Home as somewhat of a social-political protest – protesting the lack of particular medical
(treatment for spinal injuries) services in Kenya. So, this particular person gave to that campaign because he felt by doing so he was expressing his social-political views about inadequate medical services in Kenya.

Of course I did like Bring Zack Home. That I did. I did because I felt like it was kind of a protest to the people who cannot afford may be spinal injury treatment and what have you. So, to identify with the people like Zack and many others… so that’s why I gave.

The second study participant explained that he gave to the Bring Zack Home campaign because of the campaign’s sophisticated marketing, transparency in fundraising or, more simply, the “way they have packaged the information.” “They were clear and precise on what it is they want to do. Then, they showed what it is that there were doing in terms of pictorial. So, with Bring Zack Home, you could actually see Zack and what he was doing.” Finally, a third study participant explained that he too gave to the Bring Zack Home campaign because the campaign messages made him feel like the small amount he could afford to give was actually desired, appreciated and would, when pooled with many other small donations, make a significant difference to the campaign to bring spinal injury treatment to Kenya. This participant contrasted this dynamic to an NGO that he thought would not be interested or appreciative of his small donation.

What I can say is that, for now, I think for example the one Bring Zack home, somebody can contribute any amount, and somebody can contribute any amount that he or she has. 100 bob [bob is slang for shilling] or such. But the local NGO’s if I just come to an NGO and give 100 bob, how will it… I don’t feel it is something.

7.7 Giving to Local CSOs/NGOs
Given previous discussion in parts of this chapter as well as other chapters in this work regarding widely held public perceptions of local NGOs/CSOs in Kenya; it was quite surprising to learn that approximately two-thirds of the 44 participants interviewed for this profile of the Kenyan giver reported that they had either given to NGOs/CSOs in the past in some way or would be
willing to give to NGOs/CSOs in the future. A number of participants expressed both sentiments – sharing that they had both given to local nonprofit organizations in the past and would be willing to do so in the future should the opportunity/occasion present itself. Overall, however, a significant majority of these respondents did report a history of actual past giving to local NGOs/CSOs in some way. Two of the respondents who reported giving to NGOs/CSOs gave to international organizations headquartered in Western Europe but operating in Kenya. These two are included in the two-thirds group of givers but the more specific data they provided regarding their giving practices is not used in this discussion. The remaining one-third of the respondents stated that they had no history of giving to NGOs/CSOs and would be unlikely to give to these organizations in the future for reasons which will be discussed later on.

Among the study participants who had previously given to local organizations in some way; most of them reported giving to children’s homes that care specifically for orphaned and vulnerable children, other child focused agencies/services such as schools and daycare centers, and/or youth oriented programming. The vast majority of these givers, however, reported that the primary beneficiaries of their giving are local children’s homes.

(P1) So, like I said, children’s homes… Children’s homes are the most… We give them the most because those ones you feel like when you are giving clothes children will be there and wearing… Even when you give you hear messages [that] the workers they carry them away… they carry away the food.

(P2) I do not pay directly to an NGO, but visiting an NGO’s something that they are doing… like visiting children’s homes, run by an NGO, yes. So you have given money and you have given foodstuff and that is something that we do almost once in a year.

(P3) And for them they need encouragement… All the time I am always called, “come talk to these kids of yours, come talk to these… They are not studying well, they are just joking in school.” So, the fact that they feel I’m able to make a small difference or a difference makes me want to stay there. Yeah.
Interestingly, many of the participants who reported giving to children’s homes in various ways do not think of the homes they are involved with as NGOs or CSOs. During the study interviews, a number of them initially said that they had never given to an NGO. Only through additional questioning was it revealed that they had actually given in some way to a children’s home and the particular home or homes that they had given to are services or programs offered by parent NGOs/CSOs who are the entities operating the home/s. It is unclear why participants would be willing to give to children’s homes and not other NGOs/CSOs or why they did not realize that children’s homes are also either directly registered with the Kenyan government as NGOs/CSOs or managed by parent organizations that are registered NGOs/CSOs. Perhaps the vulnerability and emotional appeal of orphaned children enabled givers to overcome potentially negative views of CSOs; or perhaps these homes not being recognized as local organizations was simply due to lack of knowledge regarding their organizational status among study participants. Nonetheless, a couple of the narratives quoted above seem to indicate that even among those who give to children’s homes there is still a degree skepticism regarding the organizational integrity of local NGOs/CSOs. This is evidenced by (P1) above stating that even at children’s homes workers “carry away” donated food and clothing, and (P2) also above noting that she does not give money to the parent NGO but does give financially and in kind to the children’s home the organization operates. Whether or not the knowledge that many of these children’s homes are local NGOs/CSOs will actually alter study participants’ future giving practices is unknown.

The other participants who reported giving to other types of child- and youth- centered programming include one who volunteers at and gives in kind to a local school operated by a community-based organization; a second who volunteers on a children’s cancer unit at a local
hospital; and a third who worked to rebuild an NGO-operated school in his community after a bridge into the school grounds was destroyed by floods.

(P1) There is another NGO… They wanted help, like volunteer, yes. That is… we were going to help in volunteering… like taking care of the kids, yes, helping them to play, to learn… There is another time I used to go to the hospital… I used to volunteer in those kids who have cancer. Yes, we used to take them out, we play with them, we share with them stories books, and comfort them, feed them, then we leave.

(P2) For a period of like 6 months… we used to give sanitary towels and underpants for girls in school… in the slums. And we used to do it monthly, yes. Yes, we actually buy the goods or, at times, give out money

(P3) For example, there is a school nearby our place for an NGO. I think it is for orphans, if am not wrong, it is for orphans. So you find sometimes there is a way… There was a recently there was a lot of rain whereby the bridge was flooded… The orphan kids are there who learn from that school… Some of us in the village or the community we come together, we start rebuilding that bridge, without being paid… just helping the kids to get… avoiding inconvenience when they are going to school, so we help each other.

A significant majority of the participants who reported giving to local NGOs/CSOs in some way said their giving was primarily in the form of volunteering their time, services, labor, expertise, etc. A few participants specifically noted making financial contributions to local NGOs/CSOs, but most giving activities described by study participants are in kind contributions or volunteer activities providing a service or expertise. This is evidenced by the narratives of the 6 participants quoted so far in this section – none of whom noted giving directly financially to a NGO – but do report giving in kind, volunteering and occasional financial contributions to buy specific food/hygiene items.

The reasons and motivations participants gave for giving to local NGOs/CSOs are no different than the reasons/motivations for giving in general that are discussed elsewhere in this chapter. However, several participants provided some interesting explanations for their chosen giving practices that warrant a brief examination here. Two participants, for example, explained that
they give to specific NGOs/CSOs because they strongly believe in the cause the NGO is engaged in. One individual stated, “I have been giving my time volunteering… hoping that things will… yeah. Why do I do that? I believe in the cause. I believe in what it [this organization] does, -- its vision… if it is to build capacity maybe within the industry, you know. Get [professionals in this particular field] thinking in a more facilitative way than they do now?” Another participant stated that he gives to organizations that provide him an event to participate in or an activity to engage in. He noted being motivated or ‘energized’ to give around events and other opportunities for participation, engagement, etc. with the organization and/or the ‘cause.’

The first one I ever did [the first CSO/NGO I gave to] was the Kenya Community Development Foundation. I went out there and they were raising funds for the projects and there was a walk involved and so on. So, I find myself giving to local organizations around an event. Because that’s, that’s all when it sort of comes out and they have a target and they have an activity and it’s easier to participate in an event.

A third participant, contrary to the pervasive negative public perception of NGOs, said that he gives to CSOs/NGOs because he believes they are more “accountable” than individuals in the way they use or might use donated money.

So, I contribute 2,000 Kenya Shillings [approximately $20 USD] every month to that CBO just to make sure that at least they are supporting girls. And I have then used my network also to bring a few friends. Cumulatively, we are giving that CSO per month about 25,000 [approximately $250 USD]. I think the reason also I like to give to CSO’s is that giving to individuals is not sustainable for me because I have tried that and I have been beaten here and there. And I therefore prefer to give CSO’s because CSO’s have a structure and they have accountability within their framework because if it is a women group they will be asking each other, “so, how much did we get? Where did we take it?” Yeah. Other than when you give to individuals because individuals sometimes they do not sometimes take the resources you give to the objective that they explained to you they wanted to do.

A fourth participant stated she has given to CSOs in the past and appreciated receiving a thank you gift for her contribution. She added that she would be willing to give to other CSOs/NGOs in the future if they recognize and appreciate her contribution by giving a thank you gift. “I have
given to a disability CSO and they gave me a bandana which I really value. It is not something expensive, but it is something that I can hold and say, ‘Wow I felt appreciated.’"

The participants that said that had not given to CSOs/NGOs in the past and are not likely to give to them in the future gave a number of reasons for their past practice and current perspectives regarding CSOs/NGOs. Reasons/explanations given are very similar to several of the themes discussed in a previous chapter regarding CSO director/OD professional perspectives of the challenges Kenyan CSOs face trying to mobilize resources locally. One group of these participants shared the perspective that CSOs/NGOs have a lot of money so they would prefer to give their donations directly to an individual or household in need.

(P1) You find people in NGO’s having crazy money. So, definitely if you are doing crazy money things, there is money that goes around.

(P2) I wouldn’t really consider giving to NGO’s cause I think they are more structured and they are able to get their way around in getting help. I would rather give to individuals because maybe they don’t have the right channels; they don’t know how to access things. So, I would rather give to individuals, than give to an organized NGO who can get funding

(P3) I believe there are some other little people out there who are not known by these NGOs and whom the NGOs will never listen or help. So, I’ll rather do it in a very small way to the people - Yeah, yeah!

A second group of participants also perceive CSOs/NGOs as having a lot of money and ‘doing things’ that can only be done with large sums of money. However, this group has not given to CSOs/NGOs and does not intend to in the future because they feel that their resources are insignificant, probably not useful to the NGO/CSO, and potentially not even desired by the NGO/CSO. Responding to questions asking if they had ever given to a local NGO/CSO, several participants stated,

(P1) No, but I have worked with a CBO in Marafa, yeah. So I gave them my time…doing…. Yeah, I worked with a CBO when I was there in the community.....
Because I am not like as in wealthy enough to give directly to an NGO so I just put in my labor for free. Yeah.

(P2) I guess they are organizations… They are organized; they have funding, you know. I like to go for the wide spaces – the areas where there is nobody roaming. Small then… at an individual level. Anyway, it is not like I have so much to give.

(P3) I have never because… okay… you know NGO’s and companies… Maybe, I cannot give them lets say 20 shillings or 1,000 bob… You know, they need maybe a large amount of money… a reasonable amount of money, yeah.

A third group of study participants reported that they had not given to local NGOs/CSOs simply because they had never been asked to do so. Several added that if they were approached or a contribution was solicited from them, they would be willing to give if they had the resources at the time.

(P1) Okay. I have not been approached. If I have, I can.

(P2) Maybe I have not come across an NGO, which need my support. I haven’t come across, yeah. Or they haven’t come for my assistance.

A fourth and final group of study participants stated that they had never given in any way to an NGO/CSO and were not likely to do so in the future because they view CSOs as corrupt organizations that often misuse the funds they have and they believe many in the NGO/CSO sector are there to “enrich themselves.”

(P1) Yes! I will never even think of giving those people because I believe the ones we have here in Kenya, when you give them, it is for their own self - I mean to enrich themselves. Most of them, they don’t do things to help the community; they just - you give them money and they will use it to elevate themselves… make themselves look good and everything… but not to help the community or do anything meaningful that is worthy. That’s why I don’t give them. And they are usually very, very corrupt and we believe that those people to be given by agencies like - development agencies USAID - and the like but I have never thought of [giving to NGOs/CSOs].

(P2) Misuse of funds… That actually is a great de-motivator. Kenya doesn’t have… Kenya has a very strong NGO sector… very positive… which does a lot of positive things, but it has also got a very dark side; misuse of resources! Yeah, before you know it the amount of money that they have been able to generate from the very many resources to support groups, ends up in their pockets without helping… They enjoy a
lavish lifestyle that tends to put off people a lot. For me that is one thing that keeps me off NGOs.

### 7.8 Improving the Success Rate of Local CSOs/NGOs

#### Soliciting Public Contributions

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Participant Suggestions for Improving CSO/NGO Success in Local Fundraising</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Improve organizational accountability, transparency, efficiency and effectiveness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Center all outreaches to the public around personal contact, relationship building and establishing partnerships.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Tap into prospective givers’ emotions – ‘tug at the heart.’ Market individuals and their needs not programs, strategies, grand plans or organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Provide givers/prospective givers opportunities to engage in the work, participate, belong, feel a part of what the CSO/NGO is doing.</td>
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As a conclusion to this profile of the ‘typical’ individual Kenyan giver, this section outlines four steps that study participants think local CSOs/NGOs should take in order to strengthen their capacity for local fundraising and increase the likelihood that any attempts they might make to mobilize resources locally will be successful. As in previous sections of this chapter and elsewhere in this work, these steps again echo themes previously highlighted such as the widespread negative public perception of local CSOs/NGOs, etc. The first action step – and the one that many participants see as the most important recommendations of the four discussed here – is local CSOs/NGOs should be managed with greater integrity, efficiency and effectiveness; improve their transparency and accountability; and keep donors and the general public well-informed about how they are using donated funds.

(P1) They have to have their financial systems in place. Just keeping proper records and being able to show the results you know it is not just about I have spent 10 million you can say I have spent 10 million… but this is the change that I have brought. And then, in terms of structures, you find many local NGO’s; yes you know who is the Director but you look underneath to the people who are working… they are, you know, part of the family. So, you know then it brings professionalism. So you know I think those are the things that the local NGO’s need to work on. Bring in professionalism in to place and then have systems that show that they are accountable and that they can be accountable...
and that they are keeping their words in terms of what they say they are going to do and to demonstrate results, yeah, spending you can spend, but how do you spend it.

(P2) Let me be sincere with you… I don’t think it’s in contradiction. I think it’s that there is, there is a job by CSOs to clean themselves first. There’s sort of distrust. I mean, it’s very hard, to convince me. I want to see what you are doing with this. CSOs and Foundations don’t clean themselves… I mean, Africa is a hard place to do that because this is where these CSOs have been working. So, you can’t lie to them because they have beneficiaries – “beneficiaries” in quotes of what CSO’s are doing and you can’t see the benefits. So, how are you going to ask me to join the relay, to fund for what I don’t see? So there’s a big job here, really!

(P3) I wish something will be done to make people more transparent. It is very easy to educate people, but to win their trust is another thing. I can stand here, the whole day and talk to people about giving, but how do I win their trust? Winning their trust will come from a whole shift to look in the way of leadership and in the way our systems work, yeah. So, we will need more transparency, we need more accountability so that people can give.

