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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS

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Collective Efficacy and Community-Based Crime Prevention in Trinidad and Tobago:
Contributions to the Theory of Collective Efficacy

by

Donna-Mae Knights, MA-SID

A dissertation presented to the
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
of Washington University in
partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy

May 2014
St. Louis, Missouri

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Dedication

I dedicate this work to the service of my Lord and Savior Jesus Christ,
and to the memory of my father, the late Wilfred Ernest Knights who in 1935, was the first from
his school to win an island scholarship to the then St. Benedict's College.

ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

Collective Efficacy and Community Based Crime Prevention:

Contributions to the Theory of Collective Efficacy

By

Donna-Mae Knights

Doctor of Philosophy in Social Work

Washington University in St. Louis, 2014

Professor Carolyn Lesorogol, Chair

Reducing crime has been the most intractable problem facing successive government administrations in Trinidad and Tobago since the late 1990s. Community based crime prevention must be an important element of any multi-faceted crime abatement strategy. Collective efficacy which purports to describe a community's capacity for social regulation is associated with lower levels of crime and has become an objective in crime prevention policy (IADB Loan Proposal, TT-L1003, n.d.). This study seeks to examine the applicability of the theory of collective efficacy to Trinidad and Tobago, understand how collective efficacy works, and discover whether and how collective efficacy could be increased in support of community based crime prevention.

The study utilized a blended design incorporating analysis of the 2007 Crime Victimization Survey in Trinidad (n=2133), as well as qualitative data obtained through semi-structured interviews, focus groups and observations in four communities (n=138) over a 12-month period. The intervening role of collective efficacy was examined through a mediation model using the PROCESS macro, a statistical package which employs sophisticated bootstrapping technology for estimating mediation effects (Hayes, 2009). The result was a significant mediation. Systematic qualitative research also

found that stable local organizations and quality local leaders play a significant role in the character of local crime prevention, and that collective efficacy for crime prevention could be increased by considerable external investment in local organizations. These findings are of great relevance to policy makers in the areas of community development and national security.

Chapter 1: Introduction

Background and significance

Trinidad and Tobago (T&T) experienced an unprecedented crime wave in the first decade of this new millennium, marked by a 400% increase in the annual number of homicides from 119 (9.4 per 100,000) to 547 (43.3 per 100,000) over the period 2000-2008 (Agozino, Bowling, Ward & St. Bernard, 2009). This precipitous crime surge has been linked to the international drug trade, which is typically accompanied by an increased availability of guns and their spill over into other crimes and even civil conflict (Agozino et al, 2009; Harriott, 2002; Moser & van Bronkhorst, 1999). As such over a similar period (1999-2008) firearm related homicides increased by 1000% and the number of criminal gangs tripled (Townsend, 2009; Agozino et al, 2009). In this scenario crime became the most pressing problem facing the country (UN/World Bank Report, 2007) prompting multifaceted approaches including community based strategies.

Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls (1997) made a significant contribution to structural explanations of crime and deviance in the theory of collective efficacy (CE). The theory argues that a community's degree of collective efficacy attenuates the adverse effects of structural disadvantage on the level of crime. Collective efficacy as a construct is an improvement on the measures of intervening social mechanisms at work in communities compared with those used in attempts to measure social disorganization. That is, this measure captures and combines specific actions and relationships that reflect cohesion (trust, closeness, helpfulness and shared values) with the active engagement in informal social control (Sampson et al, 1997; Sampson & Graif, 2009). In this way it differs from the processes like organizational participation and social networks, which are expected to create trust and produce acts of social control. The measure also appears to be quite reliable, as researchers have found a strong and

consistent association between higher levels of CE and lower levels of crime (Sampson et al, 1997; Sampson & Wikström, 2008; Mazerolle, Wickes & McBroom, 2010; Browning, Feinberg & Dietz, 2004).

However, although the theory has been successfully tested in communities in the United States (US), in Stockholm, Sweden (Sampson & Wikström, 2008) and Brisbane, Australia (Mazerolle et al, 2010), certain fundamental questions remain unanswered. In addition, at least one international development organization (known to the author), the Inter-American Development Bank, has already embraced the idea of increasing CE as an objective of the crime prevention initiatives it finances, in countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (IADB) (Questa, 2007). The Citizen Security Program in Trinidad and Tobago is one of those initiatives.

The theory of collective efficacy has not sufficiently addressed the question of what generates, and to a lesser extent, what attenuates the formation of collective efficacy. The theory has therefore found its way into regional crime prevention policy without sufficient empirical support for whether and how increasing CE can be achieved in communities where such intervention is most needed.

The focus of this study is on lower income high crime communities in Trinidad and Tobago (T&T) which provide a unique cultural context for the study of delinquency, crime and collective efficacy. Residents in these communities live with a high risk of victimization (Cohen & Felson, 1981; Bursik & Grasmick, 1993; Ferguson & Mindel, 2007; Aisenberg & Herrenkohl, 2008), and with high levels of exposure to violence, gang warfare and police activity (Venkatesh, 1997; Townsend, 2009; Anderson, 1994; MacDonald & Stokes, 2008; Weitzer, 1999). Lower income crime torn communities are also generally found to have lower levels of social control, trust and cohesiveness (Wilson, 1996; Sampson & Wilson, 1995).

This study will contribute to research, policy and practice with respect to the theory of collective efficacy and its relevance for community based crime prevention. Firstly, the study will contribute to

knowledge and generate areas for further research by examining how CE works in lower income high crime communities. The study will focus on the operations of the constituent parts of the CE concept, that is, social cohesion and social control. To this end, the study uses qualitative methods to understand (i) the norms, processes and relationships that define social control and cohesion in selected communities, (ii) the relationship between social cohesion and social control, and (iii) the factors responsible for generating social cohesion and social control in selected communities.

Second, the research will seek to examine whether collective efficacy provides an explanation for the relationship between concentrated disadvantage and the fear of crime. In this way it will assess the applicability of the concept to the Trinidad context, thereby contributing to the international generalizability of the measure. This aspect of the study uses quantitative methods to analyze the 2007 Crime Victimization Survey in Trinidad which contained scale measures of collective efficacy.

Finally, the study investigates whether and by what mechanisms CE can be increased. To this end, the study qualitatively assesses the contribution to CE of the IADB funded Citizen Security Programme in four communities in Trinidad and Tobago. The Citizen Security Programme, initiated in the year 2008, is a part of the government of Trinidad and Tobago's multifaceted assault on escalating crime. The CSP delivers three main community level interventions as part of its community action component which will be the focus of this examination. These include (i) violence prevention training for residents, (ii) the implementation of various locally designed crime prevention projects (e.g. park refurbishment, youth camps and mentorship programs), and (iii) the establishment of a Community Action Council as the local focal point for the coordination of this crime-prevention effort. The execution of these elements of the CSP is expected to enhance local capacity for crime prevention. The possibility of increasing CE is a critical question for crime prevention strategies as well as the wide range of other outcomes associated with CE including increased positive health behaviors (Roman & Chalfin,

2008; Browning & Cagney, 2002), increased reporting of domestic violence (Browning, 2002) and improved youth choices (Rankin & Quane, 2002).

While the CSP is being implemented in 22 lower income high crime communities in Trinidad and Tobago, the 2007 Crime Victimization Survey only covered the 19 partner communities located in Trinidad. The qualitative assessment of the contribution of the Citizen Security Programme to CE focuses on four of these communities which varied in terms of their exposure to the CSP at the commencement of field work and only moderately in terms of the socio-economic status. In-depth interviews, focus groups (n=138) and observations were used to collect qualitative data in these four communities. The CSP's contribution to collective efficacy is observed through the perceptions of the residents regarding the initiative's association with enhanced levels of social cohesion and active engagement in social control.

The study makes several contributions to the state of knowledge about the concept of collective efficacy and about its intersection with community-based crime prevention. First, peer-reviewed literature does not contain studies which examine the applicability of the theory of collective efficacy in the Caribbean context, or specifically among lower income communities. The finding that collective efficacy mediates the effect of concentrated disadvantage even in a study of fairly homogeneous lower income high crime communities is a major contribution to the robustness of the measure of CE, and lends support to the claim by Sampson et al. (1997) that CE performs its intervening role regardless of the level of poverty.

Second, the CE literature associates the cohesiveness of a community (defined as relations and interactions among neighbors, reciprocal exchanges and close-knittedness) with generating shared commitment for community well-being, while having a stake in the neighborhood is associated with promoting a rational interest in social regulation (Sampson et al. 1997; Sampson, 2006). Yet Sampson

(2006) conceded that little is known about what produces collective efficacy. The study offers two explanations for the presence of collective efficacy, which are also important for growing collective efficacy.

On the one hand, the study draws on the concept of bounded solidarity as a binding underlying phenomenon based on the common experience of place and shared circumstances, which predisposes neighbors to cordial social interactions. In this way bounded solidarity helps explain the observed persistence of a collective identity in the face of distrust and suspicion at the individual level. On the other hand, the study highlights the role of local organizations and local leadership both to facilitating social cohesion and to influencing the nature of social regulation. Stable local organizations and quality local leadership is associated with generating a wider range of social development interventions, especially to protect children and youth, as well as more cohesion building activities.

Third, the study challenges Sampson's (2006) notion that the collective efficaciousness of a community results from purely rational and instrumentally motivated individuals. Rather it found that most of the leaders or unconditional cooperators (defined later in this chapter) in the study communities who were in fact the architects of social control, were motivated by altruism, consistent with the concept of bounded solidarity (Browning, Dietz & Feinberg, 2000). Others demonstrated a combination of altruistic motivations with reputational interests (Chong, 1991) or self-interest (Ostrom, 2010). The importance of the source of motivation speaks to the nature of the effort required to engage residents in collective action/social control.

Fourth, studies of collective efficacy have not dissected the elements of social cohesion and social control to provide a more in-depth understanding of how the two are related. This study dissected the measures of social cohesion into high and low emotional transactions and examined social control through the three-level Hunter (1985, in Bursik & Grasmick, 1993) typology of regulation at the

private, parochial and public levels. In so doing, the study was able to associate high level emotional transactions – trust and close-knittedness, with private level social control, and lower level emotional transactions – getting along, shared values, with parochial and public level social control. This finding is very important to an understanding of how and why some mechanisms of social control are weaker than others, and for devising strategies to enhance informal social control. For example strategies to enhance private level social control would require more time investment based on the need to build trust, compared with strategies at the parochial level.

Finally, the study is the first to associate collective efficacy with a particular social program or an attempt to examine whether CE could be enhanced by external intervention. The study found that the Citizen Security Programme enhanced social cohesion and social control by virtue of its structural arrangements at the local level, the initiatives funded, and through capacity building. It also noted that the influence of the CSP varied with the existing social organizational arrangements in the community.

The use of a blended design, allowed the study both to examine the applicability of the concept of collective efficacy to lower income communities in Trinidad, as well as to contribute to a deeper and more practical understanding of the operations of this social mechanism and relate it to a most critical social issue, that of crime prevention.

The theory of collective efficacy: Origins, formulation, testing and concerns

Theoretical foundation

Described as a “magnum opus in criminology” (Burgess, in Shaw and McKay (1969, p. xxv), Shaw and McKay’s (1942, 1969) identification of the structural correlates of crime and delinquency is said to be one of the most important and enduring contributions of the Chicago School (Small & Newman, 2001). In their study of the data from Chicago and other US cities, Shaw and McKay (1942) found that serious juvenile delinquency was not randomly distributed across cities but varied by evidence of

physical disorder, poverty concentration, residential instability and ethnic heterogeneity (Short, in Shaw & McKay, 1969). They hypothesized that these factors were associated with higher levels of serious delinquency through the underlying mechanism of social disorganization (Shaw & McKay, 1969; Sampson & Groves, 1989; Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003). They explained how adverse ecological conditions disrupt the formation and maintenance of neighbor relations and networks and in turn, the social processes which would otherwise produce social control and result in regulated communities (Browning, 2004). Those disruptions therefore prevent the formulation of social norms, rules and relationships which are dispensed through the institutions of the family, religion, the education system and the community, and give rise to disorder, crime and other problem behaviors (Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003; Small, 2004; Browning et al., 2004; Sampson, 2006).

Social disorganization theory (SDT) is the foundation of the theory of collective efficacy. However instead of seeking to measure the institutions or social formations that facilitate engagement in actions that produce social order as SDT does, the social mechanisms measured in the theory of collective efficacy are those actions, rules and practices which more directly produce order. For example, in the first empirical test of SDT which was conducted by Sampson and Groves (1989) using data from the 1982 British Crime Survey, the intervening social mechanisms included, (i) the extent of local friendships measured by the number of friends based within a 15 minute walk of the respondents' home; (ii) the level of local organizational participation measured by meeting attendance the week prior to the interview; and (iii) an indicator of social control indirectly measured by individual responses about the prevalence of disorderly teens hanging around (Sampson & Groves, 1989).

The selection of these measures reflected, in the first instance, Shaw and McKay's focus on the problems of unsupervised idle youth and the prevention of long term criminal careers by the supervision and regulation of youth. Secondly, local participation in formal and voluntary organizations arguably

supplied the community with solidarity, institutional stability and increased capacity to control youth (Hunter, 1974; Kornhauser, 1978; Shaw & McKay, 1969 in Sampson & Groves, 1989, 778-779). The inclusion of measures of local friendship networks was influenced by the systemic theory of community (Kasarda & Janowitz, 1974) which hypothesized a causal relationship between dense social networks and social control. Although similar measures continue to feature in research on community social mechanisms, these are at most proxies for direct engagement in social control and cohesion.

In terms of the structural predictors of social disorganization, Sampson and Groves (1989) used five variables, namely, concentrated poverty, residential instability and ethnic heterogeneity, family disruption and urbanization. Considerable support existed(s) for this choice of factors. Firstly, there was consistent support among researchers (Kornhauser, 1978; Bryne & Sampson, 1986), for the association between poor socio-economic conditions and higher levels of crime, including Wilson's (1987) classic work which blames prolonged joblessness for creating self-perpetuating unproductive behaviors. Secondly, residential mobility was hypothesized to influence crime levels indirectly by disrupting social networks and relations (Sampson & Groves, 1989), weakening local organizational capacity (Wilson, 1996) and retarding the assimilation of new members (Janowitz, 1974). Thirdly, ethnic heterogeneity is said to create fear and mistrust across ethnicities and diminish the community's ability to arrive at consensus (Suttles, 1968, in Sampson & Groves, 1989). Fourthly, Sampson (1987) and Wilson (1987) concur that family disruption influences the level of crime by weakening the family's ability to supervise young members. Family disruption refers to single parent-- generally female headed-- households including those where the household head was divorced, widowed or separated (Sampson & Groves, 1989). These have been found highly related to juvenile delinquency and adult crime for both white and minority households (Sampson & Wilson, 1995). Finally, Sampson and Groves (1989) argued that

urbanization may influence crime by weakening networks of friendship and kinship ties, and local participation.

Using a path model, the authors found that the three measures of social disorganization -- friendship networks, organizational participation and unsupervised youth -- acted as full or partial mediators of the effects of the above structural correlates on crime and delinquency, with family disruption and urbanization having strong effects on crime even after the intervening variables were included (Sampson & Groves, 1989). The results also showed variations by type of crime suggesting that the effects of structural and intervening factors on crime are not homogeneous. In fact the results suggested that structural factors are stronger predictors of property crime, while intervening variables have a stronger mitigating role against violent crime. This is certainly an issue for further examination. However, notwithstanding this classic examination of SDT, Sampson and Groves (1989) conceded that the three intervening factors could not be considered different measures of the same variable-social disorganization- but rather they were each conceptually distinct.

Collective Efficacy - theory and measures

The concept of collective efficacy makes a significant improvement in terms of the measurement of intervening social mechanisms. CE is represented by a 10-item scale which attempts to directly measure resident perceptions of acts of social control and evidence of social cohesion. The social control measure is focused on adult supervision and regulation of youth behavior and as such seeks to capture the perceived likelihood of adult intervention to break up a fight, address disrespectful behavior or avoid truancy. It is also concerned with the likelihood of adult intervention if local property is being defaced by graffiti or if the local community is to lose a vital service e.g. its closest fire station. The measure of social cohesion captures relations among the residents by examining (i) whether neighbors are helpful to each other (e.g. watch each other's property, car pool, provide job referrals), (ii)

whether they get along, (iii) whether they trust each other and (iv) whether they share similar values (e.g. for a clean and orderly neighborhood, children supervision and development, adequate services in neighborhood).

The respective indicators of social control and cohesion are internally consistent and strongly map onto the respective constructs (Sampson et al., 1997; Knights, class assignment, 2010). In addition, by measuring the level of control and cohesion, they avoid some of the criticism the concept of social disorganization faced, as a negative concept (Small, 2004). That is, authors argue that the concept focuses on what the community lacks without paying adequate attention to its strengths and the way such communities are in fact organized, even in the face of prolonged poverty (Suttles, 1968; Bursik & Grasmick, 1993).

The theory of collective efficacy argues that CE is a characteristic of neighborhoods which intervenes between structural and individual risk factors and crime and that high levels of CE account for lower levels of crime across communities (Sampson et al, 1997). Collective efficacy describes the specific capacity of a community to regulate the behavior of its members. In making this point Sampson (2006) and Sampson and Graif (2009) argue that just as Bandura's concept of self-efficacy references specific individual capacities, so collective efficacy makes specific reference to the community's capacity for the regulation of public order. Moreover, Sampson and Graif (2009) place collective efficacy in the context of social capital which they define as "expectations for action within a collective" as adopted by Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993). In this context they argue that CE is the component of social capital that links trust and cohesion with the possession of shared values for social control. They distinguish other components of social capital such as friendship networks, organizational participation and the normative framework of the community relevant to deviance (Sampson & Graif, 2009).

Elaborating on the concept of CE, Sampson (2006) and other authors (Gibson, Zhao, Lovrich & Gaffney, 2002; Browning et al., 2004), explain that social cohesion is a facilitative condition for social control. Sampson (2006) also argues that the motivating factor in collective acts of social control is neither only nor mainly affective relationship, but also instrumental or rational motivations. He argues that in contemporary communities residents are likely to have strong extra-community networks and less time or inclination to develop close friendships locally, but may maintain instrumental relationships based on an expectation of future benefit from fellow residents and/or a mutual desire to secure the best community environment for their children, families and real estate investment.

The systemic model of community attachment is another control theoretic explanation of social processes which emanated from the Chicago School, which pre-dated collective efficacy theory, and which collective efficacy theory has sought to learn from. Developed by Kasarda and Janowitz (1974), the model conceives of the community “as a complex system of friendship and kinship networks and formal (local organizational) and informal associational ties rooted in family life and on-going socialization processes” (1974, p. 329). These network ties, they argue, are generated by residential longevity and, in turn, improve the community’s capacity for social control (Kasarda & Janowitz, 1974; Sampson, 1988; Browning et al., 2004). In testing the systemic model, Kasarda and Janowitz (1974) used measures of local friendship and kinship bonds, and detailed information about participation in local organizations as the mediating variables. They found that notwithstanding variations by social class and age group, persons that lived together for longer periods of time, (i) had a larger number of friends in the area or (ii) participated in formal local organizations, had the strongest community attachment and community interest respectively (Kasarda & Janowitz, 1974). In short, persons with the most deeply interwoven friendship networks demonstrated greater solidarity with their community.

Sampson (2006) accepts that kinship and friendship networks facilitate collective efficacy, in so far as they reflect relationships and contribute to cohesiveness. He argues, however, that such networks are not sufficient to produce social control. This is supported by the numerous studies which have found friendship and kinship networks to be a source of protection and buffer against social sanction (Venkatesh, 1997; Pattillo, 1998; Browning et al., 2004). These are elaborated later in this chapter.

Empirical tests of collective efficacy as a mediator of social outcomes

The theory of CE has been subject to empirical verification by robust studies using identical measures of CE (Sampson et al., 1997; Browning, 2002; Browning et al., 2004; Browning, 2009; Mazerolle et al., 2010), and other studies that used modified measures of CE (Sampson & Wikström, 2008; Browning, 2002; Rankin & Quane, 2002; Browning et al., 2005). The studies using modified measures of CE cannot be considered true tests of the theory of CE, but they raise useful questions. The theory makes important contributions to the study of social mechanisms and neighborhood effects in that CE (i) is a clearly defined collective property that can be reliably measured, (ii) is a robust underlying social mechanism that explains the relationship between structural and individual factors that are highly associated with crime; (iii) explains a considerable amount of the variation in crime rates across communities; and (iv) is correlated with yet distinguishable from other social properties (friendship networks, local organizational participation and neighborhood services) that are also associated with varying crime levels (Sampson et al., 1997; Sampson, 2006).

Studies of CE, beginning with Sampson and his colleagues (1997), have confirmed the hypothesis that collective efficacy is associated with lower levels of crime, and a mediator of the association between structural risk factors and crime levels. Using the 1995 Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods (PHDCN) with 8782 residents from 343 neighborhood clusters, Sampson et al. (1997) found CE to bear a strong inverse association with concentrated poverty, resident instability and

ethnic heterogeneity, which together explained 70% of the variation in CE across the clusters. Further, to disentangle the potential confounds given the association between racial composition and concentrated disadvantage, they also examined the effect of CE in 125 predominantly black (> 75%) neighborhood clusters and found the mediating role to obtain (Sampson et al., 1997). Overall, they found that incorporating CE as a mediator variable accounted for 75% of the variation in perceived violence across clusters, and strongly reduced the odds of violent victimization and the rate of homicides (Sampson et al., 1997).

Another important finding in this 1995 study was the strong discriminant validity demonstrated by the measure of CE. Sampson and his colleagues (1997) sought to establish that CE was tapping unique social processes compared with other social mechanisms also associated with lower crime levels, such as friendship and kinship ties, organizational participation and neighborhood services (Sampson & Groves, 1989; Cancino, Varano, Schafer, & Enriguez, 2007). As they expected, CE was positively associated with these characteristics ($r=0.49$; $r=0.45$; $r=0.21$ respectively), but when these were controlled, CE remained the 'largest negative predictor of the violent crime rate' (Sampson et al., 1997, p. 923). In a related model, Sampson et al. (1997) found that CE was associated with reduced levels of crime even when prior crime and social structure were controlled. By holding prior crime constant, they accounted for possible effects of prior crime both on CE and on the level of crime. Further, Sampson and Raudenbush (1999) compared the effects of CE to the effects of a measure of observed disorder obtained from their systematic observation of Chicago neighborhoods. They describe observed disorder as referring to both social and physical disorder. Social disorder is referred to as threatening behavior from a stranger, public intoxication and unsupervised rowdy youth. Physical disorder encompasses "the deterioration of urban landscapes, for example, graffiti on buildings, abandoned cars, broken windows, and garbage in the streets (Sampson & Raudenbush, 1999 p. 604). They found CE to be a stronger

predictor of crime than observed disorder after controlling for the reciprocal effects of crime on CE (Sampson & Raudenbush, 1999).

A test of the applicability of CE was also conducted in Brisbane, Australia, where the crime rate was significantly lower than the US (1.5 crimes per 100,000 people compared with 5.7 for the US in 2003); and where according to Mazerolle et al. (2010) strong egalitarian and communitarian values permeate the governance and social structure in contrast to the more neo-liberal individualistic US society. Mazerolle et al. (2010) used similar measures and a similar multi-level analytical strategy to Sampson et al. (1997), incorporating individual and community level predictors of crime in their examination of CE. They found that when CE was incorporated in the model, it accounted for 30% ($R^2 = .303$) of the variation in the rate of self-reported violent victimization, confirming the applicability of the construct of CE in this quite different context. In another international study, a comparative study of CE between Chicago and Stockholm, Sweden, Sampson and Wikström (2008) found CE to be a social property operating in both contexts, measurable using identical indices. For Stockholm, the 1996 survey included 3,992 respondents from 200 cities and identical variables were painstakingly paired for both contexts modeled on the early Chicago study. As with Chicago, they found that CE was a significant predictor of lower crime levels in Stockholm cities explaining 34% ($R^2 = .339$) of the variation in crime rates, notwithstanding the fact that Stockholm's cities performed considerably better than Chicago on all structural predictors of crime and had much lower homicide rates (Sampson and Wikström, 2008). Back in the US, Browning (2002) and Browning and Cagney (2002) found CE to be associated with better health outcomes, increased domestic violence reporting by women, and healthier youth choices.

The generation and attenuation of collective efficacy

This section discusses a number of factors presented in various studies that have been associated with higher or lower levels of collective efficacy. These include structural (socio-economic

disadvantage and disorder) and individual factors, as well as other collective community characteristics including fear of crime, deviance tolerance and local friendship networks.

Structural and individual factors

While the question of what generates CE has not been fully addressed, a number of structural and individual factors have been highly associated with CE. According to Sampson (2006) structural predictors of CE provide initial evidence of what generates CE. In the 1997 study, Sampson and his colleagues found that concentrated poverty, residential stability and ethnic heterogeneity explained 70% of the variation in CE across neighborhood clusters. Using principal components analysis, they were able to reduce 10 census variables into the three structural categories. Concentrated poverty was a composite measure including, the percent below poverty line, percent on welfare, percent female headed households, percent unemployed, percent black and percent under 18 years of age. Residential stability included the percentage of owner-occupied homes and the percentage of persons living at the same address five years earlier. The third component, ethnic heterogeneity, comprised the percent foreign born and the percent Latino. Studies using single rather than composite variables found that percent low income families (Gibson et al., 2002; Mazerolle et al., 2010) percent young persons 15-19 years and percent at different address five years earlier (Mazerolle et al., 2010) were predictive of CE, consistent with the findings of Sampson et al. (1997) regarding disadvantage and instability. There was less support for ethnic heterogeneity as a predictor of CE.

With respect to the individual correlates of CE, a fairly consistent pattern emerged from studies in terms of the characteristics of residents most likely to conceive of higher levels of CE in their communities. Persons who were older, had higher socio-economic statuses or incomes, and owned their own homes were more likely to perceive higher levels of CE in their neighborhood (Sampson et al., 1997; Mazerolle et al., 2010). Duncan et al. (2003) also found age and marital status to be a significant

positive predictor of CE but not family income, while Mazerolle et al. (2010) found gender to be significant, although the significance of gender was not supported in other studies (Sampson et al., 1997; Duncan et al., 2003). The results suggest older persons, stable community residents and persons with higher SES are more likely to have a favorable perception of the degree of community cohesion and the willingness of neighbors to intervene for the common good of the youth specifically and the neighborhood in general. These findings notwithstanding, a lot remains unknown as studies have not examined who are the persons more likely to be involved in acts of social control or to have cohesive relationships with their neighbors.

Fear of Crime

The fear of crime appears to have a reciprocal relationship with CE. Rationalist (Elchardus, Groof, & Smits, 2008) or cognitive fear (Ferguson & Mindel, 2007) which has to do with explicit or perceived risk of violence has been found to affect the level of trust (Gibson et al., 2002), community attachment (Kasarda and Janowitz, 1974) and participation in local activities (Roman & Chalfin, 2002), thereby reducing the level of cohesion and adversely impacting active engagement in social control. Ferguson and Mindel (2007) estimated the relationship between CE and fear of crime using a measure of CE that assessed resident participation in collective initiatives including neighborhood watch groups and community meetings. They did not find a significant association. This is not surprising however as Rosenbaum (1998) noted that participation in neighborhood watch groups can even increase the level of fear of crime due to access to more information on the crime situation in the community. Using a 5-item measure of CE that was not identical but more conceptually related to the original measures used by Sampson et al. (1997) than the Ferguson and Mindel (2007) study, Gibson et al. (2002) found that higher levels of collective efficacy were associated with lower levels of fear of crime. This finding suggests that when members of a community have cohesive relationships with one another and can rely

on one another to watch their property and otherwise look out for them, there is a greater sense of safety. Ferguson and Mindel's (2007) review of the literature on structural predictors of the fear of crime, found significance with high levels of crime, racial segregation, population density, residential instability, political apathy, and low levels of cohesion and civic engagement. It must also be noted that predictors of low levels of CE also predict high levels of fear of crime. This study examines the fear of crime as an adverse social outcome to be mediated by collective efficacy.

Deviance tolerance

The idea of communities having higher degrees of tolerance for deviance finds support in the social disorganization, social isolation, and systemic and cultural transmission models. Theorists in these traditions have argued that severely disadvantaged, racially segregated communities evolve weak social institutions, are unable to unite around shared positive values, execute limited informal social control and are over exposed to networks with limited productive value in terms of jobs and role models (Wilson, 1996; Kornhauser, 1978 in Sampson & Bartusch, 1998). The cultural transmission model takes this further by arguing that what evolves in this context is an oppositional culture, that is, in the context of developed western societies, behaviors that reject the norms of conventional 'white' society, which is viewed as oppressive (Ogbu, 1982), or which evolve in the absence of social controls (Anderson, 1994 in Browning et al., 2004). Other authors found however that deviance tolerance is not associated with variations by race or ethnicity (Rossi et al. 1974 and Earlanda & Winsborough, 1976, in Sampson & Bartusch, 1998). Horowitz (1987) introduced the issue of social distance in her explanation of community tolerance of gang violence, arguing that gang members are part of family and friendship networks in which they may conform to conventional rules, and that this close social connection facilitated tolerance. Deviance tolerance is usually measured by asking residents their views on how wrong it was for teenagers (around 13 years, and 19 years) to smoke cigarettes, use marijuana, drink

alcohol and get into fist fights (Browning et al., 2004; Sampson & Graif, 2009). In the latter study this was discussed as examples of conduct norms. As such, deviance tolerance is not conceptualized as a matter of individual views, perceptions and variations, but as norms and attitudes associated with the depth of socio-economic disadvantage, residential stability and ethnic heterogeneity of a specific place (Sampson & Bartusch, 1998). Deviance tolerance is hypothesized to reduce the likelihood of engagement in informal social control (Browning et al., 2004; Browning, 2009) and is also likely to adversely impact the evolution of shared values.

Research on the attenuating impact of deviance tolerance yielded mixed results. In a logistic model of violent victimization, Browning et al. (2004) found that deviance tolerance had no effect on the relationship between CE and violent victimization. Sampson and Bartusch (1998) found that (i) areas of concentrated poverty and residential instability had higher levels of tolerance for deviance and (ii) there was no support for the idea that tolerance for deviance varied by race or class, but that residentially mobile residents tended to be more deviance tolerant. Further research is needed to examine the relationship between deviance tolerance and collective efficacy.

Local friendship networks

The concept of local friendship networks has an ambiguous relationship with CE. While several researchers have found or hypothesized that such networks facilitate cohesion and community attachment (Sampson, 2006; Karsarda & Janowitz, 1974; Browning et al., 2004) others have found a negative association between friendship and kinship networks and social control. Studies have indicated the ability of strong ties to obstruct efforts at social control in three distinct ways. Firstly, in the contexts of prolonged poverty and social isolation, strong ties to networks with limited connections to jobs or comprised of persons with limited life skills can be unproductive (Wilson, 1996; Stack, 1975 in Sampson, 2006). Secondly, dense social ties inevitably create an opportunity for the overlapping of licit and illicit

networks. When persons involved in illicit activities provide benefits (e.g. financial support, security) to “conventional residents”, they may be rewarded by protection from authorities (Browning et al., 2004; Venkatesh, 1997; Pattillo, 1998). Other authors make reference to the “*omerta*” or code of silence (Diagne, 1995 in Heinemann & Verner, 2006) practiced by some residents in areas ‘served’ by corporatized gangs (Taylor, 1990 in Venkatesh, 1997) due to threats of victimization, or benefits derived. All of this can be captured in what Browning et al. (2004) call negotiated co-existence, which arguably reduces the effect of both social ties and CE. Venkatesh (1997), Pattillo (1998) and Browning et al. (2004) used qualitative and quantitative methods and have found this attenuating effect of friendship networks to be evident. However in quantitative work by Browning et al. (2004) local friendship networks reduced but did not remove the mediating effect of CE.

Some concerns regarding the theory of collective efficacy

A number of questions remained unanswered in terms of the theory of collective efficacy. In the first place, Robert Sampson (2006) one of the theory’s main proponents, admits that there is no clear theoretical explanation for what generates collective efficacy. In this regard the theory is unable to offer an explanation about how to grow or increase collective efficacy. While there is strong evidence that structural conditions of poverty, residential instability and ethnic heterogeneity are inversely related to collective efficacy, Sampson et al. (1997) provide evidence for the mediating role of CE despite the level of poverty. In addition, while women, older residents and persons with higher SES have higher perceptions of CE it is unclear whether more or fewer such persons generate CE and by what mechanisms. Beyond demographics for example, in the collective action literature Chong (1991) demonstrated how leaders (unconditional cooperators) galvanize support of others, for a cause of movement. The presence of residents with charismatic personalities, deep commitment to community development and strong organizing or leadership qualities and external networks, may be important for

generating CE. The presence of such persons in a community can be a uniting force and stimulate interest among residents in the pursuit of the common good of the community, independent of the socio-economic conditions of the community. This type of influence will hardly be observed by quantitative methods, but rather through more in-depth community study.

Second, there appears to be a mismatch between the measures of social cohesion and the theoretical explanation of social cohesion in contemporary communities. It is argued that in contemporary communities shared values for social control are inspired by rationality and instrumental relations and to a lesser extent by affective ties (Sampson, 2006). However, the issue of rational motivation for social control may well be a too limited conceptualization of the inspiration for involvement in community regulation. According to Ostrom (2000) there are many types of individuals who incur costs for the common good, including the rational and the altruists.

In addition, Sampson (2006) explained that his reference to trust refers to working trust, that is, neighbors' willingness to work together for the common good. This can be differentiated from social, civic and interpersonal trust (Macinko & Starfield, 2001) each of which refers to the ability to place confidence in an individual. In this regard, the measures of trust (people around here can be trusted) as well as the measure of close-knittedness (this is a close knit neighborhood) incorporated on the social cohesion scale raise questions of content validity as these may be seeking to measure a level of intimacy and affective relations more prevalent in the traditional village rather than rationally motivated "working trust" as Sampson posits. The measure of the perception that residents "get along" for example, appears to present a more adequate reflection of the quality of relations in the new urban village, having less reliance on closeness.

Second, the relationship between the two constructs -- social cohesion and social control -- which comprise the measure of collective efficacy warrants deeper analysis. On the social control side,

Hunter (1985, in Bursik & Grasmick, 1993) has elaborated on the concept of social control, dissecting it into three component parts. These include mechanisms that operate at the private, parochial and public levels. The private level of social control gives consideration to mechanisms, institutions or sanctions such as ostracism, ridicule and direct criticism which work among friends, kin and other intimate groups, on the strength of affective ties. At the parochial level, social control is effected at the organizational level -- the church, school, local institutions, shops, and voluntary organizations -- through collective action by residents (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993). The third level of social control is the public level, which refers to the political agency of a community or its ability to negotiate with its external environment to obtain resources and services for the benefit of the community (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993). Hunter (1985, in Bursik & Grasmick, 1993) argues that for the social control to be most effective each type of social control should be at work simultaneously.

Sampson et al. (1997) appeared to embrace this typology as the measures employed on the social control scale appear to represent these levels of control mechanisms. For example, the likelihood that someone would intervene if children were disrespectful or skipping school could be considered regulation of children and youth by private sanction, while responding to the closure of a fire-station was at the public level of social control.

However, while collective efficacy theory accepts that social cohesion creates the conditions for social control, it has not explained whether different types of cohesion -- reciprocity, trust, close-knittedness, getting along, shared values -- are differentially correlated with the various levels of social control. For example, private level social control may be inspired by interpersonal trust and close-knittedness, while working trust may influence the willingness to work together at an organizational level to solve local problems. The combination of measures on the respective cohesion and control

scales may obscure the working of these relationships. However, understanding these relationships would be important for an appreciation of the dynamics at the community level.

In addition, there is theoretical support for a reciprocal relationship between social cohesion and social control, in that, while cohesion facilitates control, successful involvement in acts of control will encourage greater cohesion as well. Few (Browning et. al., 2004) empirical tests of the theory of collective efficacy have explored the relationship between social cohesion and social control and potential unique associations each may have with crime levels.

Summary

The theory of collective efficacy, with its foundations in social disorganization theory, provides an answer to the question, by what mechanisms concentrated poverty influences higher levels of crime and violence. The concept of CE is described as a community characteristic or mechanism which captures the community's capacity to regulate its members and its tendency for cohesiveness and shared values (Sampson et al., 1997; Sampson & Graif, 2009). As a direct measure of social cohesion and social control, CE is considered to be more sophisticated than the proxy measures -- local organization participation, friendship ties and unsupervised youth -- used in examination of social disorganization. In addition, CE is put forward as one construct with high internal validity, compared with the three conceptually distinct constructs referenced above. It is argued that CE underlies the association between structural and individual risk factors, and crime, and accounts for variable levels of crime across communities (Sampson et al., 1997). This has been confirmed by empirical tests in the United States and a few other developed countries (Sampson, 2006).

However the theory of collective efficacy does not explain the social mechanisms that generate CE, beyond the structural and individual correlates of the measure of CE. Other important questions emerge from the elaboration of the theory of collective efficacy including whether the motivations for

engaging in social control are accurately theorized, whether the measures of social cohesion adequately reflect relationships in contemporary communities, and whether the relationship between social cohesion and social control has been fully explored, including the potential differential relationships between individual scale measures of cohesion and control.

Other theoretical frameworks underpinning the study

Other theories that incorporate the issues of change, may provide answers to some of the questions about which the theory of collective efficacy remains silent; particularly, its inability to explain what generates or may increase or decrease collective efficacy. For example, perhaps an inherent place-based solidarity that could be ignited in pursuit of general community well-being should be explored as an underlying mechanism that provides a basis for interactions, regardless of the nature of the community-- traditional or contemporary. Further, examining the content of local social norms and shared beliefs may provide clues about the processes involved in generating or attenuating CE. As such, new institutional theory which is concerned with the emergence and change of formal and informal rules, including norms that regulate and shape behavior in communities would be instructive. Moreover, it will be important to explore issues around collective action and leadership to understand the nature of community's involvement in social control. The ensuing sections set out these theoretical areas in turn.

Bounded solidarity

The concept of bounded solidarity has been elaborated by Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) as a mechanism that generates social capital, defined as expectations for action within a collective. Bounded solidarity has its origin in Marx's explanation of the conscientization of the proletariat and how this group becomes transformed into a "class-for-itself" (Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993, p. 1324). In its contemporary application, bounded solidarity has typically been used to explain ethnic solidarity as

experienced by minorities, very distant from country of origin, and coping with prejudice, marginalization, and discrimination at the hands of a perceived “hostile” host society. For example, Portes & Sensenbrenner (1993) study Chinese immigrants who were prevented from working in factories in the US states of New York and California, and who responded by establishing strong networks of support to co-ethnics in tightly knit communities called Chinatown.

Bounded solidarity is therefore conceptualized as a situational reaction to a common experience of adversity and opposition to mainstream society that invokes a sense of “we-ness” (Portes, 1998). Its boundedness is associated with both the facts that it is context specific, and related to a specific in-group. Bounded solidarity is also associated with the generation of an altruistic response, where participation is not associated with reciprocity or instrumentality but based on a perceived moral imperative, given the common struggle. In the case of the Chinese, the response to alienation resulted in an effective system of economic support to new migrants and new migrant enterprises such that they are said to have the highest rates of self-employment among migrant groups and the largest businesses (Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993).

The value of bounded solidarity to this study is in its applicability to place based communities (Portes, 1998) and its relevance to the study of communities that exist outside of mainstream society, and share a common history of marginalization neglect, underdevelopment, concentrated disadvantage and stigma. Bounded solidarity is viewed as a constant underlying mechanism or sense of “we-ness” that is ever present in these communities and is ignited or demonstrated in specific circumstances, for example, in response to threats from outside of the community. As such, it may well be that this underlying “we-ness” provides a more stable explanation for the presence of shared commitment to community well-being, in the face of the shift from the traditional to contemporary communities where close-knittedness and trust take on different dimensions (Sampson & Graif, 2009).

Moreover, as argued by Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) that sense of “we-ness” provokes responses on two fronts. On the one hand, there is the non-rational altruistic response that is a demonstration of group solidarity rather than an investment for future returns. On the other hand, however, there is the response referred to as the “downward leveling” norm whereby group members’ attempts to create an existence for themselves outside group norms and limitations, for example, to move into the mainstream society and away from the community receive sanctions by group members.

While bounded solidarity may explain the underlying connection between residents, it does not explain all interactions, nor does it explain how social control is effected or how norms change over the course of time. These issues are better explained by the institutional perspective.

Institutional perspective

Institutions are defined by Douglas North (1990) as the informal and formal rules that guide every day interactions. Such institutions perform the function of securing conformity and reducing uncertainty through a system of rewards and punishments. The mechanisms underlying CE can be described as informal institutions in the Northian sense. The institutions of informal community regulation for example, would include the habits of adults intervening when youth are disorderly, correcting disrespectful youth, or lobbying government agencies for better community services. The institutions that define social cohesion would be for example, norms and actions that reflect trust, helping and shared values such as looking out for each other’s property, taking the neighbor’s kids to school, or participating in community events. From North’s (1990) perspective, compliance with these formal and informal norms has to be enforced and this enforcement must occur at a cost that is deemed worthwhile to the parties. That is, the benefits of enforcing the norms need to exceed their cost. This helps explain the challenge of social control in circumstances of a high level of disorder, distrust and suspicion as is common in lower income high crime communities. In such contexts, attempts at rule

enforcement can be met with varying responses including acceptance and change, but can also range from belligerence to violence thereby rendering the cost greater than the benefits. If norms are not enforced, they may atrophy over time, thus reducing effective social regulation.

North also sheds light on norm change, arguing that behaviors and practices are shaped by incentives or pressures exerted on the community by internal and external forces. Internal forces in the context of the study communities can include the effects of prolonged poverty, and the out-migration of persons with leadership capacity who may have held the community together. On the other hand, external pressures could include increasing availability of guns coming in to the community or increasingly poor management of a government programming which inadvertently fuels the criminal enterprise in these communities.

An institutional perspective therefore provides a framework for exploring whether the study communities conform to the theory of collective efficacy. This would include (i) an understanding of relational norms that guide interactions at the level of the individual and community; (ii) a search for specific norms, conventions, habits, practices rewards and sanctions by which the community regulates itself, and (iii) the incentives and pressures on the community that might have caused the evolution or shift in norms relating to social control and cohesion.

Collective Action

Bounded solidarity provides guidance concerning the underlying impetus for community relationships and the institutional perspective helps zero in on the norms and processes of interaction as well as the pressures that provoke norm change. Collective action is particularly helpful for an understanding of the expression of cohesion and agency for social control exercised in each community.

Theories of collective action seek to address the social dilemma of why individuals participate in a movement or activity that will derive benefits to all, with little apparent personal gain for the

participant above and beyond the collective benefits. This is the crux of the free rider problem. Dennis Chong (1991) developed a general model of collective action, with illustrations from the civil rights movement in the United States. His concern was with what he calls “public-spirited collective action”, that is, large group collective action in pursuit of a public good which does not directly produce economic benefit, such as peace, women’s rights and civil rights. Such issues constitute public goods in that they are jointly supplied by participants; non-participants cannot be excluded from the benefits obtained; and crowding or over use by other participants does not reduce benefits to others. Social control in general and specifically informal crime prevention in a community are also public goods. The entire community will derive benefits from the peace and safety that can be derived from informal social control, but the question remains what would motivate individuals to incur the costs of involvement.

Chong’s (1991) point of departure, like Sampson’s (2006) is that “people are rational actors whose decisions are guided by rational calculations” (p. 1). However, Chong is dissatisfied with the pure rationalist explanation and is of the view that material incentives contribute minimally to cooperation in public-spirited collective action. He believes that participants in public-spirited collective action also receive “selective incentives” to cooperate, which non-cooperators do not, but that these are based on social pressures and not merely monetary. Those pressures hold, based in the first place, on the “consistency between the goals of the cause and the individual’s own values” which in turn is part of the motivation to participate (Chong, 1991, p. 33).

Secondly, in the large group context the motivation to cooperate occurs in a situation of repeated interactions when the goals of the cause are supplemented by social incentives “such as the desire to gain or sustain friendships, maintain one’s social standing, and avoid ridicule or ostracism” (Chong, 1991, p. 9). In short, participation secures the selective incentive of a good reputation. He

argues that reputation is an intrinsic goal of individuals as they seek to establish and maintain a specific social identity -- how they appear in the eyes of others. Maintaining a particular reputation therefore becomes an incentive to participate, while the potential loss of reputation functions as a sanction. Chong (1991) argues further, that social interactions also inspire the development of other-regarding interests and cooperators therefore also operate out of a sincere concern, sympathy and affection for others.

Chong (1991) recognizes also that there are those truly committed individuals, unconditional cooperators, who contribute to a movement or cause irrespective of the involvement or investment of others. Such persons, he argues are driven by a combination of altruism (the pleasure obtained for the pleasure of others), and strong moral (rightness that does not necessary increase pleasure or welfare) commitment and therefore do what is right because it is right and not because it will serve their self-interest (p. 126). Ostrom (2010) included the dimension of bounded rationality to the discussion of unconditional cooperators. She describes the boundedly rational as those whose motivations combine both a genuine concern for others and self-interest. Unconditional cooperators so motivated, play critical roles in promoting cooperation. According to Chong (1991) and Ostrom (2010) they pave the way for the conditional cooperators -- those whose participation relies on the contribution of others -- to become involved and they both incentivize participation, and “cast shame” on those who don’t bear a reasonable share.

Additional theorizing on the role of unconditional cooperators can be found in the discussion of leadership in many fields including management, and education. In management the term transformational leader was used to define those who motivate others to join a movement by setting high standards and otherwise inspiring their followers (Chou, Lin, Chang & Chuang, 2013; Demir, 2008). Such leaders produce outcomes including engaging otherwise unmotivated participants, improving team

performance, promoting a collaborative culture among teachers, and collective teacher efficacy. The success of such leaders has been attributed to their ability to 'frame' the goals of action in compelling and captivating ways (Snow & Benford, 1988, in Einwohner, 2007); the leader's credibility (Krishna, 2007; Chemers, 2000) and exemplary behavior (Chong, 1991); and the leader's modeling of desired behaviors, exhibiting high expectations of and confidence in followers (House, 1977, in Chemers, 2000). In addition, the leader is the one who is willing to pay heavy start-up costs, promoting the movement in the absence of explicit evidence of success, a sizeable following or social pressures or incentives to participate (Chong, 1991, p.11).

Important issues emerge from the collective action and leadership literature. First is a challenge to the notion that pure instrumentality alone is the only motivation for engaging in acts of social control. Instead persons may be motivated by social incentives including safeguarding their reputations or by altruistic interests. Secondly the impetus for involvement could come from exemplary leaders who by personal sacrifices, strong commitment to and compelling framing of the cause provide both the motivation and sanction for others to follow. Third, conditional cooperators or followers -- the critical mass in social movements -- could be incentivized by their own value or belief in the cause, but also by the system of rewards and sanctions related to their reputational interests, their expectations for success and the number of followers. Ultimately therefore, leadership emerges as an essential ingredient in the generation of collective action. In this regard, understanding the motivations for collective action and the role of altruistic leaders can well be a missing ingredient or mechanism in the theory of collective efficacy.

Organization of Dissertation

The dissertation proceeds in the following manner. Chapter 2 sets out the research hypotheses and aims of the dissertation and presents the blended research methodology. Chapter 3 describes the

research setting including the historical and socio-economic country context, factors contributing to the crime surge of the new millennium and the history of the Village Council Movement in Trinidad and Tobago, which provides the backdrop to the local organizational character of the study communities.

Chapter 4 presents the quantitative analysis of both the 2007 Crime Victimization Survey and the primary dataset gathered for this study. Using the 2007 CVS, the chapter analyzes the degree of social cohesion and social control evident, the predictors of collective efficacy, the mediation model examining the intervening role of collective efficacy between socio-economic disadvantage and the fear of crime, as well as mediation models examining the relationship between social cohesion and social control.

The qualitative analyses of social cohesion and social control are set out in Chapters 5-7. In Chapter 5, the various elements of cohesion are explored including relationships, reciprocity and shared values for community well-being and a number of explanations are advanced for the generation and persistence of that shared commitment. In Chapter 6, with the help of the institutional and negotiated coexistence perspectives, the considerably weakened private level social control is described and explained. Social control at the parochial and public levels are combined as organizational level social control in Chapter 7. This chapter explores the agency for social control demonstrated by the four study communities and emphasizes the differential roles the local organizations and local leaders play in generating community level collective action.


The qualitative assessment of the contribution of the Citizen Security Programme is presented in Chapter 8, focused on an analysis of two substantive issues: the perceptions of residents regarding the structure, programming and capacity building of/by the CSP and the association between CSP-funded interventions and the targeting of risks for violence prevention. The study concludes in Chapter 9, with a synthesis of the findings and a discussion of the implications for research, policy and practice.

Chapter 2: Conceptual model and research design

Conceptual model and statement of aims

The study advances two hypotheses to explain the role and operations of collective efficacy in the CSP partner communities in Trinidad. The first is represented at Figure 1 below. This can be described as the parsimonious model which, as studies in other contexts have found, posits that collective efficacy will mediate the effects of structural conditions on the fear of crime in the 19 CSP partner communities. The study hypothesizes that socio-economic disadvantage is negatively related to collective efficacy (path a in Figure 1) and therefore socio-economically worse off communities will evince lower degrees of collective efficacy (Sampson et al. 1997).


Figure 1: Conceptual model of the intervening role of collective efficacy



However, the cohesiveness of the neighborhood, especially the ability of neighbors to get along and forge cordial and working relations for the common good of the community, reduces the adverse effect of poor economic conditions on the fear of crime as shown in path ab in Figure 1 (Gibson et al. 2002). The engagement of neighbors in wholesome collective activities generates hope, a sense of control and reduces fear (Berg, Coman & Schensul, 2009). Path c' in Figure 1 depicts the anticipated positive association between socio-economic disadvantage and the fear of crime. That is, poorer communities will exhibit higher levels of fear of crime.

The second, fuller hypothesis depicts what is anticipated via the qualitative analysis, and provides more in-depth insights into the social organization of communities focused on the operations of collective efficacy. Figure 2 refers to this hypothesis.

Figure 2: Conceptual model of collective efficacy for crime prevention



The model depicts the well-established inverse relationship between adverse conditions and social cohesion (Gibson et al., 2002; Browning et al. 2000). It however contributes to the literature on social cohesion by dissecting the concept into low emotional cost and high emotional cost transactions, borrowing from North's (1990) discussion of transaction costs involved in the enforcement of rules and norms. Similarly, emotional costs here refer to cost of sustaining a level of relationship and assumes that trust and close-knittedness invokes higher cost, given the potential for betrayal, hurts and conflict. Getting along, shared values and reciprocal exchanges better allow residents to project placed based solidarity into individual level interactions and so the cost is diffused to the community rather than to the individual. As such, lower emotional costs are incurred in maintaining this level of relationship. This

idea that individual interaction and exchanges can be motivated by community rather than individual solidarity is supported by Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993).

The model therefore includes the premise that bounded solidarity is embedded in the historical and mutual struggles especially of marginalized communities. Residents in these communities experience what Portes (1998) describes as a sense of “we-ness” that in turn provokes altruistic considerations for one another (Browning et al. 2000) that transcends individual relationships but accrues to the collective (Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993). This solidarity of place is intensified by the mutual struggles for survival and tension with mainstream society, combined with the shared experiences of poverty, disorder and stigma. Bounded solidarity provides a mechanism for overcoming the challenges of social cohesion in poor and marginal communities.

The model also shows that cohesion is hypothesized as being differentially associated with social control, such that high-cost cohesion is positively associated with private level social control, while low cost cohesiveness is similarly associated with organizational level social control-the parochial and public levels combined. The study will show that high levels of distrust and suspicion are associated with weakened private level social control. However, high levels of reciprocity and residents getting along are associated with the sustainability of organizational level social control as the main vehicle for social control in the study communities.

The model introduces two additional elements into the discussion of collective efficacy (all elements introduced not typically associated with collective efficacy are shaded). The first is the endogenous and non-random factor of the capability, style and credibility of local organizational leadership, and the second is the potential contribution of an exogenous factor in the deliberate investment of external resources towards crime prevention such as the Citizen Security Programme. The issue of local leadership poses a problem for social research because the presence of such leaders is

unpredictable (Krishna, 2007). The capacity and style of leadership has also not been examined in the collective efficacy literature. However, in this model, capable leadership is associated with the nature of organizational level social control (Krishna, 2007) and low-cost cohesion.

The model predicts that a very specific and structured external resource such as the CSP enhances both low-cost cohesion and organizational level social control for crime prevention. On the right side of the figure, the model represents the adoption of an ecological and scientific approach to crime prevention through reducing risks of and enhancing protective factors against crime and violence (Hawkins, Catalano & Arthur, 2002). It assumes that just as disease prevention is pursued by reducing risks and enhancing protective factors, so too a reduction in crime and by extension the fear of crime can be achieved. The model therefore postulates that the CSP will be associated with reduced crime and the fear of crime, through enhanced cohesion and capacity for social control focused on the adoption of a scientific approach to crime prevention. This approach also can improve private level social control for example, through the adoption of measures that reduce risks at the household level.

In the context of the hypotheses depicted at Figures 1 and 2 and elaborated above, the study proposes the following aims:

Aim 1:

To examine the norms, processes and informal operations of lower income, high crime communities of Trinidad and Tobago in the light of the concept of collective efficacy, including:

- What is the nature of social cohesion and social control in the study communities
- What is the relationship between social cohesion and social control
- Whether and how social cohesion and social control are generated in lower income high crime communities

Aim 2:

To examine whether collective efficacy functions as an intervening variable between structural disadvantage and the fear of crime in lower income communities in Trinidad and Tobago.

Aim 3:

To understand in what ways the community action component of the Citizen Security Programme contributes to collective efficacy.

For the qualitative assessment of Aim 1, the extended case method (Buraway, 2009) will be used to search for patterns anomalous to the anticipated high levels of mistrust, low levels of cohesion and limited engagement in social control (Wilson, 1996) associated with lower income high crime communities, as well as to construct an understanding of the norms, patterns and relationships observed and their association with social control. The study will dissect the mechanisms which define social cohesion and social control to better understand those relationships. It will also explore endogenous as well as exogenous factors associated with the generation or attenuation of shared values for community well-being.

Analysis of the mediation model of collective efficacy on the fear of crime (Aim 2) is in keeping with the extensive range of literature which has tested the intervening effect of CE (Sampson et al., 1997; Browning et al., 2004; Browning, 2009; Gibson et al., 2002; Rankin & Quane, 2002; Duncan et al., 2003; Mazerolle et al., 2010). The study will utilize sophisticated bootstrapping methodology (Hayes, 2009) to investigate this mediating effect in a single level model, utilizing data from the 2007 Crime Victimization Survey (n=2133).

The study explores the contribution of the Citizen Security Programme to collective efficacy using two strategies. First, an examination of the perception of this contribution through the eyes of residents as it relates to the structure of the relationship between the CSP and the respective communities, the value of the programming funded under this initiative, and the capacity building

facilitated for residents and local entities by the CSP. Second, an examination of the CSP-funded programming in light of specific risk factors for crime and violence as outlined by Hawkins et al. (2002). A full elaboration of the research design follows.

Research Design

Data sources

The study combines qualitative and quantitative research strategies to address the three study aims. Quantitative analysis was performed on data from two sources - the 2007 Crime Victimization Survey, commissioned by the Ministry of National Security (MNS), and primary data collected in Trinidad over the periods October 2010 to June 2011 and December 2011 to February 2012.

Crime Victimization Survey (CVS)

The 2007 CVS (n=2133) was conducted in the 19 CSP partner communities as baseline data prior to the implementation of the CSP. The CVS was financed by the CSP and conducted by the private research and marketing firm HHB & Associates Limited. The CVS is a random sample of households in each community based on the population size of the community and an overall goal of a 3000-respondent sample (Bertrand, L, n.d). The CVS includes demographic and victimization information as well as scale data on collective efficacy, perceptions of safety and views about police services. The presence of these variables facilitated the examination of the mediating role of collective efficacy between socio-economic disadvantage and the fear of crime as per Aim 2.

The CVS data also contributes to an understanding of collective efficacy (Aim 1), by facilitating the examination of the relationship between social cohesion and social control. While collective efficacy

has typically been studied using multilevel¹ models, the current study follows in the tradition of others who have examined these relationships using single level models (Gibson et al., 2002; Ross & Jang, 2000). A single level model was used due to limited variation in the data at the second (community) level, as attested by the low intra-class coefficient analysis (ICC).

Primary Data

Primary data was collected in four partner communities of the Citizen Security Programme namely, Never Dirty, Mt. Dor, Samaroo Village/Mootoo Lands and Pinto Road. Interviewees were identified using purposive, snowball and convenience sampling strategies in order to obtain a sufficient representation of the sub-populations to be included in the research. The sampling strategy resulted in the involvement of a total of 138 persons through semi-structured interviews (62%) and focus groups (38%). Details of the qualitative methodology are provided in the Qualitative design and analysis section.

Variable operationalization

Crime Victimization Survey

The key test variables from the CVS dataset are fear of crime, collective efficacy, social cohesion and social control, dissatisfaction with the police, victimization and community level socio-economic disadvantage. The structure of these variables is outlined at Table 1, while a detailed description of all the factors and relevant items are provided in **Appendix A**.

Table 1: Key test variables from the Crime Victimization Survey

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Type</i>	<i>Characteristics</i>
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¹ Collective efficacy has typically been tested using multilevel models, however, the combination of N=2133 respondents at level one, and N=19 community clusters at level two, yielded very low intra-class correlation (ICC = .01) and as such simpler single-level models were used.

<i>Dependent</i>		
Fear of crime (FOCF2)	Continuous	Min=-1.9 Max=1.7 (Factor scores)
<i>Independent</i>		
Socio-economic disadvantage (REG_SES)	Continuous	Min=-1.8 Max=1.6 (Component scores)
<i>Mediators</i>		
Collective efficacy (CEFS2)	Continuous	Min=-2.4 Max=2.1 (Factor scores)
Social cohesion (SOFS2)	Continuous	Min=-2.2 Max=1.7 (Factor scores)
Social control (SCFS2)	Continuous	Min=-1.6 Max=1.6 (Factor scores)
<i>Controls</i>		
Dissatisfaction with the police (DWPF2)	Continuous	Min=-2.5 Max=1.9 (Factor scores)
Victimization		
-One experience of victimization (ONEVICT)	Dummy	1=yes, 0=no
-More than one experience of victimization (FEVVICT)	Dummy	1=yes, 0=no

Fear of crime

Fear of crime is the dependent variable. It is derived from a three item, 3-point Likert type scale which asked respondents to indicate whether they felt very safe, safe or very unsafe “*in your home or apartment,*” “*on the streets of your community during the day,*” or “*on the streets of your community at night.*” The three items were highly correlated with a Cronbach’s alpha of ($\alpha = .82$). Gibson et al., (2002) used two similar items from the National Crime Victimization Survey of the United States. The three CVS items had acceptable skewness and kurtosis values, however there were less than 1% missing values across two of the items which were imputed using ICE in Stata 12.

Collective efficacy

Collective efficacy is modeled as a mediator variable. The measure was derived from the six items in the CVS, three each measuring social control and social cohesion respectively. Sampson and his colleagues developed a 10-item measure of collective efficacy, five items each measuring social cohesion and social control. This has been the standard for several studies in developed countries

(Sampson et al., 1997; Mazerolle et al., 2010; Browning, 2002). The omission of the four additional items from the CVS was due to the belief that they were not relevant for the local context. The social cohesion items in the CVS, asked respondents to indicate on a five point scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree, whether people around here *“are willing to help their neighbors;”* *“People around here can be trusted;”* and whether *“this was a close-knit community?”* The social control measures inquired about the likelihood that neighbors would *“do something about children skipping school;”* *“intervene if a fight broke out in front of your house;”* or *“intervene if a child was showing disrespect to an adult.”* The six items demonstrated great overall internal consistency with Cronbach’s alpha of $\alpha = .82$, while the social control items had a Cronbach’s Alpha of .71 and the social cohesion items had an alpha of .85, all above the rule of thumb for reliability of $\alpha = .7$ (Garson, 2008). The responses were reverse coded so that 5=strongly agree and 1 = strongly disagree. The responses were also well spread across the five points and fairly normally distributed.

Dissatisfaction with police

Dissatisfaction with the police is derived from the responses to eight items, with 5-point Likert type response options. The items were taken from the 2004 Vera Institute of Justice’s assessment of police-public contacts in Seattle Washington (Davis et al, 2004). They conducted exploratory factor analysis on 15 items representing four sets of questions measuring “police effectiveness, misconduct and satisfaction with voluntary and involuntary police contacts” (2004, p. 49), and found that these four distinct factors emerged. The items used in the CVS were the police effectiveness items and respondents were asked to say whether they strongly agreed to strongly disagreed with statements including, *“the police in your neighborhood do a good job of preventing crime,”* *“the police in your neighborhood respond promptly to emergency calls for assistance,”* and *“the police in your neighborhood are doing a good job dealing with residents in a fair manner.”* The items were initially coded five (5) strongly agree

to one (1) strongly disagree, but were reverse coded for the highest values to reflect dissatisfaction. Responses were fairly well distributed across the five points and there were no outliers. A total of 15.4% of responses were found to be missing at random on these items, as missingness was significantly associated with age, level of education, employment status and gender (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). These variables were all included in the imputation model using ICE in Stata 12. The eight items in the TT-CVS had a Cronbach's alpha of ($\alpha = .90$).

Dissatisfaction with the police will be examined as a control variable in the collective efficacy mediation model. It is anticipated that dissatisfaction with the police would have a strong negative association with collective efficacy as police ineffectiveness, and distrust increase fear and mistrust among neighbors (Koenig, D.J., 1980; Macdonald, J., & Stokes, R.J., 2006) which in turn are inversely associated with collective efficacy (Gibson et al., 2002). For example, the higher rates of police misconduct in lower income communities (MacDonald and Stokes, 2008), and the higher levels of distrust of police in these communities are also strongly associated with lower crime reporting (Heinemann & Verner, 2006). Thus, dissatisfaction with the police is expected to produce low levels of crime reporting and in this way attenuate engagement in informal social control. Police dissatisfaction has not previously been examined in the context of collective efficacy.

Creating the key latent variables – Principal Axis Factoring

Factor analysis of the items measuring fear of crime, collective efficacy, social cohesion, social control, and dissatisfaction with the police, was performed in SPSS 19.0 using principal axis factoring (PAF) with varimax rotation. PAF was considered suitable given its simplicity and ability to remove the unique and error variance from each of the measured variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007, p. 657),

while varimax rotation is justified based on the aim to derive one factor from each set of items. The measured variables showed no multicollinearity, while significant sphericity tests and favorable (> 0.6) Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin's measure of sampling adequacy confirmed their appropriateness for factor analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).

According to Tabachnick & Fidell (2007), acceptable item loadings should be at .32 and above, while communalities of .2 are considered low. Five factors were meaningfully extracted from the respective analyses with moderate to high communalities, and loadings well above acceptable limits. This means that the respective items performed well as fairly reliable indicators of the factors they represented. Additionally, all of the latent factors explained more than 50% of the variance in the set of variables. A detailed summary report with tables of the all variable reduction strategies used in this study is provided at **Appendix D**.

The distributional characteristics of each of the new variables were examined and found to be fairly normal with low skewness and kurtosis values (all under 1) and very acceptable box and Q-Q plots. The factors were also significantly correlated with each other and in the expected direction. See correlation matrix at table 2 below.

Table 2: Correlation matrix of factors derived from the 2007 Crime Victimization Survey

Factors	Fear of Crime FOCFS	Collective efficacy CEFS	Social control SCFS	Social cohesion SOFS	Dissatisfaction with police DWPFS
FOCFS	1	-.203**	-.130**	-.212**	.143**
CEFS		1	.317**	.983**	-.252**
SCFS			1	.487**	-.208**
SOFS				1	-.272**
DWPFS					1

** $p < 0.001$.

Socio-economic disadvantage

Sampson et al. (1997) found that socio-economic disadvantage (a composite variable) explained 70% of the variation in collective efficacy across 343 communities in Chicago. A composite socio-economic disadvantage variable was created from the CVS data, using the percentage of unemployed heads of households per community (REG_HHEMPL), the percentage of respondent households with incomes of below \$3000 per month (REG_INCSUB), and the percent of respondents with up to primary level education (REG_EDLW). The resulting variable REG_SES, is an individual level variable which appropriately assigns community level data to each respondent in the sample. Principal components analysis (PCA) in SPSS 19.0, was performed on the three community level variables to derive the socio-economic disadvantage variable (REG_SES). REG_SES was fairly normal with low skewness and kurtosis values, no outliers, and a Q-Q plot well within ± 3 . Socio-economic disadvantage will be utilized as the independent variable in various mediation models exploring the intervening role of collective efficacy between socio-economic disadvantage and the fear of crime. The study is particularly unique in that all of the communities fall into the low SES category where lower levels of collective efficacy are anticipated. Therefore significant mediation effects would suggest that (i) collective efficacy is performing as theorized and (ii) even lower income communities are able to evince functional levels of collective efficacy.

Control Variables – Crime Victimization Survey

Individual variables in the 2007 CVS included measures of age, gender, ethnicity, years of residence in the community, level of education, monthly household income and work status of respondent. These are important to the current study as control variables, both as correlates of the fear of crime and collective efficacy and can all be independently accommodated in the study due to the large sample size. The list and structure of control variables used in this study is provided at Table 3.

Table 3: Control variables – Crime Victimization Survey

Variable	Type	Characteristics
YRSRESSQ - Years of residence square root transformed	Continuous	Min=0 Max=81 (untransformed)
RSPAGESQ - Age of respondent square root transformed	Continuous	Min=16 Max=96 (untransformed)
FEMALE - Gender of respondent	Dummy	1=female, 0=male
ETHNIN - Ethnicity:Indian & other descent	Dummy	1=Indian and other, 0=other
ETHNMX - Ethnicity:Mixed descent	Dummy	1=Mixed, 0=other
SECED - Secondary education level education	Dummy	1=secondary education, 0=other
HIGHED - Vocational & higher education/university	Dummy	1=vocational & higher education/university, 0=other
INCLW - Household income between \$4,000-\$9,000	Dummy	1= household income between \$4,000-\$9,000, 0=other
INCMID - Household income \$10,000 and over	Dummy	1= household income \$10,000 and over, 0=other
WORKING - Employed respondents	Dummy	1=working, 0=other
WORK_OTH - Other work status (retired or disabled, going to school/training, other)	Dummy	1=Other non-unemployed, 0=other
DWPFS – Dissatisfaction with the police	Continuous	min=-2.48, max=1.98 (factor scores)
ONE-VICT – the experience of one from a list of 14 possible victimization experiences	Dummy	1=One victimization experience, 0=other
FEW-VICT – the experience of more than one from a list of 14 possible victimization experiences	Dummy	1=Many victimization experiences, 0=other
WORK_OTH - Other work status (retired or disabled, going to school/training, other)	Dummy	1=Other non-unemployed, 0=other

Key variables - Primary Dataset

The primary data contains 23 items measuring collective efficacy. Twelve of these measure social cohesion and eleven measure social control. The measures were mostly taken from the 1995 Project on Human Development in Chicago. The items were respectively subject to principal axis factoring with varimax rotation in SPSS 19.0., with the aim of deriving three sets of factors, each measuring collective efficacy (CEFSORG), social cohesion (SCHORG) and social control (SCNMXD). The item combinations with closest similarity to that used by Sampson et al. (1997) yielded better loadings, communalities and variance explained. See **Appendix D** for details of factor analysis.

Only on the social control (SCNMXD) measure were adjustments made to items to ensure relevance. The item which asked whether neighbors would intervene if 'children were spray-painting graffiti on a local building' was not used in this study because the spraying of graffiti on local buildings is not a current problem in the local context. This was replaced with another PHDCN question which asked whether neighbors would get together to solve local problems. In addition, the item which enquired about community intervention if the nearby fire station was threatened with closure, was adjusted to enquire of community intervention if the local community center was threatened with closure, as this is an issue with which residents would more readily identify. The original social cohesion (SCHORG) items statement that neighbors were willing to help each other received poor loadings, but was retained in the factor given the importance of reciprocity to social cohesion. For the most part, as can be seen in **Appendix D**, all of the measures fit reasonably well with the other.

The full list of model variables is provided at Table 4. The control variables for the analysis include individual characteristics of age, gender, ethnicity; socio-economic characteristics such as individual income, highest education, employment status, occupational category, and home ownership status. Variables reflecting the respondent's level of community attachment including years of residence and organization affiliation are also included.

Table 4: Model Variables Primary Dataset

Variable	Type	Characteristics
<i>Dependent</i>		
Collective efficacy (CEFSORG)	Continuous	min=-1.9, max=1.9 (factor scores)
Social cohesion (SCHORG)	Continuous	min=-1.6, max=1.9 (factor scores)
Social control (SCNMXD)	Continuous	min=-2.0, max=1.6 (factor scores)
<i>Independent</i>		
Individual socio-economic status (IND_SES)	Continuous	min=-1.7 max=2.3 (component scores)
Individual monthly income (INC)	Continuous	min=\$1,000 max=\$15,000
Highest education-binary (EDUB)	Binary	1=up to secondary education, 2=technical training or higher
Employment status of respondent (EMPLB)	Dummy	1=employed full time (≥ 35 hours per week), 0=other
Occupation categories (JOBBS)	Dummy	1=elementary workers and machine operators, 0=other.
Age of respondent (AGE)	Continuous	min=18, max=80
Gender of respondent (GENDER)	Dummy	1=female, 0=male
Ethnic group of respondent (ETHNB)	Dummy	1=African, 0=other
Years of residence in community (RES)	Continuous	min=9 max=62
Home ownership status (TENUB)	Dummy	1=homeowner, 0=other
Organizational affiliation (POSGPD)	Dummy	1=executive member, 0=other

Data management and analysis

SPSS 19.0 was used as the main data management software. The CVS data was supplied in SPSS, while the primary data was entered into SPSS. Both datasets were subject to careful checking and cross checking through the examination of frequencies, descriptive statistics (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007; Drake & Jonson-Reid, 2008), and case summary outputs in SPSS, to ensure accuracy and univariate normality. Square root transformations and variable recoding were done as necessary. SAS 9.2 was used for most final bivariate and multivariate analyses, including checks for bivariate and multivariate normality, homoscedasticity and multicollinearity.

The main focus of the quantitative analysis was a series of mediation models which were conducted using the Hayes (2004) bootstrapping macro called Process, created for SAS. For each model 5,000 bootstrapping samples were used to derive a 95% bootstrap confidence interval. The bootstrapping method is considered a superior approach to mediation or indirect effect analysis compared with the causal steps approached made popular by Baron and Kenny (1986, in Hayes, 2009). Bootstrapping has the advantage of significant power, it eliminates the need to estimate standard error, it deliberately calculates the intervening effects rather than inferring them from significant regression paths, and is capable of very complex models (Hayes, 2009). I also requested the total = 1 option so that both path coefficients and the total effects of the model would be provided.

All mediation analyses were run on the 10 imputed datasets and then more precise estimates of the slopes and standard errors manually computed or 'rolled-up' consistent with the Rubin's rubric (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).

Two types of mediation models, facilitated by the process macro, were used in this study:

- i. Model 4: the simple mediation model through which I examined collective efficacy as a mediator of socio-economic conditions on the fear of crime, in accordance with Aim 2, and
- ii. Model 6: the double mediation model through which I estimated the relationship between social cohesion and social control relevant to Aim 1.

Prior to running the mediation models I examined the predictors of the fear of crime and collective efficacy in separate regression models. These models aided in the understanding of collective efficacy in the local context compared with findings in other contexts as well as across the CVS data and primary datasets. All of the mediation and regression analyses were conducted at the individual level.

Missing data

In the CVS, there were missing data on four variables of interest. Nineteen responses or less than 1% were missing on the fear of crime measures, 15.4% were missing at random on the dissatisfaction with the police measures, 18% were also missing at random on income, and 3% were missing on employment status of head of household. In the primary dataset, 14.4% of responses on the income variable and 7% on the collective efficacy scale items were missing data. Except for dissatisfaction with the police, chi square analysis and logistic regression revealed no significant patterns of missingness observed between other variables with missing data and demographic variables in the data sets, indicating that the data was missing completely at random (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).

To address missing data on all ordinal and categorical variables, the imputation of chained equation (ICE) method in Stata (Royston, 2005, Shafer & Olsen, 1998) was used. In the case of the continuous income variable in the primary data set, multiple imputations was performed using SAS. To do so, the income variable was first log transformed and missing values were imputed on the log transformed variable which was then back-transformed to binary numbers. This was done to increase the reliability or reduce the error in the imputations (Professor Spitznagel, personal communication, April 2012). Each of the 10 income imputations were assigned to the 10 output datasets generated by the ICE imputations in Stata. The main regression and mediation analyses were conducted on the respective ten imputed datasets, followed by the hand calculation of parameter estimates and standard errors consistent with Rubin's rules (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Subordinate analyses were conducted on one of the 10 datasets, which produced initial results that were closest to the rolled-up coefficient and standard errors of the 10 datasets.

Qualitative design and analysis

The qualitative design and analysis was undertaken with due consideration to issues of rigor to ensure the validity and replicability of results.

Design

The four CSP-Partner communities were selected for maximum variation (Small, 2009), while using a quasi-experimental design. Communities which were fairly similar in terms of socio-economic status prior to the study were selected on the basis of the duration of their association with the CSP. Socio-economic status has an inverse relationship with lower rates of organizational participation (Skogan, 1988, distrust and the fear of crime (Gibson et al. 2002). While these were all lower income communities Never Dirty and Mt. Dor shared some similarities, while Pinto Road and Samaroo Village Mootoo Lands did also. Comparative socio-economic data on the selected communities is provided **Appendix F**. In addition, mobilization of communities for participation in the CSP took place over the period 2007 to 2009. The Community Action Councils (CACs) - the local entity established as the CSP inter-face - in Never Dirty and Pinto Road were set up in 2007 and therefore had a longer period of association with the CSP as well as a head start on project implementation. The CACs in Mt. Dor and Samaroo Village Mootoo Lands were established in 2009. The quasi-experimental design allows an examination of whether the contribution of the CSP to collective efficacy in the study communities varies by the dosage/duration of the CSP intervention.

The sampling strategy made use of three different methods, purposive, snowball and convenience sampling. A guide to the types of respondents to be included in the sample was developed on the basis of the theoretical literature guiding this study and the variables which may influence an individual's contribution (Marshall, 1996). The list included: i) leaders and executive officers of all local organizations (including community, women, youth, sport, religious and political organizations) in each community; ii) senior community members and senior past members of local organizations; iii) business owners; iv) minors; v) newer residents and vi) persons typically uninvolved in community affairs. The

aim was to derive a “maximum variation sample” including respondents who were likely to generate “confirming and disconfirming” opinions (Marshall, 1996; Small, 2009).

The process of sampling began with a list of members of the Community Action Council established by the CSP which comprised representatives of many if not most of the local organizations in existence in the various communities. In the early stages of the interviewing process, each interviewee where asked to provide the names of other leaders or relevant persons from the list above who could provide useful insights for the study. In an effort to objectively identify minors, these were conveniently accessed through local groups. To access persons not attached to local organizations, focused conversations were undertaken with public-works program work-gangs, the majority of whom met this criteria. This tripartite sampling process led to an average of 21 interviewees and 13 persons engaged in focus groups in each community. The size of the sample in each community was driven by data saturation, that is, when additional respondents failed to add new information or themes to the data gathered (Guest, 2006). Some sources suggest 12-15 respondents is sufficient (Guest, 2006; Small, 2009) while others suggest 20 (Drake & Johnson-Reid, 2008).

Semi-structured in-depth interviews and focus groups were the main tools used to gather qualitative data. The focus groups were of two types. One was the large ($n > 4$) focus groups of residents who were employed in the public works program, the Community-Based Environmental Protection and Enhancement Programme (CEPEP), which mostly involves work teams in cutting grass (landscaping) and which serves most communities across the country. The other type of focus group comprised groups of three (3) persons, all minors and/or members of the same youth organization. This strategy allowed access to diverse opinions in a limited amount of time from specific subsets of the sample (Bernard, 2006; Creswell, 2009).

Instrumentation and pilot testing

A short questionnaire was used to collect basic demographic data on all community-based survey participants, with a slightly modified version addressed to minors. (See **Appendices B & C**). The modified version included questions about school attendance, access to free lunches and family structure. The study utilized three semi-structured interview guides, and a focus group guide. The guides were developed from the theoretical literature on collective efficacy, other instruments used by collective efficacy researchers (Gibson et al. 2002; Browning et al., 2004; Rankin & Quane, 2002), the World Bank Social Capital Assessment (World Bank, 2010) and my understanding of the local context. Slightly modified guides were used for adult community participants compared with minors, and a unique guide was developed for government officers. The main interview guide is provided at **Appendix**

E. The guides covered:

- the history of relations and self-regulation in the community;
- the internal and external dynamics associated with norm and behavior changes in the community;
- common resident perceptions of the neighborhood,
- relations between adults and youth;
- the involvement of residents in sanctioning disapproved behaviors;
- the level and variety of actions that define cohesion in the community
- perceptions of the nature and functioning of local organizations and leaders
- perceptions of the Citizen Security Programme and its impact.

Pilot testing was conducted as part of the process of interviewing the first three to five respondents from each category and probing their level of comfort with specific questions. All instruments were revised accordingly. The major revision involved the inclusion of the specific Likert

type items measuring collective efficacy as respondents appeared to be more comfortable responding to specific examples than to providing those examples.

Analysis

The study treated each community as a specific case to examine differences in social arrangements, norms and processes. The purposive sample of group leaders, group members, religious leaders, un-involved residents, senior citizens, newer residents, and minors, allowed data to be triangulated across communities, residents and age groups and so unearth the unique social arrangements and institutions of each site relevant to a deeper understanding of collective efficacy (Miles & Huberman, 1994).

The extended case method (ECM) of analysis was used. This is a deductive approach to in-depth research, and most appropriate for the study's examination of an existing theory - the theory of collective efficacy. In contrast to grounded theory for example, ECM seeks to arrive at explanations by looking for patterns that run counter to hypothesized relationships and processes (Buraway, 2009). The study examines relationships and patterns in the context of the theory of collective efficacy, and extends these ideas by a number of processes. These processes included; dissecting the mechanisms of social cohesion and control in search of particular relationships among these mechanisms; exploring the role of other mechanisms not typically explored in studies of collective efficacy including, community organizational and leadership capacity as well as the motivating factors which inspired persons who lead various local initiatives.

Secondly, the study also examined how exogenous and endogenous factors impacted both social cohesion and social control. This was guided by the institutional perspective and the negotiated coexistence model which helped understand how external socio-economic and criminogenic pressures

as well as subcultural norms around coexistence with the criminal subculture greatly weakened social control.

Third, in the context of the contribution of the CSP, the study was concerned with whether, from the perspective of the residents, the CSP could be associated with building cohesion and social control for crime prevention. Resident perceptions were examined particularly as they related to the structural arrangements employed by the CSP at the community level and the value of the programming and capacity building supported by the CSP. In addition, the study attempts to understand whether the CSP-intervention could be associated with the comprehensive targeting of issues in all of the domains of risks for violence for prevention in the study communities. The targeting of the range of domains of risks for violence prevention indicates awareness of the multi-faceted nature of violence prevention and as such the installation of an important component of a more scientific approach to crime prevention. The list of documents reviewed on the CSP is provided at **Appendix G**.

All respondent interviews and focus groups were recorded and transcribed, and field notes were also typed and saved to an electronic file. Transcribed interviews and field notes were imported into NVivo software. NVivo is a specific aid to qualitative research which was used to organize the data into the domains, themes, patterns and variations identified from the data (Bazeley, 2007). Access to coded data according to specific themes from respondents within and across the communities facilitated an understanding how resident perceptions of community processed cohered or varied by community and in some cases within communities. In this regard the study benefited from cross-community and cross-resident triangulation.

Chapter 3: Research Setting

Historical and socio-economic context

Trinidad and Tobago is the southernmost of the chain of Caribbean islands which stretch between the south coast of Florida in the northwest and Venezuela in the southeast. The British, which had control of Trinidad since 1797 and Tobago since 1814, eventually annexed the two islands in 1889 in a caretaker arrangement as Tobago comprised only 4% of the population of the islands (Kairi, 2005). The twin island nation of 1.3 million is rich in ethnic diversity. Over about 500 years of European colonization, Trinidad was mostly controlled by the Spanish 1492-1797, but Tobago changed hands some thirty times between the Spanish, French, English and Latvians. Trinidad and Tobago's culture and social organization is influenced by its colonial history, and shaped by the ethnic mix of native inhabitants (Caribs and Arawaks), descendants of African slaves brought to work the sugar cane plantations (1798-1807), and the Portuguese, Madierans, Chinese, Syrians, Lebanese and mostly Indians (1845-1917), brought as indentured laborers in the post- slavery period (Valtonen, 1996). In the 2000 population census the country was comprised of 40% Indian, 37.5% African, 20.5% mixed races and 2% Caucasians, Portuguese, Chinese, Syrians, Lebanese, and Amerindians (Kairi, 2005).

Trinidad and Tobago has enjoyed a stable and peaceful parliamentary democracy since its independence from Britain in 1962, save for a 6-day attempted coup by an extremist Muslim group in 1990. By the time of independence, the country already had more than 100 years of oil exploration and drilling, followed later by production (Down, 1960). T&T's economy has therefore been driven by the oil and more recently the natural gas sectors. The energy sector accounted for an average of 46% of the country's gross domestic product between 2005 and 2008 and 39% in 2009 reflecting the very recent effects of the global economic downturn (T&T Central Bank, 2009). Also in 2009, the country experienced its first negative growth (-3%) following 15 years of positive growth. T&T has made

considerable strides over the past twenty years in the manufacturing, finance, insurance and real estate, sales and distribution sectors, with these now accounting for some 27% of the GDP (US Department of State website). The country's gross national income (purchasing power parity) per capita is US\$24,240 and the World Bank has placed T&T in the high income country category among the non-OECD group (World Bank, 2010).

The high income status masks large income disparities. In the year 2000, 74% of the population were in receipt of annual income under TT\$4000 (US\$624), only 7% received incomes of between TT\$5000 and \$9999 and 1.4% received over TT\$10,000 (US\$1,560). However, the Gini coefficient of 39% has remained constant between estimations in 1997/98 and 2005 (Kairi Consultants, 2005). Additionally, there has been a slight reduction in the level of poverty between 1989 when the poverty level stood at 18.5% compared with 16.5% in 2005 using a poverty line of TT\$665 (US\$104) per month. The level of poverty also disproportionately impacted female headed households and Afro-Trinidadians who comprise 42% of those in poverty compared with Indo-Trinidadians at 29% and persons of mixed descents at 28.5% (Kairi Consultants, 2005).

Citizens of T&T are mostly (62%) employed in the service sector which includes a wide gamut of jobs from domestics to corporate executives. Another 20.4% are employed in the construction and utilities sector which had seen a huge investment of government spending from 2002 to 2010, accounting for considerable employment. The government also funded a large on-the-job training program for young graduates from high school, technical colleges and universities, and specific public works programs, contributing to low unemployment levels (Social Sector Investment Program, 2010). As such, the country saw steadily declining levels of unemployment which moved from 15% in 2000 to 4.6% in 2008, slightly up to 5.7% in 2009 (Central Bank AES, 2009). On the other hand there was also steadily

rising core inflation, from about 3% in 2000 to approximately 15% in 2009, fueled in part by international commodity prices (Central Bank AES, 2009).

Successive governments of T&T have also made considerable investments in the human capital of the country. Education is free through the secondary level, while free tuition is available for bachelor degrees at local institutions and 50% tuition for higher and professional degrees. Private and public tertiary institutions have mushroomed in T&T providing information technology and business training, and a range of other qualifications. In 2004 the government commissioned a new University of T&T, established with an emphasis on technology and innovation, and a technology park, all with a view to creating an innovative and educated citizenry (Social sector investment program, 2010) for an industrialized T&T. Tertiary enrollment rate is still relatively low (14% in 2007) compared with 24% in Barbados (UNDP, HDR, 2007/8) and the literacy rate stands at 98.6% (Index Mundi, 2010). Over the past 15 years, successive governments also provided support for the training and retraining of nationals in various skilled trades, for which a stipend was paid for attendance in an effort to ensure that opportunities were available for persons with varying skills and interests.