The second action step study participants recommended could simply be called ‘building relationships.’ By that, participants meant primarily connecting with existing local donors and potential donors in a personal, relational way. To a certain extent what participants described could be considered ‘networking’ or ‘personalized/targeted marketing,’ but study participants seemed to be talking about something much deeper, more personable and more relational than a term like ‘personalized marketing’ would suggest. For example, many participants referred to their past and current giving engagements as the direct result of personal contacts and relationships introducing them to organizations and individuals in need. Participants noted that these personal, relational links bred trust that the cause or need, they were being asked to give to, was legitimate and that their contributions would be used as intended. One participant described the relationship, personal connection he thought should exist between receiving CSOs/NGOs and their donors/contributors as a “partnership.” Numerous participants also emphasized the importance of local organizations reaching new potential donors through social networks and “circles of influence.” Several suggested that, as local CSOs/NGOs receive contributions from
new donors, they should encourage these new “partners” to be their advocates within their individual spheres of influence and various social networks.

(P1) I think that is where we got off [as in… got off on the wrong foot]. I always say this is a kind of partnership. You cannot get a lady today and tell her can I marry you. Of course she wouldn’t accept. But, how you build that relationship so that eventually you can bring that point of marriage. You might want money from me but it might be the wrong time. So I give you money and I want something else… Instead of that money – I force you to move in a different direction and that was not the reason why you formed the organization. So those are kind of things that I look at. So then, once I understand you, you also understand me, and then we can be able to work together.

(P2) Probably through your own groups… You probably are part of existing groups and you obviously would convert your immediate group. Once that group is converted, chances are that somebody now can lead – ‘cause we all have sort of leads – now somebody could lead you into another group and into another group. I think that is the way it would work.

(P3) So, it is really how you get in… I think using ‘the circles of influence’ …sort of networks that help… You obviously then need to be more strategic in terms of you know, which groups are you going to target and how are you going to get to them… So network is a big part of it. But then once you have the platform, then it’s really the message and then also getting sort of some low hanging fruits. So for example if you ask for somebody’s time, as they now spend time, they are getting more engaged then they probably see the value of dipping into the checkbook and they give.

(P4) No, I prefer a direct approach, a really personalized approach. Don’t go to the radio, ‘cause the advertisement they really slip me. But if you really personalize then I think you understand that I am suitable for that project and yeah I can help. Then I’ll take it like I can actually really commit to it cause you understand also that I am suitable, don’t generalize.

Study participants also think that local NGOs/CSOs that want to start raising money locally or be more successful at local fundraising should ‘tell more stories’ – particularly ones that evoke an emotional response among readers/listeners/viewers of the stories. They suggested that local organizations focus more effort on showcasing human and community need and how the organization’s intervention will directly impact the human and community need shown. They proposed that this approach would, in their views, be much more successful than an appeal for a ‘social cause,’ project, program or organization. Participants also noted the kinds of ‘stories’
that most often evoke emotional, empathic responses are those involving emergencies, crises, grave illness and other critical situations like natural disasters and conflict.

(P1) You know, you can build a case and say, “This is Henry. He was here, somebody helped them, now here they are. You see; this is what you can do.” Those sort of things… you know… they touch… the story. That really helps. If one can see… you are able to show the results or show the influence or the effect of what you’ve done to a community or something… by just maybe a shilling… whatever it is every month.

(P2) It’s the story, you know, you just read. You come across it. Maybe you didn’t know. Social media really helps. You learn, you get to share so much. So, like most of this… Of course West Gate* was everywhere… we were all giving. [*West Gate is a high-end mall in Nairobi that was attacked and held by terrorists for several days during the summer of 2013. Approximately 70 people were killed and 175 wounded. Significant portions of the mall were damaged by fire. West Gate re-opened to the public in early 2016.]

(P3) Those things… I look at them carefully. It has to touch… Whatever it is; it has to touch my heart. I give from my heart. I don’t give from my head, no. It has to touch me in a special way such that I feel—yes.

(P4) Make me identify with what you are doing. Make me see myself in it. I remember West Gate. West Gate moved me because of one particular lady. The pictures were going around the Internet of the dead people. There’s this girl who was lying by the escalator, dead. And I will never forget that, because, she was just your normal Nairobi girl in jeans and a top… a young girl and then she was just lying there. And I thought, “that could have been me.” I used to visit West Gate often so I just thought, “that could have been me lying there.”

Finally, study participants suggested that local CSOs/NGOs provide more opportunities to participate and engage in the activities of the organization. Participants think that part of the partnership, relational dynamic described above includes not just a giving aspect but active participation in the programs and services the organization provides.

(P1) More of, okay, come and do… Yeah, come and do.

(P2) Involve me. How do you really personalize my role so that I can create not only a rapport but a relationship. Like give me a task. Tell me to me handle this. Then I can force myself to come out and be there for that need or that assignment that you can give me. Yeah, I prefer you really give me like a task. Make me personally involved. Assign me something then and somehow I will grow into it, does that make sense?
P3 If you could let people participate in a small way. [For example,] you are doing a big project and you have one day where you let people do something you show them. That helps for people to see. Let people get engaged. If you can, involve people, not necessarily to run them. Once in a while, let people get to know what happens.

(P4) If it’s something that that would require my involvement I am usually more than happy, you know. I am more than happy to do that. I, you know, it helps me feel part of it. I created it. I have helped, you know, to build it. Yeah. And even getting that time, creating that time, you know that says something, yeah.

7.9 Conclusion
The data collected to profile the perspectives and practices of individual Kenyan givers strongly indicates that Kenyans are generous givers. Regardless of their socio-economic status all participants described giving in some way. This was most often in the form of financial contributions – even among the lower categories of socio-economic status. Participants giving revolved first-and-foremost around their personal connections. They gave to their family, friends, neighbors and colleagues. They most often gave at critical times of need in the lives of these 4 groups of people. They also gave generously to these same groups of people at important life events such as weddings and funerals.

What is most interesting about this data is that it supports traditional patterns of giving seen throughout Sub-Saharan Africa as well as in other parts of the world where members of an individual’s social network function as his/her primary social safety net and source of credit – during both times of crisis and at defining moments in life. While individuals in the United States and elsewhere in the Global North rely on credit and lending institutions as well as organizations/companies that are willing to carry their debt for extended periods of time (eg: medical facilities) on such occasions; the vast majority of individuals in Sub-Saharan Africa and other countries of the Global South turn to their social networks. For example, an individual in the U.S. who needed to visit her sick grandfather in another city but did not have sufficient funds
for travel, might purchase a plane ticket using a credit card. She would then pay off with small payments over time. An individual facing the same situation in Kenya might turn to her uncle whom she knows has a good government job and ask to borrow the travel money needed from him. There is some level of reciprocity expected within these social networks where whether or not members of the group are particularly conscious of it at any one time, there is some knowledge that both giving and receiving will take place at various points for everyone in the network. The same Kenyan who asks her uncle for travel money, at some level knows that her sister, for example, could ask her for help paying her children’s school fees.

While a surprising number of respondents expressed that they had given to NGOs/CSOs at some point, these findings have potentially very interesting implications for local nonprofit organizations seeking to raise funds from individual Kenyans. They raise a number of important questions for the local organizations to consider:

1. Where these traditional social safety networks operating to mutually assist ‘members’ in critical times of need and extend credit from time to time; what measure of success can NGOs/CSOs have in re-directing these patterns/habits of giving away from these social relationship to structured organizations?

2. Given that this giving among members of a social network has been a rather successful way of covering crisis expenses, extending credit, accumulating assets, mutual benefit, etc. should the organizations even try to ‘tap into’ these giving patterns? Would such an effort disrupt what is a traditional, well-functioning system?

3. In the Global North, CSOs and social service agencies exist – in large part – because our societies have created them to fill the role of that the social safety network plays in many Sub-Saharan African countries. In a context where this social network is functioning quite well, is the whole concept of a CSO and public/private partnerships working jointly for public good even the right form of organization for the context?

These and many similar questions could be asked as a result of this data. Some of these issues will be taken-up in the final chapter of this work, but others would be good lines of enquiry for future research.
Chapter 8: Research Question 4

Using an interpretive, grounded-theory approach to data analysis, what possible theoretical assertions can be made to explain stakeholder-focused and context-specific conceptualizations of organizational sustainability of local organizations in development?

8.1 The Art of Theorizing

As noted in the research methods chapter for this study, research question #4 is about taking an intentional, conceptual and abstract look at the data already examined in various ways through research questions #1-3. This chapter takes a step back from the data and looks, more deliberately, for deeper meaning in the data. This deeper look means identifying patterns when and where they exist; identifying relationships and interactions among data; and determining what conceptual implications might be drawn from these patterns and relationships. Therefore, the central objective of this chapter is to take the information reported on for the first 3 research questions – i.e., what are the contextual determinants of OS/OE; what is the role of local fundraising in attempts by CSOs/NGOs to become more sustainable; and what is the profile of the individual Kenyan giver – and try to weave a conceptual narrative of how all this data “holds together” to impact the sustainability and effectiveness of local organizations in development. This chapter takes the initial steps toward developing grounded theory that explains this data.

Charmaz (2014) makes a clear distinction between theory or developing theory and theorizing. She defines theorizing as “a practice.” It entails practical activities of engaging the world and of constructing abstract understandings about and within it (p. 233).” So, this chapter is the investigator’s attempt to theorize – to engage with the data collected and to see if any more abstract understandings can be derived from and through that engagement, yet not forcing abstractions or theoretical conclusions where they do not exist. Charmaz notes that some scholars define theory as “generalized statements about universals (p. 233).” The content of this
chapter is not that! Rather, what follows is a series of what Charmaz (referencing Alasuutari, 1996) calls possible “interpretive frames through which to view realities (p. 232).” (See Table 8.1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Interpretive Frame</th>
<th>Key Assertions</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| 1   | Underlying the OS/OE of local organizations in Kenya is a self-defeating system of ineffectual relationships. | • CSO boards relationships with management teams are incongruous with OS/OE  
• CSO staff–founder-directors relationships are often dysfunctional  
• International donor-CSO relationships are overbearing and patronizing  
• CSO-CSO relationships are competitive not collaborative  
• Public highly distrustful of CSOs |
| 2   | The system underlying OS/OE is dominated by the “projectized approach” to development that does nothing for long-term organizational viability. | • Development=series of successfully completed projects  
• Intl. donors implement through projects  
• Intl. donors only fund projects  
• Local CSOs=donor delivery mechanisms  
• Intl. donors do not invest in core ops./structures that would strengthen OS/OE |
| 3   | Dynamics within the system underlying OS/OE prevent the development of strong organizational identity (OI) among local CSOs/NGOs. | • Projectized approach, heavy sway of donor funding, no funding for core ops. and high staff turnover prevents developments of org. elements that are central, distinctive and enduring  
• Thereby, prevents development of OI |
| 4   | The system underlying OS/OE is highly politicized and characterized by adversarial relationships between local CSOs/NGOs and government. | • CSO-GOK relationship=adversarial  
• CSO-Local politicians relationship=symbiotic ‘complementary opposites,’ – very difficult for CSOs to manage  
• Adversarial CSO-GOK relations overall will limit GOK funding of civil society organizations |
| 5   | The position that the nonprofit sector holds with the system underlying OS/OE has made social service/development work a lucrative profession that can enhance social status. | • This work allows staff to ‘make it’ and ‘move up the social ladder’  
• Attracts people with questionable motives/objectives  
• Causes high staff turnover  
• Prevents staff buy-in, OI and, therefore, OS/OE |
| 6   | The system underlying OS/OE – without international donor funding – cannot support local CSOs/NGOs as they are currently structured. | • To survive and thrive in this system w/o intl. donor money…  
  – CSOs must shrink  
  – CSOs must adjust budgets/operational platforms to be in line with ‘local philanthropic market’  
  – CSOs must establish/reestablish community ownership… or else disband |
8.2 Interpretive Frame 1: Underlying the OS/OE of Local Organizations in Kenya is a self-Defeating System of Ineffectual Relationships

The data support the conclusion that the sustainability and effectiveness of local development organizations (CSOs/NGOs) in Kenya occurs both within a ‘system’ and is a product of that ‘system.’ In other words, OE/OS is heavily influenced – or actually determined – by the complex interactions between the various components or actors/agents within that ‘system.’ Richmond (1991) defines a ‘system’ as “the underlying web of ongoing, reciprocal relationships [among actors/agents], which are cycling to produce the patterns of behavior a system is exhibiting (p. 2).” Senge (2006) describes a rainstorm, for example, as a product of a ‘system.’ He describes how various elements and processes in nature such as groundwater, evaporation, storm runoff, clouds, etc. interact with one another to result in or produce a rainstorm. These various elements and their interactions/relationships with one another constitute the system within which the rainstorm occurs as well as the set of factors that, when working in concert, ‘cause’ or lead to the rainstorm.

The data collected for this study reveal that the system in which OS/OE occurs in Kenya is composed of numerous key actors, agents, elements and processes. These include the Government of Kenya (GOK), Kenyan politicians, international development donors, international NGOs implementing programs in Kenya, the communities in which local CSOs/NGOs operate, the Kenyan public at large, existing and potential individual Kenyan donors, the staffs of local CSOs/NGOs, the management and governing boards of local CSOs/NGOs and, of course, the local CSOs/NGOs themselves. The system that undergirds the OS/OE of local CSOs/NGOs in Kenya includes a number of additional actors, agents and
processes, but the data collected for this study highlight, in particular, the key importance of these 10 particular actors/processes within the system.

At present, the elements of this system appear to be operating in silos isolated from one another and, at times, even in direct conflict with one another. It is hard to envision how a system characterized by these kinds of relational dynamics among key agents could help generate, in any significant way, a community of vibrant, thriving, sustainable and effective local development organizations. While the various components of the system do communicate with one another, maintain some degree of collaborative relationships with one another, and engage in mutually beneficial transactions; these actors clearly have very different concerns and priorities. They seek and claim to be in partnership but settle for something far less than that. Collectively, they laud the importance and near sanctity of ‘community ownership’ while their efforts to advance and achieve community ownership can, at best, be described as placation. Consider the dynamics that exist among many of the primary actors in this system – as described by study participants – and ponder the question, ‘How can local organizations not just survive but thrive and make a difference in such a system?’

To start, the relationships between many CSO/NGO boards and the organization’s executive management team seem completely incongruous with the idea of achieving and maintaining organizational sustainability. As was discussed in Chapter 5, governing boards seem to be either too involved in the daily operations of the organizations or actively shirking their responsibility as organizational caretakers. One participant noted, for example, “we have a board of directors, but really they are not involved – most of them don’t even know what the organization stands for.” Another said, “At times, you’ll find the board interfering with the organization…” A third participant stated, “not very many people want to sit on a board when they are not walking out of
the board with money.” If organizations have been designed following the ‘traditional’ governing board/implementing management team model – which most of the participating organizations in this study seem to have been – the boards are clearly constituted or working in ways that would not be particularly supportive of OS/OE.

A number of study participants mentioned the frustrated relationship NGO/CSO staff often have with their founder-directors who refuse to ‘share power’ with them by delegating responsibilities and authority to them or by entrusting them with key tasks. One participant described this founder-director style of leadership often seen among local CSOs/NGOs as “a dictatorial kind of leadership.” One of these founder-directors himself recognized the sometimes-fraught relationship between organizational leadership and staff. He stated, “There is a lot of that founder mentality going on… especially in local organizations. People will tend to view the founder as the owner of the organization. Everybody now will fear the founder. That kills an organization. You are working to please the founder, but you are not working to actually build the organization.” Dysfunctional relationships between management and staff in any organization hinder organizational development and often result in high turnover among employees.

Nearly all of the CSO/NGO directors as well as the OD professionals characterized the NGO/CSO – international donor relationship as overbearing and patronizing. They felt that donors are too directive and restrictive with their funding and, much more importantly, they are not sincerely interested in building communities of thriving, sustainable and effective local organizations that could exist without their support yet still ‘do good work.’ Numerous CSO directors, for example, whose organizations had received ‘capacity building interventions’ directly from or funded by international donors or international NGOs, explained that this lack of
sincerity and commitment has been exhibited many times by the way in which capacity building interventions have been carried out in Kenya. These participants explained that these interventions had not been effective because they were usually designed from the “top-down,” were not “demand-driven,” were not sufficiently “customized” or “tailored” to the recipient organization’s needs, were too short, and too theoretical. One OD professional stated, “Let’s be keen on the fact that if it’s a donor who is giving funding for this, donors also have their own agenda, and then the question of balancing between that donor’s interest and the interest of the organization becomes key.” Another OD professional describes the local capacity building interventions he has observed, and even been a part of… “We are just bringing and saying this is how we want you to work, we are not actually looking at what are their priorities, what do they want to see in their organization.” One of the CSO directors interviewed for this study complained about the lack of follow-up to and opportunity for hands-on practice of capacity building/training received. He noted, capacity building “needs to be continuous. I usually say that if I read a book today, and practically I don’t perform what I’ve read, it is of no use for me. It’s like a time wasted… Yes, it is not adding any value in my life, so it is a time wasted.” Finally, two more participants explained why they doubted the sincerity and donor commitment to genuine sustainability and effectiveness of local organizations. One CSO director stated, “I think, first and foremost from my experience, donors are paying lip service to capacity building. You say, you’re building capacity, but you are not addressing the real issue.” Another CSO director, quoting a friend of his who is also a CSO director, stated… “Yes, give us all the policies, give us all the systems and no money. So what do we do with those policies and systems without money that keeps the organization moving, money to fund our programs, and core funding for the organization?”
This dysfunctional relationship occurs in a professional context where international donors and international NGOs are quite vocal about the critical importance of local organizations in development. Many go so far as to say that local organizations have a central role to play in national and community development. The reader may recall sections of this work that discussed both evidentiary and theoretical support for comparative advantage within the development community that local organizations enjoy. Nearly all of the primary, official bilateral donor agencies – USAID, AFD, CIDA, SIDA, DFID, etc. – have statements in their policies and strategic plans that clearly situate the local development organization at the center of the development process. One of the assertions made in USAID policy, for example, is that local organizations are more effective at facilitating change because of their rootedness in community and resulting knowledge of local culture and society (USAID, 2013 and WTW, 2013). Yet, while sentiments are expressed within professional discourse that support local organizations, study participants express significant frustration at the relationships they have with international donors and international NGOs – describing them as overbearing and patronizing. A thriving community of local organizations is not likely to emerge in a system where both the funders of development and the development implementers are at loggerheads with each other.

The data also highlight the existence of a competitive rather than a cooperative relationship among local CSOs/NGOs. Several study participants made statements like, “people fear networking;” and “there is a lot of competition amongst ourselves… we don’t see why we need to come together.” “Last year, one partner from Finland came to Kisii. We were given the lead in two counties so that we can lead three other organizations. And you know, there was conflict. Each and everyone could come and say, ‘this is what I want; this what I want; I don’t want this
one; why this one; why not this?” Fear of networking and collaboration is almost certainly a significant contributor to program and project duplication. It likely increases the costs of services and interventions because the potential cost savings of networking/collaboration are not realized. Heightened levels of competition among organizations likely reduces both the quality and breadth of service as fights for resources and control of ‘space’ in the development ‘marketplace’ distract organizations from their core mission as public benefit organizations. To a certain extent some measure of competition could increase organizational survivability but if it continues unabated it will almost certainly reach a threshold where it threatens an organization’s reach, quality of work, and therefore, its sustainability.

The final, but one of the most significant relationships emphasized in the data, is the ineffectual relationship within the system between CSOs/NGOs and the general public. All study participants stressed the widely held perceptions among the Kenyan populace that local CSOs/NGOs are corrupt; misuse funding; receive money from international sources and so do not need local investment; and are often founded, directed and staffed by individuals whose motives are questionable. According to one study participant, “Most of the communities and even private organizations believe that nongovernmental organizations have lots of monies since they are connected with international partners so they don’t need local funding.” Another participant described his belief that individual Kenyans would not give to local organizations with this words… “Corruption, of course! People are not sure where the money will go; what will be done with their money.” A third study participant shared, “These guys are being given our money; but we are seeing them driving big cars, taking their kids to better schools and whatever… Will my money go to help person ‘z’ do this or will it go to their pocket or how is it.” Clearly, people are not likely to give to organizations they perceive as corrupt vehicles for
people looking to get rich. CSOs/NGOs that operate in a public space where they are perceived with this degree of disdain will have a very difficult time of increasing their sustainability by increasing the amount of funding they raise from local populations.

There are other relationships and reciprocal interactions among the various components of the system that are not discussed here. One of them – the local CSO/NGO-Government relationship – warrants singular attention so it will be discussed in greater detail below. To summarize, when taken collectively, these ineffectual relationships among the various actors, agents, elements and processes within the system – ‘intended’ to support OS/OE of local CSOs/NGOs in Kenya – actually work against rather than for greater levels of organizational viability and sustainability. While many of the agents within the system articulate ardent commitment to greater sustainability among local organizations, their actions and reactions with each other often have deleterious effects on their objectives. Many of the CSO board members, directors and staff seem to recognize the negative impact dynamics within the system ultimately have on the sustainability and effectiveness of their organizations. However, they seem powerless to change the system given their relatively low power position within this system particularly when compared to international NGOs, international donors and other donors and contributors. Alternatively, some actors may not recognize the consequences of their actions and those of others within the system. Perhaps they do and choose to ignore it. Perhaps they do but feel like altering the dynamics within the system is impossible, etc. Addressing these particular issues would be excellent questions for a future research enquiry.
8.3 Interpretive Frame 2: The System Underlying OS/OE is Dominated by the “Projectized Approach” to Development That Does Nothing for Long-Term Organizational Viability

Most scholars trace the emergence or conceptualization of ‘development’ as both a process or enterprise and an ‘ideal end state’ to a series of events that occurred in the mid-1940s and revolved around both the lead-up to and the conclusion of World-War II (WWII) (Rapley, 1996, Rist, 2008, Schafer et al., 2012, and Willis, 2005). President Harry S. Truman’s (the 33rd president of the United States) inaugural address given on January 20, 1949 is probably the single most-cited event that scholars conclude gave rise to the contemporary concept of development as both practice and ideal end state. The fourth point of Truman’s speech has been described as the “inauguration of the development age (Rist, 2008, p. 71).” Truman argued that the US and the international community as a whole,

…must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas.

Truman’s use of the term ‘underdeveloped’ ushered in a new way of thinking about the community of nations. Nations came to be categorized as either ‘developed’ or ‘underdeveloped.’ Western nations (North America and Western Europe) were thought of as ‘developed’ while most of the rest of the world was thought of as ‘underdeveloped’ – needing to move or transition from their state of underdevelopment to a Western-like state of development. The dichotomizing of world nations into two camps led, in part, to a new conceptualization of development not as a ‘natural progression’ that ‘just happens,’ but as a facilitated action leading to an ideal state that is associated with certain attributes. Prior to the emergence of this new conceptualization, the development of nations, communities, people groups, cities and towns, etc. was viewed as ‘organic’ or ‘natural’ – in much the same way that an individual ‘develops’
over time – naturally evolving from one stage of development to the next. With the Truman speech, development came to be viewed as ‘something someone does to someone else’ – or, in the Truman view, something a developed nation does to and/or for an underdeveloped nation.

The “projectized approach” to development – as discussed and described by many of the participants in this study – seems to have directly emerged from the school-of-thought that views development as something an organization does to another organization; a person to another person; or a nation to another nation. On numerous occasions, in response to questions about context-specific factors that impact organizational sustainability; questions about the role of capacity building in the sustainability of local organizations; and questions about international funding of local organizations; study participants repeatedly brought up the subject of the “projectized approach” to development. Their evaluation or assessment of this “projectized approach” was always negative.

Participant perspectives – when analyzed collectively – present a pretty clear definition of the “projectized approach” to development. This approach views ‘development’ as the result of a series of projects. Projects are discrete, time-bound, interventions and/or services designed to improve social welfare for the targeted beneficiaries in specific ways. These improvements are nearly always tangible and easily measurable using relatively simple quantifiable techniques. Projects typically have a life span of 2-5 years. They include a set of quantifiable, measurable objectives and indicators. They are usually associated with specific line-item budgets with clear restrictions on how funds may be used. Interventions and services usually include activities ‘done to’ or ‘done for’ a community of beneficiaries. These activities might be building schools and clinics for a community, vaccinating children, distributing food, etc.
Participants explained that virtually all funding from international donors is tied to projects and project implementation. Participants describe that the generally accepted description of a successful project is one that is implemented on time, on budget and one that achieves the targeted number of outputs and sometime outcomes – e.g. children vaccinated, people trained, shovels delivered, trees planted, calves distributed, etc. To a significant extent development as a process or practice has become synonymous with ‘successful project implementation.’ Development as an end state has become synonymous with ‘successful project completion’ and ‘the achievement of project targets.’

This “projectized approach” that views development as a series of interventions done to and/or services provided to ‘needy’ communities seems to dominate the ‘development system.’ Some agents within the system support this or at least acquiesce to it. Others seem to be very frustrated by it. Regardless of the variety of opinions among the agents within the system, the “projectized approach to development” dominates the development system and the development/civil society community in Kenya. The “projectized approach” and the thinking that undergirds it stands in contrast, for example, with Amartya Sen’s work that views development as a transformative process that enables people to live the lives they envision for themselves; to live-out their values and principles. From Sen’s perspective, material well being, economic growth, etc. are part of a necessary but insufficient scaffolding that enables individuals to live a transformed life with unencumbered freedom of choice. Sen would likely describe this “projectized approach” as shallow and extremely shortsighted.

According to study participants, the “projectized approach” not only inhibits the development of effective and sustainable organizations but actively works against the OS/OE of local organizations in development. For example, many study participants described how donors only
fund projects; they do not fund core business or organizational expenses such as infrastructure, managerial salaries, or human resource systems, etc. Participants claim that restricting funding to projects and project implementation makes it basically impossible to build effective organizations that stand the test of time. “(P1) That’s what we tend to see in a lot of local CSOs in Kenya. They get funding for a specific project and once a project is done, the organization almost folds up.” “(P2) “Those big organizations… the USAIDs… always come in with programs. They come in when they know what they would want to be achieved with their resources.” “(P3) Donors are more interested in the project objectives being met.” “(P4) We’re seeing a lot of donors wanting to pay for the activities, and of course that works to our disadvantage a lot of times, but sometimes that’s what you work with.” “(P5) Local organizations do not get overheads. So, your engagement with – or any kind of organization – is just for the purpose of delivering the project. So, once you become delivery oriented, project oriented, delivery and sustainability is thrown out of the window.”

Many participants expanded on this point by adding that most internationally funded and/or internationally implemented organizational capacity building is actually oriented more toward the recipient organization’s specific capacities for project implementation. In such cases, the donor/capacity builder – intentionally or unintentionally – is interacting with the recipient organization simply as a vehicle through which it implements its projects. “(P1) A lot of organizations never saw that really as building the capacity of the organization. It was building the capacity of the organization to implement the USAID program.” “(P2) The investment in building the capacity of [civil] society is quite limited. Donors are more interested in the project objectives being met.” It seems quite clear, that more often than not, the local CSO/NGO is not viewed as a stand-alone entity worthy of investment in and of itself but more as a means to an
end. This approach is somewhat baffling as the main objective of ‘organizational capacity building’ is establishing a cadre of local organizations sufficiently strong and equipped to ‘take over’ social service/development practice so international organizations can ‘go home.’ Participants described, in some detail, how capacity to implement a project is distinct from capacity to effectively and efficiently establish and run an organization that makes a positive contribution to social welfare and the public good over an extended period of time. “(P1) The donor focus is [on] service delivery. There is not that much focus on institutional strengthening which is a key element of institutional sustainability.” “(P2) Money was never really meant for institutional strengthening, a lot of that money was to help the organization [the donor or capacity building organization] implement its own program more efficiently.”

The system that undergirds the sustainability of local organizations is dominated by a “projectized approach to development.” The dominance of this approach to development has so permeated the system that nearly all funding for development and social service is tied to ‘the project;’ funding for and implementation of capacity building of development and social service organizations is tied to ‘the project;’ and successful development is, itself, defined as project completed and targets met. Even actors within the system – such as the local CSOs/NGOs themselves – that see the shortcomings of the “projectized approach” are forced to respond to the approach’s dominance in ways they often know is not in their long-term best interests. Building and maintaining a community of vibrant, successful, sustainable organizations in this type of system will be a tremendous challenge if not nearly impossible.
Interpretive Frame 3: Dynamics Within the System Underlying OS/OE Prevent the Development of Strong Organizational Identity

Albert and Whetten (1985) are credited with developing the idea of ‘organizational identity’ (OI) and positioning it as a cornerstone concept within the field of organizational behavior research (Gonzales-Miranda et al., 2014). Gonzales-Miranda et al. note, that after more than 25 years of scholarly research on organizational identity, neither a widely accepted conceptualization or a “complete” (p. 129) definition of the term has been realized. Nonetheless, three central tenets of OI, first proposed by Albert and Whetten, continue to serve as the core starting point for many scholars studying/conceptualizing OI (Yamashiro, 2015 citing Sata, 2013 and Albert & Whetten, 1985). According to Albert and Whetten, OI consists of those elements within an organization that are “a) central, b) distinctive, and c) enduring (as cited in Yamashiro, 2015, p. 195).” Other scholars use the very similar terms “a) unparalleled, b) unique and c) unchanging over time (as cited in Yamashiro, 2015, p. 195).” At its core, OI attempts to answer the question that is essential to every organization’s existence – *Who are we?*

According to Whetten (2006) that which is distinct is defined as organizational attributes that distinguish organizations from one another. That which is central are organizational attributes that are at the core of the organization – it’s “deepest commitments (p. 224).” That which is enduring includes organizational attributes that are at the core of the organization and have “stood the test of time (p. 224).” Numerous scholars have both built-on and critiqued Albert and Whetten’s work. An in depth exploration of the very complex concept that is OI is beyond the scope of this work. Massive amounts of literature have been written about OI and its ever-evolving conceptualization.
If, however, we view data from the present study through Albert and Whetten’s simple 3-pronged conceptualization of OI (central, distinctive and enduring elements of an organization), it becomes quite clear that formation of organizational identity with the system in which local CSOs/NGOs operate in Kenya is extremely challenging if not impossible. For example, study participants repeatedly spoke of the heavy sway of donors and international NGOs through both their project funding and capacity building interventions. If local NGOs/CSOs want funding to implement their programs they essentially have to acquiesce to the demands/requirements of the donor. This likely requires them to compromise any “central commitments” they may have or be developing. Whatever “central commitments” the organization may have, they are not likely to last for any length of time as organizations change focus, change priorities, change directions, etc. in order to secure donor funding for whatever programmatic priorities the donor has chosen for that particular funding cycle. One participant lamented the connection he has often observed between capacity building and project funding, for example,…

Let’s say capacity building donors X and Y have completely different frameworks for capacity building, but they are all going to be funding one agency. The same agency at some point… So, because these agencies are powerless in that sense... I mean, they have got the right to say we have gone through this or not. But, many times the funding agencies also have their agenda. Phase one is capacity building. So, you can’t say be we have done this. Do you want to receive the money…?