Contributions to the recent surge in violent crime in Trinidad and Tobago


In this mix of a solid economy, considerable government social investment in human capital, low unemployment and rising cost of living, T&T has been faced with the horrendous specter of rising violent crime. There was a 400% spike in homicides between the years 2000 and 2008, and the 1000% increase in gun homicides over the same period have been inexorably linked to the drug trade. The precipitous increase in violent crimes, homicides and gun offenses over this decade appear related to a rise in the drug trade. According to Agozino et al. (2009) there are systemic links between guns, drugs and crime. They outline that the guns are the enforcers and guarantors of compliance in the contract law in drug agreements. The supply of guns that precede, accompany and follow drug shipments or

transactions evoke an unbridled sense of power that ensures conflicts are violent, disagreements and turf wars are deadly and life is subjugated to the power of the trigger. In 2007, T&T surpassed Jamaica in gun related homicides. However in terms of homicides in general, the rate in Jamaica in 2008 was 56 per 100,000 (1500) (Agozino et al., 2009), compared with 43 (547) in T&T.

The final leg in this drugs/guns nexus, is that the availability of guns on the streets means that they are available for use in other controversies unrelated to the drug trade, including domestic violence and robberies, and increasing susceptibility to mere accidents. The escalation of crime has also been an additional burden to the already under-resourced police service and judicial systems such that offenders go about unpunished, as less than 20% of violent crimes are solved (Townsend, 2009).

One of the other likely contributors to the crime pandemic is the fact that T&T and the Caribbean have had to deal with the issue of deportees from the United States and Canada, most of whom (3 to 1) were involved in serious violent crimes in North America (Draft National Policy and Action Plan, 2006). Trinidad and Tobago received its first group in 1996, and the number of deportees increased from 50 per year in 1996 to 213 per year by 2001. In a 2007 report to the US Congressional Hearing Sub Committee on the Western Hemisphere, Dr. Annmarie Barnes of Jamaica noted that 1990-2005 had seen over 30,000 deportees returned to Caribbean countries with more than half of these involved in drug offences and another 9% cited for possession of illegal firearms and homicides (Barnes, 2007). Moreover, deportees were three times more likely to be arrested back in their home countries than non-deportees (Barnes, 2007). The deportees who were incarcerated in North America for serious offences, are likely to have contributed to a greater sophistication in criminal culture locally as well as to have international criminal networks. Notably, the rate of homicides in T&T was on a downward trajectory from 121 in 1995 to 92 in 1999 (Agozino et al., 2009). The figure jumped to 120 in the year 2000, had more than trippled (386) by 2005 and had climbed to 547 in 2008 (CAPA, 2014).

Figure 3: Number of homicides in Trinidad and Tobago 1998 - Sept. 2012



Source: Agozino, Bowling, Ward & St. Bernard, 2009 & Citizen Security Programme 2014.

Moreover, many of the deportees had severed ties with T&T many years ago, had little or no family connection and no resources but the clothes on their backs when they boarded the plane home. The government sought to make supportive arrangements for deportees by offering temporary accommodation in shelters, unoccupied toiletries, retraining and re-integration support. Some who fell through the cracks squatted on land or otherwise assimilated into lower income communities (Director Social Displacement Unit, personal communication, 2005).

Government's major public-work programs currently known as the Unemployment Relief (URP), and the Community Environment Protection and Enhancement Project (CEPEP) Programs have been a source of violent crimes and the financing of criminal gangs (Townsend, 2009; Ryan, Rampersad, Bernard, Mohammed & Thorpe, 2013). Started in the 1960s as the Crash Programme, the idea behind these programs was to provide a cushion of income to the indigent, unskilled, ex-convict and the like who could not find work in the traditional labor market (Ryan et al. 2013). Over the years however,

these programs became highly politicized as a source of “work for the boys”, that is, persons appointed at the management and supervisory levels due to their political connections rather than competence. These public works programs have also been manipulated “for votes” by successive political administrations (Ryan et al. 2013).

The net effects of the politicization of the public work programs are critical and deleterious. In the first place there was a complete lack of adequate supervision of these programs, especially the URP and its gender sensitive subset the URP-Women’s Programme which engaged women in work (cleaning schools and community centers etc.) and skills training. The lack of supervision of these programs over the years allowed workers to be engaged for substantially less than the allotted time (mostly 9am-2pm) entrenching poor work habits. As a testimony to the damaging effect of these programs on the work ethic, during the course of field work more than 50% of respondents employed in public works programs, who were typically engaged for 2 hours a day, described themselves as being full-time employed. Another pernicious effect of poor supervision was the phenomenon call ghost-gangs. Ghost gangs were work groups which existed in name only or where two persons may work and 20 are paid (Townsend, 2009). In addition to institutionalizing dependency and poor work values, ghost gangs helped to finance criminal gangs. Persons names appeared on a list as having worked, they are paid, but no work is performed and a percentage (up to 50%) of the earnings go to the foreman or “gang” leader who allegedly channels the funds to support criminal activity.

However, perhaps the most lucrative source of gang financing was generated by the award of contracts for infrastructure works to gang leaders under the URP and CEPEP programs. It is suspected that monies so obtained financed the purchase of arms and the like by gang leaders. In addition, URP gangs killed each other over the award of work contracts, in many areas projects were halted due to threats by rival gangs over the award of contracts and in some cases police security had to be engaged

to protect workers. This brought a new level of violence to communities and fueled the murders and the fear under which residents existed.

The association between the URP for example and crime was a common theme in the local media. Between 2009 and 2011 in one newspaper only - the Trinidad Express Newspaper - there were more than 25 articles linking URP to crime. Headlines included “Take URP out of gang control”, “URP foreman guilty, wife on bail for cocaine”, “UPR man shot dead in vehicle”, “Will splitting URP reduce the murder rate” and “URP-Government link in rising crime, says Ramesh”.

Historical evolution of urban poverty in northwest Trinidad

Lower income communities like the ones involved in the Citizen Security Programme have been at the forefront of the crime scourge. Many of these areas have been historic enclaves of poverty dating back to the post- emancipation period in the mid-1800s when the freed slaves squatted on Crown Lands after legislation and policies ensured that land prices were out of their reach (Rajack & Barhate, 2004; Doumerc, 2003)). Many freed slaves opted to leave the plantations in favor of the skilled trades or unskilled labor and tended to settle around the capital city of Port of Spain and other major towns (Bereton, 2002). From this group emerged the Afro-Trinidadian middle and lower income classes differentiated by skin-color, pre-emancipation occupation, skill sets, post-emancipation occupational opportunities and access to education (Bereton, 2002). To date, a significant proportion of the country’s population and the majority of persons of African descent can be found across the north of the island from Diego Martin in the West to Sangre Grande in the east as shown on the map at Figure 4. This area is commonly known as the East-West Corridor. Seventeen of the 19 CSP communities come from the East-West Corridor. Only Embacadere and La Romain are from south Trinidad.

On the outskirts of the capital city Port of Spain in the early 1900s, there emerged a number of unregulated settlements of newly freed African slaves. Trinidad and Tobago also attracted emigrants

from the smaller more densely populated neighboring Caribbean islands including Grenada, Barbados, St. Vincent and the Grenadines. At the time, Trinidad was less populous having one of the youngest sugar plantation economies. Later on in the first half of the twentieth century, the attraction was the oil based economy and construction jobs provided by the US military bases established during World War II (Valtonen, 1996; Liverpool, 1994).

The T&T economy was, however, unable to sustain the demand for jobs. The plantation economy was weak and too focused on primary production (Valtonen, 1996). Also, the energy sector which was developed later was not labor intensive, and was subject to booms (1973-1983) and busts (1984 – 1993); and the US Bases provided mostly temporary jobs (Valtonen, 1996). The results of these scenarios were the emergence of overcrowded settlements and shanty towns on the entrance to the capital, notably on what was formerly the Beetham Estate and in Sea Lots and other more or less structured settlements on the hills surrounding the city. Six of the CSP communities share some of this history in terms of their conditions and nexus to the capital, Port of Spain. These are Beetham Gardens, Mon Repos, Never Dirty, St. Barbs, Gonzales, and Dibe/Belle Vue. These communities actually form a sort of semi-circle around the capital.

Residents of these cities also had to deal with (i) variations in ethnic orientation given the emigration from neighboring islands and the ethnic enclaves formed that may have been inimical to community social cohesion (ii) the degree of horizontal mobility in search of jobs and economic resources also attenuating cohesiveness (Conway & Brown, 1980), (iii) the social disorder they exhibited given the cramped, dense conditions and the absence of physical amenities particularly in Beetham Gardens for example, until the 1970s-1980s (Valtonen, 1996) and finally (iv) the high rate of absentee parents, as the depressions (1960s to early 1970s, 1984-1993) and high unemployment caused parents to migrate to North America for better opportunities.

All too often children were left to be raised by older siblings or grandparents, giving rise to the phenomenon called ‘barrel children’ (Cambridge, 2003). That is, children who were raised without close parental supervision and regulation, but rather relied on barrels containing the latest ‘brand name’ clothing, and household items sent by parents living abroad. Households in these areas became known for the contradiction of being well supplied with the latest clothing and amenities but experiencing financial poverty. They also exhibited the characteristics of social disorganization discussed by Wilson (1987, 1996) including high levels of family disruption, unemployment, low educational attainment, high levels of juvenile delinquency, teen pregnancy, crime, and the daunting stigma that jeopardized resident attempts at engagement in mainstream economic activity (Cambridge, 2003; Conway & Brown, 1980).

Brief profiles of the study communities

Table 5: Selected SES data from the 2000 Census comparing study communities with national averages

Community	% No Education		% Unemployed		% Female headed households		% in Elementary Occupations		Dependency Ratio	
	Com	Nat.	Com	Nat.	Com	Nat.	Com	Nat.	Com	Nat.
Never Dirty	38		7		35		19		45	
Mt. Dor	40		9		40		27		43	
Samaroo Village/Mootoo Lands	17*	20	11	4.4	34	29	23	22	41	38
Pinto Road	41		11		35		30		47	

Source: Central Statistical Office, 2000 Census Data

It must be noted that the socio-economic data provided on the study communities is drawn from the 2000 Trinidad and Tobago Housing and Population Census. Although the 2011 Census was completed, data was not yet available by community.

Never Dirty

Never Dirty is a community nestled in the foothills of the Northern Range less than 3 miles from the capital city of Port of Spain. The community got its name from the many “always clean” and refreshing natural springs it was blessed to possess. Its settlement dates back to the 1940s with the construction of the Lady Young Road during the tenure of Governor Sir Hubert Winthrop Young (1938-1942). The Lady Young Road is a major roadway which crosses the foothills of the Northern Range between the Eastern Main Road in Barataria and the Queens Park Savannah in Port of Spain. Its construction opened up access to Never Dirty and other nearby communities as residents moved nearer to provide labor and other services for its construction. Residents (even some from remote parts of the country) were also drawn to the community given its close proximity to the capital, as well as industries on the Eastern Main Road in Laventille (Interview) such as Citrus Growers operational since 1931 (SM Jaleel website) and Angostura Limited established since 1875 (Angostura Ltd website).

The housing and infrastructural organization of the community reflects mostly unplanned areas as most residents either rented land from private owners, or squatted on available land and there were no formal settlements in this area. The community is serviced by two main streets, Laventille Extension Road (LER) which is the only entrance and exit, and Angelina Terrace which is perpendicular to LER and carries residents further up into the hillside. The community is supplied with electricity, and a daily water supply is available to most households. Those living further way from the main streets and higher into the hillside are faced with poorer infrastructure and access to utilities.

Never Dirty was also home to many nationals of other Caribbean islands especially persons from Grenada and St. Vincent, who were part of the immigration to Trinidad as discussed above. In 2000, 10% of residents identified as being foreign born, among the highest in the study communities.

The community is home to 485 households, 78% of whom own their homes and 22% renters. The community was fairly evenly gender balanced, however 35% percent of households were female

headed and 61% of all adults were unmarried. Twenty eight percent of residents were between 0-14 years while 8% were over 65 years. The community's dependency ratio was 45% compared with the country average of 35%.

With 60% Afro-Trinidadian residents, Never Dirty was one of the most ethnically homogenous communities among the study areas. Nineteen percent respectively were Indo-Trinidadians and persons of mixed ethnicities. Interestingly, however, the Indo-Trinidadians in Never Dirty held a very prominent place being strategically located in the center of the community, an area referred to as "the Frontline". The Indo-Trinidadians also managed the larger shops and the main bar on the Frontline, however there were several small shops also owned by Afro-Trinidadians.

While 38% of Never Dirty residents had no formal education, 44% had completed or done some secondary level education. However among the study communities Never Dirty had the largest percentage (16%) of persons with post-secondary education inclusive of persons holding university degrees. This community also had the highest percentage (23%) of residents who worked in the professional, managerial and technical areas and the lowest percentage of persons working in elementary and plant and machinery type occupations (26%).

Mt. Dor

Mt. Dor's history is similar to Never Dirty in several respects. The community is also set in the foothills of the Northern Range about 1.5 miles further east of the capital than Never Dirty. The opportunity for settlement was opened up to residents when Charles Buthn a British national and Botanist with the Tropical College of Agriculture moved into the area with his mistress an Indo-Trinidadian woman (Valton Matthews, Chairman of Mt. Dor Development Foundation, personal communication, February 18, 2014). According to Matthews, Buthn's choice of mistress did not fit with "established white society" so Buthn chose to make a home for himself outside of the capital. As a result

of his residence in a thick forested area, the main thoroughfare in and out of the community – the Mt. Dor road – was built.

This was followed by an influx of residents who rented land from its owner, Chanka Maharaj, a politician and Member of Parliament for the area in the 1950 elections. Mt. Dor was an ideally suited location, close to a number of factories including the West Indian Tobacco Ltd, Carib Brewery, Lumber Industries Ltd, the Paper Factory in Mt. Lambert and the Bermudez Biscuit Company (Valton Matthews, Chairman of Mt. Dor Development Foundation, personal communication, February 18, 2014). The hilly terrain of the area was also familiar for immigrants from Grenada and St. Vincent who were among those who made their home in Mt. Dor. Like Never Dirty, 10% of residents of Mt. Dor were foreign born in the year 2000. There were also a few squatter settlements in Mt. Dor in the Spring Valley and Spring Valley Extension and Community Drive areas.

Mt. Dor was home to 659 households, 40% of which were female headed. Sixty nine percent of the adult residents were unmarried. Mt. Dor was the most homogenous of the study communities with 70% Afro-Trinidadians, 19% mixed and 10% Indo-Trinidadians. The community also had a large percentage of children 28% and a dependency ratio of 43%. Forty percent of residents had no education and only 9% had post-secondary education. As many as 33% worked in elementary and plant and machinery occupations, while only 13% worked in the professional, managerial and technical jobs. The community was supplied with fewer shops than Never Dirty, but most of those that existed were larger, well stocked and there even two fairly well organized grocery stores with aisle shopping.

Samaroo Village/Mootoo Lands

Samaroo Village and Mootoo Lands are located approximately 12 miles east of Port of Spain. These communities are located within the borough of Arima, a large town located along the East-West Corridor. Samaroo Village and Mootoo Lands are two distinct communities which for administrative

purposes are addressed as one. Samaroo Village is an old community built on lands owned by the Samaroo family. Residents rented lands as in Mt. Dor and Never Dirty but the land was subdivided in a more orderly manner into distinct plots, along a series of streets which ran parallel to each other. However in the early 1980s the government acquired lands from the Mootoo family and established a small housing settlement there. Mootoo Lands is located within the Samaroo Village area and is accessed by a main access road to Samaroo Village. Mootoo Lands which was located on the south eastern side of Samaroo Village apparently attracted a mix of residents ranging from middle to lower income² residents. On the western side of Samaroo Village there is a small squatting community, a little shanty town with mostly board houses. It appears that as families expanded, they spread out into that areas referred to as “The Squatting”. It is alleged that The Squatting also became a haven for fugitives.

Together Samaroo Village and Mootoo Lands was the smallest of study areas. They were home to 380 households with a dependency ratio of 41%, the lowest among study communities. These communities were among the least homogenous with 52% Afro-Trinidadians, 36% mixed and 12% Indo-Trinidadian. Thirty four percent of the households were female headed and 32% of residents were married.

These communities also had the lowest percentage (17%) of persons with no formal education, however only 10% had post-secondary education, while they had the largest percentage of persons (67%) with secondary education. In terms of occupations, next to Never Dirty, they had the highest percentage (17%) of persons working in the professional, managerial and technical type occupations,

² Census data on Samaroo Village and Mootoo Lands are merged and as such it was not possible to examine demographic and socio-economic data on these communities individually.

while the majority worked in clerical, service and crafts and as many as 30% worked in elementary and plant occupations.

Pinto Road

Pinto Road was also located within the borough of Arima. This was originally an agricultural community with the main items being cocoa and tonka beans. Pinto Road is the largest of the study communities with over 1400 households, most of whom (86%) owned their homes. The community was the most ethnically diverse with 41% Afro-Trinidadians and even more (45%) residents of mixed descents. Twelve percent were Indo-Trinidadians. The community also had the highest dependency ratio of 47%.

Pinto Road was the most economically vibrant of the study communities. Perhaps because the street Pinto Road was a main thoroughfare between the Churchill Roosevelt Highway and the Eastern Main Road, Pinto Road was littered with businesses. By my count there were over 35 businesses on Pinto Road. These ranged from small shops, bars and restaurants, auto repair and straightening, glass cutting, hair dressing and the like. Surprisingly, this community had the highest percentage (41%) of persons with no education and the lowest (4%) with post-secondary education. However, both the preponderance of businesses and the lower percentage with post-secondary education, may be explained by the fact that many of the children of the farmers chose self-employment, factory work or public-works programs. However, many of the third generation Pinto Road families took various public service jobs for example, as firemen, teachers, police officers (Interview #103).

Pinto Road also had the largest squatting community of the study communities. According to residents, from the early 1970s persons from various parts of the country moved into the community and occupied available land owned by a private company. It is believed that many moved out of the overcrowded ghettos of Port of Spain (Interview #102). Many of the squatters still live in dilapidated

ply-board houses, while many others have built permanent concrete structures. Still, many areas are without adequate infrastructure and the settlements are disorganized and provide a great source of conflict among residents.

The Village Council Movement – History and Origins

The Village Council is the longest standing and most officially recognized self-initiated local organization in the communities of Trinidad and Tobago. Its history and functioning is essential to the nature of collective action and by extension collective efficacy in the study communities. Ensuing is a detailed account of the origins and operations of the Village Council Movement, its role in community building and how that role was shaped by its relationship with the government.

The history of the Village Council Movement includes: being, in the first instance, a public sector response to needed welfare reforms in the 1940s; having an intimate association with the People's National Movement (PNM), the political party which led the nation to independence in 1962; and having a specific set of government programs designed for its collaboration.

The first Village Councils, then called Welfare or Community Councils, were established by Rural Welfare Officers of the Social Welfare Department in the early 1940s (Plowden, 1989). The intervention was one of the recommendations of the Advisory Social Welfare Committee established by the Governor in 1944 aimed at correcting the social ills of the colony at that time. The social and economic conditions of the colonies had been highlighted by the labor riots of 1938, and in the findings of the Moyne Commission of Enquiry appointed by the British Government to investigate the social and economic conditions of the Caribbean which led to the riots. According to Plowden (1989) by 1955 there were 170 Village Councils, 116 Women's Groups and 285 Youth Groups formed through the intervention of the Officers.

In the first period of Village Council history (1944-1962), Craig (1974) suggests that the Councils received considerable support from community residents in the hope that they would bring much needed amenities and improvements to their living conditions. The focus of the Councils was however on building community centers with the state bearing half of the cost and the residents, the other; organizing handicraft and nutrition classes, educating each other and other voluntary activities (Plowden, 1989). It is during this period that the Village Council Movement was formalized when by an Act of Parliament in 1956 the Trinidad and Tobago Association of Village Councils was established as a charitable body. Consistent with its origins in the public sector around social welfare reform, the association assigned itself the broad mandate, “to promote the interests and welfare of the community through cultural, recreational, educational, social and economic activities in the community, and to co-operate with Government and other agencies in so doing” (WI reference, 1981). The Association sought to pursue this mandate mainly through the lowest of three operational levels:

- i. Village Council - the lowest level was the VC, an umbrella body of elected residents³ designed to be representative of all groups, entities, and individuals in the community,
- ii. Branch Association - the next level up was the Branch Association which coordinated VC activity at the County⁴ level, and
- iii. National Association - the highest level was the National Association comprised of representatives from the Branch Associations.

³ According to the revised constitution (1995) of the Trinidad and Tobago Association of Village and Community Councils, individual members pay an entrance fee of TT\$3.00 and a monthly subscription fee of TT\$1.00, while organizations pay a one-time affiliation fee of TT\$30.00 and an annual subscription fee of TT\$25.00.

⁴ Trinidad and Tobago was organised into 9 geographical areas called counties up to 1990. Between 1990 and 1992, by Act # 21 of 1990 and its amendment Act # 8 of 1992 a total of 14 municipal regions including two cities- Port of Spain and San Fernando; and three boroughs-Chaguanas, Arima and Point Fortin (Anthony, 2001).

The second phase of the Village Council Movement (1963-1985) was marked by an intensified relationship with the state and the politicization of the Councils. The political party, the People's National Movement was elected into office in 1956 under the Territorial Legislature constitutional system, and by 1962 Trinidad and Tobago became an independent nation. In this era of nationalism, the Prime Minister, Dr. Eric Williams launched his "Meet the People" tours, journeying the length and breadth of the nation hearing the concerns of the people. These tours marked a turning point in the history of the Village Council Movement.

There were two direct results of these tours that are of interest. First there was the call by the Prime Minister for members of the PNM "to get into these civic organizations...so that they may win through the groups what was needed in the community" (Thomasos, 1963, in Craig, 1974, p.40). Second, there was the institutionalization of a menu of programs, housed in the Office of the Prime Minister, for implementation with and through the Village Councils. The menu of programs fell under the earlier established Better Village or "Crash" Programme, an infrastructure development program with a short term public-works element, which had the two-fold objective of improving infrastructure conditions and beautification alongside relieving unemployment. The expanded Better Village Programme included:

- the construction of community centers to specified sizes based on the population of the community it would service;
- the provision of mobile medical clinics
- the training in and production of handicraft to harness local skills and generate income (an original element of the Better Village Programme); and
- the Prime Minister's Best Village Trophy Competition (PMBVTC) which incorporated cultural and folk performances, craft and culinary arts, village Olympics, La Reine Rive (the village queen show) and village beautification.

The PMBVTC continues to be implemented annually in eight areas of competition; (Craig, 1974; Associated Technology and Research Services (AT&RS), 2011)

The work of the VCs in the context of these programs transformed the social landscape of Trinidad and Tobago in terms of infrastructure improvements to communities and increased the prominence and appreciation of local culture, art forms and food, an investment especially critical for a young nation and former British colony (AT&RS, 2011). However, Craig (1974) highlighted adverse consequences for the Movement caused by the approach adopted in the aftermath of the “Meet the People” tours. For instance, the executive membership of the VCs were by and large members of the PNM⁵, eventually leading to complacency with government neglect or in-action⁶, discouraging participation by the apolitical or by members of other political parties, and creating the background for politically motivated power conflicts over the leadership of VCs as other political parties gained strength in the early 1980s. In addition, the menu of programs is said to have dominated the energies of residents and the Community Development Officers⁷ who had to administer these programs as opposed to pursuing the other human development needs.

⁵ It must be noted that until 1981, the PNM held political power in Trinidad and Tobago and was virtually unchallenged in the East-West Corridor and other areas of the country where Afro-Trinidadians predominated. As such in the 1960s when the Prime Minister would have made the call for PNM members to join VCs, the PNM was the party of the vast majority of middle class Afro-Trinidadians.

⁶ Comparing the Belle Garden VC which was controlled by persons with allegiances to the Democratic Action Congress (a party then operational in Tobago) Craig (1974) made the point that VCs controlled by persons outside of the governing political party (PNM) tended to be more critical and less condescending to the government. This point was also made in the interview with Mobafa of Never Dirty).

⁷ Responsibility for the community development programme changed hands several times, beginning with the Social Welfare Division, later the Ministry of Education and subsequently the Community Development Department (Plowden, 1989).

In 1972, just eight (8) years after the “Meet the People” tours, participation in the Village Councils was already in decline. In that year, the Governor General appointed a commission of enquiry to “Re-Appraise the role of voluntary organizations vis-a-vis the state in social services,” based on this apparent decline and its adverse impact on the community development process (Plowden, 1989). The review found that Village and Community Council membership was small and unrepresentative (Plowden, 1989). It is argued that the politicization of the councils (Craig, 1974) as well as the lack of power by Village Councils to enforce compliance or to attract resources to the community apart from navigating political connections (Plowden, 1989), were at the heart of this decline.

The third phase of the Village Council Movement (1986 to the present) has been an era of rapid changes in political leadership of the country compared with the 30 consecutive years of governance by the PNM from 1956-1986. Since 1986 the country was governed by three different parties and is currently governed by a coalition of four parties. Over the period, the governing parties included: the National Alliance for Reconstruction 1986-1991; the PNM 1991-1995, 2001-2010; the United National Congress 1995-2001; Peoples Partnership 2010 to the present. Rapid political change brought a degree of instability to and a disturbance of the power base of the VCs. Firstly, the nature of relationship between the VC and the government changed especially, for example, when political party affiliation differed between VC Executive Members and that of the Regional Corporations which are responsible for a specific set of infrastructural works, maintenance and sanitation in communities. Political expediency also caused a removal of the VC’s control over the Special Works Programs paving the way for such programs being captured by criminal gangs (Townsend, 2009).

In addition, new governmental institutions were also established like the National Commission for Self-Help (NCSH) in 1987, designed to reduce dependency on the state and encourage community

action and input in its own infrastructure development. As a result, many community organizations bypassed the VC and organized their own infrastructure upgrades, reducing the dependence on the VCs.

Secondly, this era saw much jostling for leadership of the VC for a variety of reasons, all attesting to the perceived power and influence of the VCs. On the one hand there were political activists and others, especially younger people, seeking to have control over access to the community center, and over the resources of the state which were still typically channeled through VCs (Plowden, 1989). On the other hand there were committed residents who were dissatisfied with the “complacency” and “lethargy” demonstrated by the older PNM-affiliated leaders of the VC and wanted an opportunity to pursue an agenda of community reform.

Thirdly, the needs of communities had changed from phase two to phase three of the VCM. Socio-economic needs had now trumped infrastructure, arts and culture needs as the country had entered a period of austerity (1986-1991). Structural adjustment measures included reduced government expenditure, a 10% reduction in public sector wages causing high levels of unemployment, reaching 22% in 1988.

In all of these circumstances the VC for the most part was a stable organization, with a structure that withstood the political and other maneuverings in the community. Notwithstanding the limitations of small size, a lack of representativeness, external axis of power in terms of access to state resources, and multiple sources of conflict including political (Plowden, 1989), personality, inter-group and over access to the community center, the VCs were an invaluable development tool for a young nation. Because of its track record in infrastructure improvements, its control of the community center, and its historical relationship with government, the VC was the key site for collective action in many of the communities where it existed. It was typically the central organization with other local organizations

operating alongside or even in competition with it. As the key site for collective action, the Village Council will be discussed again in Chapters 5 and 7.

Chapter 4: Collective efficacy in CSP Partner communities: Quantitative evidence

The Crime Victimization Survey (CVS) and primary dataset shed light on the nature of the relationship between social cohesion and social control, as well as address a fundamental question of this study, that is, whether collective efficacy acts as a mediator between concentrated disadvantage and the fear of crime. The chapter consists of four (4) sections. The first section will discuss the sample characteristics of the Crime Victimization Survey in comparison with national averages and averages across the 19 communities using data from the 2000 Census. This section will also examine the predictors of collective efficacy as the central concept of the study, and present the major analytical models followed by the main results from mediation analyses.

The second section will follow a similar pattern in respect of the primary dataset. The characteristics of the dataset and substantive analyses of the correlates of collective efficacy, and the relationship between social cohesion and social control will be presented.

The third and fourth sections include a discussion of the main findings, synthesis of the results of both datasets, and limitations of the quantitative analysis.

Evidence from the 2007 Crime Victimization Survey

Sample characteristics

To provide an idea of the representativeness of the survey, sample characteristics of the CVS are compared to 2000 Census data for the 19 communities and the national population in Table 6. Available data provides a less than perfect comparison of these datasets, given the different data collection time points. However, there were similarities. The CVS sample closely reflected community averages on ethnicity and employment. Afro-Trinidadians (55.9%) were the predominant ethnic group while there were equal percentages of persons of Indian and mixed descents (22%). Indo-Trinidadians comprise the largest ethnic group nationally (40%). In terms of employment, in the CVS, working persons comprised the majority of the sample (51.8%), with as many as 35.1% out of the job market as homemakers (13.3%), students (10%) and retired persons (9.1%). Only nine percent (9%) were unemployed.

The CVS polled slightly more women (56.1%) than the community and national averages, and a smaller percentage of youth and young adults 16-34 years (42% compared with 50% and 47% respectively). It also polled more adults over 55 years at 24.1% compared with the community (17%) and national (18%) averages. More than two thirds (72%) of the CVS respondents had lived in their neighbor for 10 years and more indicating a considerable amount of residential longevity. Census data on years of residence was unavailable.

Table 6: Comparison of CVS sample demographics with the average across 19 communities and the national average from the 2000 Census

		CVS sample	19 area average	National average
		%	%	%
Age	16-34	42	50	47
	35-54	33	33	35
	54+	24	17	18
Gender	Male	44	50	50
	Female	56	50	50

Table 6: Comparison of CVS sample demographics with the average across 19 communities and the national average from the 2000 Census

		CVS sample	19 area average	National average
		%	%	%
*Marital status	Never married	-	59	50
	Married	-	29	38
Ethnicity	African	56	59	38
	Indian	22	19	40
	Mixed	22	21	21
	Other	1	0.01	1
*Years of residence	≤ 9 years	27	-	-
	10 to 19 years	23	-	-
	20 to 39 years	35	-	-
	≥ 40 years	14	-	-
Highest Level of Education	Primary	33	45	40
	Secondary	49	45	43
	Technical	6	2	3
	University	8	2	2
Employment	Employed	52	51	50
	Unemployed	9	8	4
	Other	35	37	41
*Occupational type	Legislative, Professional & Technical	-	9	20
	Sales & Clerical	-	30	26
	Agriculture, Craft, Plant & Machine Operators	-	17	29
	Elementary	-	33	21
**Income	≤ \$3999	57	74	76
	\$4 – 9999	36	5	7

Table 6: Comparison of CVS sample demographics with the average across 19 communities and the national average from the 2000 Census

	CVS sample	19 area average	National average
	%	%	%
≥ \$10,000	7	1	1

*Not collected.**Comparison is not intended as income data from the 2007 CVS is at the household level, and refers to slightly different income categories of ≤ \$3000, \$4000-9000, ≥ \$10,000.

The CVS data also contained larger percentages of persons trained at the technical (6%) and university (8%) levels than the community and national averages. Still, the vast majority of respondents had up to primary (33%) and secondary (49.2%) education. A more meaningful picture of employment data is provided by looking at occupational status. Occupational status was not captured in the CVS, but data from the 2000 Census showed that in the 19 communities, persons in elementary⁸ occupations exceeded the national average 24.4% to 21.1%, while persons in legislative, professional and technical categories fell short of the national average 14.6% to 20.1%.

In support of this notion, more than half (57%) of CVS respondents reported average household income of less than TT\$3000.00 (US\$469.00) per month. To put this income figure in context, analysts of the 2005 Survey of Living Conditions (SLC) in T&T derived a very conservative poverty rate of TT\$665.00 (US\$104.00) per month for an individual (Kairi Consultants, 2005). This figure was adjusted for inflation in 2008, to TT\$810.00 (Theodore & Scott, 2008). Given that the average household size in the CSP

⁸According to the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-08) occupational codes elementary occupations are those requiring tasks that are of a “simple and routine nature, *and* mainly entail the use of hand-held tools, some physical effort, little or no previous experience and understanding of the work and limited initiative or judgment (ILO, 2011).

communities was four (4) persons (SD=.58), (2000 TT Census), this suggests that a considerable percentage of employed respondents live in poor and vulnerable⁹ households.

The CVS sample was fairly representative of the community population in terms of ethnicity, age, gender, education, and employment. On the income variable however the CVS was quite different to the community population as it comprised fewer persons earning at the lowest level ($\leq \$3999$) and considerably more earning above \$3999.

Frequency distributions of key test variables

The study will examine relationships among key variables to understand the operations of collective efficacy in a segment of communities in Trinidad. The key variables which were created from a number of scale items include *fear of crime*, *dissatisfaction with police* and *collective efficacy* as reflected by *social control* and *social cohesion* (see Chapter 2).

Fear of Crime

Table 7: Responses to the three-item measure of the fear of Crime from the Crime Victimization Survey

How do you feel about your safety?	<i>Very safe</i> %(n)	<i>Safe</i> %(n)	<i>Unsafe</i> %(n)
In your home or apartment?	25.7(549)	62.7(1338)	11.5(246)
On the streets of your community during the day?	13.6(291)	69.8(1489)	16.5(353)

⁹ Vulnerable households are defined as those in the range of 125% above the poverty line (Kairi Consultants, 2005).

On the streets of your community at night?	9.8(209)	49.8(1062)	40.4(862)
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Source: CVS survey, 2007.

Feeling safe is reflected by those who feel very safe and safe combined, while the fear of crime is represented by those feeling a lack of safety. The majority of respondents in the 19 communities felt safe in their homes (89%), and in the community during the day (84%) as can be seen at Table 7.

However as many as (40%) felt a lack of safety during the night. This is consistent with the reports¹⁰ that the residents of many of these communities engaged in self-imposed curfews for weeks, sometimes months, in response to gang related murders and especially in the case of what they called an 'undeserved'¹¹ killing.

Dissatisfaction with police

Respondents reported a fair amount of dissatisfaction with the police in the 19 communities as seen in Table 8. The percentage of dissatisfied respondents ranged from a low of 38.6% to a high of 57.9% on different measures. Skogan (2005) found similarly low levels of favorability with specific police-initiated encounters, by Blacks and Spanish-speaking Hispanics compared with Whites and English-speaking Hispanics. On most items in the 2007 CVS, almost half of the respondents were emphatically dissatisfied with police performance. This scale also had the largest percentage of ambivalent respondents indicating that many persons did not have sufficiently good or bad experiences of police performance to answer one way or the other.

¹⁰ This information was provided by the staff of the Citizen Security Programme as well as residents of the four communities which were the site of the primary data collection.

¹¹ An undeserved killing is one in which the victim was an innocent party having no direct involvement with crime, gangs or drugs (Interview with Village Council President Never Dirty, October, 2010).

Table 8: Responses to the eight-item measure of the dissatisfaction with the police.

....your response to statements about police effectiveness.	Strongly agree/Agree %(n)	Neither agree nor disagree %(n)	Strongly disagree/Disagree %(n)
The police in your neighborhood do a good job of preventing crime.	42.9(915)	11.0(235)	46.1(983)
The police in your neighborhood promptly respond to non-emergency calls for assistance.	26.8(572)	15.3(327)	57.9(1234)
The police in your neighborhood promptly respond to emergency calls for assistance.	38.9(829)	11.7(250)	49.4(1045)
The police in your neighborhood are helpful to people who have been victims of crime.	34.6(738)	26.8(571)	38.6(824)
Overall, the police are effective in dealing with the problems that really concern people in your neighborhood.	33.1(706)	20.3(434)	46.6(993)
The police in your neighborhood are doing a good job working together with residents to solve local problems.	27.9(595)	20.8(443)	51.3(1095)
The police in your neighborhood do a good job dealing with residents in a fair manner.	39.0(931)	19.39(411)	41.8(891)
The police in your neighborhood do a good job dealing with residents in a courteous manner.	37.5(800)	17.3(369)	45.2(964)

Source: CVS survey, 2007.

Social Cohesion – a component of Collective Efficacy

Collective efficacy combines two concepts, social cohesion and social control. See frequency distributions at Tables 9 and 10 respectively. Only an average of 30% of respondents agreed unequivocally that their communities displayed cohesion as measured. On average, close to 50% did not agree that cohesion was displayed. Also, more than half of the respondents (55%) disagreed with the statement that residents were willing to help one another, while fewer (42.8%) disagreed with the idea that residents could be trusted. This suggests that reciprocity was even less common than trust in these communities.

Table 9: Responses to the three-item measure social cohesion

....how close the members of your neighborhood feel toward one another?	Strongly agree/Agree %(n)	Neither agree nor disagree %(n)	Strongly disagree/Disagree %(n)

People around here are willing to help their neighbors.	28.2(601)	16.9(360)	55.0(1172)
People around here can be trusted.	31.4(670)	25.7(549)	42.8(814)
This is a close-knit community.	32.3(690)	18.4(393)	49.2(1050)

Source: CVS survey, 2007.

Averaged across the three items in Tables 9 and 10 respectively, it was evident that more respondents positively identified with neighborhood evidences of social control (44.3%) than of social cohesion (30.63%). Given that social cohesion is hypothesized to create the context for the social control the reverse was expected. Residents were also more likely to intervene to break up a fight (52%) than to regulate errant children (38.5%) or youth (42.4%). This is important as the collective engagement in the regulation of youth is essential to crime prevention.

Table 10: Responses to the three-item measure social control

....questions about your views of your neighborhood?	Very likely/ Likely	Neither likely nor unlikely	Very unlikely/ Unlikely
	%(n)	%(n)	%(n)
Likelihood that neighbors would do something about children skipping school.	42.4(904)	11.6(248)	46.0(981)
Likelihood that neighbors would intervene if a fight broke out in front of your home.	52.1(1011)	13.6(290)	34.3(732)
Likelihood that neighbors would intervene if a child was showing disrespect to an adult.	38.5(822)	12.1(258)	49.4(1053)


Source: CVS survey, 2007.

Situational analysis of communities on key test variables

The 19 communities involved in the CSP are mostly located across the north of the island referred to as the East-West Corridor, however three communities were also drawn from central and south Trinidad (See Figure 4). The communities had an average population size of 3166 persons, and an average sample size of 162 respondents per community.

For the purpose of this analysis the communities are grouped into four geographic regions or clusters. The communities are color coded by region and identified on the map at Figure 4. The four communities identified in yellow are Cocorite, Covigne, Patna Village/River Estate and Dibe/Belle Vue, are all located in north west Trinidad. The six communities in red are located in north central, which is just on the outskirts of the capital city of Port of Spain. These are Gonzales, St. Barbs, Soogren Trace, Mon Repos, Beetham Estate and Never Dirty. The northeast in local parlance typically defines communities situated as near as three to four miles east of the capital city and stretching to the most north eastern end of the island.

Figure 4: Poverty Map of Trinidad & Tobago showing CSP-Partner Communities



NB: Communities in Tobago were not included in the 2007 Crime Victimization Survey.

Communities in the north east are marked in green and include Mt. Dor, Farm Road, Samaroo Village/Mootoo Lands, Pinto Road, Quash Trace and North Eastern Settlement. The three central and southern communities marked in blue are Enterprise, Embacadere and La Romain. All of the communities are classified as urban according to the Central Statistical Office of Trinidad and Tobago. That classification is based on population density, availability of pipe borne water and acreage under agriculture (Central Statistical Office of Trinidad and Tobago, 2008). The communities have been exposed to varying rates of development, for example, slower rates of agricultural substitution, and some have accordingly retained more 'village values' than others. Anecdotally, communities in the south, central and far east are considered to have retained more of the 'rural culture' than those in the north west, north central and some north eastern communities.

Summary data on the key test variables by community and region is provided at Table 11. The regional community clusters were represented by a four category variable (REG_SUBDV) with 1=communities in the northwest, 2=communities in the north central, 3=northeast and 4=central and south. For this analysis, total victimization was measured by a binary (yes/no) variable (VICTOT) with 'yes' identifying having any victimization experience. Collective efficacy, dissatisfaction with the police and fear of crime were measured by the percentage of residents answering clearly in the affirmative (agreed/strongly agreed; likely/very likely or very unsafe) derived from the summed scores of these variables, as factor scores used elsewhere in this study, would not have been meaningful.

Table 11: Results on key variables by community and region

Region & Community	Vict. Experiences	Collective Efficacy	Dissatisfaction with police	Fear of crime
	%(n)	%(n)	%(n)	%(n)
<u>Northwest</u>	28.6(120)	18.2	22.8	17.4
Cocorite	24.0(12)	28.0	18.0	6.0
Covigne	25.7(9)	8.6	25.7	25.7

Table 11: Results on key variables by community and region

Region & Community	Vict. Experiences	Collective Efficacy	Dissatisfaction with police	Fear of crime
Patna Vge/ River Est.	37.8(65)	20.4	22.1	22.1
Dibe/Belle Vue	27.0(34)	15.9	25.4	15.9
<u>North central</u>	30.2 (173)	22.1	29.3	20.5
Gonzales	32.4(33)	25.5	30.4	7.8
St. Barbs	30.2(38)	23.0	28.6	22.2
Soogren Trace	28.8(34)	16.0	24.6	23.7
Mon Repos	32.4(23)	21.1	18.3	15.5
Never Dirty	23.3(17)	12.3	24.7	19.2
Beetham Est.	34.2(28)	17.1	28.1	18.3
<u>North east</u>	28.0(188)	17.4	21.0	16.5
Mt. Dor	23.0(31)	22.2	23.7	9.6
Farm Road	31.8(27)	9.4	20.0	22.4
Samaroo Vge/ Mootoo Lds.	31.5(34)	21.3	18.5	18.5
Pinto Road	32.7(34)	14.4	16.4	15.4
Quash Trace	28.2(35)	18.5	26.6	20.2
North Eastern Settlement	20.6(27)	18.3	20.6	13.0
<u>Central&South</u>	26.2(129)	24.1	22.6	16.7
Enterprise	26.4(69)	27.2	21.8	18.0
Embacadere	24.3(28)	20.0	25.2	18.3
La Romain	27.8(32)	25.2	20.9	13.9

Source: 2007 Crime Victimization Survey

Given that these were all classified by the CSP as lower income high crime communities, it is not surprising that the clusters evinced very similar overall results on these variables. For example, the ranges in the percentage of persons experiencing victimization, fear of crime and dissatisfaction with the police or levels of collective efficacy, were as low as 4, 4, 8 and 5 respectively. The Central and South region had better overall results than the others including relatively low average percentage of persons experiencing fear of crime (16.7%), lowest average percentage with victimization experiences (26.2%) and the highest percentage with positive views on collective efficacy (24.1%). The concept of collective

efficacy suggests that where fear of crime, police dissatisfaction and victimization are low, the levels of collective efficacy would be high. As such, the Central and South region behaved as would be predicted by the theory of collective efficacy.