The “projectized approach to development” is another dynamic of the system that hinders the development of organizational identity among local CSOs/NGOs. As previously stated, most donors direct nearly all of their funding to project implementation and project-related expenses. They generally do not fund a local NGOs/CSOs’ core operating expenses. Local organizations need a core business unit that endures as projects come and go in order to be sustainable and effective. It seems logical that any defining central commitments (core beliefs) that stand the test of time can only emerge from and be sustained by the organization’s core business unit and not
from individual project implementation units that, by nature, are relatively short-lived. Organizations that exist – as many of the organizations represented in this study do – almost solely on funding from international donors and without any core funding will not be able to develop the operational platform necessary to establish central commitments/core beliefs and thereby develop a strong organizational identity.

An OD expert noted how the near irresistibility of large sums of international donor money has negatively impacted local organizations’ individual identities. He stated, “this huge funding… pushed organizations away from themselves to implementing programs.” One of the CSO directors made the same point in this way… “I feel like local organizations tend to really do a lot of implementation, rather than building their organization…” One of the most insightful quotes regarding the impact the “projectized approach” has on organizational identity was made by another CSO director who said…

I think the issue of mission drift… So that there’s the reason why the organization exists, but because they need to get funding from certain organization, you tend then to meet their goal and kind of ignore yours. So, after a period of the project – say three years – that project will not continue because this partner is not there to fund it, and it’s not necessarily what the organization exists to do… so that dies! Then, you start another project and that dies, and another one… So, the organization ceases to exist basically and you’re busy following projects.

This individual – perhaps without knowing it – was discussing organizational identity and the deleterious effects of the “projectized approach” on OI. An organizational mission statement is essentially an articulation of an organization’s central commitments and core beliefs. Drifting away from the mission statement due to the appeal of donor funding pulls the organization away from its central commitments and thereby compromises its identity. The respondent mentions the organization, as an independent entity, being completely overshadowed by the projects it is
implementing. In other words, the local organization is nothing more than a delivery mechanism.

High levels of staff turnover also restricts the development of strong organizational identify within local CSOs/NGOs. According to study participants, high turnover seems to be due, in part, to donor driven capacity building that unintentionally makes staff more marketable so they leave smaller, local organizations looking for better paying jobs with greater opportunities for social advancement. Another ‘cause’ of high staff turnover is the public perception that NGO/CSO work is a route to greater wealth and social mobility. CSOs, therefore, attract a cadre of people perhaps less focused on fully investing themselves in the jobs and organizations they are in at any given time. Instead they are always seeking opportunities to get higher paying jobs and move-up the social ladder. While the desire for greater prosperity and material well being is common to all, participants describe a degree of focus on wealth accumulation and social advancement that seems ‘above average’ or, at least, raises questions of individual motives and commitments. “I hear it much with other organizations… What are the kind of people you are getting into the organization in the first place. Because many times you find people who say yes they are looking for jobs, but it’s not really because they care about the work they are doing. They are coming in because they need a salary at the end of the month. If somebody offers work… they are gone!” Transitory staff inhibits institutional memory and thereby erodes an organization’s ability to develop an enduring sense of identity. While implicit within a concept like OI is the idea that an organization is more than the sum of its parts; the organization’s existence is dependent on the people that make-up the organization, develop commitments to a set of core beliefs and commit to acting on those beliefs over the lifespan of the organization.
An organization must have a committed group of core people to develop an organizational identity and then sustain that identity over time.

Without a set of enduring central commitments, it becomes increasingly difficult for an organization to answer the question, *Who are we?* If they can not answer this fundamental question; or if they can, but will relatively quickly compromise their central commitments for project funding, then it will be challenging to solidify any sense of stable organizational identity. An organization will not be able to thrive and sustain itself in the long-term without a fundamental understanding of ‘who’ it is – without a sense of identity. Without a core organizational identity it becomes increasingly difficult – likely impossible – to even determine what is to be sustained or what is worth sustaining.

### 8.5 Interpretive Frame 4: The System Underlying OS/OE is Highly Politicized and Characterized by Adversarial Relationships Between Local CSOs/NGOs and Government

For most of the past 50 years, the relationship between the nonprofit sector – or more specifically nonprofit organizations/social service agencies – and the U.S. government could be described as ‘complementary’ (Young, 2000). This complementary relationship has entailed both the nonprofit sector and the government seeing themselves and each other as the two halves of a public-private partnership working hand-in-hand to deliver social services and maintain minimum social welfare standards for all Americans. During this complementary phase of nonprofit sector-government relationship in the U.S., nonprofit/social service organizations have relied heavily on both private and public financial support in the form of individual altruistic donations, philanthropic contributions, earned income and, notably, public grants and contracts. This phase of joint responsibility for social welfare, with the private sector bearing an increasing
amount of financial responsibility, still seems to be the relational paradigm that characterizes the nonprofit sector-government relationship in the United States today – particularly since the advent of welfare reform. Most would agree that nonprofit organizations and governments in most countries of the Global North can be characterized by very similar ‘complementary’ relationships; although governments in more democratic-socialist countries of Western and Northern Europe take a more centralized role than do private organizations in ensuring minimum public welfare standards.

The data in this study reveal a very different type of relationship between local NGOs/CSOs and the Kenyan government today. It is common knowledge that the relationship between the nonprofit/civil society sector and government in many countries of the Global South is often ‘adversarial.’ This is certainly the case in Kenya. This is not, however, a necessarily negative dynamic. In fact, it is often positive. In many Global South countries, civil society organizations have served as the primary check – sometimes the only check – on authoritarian regimes through their ardent advocacy for human rights, the rule of law, minority rights, democratic systems and processes, etc. Oftentimes, however, CSOs that are more overtly political and perhaps better described as advocacy/social justice organizations are not distinguished from the often less political social service agencies. At the same time, however, many organizations are active in both social service and advocacy/social justice so it is often impossible to differentiate between the two types of nonprofit organizations. This certainly seems to have been the dynamic that has played-out in Kenya over the last 50 years. Throughout much of Kenya’s history CSOs/NGOs have served as a check on authoritarian one-party rule. However, even after democratic elections were held in Kenya beginning in 1992, this adversarial CSO/NGO-government role persists. According to many study participants, this adversarial relationship
persists even after the 2007 democratic elections in Kenya saw numerous, well-known civil-society leaders assume prominent leadership roles in government. Participants noted how these former CSO leaders – once in power – have adopted the same approach to CSOs as the approach they once criticized the former government for adopting.

An analysis of study data highlights the pervasiveness of an adversarial relationship between local CSOs/NGOs and the GOK and, in particular, local politicians. The data indicates that the relationship between civil society organizations and the GOK has become highly politicized. Local CSOs/NGOs in Kenya are political actors. They are political forces in their own right and part of an evolving political dynamic whether they want to be or not. Politicians ‘use them’ to implement projects through them that benefit members of their voting constituencies. Politicians use them as inroads into communities in order to garner favor and seek votes from the community. The local CSOs, on the other hand, walk a tightrope – often needing local politicians to ‘open doors’ for them yet not wanting to be co-opted by the politician’s agenda or have organizational objectives overshadowed by a politician’s objectives. Local politicians – particularly Members of Parliament – also have constituency development funds that organizations can tap into to fund projects. Often politicians are eager to spend these resources and that makes it hard for struggling organizations to turn them down. In essence politicians and local organizations are in a ‘yin and yang’ or a ‘complementary opposites’ type of relationship.

One study participant explained a part of this CSO/NGO-government/politician relationship this way,

If you’re going to walk into communities there will always be the keepers… and the politician is a major gatekeeper. And the politician is a dreaded gatekeeper because he has the ability to literally impact your project even unconventionally. So, you have to work with him. And in that case, for example, where we [the local CSO] resisted, we actually had to move the project to another place… It was not worth the fight.
Another participant noted how politicians often feel threatened by local NGOs/CSOs and fear their motives. “We are always seen as a threat because NGOs go deep down into the root of the community… places where politicians won’t go. So, they are suspicious… what are you saying; what are you telling them; what are you telling these people…?” Numerous study participants described how the relationships they and their organizations have with relevant local politicians and government authorities can either ‘make or break’ them. Politicians will either see them and their organizations as threats and actively work against them or see them as a platform on which to build a greater following. Local organizations, on the other hand, know that “if we don’t involve the politicians they will be against us. When we make it successful and involve them, they take the credit.”

It should also be pointed-out here that, although local politicians in Kenya and the recently established county governments seem to have increasing amounts of funds that they can distribute to local organizations for social welfare projects, the overarching adversarial nature of the CSO/NGO relationship with the Government of Kenya will likely preclude the CSOs/NGOs from seeing any significant influx of government resources in the near- to medium-term. This adversarial relationship will likely not allow the kind of public/private partnership arrangements between civil society organizations and government that are emerging in other parts of the world. The assumption cannot be made, therefore, that the GOK will be a significant source of funding for local CSOs/NGOs as international donor funding shrinks or is withdrawn. However, the recent devolution of power from the central GOK to a network of counties (equivalent to states or provinces) may afford CSOs/NGOs the opportunity to form relationships with these new government entities that take on a different character than those they have historically had with
various components of the GOK. Considerable amounts of the national GOK allocated budget amounts for social welfare are being devolved to the counties. So, funding from the newly created county governments may be possible for Kenyan CSOs/NGOs in the future. However, this transition to devolved government is proving very challenging and complex so the outcomes of the process will not be fully known for years to come.

Complicating all of this, in ways far too complex to go into here, is ethnicity. One study participant said, “There’s also politics and this is ethnic.” Another participant described this reality this way,

Anybody who lives in this country will tell you, in fact even today, the ethnicity of this country… The ethnic levels of this country are higher than they have ever been. The next question anybody asks me – even if they are scared to say, “Are you a this tribe…?” They would say, “Where do you come from?” …or, if I said my first name, [they would ask], “What is your second name?” In my organization, of course, I fight every day… because you find even staff cocoons themselves along tribal lines. So, that is a cancer in this country.

Ethnic identity and ethnic tensions seem to significantly influence the internal and external operations of CSOs/NGOs as well. CSOs that are directed by someone from ethnic group A may not be welcome in parts of the country where his/her ethnic group is not in the majority. Several participants noted that if their organization wanted to work in certain parts of the country, they needed to make sure to send staff there who are of the primary or dominant group in that area. Simply put, ethnicity is political; politics are ethnic; and politics are everywhere!

So, what does all this have to do with conceptualizing the effectiveness and sustainability of local development organizations in Kenya? This brief overview of the CSO/NGO-GOK relationship is meant to highlight that building a thriving, sustainable organization in a system so highly politicized in very context-specific ways is not likely to be achieved by applying textbook conceptualizations and models of OS/OE to local organizations. As many of the participants in
this study have noted, most of the organizational development models used by capacity builders and development professionals in Kenya are dominated by western/northern approaches. Many of them complained about an approach to capacity building that they described as “cut and paste.” These approaches to OD and to capacity building were not created for contexts where the relationship between CSOs and government is as adversarial and as highly politicized as it is in Kenya. Yes, good governance, functioning financial systems, accountability, sound management practices, etc. are critical components of OS/OE – as was clearly stated earlier in this work. However, developing thriving, sustainable organizations in Kenya is and will be a political affair. Politics and, therefore, ethnic dynamics and tensions are inescapable. Politics certainly impact OD in the Global North. There too; politics are inescapable. However, as much as they may be influenced or impacted by politics, nonprofit organizations in the Global North maintain a distinct identity of their own that is neither private nor public sector. In Kenya, nonprofit organizations do not really occupy a ‘third space’ in society. They are described as occupying a third space but they are often political actors in their own right. Building local organizations in this type of setting – where organizations are so enmeshed in political and ethnic dynamics – requires highly tailored knowledge, skills and political savvy that only a Kenyan is likely to have. Therefore, any external/international organization seeking to fund OD, support OD, or directly engage in OD in Kenya has to be willing to give Kenyan organizations and Kenya leaders wide latitude to design, build and maintain organizations in a way that is suitable, appropriate and ‘workable’ in the Kenyan context. The sustainability and effectiveness of the organizations they build will not and cannot mirror western/northern design.
8.6 Interpretive Frame 5: The Position that Development/Social Service Organizations Hold Within the System Underlying OS/OE Has Made Social Service/Development Work a Lucrative Profession that can Enhance Social Status

If an individual in the United States wants to “make it,” “succeed,” “move up the social ladder,” or otherwise establish him/herself as a well-to-do member of the middle- or upper middle-class, the conventional wisdom is that he or she should pursue a career in medicine, law, business, banking/financial services, information technology, engineering, acting, the music industry, or professional sports. People who pursue careers in these professional fields are perceived – correctly or incorrectly – as the elite of American society. Many are described, and perhaps describe themselves, as having achieved the ‘American dream.’ In a similar fashion, conventional wisdom perceives people who go into nonprofit, social service or community development work as struggling, underpaid, “barely getting by,” but also as “do-gooders” and “bleeding-heart liberals.” Few, if any, would describe a career in nonprofit or social service work in the U.S. as the choice for individuals who desire to “make it,” “get rich” or “move up the social ladder.” A similar dynamic likely ‘plays out’ in other countries of the Global North.