Anomalies exist in respect of the other regions. The North Central cluster which had the next highest level of collective efficacy (22.1%) also had the poorest statistics on victimization, dissatisfaction with the police and the fear of crime. In addition, the North East which had the lowest level of collective efficacy (17.4%) also had the lowest percentage expressing fear of crime (16.5%) and dissatisfaction with the police (21%), but higher percentage experiencing victimization (28%). Further the North West cluster also had low collective efficacy although it performed similarly to the Central & South cluster on the other variables except with a slightly higher experience of victimization. The three north clusters on average demonstrated no consistent pattern between collective efficacy and the adverse conditions examined. The somewhat more consistent performance of the Central & South cluster raises questions about the possible influence of the slower pace of urbanization on the formation of collective efficacy – this is a matter for further study.

Regional similarities on these variables were confirmed by bivariate logistic regression models which revealed no statistically significant regional differences in terms of the percentage of persons who experienced victimization. The Wald statistic with a critical value of 3.9667 on the binary victimization variable was non-significant $X^2 (3, 2133) = 3.9667, p = .2651$. In addition, the percentage who affirmed dissatisfaction with the police $X^2 (3, 2133) = 4.577, p = 0.2056$ and the percentage who experienced fear of crime $X^2 (3, 2133) = 31.374, p = 0.7116$ were also non-significant. However significant regional differences were found on collective efficacy $X^2 (3, 2133) = 9.963, p = 0.0189$. Respondents in the central & southern communities were on average, 37% more likely to perceive higher levels of collective efficacy in their communities than those in the north central area. One explanation may be that the

North Central area which surrounds the capital city and would have experienced a faster rate of urbanization than the Central & Southern areas. This provides additional support for the notion that that disparities in norms associated with the pace of development may be impacting the existence or perceptions of collective efficacy above the impact of disorder as represented by victimization, fear of crime and dissatisfaction with the police.

Analytical models

Analytical Models


One aim of this study (Aim two) is to determine whether the mechanism of collective efficacy, offers an explanation for the relationship between socio-economic disadvantage and the fear of crime. As discussed above, several studies in developed countries have found collective efficacy to mediate the relationship between socio-economic disadvantage and a number of adverse outcomes including problem behavior (drug use, arrests), perceived violence, victimization and homicides and the fear of crime (Rankin & Quane, 2002; Sampson et al., 1997; Browning et al. 2004; Gibson et al., 2002). Collective efficacy is a measure of the degree of community cohesiveness and the active engagement by residents in informal social control. As a community characteristic, collective efficacy is expected to account, at least in part, for the relationship between socio-economic disadvantage and the fear of crime. This is because the greater willingness and ability of residents to collaborate on common goals for community regulation is likely to improve their sense of control over community life.

Preliminary data as presented at Table 11 above indicated no consistent relationship between collective efficacy and the fear of crime in these fairly homogenous communities. However, the study aims to contribute to the collective efficacy literature by testing the formal theoretical propositions concerning the theory of collective efficacy, using a simple mediation model as shown in Figure 5. Hayes (2009) argues that since the total effect in a mediation model is the sum of the paths, the non-

significance of any of the paths does not preclude or obviate the relevance of other significant paths.


The main variables of interest in the model are a composite measure of socio-economic disadvantage as the independent variable, fear of crime factor scores as the dependent variable, and collective efficacy factor scores as the mediator.

Figure 5: Simple mediation model of the intervening effect of collective efficacy



Aim one of this study seeks to understand collective efficacy and the factors that lead to the emergence of collective efficacy through insights into the norms, processes and operations of social cohesion and social control in the lower income high crime communities of Trinidad. A component of this aim is to understand the relationship between social cohesion and social control, to determine if, as hypothesized, social cohesion creates the conditions for the exercise of social control. The test of this hypothesis involves running a double mediation model reflected in Figure 6, in which social cohesion is modeled as having a 'causal effect' on social control, in their mediating role between structural disadvantage and the fear of crime.

Figure 6: Double mediation model examining the relationship between social cohesion and social control



Social cohesion is expected to positively influence the effect of social control as a mediator between structural disadvantage and the fear of crime. In other words the effect of social control in this model will be explained by social cohesion, indicating that the presence and level of social cohesion increases the exercise of social control. In this case, the reverse should not be true. Social control should not explain the effect of social cohesion as a mediator of structural disadvantage on the fear of crime, unless these variables have a reciprocal relationship. A reciprocal relationship between social cohesion and social control is, however, also plausible. While the presence of social cohesion is considered vital to the exercise of social control, the exercise of social control could also lead to improved cohesion, for example, through collaboration in local groups.

Understanding individual level predictors of collective efficacy from the Crime Victimization Survey

Examining the predictors of collective efficacy was considered useful to an understanding of the individual level drivers of collective efficacy in the local context. A list of likely predictors of collective efficacy was developed from the CVS dataset, guided by existing evidence and bivariate analyses (correlations, independent sample *t* test, one-way Anovas). The full list of variables is as follows:

- Age squared. The square root transformation addressed slight positive skewness. Age was found to be a significant positive predictor of collective efficacy (Sampson, 1988; Duncan et al., 2003; Mazerolle et al. 2010; Sampson et al., 1997). Older persons were more likely to perceive of greater levels of closeness and cooperation in their communities perhaps because of historic relationships or employing a mature approach to relationships.
- Gender. A dummy variable representing females. Evidence on the role of gender was inconsistent, however Mazerolle et al (2010) found a significant positive results for women.
- Ethnicity. Dummy variables for persons of Indian and mixed descents were included. Ethnicity has been investigated in studies of collective efficacy but a consistent position has not emerged. Sampson et al. (1997) found ethnicity non-significant in the Chicago study.
- Years of residence in the community squared. This was also transformed to address positive skewness. Evidence on the association between collective efficacy and length of residence in a community is also inconsistent. However, it is expected that persons with longer residency would report higher levels of collective efficacy due to longer periods of exposure to and, more opportunities for building and cementing relationships. This was found to be true by Kasarda & Janowitz (1974) and Sampson (1988) in their respective works on community attachment.
- Individual socio-economic status (SES). This was a composite variable created through principal components analysis and which combined dummy variables for low income and middle income; secondary and technical/higher education; and persons who were working. Previous research found individual socio-economic status to be a positive predictor of collective efficacy (Sampson et al., 1997).
- Community level socio-economic disadvantage (REG_SES). This composite variable combined the percentage of households earning low incomes (\leq TT\$3000 per month) in each community, the

percentage with only primary level education and the percentage with unemployed heads of households. A higher level of community social disadvantage is expected to be associated with lower levels of collective efficacy.

In addition to demographic factors, other individual level factors such as fear of crime, dissatisfaction with the police and experiences of violent victimization have not commonly been examined in terms of a relationship with collective efficacy, but are considered worthy of investigation in terms of their potential attenuating the effects. In the case of the fear of crime, the reciprocal relationship with collective efficacy has been referenced, although most studies have examined fear of crime as the dependent variable (Gibson et al. 2002). With respect to dissatisfaction with police, evidence has not been found of its relationship with collective efficacy. However Wells et al. (2006) observed a reduced willingness to act on critical community problems in the face of distrust of the police indicating an effect on social control. Finally, with respect to victimization, studies in the United States have also found an inverse relationship between prior victimization and collective efficacy (Sampson et al., 1997). Two dummy variables were used for victimization, one representing persons who had only one experience of victimization and the other, persons who had more than one experience of victimization. Dissatisfaction with the police, and collective efficacy were represented by the factor scores of the respective item measures of these latent constructs.

Table 12: Results of regression analyses showing predictors of collective efficacy

Predictors	Collective efficacy (CEFS)	
	B(SE)	β
R ²	.12	
<u>Individual characteristics</u>		
-Respondent age (sqrt) (REPAGESQ)	0.042 (.02)	0.07*
-Gender (female)(FEMALE)	-0.083 (.04)	-0.05*
-Indian (ETHNIN)	0.205 (.05)	0.10***
-Mixed (ETHNMX)	0.063 (.05)	0.03

Table 12: Results of regression analyses showing predictors of collective efficacy

Predictors	Collective efficacy (CEFS)	
	B(SE)	β
<u>Socio-economic characteristics</u>		
-Secondary education (SECED2)	-0.036 (.05)	-0.02
-Technical & higher education (HIGHED)	0.074 (.06)	0.03
-Monthly household income between TT\$4,000-9,000 (INCMID)	0.009 (.04)	0.00
-Monthly household income over TT\$10,000 (INCHI)	0.016 (.08)	0.00
-Respondents who are employed (WORKING)	0.044 (.07)	-0.03
-Respondents not in workforce (WORK-OTH)	-0.056 (.07)	0.03
-Community socio-economic disadvantage (REG_SES)	-0.033 (.02)	-0.04
<u>Experience with community</u>		
-Years of residence (sqrt) (YRSRESSQ)	0.023 (.01)	0.05*
-Persons with 1 victimization experience (ONEVICT)	-0.103 (.05)	-0.05*
-Persons with > 1 victimization experience (FEWVICT)	-0.199 (.07)	-0.07**
<u>Latent factor</u>		
-Dissatisfaction with police (DWPF2)	-0.184 (.02)	-0.20***
-Fear of crime factor scores (FOCF2)	-0.161 (.02)	-0.17***

Note: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.0001$.

The model examining predictors of collective efficacy was significant $F(16, 2133) = 17.94$; $p < .0001$ and explained 12% of the variation in collective efficacy as seen at Table 12. In terms of individual characteristics, age ($b = .042$, $t = 2.47$, $p = .0137$) and being of Indian descent ($b = .205$, $t = 4.39$, $p < .0001$) were significant positive predictors of collective efficacy, while being female ($b = -0.083$, $t = -2.19$, $p = .0283$) was, surprisingly, a negative predictor. This may however be a function of unsatisfied expectations by women about relations with their fellow residents and the ability of their communities to intervene to solve local problems or problems of youth. That Indo-Trinidadians reflected higher levels of collective efficacy than Afro-Trinidadians in these predominantly Afro-Trinidadian communities is perhaps a reflection of the cultural differences between the two ethnic groups. Indo-Trinidadians are

culturally a more homogeneous group and have stronger extended familial ties (Eriksen, 1991) with multiple households within one residence. As such they have a network of safety and solidarity primarily among their own group within the community.

As expected, residents who resided in the community for longer periods ($b = .023$, $t = 2.14$, $p = .0321$) had higher perceptions of collective efficacy. Also expected were the significant negative impacts on collective efficacy of having one or more experience of victimization. Victimized persons are likely to have greater fear of crime and perhaps a greater degree of suspicion of their neighbors depending on the nature of victimization. Dissatisfaction with the police ($\beta = -.20$) and fear of crime ($\beta = -.17$) had the largest significant negative influences on collective efficacy. Higher levels of fear of crime, and poorer perceptions of the police, were therefore associated with worsened perceptions of local collective efficacy. Interestingly, none of the individual socio-economic variables achieved significance in this regression, suggesting that there is a fairly common understanding about how the community works and a fairly consistent level of engagement with the community across socio-economic groups.


Mediation models

The mediating effect of collective efficacy

In the simple mediation model shown at Figure 7, the intervening effect of collective efficacy between community socio-economic disadvantage and the fear of crime was examined, with controls for individual demographic characteristics. Community socio-economic disadvantage achieved significance as a predictor of fear of crime in the bivariate and multivariate regression models with collective efficacy as the only other predictor/mediator, but failed the significance tests in the model with multiple covariates. The use of community socio-economic disadvantage as the independent variable (X) in this mediation model, despite its non-significance as a predictor of the fear of crime (Y), is supported by Hayes (2009) and other authors (MacKinnon et al., 2000; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). Shrout

and Bolger (2002) argue for example that a significant $X \rightarrow Y$ relationship is not a precondition for mediation analysis especially when a small effect size is anticipated. Hayes (2009) argues that since the total effect is the sum of the paths in the mediation model, the non-significance of any of the paths does not preclude or obviate the relevance of other significant paths.

Figure 7: Simple mediation model of the intervening effect of collective efficacy



Model results provided at Figure 7 above and detailed at Table 13 below, indicate that the main effect of interest (path a_1b_1), which is the indirect effect of socio-economic disadvantage on the fear of crime through collective efficacy, was significant and positive ($a_1b_1=.009$ (95% CI [.0007, .0176])). Neither the total effect of the mediation model – path $c'_1a_1b_1$ in Figure 7 above - ($c_1=.032$, $p = .111$) nor the direct effect – path c'_1 above ($c'_1=.024$, $p = .233$) was significant. The positive direction of the effect was however contrary to expectations. Similar results (positive sign of the main effect) were generated using the Sobel test ($z = 1.99$, $p = .047$).

Table 13: Mediation model results

	Path	B(SE)	Conf. Interval
- Variance explained 9.2%			
- Socio-economic disadvantage \rightarrow Collective efficacy	(a_1)	-.039(.02)*	

- Collective efficacy → Fear of crime	(b_1)	-.218(.02)***	
- Indirect effect	(a_1b_1)	.009(.00)	.0007 - .0176
- Direct effect	(c'_1)	.024(.02)	-.0151 - .0620
- Total effect	($a_1b_1+c'_1$)	.032(.02)	-.0074 - .0713

Note: The model used a 95% bootstrap confidence interval (CI) for the indirect, direct and total effects. If the CI does not include zero, the effect is statistically significant. Statistically significant effects are displayed in bold. * $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.0001$.

The results of regression models antecedent to the mediation model were consistent with previous research findings to the effect that both paths a_1 between socio-economic disadvantage and collective efficacy ($b = -.0390$, $t = -2.036$, $p = .0419$) and path b_1 between collective efficacy and the fear of crime ($b = -.2182$, $t = -9.823$, $p < .0000$) were significant and negative. These significant paths respectively indicate that poor socio-economic conditions are associated with lower levels of collective efficacy (path a_1), while higher levels of collective efficacy are associated with lower levels of the fear of crime (path b_1). However, mathematically, the indirect effect which is the product of these two negative paths (a_1b_1) is appropriately positive. This suggests that the indirect effect of the relationship between socio-economic status and the fear of crime actually leads to an increase in the fear of crime over and above the direct effect.

This finding is however more likely to be an artifact of the mathematics behind the model rather than the behavior of these social phenomena. It is unlikely that as a mediator between socio-economic disadvantage and the fear of crime, the presence of higher levels of cohesiveness and participation of the residents in informal social control, would be associated with heightened feelings of fear of crime. This is especially unlikely in the face of the strong inverse relationship between collective efficacy and the fear of crime ($\beta = -.17$). Moreover, the regression coefficient for socio-economic disadvantage was reduced from 0.0320 to 0.0235 when collective efficacy was added to the model. This suggests that as an underlying mechanism which explains the impact of socio-economic disadvantage on fear of crime, collective efficacy reduces the negative impact of socio-economic disadvantage and is therefore unlikely to be associated with increased levels of fear of crime.

In addition, in their test of the mediating effect of collective efficacy, Sampson et al. (1997) used the same logical inferences to conclude in favor of a significant mediation. That is, they observed that after socio-economic disadvantage was controlled, collective efficacy maintained a strong negative association with violence, consistent with the current study's finding in respect of the fear of crime. They also observed that there was a statistically significant reduction in the socio-economic disadvantage coefficient after the introduction of the collective efficacy variable. On these bases they concluded that collective efficacy partially mediated the effects of socio-economic disadvantage, residential instability and immigrant heterogeneity on violence. Most empirical tests of collective efficacy also used this approach (Browning, 2002; Browning et al., 2004; Browning, 2009; Mazerolle et al., 2010).

In the current study, socio-economic disadvantage exerted very little influence ($\beta=.03$) on fear of crime. Socio-economic disadvantage accounted for 70% of the variance in violence in the Sampson et al. (1997) study and usually carries considerable explanatory power in studies of crime and violence (Sampson & Wilson, 1995). Socio-economic factors, along with prior victimization, community disorder and social integration, are well tested as important predictors of the fear of crime (Gibson et al. 2002). The low performance of the community level socio-economic status variable (REG_SES) in the current study is likely due to the fact that this variable, though reflected at the individual level ($n=2133$) was actually based on data on 19 lower income communities which had relatively small differences in SES.


In order to generate an effect size for the indirect effect, the mediation model was re-run without the covariates, as the PROCESS macro does not generate effect size measures in models with covariates (Hayes n.d.). The Kappa-squared effect size as recommended by Preacher & Kelly (2011) was $K^2=.0078$ with a 95% confidence interval of between .0008 and .0171. Preacher & Kelly (2011) concede to qualifying the Kappa-squared effect size measure along the lines of the Cohen (1988, in Preacher &

Kelly, 2011) rubric for assessing effect size, namely: .01=small, .09=medium, .25=large effect. This means that the indirect effect of collective efficacy between socio-economic disadvantage and the fear of crime was small, notwithstanding a moderate effect for the relationship between collective efficacy and the fear of crime as indicated by the standardized beta coefficient of $-.17$ in the multiple regression model.

The relationship between social cohesion and social control

Prior research has not provided statistical evidence of the relationship between social cohesion and social control. This study attempts to answer this question using a mediation model. Given that social cohesion and social control are the factors explaining collective efficacy, these two variables are substituted for collective efficacy in a double mediation model as depicted at Figure 8. The double mediation model facilitates examination of potential 'causal' connection between the two mediators in the model. In this way the notion that social cohesion creates the conditions for willingness to engage in social control (Sampson, 2006; Browning et al., 2004) is examined statistically. While longitudinal data will be more appropriate for examining this causal relationship, a significant and non-reciprocal indirect effect through path $d_3e_3b_3$ will provide evidence for the acceptability of the model for further research.


Figure 8: Double mediation model examining the relationship between social cohesion and social control



Only the indirect effect of socio-economic disadvantage on the fear of crime which is carried through social cohesion $d_3f_3=0.0094$, was statistically significant. There was a 95% bootstrap confidence interval of between 0.0018 to 0.0160, See model results at Table 14 below. The main effect of interest, path $d_3e_3b_3$ through both social cohesion and social control was non-significant, and the path through social control also did not achieve significance. This suggests that in the CSP partner communities, social cohesion rather than control is the driving force of the intervening effect of collective efficacy on the fear of crime, and the hypothesized effect of social cohesion on social control is not borne out in this model.

The model was reversed, as represented in Figure 9, to see what if any effect social control may have on social cohesion. Quite unexpectedly, in this model, the reversed double mediation effect through social control and social cohesion $d_3e_3b_3=0.0036$ was statistically different from zero with a 95% bootstrap confidence interval of 0.0008 – 0.0072. See results at Table 14 below.

Figure 9: Reversed double mediation model examining the relationship between social control and social cohesion



This suggests that the relationship between socio-economic disadvantage and the fear of crime which was explained by social cohesion, was further explained by the extent of social control in the

community. This finding underscores the reciprocal relationship noted between social control and social cohesion observed in separate regression analyses which showed that social cohesion ($\beta = 0.46$) was the largest predictor of social control and social control ($\beta = 0.44$) explained most of the variance in social cohesion. In these communities also, more respondents felt that measures of social control (44.3%) were likely to occur, than those who agreed that instances of social cohesiveness (30.6%) were present.

Table 14: Results of reversed double mediation model

	<u><i>Social Cohesion causal model</i></u>			<u><i>Social Control causal model</i></u>		
	<i>Path</i>	<i>B(SE)</i>	<i>Conf. Interval</i>	<i>Path</i>	<i>B(SE)</i>	<i>Conf. Interval</i>
Variance explained	12.2%			10.5%		
-Socio-economic disadvantage \rightarrow Social cohesion	(d_3)	-.052(.02)*		(a_3)	-.025(.02)	
-Social cohesion \rightarrow Fear of crime	(f_3)	-.183(.02)***		(b_3)	-.177(.02)***	
-Social cohesion \rightarrow Social control	(e_3)	.455(.02)***		-		
-Socio-economic disadvantage \rightarrow Social control	(a_3)	-.025(.02)		(d_3)	-.043(.02)*	
-Social control \rightarrow Fear of crime	(b_3)	-.020(.02)		(f_3)	-.032(.03)	
-Social control \rightarrow Social cohesion	-			(e_3)	.481(.02)***	
-Indirect effects						
SED \rightarrow SCOH \rightarrow FOC	(d_3f_3)	.009(.00)	.0024 - .0182	(a_3b_3)	.005(.00)	-.0013 - .0107
SED \rightarrow SCOH \rightarrow SCON \rightarrow FOC	$(d_3e_3b_3)$.009(.00)	-.0005 - .0022	-	-	-
SED \rightarrow SCON \rightarrow SCOH \rightarrow FOC	-	-	-	$(d_3e_3b_3)$.004(.00)	.0008 - .0072
SED \rightarrow SCON \rightarrow FOC	(a_3b_3)	.001(.00)	-.0005 - .0032	(d_3f_3)	.001(.00)	-.0005 - .0051
-Direct effect	(c'_3)	.040(.02)	-.0008 - .0797	(c'_3)	.023(.02)	-.0157 - .0610
-Total effect	$(d_3e_3b_3 + c'_3)$.050(.02)	.0090 - .0908	$(d_3e_3b_3 + c'_3)$.032(.02)	-.0068 - .0710

Note: The models use a 95% bootstrap confidence interval (CI) for the indirect, direct and total effects. If the CI does not include zero, the effect is statistically significant. Statistically significant effects are displayed in bold. * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.0001$.

The results suggest that collective efficacy does function as an underlying mechanism which reduces the impact of socio-economic disadvantage on the fear of crime in these lower income high-crime communities of Trinidad. The study also confirmed through regression analysis that a reciprocal

relationship exists between social control and social cohesion. The mediation models further suggest that in these communities it is the engagement in informal social control which creates the conditions for social cohesion, while it is social cohesion that reduces the impact of socio-economic disadvantage on the fear of crime. However, the small effect sizes of the models creates concerns about the reliability of the measures employed in study.

Evidence from primary data

Sample characteristics

As discussed in Chapter 2, sample characteristics of the primary data will be differentiated among the full sample, a sub-sample of respondents (43%) who answered the collective efficacy scale questions, and the minors. As seen in Table 15, information on the averages across the four communities is provided for comparison with sample data. The full sample (n=138) contained respondents drawn from Never Dirty (n=29), Mt. Dor (n=36), Samaroo Village/Mootoo lands (n=40) and Pinto Road (n=33). They ranged in age from 12 to 80 years, with the majority (37%) between the ages of 35 to 54 years. Twenty five percent (25%) were between 18-34 years, and 23% over 55 years. There were at least four (4) minors from each community and these comprised 15% (n=20) of the sample. The full sample was fairly balanced in terms of gender, with just slightly more males (51.4%) than females. The sample mainly comprised persons of African (68%) descent as these communities were traditionally the enclaves of Afro-Trinidadian residents. Twenty four percent (24%) were mixed and 6% were Indo-Trinidadians. Non-married respondents (39%) outweighed the married or partnered (33%) group, while

homeowners (70%) and long term residents¹² (71%) greatly outnumbered the renters (12%) and respondents with less than 10 years of residency (6%). The majority (70%) were also involved in local organizations, with as many as 43% on the executive of these organizations, only 30% were not affiliated with any local organization.

Table 15: Sample characteristics of full primary dataset and sub-sets.

Variables	Categories	Study Areas %	Full Sample N=138 %	Sub-sample N=59 %	Minors N=20 %
Population*	ND	19	21	31	20
	MD	26	26	24	25
	SV/ML	15	29	20	20
	PR	50	24	25	35
Age	12-17	11**	15	-	100
	18-34	36**	25	24	-
	35-54	23	37	48	-
	54+	11	24	29	-
Gender	Male	50	51	48	60
	Female	50	49	52	40
Marital status	Not married	70	39	41	65***
	Married	30	33	44	25
Ethnicity	African	52	68	75	65
	Indian	13	6	5	.05
	Mixed	34	24	20	30
	Other	1	1	0	-
Highest Level of Education	Primary	48	20	15	26
	Secondary	42	46	44	74
	Technical	2	30	34	-
	University	2	5	7	NA

¹² Long term residents are persons with more than 20 years of residency in the community (Roman et al. 2009).

Table 15: Sample characteristics of full primary dataset and sub-sets.

Variables	Categories	Study Areas %	Full Sample N=138 %	Sub-sample N=59 %	Minors N=20 %
Employment****	FT Employed	55	47	49	40***
	PT Employed		32	27	35
	Unemployed	7	5	-	10
	Other	39	16	24	15
Occupational type	Prof. & Tech	14	9	10	-
	Cler. & Sales	27	30	39	-
	Agri., Craft,	22	17	17	-
	Elementary	37	33	19	-
Income	≤ \$1999	79	23	14	-
	\$2000–4999	17	47	48	-
	\$5000–\$7999	2	19	24	-
	\$8,000	2	11	15	-
Own home	Owner	87	70	71	-
	Renter	14	12	7	-
	Other	1	18	22	-
Years of residence	≤ 9 years	-	6	2	15
	10 to 19 years	-	24	15	85
	20 to 39 years	-	48	58	-
	≥ 40 years	-	23	25	-
Organizational affiliation	Executive	-	48	68	10
	Member	-	20	15	65
	No affiliation	-	31	17	25

*ND=Never Dirty, MD=Mt. Dor, SV/ML=Samaroo Village/Mootoo Lands, PR= Pinto Road. ** Age data for the study areas refers to 10-14 year and 15-34 year age groups respectively. ***Data provided under minors in these categories refer to the parents of the minors. ****Full time employment refers to ≥ 33 hours of work per week for the national average and ≥ 35 hours per week in the primary data set. Information on full-time and part-time employment was not available for the study communities. Blank areas mean not applicable in the case of minors and not obtained at the national level.

Source: 2000 Census data and Primary dataset – dissertation research 2010-2012(February)

In terms of representativeness, the sample was similar to the study communities in terms of gender, percent married, ethnicity and home ownership. However there were notable differences with respect to the socio-economic status of respondents. Respondents tended to be generally better off than the average across the study communities. For example, there was much more variation across

educational levels in the sample than in the study communities combined. Twenty percent (20%) of respondents had only up to primary level education, compared with 48% across the study communities, and 35% had some type of technical training, associate's degree or higher education compared with only 4% across the study communities. Income was also more dispersed across respondents but considerably unequal across the four communities, with 79% earning under TT\$2000 compared with 23% among respondents. This notwithstanding, fewer (9%) respondents worked at the professional, managerial and technical levels (14%) than across the communities. There were similarities across the other occupational categories. The sample also polled more older respondents (61%) compared to the combined community average (34%), perhaps due to their availability and association with local organizations.

Minors

There were 20 minors in the sample, 35% (n=7) of whom were 12-13 years old and 65% (n=13) were between 14-17 years. One had completed high school, while 26% (n=5) were in primary school, 60% (n=12) in secondary school and 10% (n=2) were in a remedial/trade school. The majority (84%) were in receipt of free lunches which are served in local schools to cater to the nutritional needs of lower income children. In terms of their living arrangements, the majority (65%) lived with one parent (male or female), and 40% lived in homes with a parent who was full time employed, compared with 25% part time, and only 10% (n=2) unemployed. Eighty five percent (n=17) of them lived in the community all of their lives, and 75% were engaged in local organizations with 10% (n=2) even holding executive positions. The minors therefore comprised a group of young residents who were mostly active participants in the life of their communities; many lived in families with limited incomes and a reduced degree of supervision as many (45%) lived with one parent and had no extended family support in the home. The responses of the minors will form an essential part of the qualitative analyses but will be

excluded from the main quantitative analyses of collective efficacy, because they will generate missing data on key socio-economic variables.

Sub-sample characteristics

The predictors of collective efficacy will be examined using a subset (n=59) of the primary dataset. This subset excludes minors, and participants in the larger (n>3) focus groups where responses to the measures of collective efficacy were not recorded using scale methodology. In this dataset, 31% of the responses were from Never Dirty, 25% from Pinto Road and 24% and 20% respectively from Mt. Dor and Samaroo Village/Mootoo Lands. Compared with the full dataset, there were slightly more females (52%, 49%), and fewer persons working in elementary type jobs (19%, 33%), but on most other variables the demographic distributions remained fairly similar. Participants were mostly drawn from the 35-54 age group (48%) with 24% being aged 18-34 and 29% over 55 years. Forty eight percent (48%) received the lowest incomes of less than \$4000 per month, 59% completed up to secondary education, 49% were employed on a full time basis while 27% were employed on a part time basis. Interestingly very many of those who worked part time considered themselves full time employed indicating some acceptance of a permanent state of limited work and limited pay. The majority of respondents (39%) worked in clerical and sales jobs, while 19% held elementary occupations, and only 10% held professional, managerial or technical jobs. Respondents in this dataset were also quite residentially stable with homeowners comprising 71%, and 83% being long term residents. Just 2% resided in the communities for less than 10 years.

Bivariate analysis

Residential stability

Residential stability is a key predictor of collective efficacy and is typically measured by home ownership and years of residence in the community (Sampson et. al, 1997, Mazerolle et al. 2010).

However, the longer term residents were not statistically different from the newer ones on key demographics such as gender, marital status, education, income, job status and group affiliation. There was also no significant difference in years of residency by community. The mean years of residency for all communities was above the 20-year level, with Never Dirty having the longest average residency of 36 years (SD=17) and Samaroo Village/Mootoo Lands having the shortest average residency of 28 (SD=7). The introduction of the new housing settlement -Mootoo Lands - within the boundaries of Samaroo Village in the early 1980s would have lowered the overall average residency in Samaroo Village/Mootoo Lands.

Socio-economic status

Socio-economic status has been another consistently significant and positive predictor of collective efficacy either as a composite variable or via individual variables such as income and employment status (Sampson et al., 1997; Gibson et al., 2002; Mazerolle et al. 2010). Bivariate analysis confirms the homogeneity of the communities in terms of socio-economic status. Significant differences were not observed on the composite SES variable by gender, age, marital status or community, but by group affiliation ($F(2, 59) = 4.09; p = .0219$) indicating that executive members had higher SES than non-executive members. Statistical analysis also did not reveal significant differences across communities on personal characteristics or on individual socio-economic variables including, marital status, home ownership and age, education, income, work status, or group affiliation.

Main Findings Primary Dataset

The main purpose of the analysis of the primary quantitative data is to triangulate my examination of the predictors of collective efficacy in Trinidad and Tobago in comparison with those in other developed countries, and of the relationship between social cohesion and social control. Based on existing evidence a regression model was constructed with eight (8) predictor variables. These included,

gender (GENDER) with male as the reference group, marital status (MSTATB) with non-married as the reference group, ethnicity (ETHNB) with non-Africans as the reference group, homeownership (TENUB) modeling home owners, group affiliation (POSGPD) modeling those in executive positions, the continuous AGE and years of residence (RES) variables, and the principal component scores measuring individual socio-economic status (IND_SES). The outcome variables were factor score measures of collective efficacy (CEFSORG), social control (SCNMXD) and social cohesion (SCHORG). As indicated in Chapter 2, eight (8) of the ten (10) item measures used to create these factor scores were taken from the Sampson et al. (1997) study, while the other two were modeled for this study from other questions in the 1995 PHDCN. The analysis extends the understanding of predictors of collective efficacy and of the relationship between social cohesion and social control.

From their simulation study of the number of variables required for prediction per sample size, Knofczynski & Mundfrom (2008) recommend that between four (4) and five (5) variables would be appropriate for sample sizes between $n=55$ and $n=65$. As such all models were run using the five predictors with the largest contribution to the squared multiple correlation coefficient, and found to be similar, with the more parsimonious model showing improvement in the p-value and slight variations in terms of the R-square and parameter estimates. (See Table 16).

Table 16: Regression results showing predictors of collective efficacy, social cohesion and social control.

Predictors	Collective Efficacy1 $b(\theta)$	Collective Efficacy2 $b(\theta)$	Social Cohesion $b(\theta)$	Social Control $b(\theta)$
<i>R-squared</i>	0.25	0.24	0.27	0.18
-Marital status (married)	-0.66 (-.37)*	-0.70 (-.40)**	-0.72 (-.45)**	-0.34 (-.21)
-Home owner-ship (owned)	0.60 (.31)*	0.62 (.32)*	0.36 (.21)	0.71 (.41) *
-Position in group (executive)	-0.51 (-.28)*	-0.49 (-.27)*	-0.46 (-.27)*	-0.29 (-.17)
-Socio-economic status	0.20 (.22)	0.18 (.20)	0.25 (.31)*	
-Age	-0.01 (-.12)	-0.00 (-.07)	-0.00 (-.05)	-0.01 (-.13)
-Years of residence	0.01 (.10)			0.00 (.05)
-Ethnicity (African)	0.10 (.05)			

Table 16: Regression results showing predictors of collective efficacy, social cohesion and social control.

Predictors	Collective Efficacy1 b(β)	Collective Efficacy2 b(β)	Social Cohesion b(β)	Social Control b(β)
-Gender	0.07 (.04)			

Note: Collective efficacy1 refers to the regression of collective efficacy using the eight-predictor model. All other models employ five predictors. Standard errors are provided in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$.

The five-predictor regression model of collective efficacy was significant $F(5, 59) = 3.42$; $p = 0.0094$ and explained 24% ($R^2_{adj} = .1729$) of the variation in collective efficacy. However only marital status ($\beta = -.40$), home ownership status ($\beta = .32$) and group affiliation ($\beta = -.27$) were significant predictors of collective efficacy across these communities. Socio-economic status and age which achieved significance in the 1995 study (Sampson et al. 1997) were not significant predictors in this analysis. Gender, length of residence and ethnicity were also non-significant both in this analysis and in the 1995 study, although gender did achieve significance as a predictor of collective efficacy in the Mazerolle et al.'s (2010) study in Australia.

The model yielded some expected and unexpected directions of effect. The significant positive effect of home ownership was expected. This concurs with the notion that homeowners were more likely to have a heightened sense of community commitment and a rational desire for community well-being (Sampson, 2006). The negative parameter estimates of marital status (married) concurs with Sampson's (1988) finding that being married was inversely related to community attachment. Married persons may be very absorbed in their own families and commitments and therefore be less available for, or less aware of community activities and events. Conversely, unmarried persons may have greater need for reciprocal relationships with their neighbors and as such invest more in social relations outside of the household.

Group affiliation, has not typically been examined in studies of collective efficacy but is included here because of the critical role local organizations play in the social life of the studied communities. The

negative parameter estimate of group affiliation (executive member) was contrary to expectations especially as such persons are usually the initiators of community building activities. In addition, it will be seen that executive group members tended to be of higher socio-economic status than non-executive members, and SES is typically positively associated with collective efficacy. It is conceivable however, that the lower perception of collective efficacy by executive members may be a function of the different perspective through which they evaluate their communities. A leader is more likely to perceive of less support from the standpoint of being the one trying to mobilize support from other residents.

The unexpected negative direction of effect of group affiliation was further examined to see what if any effect the anticipated interaction with socio-economic status was having. The results indicated that while persons holding executive positions were twice as likely to have higher socio-economic status $\chi^2(1, N = 59) = 4.9110, p = .0267$, than other respondents, the interaction was non-significant¹³.

Two additional models were run respectively regressing social cohesion (SCHORG) and social control (SCHMXD) on the five predictor variables. Both models were significant and yielded interesting results. The statistically significant social cohesion model ($F(5, 59) = 4.01; p=0.0037$), explained 27% ($R^2_{adj} = .2061$) of the variance in social cohesion. There were three significant predictors in this model – marital status ($\beta = -.44$), group affiliation ($\beta = -.21$) and socio-economic status (give beta). Being unmarried and holding an executive position were significant and negative as in the collective efficacy

¹³ Persons not affiliated with local organizations (n=10) were generally of lower socio-economic status and so I was unable to explore whether persons of higher SES who were not in leadership had lower or higher perceptions of collective efficacy.

model and made strong contributions to social cohesion. Unlike the collective efficacy model, individual socio-economic status (IND_SES) was a significant ($b = .256, t = 2.28, p = .0272$), and strong positive ($\beta = .31$) influence on social cohesion. However, home ownership, the lone measure of residential stability in this model failed to achieve significance ($b = .362, t = 1.41, p = .1638$).


The findings support the idea that single persons with more time and perhaps more need for social interaction and support, invest more into the social life of their communities. In addition, residents with higher SES may themselves have greater self-efficacy to sustain meaningful social ties. Persons with higher SES may also engage with peer groups of likeminded individuals within the community therefore accounting for a positive perception of cohesion. The persons not holding executive positions in local organizations may be conditional cooperators who are drawn to collective action because of their perception that others are also investing their time and effort (Chong, 1991) and therefore are more likely to perceive of higher levels of social cohesion in their communities.

The social control (SCNMXD) regression used a 5-predictor model in which years of residence in the community was substituted for socio-economic status. This was because years of residence, made a slightly larger contribution ($\beta = .13$) to social control than socio-economic status ($\beta = .11$). The model fell just short of statistical significance ($F(5, 59) = 2.33; p = 0.0551$) and explained 18% of the variation in social control. Home ownership status (TENUB) was the only significant predictor of social control and made the strongest contribution to the R^2 ($\beta = .44$). The significant positive home ownership status result supports the notion that home owners were rationally motivated to engage in measures of social control, having a greater stake in their communities (Sampson, 2006). It is of interest also that different demographic predictors were associated with the two constructs - social control and social cohesion. This strengthens the notion that they are in fact very distinct community phenomena. It also highlights the need to understand just how they are related.

The first step towards understanding the relationship between social control and social cohesion was by including social cohesion as a predictor of social control in the current regression model and vice versa. These two concepts are highly correlated $r(59) = .47, p < .0001$ and are expected to greatly influence the respective models. The social control model was significant $F(6, 59) = 4.29; p = 0.0014$ and explained 33% of the variation in social control, compared to 19% variance explained in the model without social cohesion. Social cohesion was also ($\beta = .44$) the strongest contributor to R^2 . The reciprocal model, with social control as a predictor in the social cohesion model, was also significant and positive and accounted for 48% of the variation in R^2 compared with 27% without social control. Social control also was the strongest predictor ($\beta = .40$). While longitudinal data would better explain the relationship between these constructs the reciprocal relationship is understandable as community action to solve local problems, for example, can create opportunities for greater cohesion among residents. It is also very likely that a cohesive community environment should better facilitate residents' willingness to unite around common problems (Sampson, 2006; Bellair, 1997).

The examination of this relationship was advanced by testing the above relationships through reciprocal mediation models. If social cohesion creates the environment for social control then only the indirect effect of individual socio-economic status on social control, through social cohesion should be significant and not the reciprocal model. This would mean that social cohesion is the mechanism that explains the effect of individual socio-economic status on social control. The model is reflected at Figure 10.

Figure 10: Mediation model exploring the relationship between social cohesion and social control



The indirect effect ($a_4b_4=.11$) was significant, with a 95% bootstrap confidence interval completely above zero (.0155 to .2317), attesting to this relationship. Moreover, the reverse was not true. Social control was not a significant mediator of individual SES on social cohesion, using the identical bootstrapping method. This gives statistical support to the model (Kenny, 2013) specifying social cohesion as a mediator of individual effects on social control and to the theoretical formulations by numerous authors that social cohesion provides the collective agency for social control (Sampson, 2006; Bellair, 1997). In the absence of longitudinal data this gives the strongest support to the facilitative role of social cohesion.

Discussion

The overall goal of this study is to understand whether and how collective efficacy operates in a lower income high crime context in Trinidad, a context which tests the power of this social mechanism to mediate adverse outcomes such as the fear of crime. There is sufficient evidence to suggest that as with other studies in the United States, Sweden and Australia, collective efficacy is a measurable social mechanism, which explains the effect of socio-economic disadvantage on the fear of crime, even within fairly homogeneous, low SES communities. The homogeneity of the communities, and the use of

datasets which allowed for the examination of some unique predictors have provided useful information for further examination of collective efficacy in the Caribbean and other regions.

Aim 2: Collective efficacy as mediator

Overall the communities evinced the expected low levels of collective efficacy with only about one in three or four persons endorsing its presence in their communities. However, from its strongly significant inverse relationship with the fear of crime, it was evident that higher levels of collective efficacy are associated with lower levels of fear of crime. On the intervening role of collective efficacy, the significant indirect effect indicates that collective efficacy mediates the relationship between socio-economic disadvantage and the fear of crime. The coefficient of the relationship between socio-economic disadvantage and the fear of crime was reduced with the introduction of collective efficacy into the model, a feature typical of successful mediations (Sampson et al., 1997; Kenny, 2013). Consistent with the standard in collective efficacy studies this series of logical inferences confirm the intervening role of collective efficacy in lower income high crime communities in Trinidad. The study, however, found a small effect size, which may be a result of the lack of differentiation in the sample (Lipsey & Hurley, 2009). This lack of sufficient variability in the sample may also be responsible for the fact that none of the individual socio-economic predictor variables achieved significance in analyses using the CVS sample. Further study with a larger number and more differentiated range of communities is recommended.

Aim 1: Understanding collective efficacy through its correlates

The comparison of findings from the CVS and primary data on the correlates of collective efficacy was limited by the fact that certain key variables were not common to both datasets. For example the CVS did not contain measures of home ownership, marital status and organizational affiliation, which proved strong predictors of collective efficacy in the primary dataset. There was

overlap between the datasets in terms of the variables age, gender and ethnicity. While these variables were significant predictors in the CVS, they did not achieve significance as correlates of collective efficacy in the primary dataset. The strong contribution of ethnicity as a correlate of collective efficacy in the CVS points to an important role for culture in our understanding of how collective efficacy emerges and is sustained above and beyond the influence of socio-economic disadvantage. More will be said about this in the qualitative analysis at Chapter 6. The non-significance of ethnicity in the primary dataset is likely to be a function of less differentiated ethnic make-up of that sample.

Residential stability which is typically measured by years of residence in the community or home-ownership is one of the key correlates of collective efficacy and a key issue in the social disorganization literature. The fact that years of residence and home-ownership both achieved significance in the respective data sets confirms the importance of residential stability to collective efficacy. Of interest though, is the fact that home ownership achieved significance as a positive predictor of social control only and not of social cohesion. This finding seems to confirm the importance of a tangible vested interest in a community to facilitate active engagement in pursuit of community regulation, as opposed to community relationships and cohesiveness. This finding seems to lend support to the idea that rational self-interest may be the factor that propels homeowners to seek the regulation of life in their communities. The motivations of resident action are discussed further in the qualitative chapters.

Of particular interest to the understanding of collective efficacy was the introduction of the variable 'group affiliation' which moves beyond organizational participation to examine the perceptions of executive members compared with non-executive members and non-affiliates. This study points to differences in perspectives about collective efficacy by persons who take on different roles in the community. Leaders may have a lower perception of collective efficacy which may inspire their role as

community mobilizers, while the perspective of followers or conditional cooperators will differ as they respond to the involvement of others (Chong, 1991).

Aim 1: Understanding collective efficacy through the relationship between social cohesion and social control

A major contribution of this discussion on the correlates of collective efficacy is the conceptual distinction between social cohesion and social control which is highlighted by differences in significant predictor variables associated with each. The relationship between social control and social cohesion has not been confirmed due to the conflicting results obtained from the two datasets. From the CVS, the theoretically derived double mediation model with social cohesion having a causal influence on social control and both intervening between socio-economic disadvantage and the fear of crime, did not achieve significance. However, the reverse model with social control having a causal relationship with social cohesion produced a significant indirect effect. The simple mediation models run on the primary dataset investigated social cohesion as an explanatory variable in the relationship between individual socio-economic status and social control. This model had a significant indirect effect attesting to the causal role played by social cohesion. The reverse model with social control as the explanatory variable was non-significant.

These results suggest a reciprocal relationship between social cohesion and social control. As such, the notion that it is cohesion that creates the context for informal regulation and neighborhood control is supported (Browning, et al. 2000; Sampson, 2006). Less tested, but apparently also relevant, is the idea that engaging in community problem solving activities and efforts at regulating youth behavior also influences the cohesiveness of communities. Support for a causal relationship between social control and social cohesion is the fact that social control effected through local organizations creates opportunities for networking and social interaction, thereby improving social cohesion. These issues are elaborated on in Chapter 5.

Limitations

Cross Sectional Design

The study used cross-sectional data to answer its central question, whether collective efficacy functions as an intervening social mechanism in the Trinidad, lower income community context. An underlying assumption of mediation models is that the variables in the model are causally linked (Preacher, Rucker & Hayes, 2007). That linkage implies temporal ordering of the variables which is not possible with cross-sectional data, notwithstanding the very common use of mediation models with this type of data (Roe, 2011). The study should therefore be taken as a guide to the potential relationships which should be further explored longitudinally.

Limited test of the theory of collective efficacy

The study also does not represent a true test of the theory of collective efficacy firstly by its reliance on single-level rather than multilevel models. Most examinations of collective efficacy (Sampson et. al., 1997; Sampson & Wikström, 2008; Browning et. al., 2004; Mazerolle et al., 2010) have utilized multi-level analysis, exploring the within-person, between-person as well as cross-community relationships. Particularly as collective efficacy is a latent construct, controls for and an understanding of both within-person and between-person variations are important. Further, as a social mechanism or characteristic of communities, cross-community variations are important to understanding collective efficacy. As a precursor to attempting to use the hierarchical approach, however, intra-class coefficient analysis (ICC) was examined comparing the null model with a one predictor model. This yielded an ICC of .01233 which indicated that only 1% of variance in the fear of crime was associated with socio-

economic disadvantage across the 19 fairly homogenous communities, therefore ruling out multi-level analysis.

The study also did not use identical variables tested by Sampson et al. (1997) in the measurement of collective efficacy. The 2007 CVS did not include four of the ten variable items as these were either not considered particularly relevant in the local context or were considered redundant. The study would have lost some of the variability in terms of the range of items covered in measuring these concepts as well as exact comparability with collective efficacy studies using the original 10 items. However, as discussed at Chapter 2, the six items included in the CVS, yielded fairly reliable factor measures.

Sample size-Primary dataset

The main findings of the primary dataset were based on the analysis of a sample of 59 respondents. Power analysis for multiple regression analysis was conducted in SAS 19.2 using proc power. The analysis suggested that a significantly larger sample size ($\alpha = .7$, 136 to $\alpha = .9$, 230) would have been needed to detect a “true” effect, as such the results of the analysis from this data subset has to be taken advisedly. Moreover, the sample in the primary dataset was derived from a process of purposive sampling and is not fully representative of the communities.

Effect size

Harris (1998 in Mertler & Craig, 2010) argues for the use of statistical analyses which have capability to detect the smallest non-trivial effect size in survey research. This study utilized the Kappa squared effect size as generated by the Process macro which uses bootstrapping methods, and which is a standardized value independent of sample size (Preacher & Kelly, 2011). Analyzing the relationship between social cohesion and social control using mediation analysis with the primary dataset (n=59), produced a medium sized effect of $K^2 = .0847$. However, the analysis of collective efficacy as an

intervening variable between socio-economic disadvantage and the fear of crime using the CVS data produced a small effect size $\eta^2 = .0078$. As discussed above, this small effect size may have been a result of the fairly homogeneous sample and as such the effect should be considered an important one.

Chapter 5: Collective efficacy unpacked: How social cohesion survives under pressure

Introduction

Social cohesion is the aspect of collective efficacy that describes the key relational elements of community life. In the collective efficacy literature, social cohesion is defined by the quality of neighbor relations such as trust, reciprocity and the presence of a shared commitment to community well-being. However, these relational mechanisms come under tremendous pressure under conditions of socio-economic disadvantage. In keeping with Aim 1 of this study, this chapter explores resident perceptions of the nature of social relationships with a view to understanding the norms and processes that characterize social cohesion. Of particular interest is the examination of what if anything produces a shared commitment for community well-being in communities where cohesion is severely challenged.

Chapter 4 provided some evidence of a reciprocal relationship between social cohesion and social control. Regression results from the 2007 CVS dataset showed social cohesion to be the largest predictor of social control. It also showed the reverse. Mediation results from the primary data set, contradicted the results from the CVS dataset by showing only that cohesion explained the relationship between individual socio-economic status and social control and not the reverse. However the qualitative analysis provides additional insights about the relationship between these two phenomena.

The major contribution of this chapter to the theory of collective efficacy however, is in the distilling of a number of additional mechanisms that may more adequately explain the generation and persistence of shared values for community well-being in the face of poverty and disorder, high crime and changing individual level social relationships within the study communities. Figure 2 of Chapter 2 is a qualitative representation of the hypothesis depicting how collective efficacy is generated, and how it mediates between concentrated disadvantage and the crime/fear of crime. Qualitative support for this model will be developed over the course of Chapters 5-8. The model represents the dissection of social

cohesion into two components – the affective relations (trust and close-knittedness) and the instrumental relations (get along, reciprocity, and shared relations). It is anticipated that, for example, where affective relations are at a low level and therefore distrust and suspicion high, private social control will be obstructed. However, instrumental relations on the strength of bounded solidarity will facilitate social control at the organizational level. The model also highlights both the role of local organizational leadership in shaping the organizational response as well as the potential role for external resources focused on crime prevention.

More specifically, this chapter will examine whether measures of cohesion involving higher emotional costs, such as trust and close-knittedness, may be uniquely associated with one or more levels of social control. From an institutional perspective, emotional costs resemble North's (1990) transaction costs – the cost involved in effecting economic transactions. Emotional costs refer to the emotional investment required to maintain affective vs instrumental relationships, for example, the costs of broken confidences or betrayal of friendship. It is anticipated that relational interactions which demand high emotional cost may be associated with the breakdown of social control at the private level (discussed in Chapter 6). On the other hand, issues around whether residents got along with each other, supported local activities and maintained reciprocal relations may have stronger implications for the willingness to work together for community well-being, that is, parochial level social control.

The chapter will make another major contribution by challenging the notions around what inspires a shared commitment for community well-being. Sampson (2006) argues that in the modern community or urban village, shared commitment to community well-being does not rely exclusively on affective trust, relationships and reciprocity but on a rational motivation for the socio-economic health of their common space. For Sampson (2006), this rational motivation produces what he describes as working trust – a willingness to work together for the common good in the absence of affective ties at

the individual level. This study will demonstrate that pure rationality was the least prominent of the motivations for the shared values observed in the four communities. More important were the ingredients of bounded solidarity, and the presence of altruistic, capable local leaders and self-initiated organizations. Together, these provided both the impetus and opportunity for working trust. Moreover, this chapter will suggest that bounded solidarity may well be the foundation for collective efficacy, in part explaining its sustainability as a community characteristic in the face of time and place-based changes in social cohesion and social control.

As indicated in Chapter 2, bounded solidarity is that sense of connectedness and “powerful motivational force” that is based upon or bounded by the sharing of a common space, history and circumstance (Portes, 1998, p.8). The concept of bounded solidarity is very relevant to the mechanisms observed in the study communities. In the first instance, the shared experience of prolonged poverty and the stigma bonded residents in a kind of solidarity that transcends individual relationships and generates a willingness to engage for the good of the community beyond pure self-interest. Second, and on the downside, there was evidence of the downward levelling norm at work in the study communities. This norm is one of the negative social mechanisms associated with bounded solidarity by which groups seek to ensure that members remain within the status quo.

The issue of altruistic local leaders or unconditional cooperators is very important to collective efficacy as it explains how shared values for community well-being are translated into collective action. The importance of these unconditional cooperators is the fact that they do not behave only out of self-interest but are also inspired by genuine concern for others and they are willing to make personal sacrifices to ignite action around a cause (Chong, 1991). Chong (1991) along with many others (Einwohner, 2007; Demir, 2008; Chemers, 2000; Krishna, 2007) who address the issue of leadership also highlight the importance of other characteristics and capacities of the leader including exemplary

behavior, and ability to frame the cause in compelling ways, which are important for collective action. In this way leaders create an environment for others to cooperate beyond the limitations of distrust and suspicion generated by social disorder.

It is in this way that local leadership begins to emerge as an important mechanism in the generation of collective efficacy. While Sampson & Graif (2009) considered the issue of leadership, they looked at leaders' perspectives on social capital in the context of their organizational involvement and their networks or contacts. The collective efficacy literature is silent on the contribution of leaders to collective efficacy in terms of the character, style and capability of the leader. This chapter will explore the role of local leadership in generating social cohesion, while Chapter 7 will look at leaders in the context of social control.

The role of self-initiated local organizations is related to the issue of leadership as leaders for the most part operated through organizations. However, the unique function of organizations is that they facilitate the evolution of norms of collaboration which in turn play a critical role in the process of building shared commitment. Norms of collaboration supply the communities with the rules and tools for the expression of their shared values, and further grows community commitment.

Barriers to developing a shared commitment to community well-being

Prior to proceeding further however, it is important to outline the kinds of challenges to cohesion experienced by the study communities.

Crime

Community life in each of these communities, suffered a significant setback in the middle 2000s due to an unprecedented level of violent crime and its associates, suspicion, distrust and fear. It must be noted however, that to varying degrees, violence had been a normal part of the landscape of these communities. In the early days (1960s to early 1990s) fist fights, stick fights, stone and bottle throwing,

and cutlass attacks were customary in intra and inter-community rivalry. These methods were also the way the community 'Bad-John' carved out his fiefdom, and one way residents addressed disputes (See section on Social control among adults in Chapter 6). During the first decade of this millennium however, community life became almost impossible with an upsurge in gun violence, a record increase in gun homicides and indiscriminate shootings. As indicated in Chapter 3, between the years 2000 and 2009 there was a 400% increase in murders and a 1000% increase in gun based violence.

While it is alleged that the main trafficked drug in these communities was marijuana, the easy availability of arms and munitions ensured that criminal gangs were armed, that guns were used in petty squabbles, revenge attacks, for control of make-work projects and to elevate a 'dissed' (Anderson, 1994) (disrespected) gangster. By 2004-5 all of these communities had begun to exist under periodic self-imposed curfews in response to numbing homicides, fearing for their lives, and unsure when and where the next shooting may occur. During these times community activities ceased or dropped to a minimum and cohesion suffered. According to Mikki, a group leader in Pinto Road, the spate of crime also had an impact on cohesion and reciprocity:

"They tend to keep to themselves because of the crime. I know for a fact if this wasn't a crime area..., the community would have been more knitted and more village-like and everybody would have been willing to help one another. But just that fact because we have these issues, persons keep to theyself."

Heterogeneity - Ethnic and Socio-economic

The communities also faced challenges with diversity on the basis of nationality, socio-economic status and ethnicity. Diversity in general and specifically racial heterogeneity is associated with a lower sense of community, interpersonal trust and formal and informal interactions (Letki, 2008).

Nationality

Each of these communities had a considerable proportion of persons from other Caribbean nationalities, in particular persons from the islands of Grenada and St. Vincent who had migrated to Trinidad in search of better economic conditions. In Mt. Dor and Never Dirty 10% of residents were foreign born, while in Pinto Road and Samaroo Village it was 3% (TT Census, 2000). However, one resident from Pinto Road perceived that as many as 50% of the squatters in the community were of these nationalities. A former community leader from Never Dirty, pointed to two potential issues in respect of the integration of foreign nationals in communities. Firstly he argued, those who were illegal would be in hiding and least likely to get involved in social activities and certainly not take leadership roles in community organizations. Secondly, their focus may be on self-improvement and that of those left in their country of birth rather than the improvement of their community of residence. Moreover, migrants are likely to have forged their own in-group solidarity as a survival mechanism, having the shared cultural experience of another place and coping with eking out an existence in Trinidad. Solidarity with the local community may be limited by these factors.

Ethnicity

The study communities were comprised predominantly of persons of Afro-Trinidadian (56%) and mixed descents (29%), with only 13% Indo-Trinidadian and 1% other ethnicities. Never Dirty, had the largest percentage of Indo-Trinidadians (19%) relative to other ethnic groups. It is my observation that the two major ethnic groups in Trinidad and Tobago, the Afro-Trinidadians and the Indo-Trinidadians, share harmonious friendly relations amidst deeply ingrained underlying suspicions. As is common in Trinidad and Tobago, in Never Dirty the Indo-Trinidadians were mostly the shop keepers and bar owners. They also mostly lived in a cluster in the center of the community which residents referred to as the 'Front line'. Therefore they held a strategic position in the community. Most of the respondents from Never Dirty spoke of harmonious relations with the Indo-Trinidadian population. One resident of

Afro-Trinidadian descent spoke about growing up in the homes of Indo-Trinidadians and vice versa. In terms of community organizations, several Indo-Trinidadian respondents spoke positively about their experience on the local Village Council. However, one respondent of Indo-Trinidadian descent spoke about the Indian community feeling discriminated against as victims of crime perpetrated by Afro-Trinidadian descent. It is also true that as shop owners they are likely to be perceived as potential targets for offenders. This respondent also spoke of his feeling that it was 'their (the Indo-Trinidadians) turn now' to control the community via the Village Council. On the other hand, several residents of afro-Trinidadian descent were very suspicious of the intentions of the new VC President who was of Indo-Trinidadian descent. More on this VC President will be explored in Chapter 8. The point here is that on the surface there appeared to be a picture of racial harmony and cooperation. However underlying suspicions were also evident.

Socio-economic status

Each community also had its share of internal socio-economic barriers. In Never Dirty, one resident said that the folks in Angelina Terrace behaved as though they had swimming pools in their backyards, explaining the perception that folks from Angelina Terrace felt that they were better off than persons from other parts of the community. In Mt. Dor and Samaroo Village/Mootoo Lands the disparity was evident by the quality and/or the degree of organization of the housing. Lower Mt. Dor had older but organized housing stock and the drives and avenues were looked upon as a 'gated community'. In addition, residents from lower Mt. Dor did not participate in events at the community center which was more or less central to the entire community. Mootoo Lands was a beautiful, tranquil, well-kept community implanted in the older Samaroo Village. Although Mootoo Lands residents participate in the sport and family days organized by a resident of Samaroo Village, the socio-economic rivalry between these areas was fierce. Finally, Pinto Road also had a perceived SES barrier between Upper Pinto Road

and Lower Pinto Road where the squatters and other newer residents settled. Most of the crime emanated from the squatting settlement and artery roads in the Lower Pinto Road area.

Low Socio-economic Status

In her study of the impact of racial diversity on social cohesion, Letki (2008) argues that socio-economic status (SES) is even more important than diversity as an undermining factor. She asserts that beyond a person's individual poverty, "high levels of unemployment, crime and disorder generate feelings of powerlessness, threat and alienation among residents, which in turn lead to low levels of neighborhood attachment and interaction" (p. 105). Other authors writing in the social psychology tradition make reference to how those negative experiences generate a host of "negative psychological states" for residents (Oliver & Mandelber, 2009, p. 576, in Letki (2008). Ross & Jang (2000) also confirmed that disorder was positively associated with mistrust and fear. Their study also confirmed that informal interactions mitigated mistrust and fear.

The study communities therefore, were faced with a number of circumstances – violent crime, diversity by nationality, ethnicity and SES, and poverty and disorder – that greatly challenge social interaction and the formation of shared values for community well-being.

Understanding social cohesion in the study communities

To understand social cohesion in the study area, norms around neighbor relationships-trust, reciprocity and the expressions of shared values-were examined through a number of open ended questions as well as 12 scale items measuring social cohesion adapted from the PHDCN (See Appendix E). These were considered in the light of collective efficacy theory as well as the issues of bounded solidarity, altruistic leadership and the role of self-initiated local organizations. The analysis of qualitative data includes quotations from respondents all of whom are assigned pseudonyms. Note that,

for ease of understanding, some effort was made to standardize the English used in the quotations, while preserving the meaning of the quotes.

Relationships

Close-knittedness, trust, getting along and home visits, are among the measures of community relations employed in this study. Respondents were asked how strongly they agreed (on a five point scale) to a number of relational questions. Their responses revealed a lower level of agreement with issues that reflected a higher level of intimacy or higher emotional costs. For example, fewer respondents (15.5%) agreed with the statement, “People trust each other enough to share confidential information”, which would have required the highest emotional investment since it involves the risk of broken confidences. Many more (46.6%) agreed that “This is a close-knit community”, but the majority agreed that “People generally get along” (80.3%) and people “talk on the street” (78.9%). A summary of these results can be found at Appendix H, figure 1. The disparity between the low level of trust and the higher level of agreement with being close-knit perhaps has to do with the fact that most residents could identify one or two persons whom they shared a closer relationship with, someone who would visit them in their homes (58%) rather than just talk on the street. However, even within such relationships there remained a level of suspicion and self-protection from potential conflicts.

A shift had taken place in the nature of relationships over the period of about a generation. A lower level of trust had evolved over time as many of the opportunities for interaction became a thing of the past and conflict was common. Some older respondents and others in their 30’s, told stories of the days when it was the norm for children to grow up in neighbors’ homes, or to share food from the

backyard garden or market, or to go on excursions together, 'parang'¹⁴ each other's homes for Christmas, and participate in each other's religious celebrations, regardless of their faith. However, the challenges of time and the different interests of the younger generation resulted in a loss of these practices over time. In addition, the norms of this new era inspired by wider societal norms which favored greater individualism, failed to generate a similar sense of togetherness.

Experiences of trust and close-knittedness were more common among 'the older heads' (as older persons in these communities were called) who had the history of the deeper relationships of the past. However, with reduced closeness, prolonged poverty and some disparities in income, there emerged in some quarters disrespect for each other's property, an increase in petty thefts and other violations fuelled distrust. Explaining the nature of relationships and the transition which occurred, Lopez, an elderly gentleman from Never Dirty, had this to say:

"They not living bad with one another but still they not living loving, they just living good. They not going the extra *mile*. Some people say, well if you too close up, next thing you become enemy. Better you stay apart and let the friendship grow down the line. When you come too close something might go on, somebody might say something to offend somebody and there the bacchanal might start..... The senior folks, they have the trust in one another, but the young ones will be in the minority. Because, ok, say like you come by the corner and rest down that (*referring to my tape recorder*) and you forget it and you come back. It gone! I and you could be good friends. It happen already, and you rest it

¹⁴ Parang is the action of a group of merry makers visiting the homes of relatives, friends, neighbors and singing songs, playing instruments, dancing and eating (Taylor, 1977 in Ingram, 2002). It is an element of Trinidad and Tobago's Spanish heritage, usually practiced at Christmas Time and the songs were usually but not exclusively in Spanish and about the nativity. Trinbagonians added their own blend of what was soca-parang and included songs about the local experience of Christmas.

down and when you come, “Nah boy I didn’t observe that you rest that down there nah boy.” He done take it and send it to get sold. So these guys within themselves, the real love they supposed to have with one another, that if my partner lose something he supposed to come back and get it. And they will help you look for it, all that!”

The response indicates the kind of behavior that fuels distrust even among friends, such that a person would seize an opportunity to make a quick dollar at a friend’s expense.

Beyond the petty thefts, there was a general sense that residents maintained deep suspicions about many of their neighbors. The question “How many persons in this community would you consider your friends....”, was met with a lot of defensiveness as respondents first expressed their general views about their fellow residents in very negative terms. Words like selfish, inconsiderate, unreasonable and envious were common. One Never Dirty resident described some of the people in the community as “too contaminated”. By this she meant they had little to say that was positive and uplifting. This also explained why she maintained few friends and would let even fewer in her home.

Another important mechanism generating distrust, was what Portes (1998) referred to as the downward leveling norm. Changes in the economic fortunes of neighbors created differences in wealth, values and lifestyles, and in some cases placed a wedge between individuals such that one resident listed jealousy as a major social problem facing her community. She was referring to the unsupportive behaviors elicited by the smallest signs of a neighbor’s progress. In a similar vein, some minors claimed that they received a lot of negativity from adults who would discourage rather than give good advice or encourage successful attitudes. Portes (1998) explained that the downward leveling norm works to pressure members to remain in the state of the majority rather than progress and disturb the camaraderie forged by the common experience of poverty and disadvantage. Socio-economic differences therefore created real or imagined relational barriers in these communities.

Conflict was also a pervasive norm in all of these communities impacting all types of relationships. Conflicts ranged from verbal arguments that soured relations with neighbors for a few hours, to inter-generational conflicts that persisted even though their origins had been long forgotten. Public, social and physical infrastructural issues, such as indiscriminate garbage disposal, power struggles over access to community facilities¹⁵, and encroachment on neighbor's property due to the unplanned nature of these communities were among the problems around which conflicts erupted.

Residents therefore appeared to co-exist in a type of tentative peace very quickly shattered over what in other contexts may be considered minor problems. As a result, residents evolved what can be called a conflict avoidance norm. One resident said they behaved as though 'everybody good' to avoid getting into 'cuss outs' with neighbors and especially to avoid being on the wrong side of gangsters. That is, they pretended to be on good terms with the next person or to like or respect the gangster while masking their true feelings.

Individual level relationships appeared to be under laid by distrust and suspicion. As a result, behavioral norms of civility on an individual level also appeared to be in flux, resulting in the felt need by residents to protect themselves and quite likely their families from potential conflicts. In this context it is reasonable to conceive of the protective position adopted by parents against exposing their children to correction and regulation by fellow residents. This highlights the connection between lower levels of trust and lower levels of private social control, a matter further elaborated in Chapter 6.

¹⁵ The Village Council is usually given official oversight of Government constructed Community Centers. This is usually a source of conflict as persons or groups outside of or in conflict with the Village Council (i) may not understand or appreciate the rules of access implemented by the Village Council (ii) may not feel access is equitably distributed (iii) may feel or be deliberately restricted from use of the center.

In contrast with the challenges of distrust and suspicion that mitigated against affective relations (trust and close-knittedness), residents in the study communities agreed that people generally got along (80.3%), and would stop and chat with neighbors when they passed on the street (78.9%). In addition, more than half engaged in home visits to neighbors (58%). The above quotation from Lopez helps us to reconcile the apparent dialectic between conflict, distrust and suspicion, and getting along. It appears that residents of these communities evolved associational mechanisms to allow them to cope in a normative environment of uncertainty, where norms of civility were under the strain, and conflict was imminent. The conflict avoidance norm was a major mechanism in this regard. Residents as far as they were able, stayed away from conflict by not getting too close according to Lopez, but maintaining “good” friendly relations, even some more friendly than others, but all at a safe social distance to minimize disagreements and disappointments. According to Makeba, “I just don't really mingle with people because I don't like confusion. I does just keep a low profile, and from work, just come straight home, “Good evening” and go inside.”

This coping mechanism, this ability to maintain “good” relations in the face of challenging interpersonal circumstances is considered to have positive and negative consequences. On the one hand, the ability to “get along” with perhaps difficult neighbors is a very important ingredient in the evolution or persistence of working trust. On the other hand, the conflict avoidance norm is likely to obstruct the implementation of crime and violence prevention strategies designed to challenge sub-cultural norms. These issues are elaborated in the Chapters 6 and 7 which deal with social control.

Reciprocity

Reciprocal exchanges are a consistent feature in the study of social relationships (Farrel & Knight, 2003). Reciprocity can be defined as the propensity for the exchange of goods, services and information between and among neighbors. In this study, reciprocity is measured by residents’

willingness to help each other, to provide support in times of illness, to borrow money from each other and to seek advice. Sampson argued that the degree of helpfulness that exists in the urban village is instrumentally determined based on a rational expectation for future benefit (Sampson, 2006). As will be shown, the evidence in these communities suggests that both rational and non-rational motivations were at work.

On average, 70.4% of respondents agreed that reciprocal exchanges (helpfulness, lending money, visiting/taking food for the sick) occurred in their community. Fewer endorsed advice seeking behavior (55%), consistent with the lower levels of trust already discussed. A summary of these results is at Appendix H, Figure 2. The respondents, especially the elders, felt that young residents were less helpful to each other and to elders. One 73 year old resident from Never Dirty gave the example of how a work-gang comprised of youths from the community built a box drain and failed to put a bridge over a small section of the drain, in front of an elderly gentleman's home so he would not have to cross on precariously placed planks of wood. She claimed that this would never happen in her days.

Some residents of Mt. Dor and Never Dirty expressed the view that if the youth were to help you with anything from mixing cement to transporting a heavy appliance up the steep hills, payment in cash would be required, whereas a generation earlier, this would be done for free or an unsolicited in-kind payment of a meal, or produce from the garden would suffice. What this seems to suggest is that younger residents, especially persons under 30 years old are the ones perpetuating what may well be a wider societal norm of instrumental motivations for helpfulness. From my observation for example, especially with respect to issues around treatment of the elderly and the desire for financial returns, these reflect societal norms and are not limited to the study communities.

This notwithstanding, some traditions appeared to have remained fairly strong. For example, 70.5% agreed that borrowing of money took place among neighbors. Respondents who agreed that the

practice of borrowing persisted, indicated that residents would borrow from close friends, business owners and persons known for confidentiality, and they would lend to persons who were most likely to repay. Despite these precautions, there was a general sense that non-repayment was common. While it is clear that instrumental motivations for reciprocity need not rely on repayment in the same medium of exchange, the persistence of borrowing and lending in the context of a high level of non-repayment suggests that pure rationality may not be the only motivation. Possible explanations include, firstly, that self-interested residents lend so that in their own time of need they would be able to call on a favor. Secondly, lending may provide the lender with an opportunity for obtaining a favorable reputation. As such, many respondents claimed that persons will lend but you will hear it on the street. It is also possible that a lot of borrowing took place because of genuine need, and lenders assisted out of a sense of solidarity with the types of financial crises that may be common among members of the group.

Residents also agreed that there was considerable support for each other in times of illness (77.4%) or adversity. Most agreed that support for the sick was likely to take the form of a visit rather than the provision of a meal. Many also assigned conditions such as; whether it was a nice person, and whether it was a friend or close neighbor. However there was a general sense that the neighbors will support each other in times of illness and adversity regardless of who they were. Rolley from Mt. Dor painted the most vivid picture of this when he asserted:

“Even though they curse each other over the fence but if you fall sick they coming. Yeah, that is a given. It have some people will really go out of their way for you, even though they be cursing each other over the fence over simple things, if you fall sick they will help you....In the time of real battle they coming for one another.”

Paul, a group leader from Pinto Road agreed that residents responded in times of adversity. He felt that residents were genuinely concerned about each other and used the opportunity of adversity to

display their concern. As such, it is possible to think of lending money and support in times of adversity as a generally acceptable occasion to display solidarity that could be described as having low ‘emotional cost’, that is, for example, having the least risk of rejection.

Shared Values

The possession of shared values for community wellbeing is a pivotal component of collective efficacy. It is typically measured as a component of social cohesion and can be defined as the bridge between social cohesion and engagement in informal social control. For instance, if residents share the same commitment to preventing deviance and youth crime, this should translate into action to regulate youth behavior.

Univariate responses to the scale item, “residents support local activities” are used as one measure of the expression of the shared interest and sense of community demonstrated by residents. This is because the measure, “people in this community share the same values” posed a challenge of interpretation for respondents. Without a specific probe focusing respondents specifically on shared values for the well-being of the community, respondents tended to assume that the statement was referring to values about parenting, children’s education or even spiritual and moral values. This issue identifies a shortcoming of the measure as used in the original test by Sampson et al. (1997).

Most respondents (84.5%) across the communities, agreed that community members came out in support of local activities. Disaggregated by community, the level of agreement on community participation, ranged from a low of 60% in Samaroo Village/Mootoo Lands, to highs of 95%, 94.7% and 82.4% in Never Dirty, Pinto Road and Mt. Dor respectively (See **Appendix H**, Figure 3). In Never Dirty however, there was a uniquely passionate narrative about commitment to community as respondents expressed a yearning for the love, togetherness and sense of family they experienced when the community was alive with collective activities prior to the 2005-2009 period. Interestingly, agreement

with the level of community participation was the same in Pinto Road where such passion was not expressed. This issue will be discussed in Chapter 7. On the other hand in Samaroo Village/Mootoo Lands, which reported the lowest level of community participation, collective activities were challenged by the absence of community management and a community center. These experiences hint at an association between strong vibrant local organizations and the expression of community solidarity. These experiences also suggest that solidarity is an underlying characteristic of these communities and can be ignited by effective organizational leadership.

It must be borne in mind however, that within these communities the issue of sub-cultural norms and the overlapping of licit and illicit networks posed a challenge to a common approach to the regulation and management of youth and crime and deviance prevention, especially but not exclusively at the private level. These issues are addressed in Chapter 6 and 7. Notwithstanding these challenges, a number of important factors are emerging as drivers of shared commitment to community well-being. These are outlined in the ensuing sections and include, bounded solidarity, altruistic, capable leaders, the presence of a governing community organization, and community infrastructure.

Factors facilitative of a shared commitment to community well-being

Bounded Solidarity

“Two fellows fight earlier in the day, real fight, blood and break up and thing like that. Later in the day a fellow from Mt. Hope came over with three other fellows and lash one of the fellows that was fighting. The same fellow he was fighting earlier in the day jump in for him.... All I know is that the same two fellows who was fighting earlier start beating the fellows from in Mt. Hope.”

Rolley, group leader, Mt. Dor

Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) described bounded solidarity as the sense of ‘we-ness’ experienced by persons exposed to a similar difficult situation, and one which provokes feelings of a

moral responsibility for altruistic behavior to one another (p. 1328). Bounded solidarity was alive in all of these communities, not only in terms of defense in times of violent attacks by outsiders, as described by Rolley, but in terms of a motivation to give selfless service for the benefit of others, especially the elders, children and youth.

Residents in the study communities had a shared experience of living in an environment of economic hardship. Even if their own households may have been better off, they lived in close proximity to unplanned settlements within their communities where disorder and social problems were common and they shared in the lower income community label because of their address. Residents in Never Dirty and Pinto Road spoke of a long history of community stigma. In Mt. Dor and Samaroo Village, residents claimed that the stigma was linked to the recent surge in crime and violence, and blamed persons who came into their area and 'hot it up'. In any event the community stigma was a source of shared pain as expressed by Makeba from Never Dirty, who desired to highlight the good of the community:

"I decide, although Never Dirty have a stigma, let me show other people out of the area that it have talented people, living in Never Dirty. Not because you from the ghetto means that nothing good could come out from the ghetto. It have a lot of people living in the ghetto, and they have passes¹⁶, they have a lot of qualifications, so I wouldn't say living in the ghetto could bring you down. I say living in the ghetto make other people know that good things could come out of the ghetto."

In an effort to understand their underlying motivations, respondents were asked the reasons for their participation or non-participation in community affairs. In each of the communities more than 65%

¹⁶ Passes refers to the subjects successfully written in standard examinations at the completion of high school.

of the responses reflected selfless interest in giving back to their community, a deep concern for the well-being of children and youth and a desire to steer them away from a life of crime and regret.

Lynette, an educator who lives in the Pinto Road community, had an experience with the children at a sports camp she was invited to, that disturbed her into wanting to bring structure, order and purpose to their lives. She explained:

“What really triggered me to start this group was one day at a sports camp.... you’re talking about 200 plus children, and they were really so rowdy that what I had planned for them I couldn’t do.... and I was telling my husband that you know it disturbed me so much because we are a part of this community and so on....*[recognizing their capacity to help the children]*. Then I told a friend who is also a teacher..and she loved the idea and she decided to come along. Then she told her friend about it. Her friend had a boy who had some behavioral challenges so she thought that it would have been a good idea for her to come and work with the children and it would help her to understand her own son on the one hand and do a good deed....I want to prepare for them for a life that can be lived with a certain amount of satisfaction and dignity.”

Like Lynette, Maria from Never Dirty conveyed the strong sense of responsibility for the well-being of her community, and for ‘bringing back’ the community to its former glory. Maria, who had recently formed a group in Angelina Terrace in Never Dirty explained:

“What I was thinking about is that we want to bring back up here, and I find that the best thing for us to do is form a group and organize ourselves, so that everybody will get back together and have that same closeness that we used to have.”

Bounded solidarity is present in these communities in both its positive and negative forms. On the downside, there was evidence of strong pressures exerted by members of the community against

individuals who attempted to progress beyond the level of the group (See Social Control Among Adults, Chapter 6). That is the outworking of the downward leveling norm.

It is important to note that the narratives of Lynette and Maria and in fact the majority of respondents who were involved in a local organization or activity, do not reflect persons with purely rational motivations for community well-being. These were principled, altruistic motivations as expressed by Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) in their elaboration of the manifestations of bounded solidarity. The case for the presence of underlying group solidarity is also made by the stark contrast demonstrated by these altruistic concerns for the well-being of the community, compared with the distrust and suspicion expressed at the level of interpersonal relationships discussed above. This indicates that commitment to the whole was sustained even when interpersonal relationships were often strained. However, the presence of bounded solidarity does not suggest that rationality was absent.

Community organization, social infrastructure and leadership

Community organizations

The Village Council (VC) is an important part of the social landscape of the study communities, having a long history dating back to the independence era of the 1960s (See detailed description in Chapter 3). The VC is an elected, umbrella organization, which is supposed to represent all of the community interests and which has an overall mandate for community well-being. Over the years the VC became an invaluable channel for addressing infrastructure and other needs, as well as planning developmental and social activities for the entire community. The VC management provided opportunities for repeated interactions among community members or group leaders, providing opportunities for them to get to know each other, to develop working trust, to evolve rules for collaborative community management, and to discuss and find solutions to community problems. The

very presence and sustainability of the VC established within these communities a strong norm about addressing their shared interests via local organizations. The VC was not the only organization contributing to building community commitment. In each community there were groups and individuals who initiated various types of social, sporting, skill building and religious activities that brought residents out of their homes and provided opportunities for wholesome interactions. These other leaders and initiators are referred to as community champions to distinguish them from the leadership of the governing community organization, the VC.

Programs like sport and family days, celebration of religious and other festivals, celebration of important national events like emancipation day, independence, and Indian Arrival, provided a host of opportunities for residents to socialize in a relaxed, cordial atmosphere. Such events also provided opportunities for residents to hone or showcase skills and talents in planning, in decorating, in culture and the arts, in presiding as master of ceremonies over events and a range of other skills. These were therefore opportunities to bond, to grow together, and to heighten community solidarity and pride. In Never Dirty the group called Grasshoppers was traditionally known for hosting sport and family days. In Mt. Dor in over the last 3-4 years SKY Connection played that role, in Pinto Road the VC hosted them, while a resident in Samaroo Village undertook this responsibility. Speaking of how these types of events impacted the community, Makeba put it this way:

“It used to be Darlin Trace, Woods Alley, Angelina Terrace, Pitch Road¹⁷, they used to come together, and we used to have like marching going on, you understand me, competition. It was ah

¹⁷ These are the names of different streets in Never Dirty which previously were engaged in friendly competitions but at the time of the escalation of violence residents of one street dared not venture in or close to the others.

togetherness yuh know. It used to have football, netball, all these kinds of things in the courts, it used to be lively...people tell me they used to come 50 cents party in the community center. Well, you know I wasn't born as yet...but it used to have these things here. So, if everybody in the community could bring back them days, the way how Never Dirty used to be, it was ah togetherness, love, unity."

Respondents from Never Dirty expressed a passion for their community that was unrivaled by the other communities. "Coming back," "connecting back," let us bring back Never Dirty," were the types of comments made thirty seven (37) times in interviews with twelve of these respondents. The hosting of activities in the community provided a sense of safety, it represented hope, and energy. Activities were the community's identity, their history, their joy, their expression of self and of their talents. It was their respite from the harsh challenges of everyday life and the stigma associated with the place they loved. The activities brought a sense of unity and togetherness, it placed everyone on the same level and overshadowed the conflicts, and distrust.

Respondents agreed that life as they knew it was returning to Never Dirty after the period of violence, and this was due to factors including the killing or incarceration of most of the gang leaders and members, and the intervention of the Citizen Security Programme (CSP) and the collective activities organized by the new Village Council President elected in 2009. These interventions will be discussed in detail in Chapter 8. Like Never Dirty however, residents of all the other communities associated collective activities, especially sport and family days with a sense of unity. A young group leader from Samaroo Village spoke about the community when she was growing up:

"As youths growing up we used to go down to the savannah and watch them (older youths) play games like rounders and cricket and thing. It used to have a community level (*meaning a community spirit*). Other guys would do they football you know. That was the positives it have in Samaroo Village. "

Community Infrastructure

The communities could not have hosted these events without appropriate neutral spaces where all residents felt welcomed. In the Trinidad and Tobago context such venues (community centers and recreation grounds) are provided by the state. In these communities the centers were also managed by the VCs, who had the opportunity to rent them out for weddings and other private uses, to raise funds for their upkeep. The collective efficacy/social capital literature is however, silent on the role played by social infrastructure in building social cohesion or shared commitment for community well-being. In the German social work environment, this issue of social spaces to enable processes of social development featured since the early 1990s (Spatscheck & Bremen, 2012).

A 20 year old Never Dirty resident described the community as the 'Big Apple' of Morvant, because the community was such a hub of activities, attracting persons from many neighboring and more distant communities. Residents explained that one reason for this was that at one time Never Dirty had the largest community center in the Morvant area. In contrast, Samaroo Village had no ---- community center and respondents perceived of the lowest level of community participation in local events compared with respondents in other communities. This community did have two recreational grounds, however it used church buildings or residents' homes for meetings and indoor activities, with all the attendant limitations of such venues. Mt. Dor and Pinto Road also had community centers and recreation grounds, and reported very high levels of community participation in local events.

Leadership

Social cohesion in the study communities was enhanced by the character and style of the Village Council leadership. In his discussion of collective action in the context of the civil rights movement, Dennis Chong (1991) highlighted the role of leaders in setting the tone for others to participate in a movement in which they would otherwise not be so inclined. Chong (1991) identified some individuals referred to as unconditional cooperators – the pool from which leaders are drawn – who were likely

motivated by the selective incentive of a good reputation or by altruism, and were willing to make greater personal sacrifices for the cause. Chong (1991) also alluded to the importance of the character and capacity of the leader in motivating followers when he identified as important ingredients, exemplary qualities and ability to convince followers of the likelihood of the success of the movement.

In the study communities, the style of leadership emerges as an important consideration for social cohesion. There was no Village Council in Samaroo Village for over 20 years and no overall community leader emerged for such an assessment to be made. In the other three communities over the course of time, leaders with different styles emerged at the helm of the Village Council. The leader in Never Dirty can be described as a transformational leader, while the respective leaders in Pinto Road and Mt. Dor could be described as authoritarian.

It is important to note that the term of office of each of these leaders was marked by altruistic service to their respective communities. A few highlights help to portray the character of these leaders. For example, the Never Dirty leader responded to a threat on his life by the community's "Bad-John" by teaching him to read, having realized that it was illiteracy and a lack of options that was fuelling his choices. The Pinto Road leader successfully encouraged Village Council executive members and other residents to take out personal loans to purchase computers for a youth development program, and the Mt. Dor leader continued to demonstrate commitment to the community even after demitting officer. Through a religious organization she continued to deliver food hampers to residents on a monthly basis. But while they each demonstrated other-regarding commitment to the well-being of their community they influenced community cohesion in different ways, largely due to differences in leadership style.

Never Dirty's transformational leader served the VC for about 20 years from 1985-2005. The term transformational or charismatic leader is used in the management and social movements literature, and refers to the leaders' ability to frame the cause in ways that compel followers, convince

them of the success of the movement and of the leader's concern for the well-being of the followers (Demir, 2008; Einwohner, 2007, Chemers, 2000). This leader, whom we shall call Mobafa had a vision of social reform for the community and one of the ways he sold this vision to residents was by using a personal approach visiting residents at their homes. He also initiated a constant slew of programs that brought them out of their homes in fun and development activities.

Mobafa led the community in weekend community clean ups, in the first protest against poor conditions, and he gave them the country's first community library. He was the community's storyteller, he started the first annual week long community festival where they showcased their talents to other communities. He presided over the 'glory days' of VC leadership when Never Dirty was the hub of activities for the entire Morvant area. The result was that community pride soared, passionate narratives about the community were unparalleled among the study communities, and individual respondents displayed a strong sense of responsibility for fixing Never Dirty.

It is important to note that during his tenure, there were two specific controversies, one surrounding his handling of the construction of the basketball court and the other arrangements for the management of the pre-school. However, in each interview respondents paid tribute to the great work, vision, projects and leadership of this VC President, and their respect and admiration was unanimous.

Barbara, the Pinto Road leader displayed an authoritative style of leadership. The authoritarian style refers to a leader with a strong personality who takes an autocratic approach to getting things done and aggressively pursues his/her own ideas (Hoyle, 2006). Authoritative leaders initiate action irrespective of the actions of others. One area that reflected this authoritarian style of leadership was in the management of the community's recreation grounds. A strong focus of this leader's tenure was the promotion of a strategy of social mobility through professionalism in sport. This leader was also at the helm of a sporting organization which put the village in the national arena as a venue for hosting

professional football and cricket tournaments. In this regard, it was necessary to keep the recreational grounds in pristine condition and the leader's strict management of the recreation grounds was the cause of much disaffection with some residents who resented this control and felt deprived of access to the facilities. This also exacerbated underlying tensions between Upper Pinto where the recreational grounds were located and Lower Pinto where the squatting communities were located and where many marginalized youth resided. The autocratic style ensured that the community continued to be a respected venue for professional games at the expense perhaps of a minority of dissatisfied residents. As a direct result of this leadership however, sport became the predominant activity of Pinto Road and a great source of community pride and attachment. Residents argued that sport was the great equalizer in the community, dismantling socio-economic status barriers, if only temporarily.