The data seems to reveal that a very different dynamic exists in Kenya. In some ways, conventional wisdom in Kenya is similar to that in the U.S. – that success and social advancement in Kenya can be achieved through careers in the professions such as medicine, business, banking/financial services and informational technology, etc. However, careers in social service, nonprofit and development work are categorized in this same group of professions. A job in the nonprofit, social service sector is seen as a way to “make it,” a way to “move up the social ladder,” a way to join the middle class. Just a quick review of textual
narratives shared by study participants yielded 25 distinct statements from approximately 35 participants describing the nonprofit sector as “wealthy,” “having lots of money,” and “rich.” Many of these statements also described nonprofit/social service/development work as “a way to get rich,” “a business,” “a retirement thing to do,” “a way to make money,” and “a ladder to making it.” Consider just 10 of these 25 statements…

There’s a lot of money in the NGO world so people started up NGOs to tap into the donor funding. So I think the motives were not right.

An NGO becomes a vehicle to get money. An NGO is a formalized way of getting external money, yah.

There are people who look at the whole field as a business. They also know you can sit with your laptop and write… and convince people… and you get money. You buy a car and you do a lot of things. Respond to whoever and life would go on.

People don’t want to admit it; civil society organizations don’t want to admit it… I start an organization because I see it as a prospect for my livelihood in terms of a job to do, a thing to do.

I want to get rich, I want to get money from the mzungus and get rich. [Mzungus is a Swahili word used to describe ‘white people’ and sometimes foreigners in general. Here, it refers specifically to foreign donors.]

Then you’ll find there are these people who’ve started projects here because they think that charity work makes a lot of money.

We do register NGOs, but the reason we register the NGO is not what we write down. Basically, it’s a money making tool.

To me, an NGO is a ladder to making it. So I open an NGO… I become financially stable. The kind of mindset that is in our country is that whoever works in an NGO or whoever owns an NGO automatically becomes financially stable.

Other people are even able to work in the proposals in creative ways, monies to sustain their opulent lifestyle and it passes. Everybody working in the NGO world is considered quite high class. Isn’t it?

Lots of people want to come in, because they feel there is money in the NGO sector and so they are all coming in to see what stake can they get out of this. So, it’s all about where can they get money
Statements like these indicate that nonprofit, social service work in Kenya, and perhaps in similar countries of the Global South, occupies a very different space in society than it seems to in many northern countries. This societal positioning ultimately impacts the sustainability and effectiveness of local CSOs/NGOs in a myriad of ways. The data support the conclusion that the sector attracts individuals with potentially questionable motives – i.e., people “who form organizations because some money is available and not because they necessarily believe in the cause.” Individuals with these kinds of motives – be they founder-directors or staff members – are less likely to have much of a long-term commitment to the organization and desire to see the organization established as a viable entity working for the common good. Individuals with such motivations are likely to view the organization simply as a means to an end and nothing more. Several participants described ‘starting a local CSO/NGO’ as a retirement plan – i.e., retiring professionals, lacking sufficient post-retirement income, start an organization, glean from it what they need, and then ‘really’ retire. If enough staff fail to invest or commit to the success of their organizations at a level that is beyond their own individual success then the organization will not be able to sustain itself and become a viable, effective agent of change.

The data also reveal that high staff turnover results, in part, from individuals who take-up work in the sector not out of commitment to the work or the cause but for personal socio-economic gain. This leads them to always be looking for the next opportunity, the next possible stepping stone rather than developing a steadfast dedication to the organization they are a part of and working to achieving the organization’s mission. Individuals who enter nonprofit, social service work in countries where the nonprofit sector does not occupy the same position in society as it does in Kenya likely do not perceive work in the sector as a means for lucrative personal gain or
a way to “move up the social ladder.” They may, therefore, have greater commitment to the cause as exhibited by their willingness to work for less pay than they might get elsewhere.

Several study participants as well as many Kenyans the investigator has interacted with over the years, describe how people from all walks of society engage in “the side hustle.” The “side hustle” is essential activities or projects undertaken “on-the-side” or as “side jobs” to supplement any income the individual may be earning from his/her primary job. So, many who have the space will plant gardens to have produce both for their own consumption and to sell. Others will raise chickens for the same purposes. Many professionals will provide their services as independent consultants – outside their normal work responsibilities – to organizational and individual customers. With 40% unemployment and approximately 51% of Kenyans living below the poverty line; it is understandable that people very legitimately and without any questionable motives engage in a variety of means to make a living – including starting an NGO/CSO or seeking a job in the nonprofit sector.

These assertions should not be taken as a statement that all Kenyans who work in the nonprofit, development sector have questionable, self-interested motives. That is not what they are! Rather, in societies where nonprofit, social service work has come to occupy the same space in society as careers in medicine, the law, professional sports and the financial industry; different dynamics will result that impact people in different ways. In a later section, it will be argued that it is the international donors and international NGOs, by flooding the market with donor money that have distorted the development of the nonprofit sector in Kenya and led to it occupying this strange space Kenyan society. This dynamic would probably not have happened if NGOs/CSOs had been allowed to grow from the ground up, so-to-speak, and allowed to emerge organically and maintain great connectedness to and rootedness in Kenya communities.
8.7 Interpretive Frame 6: The System Underlying OS/OE – Without International Donor Funding – Cannot Support Local CSOs/NGOs as They Are Currently Structured

Annual income or budget data were collected for 27 of the 54 organizations that participated in this study. Twenty-one (21) or two-thirds of those organizations received a minimum of 70% of their total funding from international agencies. Nearly all of the organizations interviewed reported serious concerns over shrinking international donor money. Many participants noted how precariously dependent their organizations are on that international donor money. They are, therefore, somewhat anxious to diversify their income streams. Many hope to do so by increasing the amount of funding they raise from local sources. However, as was discussed at length in Chapter 7, a significant number of the CSO directors interviewed for this study reported that a) most of their local fundraising efforts were not profitable; b) on occasions when their fundraising efforts were successful they often stated that the amounts they raised were not worth the amount of investment they put into the effort; c) local fundraising was much harder and time consuming than submitting proposals to international donors and d) the amounts they raised locally were nowhere near the amounts they could receive from international donors responding favorably to their proposals.

Comparing data regarding CSO perspectives on local fundraising to data regarding the giving perspectives/practices of individual Kenyans interviewed for this study presents a somewhat perplexing picture. While the CSO directors presented a rather negative picture of the potential of local fundraising to have any significant impact on OS/OE, the data on the giving practices of individual Kenyans indicates very clearly that individual Kenyans are givers; and not only that, they are quite often generous and self-sacrificing givers. All of the individuals interviewed described giving multiple times a month to family members, friends and neighbors in times of
particular need. They all described participating in various *harambee* fund-raisers – usually associated with weddings, funerals and paying for costly, often internationally obtained, medical treatment. Many of them mentioned paying for more than one of their family members to attend secondary school. Many mentioned paying school fees and purchasing school supplies for students who are outside their families. The conclusion that giving, generosity, philanthropy, altruism, charity, etc. is alive and well among this group of Kenyans cannot be doubted when reviewing these data.

Many of the CSO directors and organizational development professionals interviewed about their efforts to raise money for their organizations from local organizations also mentioned the generosity of their fellow Kenyans and lauded them for their giving. They made these statements even while lamenting the fact that, from their perspectives, Kenyans do not and will not give to CSOs and NGOs. This disconnect between the experiences of CSO directors, on the one hand, and the reported practices of individual givers, on the other hand, can perhaps be explained by looking more closely at the specific practices among the group of respondents that did report giving to CSOs and/or at least an openness to giving to CSOs.

Somewhat surprisingly, half of the individual Kenyans interviewed for this study stated that they had or would be willing to give to local CSOs/NGOs. Those individuals who have given to CSOs and say they would be willing to give to similar organizations in the future often gave to organizations that they ‘belonged to’ or with which they had developed some form of close, personal connection or relationship. These organizations included the schools their children attended, children’s homes where they could interact directly and bond with the children, and hospitals/medical facilities where they could interact with people in need and ‘connect’ to them in closer more relational ways. Individual participant giving practices seems to indicate that
people may be willing to give to organizations that they feel “closer to;” that are more rooted the communities they are a part of; and that emerge from dynamics within a community rather from outside dynamics or conditions. Many participants added to this point by highlighting their regular giving to faith-based institutions such as their churches and mosques.

(P1) I just feel like I have a responsibility. Personally my belief is God gives you—I believe everything comes from God. Opportunities… what you are today, is because God wants it to be that way, because it could have been somebody else, but he chose you.

(P2) You find that the church is the base of… it will be like the base…

Interestingly, while these faith-based institutions are not CSOs or NGOs, they are organizations that people clearly identify with, feel like they belong to, and are committed to. Interestingly, while many of the churches and other faith-based organizations in Kenya were started by external, non-Kenyan parties, these organizations have morphed over the years and now seem to be viewed as indigenous to community and emerging from community.

(P1) According to the way we are brought up, church is the only place that there is truth and accountability. Between the CSO and the church and a person, I think I would go with the church because first of all there is accountability and you can follow up. Then the church has been there so there is credit. Credibility… like they can’t just raise something up and say there is a need for something yet there isn’t a need for something.

Local CSOs/NGOs looking to increase their long-term sustainability and effectiveness through increased reliance on giving from individual Kenyan donors, should draw two conclusions from study data regarding CSO/NGO perspectives on raising money locally and from study data regarding individual Kenyan giving practices: 1) Many organizations will need to downsize so that both their operations and programming structures are a better fit with what the local system can sustain; and 2) Organizations must establish or reestablish genuine community ownership. For organizations without already well-established connections to particular communities this
may require closing the organization and recreating it in a way that is community-centric and re-built from the ground-up.

As highlighted in Chapter 6, even if organizations are successful at raising funds from local sources – including individual Kenyan donors – and even if their efforts are truly profitable; total amounts generated in the course of a year from local fundraising is almost certainly incomparable to the amounts a couple of successful proposals to international donors would generate in the same time-frame. One of the respondents quoted in Chapter 6 stated,

\[ \text{Let’s say all the international donors packed and went. Then you tell an organization like mine to look for resources locally to implement its programs. They [would] probably wind up. The reason being; there are no local donors who can give monies to the level that the international donors give for these organizations to succeed.} \]

Another respondent quoted in this chapter and in an earlier chapter stated that local CSOs/NGOs do have the “right” – as he put it – to refuse donor money. Nearly all of the CSO directors and OD experts interviewed for this study described local organizations as having to “chase” donor money or being “forced” to compromise their core missions and purposes in order to obtain donor funding. In many cases they placed the primary blame for this “unfair” and “unjust” dynamic on the international donors. While not defending the donors, but as the respondent quoted earlier said, local CSOs/NGOs do have the right to refuse donor money. Local organizations bear some of the responsibility for allowing themselves to be held captive to a ‘tail wagging the dog’ type of dynamic. If these organizations want to reduce their dependency on international funding and be sustainable and effective in the long-term within the confines and realities of the system in which they are rooted and operate, they will have to make hard choices and in a sense learn to ‘live within their means.’ This will require staff layoffs, reductions in the
broadth and depth of programming, and some organizations will need to cease operating. In simplest terms, this will require local organizations willing to say… No.

Essentially, as they are currently structured, most of the local organizations interviewed for this study seem to be operating on the realities and conditions of a philanthropic market that exists outside of their system. Who they are as organizations, how they function and what they do seems to be in ‘reaction’ to forces outside the system – as previously described – that ultimately undergirds their sustainability and effectiveness. If, for example, the average amount a small-to-medium sized organization is able to raise from local sources is $20,000 USD per year then that figure needs to be a primary touchstone of the organization’s operational plan. The organization can still apply for and accept international funding. However, it cannot allow its growth to mushroom the capacity of the “local philanthropic market” so-to-speak to sustain it. If it does seek international funding, it should only apply for and accept those amounts that it can successfully absorb with minimal or proportional growth. The organization must be careful not to allow international funding to once again constitute the majority of the organization’s income stream and, thereby, make the organization dependent, yet again, on international funding. Intentionally stepping out of relationships dominated by international donors and their funding will hurt the organizations in the short-term and will likely negatively impact the social welfare of the Kenyans these organizations serve. While some of these potentially negative impacts can be mitigated through careful planning and conscientious deliberate steps taken to ‘step out of’ the relationships they have with international donors, there will be challenges in the short term. Nonetheless, the long-term sustainability and effectiveness of local CSOs/NGOs in development is dependent on the organizations’ willingness to make hard choices.
The second primary lesson local CSOs/NGOs should learn from these data is that they need to establish or reestablish genuine community ownership of their organizations and projects. What this means is they need to establish or reestablish a degree of community connection and rootedness where potential individual Kenyan donors come to view them as entities/groups they belong to, are connected to, are bonded with, and are in relationships with that allow them to engage and participate with the organizations and in their work. This is the dynamic the group of participants that reported giving to local CSOs/NGOs claimed to have with the organizations that they gave to.

This is a critical step these organizations must take because among all the building blocks of or influencing factors on the sustainability and effectiveness of local organizations in development, identified “community ownership” as one of the most important. Study participants perceive community ownership as essential for building and maintaining local organizations. They, in turn, perceive local organizations as key players in advancing social welfare for all the various reasons highlighted throughout this work (local knowledge/expertise, less costly, rooted in community, etc.). CSO directors in Kenya are particularly concerned about community ownership because, as noted above, they are viewing them more and more as potential sources of organizational income as international development assistance funds are shrinking.

In this study – as in many other studies and discussions regarding “community ownership” in development – terms like community participation, community involvement, community engagement, community support and community leadership are used more or less synonymously with the term “community ownership.” Collectively, study participants seem to conceptualize community ownership as:
• The local CSO/NGO understanding community needs
• The community being a part of what the local CSO/NGO is doing
• Getting community buy-in
• Getting community leaders on ‘your’ side
• Getting community leaders to advocate for ‘you’
• Working closely with community leaders
• Developing legitimacy within the community
• Getting community contributions to CSO/NGO efforts
• CSOs/NGOs reporting back to communities re: their accomplishments
• Connecting to the community
• Developing relationships with the community
• Maintaining a good relationship in the community
• Involving the community

Participants do not seem to realize that the local CSO/NGO is still at the center of each of their conceptualizations of community ownership. Each of their conceptualizations listed above implies that the local CSO/NGO is the primary agent within the relationship and is ‘extending’ community ownership to the community or, through its various activities, inviting local communities to share in the “ownership” of a community development or social service project. In each of these conceptualizations and in nearly all the examples participants provided to support their assertions, the genesis for the project or idea behind a growing momentum for change is ultimately the local CSO/NGO and not the community.

One study participant stated, for example, that he and his colleagues need to prioritize community ownership by completing “bigger research on what the community thinks is a solution to their problem… make they part of the solution… [and] then they will all be willing to put their little resources that they have inside your project.” On the surface these kinds of statements seem very inclusive – and they are – but the local CSO/NGO is still at the center of the dynamic and the relationship implied is one where the community is the agent that has to “make the step toward” the local CSO/NGO and by doing so somehow achieves community
ownership. This formulation or understanding of community ownership is not the kind that will facilitate the sustainability and effectiveness of local organizations.

For example, if the various conceptualizations of community ownership listed above are compared to Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of participation (See Table 8.2), it seems clear that what participants are describing as community ownership is not ownership at all. It is, at best, *placation*.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Participation</th>
<th>Locus of Power</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Citizen Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Delegated Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Placation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Consultation</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Informing</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Therapy</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Manipulation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to Arnstein’s ladder, placation still places the locus of power with the external entity – in this case the local NGO/CSO – who determine the structure and nature of the relationship through their control of power but extend some level of token decision-making to the community. Thinking about community ownership through Arnstein’s lens, one has to conclude that true “ownership” can only be achieved at the level of *citizen control*. Arnstein defines *citizen control* as “citizens having the majority of decision-making seats, or full managerial power (p. 217).”
Most of the organizations that participated in this study were started by an individual or a group of individuals. Most of the organizations have their headquarters in the city of Nairobi. They implement projects and provide social services either in some of the poorest communities of greater Nairobi and/or various communities around the country. So, some of the organizations have a smaller neighborhood or city-wide reach while others are active nationwide or in more than one region of the country. From the investigative team’s interactions with these organizations over the course of data collection, it seems clear that the idea for and design of their projects comes from within the organization although at some point they may engage the intended beneficiaries, their representatives and/or other relevant stakeholders. It seems highly unlikely that organizations started by a single individual or small group and not through some form of community organizing could ever be described as community owned. It will, therefore, be enormously difficult for organizations established in this manner to establish/reestablish any sense of community ownership but the data indicate that they have to try if they want to sustain themselves in their system. Some will not be able to sufficiently adapt and change because they are too far removed from any notion of ‘community.’ They will, therefore, need to cease operating. Though difficult and painful, this step is necessary in order to establish a thriving sustainable community of local CSOs and social service agencies in Kenya.

8.8 Summary
Using a theorizing approach to grounded theory – as outlined by Charmaz (2014) – the data indicate that the sustainability and effectiveness of local organizations in development in the Kenyan context happens within a system composed of 10 primary actors or agents. The dynamics within the system – i.e., the interactions among these agents significantly impacts the possibility of an organization becoming sustainable and effective. The nature of the relationships
among these primary agents, rather than supporting OS/OE, actually works to undermine OS/OE. The “projectized approach” to development has come to dominate the system. The nature of this approach – in and of itself – works against the sustainability and effectiveness of local organizations by focusing the majority of resources within the system on the implementation of development interventions and not on the welfare and viability of the organizations carrying out those interventions. This projectized approach to development along with the dysfunctional relationships between the 10 primary agents in the system prevents any significant formation of organizational identity. It is only through a strong organizational identity that local CSOs/NGOs can answer the question *Who are we…, and ultimately who and what they want to sustain.*

The adversarial relationship between two of the most important agents within the system – the CSOs themselves and the GOK – presents a series of challenges that CSOs in a system where local organizations and governments have a complementary relationship do not face. In Kenya, local CSOs are political actors and no one but them can really successfully navigate political realities within the system in a way that might positively contribute to OS/OE. In addition to the somewhat ‘unique’ dynamic (at least from a northern/western perspective) between CSOs and the government is the equally unique place that development and social service work occupies in Kenyan society. With development/nonprofit work affording similar socio-economic opportunities to many other lucrative positions within society, people of questionable objectives are attracted to the work. They may not have sufficient commitment to the work or their organizations to advance, to any significant degree, the sustainability and effectiveness of the organizations they work for.
Finally, local CSOs/NGOs seeking to a) wean themselves off their dependence on international donor funding and b) increasing the percentage of their funding that is derived from local sources and particularly individual Kenyan donors will have to undergo significant organizational transformation if they plan on surviving in the system they find themselves in absent international donor funding. These organizations will have to downsize. They must bring their budgets and operational platforms in line with the realities of their ‘local philanthropic market.’ They must establish/reestablish community ownership. If they are unable to establish/reestablish community ownership; they should disband.
Chapter 9: Implications and Conclusions

9.1 Discussion and Implications for Future Scholarship

Organizational Sustainability/Organizational Effectiveness. Chapter 2 of this work explained how much of the academic literature seems to use the terms organizational sustainability, organizational effectiveness, organizational performance and organizational survival, etc., more or less interchangeably. While, at first reading, these concepts imply some obvious distinctions, scholarly and practitioner attempts to operationalize and measure the concepts have produced some complex yet significantly overlapping understandings.

The 2011 meta-analysis conducted by Lecy, Schmitz and Swetlund of 64 studies was described in Chapter 2 as generating one of the most comprehensive conceptualizations of organizational effectiveness found in the literature. Lecy and colleagues identified 3 specific trends regarding OE that are worth repeating here: 1) scholars reject the idea that there is one uniform way to measure OE; 2) scholars assert that OE is a complex concept with multiple dimensions and 3) OE is dependent on context. They concluded that OE consists of 4 elements: managerial effectiveness, program effectiveness, network effectiveness and legitimacy. Managerial effectiveness includes an organization’s daily operations and administrative activities, such as financial management, effective planning, that keep it functioning. Program effectiveness includes the degree to which the organization reaches its targets, produces desired outcomes, attains goals, and, ultimately, has the desired long-term impact on its targeted communities/issues. Network effectiveness includes the degree to which organizations are able to partner, share resources, build coalitions and otherwise leverage their connections to broaden and enhance impact. Legitimacy refers to reputation, branding and stakeholder perceptions regarding the organization’s effectiveness.
Similar to the Lecy et al. study – in terms of its thoroughness and richness of insight – Gustafson (1994) conducted in depth case studies of 24 nonprofit organizations in Southeast Asia, Latin America and East Africa in an effort to develop a conceptualization of institutional (aka organizational) sustainability. Gustafson concluded: a) there is no single, correct conceptualization of OS; rather, it is highly impacted/determined by contextual realities; b) OS requires internal and external stakeholder support; c) programs and services must be successful and effective for an organization to be sustainable; d) achieving OS requires careful balancing of technical, best-practice solutions with stakeholder desires and perceived needs; and e) achieving OS requires careful construction of an organization’s program portfolio – it cannot be too broad nor too narrow in technical focus.

The current study supports many of the conclusions and insights generated by the Lecy et al. and the Gustafson studies, yet this study illustrates how the general concepts identified by Lecy et al. and Gustafson take on a much richer, much more tangible meaning when explored in context. Findings presented in Chapter 4 summarize the various concepts that study participants say either shape OS/OE or are building blocks of OS/OE in Kenya. Participants initially identified a set of concepts that they believe are generally applicable to the OS/OE of all organizations regardless of their context. These concepts include: 1) Good Governance; 2) Capable & Well-Managed Human Resources/Staff; 3) Effective Management/Leadership; 4) Access to & Sound Management of Financial Resources; 5) Commitment to the Organization’s Vision & Mission; and 6) Effective Networking & Partnership Skills. Table 9.1 compares the general findings regarding OS/OE generated by this study to those identified by Lecy and colleagues. Concepts 2-4 are similar to what Lecy et al. label as managerial effectiveness. Concepts 3 and 4 of this study are also somewhat similar to what Lecy et al. have described as program effectiveness in
the sense that effective management and specifically financial management are not only necessary for the daily operation of an organization but also for program effectiveness. Concepts 6 – Effective Networking & Partnership Skills – is nearly identical to the one described by Lecy and colleagues as network effectiveness. Lecy et al. might argue that Good Governance and Adherence to Vision/Mission would fall under their managerial effectiveness rubric. However, their description of managerial effectiveness does seem to emphasize the more administrative/operational aspects of good management rather than the more leadership oriented functions of a good management team. An argument could also be made that the current study highlights governance/leadership as a unique concept that is distinct from management.

Table 9.1 Comparison of Study & Literature Concepts re: OS/OE (Tucker/Lecy et al.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current Study General Concepts of OS/OE</th>
<th>Lecy, Schmitz, Swedlund Elements of OS/OE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Good Governance</td>
<td>??? Possibly Management Effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Capable &amp; Well-Managed Human Resources Staff</td>
<td>Management Effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Effective Management &amp; Leadership</td>
<td>Management Effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Access to &amp; Sound Management of Financial Resources</td>
<td>Management Effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Commitment to Organization’s Vision &amp; Mission</td>
<td>??? Possibly Management Effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Effective Networking &amp; Partnership Skills</td>
<td>Networking Effectiveness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In similar ways, the current study also supports Gustafson’s conclusions regarding OS/OE. However, Gustafson’s approach resulted more in a series of ‘lessons learned’ or ‘foundational principles’ rather than a conceptualization of the OS and OE concepts themselves or an identification of the influential factors that shape/determine OS/OE. So, comparing the current study data with the Gustafson study’s conclusion is not as straightforward. Nonetheless, several direct comparisons can be made – these are summarized in Table 9.2. Gustafson notes the importance of effective programs and services to OS/OE. Effective management and leadership as articulated by the participants in the current study include both successful implementation of
programs and delivery of services. Successful programs and services could, of course, not be realized without both effective management and capable staff. So, Gustafson would likely include those two elements identified in the current study under his conceptualization of “successful programs/services,” or he would, at least, acknowledge that a critical relationship exists between effective management/capable staff and successful programs implementation/service delivery. The Gustafson conceptualization of OS/OE also highlights the importance of internal and external stakeholders. Participants in the current study identified the importance of staff and management adherence to the organization’s vision and mission, which implies the buy-in of key internal stakeholders to the organization’s vision and mission. Furthermore, this study also highlighted the importance of effective networking and partnership with a variety of stakeholders – most especially other local CSOs/NGOs. Gustafson’s conclusion that OS/OE requires carefully balancing and organization’s program portfolio – best practice vs. stakeholder desires and broad focus vs. narrow/specialized focus – could be categorized under what the current study has labeled as effective management and effective partnership skills.

Table 9.2 Comparison of Study & Literature Concepts re: OS/OE (Tucker/Gustafson)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current Study General Concepts of OS/OE</th>
<th>Gustafson Principles of OS/OE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Good Governance</td>
<td>??? Possibly Successful Progs./Srvcs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Capable &amp; Well-Managed Human Resources Staff</td>
<td>Successful Programs/Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Effective Management &amp; Leadership</td>
<td>Successful Programs/Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Access to &amp; Sound Management of Financial Resources</td>
<td>??? Possibly Successful Progs./Srvcs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Commitment to Organization’s Vision &amp; Mission</td>
<td>??? Possibly Successful Progs./Srvcs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Effective Networking &amp; Partnership Skills</td>
<td>Relationships with internal and external stakeholders</td>
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</table>

While the 3 studies discussed here each have distinct approaches to OS, OE or OS/OE, there is a great degree of overlap. The findings produced by this study regarding OS/OE seem to be quite
consistent with the literature and serve to support existing conclusions and understandings regarding the organizational sustainability, organizational effectiveness and other very similar, overlapping concepts. However, both the Lecy et al. meta-analysis and Gustafson’s in depth case studies highlight the critical importance of context to both understanding and realizing OS/OE. For example, Lecy et al. state that OE is dependent on context and Gustafson states that OS is determined by contextual realities. However, they do not explain what aspects or elements of context impact OS/OE and how specific elements of a particular context might impact OS/OE.

By attempting to conceptualize OS/OE in specific context, the current study both supports the assertions that Lecy et al. and Gustafson make about context but goes much further by providing a specific, in depth look at how a specific context – Kenya – impacts OS/OE. The primary scholarly contribution of this study, therefore, is this explication of how an element of OS/OE that has been identified as critically important to the construct is actualized in a real-world setting.

Chapter 5 reviews six factors that study participants assert are more specific to the sustainability and effectiveness of local organizations in the Kenyan context. Some of these factors are variables while others are dynamics or relationships among variables. Nonetheless, participants view them as unique or at least particular to the Kenyan context. The six concepts/dynamics identified by study participants are (See Figure 1):

1. Public perceptions, the proliferation of organizations and resulting impact on internal operations.
2. Kenyan view of the CSO board of directors (BOD): What we wish we had vs. what we have!
3. The projectized approach to development in Kenya.
4. Community ownership.
5. Symbiotic relationships between CSOs and politicians.
6. The role of capacity building in OS/OE in Kenya.
Figure 9.1 Web of Context-Specific Factors re: OS/OE

Each of these concepts or dynamics and their impact on OS/OE was thoroughly explained in Chapter 5 and some of these concepts were also used to theorize from the collected data in Chapter 8. So, these details and conclusions will not be repeated here. What is important to highlight here is the idea that the broader, more general variables/concepts that Lecy et al. and Gustafson identified as critical elements of OS/OE could likely absorb all of the context-specific components of OS/OE identified by the Kenyan participants in the current study. Consider the following possibilities.

Public perceptions of and proliferation of organizations is a concept/dynamic, for example, that is closely related to Lecy et al.’s concept of legitimacy or simply an organization’s reputation and branding in society. It is also similar to Gustafson’s assertion that support from internal/external stakeholders is important to OS/OE. Kenyan views of CSO BODs and how boards are
constituted and operated is a concept/dynamic identified in the present study that does not have a
direct parallel in either the Lecy et al. or the Gustafson studies but it could possibly be subsumed
under Lecy et al.’s concept of managerial effectiveness.

The projectized approach to development, identified in the current study, primarily refers to CSO
relationships with their external donors. Community ownership primarily refers to CSO
relationships with their targeted beneficiaries and with other community stakeholders in the areas
in which the CSO operates. Symbiotic relationships between CSOs and politicians refer
primarily to CSO relationships with a group of external stakeholders. These three
concepts/dynamics, derived from data collected for the current study, are conceptually akin to
Gustafson’s assertion regarding the importance of internal and external stakeholders to OS/OE.
Finally, the role of capacity building in CSO OS/OE as described in this study could probably be
categorized as an aspect or articulation of Lecy et al.’s program effectiveness construct and
Gustafson’s emphasis on relationships with internal/external stakeholders when trying to build
sustainable and effective organizations.

However, the findings generated from this study clearly reveal that the various factors and
variables, etc. that Lecy et al. and Gustafson identify in their studies are so generic that they have
little meaning or potential applicability absent a contextual frame. Without a context-specific
lens through which to conceptualize and really begin to understand these factors and variables;
complex relationships, dynamics, or realities such as ‘there is a widely held perception among
Kenyans that local CSOs/NGOs are corrupt, misuse resources, and their founders/staff are in
development primarily for personal gain’ is reduced to ‘relationships with external stakeholders
are important’ or ‘legitimacy’ is important. These two concepts/variables/dynamics are, in one
sense, very similar but applying a context specific lens reveals that these general variables that
are critical determinants of OS/OE could represent drastically different realities from context to context. Knowing that OS/OE is dependent on ‘having good relationships with internal and external stakeholders’ is absolutely necessary for scholars studying organizational development and for practitioners managing organizations but it is just the starting point – just the doorway to a much deeper, fuller understanding of these concepts so critical to OS/OE. This is especially true for those seeking to apply knowledge gained to real-world situations.