In Mt. Dor a very revered leader whom we call Melvina, ceased to be Village Council President in about 1993 but her leadership highlighted the impact of the authoritative leadership style on social cohesion. Melvina's leadership can in part be linked to the development of greater feelings of cohesion within some segments of the community as opposed to across the community as a whole. It is normal for persons who live closer to each other to have more opportunities for social interaction and therefore share closer relations, however affected respondents explained that under the period of authoritative leadership the squatter settlements felt marginalized by what they considered to be neglect by the Village Council, with respect to having certain infrastructure needs met.

As a result, residents of these squatter settlements connected with Government's National Commission for Self Help, and negotiated major infrastructure improvements without the intervention of the Village Council. These street-based efforts played a role in building greater cohesion within segments of the community rather than across the community as a whole. The presence of a stronger

sense of shared commitment within segments of Mt. Dor was conveyed by Henrika, a member of the Mt. Dor VC:

“Mt. Dor like it has about five parts. Is Spring Valley to Oliver Trace, you have 6th Drive to Hope Place, then you have here (referring to Community Drive and places around the community center), then you have the Private Roads, then you have William Street which is in the back and you can access it from Industry lane, go down by B’s Ice Cream and its linked with Oliver Trace. So in those little areas your find people would be close, but the whole area together, I disagree.

Mt. Dor and Pinto Road both had a history of authoritative leadership, which though associated with cohesion building activities on the one hand, also appeared to be less able to unite the community in the face of differences. In short, conciliation was not a strong suit of authoritarian leadership. However the transformational approach used in Never Dirty served to inspire community cohesion, pride and the passionate expression of shared commitment to community well-being, notwithstanding periods of leadership challenge.

While the style of leadership had different associations with cohesion, the credibility of the leadership appeared to be associated with working trust. In 2009 a new Village Council President, Brian, was elected in Never Dirty and by his own admission was previously associated with some of the criminal element and activity in the community. The majority of respondents (n=12) from this community, believed that Brian’s past criminal involvement made him unfit to hold the office of Village Council President (VCP). The more sympathetic respondents (n=2) felt that if he expressed regret for those passed activities the community “may give him a chance”. This leadership situation poses a challenge for Never Dirty in that while the community is alive once again with activities, the majority of which have been initiated by Brian under the Citizen Security Programme (CSP), his past has resulted in

the reluctance of other local groups to work alongside him and potentially affects the forging of true community collaboration.

In contrast to the other study communities, Samaroo Village/Mootoo Lands evinced a low (60%) level of participation in community activities; there was no center for community activities; the VC had a hiatus of approximately 22 years, and no overall community leader emerged. There were therefore limited avenues for building working trust, and rules or norms around collaboration had either not evolved or were not transmitted. In the absence of the unifying presence of a single leader, several community champions - emerged with an interest in investing their time and talents for the benefit of some sector of the community, mostly children and youth. There were at least five (5) such individual initiatives (activities with no executive structure) on-going in Samaroo Village at the time of the research. This was not found in any of the other communities, where residents typically formed groups to execute initiatives. One of these champions however was responsible for the annual sport and family days in the Village and this was for the most part seen by residents as a positive community building initiative. However, such events in the absence of cooperation within groups or the potentially unifying presence of a leader such as a Village Council President, meant that working trust was not being forged and collaborative tools for expression of shared commitment remained largely dormant.

Summary

The harshness of life at the lower spectrum of economic wellbeing, coupled with socio-economic and other forms of diversity and the fatality of violence, created fiercely self-protective individuals, among whom conflict, distrust and suspicion strongly under laid individual relationships. In this environment there were both notable changes in reciprocity while specific forms of reciprocity thrived. For example among the youth, there was an observed desire for financial reward for assistance rendered compared to in-kind exchanges which were predominant in the earlier period. Residents

however continued to provide strong support to each other in times of adversity and in times of financial need where possible. The solid persistence of borrowing and lending and support in times of illness, despite weakened individual level relations, reflects a moral obligation consistent with bounded solidarity.

Working trust – the willingness of persons to work together in local organizations for the good of the community – was present to varying degrees in each of the communities. However, working trust needs to find expression and only in Samaroo Village/Mootoo Lands where there was a 22-year absence of a Village Council or other similar community organization, was there a lack of such opportunity. Norms of organizational collaboration were therefore very underdeveloped in Samaroo Village/Mootoo Lands. The experience of Samaroo Village compared with the other three communities suggests that the presence of stable and functional organizations, like the Village Council with its overarching mandate for community well-being, is a critical ingredient in the expression of shared commitment to community well-being. This type of umbrella organization functioned as a generator and transmitter of the norms of collective action and was a central avenue for the expression of community solidarity.

The presence of working trust also alludes to the success of resident coping strategies such as the conflict avoidance norm, which provided a space for residents to get along in the face of high levels of conflict, distrust and suspicion. This association between getting along and working trust gives support to the idea that measures of cohesion may be differentially associated with types of social control and helps explain why organizational level social control continues to be the main type of informal social control practiced, as will be discussed in Chapters 6 and 7.

Finally, each community had its supply of unconditional cooperators who either rose to leadership prominence over the VC or organized specific groups or initiatives. These leaders or champions, all played a role in generating shared commitment to the community through activities for

children, youth or the elderly. However, the type – transformative or authoritative – of overall community leader also appears to have a particularly profound effect on community solidarity. Among the study communities, transformational leadership in Never Dirty promoted the most buy-in, unified the community across ethnicity, community segments and SES, and resulted in the shared expression of passion for and solidarity within the community. Authoritative leadership was able to promote activities that inspired pride and participation, but failed to unite segments of the community leaving some feeling neglected or marginalized. This notwithstanding, both styles of leadership were able to generate community pride thereby privileging the role of exemplary, committed, self-sacrificing leaders as a mechanism to build social cohesion, regardless of the leadership style.

Chapter 6: The exercise of private level social control in lower income, high crime communities

Introduction

To fully understand the nature of social control practiced in the four communities, the study differentiates social control into the three level Hunter (1985) typology – the private, parochial and public levels of social control, with the understanding that social control is most effective when all the levels function simultaneously (Hunter, 1985). This chapter focuses on the private level social control. According to Hunter (1985, in Bursik & Grasmick, 1993) this should cover the use of sanctions such as ostracism, ridicule and direct criticism which work among friends, kin and other intimate groups. Included in this category are interventions by “community parents”, -- concerned adults in the community -- bearing in mind that in traditional neighborhoods, children were often regulated by adults besides their own parents (Sampson, 1986).

Private level social control will be further dissected into three dimensions of social regulation – parent/child regulation, regulation of children and youth by neighbors and elders referred to as community parenting, and adult regulation of each other. The traditional village in Trinidad and Tobago was one in which parents welcomed and children respected the scolding, advice, meals provided by and fun activities they enjoyed at the hands of neighbors. Parents would leave their children with these community parents – persons with whom they likely shared a close relationship – rather than leave them unsupervised if they had to run an errand. These functions are what is meant by community parenting.

The examination of private social control is informed by responses to open-ended questions (See Appendix E) as well as in-depth responses to eight (8) Likert Type scale items taken from the PHDCN (See Appendix E). Six (6) of the scale items focused on adult/youth or child regulation. Questions included “If a child is showing disrespect to an adult, how likely is it that people in the community will

scold that child?” “How likely is it that someone would intervene if neighborhood children are seen at the wrong place at the wrong time?” and “If I am not at home, how likely is it that adults in this neighborhood would watch out that my children are safe and don’t get in trouble?” The other two explored adult/adult regulation focused on crime prevention, and asked “How likely it was that a neighbor would make a report to the police if a resident was known to be doing something illegal?” or “How likely is it that a resident would intervene if someone suspicious was doing something illegal in the community?”

Social control at the private level in the study communities had undergone change over time and had weakened considerably in each of the three dimensions (parent/child, community parenting and adult/adult regulation). Two explanations are advanced for the deterioration in the social control mechanisms at the private level. The first explanation is consistent with what was observed in Chapter 5 in terms of how low levels of trust and high levels of suspicion gave rise to new relational norms based on “just getting along”. The new institutionalism perspective guides the understanding of how norms change over time. From this perspective, norm change results from internal and external pressures on communities that increase the level of distrust and suspicion and in turn affect the transmission of norms of private social regulation. The failure of norm transmission leads to increasing uncertainty in social interactions and increasing costs of transaction involved in applying sanctions to behaviors that violate social norms (North, 1990). In the context of the study communities, for example, confronting violations is met with conflict and “cuss-outs” and therefore limited regulation of behavior.

The major internal pressures discussed are of a socio-economic nature, while the main external pressures discussed include the availability of guns and the poorly managed public works programs. The argument is made also, that these pressures differentially impact the normative frame of residents based on factors including household economic stability, family stability, and family culture (Rodman,

1971). This may explain why households within the same environment of poverty and stigma may evince different outcomes.

The second underlying social mechanism which works against effective private social control is explained by the negotiated coexistence framework which focuses on the embeddedness of those involved in criminal activities in kinship or friendship ties with non-criminal residents (Browning, 2004). These ties provide a buffer against social sanction to an individual or individuals who may be engaged in norm violating or criminal behavior. The negotiated coexistence model argues that not only is this embeddedness driven by kin or friendship relations, but also by the provision of favors and benefits that generate loyalty, silence and protection from prosecution. In Chapter 5 it was noted that reciprocity thrived though the nature of reciprocity had changed, and in particular younger residents favored financial rewards for assistance provided. In this context, it is possible to conceive of how financial favors by criminals may be readily embraced, especially by persons experiencing financial need.

In addition, the role of fear, self-protection and sub-cultural norms can also be subsumed under this idea of negotiated coexistence. In this context residents may fall into two categories. The first category includes those who, out of fear and self-protection, would turn a blind eye to norm violation in the community and not engage in acts of social control. One can argue that motivated by fear and a desire to protect oneself, family and property, residents may choose a particular system of behaviors, which provide them maximum protection from the object of their fears.

The other category includes those who accept the presence of criminal activities out of sympathy or empathy, and those who by reason of the strength of the sub-cultural norms feel powerless to intervene. The sympathizers accept the view that those pursuing a career in crime and violence have no alternatives and have to find means of support for their family and kin. As such they do not report criminal activities that don't affect them personally, adopting a "live and let live" attitude. In addition,

there were strong sub-cultural norms around the use of marijuana and gambling such that even the law abiding residents who would not engage in these activities, would also not take action to sanction them.

In the following sections I will elaborate on how the pressures of poor socio-economic conditions and negotiated coexistence mechanisms undermined the relevance and value of private level social control mechanisms.

Internal and external pressures on community norms

Internal pressure was exerted on these communities in a fairly uniform manner by their similar adverse socio-economic circumstances as elaborated in Chapter 3. These communities faced prolonged poverty, high under-employment, high levels of dependency on government welfare and public works programs, low levels of education, and high levels of single parent families. They each contained squatter settlements which to varying degrees were associated with more severe socio-economic conditions, disorder and crime, and they each experienced a fair amount of out-migration of some of the better-off residents, role models and leaders.

In Ross & Jang's (2000) study, they found that experiences of poverty and disorder were associated with higher levels of distrust and suspicion, thereby placing a strain on adult relationships. The high level of distrust and suspicion experienced in the study communities was already discussed in Chapter 5. In addition, low income status, family disruption and single parent families are also strongly associated with poorer family management practices including nurturing and supervision of children, as the parent jostles between work and care of children (Anderson, 1991; Laub et al., 2006).

With respect to external pressures, as urban lower income communities, the study communities felt the brunt of macro-economic policies which impact the economy's employment generation capacity, and their children were more likely to be provided with lower quality education (Roscigno, Tomaskovic-Devey & Crowley, 2006). Beyond the policies at the macro level which disadvantage lower

income communities, two critical unique external pressures influenced life in these urban communities in Trinidad. The first was the ready availability of arms and munitions due to the increasing use of Trinidad and Tobago as a transshipment port for drugs (Townsend, 2009; Agozino et al., 2009). The unprecedented (400%) increase in homicides between 2000 and 2008 and the 1000% increase in gun related homicides nationally, have been largely associated with the drug trade (Townsend, 2009; Agozino et al., 2009).

Second, was the mis-management of the public works programs resulting in the capture of these programs by criminal elements to finance their criminal enterprise, the evolution and persistence of “ghost gangs”, and the customary engagement in shorter than the required hours of work (Townsend, 2009). (See Chapter 3). These issues bolstered criminal gangs, facilitated greater association between criminals and law abiding citizens and contributed to the erosion of the work ethic among work-gang members.

However, these internal and external pressures were not experienced in a uniform manner by households in the four communities. Several authors have recognized that lower income communities are home to different types of families. The respondents in Anderson’s (1994) study of Philadelphia inner city communities described them as families with “street” and “decent” values. Anderson (1999) believes that this dichotomy is relevant to inner city neighborhoods, be they in Chicago or New York, Rio or Johannesburg. He described the decent family as one which not only embraces mainstream or middle class values but had the capacity to execute those values. That is, they tended to be hard-working, and to have confidence in using available mainstream systems for stability and upward mobility. They also tended to be concerned with transmitting these values to their children by using stricter child rearing practices, making personal sacrifices for their children, teaching them to be respectful and to have high moral values.

Conversely, the lives of the street families were marked by disorganization and a greater degree of permissiveness with their children. In addition, the women of street families were more likely to find themselves in complicated abusive relationships, while the fathers were more likely to be absent, and the children more likely to be brought up in unstable aggressive, even abusive environments. Individuals raised in this context, were also more likely to experience the triple jeopardy of being marginalized from education and therefore jobs and livable wages, and to face community-based stigmatization.

Writing in the Trinidad context, Rodman (1971) used a model of four family types based on the combination of economic stability and family stability. The four types included: *the stable poor*-those which had both economic and family stability; *the strained*-those with economic stability but family instability; *the copers*-those with economic instability and family stability; and *the unstable*-those experiencing both economic and family instability.

The essential point of the classifications by Anderson (1994) and Rodman (1971) is the degree of heterogeneity present in the lower income community family. This could be related to references in Chapter 5, to the socio-economic barriers which existed between residents as well as the perceptions of differences in SES noted. As such, households would have had different degrees of resilience to the internal and external pressures, activating the downward levelling norm (See Chapter 5) and intensifying distrust and suspicion.

In addition, akin to Anderson's (1994) dichotomy of street vs decent values, respondents made reference to the demonstration of different cultural capacities by residents/households with respect to self and family regulation. The term cultural capacity uses a definition of culture as a toolkit or repertoire of behaviors from which actions are constructed (Swidler, 1984). As such it speaks to available behavioral tools that individuals can call upon in social interactions. It recognizes that these tools are evolved in the context of the varying degrees of exposure to the constraints and options

available to individuals and families, including but not limited to, availability of work, hours of work, family structure, and extended family support. It is likely that over time, in the context of the internal and external pressures, residents would have been exposed to varying repertoires of responses, perhaps especially within the family, from persons experiencing similar situations of marginalization, and through other extra-community networks and opportunities. These would have shaped their cultural capacity.

The study communities, like the entire nation of Trinidad and Tobago would also have experienced the pressures of individualism associated with modernization and growth, common in western societies (Veenhoven, 1999). Charles, for example, identified the large middle class and an education system that is available to the vast majority as predictors of individualism in Trinidad and Tobago (2001, in Descartes, 2012). These predictors have also evolved fairly quickly and represent considerable progress since the country's independence in 1962, some 51 years ago. Individualism is associated with independence from others, emotional autonomy, assertiveness and the value of privacy (Descartes, 2012). While individualism has also been associated with social distance and self-centeredness (Veenhoven, 1999) which suggests challenges for collective action, some argue that individualism promotes self-esteem and self-actualization, which in turn are associated with pro-social behaviors including helping, social involvement and moral responsibility (Water, 1984, in Veenhoven, 1999). As such, the experience of individualism may be associated with a change in the nature of individual relationships at the community level, without removing the capacity for collective action.

Internal and external pressures exerted two main impacts on the study communities. First, they intensified levels of distrust and suspicion, thereby creating uncertainty in social interactions. Second, they disproportionately impacted households based on their level of resilience, such that different cultural capacities emerged. The challenges discussed below, which manifested in the study

communities with respect to parent- child regulation, community parenting and adult regulation of each other could be directly linked to distrust and suspicion and lower levels of cultural capacity.

Norm changes at the household level – Limitations of Cultural Capacity

The nurturing and regulation of children through the institution of the family is arguably the most important source of private social control. The life course theory of crime argues that higher levels of deviance in adolescents occur where there is less family attachment and supervision (Laub et al., 2006). Respondent narratives about parenting in the four communities mirrored the explanations outlined above. Different parenting capacities were described by respondents, as well as changes in the quality of parenting over the past generation and socio-economic pressures were blamed for the conditions noted.

In interviews and focus groups across the four communities, respondents mentioned parenting challenges 91 times as a reason for problems of disrespect of elders, teen pregnancies, low school performance and crime and deviance. As evidence of low parenting capacity, they listed parents' inability to regulate their children; parents' complicity in their children's illegal activities; parents being poor exemplars; and parents' vehement defense of their children's wrong doing. These factors are evidence of perceived low parenting capacity and reflect household norms associated with severe economic pressures and limited perceived and available options. However parents' acceptance and protection of their children's illegal activity is better explained by the negotiated coexistence model discussed in a subsequent section of this chapter.

In their study of the mediating role of collective efficacy between the role of parents and deviant adolescent outcomes, Rankin and Quane (2002) considered three aspects of the parents' role, namely, parental monitoring of the whereabouts of their children, parental involvement in the activities of their children and parent establishment and enforcement of rules around chores, homework and

television viewing. They found that only parental monitoring was negatively associated with problem behaviors in adolescents.

In all of the communities with the exception of Mootoo Lands, residents complained about the presence of unsupervised children between the ages of 8-12 years and youth 13-17 years, liming¹⁸ and/or gambling in the early evenings and night. This was confirmed during fieldwork and as indicated, unsupervised children/youth were not observed in Mootoo Lands, where respondents claimed that children were under the vigilant eyes of their parents and neighbors, while at play in the streets. Minors also agreed that parents would not tolerate children under age 13 being away from the home after 6pm or a neighbor's child being at their home after those hours.

Another concern of residents was the generally lower level of support parents appeared to demonstrate towards the activities of their children, by their lack of involvement. In all the communities where groups or residents initiated activities for children, the complaint against parents was the same. According to Jacob from Samaroo Village/Mootoo Lands, who organized a football team of male and female minors:

“Sometimes you know we might have a little meeting and parents invited....Out of 20-something almost 50-something little youths you see two parents coming and who really showing that interest. I always say we have to teach the children in the way that they will grow. So if we having a little meeting and you show that interest, the youth will take note of that. If we having a little practice and you as a

¹⁸ The term ‘liming’ is a local expression which denotes any informal gathering of persons who engage in socializing, drinking and eating (Winer, 2009). It is a term which is said to have emerged in the 1940s (Winer, 2009) although the earliest recorded documented usages are dated in the 1960s. It is also used in the form of a noun ‘lime’ which is the event at which liming takes place, or the collection of people who are liming.

parent come down and watch your little youth in a little practice or even a little game, he must take note of that...When you not there he taking note of that too.”

The respondents recognized that variations existed in parenting capacity in their communities. They argued that low capacity parenting was not the case with all parents. Many families made sacrifices for their children, created nurturing environments for them, were directly involved in their education and/or sent them to take advantage of extra-lessons or homework centers, and generally protected them from the influences of ‘the street’. Residents reported that one strategy used by many families was not to allow their children to “lime” on the streets at all or without their close monitoring.

Residents were also aware that parenting capacity was impacted by socio-economic disadvantage and family disruptions and believed that parents were not entirely to blame. In a Mt. Dor focus group discussion one respondent said:

“They need to put something in place for single parents... They have to go out and put food on the table and can’t do that and supervise the children at the same time. So it have lots of children on the road doing whatever they want to do because the parents not around. Sometimes it’s only mother alone. She has to go out there and work to provide their needs. She can’t do that and be home to watch them too, so that is a problem.”

The challenges of monitoring, supervising and nurturing children are exacerbated by family disruption and single parent families (Sampson & Wilson, 1995). In the psychology literature the role of the father is considered critical in shaping the self-competence and identity of the children (Jodl, Michael, Malanchuk, Eccles & Sameroff, 2001; Rosenberg & Wilcox, 2006). In the study communities, 36% of the households were female headed compared with the national average of 29%. Moreover, Sampson & Wilson (1995) argue also that while economic deprivation and joblessness appeared to have a weak association with violent crime, much of the effect occurred through the mediation of family

disruption. In other words, a single parent family explains the positive effect of economic conditions on crime. One elderly resident of Never Dirty associated the absent fathers with the changes he observed in the community:

“The change came also because fathers not staying alongside their children.... They are not listening to the mother, because it don't have a man around, so when the mother say something, the man will say, “Boy, what happen to you, pull up on yourself, you eh hear your mother talking to you.” They not getting that kind of thing, that kind of man voice coming back to them. So, I think some of what come out from these kinds of situations is what have the community so.”

Finally, respondents recognized that a shift had taken place compared with a generation ago. Shako, a resident in his 60's, provided an example of how parents regulated their children during his childhood. Making reference to a verbal conflict between his father and a neighbor, he said:

“It does have a little mouth mouth. I hear them “tinging” but I little boy. The morning I get up and I going down the road, meet the woman I see that was quarreling with my father, and I passed her straight. I passed her straight! When my father came home, she call my father and tell him, “so Shako playing man, he passing me in the road and not telling me good morning?” Love, my father came home, tell me, go and tell Ms. (name called) good day. When I reach there and I told her “good day”, she hit me a tap. You know when I reach home is licks I going to get. And you know what my father told me, “That is big people thing, you are a child, what kind of behavior is that?” And from then I know how to hold my hand around certain things.”

In that era, therefore, parents took a firm hand in the regulation of their children in the context of clear standards of behavior, valued complaints from adults about a child's conduct and enforced the rules that they required their children to follow.

The breakdown of community parenting

In addition to the challenges of parenting capacity within many homes, parents also faced decreasing support within the community as norms around community parenting had also been greatly weakened. Residents expressed a general reluctance and even fear of involvement in community parenting, except where relations with the parent and disposition of child favored same. This reluctance of residents to “parent” neighbors’ children is not unique to lower income communities in Trinidad. Carr (2003) also observed this normative shift in the working class, lower middle income community of Beltway in Chicago.

Some of the most prominent reasons for the reluctance advanced by respondents in Trinidad were similar to those of the respondents in Chicago. The responses included:

- (i) the anticipated belligerent reaction of parents
- (ii) the likely unfavorable reaction of the child and
- (iii) the possibility for violence.

A number of factors explain this shift in the Trinidad context. In the first place it is understandable that parents would seek to protect their children from persons whose motivations they distrusted, or who otherwise displayed low self-efficacy or cultural capacity in handling such matters in other instances. Later in this chapter the issue of kinds of conflicts that arise simply because matters are not handled in the most sensitive of ways is discussed.

Another barrier to community parenting was the issue of parents questioning the “moral authority” by which other neighbors felt empowered to correct or report on other people’s children, when their own situations may have been wanting. Angelique of Never Dirty argued that many children of adults in the community, including some holding positions in local organizations were also delinquent

or involved in crime and therefore could not be respected as exemplars to correct others' children. She continued;

“...with the elders (*older adults*) definitely they don't correct. They are not correcting their *own* children, they will speak about other people's children? They need to mind their business home first, before you step out and say a person's child doing this or whatever. You need to mind your business first. You don't need to be at the side of the road talking about people children when you have your whole bunch of worries for your own self like a bag of worms waiting. “

Pressures were also exerted on the norm of community parenting by the fact that some parents were the bad-Johns or criminals and residents would have been wary of correcting the children of “bad men”. The experience of parents accepting and benefiting from and protecting the criminal activities of their children would have also exerted similar pressures on this norm. Dominique, a 30 year old focus group participant from Mt. Dor explained the shift and possible cause this way:

“Long time they use to say if you do something wrong and a neighbor or some elder hit you two lash or something, you can't go home and tell your mother because you will get a cut arse on top of it. But in this rounds now you really have to go to the parents first... How the parents operate, the children come out the same way too. Like ok, I could do you this because my mother was a bad-John and my daddy was a Bad-John you know. So it really has to do with the parents. The parents are not disciplining the children. You can't talk to them, they giving you back chat, they rude, they rude.... Sometimes you go to the parents and the parents don't business (*not concerned*).”

This normative shift denied both parents and children the benefit of wholesome parenting interventions by genuinely concerned neighbors. Challenges with parental monitoring and nurturing in the home, whatever the cause, and reduced support by adults in the community broke down what may well be the most critical layers of social control especially for children and youth.

Social control among adults

The study communities also appeared not to have sustained norms of social regulation among adults. The issues of cultural capacity and the negotiated coexistence framework both help to explain the lack of social regulation between and among adults. The navigation of civil issues and the sorting through of relational issues require social skills that tend not to be in large supply in lower income communities, for reasons already discussed. This is evidenced by the high level of conflict reported by respondents, which further obstructed the formulation of norms of civility

At the private level of social control no normative framework for sanctioning adults was evident. The handling of day to day vexing issues like inappropriate dumping of garbage, speeding through the community or land encroachments, inevitably led to conflict. Otherwise respondents who were not prepared to deal with the verbal or even physical abuse attendant upon confronting any one of these situations, deferred to the conflict avoidance norm as discussed in Chapter 5. They pretended that all was well (“everybody good”) and did not confront disturbing situations to avoid conflict.

The unplanned nature of many areas in each of these communities was a thorny issue and the source of many conflicts among neighbors. Disturbances to water courses, disputes over land ‘ownership’, encroachment on land, and space to locate electricity poles were commonly referred to by respondents. The disputes were usually verbal and involve “cuss outs”, but in some cases they involved violence or the law courts. There was one report in Samaroo Village about a matter reaching the courts, while in Pinto Road and Never Dirty threats and violence attended such conflict. Explaining the situation in Pinto Road, one respondent complained as follows:

“....but no proper infrastructure. Right now what you having is ...I have it right here.... This house here since I a little thing. Water runs down, I never know water to run up.... But the owner of this house here she built a house down in the back there. So she no longer wants the water going there. So I

told her well you do what you want, anytime you could get it (water) to come up I will work with you, but for now that's where it going, because over 20 years it going there. And so these are some of the problems you have throughout the whole of Pinto. No development, so you have enemies among neighbors and last week one neighbor planass¹⁹ another one, big woman. No proper infrastructure.”

This type of narrative was common and suggested a lack of capacity to find the compromise position necessary for living harmoniously in a community so that everybody wins.

Two examples were given about dealing with waste disposal to highlight the difficulties involved in addressing norm violators. In Never Dirty the resident confronted a neighbor who had cut down a tree and placed a very large branch by the side of the street for the Municipal Corporation to pick up. The respondent intervened, being convinced that the Corporation would not take it up unless cut into smaller pieces. In Pinto Road it was reported that a resident would habitually put out his garbage on days that were not scheduled pick up days, to the delight of the stray dogs which made a mess of it. In the first case the respondent deferred to the conflict avoidance norm anticipating a likely cuss-out. In the second case, private intervention resulted in a cuss-out and no behavior change.

The study communities therefore appeared to represent physical spaces marred by social and physical disorder, in which context a subset of residents evolve a limited repertoire of responses to interpersonal and civil challenges. As such they became unpredictable volatile environments, where cuss-outs, violence or other unproductive confrontations provided the normative framework for solving (or not solving) inter-personal conflicts.

Overlapping licit and illicit networks

¹⁹ The word planass is a colloquial expression which means to beat someone with the blunt side of a cutlass. Cote ce Cote la. Dictionary of Trinidad and Tobago expressions.

The negotiated coexistence framework is focused on how through kinship and friendship ties, criminal networks become embedded in conventional networks and prevent acts of social control. Socio-economic marginalization is associated with increased levels of criminal involvement through a number of routes. For example, access to poorer quality schools and the unavailability or inability of parents to assist with homework can lead to higher drop-out rates, which in turn would impact employment prospects, reducing earning options. The availability of drug blocks, criminal gangs or even 'make-work' gangs with criminal bosses in the community could mean easy access to the criminal lifestyle for youth with few options. In Mt. Dor respondents complained that youth were dropping out of school in favor of selling marijuana. The close proximity to criminal options and the barriers to pursuing mainstream opportunities could have meant more youth choosing the criminal lifestyle, and therefore more households with at least one member involved in crime.

In the study communities, residents involved in illegal activities enjoyed various mechanisms of protection against social control. Firstly, there was the mechanism of affective relations. Residents had kinship relations and friendship ties with criminals which evoked feelings of responsibility for safeguarding them from the authorities. Secondly, there was the mechanism of mutual exchange, where many individuals were dependent on or otherwise benefitting from the proceeds of criminal enterprise and were therefore obliged to protect their income stream. In this context, Shako from Never Dirty lamented the presence of complicit parents who were willing to accept money from their children without questioning its source. Thirdly, there was the mechanism of acceptance. Some residents accepted the choices of the gangsters due to the common experiences of alienation from mainstream sources of economic sustenance and stability. For example, in an interview with a respected member of the Samaroo Village community the respondent indicated acceptance of the drug pushers on his block.

“They have to eat” he said. The three mechanisms provoked a different value system, and beyond tolerance, they reflect ‘*acceptance*’ of the criminal lifestyle of fellow community members.

Of major concern was the fact that some younger residents had internalized and accepted the criminal lifestyle. In an interview with a minor from Mt. Dor, the youngster was angry with a female robbery victim from another community, who alerted the police, resulting in the death of the male perpetrator whom he knew personally. The fact that the woman was a victim of a robbery was lost on the youngster. Another minor from Mt. Dor was quoted promising to have his relatives steal a vehicle, had the owner left it unattended much longer. In Never Dirty another minor spoke of feeling safe in the community because his uncles were gangsters, while appearing unmoved by the fact that a few of his relatives had already been murdered during the height of gang violence in that community. These attitudes hint at potential problems later on when the minors become teens or young adults, provided there is no effective intervention.

The embeddedness of criminals within conventional networks also created distrust and suspicion about speaking out against illegal activities mitigating against the generation of norms of private social control against crime. A religious leader in Never Dirty spoke about the discomfort he felt addressing issues of crime and violence at his church services, given the fact that church members were relatives of perpetrators. Another resident of Never Dirty argued that every household had their “bandwagon”, meaning a member who engaged in criminal activity. As such, the embeddedness of criminals and norm violators protected them from sanction, and prevented the evolution of relevant norms of social control.

Gang leaders also established their power over residents through gun violence, the senselessness of many murders and the killing of informers, instilling fear and effectively silencing the majority of residents. Gang leaders also protected the communities – their turf – from external criminal

threats. It is not surprising therefore, that 63% of respondents felt it was likely that residents would take action if a suspicious person – a non-resident – was involved in illegal activities in the community. However, only 27% would take action if that person was a resident. This supports both the embeddedness and fear hypotheses. It must be noted that the exercise of the power of the gun, was complemented by the high level of distrust in the police, but this issue will be discussed albeit briefly in the following chapter.

Conclusion

Social control at the private level was severely limited in the study communities as efforts to sanction norm violations scarcely bore fruit in adult/adult regulation, while parent/child regulation and community parenting had greatly weakened over time. The area of adult/adult regulation is however quite broad and its treatment in this study should not be seen as exhaustive.

Different norms and processes co-existed in the communities. Borrowing the Anderson (1994) classification, it is possible to argue that at the household level where family circumstances reflected “decent values”, tighter monitoring and regulation of children took place. Due however to limited cultural capacity brought about by social and economic pressures and a limited repertoire of responses, many individuals lacked the tools and the opportunities both to provide effective child monitoring at home and to manage situations of adult level conflict. Instead, attempts at sanctioning norm violations typically resulted in conflict without behavior change. Many people then resorted to conflict avoidance mode, leaving violations unaddressed.

The socio-economic and criminogenic conditions of the study communities as well as external influences of increased gun and possibly drug availability also exerted severe pressures on community norms and processes. That is, these pressures evoked a negotiated co-existence between law abiding citizens and those involved in criminal and other norm violating activities. The mechanisms of this co-

existence included kinship and affective ties, the exchange of benefits between criminal and 'law' abiding residents, and the empathy by law abiding residents with the plight of criminals, whom they perceived as having no option but to pursue a life of crime to feed themselves and their families.

Despite this picture, children, youth and adults alike benefitted from the intervention of a number of individuals within the communities, who gave of their time and talents unselfishly for the good of the community. Such persons became role models and mentors to various residents, however, much of their efforts were delivered through voluntary organizations, the subject of the following chapter.

Chapter 7: Collective efficacy and organizational level social control

Introduction

The “new parochialism” is the term coined by Carr (2003) to describe his observation that the parochial and public levels of social control are inseparable. Parochial social control refers to measures to safeguard and protect community interests initiated by local organizations, be they faith based, business, sporting or other community-based organizations. Public level social control has to do with the community’s capacity to engage external resources for community well-being. Studying the mechanisms of social control in the community of Beltway in Chicago, Carr (2003) found that local organizations were the main vehicles through which external resources were attracted to the neighborhood for community objectives.

This new parochialism was observed in the Trinidad communities. Also observed was the intervention of individuals not affiliated with local organizations, who attracted external resources for personal and community benefit. This chapter will focus attention on the parochial and public sources of social control as one category referred to as organizational level social control. It will also pay attention to individual efforts at community service.

In Chapter 6, it was observed that private level social control had been greatly weakened due to the pernicious effects of prolonged poverty on family and adult relationships, the adoption of strategies for co-existence with crime and violence, and increasing individualism in the wider society. In Chapter 5, it was established that local organizations and leaders played a pivotal role in the expression of shared commitment for community well-being. Leadership and collective activities ignited the feelings of solidarity, while the organizations provided the framework for evolving rules around working trust. As such, while a great deal of distrust and suspicion underlay individual relationships and militated against social control at the private level, residents expressed solidarity through their collective activities, which

were mainly initiated by local organizations. Sampson and Graif (2009) make a similar observation, asserting that individual capacities, attitudes and behaviors, and shared expectations for social control are very different phenomena and produce different results.

The questions addressed in this chapter include, what does organizational level social control look like and what factors are associated with the contribution of local organizations to social control in these communities. Few studies have examined the role of local organizations in promoting social control or collective efficacy (Morenoff, Sampson & Raudenbush, 2001). **Appendix I** provides a summary of the research examining these relationships. In each instance, whether organizations were examined by type (Peterkin, Krivo & Harris, 2000), number (Morenoff et al., 2001) or capacity (Roman & Moor, 2004; Krishna, 2007) there was an association between the presence of organizations and either lower levels of crime or greater levels of collective efficacy or social capital respectively. Collective efficacy is but one dimension of social capital, specifically addressing working trust, shared commitment to and specific capacity for social control (Sampson & Graif, 2009). As such, the results of Krishna's (2007) study regarding the generation of social capital in 61 villages in Rajasthan India are considered pertinent. He found that growth in social capital was inspired by the presence of three main factors: (i) self-initiated local organizations; (ii) the local production of rules to manage organizational activities; and (iii) the availability of leaders with organization-building/rule-generating capacity (p. 954).

These three issues also appear relevant to understanding the generation of social control in the local scenario. The main self-initiated community organization in the study communities is the Village Council (VC). It will be shown that the VC contributed to social control by the very essential role it played in the generation of rules of collaboration, and as a major facilitator of collective action. In addition, the nature of social control mechanisms employed was greatly influenced by the presence, type, style and interests of the VC leader.

In analyzing the organizational level social control in the study communities, the efforts of the VC will feature prominently. It must be noted however that the VC operated on the basis of their mandate to promote the interests and well-being of local communities. In other words, most local organizations did not operate from a specific mandate to address delinquency, crime and violence, but demonstrated understanding that their efforts served this end. The chapter also focuses on how the communities functioned independent of the intervention of the Citizen Security Programme (CSP). The impact of the CSP will be explored in Chapter 8.

The Village Council Movement – the foundation of organizational life in Trinidad and Tobago

Social control at the organizational level assumed its character in large measure, from the history of Village Council activities and the political and governmental structures within which they evolved. As discussed in Chapter 3, the Village Council is the longest standing and most officially recognized self-initiated local organization in the communities of Trinidad and Tobago. According to its constitution, “the VC is a voluntary, non-political, non-governmental organization operating in a defined area. It is the coordinating agency for community improvement and its main function is to promote the interests and welfare of the community” (TTACC Constitution, 2003). Most communities, especially but not exclusively lower income communities, and all of the study communities have a history of Village Council (VC) leadership.

As indicated in Chapter 3, the Village Council Movement began as a public sector response to needed welfare reforms in the 1940s. The Trinidad and Tobago Association of Village and Community Councils was eventually formalized as a charitable body in 1956, having a constitution and a three tiered structure including the national body, the branch associations and the Village or Councils at the ground level. As such the VC is part of a structured organization with clear operating rules of engagement.

The VC Movement has had an intimate relationship with the government that dates back to the 1940s. In the 1960s a more formal arrangement was effected through the Better Village Programme located in the Office of the Prime Minister when a specific set of programs were designed for implementation with and through the VCs. The construction, upgrading and management of community centers were among those original VC functions. Others included participation in the Prime Minister's Best Village Trophy Competition – the annual culture, arts and culinary skills, sports, beautification and queen competitions, and participation in a number of skills training programs (Plowden, 1989).

The Ministry of Community Development (MCD) has maintained a paternalistic relationship with VCs. Officers of the Community Development Division (CDD) attend the Annual General Meetings of VCs, while VCs continued to be expected to collaborate with the MCD on an expanded range of programs. In addition to community center management and the Prime Minister's Best Village Trophy Competition some of the additional initiatives include:

- the Community Empowerment Programme (CEP) which provides tutors for a range of non-certified courses designed to provide residents with skills to facilitate income substitution;
- the emergency relief assistance grant program for housing repairs,
- the handicraft development program which includes training and enterprise development
- the Geriatric Adolescent Partnership Programme which provides training and placement in elder and convalescent care (Ministry of Community Development, Draft Strategic Plan 2011-2015).

In addition, the Ministry of Community Development also manages a number of grant programs through which funding is made available to local organizations for community-based initiatives. The MCD constructs and refurbishes community centers in collaboration with VCs, which are then responsible for their ongoing maintenance, the scheduling of daily activities, payment of utility bills, hiring out the facility for private functions and liaising with the CDD for large scale infrastructure works.

These arrangements gave the VCs power and legitimacy as the main local authority over community affairs.

The arrangements with the CDD also suggest that Village Council activities essentially took on common dimensions across the country. However, community input, capacity and initiative are demonstrated in the peculiar ways in which the Councils took advantage of those programs to satisfy local needs, and the kinds of other unique initiatives undertaken that reflected the specific organizational footprint.

Agency for organizational level social control

Collective efficacy also refers to the agency or capacity for social control that emerges within a particular context (Sampson, 2006). Initiatives undertaken by local groups are considered as evidence of the agency for organizational level social control demonstrated in the study communities. A summary listing of the major initiatives and activities of the VCs and other groups covering the current phase of the VC Movement (1980s to present) is provided at Appendix J. In the appendix, reference is also made to the earlier work of the VCs such as nascent community infrastructure development, building of the first community centers and management of the Crash Programme to especially highlight the relationship between the VCs and the government. Unfortunately, most of the initiatives of the VCs have not been the subject of any serious impact assessment as such this study makes no attempt to assess the quality of the interventions, but focuses on the types and sources of such initiatives.

The importance of the character, style and capacity of the VC leader are also highlighted in the context of the leaders' role as a facilitator of the communities' organizational agency for social control. Recall that Chong (1991) identified important elements of leadership which contribute to successfully engaging conditional cooperators in collective action. This success results from the exemplary, self-sacrificing character of the leader as well as the leader's capacity to frame the cause in a manner that

convinces of success and compels action. The issue of framing the cause in compelling ways implies an understanding of the issues and having a particular vision of how they should be addressed, and therefore is an issue of capacity. The foregoing describes the types of approaches to social control initiated by local organizations in the study communities and highlights the roles of organizational stability, capable leadership and willing cooperators.

Limited direct interventions

In the current phase of VC leadership, there were very few local organizational efforts which took a direct approach to addressing crime. This was consistent with the finding that only 22% believed that a resident would make a police report against a resident known to be involved in illegal activities. By contrast, 76% of respondents believed it was likely for residents to get together to solve local problems. The mechanisms that would inform the low level of willingness to report residents to the police have already been discussed in Chapter 6. These include, the embeddedness of persons involved in criminal activities within kinship and friendship networks, and the evolved strategies of co-existence with criminals and criminal activities.

Understandably there were few direct approaches against crime. One such approach was initiated by a vigilante group in Mt. Dor by the name of SKY Connection, some of whose members were described as “trouble makers” in Mt. Dor. Sky Connection was however seen by many respondents as the peace keeping force of the community and their role in dealing with the petty thieves and preventing ‘bad seeds’ from coming into their community was appreciated by many. They were also credited with bringing an end to the “war” that occurred between gangs from Mt. Dor and the neighboring community of Mt. Hope, and with dealing with “nuisances” (petty thieves) within the Mt. Dor community. According to one member of the SKY Connection, they sought to “contain the influence of bad seeds from outside of the community.” Sky Connection sought to have their peace keeping

activities legitimized by police presence and made a verbal appeal to the nearby St. Joseph Police Station to this effect. Their request was however, denied.

The other direct crime prevention approach was made by the Pinto Road Village Council which also sought to formally engage with the police. The VC wrote to the Officer-in-Charge of the closest Police Station just over a mile away from the community center, and even closer to the high crime areas of the Pinto Road community. The VC sought increased patrols at night especially in the artery roads known for criminal activities. The request was granted. Increased patrols lasted one month and ceased when the particular Officer-in-Charge was re-assigned.

The failure of attempts at community partnership with the police is also partly a reflection of the ambivalence by the government and Trinidad and Tobago Police Service with respect to relations with communities. During the 1995-2000 period of governmental administration of the Trinidad and Tobago a Community Policing Section was established as well as Community Policing Units in each Police Division (Community Policing Manual, 1996-1999). Several respondents lamented the disbanding of the Community Policing Units which occurred in 2002 with a change in political administration of the country. The study has been informed however that a new community policing plan is in draft (Officer-in-Charge, Community Policing Secretariat, personal communication, December 2013).

Organizational stability and influential leaders in Never Dirty, Pinto Road and Mt. Dor

The respective Village Councils in Never Dirty, Pinto Road and Mt. Dor were for the most part, the leading agents of organizational level social control. The presence and stability of the Councils can be associated with the fomenting of norms of collective action in these communities. These Councils also had the experience of leaders who held the reigns of leadership for decades. Mobafa was the President of the Never Dirty VC from 1985-2005, while Barbara functioned in various executive positions on the Pinto Road VC over a similar period and Melvina also functioned as President for about two

decades in Mt. Dor. The capacity and interests of these leaders greatly influenced the nature of interventions undertaken. In addition, the types of interventions initiated by the VC appeared to provide a guidepost both for emergence of new organizations as well as the nature of interventions designed to fill perceived community needs.

Never Dirty

Mobafa, Never Dirty's transformational leader was a well read, knowledgeable man, a social reformer with a strong sense of his own cultural identity and a strong commitment to improving the lives of the residents of Never Dirty. He framed the movement for community transformation with the compelling mantra, "you don't have to live this way, you can do better!" With these words he mobilized the first community protest action against the poor infrastructural and social conditions under which they lived in the 1980s.

The circumstances of the community in the early 1980s also provided him with the opportunity to assert a new kind of leadership. First of all, the Village Council executive at that time were persons who had led the Council since the advent of the movement in the 1960s. Consistent with Craig's (1974) findings, Mobafa insists that these leaders had become comfortable in their positions of power, lethargic and unwilling to challenge the government administration for improvements to the community, largely because they were members of the political party in power-the PNM. Moreover, they were unable to relate with the younger generation of Never Dirty residents and were in regular conflict with them over access to the community center.

Meanwhile the physical and social conditions of the community were deteriorating, the original community center built by the residents had become dilapidated, there were no recreation facilities and the country had entered a period of austerity resulting in higher levels of unemployment and poverty. In response to these issues Mobafa first established the Cry of the People Action Movement (COPAM)

which both highlighted and identified with the plight of residents. He took pictures of the community showing the dirty and disorganized conditions and the residents did not recognize the place but for the presence of a known villager in the photos. He recognized that residents had grown accustomed to the squalor around them, but challenged their acceptance of those poor conditions. In this way he began to establish himself not just as a leader but as a reformer who cared about the conditions of the community and its members, and who believed in the residents' ability to be engaged in a successful movement for change.

Over the 20 years as VC President, Mobafa pursued an approach designed to enlighten, to build self-worth through enhancing the cultural identity of residents, and to promote financial independence. The goal of enlightenment was pursued through sensitizing residents to the unacceptability of their living conditions, adult literacy training, storytelling, the establishment of the library, and the large 200-student homework center (See Appendix J). He sought to heighten the appreciation of their talents through the annual week-long community festivals, and participating on the national arena in the Best Village competition and other cultural events.

The VC also promoted financial independence by carefully selecting cost saving, income-generating skills from the Community Education Programme of the CDD for resident participation (see list at Appendix J). In addition, construction was commenced on a bakery and trade school. The bakery was to provide a sustainable source of income for participating residents, and to retain the income spent on bread and pastry within the community. However, Mobafa left the community suddenly in 2005 due to ill health, and the trade center and bakery were never completed. He explained the vision for the bakery and trade center as follows:

“People were getting some courses and we wanted to translate from course into productivity into earning....And then the trade center where people could come learn more trades and it be an

incubator for more business right there. For example, electronic repair, food processing, fabric design. Then we could have contracts for local schools or for geriatric care, etcetera.”

While the Never Dirty VC demonstrated the most agency for developmental programming, other community organizations also made investments in the social life of the community. Mt. Zion Baptist Church engaged many of the children in its annual two-week Bible Camp which it hosted since the 1980s. In addition, the group Grasshoppers and the Angelina Terrace Women’s Group made contributions in the area of inter and intra-community tournaments in football and all-fours, sports, sports and family days, and in other social events respectively.

This period of transformational leadership made several contributions to collective efficacy. The period produced a range of preventive social control measures which productively engaged children and youth and reduced opportunities for idleness among them; and kept many young people out of a life of crime. In addition, it was an investment in organizational stability, the generation of norms around collaboration, and the installation or upgrading of community infrastructure whose important role in social cohesion has already been discussed in Chapter 5. The basketball court, the community library and pre-school, the expanded community center are all physical legacies of Mobafa’s tenure, and critical community investments in the recreation, development and training of generations of Never Dirty residents. Of particular importance was the evidence that expressions of community solidarity in Never Dirty were unparalleled by the other communities. Respondent conveyed a yearning for the “love and togetherness” of those days when the community was alive with activities. But more than this, many were very clear that it was their responsibility to “bring back” Never Dirty.

Pinto Road

Barbara was an executive member of the Pinto Road VC, but was recognized as the de facto leader of the community. She was a member of a strong, well connected Pinto Road family which held

key positions on the Village Council for decades. The Pinto Road VC has been credited with having the best managed community center in the country (personal interview with Community Development Officer), a feat that can be associated with the discipline of its leaders. The Village Council used a multi-pronged approach to promoting the well-being of the community. Some relevant services included: a selection of CEP skills training programs of the Ministry of Community Development; a pre-school; monthly meetings by the Welfare Department with old age pensioners of Pinto Road; and the supply of school books to needy children annually (See Appendix J).

While these were among their key ongoing initiatives, social mobility through professionalism in sport was Barbara's main developmental strategy. Over the years, Barbara initiated or was connected to a number of sport organizations in the community. However, it was mainly through the group New Horizons that for about 30 or so years she pursued this sport development strategy. New Horizons hosted professional football and cricket tournaments welcoming the country's best national clubs and players into the community. New Horizons gave 40 Pinto Road youth the opportunity of a college education through sports scholarships, many attainable overseas. For many of them this was an opportunity they would never have had without her intervention. The scholarships and the tournaments provide testimony to how well-connected and resourceful Barbara was in terms of attracting external resources to the community.

While historically New Horizons and the VC maintained a strong focus on sport, within the last 4 years other organizations were established contributing to a more diverse range of social programming. This may have been a response to the crime surge and the dire need to reach out to children and youth.

In 2007, the sports club Pinto United was established by Paul. Paul was a product of New Horizons' investment sport, and had seen doors of employment in the protective services open up to him based on his talent. Paul shared Barbara's vision of professionalism in sport. His aim was to take

the Pinto United club into the professional league, starting with an emphasis on football, but progressing to professional coaching in cricket, netball, basketball, swimming and other fields of sport. More importantly, many of the members of Pinto United were drawn from the squatting areas of Pinto Road, where the levels of unemployment, illiteracy, idleness and crime were high.

Paul's vision for the players was holistic, including support in the areas of literacy, education, life skills and family life support. Belinda, another resident also heavily involved in sport expressed a sense of hopefulness about Pinto United. She said, "Is a set of the little so called 'bad boys' he pull off the street and form the team, and he is seeing changes with them."

The Police Youth Club (PYC) and Youth Stars were two other recently started interventions. The Police Youth Club falls under the ambit of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service, but the establishment of a club in a particular community relies on the interest and voluntary service of a Police Officer. The Club's objective is to expose young people to productive activities in education, sport, culture, spirituality and community service, as an alternative to involvement in drugs, crime and juvenile delinquency. Officer Hersha, a resident of Pinto Road, started the club in 2011. The club held sessions weekly on Saturday afternoon and attracted 125-175 children of ages 5 to 18 years. While the group appeared to be challenged by the ratio of children to facilitators²⁰, it represented another effort to productively engage children and youth of the community.

The group Youth Stars also meets weekly and caters to 30 young persons, 13 to 19 years. Youth Stars is a more intimate and structured life skills program which seeks to provide the young residents

²⁰ The group was in its sixth month of operation at the time of the study. The club was in need of committed mentors and workers to assist with the children on a weekly basis. (Personal interview with the Police Officer in charge)

with life skills coaching in an empowering, yet disciplined environment. Three of the minors interviewed were members of Youth Stars. One of them, Shelly, felt that the program was taking youths off the street. She was also proud of the changes she saw in herself since being a part of the group. She admitted to being rebellious and claimed that the group helped her to want to change, and to become a more disciplined person. Terrika felt that she had learnt not to give adults attitude, only friends her age, while Ryan said he learnt etiquette and how to use a computer.

The nature of organizational level social control in Pinto Road was different to what emerged in Never Dirty, perhaps due to a wider resource pool in Pinto Road and the standards of professionalism established by the leadership of the VC and New Horizons. In Pinto Road development programming was generated from several leaders or community champions and there was a strong emphasis on quality and high aspirations especially in the case of Youth Stars and Pinto United respectively.

Mt. Dor

Mt. Dor was another community with a long history of VC leadership dating back to the 1960s, and one in which the VC continued to be viewed as an important local organization even in the face of the loss of some of its earlier prominence. Over the years, the VC had established itself as the main architect of civil control in the community working in tandem with its key affiliates/groups like the Women's Group, the Best Village Group (Mt. Dor Cultural Performers-MDCP), and the PNM Party Group from which it drew many of its members.

After JP Morgan, the community's first VC President and very revered son, Melvina was one of the community's respected community members. Melvina was a strict, principled and hardworking leader, who served on several groups including the PNM Party Group, the Women's Group, on the VC executive and eventually served as VC President perhaps over two decades until about 1993. She continues to be so highly respected by residents that during the period of escalating gun violence when

criminals showed little respect for anyone's life, she slapped a gangster for chasing someone through her street with a cutlass. The fact that she lived to tell that story is a testimony of the respect even the criminal element had for her. Melvina's leadership is discussed in this study because it continues to be highlighted by residents as an important period of VC leadership.

The focus of Melvina's leadership was on alleviating the hardships of families. In the 1970s she managed resident participation in public works programs trying to divide fortnightly work opportunities equitably based on the level of household need. She facilitated the provision of food hampers and clothing to residents through her association with the Society of St. Vincent de Paul, a service she continued to provide at the time of field work. She also utilized the CEP Program of the Ministry of Community Development to facilitate skills training for women especially in cooking, craft and other skills. Speaking of this era of leadership one resident boasted that Mt. Dor residents did not have to go outside of the community to do anything because the "community center was home to countless courses, sports, and parties." Compared with Pinto Road for example, where the focus was on upward mobility, the emphasis of this era of leadership was on survival and helping the less fortunate residents get by.

The Mt. Dor VC changed leaders at least three times after Melvina gave up the post, although for some period the Council was held together by an interim structure. Jane led the VC from about 1995 to her passing in 2007. She was regularly highlighted as a good leader who demonstrated passion for and commitment to the youths. Her talent was in the arts and so her approach to the informal control of crime was to engage the children and youth in the Best Village group -- the Mt. Dor Cultural Performers (MDCP) where youth were engaged in perfecting various art forms, learning the discipline associated with competitions and being exposed to a great mentor in Ms. Jane. She was credited with a

positive influence on the youth who were involved in the performing arts group and the fact that only one of her members was lost through involvement in violent crime.

Rolley had also been in the forefront of a number of community interventions through his 16-year old organization, the Mt. Dor Coaching Clinic (MDCC). Rolley used his training as a skilled coach to provide football coaching and mentorship to children between the ages of 8-15 years. At the time of research, the program reached about 25 children on a weekly basis MDCC and many more during the summer school vacation. MDCC was also known for hosting annual social events for children, the elderly as well as events for Mothers' and Fathers' Day.

The presence of the four year old peace keeping force in Mt. Dor has already been discussed. Sky Connection's goal was not only to keep the peace, but also to restore the confidence of residents. The group therefore also hosted activities such as amateur sport tournaments for the youth and young adults and community parties to entertain residents and rebuild community cohesion. Respondents credited Sky Connection with engaging the youth and keeping them out of trouble, as well as creating opportunities for community interaction.

Like Never Dirty and Pinto Road, residents of Mt. Dor demonstrated a preference for collaboration in groups, providing additional support for the idea that a long history of VC leadership can be associated with growing norms of collaboration as in these communities most efforts beyond the work of the VC was also through collaboration in groups. Additionally, the agency for social control demonstrated by the community relied on the capacity of the VC leader and the availability, capacity and interests of other unconditional cooperators in the community. As such, while in Never Dirty one very strong leader emerged, in Pinto Road, in addition to a strong leader, other strong community champions took on the challenge of implementing programs to protect vulnerable community populations. In all of the communities, the focus was on building cohesion, engaging at risk children and

youth and enhancing the quality of life of residents. With respect to enhancing the quality of life, this was attempted by strategies on a continuum from hardship alleviation to upward mobility.

Limited organizational interventions in Samaroo Village/Mootoo Lands

Samaroo Village and Mootoo Lands were two distinct communities annexed administratively by the Central Statistical Office due to the construction of houses by the government on acquired private lands (Mootoo Lands) within the boundaries of Samaroo Village. In terms of socio-economic status, Mootoo Lands was a heterogeneous community of lower middle to middle income residents many of whom may have been economically better off than those in Samaroo Village.

Organizational arrangements in Samaroo Village/Mootoo Lands were in sharp contrast to that of Never Dirty and Pinto Road. The absence of a governing organization like the VC, a local leader or community spaces provides strong evidence of the importance of local leadership, stable governing organizations and community meeting spaces to the practice of organizational level social control. The VC ceased to function in 1991, and four attempts at resuscitating it failed, due to conflict within the executive committee. In addition, at the time of the study, the area's first community center was under construction. Major results of these absences were low levels of working trust and limited norms of collaboration.

It is unclear for example, whether there was significant opportunity for the evolution of rules of engagement in the community. During its existence, the VC was not involved in innovative programs for the community beyond the traditional infrastructure works and the programs of the Community Development Division (see Appendix J). In addition, it may be that the level of direct involvement of the VC in initiating infrastructure works may have been minimal. Instead, these projects were the initiative of the Local Government Councilor or the Member of Parliament for the area who was also Minister of

Works (1976-78). In addition, the absence of a community center robbed the VC of a source of power, and a specific managerial responsibility around which to evolve rules of engagement (Krishna, 2007).

This community also did not have neutral spaces for holding community meetings and activities. The hosting of meetings at two church buildings may have excluded residents who for religious or other reasons would not be associated with such spaces. The leadership of the Samaroo Village Youth (SVY), one of the few groups in the community, indicated that some residents would not participate in their activities because their meetings and practices were held at a neighbor's garage.

Consistent with the absence of the VC or any other unifying organization in Samaroo Village/Mootoo Lands, participation in local activities was lowest (60%) compared with the other study communities (average of 91%). This low level of participation may have retarded the generation of working trust and the evolution of leaders. Residents in Samaroo Village/Mootoo Lands were also the least likely to get together to solve community problems (47%) compared with the other communities combined (63%) and the least likely to report a resident who was involved in illegal activities (13.3%) compared with the others (27%).

Residents of Samaroo Village in particular, displayed a low level of working trust indicated by the expressed preference by a number of community champions to work alone rather than in groups. Candice, who is responsible for one of the individual initiatives in the community, explained that she preferred to stay away from groups because residents fight for positions of power in groups even when they know they do not have the capacity to fulfill the responsibilities of the position. In her words, "you can't write but you want a pen." Similarly, Jacob, a mentor and coach to children in the community, experienced disappointment at the hands of team leaders who failed to pull their weight, so he decided to go it alone. He said,

“Guys at the head had to do things to get uniforms and they failed us. From that time I say if I have to be any part of any coaching with any team I don’t want to be part of this. I want to do my own thing....I just don’t want to be in the group because I find those in charge doesn’t pull they weight enough, but when success take place you seeing everybody on board.”

Conflict in Samaroo Village/Mootoo Lands did not only occur on the intra-group level. There was a challenge of collaboration across groups associated with but not limited to the perceived SES barriers between the two areas. Respondents spoke about the heated exchanges which arose at a recent Organizational Enhancement Workshop held in the community in 2011 where much time was spent trying to address the inter-area conflict between participants from Samaroo Village and Mootoo Lands. Moreover, participants were encouraged to collaborate on common events on their respective agendas rather than duplicate resources. An attempt at collaboration on a Christmas treat for children collapsed as the groups and individuals involved could not reach agreement.

What is clear is that in the absence of norms of collaboration and working trust, some individuals remained engaged in their communities, and on their own provided options for the community’s children. In this regard, the King family has traditionally thrown an annual Christmas party for the community’s children. Within the last 5 years prior to the research a number of other initiatives were started by individuals such as Candice who hosted the Sports and Family Day for the community; Jacob who established Net Warriors football club through which he coached and mentored as many as 50 children up to 15 years old. In addition, Jessica provided homework support and mentorship to about 10 children 5-13 years; Shanice provided music lessons for children in various instruments during the summer vacation and Sherma started a parent support group to help build relationships between youth and their parents.

Jacob explained that he was investing in the children because he wanted peace in his community. He felt that if he didn't invest in the youths today, they would be the ones shooting up the place tomorrow. Residents like Jacob were therefore doing a good deed so that they could also reap benefits that would also redound to the community as a whole. Candice lost her son to internal community violence and wanted to promote peace and togetherness; Jessica had a special needs child and wanted to help other children in his honor; Sherma was a social worker and felt responsible to lend support to her community. These community champions may qualify as being unconditional cooperators given that they jump in and make heavy personal sacrifices; with or without the support of others.

These unconditional cooperators demonstrate varying motivations none of which fit with pure rationality. Jacob can be described as boundedly rational as he anticipates future benefits to himself from his actions toward others (Ostrom, 2010). Candice and Jessica receive the selective incentive of personal healing through their other-regarding actions. They therefore also demonstrate bounded rationality as they do not behave only on the basis of the private benefits but are also inspired by genuine concern for others. Sherma's motivation on the other hand may fit with Chong's (1991) view that reputational concerns can inform action. She may have felt that as a professional social worker, her reputation was at stake if she turned a blind eye to the needs within her own community. It can be argued however, that underlying the various individual motivations may be a genuine concern with the well-being of their common space produced by bounded solidarity. Further, these individual initiatives qualify as efforts of social control, although they lack that collective ingredient and are different from initiatives which for example, expose children to multiple supportive adults rather than one.

Mootoo Lands

The absence of a VC and a community leader in the form of a VC President, would have held a different degree of significance for Mootoo Lands than it did for Samaroo Village. Mootoo Lands presented an interesting organizational challenge potentially due to its youth -- being a 30 years old community -- while its mixed income status would have created some relational barriers among residents (Lekti, 2008). In addition, as residents implanted from other areas of the country, they had multiple interests outside of the community including previous friendships and family ties, career and educational pursuits, limiting the time for association within the community.

Organizations in Mootoo Lands appear to be valued for specific purposes. As such, the community established its first organization – the Home Owners Association (early 1980s-1994) in response to the dire infrastructure conditions met on their arrival in the community in the 1980s. The organization eventually fizzled out after the infrastructure needs were met and the need no longer existed. The second organization - Omeara Court Enhancement Group was started in 2004, as residents became aware of evidence of youth delinquency. However the leader of this group admitted that they were not successful in designing programs for the youth largely because they were unable to garner youth support in the assessment of and strategy for youth programming. It is possible that need to protect the youth had not been fully appreciated by residents due to the stronger private level control practiced in this community (See discussion in Chapter 6), as well as the limited visible signs of social decay or of a crime problem. These examples show that residents of Mootoo Lands displayed willingness to work together in groups but on the basis of specific needs.

Discussion

This chapter sought to understand what organizational level social control looked like in the study communities and the associated factors. To answer these questions the types of initiatives of

local organizations designed to improve living conditions and opportunities were examined against the backdrop of the role performed by the VC, other local organizations, and role of local leaders.

Organizational level social control in the study communities took on a social development approach, including a range of initiatives such as skills training, homework centers, culture and arts programs, sport and sport scholarships and mentorship (Rosenbaum, 1988; Hawkins, 1999). These types of interventions were informal attempts to counteract issues of income insufficiency, unemployment, low education and high school failure, idleness and unsupervised youth, and negative sub-cultural norms. The Village Council was typically the lead organization in designing and implementing programs, however other organizations or individuals also contributed to addressing these issues.

One can argue that the Village Council set the tone for organizational life in these communities. Consistent with Krishna's (2007) findings in India, the presence of a stable local organization like the VC appears to be essential to the evolution of norms of collaboration and therefore critical to the organizational character and organizational relationships in the study communities. As such, regardless of the strength of VC leadership, where the VC existed, residents demonstrated a preference for addressing community issues collectively rather than solely through individual initiative. In this regard, it seems that the VC encouraged the evolution of norms around collective action. This is not to assume that the VC did not have internal challenges or that relations between other groups and the VC were always harmonious. What is clear however, is that among the study communities, where a VC existed residents chose to address community needs via local groups.

In Samaroo Village/Mootoo Lands, where no VC existed, there was unwillingness among residents to cooperate in groups and as such, community - based interventions mounted by individuals were more common. Moreover, in addition to the difficulty cooperating in groups, there was also great

difficulty collaborating across groups or initiatives, a phenomenon that appeared to go deeper in SV/ML than the common rivalries among groups. This suggests that in the absence of recent history of a successful central organization, norms around working trust had not developed or found expression.

In Chapter 5, it was argued that new relational norms in communities that favor getting along rather than close-knittedness or trust were consistent with the idea of working trust. The situation in Samaroo Village/Mootoo Lands (SVML) appears to pose a dilemma for this theorizing. However, it is more likely that both the absence of unifying leadership and the absence of opportunity for the expression of working trust are the underlying barriers to collaboration faced by this community. In addition, the fact that most of the individual-run initiatives emerged out of Samaroo Village and not Mootoo Lands, suggests that the problem of working trust was not fuelled by the SES barrier between the two communities. It appears therefore that the 1991 collapse of the VC, followed by four failed attempts at its resuscitation, had generated a level of working “distrust” that may be both a consequence and a cause of absence of central leadership in this community.

In addition to the fomenting of organizational norms, the chapter underscores the importance of capable local leadership to informal social control at the organizational level. The knowledge, interests and resourcefulness especially of the VC leader was critical to the way organizations chose to intervene to address community problems and as such was responsible for the agency for social control demonstrated by the community. In other words, the community’s agency for social control was in large measure determined by the leaders which emerged.

This is in contrast to the style of leadership (transformational or authoritative) which as observed in Chapter 5, was associated with the cohesiveness of the community. The transformational style was associated with greater community solidarity and unity, whereas the authoritative style appeared to be insufficient to quell potential conflicts that would be common in such a large group

environment as a community (Chong, 1991). The importance of the credibility of the leader (Krishna, 2007; Chemers, 2000) to the expression of working trust was also underscored in Chapter 5. The association of the new Never Dirty VC President with past involvement in violent crime resulted in the unwillingness of other group leaders to cooperate with him.

The style of leadership however, also appeared to bear little relevance to the nature of social control, but both styles were associated with attracting other individuals to engage in collective action, though possibly for different reasons. As Chong (1991) pointed out, leaders encourage others to follow based on their exemplary character, high standards, and personal sacrifice. Exemplary character and high standards appeared to be more important to social control than style. In Never Dirty and Pinto Road for example, residents who felt empowered by the social interventions of the transformational and authoritative leader respectively, felt committed to give back to their community by forming groups to fill service gaps. In Mt. Dor under authoritative leadership, some residents started groups in reaction to feeling marginalized by the leader.

Leadership is however, not the only impetus for the engagement of others in social control. Individuals referred to as community champions emerged in Samaroo Village/Mootoo Lands in the absence of VC leadership. These individuals provided a range of reasons to explain their motivation to intervene. Rather than pure rationality, the influence of the private benefit of a good reputation, bounded rationality and other-regarding motivations predominated. The emergence of such unconditional cooperators or individuals willing to give sacrificial service to the communities regardless of the type of local leadership or the local organizational structure seems to contradict earlier observations assigning this motivational role to exemplary leadership. Instead, what is evident is that both obtain. For example, as indicated by Chong (1991) where exemplary leaders exist, their sacrifices act as pressures on others who also wish to promote their own social identity as an individual who is

other-regarding. Regardless of the motivation, these cooperators fill important gaps in the umbrella of social control initiatives in a community.

Like Krishna's (2007), the study is unable to predict the emergence of capable leaders or cooperators who will serve the interests of their respective communities. What is clear is that in every community individuals exist who are willing to make personal sacrifices for their communities (Ostrom, 2000). It is also likely that from this pool of individuals, overarching community leaders will emerge.

A few additional issues are worthy of noting. First is the contribution to informal social control by the Ministry of Community Development (MCD) via its programming for collaboration with communities. For over 50 years, these programs have been the jumping off point for the VC response to community management. While additional grants have been added to the MCD's arsenal of initiatives, there has not been any major evolution in the support provided by the MCD. The failure of the MCD initiatives to evolve with the times and needs of communities, especially in relation to providing expert guidance to communities regarding best practices in community management in general, and crime prevention in particular is a critical shortcoming and loss of opportunity.

Second, there were few successful direct overtures to the police, whereas many studies identify the involvement of the police as an essential element in community based crime prevention (Payne & Button, 2009; Skogan, 1988). It was noted however that there were specific challenges around engaging the police, including distrust of the police, and changes in political administrations which brought changes in the policy towards community policing.

Third, the informal measures of social control employed by the study communities, regardless of how developed or piecemeal, would have been subject to endogenous and exogenous pressures. Endogenous barriers including the pressures of community poverty and norms of coexistence with the criminal sub-culture resulting in weakened private level social control were discussed in Chapter 6. The

study communities also faced exogenous constraints, the most notorious being the severity of the criminal enterprise in this era. As discussed in Chapter 3, criminal gangsters controlled many of the work-gangs in the Government's poorly managed public works programs. Through their manipulation of these programs, securing lucrative contracts and the use of "ghost gangs", gang leaders were able to finance guns and ammunition, ensuring that violence was deadly (Townsend, 2009) and thus drastically changed the nature of Bad-Johnism in the communities. As such, the failure of the Government to effectively manage the public works programs as well as the failure of the national security apparatus to halt the importation of illegal firearms into Trinidad and Tobago ensured ready access to fire power in these communities, especially from the beginning of the 2000 millennium. Violence now meant certain death, so according to Mobafa, "when you slip there is no play over."²¹

Finally, crime prevention is also now very much a science (Hawkins, 1999). Best practice in crime prevention involves the careful targeting of risks and protective factors with a view to reducing risks and enhancing protective factors for crime and violence. The new trends in crime prevention and the contribution of a government intervention to collective efficacy will be fully discussed in Chapter 8.

²¹ This is an analogy from the game of marbles, whereby if a marble slips from a player's hand (or if the player is otherwise seeking an opportunity for a better shot) and he shouts "slips", he may be allowed to play again. When the gun was introduced to violence there was hardly an opportunity for a play over.

Chapter 8: Collective efficacy and The Citizen Security Programme

Introduction

“Purposively investing in social capital is possible and worthwhile.”

Krishna (2007).

Local organizations and the nature of the leaders, especially those at the helm of the Village Councils, were the major facilitators of collective efficacy in the study communities. That is, local organizations directed by their leadership, initiated actions that both inspired cohesion and were the main vehicles for social control. This was established in Chapters 5-7. The purpose of this chapter is to examine whether and in what ways the Citizen Security Programme (CSP) – a government intervention -- contributes to collective efficacy. A shortcoming of the collective efficacy literature is its silence on the issue of how and whether collective efficacy can be grown. The current study contributes to a body of knowledge, referred to as the implant hypothesis (Rosenbaum, 1988) which is concerned with whether or not the capacity for social control and cohesion could be improved in communities where such capacity is weak, and in particular, whether it could be improved or implanted via external intervention.

Krishna (2007) identified three possible explanations for externally generated social capital. The first addresses the role of government institutions as a trusted referee, mediator and focal point “establishing peaceful equilibria among otherwise combative groups” (Levi, 1996, p. 51, in Krishna, 2007) and thus creating opportunities for effective collaboration. The second is the role of government in creating conditions for economic and infrastructural development and therefore creating the structural conditions for increased social capital. The third is what he referred to as “purposive external intervention” which invests directly in building the capacity of local organizations-an approach embraced by the World Bank (Krishna, 2007).

Krishna's (2007) longitudinal study of social capital in sixty one (61) villages in India in 1997 and 2004 did not find considerable support for any of the three hypotheses discussed above. He found much more support for the idea that growth was propelled by the internal dynamics of the communities. He conceded however, that external organizations could help by promoting leadership development and capacity building with the expectation for improved social capital over "a longer time period" (p. 954).

This study uses in-depth investigation of a government intervention to reduce crime in Trinidad, to examine its possible contribution to collective efficacy. To this end, the study synthesizes the narratives of respondents across communities to piece together the contribution of the CSP to social cohesion and local capacity for social control, from their perspective (Denzin, 1989b in Miles & Huberman, 1994). Attention will be directed to respondent views on the role of various elements of the CSP including: (i) the CSP structures at the community level, that is, the Community Action Officer and the Community Action Council; and (ii) CSP investments such as its funding windows and capacity building exercises, with respect to promoting cohesiveness and enhanced capacity for social control.

In addition, the study notes the CSP mandate to target risk and protective factors for crime and violence prevention, consistent with the body of literature which identifies such strategies as the new scientific approach to crime prevention. In this regard, the study will examine whether the range of risk factors for crime and violence were targeted in the selected communities.

The purpose and process of the Citizen Security Programme

Why the Citizen Security Programme

The Citizen Security Programme (CSP) is a six-year, multi-pronged crime prevention initiative funded by the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) in the amount of US\$35m (IADB Loan Proposal, TT-L1003, n.d.). The Bank has multiple citizen security programs and projects ongoing in approximately

18 countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (IADB Website, Dec. 2013), and considers itself “the vanguard among donor agencies” in addressing citizen security issues (Hammergren, 2010, p. 6). The Trinidad and Tobago CSP which officially extends from 2008-2014 is one such initiative, designed as a critical government response to the spate of serious crime in Trinidad and Tobago.

The CSP intervention has three components. The community action component finances:

- the provision of technical assistance to assist in the development, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of preventive interventions, and engaging the community in addressing priority crime and violence prevention issues identified through local assessments; and
- the strengthening of community centers to carry on these activities;

The other components include the strengthening of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS) through financing:

- the rehabilitation of police stations, IT training and computer equipment, and victim services training for the Victim Support Unit; and
- the provision of psycho-social skills and support services to Police officers to reduce work related stress and improve police/citizen interactions and relations; and

the institutional strengthening of the Ministry of National Security by financing:

- technical assistance to develop an integrated crime and violence information system (Crime Observatory);
- applied training in statistical analysis and problem identification; and
- the periodic conduct of national victimization and attitudes surveys.

Further references to the CSP in this study will refer singularly to the community action component. The CSP was designed to contribute to the reduction of crime and violence in twenty two

(22) high crime pilot communities, by financing prevention initiatives aimed at addressing “the most proximal and modifiable risk factors for crime and violence, identified as: firearms, juvenile delinquency and anti-social behavior, child maltreatment and domestic violence.” (IADB Proposal, TT-L1003, n.d., p.1). More specifically, the objectives of the CSP intervention were:

- i. the reduction in the levels of homicides, robberies and woundings in partner communities;
- ii. an increase in the perception of safety in the partner communities;
- iii. a reduction of injuries²² related to firearms, child maltreatment, domestic violence and youth violence; and
- iv. an increase in the **collective efficacy to prevent violence** in the partner communities. (emphasis added)

It is this last objective in particular, that made the CSP such a relevant and timely intervention for the examination of any perceived association between this state-based initiative and increased collective capacity for crime prevention at the community level. The assessment is critical also as crime and violence has continued to be recognized as the major social issue facing successive political administrations in Trinidad and Tobago since the year 2002.

The CSP Process

The CSP’s Project Implementation Unit (PIU) is located in the Ministry of National Security and is the main delivery arm in this process. It functions through four operational centers; an Executive Management Team, Community Engagement Team, Accounting and Administrative Management, and Monitoring and Evaluation. The Community Engagement Team manages the interface with the

²² In Trinidad and Tobago the category of offence referred to in this study as “injuries” is recorded as “woundings” to convey the idea one person inflicting bodily harm upon another.

community, the work of the Community Action Officers and other resources made available to the communities. The Monitoring and Evaluation component was also an essential resource to the communities responsible for inculcating the concepts and habits of M&E in the design, application and reporting on projects by communities.

To its credit, two years in advance of the official start date of the CSP, the IADB made resources available for project preparation activities. A core specialist team including the Coordinator and the Community Action Coordinator were engaged. It was during this preparatory period that the 2007 Crime Victimization (See Chapter 4) was conducted and brief community assessments conducted in the 19 selected communities in Trinidad. The communities were selected on the basis of three criteria including the high level of crime, being sufficiently distinct to withstand the influence of crime in neighboring communities and geographic location (Communications and Youth Specialist, personal communication, November 2010).

The community action activities of the CSP were effected through a number of distinct strategies including (CSP's Operating Regulations, 2012):

- ***Community mobilization:-*** the assessment, mobilization and engagement of communities in violence prevention initiatives. These activities were spearheaded by Community Action Officers (CAOs) who were the focal point for community interaction, intra-community collaboration, private sector involvement and support for the generation of local initiatives. The CAOs mobilized and facilitated the establishment of Community Action Councils (CACs) as the local steering committees of residents through which violence prevention activities would be generated, discussed and assessed. The CACs also had access to a menu of funding windows through which locally generated crime prevention initiatives were supported. These funding windows included:

- **Rapid Impact Projects (RIPs):-** A maximum of TT\$90,000 (US\$14,040)²³ to fund quick win projects of the CACs, aimed at enhancing resident safety and security.
- **Inspiring Confidence in Our Neighborhood Fund (ICON):-** A maximum of TT\$30,000 (US\$4,680) for crime and violence prevention micro projects of local organizations.
- **Community Engagement (CE):-** A maximum of TT\$10,000 (US\$1,560) for local cohesion building events by CBOs or collaborations with state or other entities.
- **Community violence prevention services:-** the provision of funding to support capacity building and the generation of initiatives in the area of crime and violence prevention. In this regard experts were to be contracted to develop evidenced based interventions to address: (a) key risk factors for crime and violence including; youth violence, delinquency, anti-social behavior, child abuse and neglect, domestic violence, conflict resolution in such places as schools and communities; (b) situational crime prevention, for example, through target hardening and making the physical environment unfriendly to crime and violence; (c) improving the provision of services in the areas of health, education, human services and the police; and (d) media campaigns to address sub-cultural norms both within communities and in the wider society. Initiatives in this regard included:
 - i. A range of **capacity building** initiatives in areas including domestic violence and child abuse prevention, HIV/AIDS awareness, counselling, organizational enhancements and project management and basic monitoring and evaluation executed over the period 2008-2011.

²³Converted using <http://www.forexticket.com/en/currency/converter-USD-TTD> at the rate of US\$1.00 to TT\$6.4104 on December 26, 2013.

- ii. **Community Based Social Intervention (CBSI)** :- Medium to long term interventions valued between TT\$200,000 to TT\$500,000 (US\$31,200 to US\$78,000) and implemented by Non-Governmental Organizations or other qualified and experienced agencies, aimed at reducing the risk factors for crime and violence and enhancing the protective factors.
- iii. Support to **school based violence prevention programs (SBVPs)**: A fund of TT\$50,000 (US\$7,800) for access by schools in CSP partner communities to equip parents, teachers and students with the skills needed to address various forms of violence and thereby contribute to the reduction of crime, violence and anti-social behavior in school settings (CSP Draft Operating Regulations, 2012).

Residents in the 22 partner communities were first engaged in a process of asset mapping in 2007 as part of the preparatory phase of the CSP initiative. Stakeholder meetings (town meetings) were held between the period 2007 to 2009 through which residents were made aware of the goals and objectives of the CSP and invited to be a part of the process to restore peace and re-gain control of their communities. Out of this initial process of community mobilization Community Action Councils (CACs) were formed to spearhead local level action to address risk and protective factors against crime. The Councils comprised mostly of representatives of the community based and faith based organizations in existence in the communities, as well as other interested residents. As such the capacity of the CACs was a reflection of the strength of the local organizational structures of the respective communities. In Never Dirty and Mt. Dor, the VC President chaired the CAC. In Pinto Road and Samaroo Village/Mootoo Lands respectively, a representative of a religious organization performed this role.

The Community Action Councils operated on a completely voluntary basis and were the focal point of CSP interaction with the community. The CACs were also responsible for encouraging the participation of other residents and local groups in the process. For the most part CACs met on a

monthly basis to discuss initiatives and strategies for violence prevention as well as to consider proposals by other local groups for CSP funding. They also held periodic public education sessions to inform the public of the work of the CAC as well as to address issues relevant to crime and violence. The CACs were each assigned liaison officers in the form of Community Action Officers (CAOs) who provided ongoing support and guidance in all of the above activities.

Expert NGOs were also engaged to address specific risk and protective factors during the course of the field work. A full list of activities undertaken by local organizations and expert NGOs, as well as the capacity building initiatives is provided at **Appendix K**. A summary of the number of community action initiatives funded under the various funding windows, from program inception to the end of field research (February 2012) is provided at **Appendix L**.

The ensuing sections will consider resident perceptions of the CSP and the targeting of interventions to reduce multiple risks factors for crime and violence.

Resident perception of the Citizen Security Programme

Context

The narratives of residents from the four communities were explored to understand perceived contributions of the CSP to collective efficacy. Attention will be paid to how the structures and investments of the CSP directly or indirectly created opportunities for enhanced social cohesion and the social control of crime. By structure is meant the mechanism for the management of the relationship between the CSP and the community, that is, the Community Action Officer, and the Community Action Council. Investments refer to funding and capacity building.

The analysis takes into consideration the fact that at the time of initial entry into the study communities in 2007 and 2008, the CSP met communities coping with the disturbing specter of accelerated gun homicides, and inter and intra-community gang wars over drugs or jobs were the order

of the day. In all of the communities this war had set streets or segments of the communities against each other erecting unnatural barriers between residents, with the painful experiences of resident on resident killings, reprisal killings, collateral killings and killing of suspected informants. Residents indicated that during the period 2008-2009 many of the gang leaders and key members were killed mostly through gang wars, but some were also killed by the police. They attribute the cessation of gun violence in their communities to the death of the “bad-men”. This meant that the CSP entered the communities in the height of the violence, and were on hand to capitalize on the relative peace after the deaths of many gang leaders, to assist the residents to regain control of their spaces.

In addition, notwithstanding the fact that poverty and violence had generated fear and distrust and community structures were of varying capacities, CSP Officers also met valuable community level structures and resources at start up. A member of staff of the CSP itemized the community resources which benefited the work of the CSP in this way:

“I think that one of the things that definitely helped CSP was the ... asset mapping, because we were able to identify individuals who specifically said that they would be a part of anything, anything that would help their community. We didn’t specify violence prevention, but anything. *We asked* “On a scale from one to five, how would you rate your willingness to volunteer, your willingness to help a neighbor?” Through that process, for each community we were able to identify a group of people who could become the Community Action Council and besides that, there were also groups. There were churches. So the presence of faith based organizations and leaders, we could call on them to also participate.” (CSP Official).

The willingness of residents to assist was consistent with earlier discussions in Chapters 5 and 7 about the presence of unconditional cooperators with both self-interested and other-regarding motivations.

CSP structures and the contribution to social cohesion and social control

Respondents from the study communities valued the design components of the CSP intervention including the Community Action Officer (CAO), the collaboration forged by the nature and operations of the Community Action Council, access to dedicated funding streams and capacity building.

Community Action Officers (CAOs)

The CAOs were spoken of as the most valuable pillar of the structure. The presence of the CAO gave the program legitimacy in the communities, the incumbents being representatives of the Ministry of National Security. This is notwithstanding the fact indicated by residents, that CAOs had first to prove themselves as friends and supporters of the interests of the community as opposed to being informers for the police. In addition, the CAO was an available source of technical support for the community in general and the Community Action Council (CAC) specifically. The CAO facilitated the establishment of the CAC, attended and in most cases chaired CAC meetings, provided guidance to the CACs in terms of project design and proposal writing and constantly sought out other local groups and resources to be a part of the crime prevention project.

The intensity of availability and support provided by the CAOs is unparalleled among similarly structured government agencies. One CAO was assigned to two (2) communities; the CAOs were not required to have a university degree, nevertheless the officers assigned to the study communities were all degree holders and one possessed while another was pursuing graduate qualifications. In comparison, Officers of the Ministries of Community Development and Sport, who are assigned to provide support to village and community councils or sport organizations respectively, have considerably greater workloads. Sport Officers who are required to have a college degree are allocated at the rate of 5 per county (Human Resource Director - Ministry of Sport, personal communication, February 9, 2014). To give an idea of the scope of the workload, the island of Trinidad and Tobago was

previously divided into nine (9) counties. Similarly, two Community Development Officers are assigned to each district. Larger counties are subdivided into two districts. As an example, the county of Victoria was divided into the districts of Victoria East and West. There were 68 communities in Victoria East alone. This means that one Officer was responsible for 34 communities. In addition to the intensity of the presence of the CAOs in the respective communities, they entered the communities in the height of extreme levels of violence, a time when other service providers typically withdrew.

In Mt. Dor one resident explained that they valued the fact that someone “from outside” was so concerned about their plight and described the CAO as a role model. In Never Dirty appreciation for the CAO was overwhelming with 72% very favorable responses, referring to her as the ‘darling’ of the community, ‘an encourager’, ‘always willing to support’, the giver of ‘good advice’ and one who treated residents with respect. A resident of Pinto Road assigned all the positives about the program to the CAO.

The CAO as a very present representative legitimized and gave residents confidence to engage in a local crime fighting effort. Residents signed up for participation in the CAC and were willing to join an effort against crime. Given the fear factor already discussed in Chapter 6 this was a major undertaking fortified by external support. The presence of the CAO instilled in the residents a sense of self-efficacy, hope and empowerment to act (Berg, Coman & Schensul, 2009, p. 347), to take back their communities from the scourge of crime. In the context of crime prevention programs for youth, Berg et al. (2009) discuss the importance of hope, in terms of its ability to inspire action above and beyond the barriers of poor structural conditions. The presence of this “outsider” willing to sacrifice his/her personal safety to repeatedly venture into their communities generated hope and a willingness to participate in the program.

Community Action Councils (CACs)

Generally, residents had no difficulty with the idea of working together on the CAC, it was typically how they responded to local concerns except that the CAC facilitated collaboration across groups to an extent that was less common. The CAC actually represented the way the Village Council was designed to operate but quite often the VC functioned as a parallel organization rather than an umbrella organization. Moreover, the mobilization of residents as partners and key leaders of the process at the ground level has been highlighted as a best practice in prevention strategies (Howell & Curry, 2009).

Respondents in three of the communities agreed that the CAC improved their network of contacts within the community, given that it provided them with an opportunity to meet and get to know residents with whom they had not previously associated. It was therefore an opportunity for the development of norms around working trust. Only in Never Dirty where the fewest number of CAC members (n=2) were interviewed, was this benefit not highlighted.