This study will hopefully encourage both scholars and practitioners to look more closely at the impact of context on OS/OE. Studies like the Lecy et al. and the Gustafson study generated core principles and/or variables associated with OS/OE. Scholars working in organizational development should perhaps apply their previously developed OS/OE frameworks to specific contexts to see how their frameworks are actualized in a particular setting. Alternatively, they could complete similar action research/inductive-interpretive grounded theory analysis of OS/OE in a particular context, from the ground up, and then use the new data as a lens through which to revisit prior work.

**New Institutionalism of Organizations.** Chapter 2 of this dissertation reviewed the core assertions of the New Institutionalism of Organizations (NI) theory as articulated primarily by Meyer & Rowan (1977), Zucker (1977), Tolbert & Zucker (1977), and DiMaggio & Powell (1983). NI scholars define institutions as social norms, values, widely held beliefs or what North (1990) described as formal and informal “rules of the game” (p. 3). North goes on to explain that these rules are “human devised constraints on human interaction” (p. 3) that provide structure to everyday life. NI asserts that organizations are established and shaped by the institutions that dominate the contexts in which organizations emerge and operate. Ultimately, the long-term viability and success of organizations is dependent on the extent to which the organization’s
identity, structure, operations, etc. is firmly rooted in and reflects the organization’s institutional environment.

NI provides a very useful lens through which to view and understand the data generated by this study. These data seem to provide strong support for NI’s core assertions. The 54 organizations whose directors were interviewed for this study seem to be trapped in a dynamic where they are forced to respond to two distinct institutional environments at the same time. The Kenyan society in which the organization works and operates constitutes one institutional environment that could be described as the organization’s ‘home’ environment. The donor community and the predominantly Northern institutions that they are rooted in constitute a very different institutional environment that could be labeled as the organization’s ‘donor’ environment.

These two institutional environments are likely just two among several institutional environments that impact the viability and well being of Kenyan CSOs/NGOs. However, these two environments, in particular, seem to have the greatest influence on local organizations. These two institutional environments, in a number of ways, appear to be pulling organizations in very different directions thereby hindering their abilities to become sustainable and effective organizations in the long-term.

For example, the donor institutional environment with its emphasis on short-term engagement and tangible/quantifiable results has produced what is described in Chapters 3, 4 and 8 as the “projectized approach to development.” Organizations seeking funding from the donor community are responding to this ‘donor’ institutional environment and, as a result, become vehicles through which donor agencies implement projects rather than independent organizations operating primarily from their vision/mission statements and for the good of their constituents.
The organization’s ‘home’ institutional environment, on the other hand, places significant importance on social values/institutions such as community ownership, participation, grass-roots accountability and transparency, etc. It seems that the appeal of international donor funding and the transformative impact it has on local organizations serves to detach the organizations from their roots in their ‘home’ institutional environment. This detachment, in turn, is perhaps what has caused the widely held and predominantly negative perceptions that many Kenyans have regarding local NGOs/CSOs – i.e., that CSOs/NGOs receive a lot of funding from international donors so the organizations and the projects they implement in Kenyan communities belong to them and not the community.

Chapter 8 presents and an even more fundamental issue by outlining how civil society and its various facets in many countries of the Global North is rooted in institutions that place value on a complementary relationship between civil society organizations and government. In a complementary relationship government and civil society work collaboratively to advance social welfare and achieve public good. In contrast, many countries in the Global South – Kenya included – have historically placed greater value on civil society and government having an adversarial relationship. If this relationship had not been adversarial to some extent – where CSOs resisted the injustices of corrupt governments; many countries would not have the levels of freedom and democracy they now have. The concept of public-private partnership that is so lauded in the North (and prescribed for the South), for example, is ultimately a product of Northern, not Kenyan, institutions.

The different views on the relationship between civil society and government appear clearly rooted in different institutional environments. Many of the actions/reactions of both local CSOs/NGOs and the donor community stem from these very different institutional frameworks.
Many donor agencies often view organizational sustainability from the perspective that national
governments will or should step in and fill funding shortfalls when donor money decreases. This
assumption, however, is fundamentally rooted in a complementary view of the civil
society/government relationship. While potentially a valuable idea, the reality that this approach
is rooted in a different institutional environment, and may not be appropriate in the Kenyan
environment, must first be acknowledged. There are a number of other dynamics that could be
pointed out in the data that support the conclusion that local CSOs/NGOs are ultimately forced to
respond to two distinct institutional environments that often pull the organizations in very
different directions.

The Role of Local Fundraising in OS/OE and the Potential Impact of Local Giving
Practices. The data collected in this study regarding both the efforts that Kenyan CSOs/NGOs
have made to raise funds locally and the giving practices among typical Kenyan givers support
four potentially significant conclusions:

First, given the lack of success local CSOs/NGOs have had raising funds from local sources, and
given the perspectives of typical individual Kenyan givers toward CSOs/NGOs; local
fundraising targeting individual Kenyan givers is not likely to be substantial enough to reduce
local CSO/NGO dependence on international donor funding to any degree in the near- or
medium-term future. Consequently, CSOs/NGOs should view and engage in local fundraising
efforts with caution and with this likely reality in mind. Managers should carefully consider, as
was outlined in Chapter 6, whether engagement in local fundraising is really worth the
expenditure of limited time and resources given its low return on investment. However, while
local fundraising should not be viewed as a short- or medium-term objective it is a major
necessity for long-term sustainability and effectiveness. So, local organizations will have the
very challenging task of viewing local fundraising for both what it is/is not at present and for what it must be in the future. They must not lose sight of the long-term objective of transforming their organizations into entities that rely more heavily on local funding and are better structured to operate based on levels of funding the local market can provide. Ultimately, less dependence on external, non-Kenyan sources of funding and increased reliance of locally-sourced income is one of the foundation stones on which CSO/NGO sustainability and effectiveness can be enhanced in Kenya.

Second, the typical individual Kenyan giver seems surprisingly willing to give to local NGOs/CSOs. However, they are not likely to give to these organizations, as they are currently structured and operated in Kenya. As suggested in Chapter 8, as part of their long-term development strategies, local CSOs/NGOs should actively work to transform their organizations into more community-centric, community-rooted and community-owned agencies. For some, this will require radical changes that are ultimately impossible. In the short-term, there will be negative impacts of these evolutions both on the organizations and potentially on development itself. Nonetheless, in order to achieve the longer-term objective of building a strong, vibrant, self-sustaining community of CSOs/NGOs in Kenya, this action must be taken. Practically, this will likely require action-steps such as downsizing, specialization, narrowing of the operating environment, re-constitution of the board and management teams so the organization is more truly community-owned, re-articulation and re-commitment to vision to the point that vision/mission and not funding opportunities drives the organization, and a heavy emphasis on collaboration and networking.

Third, the system underlying the sustainability and effectiveness of local organizations in development in Kenya is a web of interconnected, interacting, interdependent relationships
among the various components/variables/dynamics that constitute the system. This was also explained to some degree in Chapter 8. Efforts to change the system so that the chances for long-term viability and success are enhanced for local organizations will not happen without a holistic perspective that considers the roles of all components within the system and how, individually and in relationship with one another, these system components impact organizational viability. For example, several of the organizations interviewed for this study highlighted a need for specific training in local resource mobilization, marketing, and public relations. Those organizations would likely benefit, to some extent, by receiving the relevant training they claim to need. However, if concurrent investments are not made in changing public perceptions of CSOs/NGOs, increasing community ownership of NGOs/CSOs, and addressing the negative impact of CSO/NGO-politician dynamics on organizations – among many other issues/dynamics within the system – then the initial investments in resource mobilization training will be for naught. This system must be viewed and efforts to change it made from a holistic perspective. This is not likely to happen without greatly enhanced collaboration, partnership, mutual support and networking among local CSOs/NGOs in the system.

Fourth, viewing the data once again through the lens of New Institutionalism raises the question whether or not the Northern model of ‘local fund raising’ and ‘supporting CSOs primarily from the contributions of private individuals and philanthropic entities’ is really the optimal organizational design/approach for the Kenyan context and institutional environment. The data seem to support that a new, different approach to both the creation, operating and funding of local CSOs/NGOs is required – one that is more closely rooted in these organizations’ home institutional environment. Some will say that in an increasingly shrinking 21st century world, distinguishing what is local and what is international; what is ‘of us’ and what is ‘external to us’
is becoming more and more challenging – if not impossible and perhaps no longer relevant. Others will say that the development system ‘is what it is’ and is so entrenched that organizations should accept it and learn to function within it. Others might even say, “Who cares if local organizations are dependent on international donors so long as the work gets done?” These are all valid positions to take. However, there are likely some key ways in which the system itself and how actors interact with one another within the system can be transformed, within certain parameters, to better reflect ‘home’ institutional environments – not only for organizations in Kenya but for organizations in any context around the world.

These four conclusions support the need for scholarship around a few critical questions such as what these system changes/improvements might be; what a new, more institutionally reflective organizational design might be, and how some of the dynamics among key agents in the system might be changed to better support the long-term viability of local organizations. A particularly interesting topic with a great deal of direct applicability to practice would be for a researcher to carry out an inductive, action-research project to construct a model organization that a) better reflected the social institutions of the local context, b) could be sustained by local resources and local ownership, but c) is not so divergent that it could only be realized through revolutionary as opposed to evolutionary change since revolutionary change within the system is highly unlikely.

9.2 Implications and Recommendations for Practice
A number of implications for practice were discussed both in the previous section and, from a broader more theoretical perspective, in Chapter 8. So, those will not be repeated here. A number of additional implications and possible applications of study data and conclusions could be discussed. The following four are implications of the study that the investigator considers as
the most consequential for development practice given the state of the field and current international affairs.

First, this study will have the most direct and tangible impact on future programming of the study’s partner organization – the Aga Khan Foundation-East Africa (AKFEA) and more specifically, the foundation’s Yetu Initiative (See Chapter 3 for a brief overview of AKFEA and Yetu). Through established reporting mechanisms and intentional efforts to identify and document lessons learned from implemented projects, study data will also impact AKFEA/Yetu’s primary funder – USAID. Data generated and conclusions drawn from that data will inform both current and future programming implemented by both AKFEA and USAID that focuses specifically on building the capacity of local organizations for sustainability and effectiveness. Both AKFEA and USAID, as described in Chapters 2 and 3 respectively, have prioritized the development of local organizations as a core component of their development strategies in the coming years. They are likely to implement many more projects with similar objectives to those of Yetu both in East Africa and elsewhere around the world.

A professional, action-oriented report is being written concurrently with this academic dissertation. That report will be distributed to various key stakeholders within AKFEA, AKF-USA and USAID. The report will make specific recommendations to these organizations regarding their future organizational development/capacity building programming. These recommendations will parallel the various conclusions, implications and theorizing that have been discussed in Chapters 8 and 9 of this dissertation. There is a possibility that the investigator will be travelling to Kenya within the next 8 months to present study findings to key stakeholders of the Yetu Initiative. This dissemination event will also be open to members of the development community throughout the greater Nairobi area. Additionally, one of the
individuals involved in the design of this study is now the Senior Advisor for Civil Society for the Global Aga Khan Foundation. He resides in Nairobi and has maintained interest in the study and its findings. Discussions with him are ongoing regarding how these data and conclusions might be used more widely within the Aga Khan Development Network.

Second, as study findings are disseminated in various ways through AKF, AKFEA and USAID reporting mechanisms, best-practice databases and various publishing avenues, findings will hopefully empower local organizations to recognize the critical importance of context on their long-term sustainability and effectiveness. These data might give these organizations additional information with which they can argue against the rote application of ‘models’ and ‘manualized/workbook approaches’ that are, as described by one study participant, “copy and pasted” from other organizations, other countries, other cultures and other contexts but are often not appropriate for their local realities. Hopefully, forward thinking CSO directors, as a result of information provided through this study, will set aside some time and resources within their organizations to intentionally examine how context is impacting them and how they might act/react in ways that enhance their sustainability and effectiveness. Hopefully, they will also recognize that the long-term viability of their organizations as well as the development of communities and countries they care about may require some tough, initially painful choices for them and their organizations.

These data will also serve as a basis for writing articles in publications and online outlets that practitioners consult and use on a regular basis to inform their program development and design processes. In this way, study data will hopefully reach a larger group of practitioners. Once distributed and disseminated, the degree to which study data are actually absorbed, internalized and acted upon in meaningful ways is, of course, yet to be determined.
Third, some of the clearest and most definitive findings of this study relate to capacity building (See Chapters 1, 4 and 5 for discussions regarding capacity building). When reviewing study data, the international NGOs and donor agencies that fund and/or implement capacity building programs designed to strengthen the sustainability and effectiveness of local organizations should strive to alter the structure and form of their capacity building (CB) as well as the way in which that capacity building/training is provided. Future capacity building initiatives (CBIs) should be designed around the following core principles:

1. The recipient organization’s stated needs/desires as self-identified without any form of prompting or guidance from capacity building organization.
2. CBIs should be personalized and tailored specifically to the recipient organization.
3. CB should be viewed as a journey, a process over time and not an ‘event’ or ‘intervention.’
4. CBI should focus on coaching, self-discovery, mentorship and not ‘training.’
5. CBI coaching should be practical, ‘hands-on,’ experiential, and peer-to-peer.
6. CBIs should place at least equal focus on organizational development and technical capacity development.

According to study participants, capacity building organizations that base their practice on these six principles will have a much more substantive impact on the development of their local organizations and go much further in helping them make their organizations more sustainable and effective.

Finally, the approach and practice of the international donor and NGO communities to the development of local CSOs/NGOs must change in several key ways. Donor agencies need to recognize that the projectized approach to development – even where it includes an organizational capacity development component – is doing very little to build thriving, viable organizations that can have significant impact in Kenyan society. The idea that strong, sustainable organizations can be built and maintained without any investment in their core operating structures and processes is, quite simply, ludicrous. Some amount of investment
directly in the organizations themselves rather than solely or primarily the projects and services those organizations deliver will be required for any substantive change to take place. The sooner donor agencies and international NGOs recognize this, the quicker a cadre of sustainable and effective local organizations will emerge.

However, donor agencies and international NGOs also have to recognize the somewhat contradictory reality to the assertion just made that the amount of funding they have provided local CSOs/NGOs and the way in which those funds have been provided has created an artificial reality. This artificial reality is one where local organizations are shaped and influenced by the socio-economic conditions of Northern countries and their Northern agencies. This has given rise to organizations that, as was stated in Chapter 8, cannot be sustained by their local contexts without significant structural and operational change. In short, local organizations do not reflect contextual realities. International entities have to recognize the role they have played in creating this reality and recommit themselves to the core development principle of phase-out. Future investments by international entities should be strategic and in-line with local, contextual socio-economic realities. Perhaps the findings of this study will influence this group of important international actors in some small way to consider these changes.

9.3 Limitations and Strengths
Budget and time constraints coupled with the use of convenience, snowball and purposive sampling techniques limited the focus of this study to organizations operating in the greater Nairobi area. Although the directors of a number of organizations operating outside the city – as far afield as Kisumu in Western Kenya and Mombasa on Kenya’s eastern coast – were interviewed during their visits to Nairobi for other business; most of the participating organizations are based in Nairobi and implement most of their programming in the city and its
immediate suburbs. This restricted the degree to which the organizations can be said to be representative of the larger population of Kenyan CSOs/NGOs.

As noted in the description of study methodology in Chapter 3, modifications had to be made to recruitment strategies early on in the data collection process. The initial group of interviews did not yield the depth of information the investigative team was seeking so a more intensively purposive approach, combined with snowballing, was adopted that ultimately reduced the population of eligible organizations whose participation could be solicited. This resulted in the first 10 interviews, or so, being less informative than they could have been had this modification not been necessary. Nonetheless, the first 10 interviews did generate useful and informative data that were included in the analysis presented in this dissertation.

Recruitment of individual Kenyan givers was also quite challenging. The use of convenience, purposive and snowball recruitment techniques were part of the original study design but the difficulty the team experienced recruiting participants willing to answer questions about their giving perspectives forced the investigative team to rely more heavily than originally desired on convenience sampling. Therefore, the data collected possibly portray a more positive perspective on giving to local NGOs/CSOs than is really the case in Kenya. Many of the team’s contacts that were relied on for convenience recruitment are likely to have a more positive view toward CSOs/NGOs and formal development organizations due to their proximity to the development field and, in some cases, their own personal involvement in development. However, a counterbalance to this potential skew was intentionally sought out and found by reaching out on random occasions to recruit participants through the daily life encounters the investigative team and its AKFEA colleagues had over the course of the data collection period.
At the end of the data collection phase of the study, the investigative team concluded that a research design that employed a more select and purposive group of CSO representatives and organizational development professionals might have resulted in deeper, richer analysis. Had this more selective approach to recruitment been coupled with multiple in depth interviews with each member of this smaller group, this study may have been able to generate more specific, concrete recommendations for addressing some of the challenges to OS/OE identified through this research project. However, a research design with this more purposive and selective approach to recruitment would have required much more intensive pre-data collection planning/organizing time in the field. It would have also been very challenging for CSO directors to commit sufficient time to allow for multiple in depth interviews. Furthermore, gaining deeper access to organizations and probing for deeper level information may not have been possible for a researcher external to the context. This alternative design would probably only be possible for a researcher who chooses to focus on organizations in his/her home environment and within his/her immediate sphere of influence at the time of data collection.

The greatest strength of this study is its inclusion of the views and perspectives of key stakeholders that are largely absent from academic literature on the sustainability and effectiveness of nonprofits in development work. This study serves to give voice to those views and perspectives. These views coupled with existing data from the many related studies of aspects of organizational development in the Global South will hopefully contribute to enhancing the viability and effectiveness of local CSOs/NGOs in development in the years to come. An additional strength of this study is its explication of the specific impact of context (in this case, the Kenyan context) on organizational sustainability and effectiveness. While many studies highlight the importance of context, the current study is one of the few – perhaps only – that
outlines how specific aspects of a particular context influence and shape OS/OE. While the intent of qualitative research such as this is rarely to generalize findings, perhaps insights and key lessons can be learned from these data and findings that may have direct relevance and application to contexts very similar to Kenya.

9.4 Conclusion
Building on the experiences, expertise and perspectives of key stakeholders – namely the directors and staff of local CSOs/NGOs; organizational development professionals with expertise in building the capacities of local organizations for sustainability and effectiveness; and individual Kenyan givers, this study has sought to answer three questions: 1) what context-specific factors help shape/determine OS/OE of local development organizations in Kenya; 2) what role has local fundraising played in the sustainability and effectiveness of local organizations and what role might it play in the future; and 3) what are the perspectives of typical individual Kenyans regarding giving and what are their actual giving practices – and how might these impact the OS/OE of local CSOs/NGOs. This study is one of the few – perhaps the only – that has specifically sought to understand how context impacts the sustainability and effectiveness of local organizations in development practice. This project not only serves to reinforce the importance of context to organizational performance but it illustrates in both practical (Chapters 4 and 5) and theoretical ways (Chapter 8) how elements within the Kenyan context impact the sustainability and effectiveness of Kenyan organizations. This study is also one of the few to give voice to a group of stakeholders that play critical roles in building and operating sustainable organizations but whose voices are seldom considered in both academia and international development practice.
Building a community of viable and impactful organizations in Kenya through local fundraising will be challenging. The participating organizations in the study report little success in their efforts to mobilize resources locally. Surprisingly, however, typical individual Kenyans are much more open to giving to CSOs and NGOs than was anticipated. So, while transitioning local organizations from over dependence on international funding to one more reliant on local funding will be challenging; does seem possible if the CSOs and their international donors are willing to make some hard choices. While the study has addressed the three questions the investigative team sought to address through its original design, it has also revealed several very interesting possibilities for future qualitative, action-oriented research projects – namely a) a project that seeks to identify an organizational model/design that might be more rooted in Kenyan social institutions and therefore more sustainable in the Kenyan context and b) a project that explores possible ways that development assistance and social service might strengthen existing community-generated practices (e.g., “harambees” and frequent/reciprocal giving to family and friends, etc.) for advancing social welfare and providing social protections to individuals and households in times of need.
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337


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Appendix A
Interview Guide for In Depth Interview with CSO/NGO Directors

Conceptualizing Organizational Sustainability (OS)/Organizational Effectiveness (OE)

▪ How do you define organizational sustainability?

▪ Describe what a sustainable and effective organization ‘looks like’ in this context – what’s going on in that organization, what is it doing, what is it not doing, what is its leader doing/not doing, who works there and what kind of people are they, etc.?

▪ How successful have local organizations been in ensuring/enhancing their long-term sustainability?

▪ What are the primary determinants of organizational sustainability in this context?

▪ Among the factors that you think are important to building sustainable and effective organizations are there any that are unique or peculiar to the Kenyan context?

▪ How do you define and conceive of each of the factors/determinants you’ve identified?

▪ Describe how these factors are interrelated and impact one another to lead to organizational sustainability?

▪ Based on the definitions you’ve provided of each of these factors, how similar/dissimilar are these definitions to ones you’d expect a western development professional or development organization might have?

▪ What specific challenges do local organizations face in their efforts to be more sustainable and effective?

▪ What are the greatest strengths of local organizations?

▪ What are the greatest weaknesses of local organizations?

▪ What is the role of government, local private sector and international development organizations in the sustainability of local CSOs?

▪ What should their roles be?

▪ What policies, actions, etc. do you know of that each of these sectors are doing to either facilitate or hinder the sustainability of local organizations?
Capacity Building

- Describe any capacity building services/interventions your organization has received?

- How successful have ‘capacity building programs’ been at developing the capacity of local Kenyan organizations? What has worked and what hasn’t? Why or why not?

- If you were developing a program to develop the capacity of local NGOs, what top 3 things would you focus on?

- Development has focused on ‘capacity building,’ ‘institutional strengthening,’ etc. of local CSOs for the last 40 years or more yet reports still note capacity gaps, institutional weaknesses, etc. among CSOs. What is the disconnect? What’s going on? Shouldn’t these CSOs... shouldn’t the sector be capacitated by now?

Community Philanthropy – Profiling Givers, Use of CPs Among CSOs

- How prevalent are fund-raising campaigns, awareness campaigns, targeted solicitations, etc. among Kenyan CSOs?

- If “little or no” prevalence of CP is noted among local CSOs, why is this?

- What strategies/tactics, etc. have Kenyan CSOs used to engage local philanthropists? How successful have these been?

- When Kenyan CSOs attempt to engage local philanthropists, whom do they target? How? Why?

- What particular challenges and opportunities do you think local Kenyan CSOs have trying to raise funds/support from local communities?

- To what extent have Kenyan CSOs made use of technology (internet, social media, etc.) in their attempts to raise funding locally? What technologies are most used? Have these been used successfully to accomplish desired objectives? Why or why not?
Appendix B
Interview Guide for In Depth Interview with OD Professionals

Conceptualizing Organizational Sustainability (OS)/Organizational Effectiveness (OE)

- How do you define organizational sustainability?
- Describe what a sustainable and effective organization ‘looks like’ in this context – what’s going on in that organization, what is it doing, what is it not doing, what is its leader doing/not doing, who works there and what kind of people are they, etc.?
- How successful have local organizations been in ensuring/enhancing their long-term sustainability?
- What are the primary determinants of organizational sustainability in this context?
- Among the factors that you think are important to building sustainable and effective organizations are there any that are unique or peculiar to the Kenyan context?
- How do you define and conceive of each of the factors/determinants you’ve identified?
- Describe how these factors are interrelated and impact one another to lead to organizational sustainability?
- Based on the definitions you’ve provided of each of these factors, how similar/dissimilar are these definitions to ones you’d expect a western development professional or development organization might have?
- What specific challenges do local organizations face in their efforts to be more sustainable and effective?
- What are the greatest strengths of local organizations?
- What are the greatest weaknesses of local organizations?
- What is the role of government, local private sector and international development organizations in the sustainability of local CSOs?
- What should their roles be?
- What policies, actions, etc. do you know of that each of these sectors are doing to either facilitate or hinder the sustainability of local organizations?
Capacity Building

- What is your experience with capacity building? …Providing CB, Receiving CB?
- If you were developing a program to develop the capacity of local NGOs, what top 3 things would you focus on?
- How successful have ‘capacity building programs’ been at developing the capacity of local Kenyan organizations? What has worked and what hasn’t? Why or why not?
- Development has focused on ‘capacity building,’ ‘institutional strengthening,’ etc. of local CSOs for the last 40 years or more yet reports still note capacity gaps, institutional weaknesses, etc. among CSOs. What is the disconnect? What’s going on? Shouldn’t these CSOs… shouldn’t the sector be capacitated by now?

Community Philanthropy – Profiling Givers, Use of CPs Among CSOs

- What are your main sources of funding? Who do you receive your funding from? What are your sources of revenue/revenue generation, etc.? What’s the percentage of international vs. local funding?
- What is your resource development plan? Do you do long-term financial/revenue generation planning?
- How prevalent are fund-raising campaigns, awareness campaigns, targeted solicitations, etc. among Kenyan CSOs?
- If “little or no” prevalence of CP is noted among local CSOs, why is this?
- What strategies/tactics, etc. have Kenyan CSOs used to engage local philanthropists? …to develop resources (eg: endowment, investments, enterprise development, etc.) How successful have these been?
- When Kenyan CSOs attempt to engage local philanthropists, whom do they target? How? Why?
- What particular challenges and opportunities do you think local Kenyan CSOs have trying to raise funds/support from local communities?
- To what extent have Kenyan CSOs made use of technology (internet, social media, etc.) in their attempts to raise funding locally? What technologies are most used? Have these been used successfully to accomplish desired objectives? Why or why not?
Appendix C
CSO/NGO Recruitment Survey

1. What is the name of your organization?

2. What is your name and job title within the organization?

3. Is your organization duly registered with the relevant government authority?
   □ YES □ NO □ DON’T KNOW

4. Was your organization started in Kenya by Kenyans?
   □ YES □ NO □ DON’T KNOW

5. Are your organization’s headquarters located in Kenya?
   □ YES □ NO □ DON’T KNOW

6. Is your organization a subsidiary or formal affiliate of an international, non-Kenyan organization or known brand? (Examples of such organizations: Save the Children/Kenya, World Vision/Kenya, CARE/Kenya, etc.)
   □ YES □ NO □ DON’T KNOW

7. Is your organization majority owned by individuals who are citizens of Kenya or is the organization managed by a governing body, the majority of whom are citizens of Kenya?
   □ YES □ NO □ DON’T KNOW

8. Are your organization’s programs and projects implemented entirely within the geographic boarders of Kenya?
   □ YES □ NO □ DON’T KNOW

9. What is your organization’s primary area of programming or activities?
   □ Animals □ Health □ Democracy & Governance
   □ Arts/Culture □ HIV/AIDS □ Water Sanitation & Health
   □ Technology □ Human Rights □ Women & Girls
   □ Microfinance □ Education □ Peace & Security
   □ Sports □ Economic Development & Poverty Reduction
   □ Disaster Recovery & Humanitarian Assistance □ Other

10. To what extent is your organization’s governance, its operations and/or its programs influenced by a foreign entity or by an individual or individuals who are not citizens of Kenya?
    □ No Influence Whatsoever □ Little Influence
    □ Moderate Influence □ Significant Influence
Appendix D
Interview Guide for In Depth Interviews with Individual Kenyan Givers

1. Tell us about your giving. Describe the ways in which you give.

2. In what ways do you prefer to ‘give?’ (i.e., cash, in kind, volunteering)

3. How frequently do you give? How often do you find yourself giving in some way?

4. Why do you give? What are your motivations or reasons for giving?

5. How does giving make you feel?

6. What particular causes, issues or situations are you more inclined to give to? What circumstances ‘move’ you to give… or make you want to give?

7. When you give to individuals (friends, family, colleagues, etc.) how do you find out or come to learn about their need? How do you become aware that the person needs you to give to them in some way?

8. When you give financially – how to you get the money to the recipient? (i.e., cash, mobile money, etc.)

9. When you give in kind and/or through volunteering…
   • Is there any particular thing you prefer donating or you frequently donate?
   • Is there any particular activity or service you prefer doing during your times of volunteering?

10. Have you ever heard of any of the ‘famous’ fundraising campaigns that have taken place in Kenya over the past few years – such as Bring Zack Home and Kenya for Kenyans?
    • If yes, did you give to one or more of those campaigns? Why or why not?
    • If applicable – What was it about the campaign that made you want to give or caused you to give?
    • If applicable – What was it about the campaign that made you not want to give?
    • If applicable – Many people and organizations in Kenya try to raise money for similar causes and in similar ways as these ‘famous’ campaigns. Why do you think these campaigns were so successful when others were not successful?

11. Have you ever given to a local NGO or CSO? Why or why not?

12. When you give to local NGOs or CSOs how do you find out or come to learn about their need? How do you become aware that the organization needs your assistance in some way?

13. Is there anything a local NGO or CSO could do that would cause you to give to them in some way… or at least have a positive view about giving to NGOs/CSOs?
14. When you give, do you prefer to give alone, as an individual ‘giver’ or would you rather give as part of a group?

15. What internet sites and social media applications do you use?
   - Do these play a role in your giving practices?
   - If an NGO/CSO wanted to tell you about an activity they are implementing, is the internet a good way of communicating with you? What about social media?
   - Have you ever given in some way as a result of seeing something on the internet or social media?