In Mt. Dor where the CAC had the largest membership (26 members) one respondent explained that the CAC brought out 'non-active' residents. The CAC's close relationships with a government department, gave it legitimacy as more likely to succeed than other local efforts and as such, inspired the participation of less engaged residents. There was a sense in the Pinto Road CAC, which had the largest number of local groups represented, that more should be done to build team spirit among CAC members, as the CAC meetings did not allow sufficient opportunity for bonding among the individual representatives. However, respondents of this CAC saw value in the opportunity for situations (especially of need) to be brought to the table and receive support from the multiple agencies represented, rather than being addressed by one entity. As such, the CAC strengthened norms about working across organizations to treat with local issues.

The CAO and CAC were particularly important structures for Samaroo Village/ Mootoo Lands, which has had various organizational level challenges including being without a Village Council for over two (2) decades, the proliferation of individual-run initiatives and conflict within and across organizations. The CAC experienced conflict leading to the withdrawal of support by one or two residents, however respondents were convinced that the presence of CAO acted as a stabilizing force for the group. Notwithstanding the conflict, the existence of the group for the last four years attests to the role of the CAO as a referee and stabilizer. The question of what happens in the absence of the CAO is discussed later in this chapter.

Dedicated grant funding

Access to financial resources from the CSP through its various funding windows was another benefit to the community recognized and welcomed by residents. A resident of Mt. Dor called it “quick and sure funding”. This funding was not limited to CAC initiatives but other local organizations were able to access funding for social projects (see Appendix L), and also benefited from help in project design and evaluation. In addition to direct CSP funding, the CAOs connected local leaders to other available public sector resources. The Never Dirty CAC President explained;

“Like before I used to do the funding for the football and pull out money out of my own pocket and pay and thing. But *the CAO* say no, you know you could get money from the Ministry of Sport. They have something called a Sport Development Officer at that Ministry, let me introduce you to them.”

This dedicated access to financial resources in a structured manner would have enabled CBOs to focus attention on generating ideas and to project design without the hopelessness and uncertainty that a lack of funding can generate.

The funding was however not always quick and delays in approvals and therefore program implementation were a source of some frustration. CSP officials explained that the delays were due to bureaucratic procedures and staff shortages at the Accounting and Legal Departments of the Ministry of National Security, while the CSP's Project Implementation Unit also had challenges to "complete all the stringent and rigid requirements of the IDB" which at times meant that "paperwork and other things took longer and approvals" came well after the desired project start dates.

Community empowerment and capacity building

Residents in the study communities benefitted from a variety of capacity building opportunities facilitated by the CSP. These training programs could be broken down into two areas, sensitization or issue-based training; and organizational development, project management and monitoring and evaluation training. At the completion of field work in February 2012, 174 persons were exposed to training across the four communities. Forty three (43%) of this number were exposed to issue based training in areas including domestic violence and child abuse prevention, HIV/AIDS awareness. The remaining 57% were trained in practical skills including counselling and basic monitoring and evaluation, project management and proposal writing. The CACs in Never Dirty and Samaroo Village/Mootoo Lands, also used ICON and RIP funds respectively to facilitate group leadership and project management training for groups in their communities. Kairi Consultants was engaged by the CSP to conduct an independent evaluation of eight (8) of its initiatives including six (6) training interventions in the areas of Counselling, Child Abuse, Domestic Violence, Mediation, Project Management and Proposal Writing, and two social projects (Kairi Consultants, 2013). Neither of the social projects was implemented in the study communities during the period under review. The findings of the Kairi Consultants (2013) on the training initiatives concur with the findings of this study.

Interviewees from all communities spoke highly about the quality of the workshops and felt that they had been personally enriched by the various training opportunities. However, the adoption of the training towards social control in the respective communities varied. Kairi Consultants (2013) observed for example, that members of organized groups in general and faith-based organizations in particular, had more opportunities to utilize the training given the services of their organizations, compared to those not in groups. In the current study, of the eleven (11) respondents from Samaroo Village/Mootoo Lands who were training participants, 36% (n=4) indicated that they were putting their training to use. One was utilizing her training in mediation and counselling within her family and among her immediate neighbors, and another at a homework center. In Pinto Road of the seven (7) participants interviewed, one (1) was applying her acquired counselling skills to situations in her Sunday school class, and felt better able to recognize the signs that a child may be experiencing abuse at home.

Two (2) other respondents from Pinto Road felt that the CAC needed to reach out to the community and thus provide members with the opportunity to utilize their training through that interaction. Similarly, Kairi Consultants (2013) noted that respondents were of the view that the CSP should assist participants with “post-training support” to legitimize and promote their skills and availability to address community needs. The Mt. Zion Spiritual Baptist Church in Pinto Road however, facilitated a 6-month counselling course for its members and other community participants. The beneficiaries of this training course agreed to make their services available to the community twice weekly. It is understood that graduates provide counselling services at the church during its weekly walk-in services day (Community Action Officer, personal communication, February 12, 2014). As such, there were mixed experiences about the application of training to community needs and issues that varied not only by organization membership, but by individual and community setting. However, the

exposure of persons to training provides intrinsic benefits very difficult to measure at any one point in time.

Respondents also indicated benefits from the project management and proposal writing training courses. In addition to the finding that these courses provided the greatest opportunities for application, Kairi Consultants (2013) found respondents to be very clear about some of the technical approaches and other tools they learnt with respect to project planning such as the use of the problem tree approach, which many continued to use. In the current study, one respondent/participant from Never Dirty indicated that he was helped to better understand how to think about and plan projects and write up project proposals. This respondent was responsible for eight (8) of the 13 locally generated projects funded by the CSP in Never Dirty. Tamela and Narissa who attended the Organizational Enhancement Workshop organized by the CAC for all groups in Samaroo Village/Mootoo Lands described its benefits this way. “The booklets that he gave us helped us. When we actually did get into the actual information he [*the trainer*] gave us about how to run the thing, how to go about planning a project and how you go about identifying your beneficiaries before you even attempt or go into your design. I found that was very informative and we use that now every time we have something to plan.” On the advice of the trainer, members of the Samaroo Village Youth attempted to engage other groups in the collaborative planning of one Christmas event for the children and avoid duplication due to multiple groups acting on their own. They expressed great disappointment that their efforts failed even though all of the organizations were exposed to the same training.

The experiences highlighted by respondents around the training point to a number of issues. First, the training enhanced social control both at the private and organizational levels as a subset of beneficiaries were able to utilize the training either in their personal lives, to the benefit of neighbors and friends or in community service through organizations. Second, communities varied in terms of the

presence of local organizational structures to facilitate the use of training to address needs. This suggests that such training needs to incorporate a community specific module addressed to strategies for post-training application for community benefit. Third, the experience of conflict in Samaroo Village /Mootoo Lands which obstructed efforts for post-training group collaboration indicates how community norms can potentially obscure the effects of training and highlights the need for greater hand-holding and mediation where norms of collaboration are under-developed.

Challenges of structure

The CAC structure was problematic for community cohesion in Never Dirty, Mt. Dor and Samaroo Village/Mootoo Lands for different reasons. In each case, pre-existing community issues were the cause of the challenges. In the case of Samaroo Village/Mootoo Lands the historic inter-area conflict between Samaroo Village and Mootoo Lands, as well as weak norms of collaboration and working trust affected the functioning of the CAC. There were mixed views about whether the CAC which comprised residents of both community segments was helping to dismantle the rivalry and build norms of collaboration. Two respondents from Samaroo Village felt alienated from the process because of insufficient information and the location of all or most CAC meetings in Mootoo Lands. With respect to the functioning of the CAC itself another member believed that “the CSP was asking the community to do something [*collaborative planning*] that it does not have the level of discipline to do.” He felt however that strong unifying leadership would help overcome traditional barriers. In this instance, it appears that the engagement of expert resources focused on assisting the community to navigate these issues may be necessary.

In Mt. Dor and Never Dirty specific leadership challenges emerged. The then CAC chair in Mt. Dor was a mild mannered individual whose style of leadership appeared insufficient to addressing conflicts within the CAC. One resident reported that at a volatile CAC meeting it was left to a visitor to

take charge. Twenty five percent of the respondents (n=5) who were part of the CAC indicated that leadership was a challenge and that the group needed help to address conflict. Many also felt that the CAC would not survive without the CAO.

The credibility of the leader was the root of the problem in Never Dirty. This was due to the leader's alleged past association with the criminal element in the community, and led to a serious crisis of working trust for the Community Action Council and the Village Council. This leadership challenge was recognized by an officer of the CSP who said,

"Another problem I am foreseeing because the VC President has a past and ..the other groups still don't want to have anything to do with him. They will talk to him and ask him for stuff, but to join [*the VC*], to show an allegiance, they still very hesitant. So when he calls meetings none of the other groups would attend."

In this regard, the efforts of the CSP in Never Dirty (via the CAC) may well be undermined by the presence of leadership in whom the active members of the community cannot repose trust. In addition, the VC is likely to be very challenged in its attempts to evolve as a strong organization, representative of the engaged residents of the community. In this context, genuine sustainable collective capacity to prevent crime is unlikely to emerge.

Finally, in all of the communities the sustainability of the CAC effort, at the conclusion of the CSP in 2014 was put forward as a challenge. The CSP engaged in numerous sensitization and capacity building initiatives discussed above. However up to the conclusion of fieldwork the CAOs were still handling most of the arrangements for and chairing of CAC meetings, and where there was conflict or challenges around collaboration, creative solutions had not yet been found or had not yet borne fruit.

Perceptions around CSP-funded programming

Respondents were asked to indicate what they believed were the benefits to the community from its participation in the CSP. Responses focused on the interventions indicated that the main benefits included the restoration of hope and the engagement of the children and youth of the communities in wholesome activities.

The hope effect

There was consistent support for the idea that while the CSP interventions did not stop the crime, they certainly helped the communities to come alive again after being besieged by crime. Residents attributed the variety of activities held at their community centers or local facilities as having inspired a sense of a return to peace and normalcy. They appreciated the “togetherness”, the fact that “people were coming out again”, and that the “events were uplifting the community.” Baptiste, a community leader from Mt. Dor explained;

“Up here used to be like when you crossing the Gaza strip. With Sky Connection sports and family day, people started to feel a sense of freedom again ...You see you here now, yuh wasn’t going and stay here so late trust me, because yuh wouldn’t want to be up here to hear when gunshots ringing out.... Gradually because of the programs -- and one of the things we was lacking was the funding -- so we get the backing from the CSP, so we seeing a lot of change in the community.”

This comment must be understood against the backdrop that Mt. Dor was one of the communities with the lowest rate of project implementation under the CSP. Yet the value of the interventions in terms of restored control was well received.

The narrative was similar in Never Dirty. Angelique, who participates in community events but is not a member of any local organization, highlighted the fact that there was interaction among residents from all areas of the community whereas during the crime surge street wars had erected

unnatural barriers between residents and neighbor on neighbor violence would have created deep wounds among neighbors. She put it this way;

“With LoveUntil²⁴ is a lot of activities in the center and a lot of people coming together here and children from down so didn’t use to come up and who don’t know the children, but everybody getting to mingle right here. It had the clinic. You know how much people can’t get up and go to clinic, they’re lazy too, but you know they have the clinic right here, and it easier, more accessible, and it’s free. They have the homework class that all children from so, from so, from up the hill, from wherever, they come together. Everybody getting to know who is who; they getting to interact with one another from small. It is not to say you growing with a grudge, this one do me that, and you know, everybody interacting.”


It is likely that recovery from the period of escalating violence may have been more retarded without the intervention of the CSP. Active residents – residents typically involved in community affairs, numbed by the frequent senseless killings, would have been less eager to retake active service without the confidence and leadership provided by the CSP initiative. As an external entity with the backing of a state agency, the CSP helped residents overcome some of their fears and suspicions and facilitated their active engagement in a crime prevention effort. In Mt. Dor and Pinto Road respondents indicated that the respective CACs kept expanding as residents showed interest when they became aware of its existence and objective. The CSP suggested that CACs should have between 8-15 members, the Mt. Dor CAC had 26 members, while Pinto Road had 17 in 2011.

²⁴ LoveUntil Foundation is an NGO which was contracted by the CSP to assist with the community rebuilding process in Never Dirty. Many of the initiatives undertaken by this organization were executed under the business name Reaction Productions Limited (RPL). See Appendix J.

The engagement effect

Respondents also valued the fact that their children and youth were engaged in wholesome activities as a distraction from the lure of crime and violence. They recognized the destructive nature of idleness and welcomed the opportunities for them to learn pro-social and income generating skills. Figure 11 represents the types of interventions undertaken as a percentage of the total number of initiatives and the percentage of beneficiaries reached by each program type.

Figure 11: Percentage of CSP-funded projects and percentage beneficiaries, 2008 - Feb. 2012.



Source: Citizen Security Programme 2014

More than 50% of responses regarding the perceived value of CSP-funded programming lauded the activities provided for children and youth. Overall, 56% of the activities targeted children and youth through camps, sport, mentorships, educational activities and employment skills. The camps organized for children and adolescents occupied them, included life-skill components and put them into short term contact with mentors and role models, creating the opportunity for positive long term relationships and networks. While, the majority of camps were held in Never Dirty, at least two (2) each were held in the

other communities. Interventions targeting children specifically comprised 28% of the CSP-funded programming and accounted for 14% of all beneficiaries.

Sport was seen by many respondents as an important measure against youth delinquency. Eleven percent (11%) of the programming focused on sport. In addition to sport, older youth were engaged in employment related skills and mentorship initiatives, which altogether amounted to 24% of the programming and reached 7% of the total number of beneficiaries. Speaking specifically of Menstart, a weekly mentorship initiative in Never Dirty which ran for four months, George and Marcus felt that they benefited personally from the program and saw changes in the attitudes of other youth who attended, in that they were “less aggressive and more thoughtful about their future”. All things being equal, the ratio of children and youth focused programs to beneficiaries hint at the need for greater outreach to these groups. However a clear effect of the CSP intervention was to engage children and youth, who are critical targets for crime prevention.

The majority of residents (77%) were engaged through cohesion building activities (Family Days, sport tournaments, and cultural events) outreach and health services. Although most of these types of social outreaches took place in Never Dirty and Pinto Road, the earlier quote from the resident in Mt. Dor, was symptomatic of the view across communities, that is, respondents from all communities felt and appreciated the resurgence in programming even where they were comparatively few.

CSP contribution to reducing risk factors for crime and violence in the study communities

Decades of research has resulted in the elevation of crime prevention to a science (Hawkins, 1999). Using the public health approach of identifying and managing risk and protective factors in the context of diseases, crime prevention science has identified ‘empirically verifiable precursors’ or risks and protective factors that predict the likelihood of crime and violence (Hawkins et al., 2002). According to Hawkins (1999) “longitudinal studies in Europe, North America and New Zealand have identified

factors such as: community poverty and criminogenic neighborhoods; low educational aspirations and academic achievement; hostile family environment and family deviance; and association with delinquent peers and limited involvement in conventional activities, as being among factors that increase the probability of later crime in adolescents and young adults (O'Brien, Daffern, Chu & Thomas, 2013). As with the prevention or mitigation of disease, crime prevention science requires that measures should aim as far as practicable to reduce these risk factors.

Researchers have also identified protective factors such as: increased parental monitoring and strong parental involvement; attachment to school and teachers; interactions with pro-social peers and beliefs in moral order, which provide a buffer against negative risk exposure (O'Brien et al., 2013). Crime prevention scientists therefore recommend efforts to enhance these protective factors. There are mixed reviews about the level of interactions among risks and protective factors respectively in terms of their additive or cumulative effects on criminal or violent behavior (Hawkins, 1999; Office of the Surgeon General, 2001) however a study across five (5) US states found evidence of increased prevalence of self-reported arrests and violent behavior with increased risk exposure, with the reverse in the case of exposure to multiple protective factors. These findings have informed the view that prevention strategies which address multiple predictors of youth crime hold most promise (Hawkins, 1999, p. 447)

While violence prevention science does not answer all questions about youth crime and delinquency, for example, why some youths in similar circumstances choose violence and others do not, there is strong evidence to guide crime prevention policy and measures. Some notable conclusions include the fact that strong bonds to school, family and community serve as protective factors against anti-social and criminogenic behaviors. These are therefore targets for concurrent strengthening, while at the same time limiting factors which heighten the likelihood that youth would choose sub-cultural and deviant norms. Additionally, risk factors for violence are age graded, that is, the predictive value of

the risk changes depending on the stage of development, context and circumstances. For example strategies to improve family attachment will be more critical for the pre-puberty stage than for adolescents or older youth. Violence prevention strategies must therefore be age appropriate.

CSP-funded initiatives – the focus on risks factors

The study attempts to observe the CSP's contribution to assisting communities to target appropriate risk and protective factors for crime and violence. The CSP approach to having risk and protective factors addressed in the partner communities was through capacity building of group members and other interested persons in the four communities, as well as by mandating expert NGOs to devise initiatives focused on the goal of reducing risk and enhancing protective factors in the said communities (CSP Officials, Personal communication, March 2014).

The current study observes how these efforts were translated into programming associated with the multiple risk and protective factors. It does not pursue an evaluation of how well these factors were targeted as that remains outside the scope of this study. The list of programs and projects financed by the CSP from its inception in 2008 to the end of field work in February 2012, which were implemented in the study communities by local groups or expert NGOs is provided at Appendix K. The list included 58 activities funded under the menu of funds, namely, Community Engagements (CE), Inspiring Confidence in our Neighborhood (ICONS), Rapid Impact Projects (RIPs), Community Based Social Interventions (CBSIs) and School Based Violence Prevention Programs (SBVPs). Fifty six (56) of these initiatives have been listed according to their assumed relevance for addressing specific risk factors. Two (2) were capacity building initiatives considered relevant to enhancing protection rather than risk reduction. Of the 56 projects, 34 were locally generated and 22 were implemented by expert NGOs contracted by the CSP.

The assessment focuses on risk factors for two reasons. First a subjective assignment of projects to risk factors was undertaken by the author as there was no a prior determination of the category to which the intervention should be assigned. Second, some projects can have a dual effect of reducing risks and enhancing protective factors. For example, a parenting program targeting parents and adolescents can have the dual goal of reducing the risk caused by family management problems and conflict in some homes, while for other parents the workshop could strengthen already favorable attitudes and parental involvement behavior.

Using the categories of risks adopted by Hawkins et al. (2002) CSP-funded initiatives were allocated to risks at the level of the community, family, individual and school. Among other things, risks at the community level included the presence of sub-cultural norms favorable to drug use, firearms and crime; high level of crime, and gang activity; poverty and economic deprivation; and issues around low attachment to community. Risks at the level of the family included family management problems and favorable parental attitudes to crime and other problem behaviors. Individual level risks refer to issues of alienation and rebelliousness, early initiation into problem behaviors and friends who engage in problem behaviors. Finally at the level of the school, risks include a lack of commitment to school, academic failure and early and persistent anti-social behaviors. The majority of projects (50%) addressed community level risks and so initiatives in this area were further subdivided into those addressing community norms, risks for involvement in gangs and crime, reducing the risks of poverty and deprivation as well as reducing the risk of low community attachment. A breakdown of the projects and the number of beneficiaries by community, according to risk category, is provided at Table 17 below.

The table indicates that collectively across the four communities, projects funded mostly addressed issues in each of the risk domains. Only in Samaroo Village/Mootoo Lands where the fewest number of interventions were implemented were most of the risk domains not targeted. Notably in

Pinto Road, no projects which fit into the category of risks for gangs and crime were put forward for funding.

Table 17: Summary of CSP-funded interventions in the study communities (2008-2012-February) showing number of projects and beneficiaries by community						
Risks	Never Dirty	Mt. Dor	Samaroo Vge Mootoo Lds	Pinto Road	All Projects	All Beneficiaries
	Projects (Beneficiaries)	Projects (Beneficiaries)	Projects (Beneficiaries)	Projects (Beneficiaries)	No. (%)	No. (%)
▪ Conduct norms	2 (42)	1 (80)	-	3 (700)	6 (10.9)	822 (14.6)
▪ Gangs & crime	3 (209)	1 (26)	-	-	4 (7.3))	235 (4.2)
▪ Economic deprivation	5 (247)	1 (1)	-	3 (95)	9 (16.4)	343 (6.1)
▪ Community attachment	5 (1365)	1 (50)	1 (300)	2 (1300)	9 (16.4)	3015 (53.6)
▪ Family	1 (12)	2 (53)	-	1 (105)	4 (7.3)	170 (3.0)
▪ Individual	10 (332)	1 (45)	3 (63)	4 (326)	18 (32.7)	766 (13.6)
▪ School	2 (59)	2 (125)	1 (66)	1 (25)	6 (10.9)	275 (4.9)
	28 (2260)	9 (380)	5 (429)	14 (2551)	56 (100)	5626 (100)

Source: Citizen Security Programme 2014

The majority of initiatives (27) addressed community level risks, and those geared to promoting community attachment -- mostly social events designed to build community cohesion -- reached the largest number of residents. The next largest number of initiatives (18) was geared to addressing individual level risks. The majority of projects in this category included various types of youth camps targeting children and teens, most incorporating an element of life skills and mentorship component. Information on the activities is provided at Appendix K.

Few projects (4) were targeted to family level risks and the smallest percentage (7.3%) of beneficiaries was reached in this category. A similarly small number of initiatives (4) were addressed to older youths who were most at risk of falling prey to the gangs and crime in the study communities. Initiatives in this domain, typically targeted older youth, most at risk of gang and crime involvement, and involved intensive coaching where social skills and mentorship were incorporated with sport tournaments. However, these interventions only occurred in Never Dirty and Mt. Dor. Sixteen percent

(16%) of the projects addressed issues around economic deprivation, however these reached only 6% of the beneficiaries. Initiatives in this domain sought to provide welfare support (11%) and income generation skills (89%) also targeted to older youth. The majority of these efforts were initiated in Never Dirty and Pinto Road.

A few significant issues were observed with respect to the targeting of risk factors for crime and violence. First, the delivery of initiatives varied with the capacity of leaders and champions who made themselves available for service as well as the nature of expert NGO support provided. Overall, 50% (n=28) of the initiatives were implemented in Never Dirty and 54% (n=15) of these were NGO generated projects. Never Dirty was particularly brutalized by the high rate of gun homicides at the start of the CSP in 2008, and residents were afraid to venture out of their homes to attend community meetings in the evenings (CSP correspondence, 2009). The LoveUntil Foundation was engaged by the CSP in 2010 to assist in the community rebuilding exercise for a period of one year, and inter alia, to improve the perception of social exclusion and marginalization and promote peace building initiatives within the community (Terms of Reference LO-1965/OC-TT).

The LoveUntil Foundation was responsible for 12 of the NGO initiatives in Never Dirty. It maintained a constant presence in the community mainly through its homework center (2 days weekly) and monthly hamper distribution initiative. Moreover, it was this organization which initiated activities to address the school and family based risks as well as 60% of the interventions targeted at individual level risks. As such, the intervention of this Foundation contributed to ensuring that all the domains of risks were targeted in Never Dirty. Moreover, LoveUntil Foundation addressed parenting and education based issues which perhaps the community did not have the skills to address. This highlights the limitations of local voluntary organizations to address all of the risk domains relevant to crime and violence, and the need for external resources.

Also, the range of services provided by LoveUntil Foundation meant that residents were widely aware of activities occurring at the community center, while presence of these “outsiders” providing services to the community, helped restore the confidence and the sense of safety experienced by residents. Speaking of the support provided by the CSP and LoveUntil Foundation one religious leader claimed that he had been associated with the community for 17 years and had never seen the level of support provided by an external entity.

It must be noted however, that a large number of the activities was implemented by local organizations in Never Dirty (13). Interestingly for Never Dirty, most of the projects (8 of 13) were initiated by the new Village Council, whose leader did not receive the support of many residents and other groups in the community. The VC itself also did not appear to be very strong in terms of its executive membership as few persons attended meetings and most of the responsibilities fell to the President (Village Council President, personal communication, March 2011). This suggests that the capacity and motivations of the leader may be more important to project delivery than the organization itself.

The next largest number of activities (11) was initiated in Pinto Road. Both Never Dirty and Pinto Road had a slightly longer period of involvement with the CSP, starting from 2007²⁵, however, more importantly, like Never Dirty, Pinto Road had a strong track record of local social interventions prior to the CSP. Unlike Never Dirty however, in Pinto Road the local initiation of activities was not as heavily concentrated in any one local group, but about seven (7) organizations participated. In addition, Pinto Road benefited from the presence of an elementary school (the Arima West Government School

²⁵ Some Community Action Councils were actually formed before the official start date of the CSP in April 2008.

(AWGS)) just on the boundaries of the community. Most of the student population of the school were residents of Pinto Road (AWGS teacher, personal communication, April 2011). Due to the close location of the school and the intervention of the CSP, both the school administration and the PTA took advantage of CSP funding windows. As such, in Pinto Road the CSP intervention was able to capitalize on the wider organizational base of the community to initiate the second highest number of activities, but also to initiate collaborations which can have far reaching benefits for the community.

Samaroo Village/Mootoo Lands and Mt. Dor had the slowest rate of implementation, with only five (5) each of the 34 locally generated initiatives across the four communities. Although, these communities had a later start date than Never Dirty and Pinto Road, their weaker organizational character offers a stronger explanation for the implementation rate. The slower rate of implementation by Samaroo Village/Mootoo Lands and Mt. Dor suggests that the success of the CSP intervention was constrained by the limitations of local organizational norms and leadership. As noted in Chapter 7, the local organizational structures in Samaroo Village/Mootoo Lands were challenged by limited norms of collaboration and by conflict. In Mt. Dor, there was limited history of strong development programming as well as leadership challenges at the time of the research.

While this study was able to observe a pattern across the communities in terms of targeting the various domains of risk factors for crime and violence, evidence of local communities through the CACs or VCs engaging in a comprehensive assessment and documentation of the existing state of risks and protective factors present in the respective communities was not found. Such a review would be equivalent to developing a violence prevention plan and having specific targets in respect of the various risks (Payne and Button, 2008).


In addition, many of the locally generated activities funded under the CSP were existing initiatives of the local organizations or initiatives already on the agenda of the groups. This was

especially the case of the initiatives in the communities with weaker organizational arrangements, like Samaroo Village/Mootoo Lands and Mt. Dor. In Never Dirty, the newly installed VC generated a number of novel income generating skill initiatives, while in Pinto Road the majority of initiatives were newly devised and generated by a greater variety of local organizations as well as through external support from two (2) NGOs, and a nearby school. As such, community capacity to devise interventions to address risk factors for violence prevention also varied with the existing organizational structures and external support. In addition, each community retained a structure and focal point for dialogue and action around crime prevention, which at the completion of field work, was an ongoing enterprise that was gaining momentum.

Violent crime in the study communities

As noted previously, Trinidad and Tobago saw a steep increase in homicides beginning around 2000, which reached its peak in 2008, the year of the official commencement of the CSP. (See Figure 3, Chapter 3). However, since the introduction of the CSP, the rate of homicides, as well as the rates of injuries and shootings declined considerably both in the study communities, and the other 18 CSP partner communities. Figure 12 above, shows the trends with respect to homicides.

Figure 12: Rate of homicides per 100,000 population, 2008-2013 (November)




Source: Citizen Security Programme 2014

In 2008, the rate of homicides in the 22 CSP partner communities was 98 per 100,000 population compared with a rate of 43 per 100,000 nationally. By 2012, the rate in the CSP partner communities fell to 46 per 100,000 representing a 54% decrease, compared with a 31% decrease nationally, indicating a considerably higher rate of decline in partner communities. The four study communities saw an 81% decline in homicides.

Similarly, there was a downward trend in injuries and shootings nationally and in the partner communities between 2008 and 2012 (See Figure 13). What is noted here, is the steeper rate of change in the study communities (30%), and partner communities (41%) compared with the national figure (13%). Data on the rate of change in non-CSP high crime communities was unavailable for comparison.

Figure 13: Rate of injuries and shootings per 100,000 2008-2013(3rd Quarter)



Source: Citizen Security Programme 2014

This study makes no attempt to attribute these trends in the crime statistics to the Citizen Security Programme as the extent to which the CSP may have contributed to the decline in crime statistics could not be ascertained.

Discussion

The Citizen Security Programme was a timely intervention in the study communities that engendered a sense of peace, hope and control by residents over their space. The activities enabled residents to come out of their homes and socialize with fellow residents. This enjoyment of space was particularly important against the backdrop of their prior experiences of self-imposed curfews precipitated by unprecedented gun violence. Moreover, as observed in Chapter 5, it was in the collective activities as opposed to the individual relationships, that social cohesion was most evident and a sense of solidarity most convincingly expressed.

The CSP structure provided a new opportunity for sustained collective interaction and the expression of working trust. Through the Community Action Council and other related activities, individual residents and groups were brought together, many of whom had no previous relationship. In so doing, the CSP created an expanded network of pro-social residents who shared a common interest in crime prevention, a network which in turn could be harnessed for future relationships and collaboration.

The CSP's contribution to social control occurred through three mechanisms -- structure, programming and capacity building. Prior to the CSP there was no structure specifically addressing the issue of crime and violence prevention in the communities. The Village Councils, as the main avenue for organizational level social control, used a social development approach to addressing crime and violence (Hawkins, 1999) within their wider mandate for community well-being. The absence of specific focus on crime prevention results in the failure to target key risk and protective factors for crime and violence. While the approach via the CAC also needs to be better in this regard, the CAC structure provided a model for and the experience of deliberate focus on crime and violence prevention, albeit with the constant support of the CAO. Whether or not members choose to retain the CAC structure at the conclusion of the CSP initiative, or establish a permanent entity within or parallel to the Village Council, they would have begun to foment organizational norms of collaboration around crime prevention and the targeting of risk and protective factors.

CSP-funded programming appeared to target each of the four domains of risk factors for crime prevention, at least in three of the four communities. This targeting of multiple risks is in keeping with best practice in prevention science (Petrosino, Derzon & Lavenberg, 2009; Hawkins et al. 2002; Surgeon General, 2001). It is noted that best practices also make specific recommendations about program design (Hawkins, 2002) which has not been explored in this study. While the literature is reluctant to prioritize addressing any specific risks, it is noted that there was an imbalance in terms of limited

programming to address risks at the level of the family and reducing risks associated with criminogenic conditions in the communities. This study recognizes that income generating skills and mentorships are also relevant to protecting youth from criminogenic conditions such as the presence of gangs and crime. However, with respect to risks at the level of the family, the breakdown in household management and community parenting observed in Chapter 6 suggests that attention needs to be paid to parenting and household management issues in an effort to rebuild this critical component of private level social control. In addition, a critical role for local crime prevention is the need for dialogue and action challenging the sub-cultural norms and negotiated co-existence issues addressed in Chapter 6.

Given that social control in the study communities was largely delivered through local organizations, the CSP's focus on building the capacity of local organizations was well placed. The engagement of expert NGOs in program delivery helped generate risk reduction activities filling gaps where local organizations lacked the capacity. Additionally, delivery of capacity building exercises by consultants in the areas of organizational development and project management were huge investments both for the period under review and for future programming. The CSP's capacity building exercises also played a positive role in individual level social control as some recipients of training in mediation, domestic violence and child abuse were able to make applications in private interactions. Such training also has potential life-saving effects and as such, is of considerable value to the communities. Thirty six percent (36%) of the trainees interviewed indicated using their training in a manner akin to community parenting discussed in Chapter 6, notwithstanding the absence of any specific structure for such training to be utilized.

The CSP contribution to social control however, varied depending on the organizational norms or existing organizational and leadership capacity of the community, an issue noted by Rosenbaum (1988). Communities with stronger organizational structures and resources were able to deliver about

twice as many initiatives than those with weaker structures. Moreover, it appears that the resourcefulness of the leader may even be more important to project delivery than the capacity within the organization as a whole. For example, the fact that the Never Dirty Village Council President was able to facilitate the most projects can be related to the personality, information and motivations of the leader, rather than the creativity of the Village Council over which he presided. On the other hand, Pinto Road had a better resourced Village Council and CAC including wide support from faith based organizations, yet it generated slightly fewer initiatives than Never Dirty. One explanation may be the greater challenge it is to mobilize multiple organizations as the case of Pinto Road than it is to initiate action through one main organization.

Important lessons were also learned from communities with weaker organizational history and structures. It is tempting in the context of communities with weaker organizational structures and histories to concur with Krishna (2007), that a government agency acting as a referee or one engaged in capacity building would have limited impact on collective efficacy. The survival of the SVMML Community Action Council in the face of conflict within the Council and across groups or residents is testimony to the success of the CAO's role as a referee. However, the situation of Samaroo Village /Mootoo Lands also highlights the need for communities challenged by the issues of limited organizational arrangements, history and norms, to benefit from deliberate expert intervention and mediation to be assessed over time.

Sustainability remains a challenge to the CSP model, particularly in the context of reliance on and the mediating role played by the CAO, both in terms of being a "referee" in times of conflict or indecision, or a ready source of technical advice. The CAO also had legitimacy as a representative of the government and as a link to "sure" financial resources. As such, preparing the CAC or another structure to function independently is an area the CSP would need to address as it prepares for the closure or

extension of the program in 2014. In the event of the conclusion of the CSP, the other issue becomes whether or not another government agency will provide some of the support and oversight provided by the CSP.

There was also no indication of support to communities to engage in the development of a plan for violence prevention which would guide the implementation of initiatives by all participating organizations. This would have been an important investment in capacity building for the communities as well as provided a mechanism by which to assess interventions and progress.

Overall however, the CSP can be associated with growing the collective efficacy for crime prevention. The CSP enhanced social cohesion by being the catalyst for restored hope and confidence of residents, and by creating opportunities for interactions and the expression of working trust. In the area of social control, through the CAC structure, CSP-funded activities and capacity building, the CSP facilitated the generation of projects for social interaction and informal crime prevention. Moreover, the CSP initiated a prototype for community based violence prevention in Trinidad and Tobago, which can be described as a sustained, intense, multi-faceted community capacity building strategy.

Chapter 9: Synthesis, Implications, Conclusion

Synthesis of quantitative and qualitative findings

Compared with social disorganization theory which has a history in excess of 70 years, collective efficacy theory is relatively young. The theory of collective efficacy has however, made a very significant contribution to ecological explanations of crime and deviance by proposing an answer to the question, by what mechanisms are adverse structural conditions associated with crime (Small & Newman, 2001). The second contribution is that it specifies a direct measure of this mechanism in the concept of collective efficacy, thereby improving on previous attempts which used “proxy” measures of social disorganization such as participation in local organizations, unsupervised youth and local friendship networks (Sampson & Groves, 1989). In addition, the component parts of the collective efficacy measure – social cohesion and social control – are positively and highly correlated and appear to share a reciprocal relationship, providing statistical support for their incorporation into the singular concept of collective efficacy.

The 2007 Crime Victimization Survey (CVS) conducted in 19 communities in Trinidad contained a subset of the originally tested measures of collective efficacy. The analysis of collective efficacy using the CVS data, provided evidence that the theory of collective efficacy is relevant to Trinidad, and that collective efficacy behaves as it did in other contexts, that is, as an explanatory variable in the relationship between structural conditions and poor social outcomes. Specifically, it reduced the impact of poor structural conditions on the fear of crime. The consistent measurability of this community property and its negative association with adverse conditions makes it a useful target for community development policy in general and crime prevention policy in particular.

Overall, the qualitative analysis helped to explain how collective efficacy works and therefore how it intervenes between poor structural conditions and the fear of crime. It showed that communities

do in fact differ in terms of their degree of cohesiveness and their capacity for informal social control and so regardless of the level of poverty, may inherently be differentially able to intervene against adverse structural conditions.

While this is not a measurement study, some measurement concerns were noted with the concept of collective efficacy. The first issue has to do with the issue of the wording of the statement “people in this neighborhood share the same values”. As discussed in Chapter 2, this statement created some trouble for respondents in Trinidad. This is because they first assumed the statement may be alluding to personal values such as the value of a good education for children, the value of work or family. However, the concept of shared values in the collective efficacy literature is usually related to values around community well-being and crime prevention (Sampson & Graif, 2009). As such, this measure appears to require some adjustment for future surveys.

The first aim of the study was to understand the social organization of the selected Trinidad communities in light of the concept of collective efficacy. To this end, collective efficacy was dissected into its component parts and cohesiveness and engagement in social control were explored separately and their interactions observed. In addition to collective efficacy theory, the study applied a number of other ideas to help examine the operations of social cohesion and control, including bounded solidarity, negotiated co-existence, collective action, and new institutional theory.

The study found low levels of trust and close-knittedness in the study communities compared with other measures of social cohesion including getting along with neighbors, talking on the street or willingness to help neighbors. From an institutional perspective, it was understood that exogenous socio-economic and criminogenic pressures on these communities resulted in high levels of distrust and suspicion, and raised the costs of relational transactions in turn weakening individual relationships. A contribution of this study to the collective efficacy literature is the qualitative association made between

these weakened individual relationships and the weakened private level social control observed in the study communities. This study purports that these weakened individual relations fuelled by distrust and suspicion are in large measure responsible for the breakdown in community parenting and in the regulation of adult civic behavior. Private sanctions are more likely to work where persons have some regard or respect for the person attempting to sanction. As such, efforts at sanction typically resulted in conflict further undermining the enforcement of community norms.

At the household level, the study concurred with Anderson (1994) and Rodman (1971) that families evinced various cultural capacities based on their nexus to opportunities, and their repertoire of tools for social interaction and family management (Wilson, 1996). As such, according to Rodman (1971) families experiencing economic and family instability or according to Anderson (1994) families that evinced “street values” were the ones most likely to be associated with weaker nurturing and family monitoring and supervision practices. The customary presence of unsupervised children in each area attested to weaker private level social controls at the household level, in some quarters.

Many authors (Browning et al., 2000; Pattillo, 1998; Venkatesh, 1997) have noted that one of the challenges of social cohesion is its ability to transmit protection to criminal members of the community. Consistent with the idea of negotiated coexistence between conventional and criminal residents, this study noted that protection from sanction or prosecution was transmitted through three mechanisms on the part of conventional residents namely, fear, benefits and a sub-cultural acceptance of the “non-lethal” (Browning et al. 2000) criminal activities of residents believed to be their only option for survival.

The resulting weakened private level social control, including poor parental monitoring, ineffective civil control of adults and negotiated co-existence with criminal residents presented severe challenges for the social control in the study communities, in that it would have contributed to the

persistence of crime and violence despite varying organizational efforts to protect high risk residents. The weakened private level social control evidenced in these communities therefore provides support for Hunter's position that social control is effective only when all levels of social control are in operation simultaneously (1985, in Bursik & Grasmick, 1993). It is noted however, that the study communities also experienced external pressures that were directly facilitative of crime and violence, in particular, the criminal capture of the public works programs. The theory of collective efficacy is silent on the role of such external pressures in attenuating the generation of collective efficacy.

In addition, targeting risk factors for crime and violence at the level of the family or in terms of addressing sub-cultural norms appear to require specialist intervention likely beyond the capacity of the local organizations and certainly warrant very careful thought and strategic intervention. Norms are hard to dismantle and residents tend to be less inclined to target them for fear of conflict and loss of reputation (Chong, 1991). It was noted in Chapter 8, for example, that smaller percentages of CSP-funded projects targeted these issues.

As the weakening of trust and close-knittedness reduced private level social control, residents adopted relational norms which allowed them to minimize conflict and emotional costs. Those norms favored "getting along" and facilitated working trust. Here, the differential association between mechanisms of cohesion and levels of social control is observed. A low level of trust and close-knittedness was associated with weak private level social control, but organizational level social control continued to be facilitated by the fact that most residents got along with each other.

Another contribution of this study is its examination of the respective roles of leadership and local organization structure on collective efficacy. The collective efficacy literature has paid insufficient attention to these issues. While, the degree of participation in local organizations has long been recognized as a measure of community attachment and cohesion (Kasarda & Janowitz, 1974; Sampson &

Groves, 1989; Ross & Jang, 2000), the activities of organizations have hardly been examined. This study has demonstrated that leadership and local organizations contribute differentially and significantly both to social cohesion and social control.

Overall, organizational level social control, which combines social control at the parochial and public levels, remains the most visible and consistent facilitator of social control practiced in the study communities. Local organizations generate multiple benefits to collective efficacy. The presence of long standing stable organizations has been associated with the generation of norms and rules of collaboration (Krishna, 2007), inspiring the adoption of other group-based interventions in the community and creating opportunities for the expression of working trust. The presence of local organizations also generates social cohesion because organizations create opportunities for social interaction among group members and spearhead activities which build social cohesion. This highlights the reciprocal nature of social cohesion and social control such that collective action to address social concerns becomes a source of cohesion.

However, as seen in Chapters 7 and 8, local organizations are voluntary entities whose strength and implementation ability relies on the non-random emergence of local leaders with some capacity for mobilizing others and for service delivery. Like other authors (Rosenbaum, 1988; Skogan, 1988), the study found that capacity and interests of local organizations vary, influencing their approach to crime prevention. As such, efforts to harness the energies of these local organizations for crime prevention in a structured manner, should take cognizance of the differential levels of needs of communities and the nature, interest and capacity of the local organizations as evidenced by their historical record.

The local leader also makes important contributions to collective crime prevention capacity. Krishna (2007) argued that the local leader's contribution to social capital was in the area of rule generation. This study found that the style, credibility and capacity of the leader also contributed both

to social cohesion and social control. The style and credibility of the leader appeared to be associated with building cohesion, encouraging individual involvement and collaboration across groups, consistent with collective action theory (Chong, 1991). The capacity and interests of the leader contributed to the way in which organizations responded to the challenges of underdevelopment and crime. The study also noted that leaders or unconditional cooperators emerged within the communities even where collaborative norms were underdeveloped. These are persons willing to make personal sacrifices for community well-being, and as indicated by Ostrom (2000), all communities have their share of such individuals.

Like Krishna (2007) this study is also unable to predict the generation of capable leaders in any community at any particular point in time, but notes that the communities appeared to have a ready supply of willing cooperators. The study holds that foundational to the generation and expression of collective efficacy, residents experience an underlying solidarity of place (Portes, 2003), based on their shared history in the community and their common experiences of poverty and stigma. This solidarity is responsible for an attachment to the neighborhood and a willingness to make altruistic contributions to its advancement “independent of benefits” (Browning, et al., 2000). This solidarity is the underlying motivation that produces conditional and unconditional cooperators who have been at the forefront of community leadership and local community participation. This is notwithstanding other motivations including self-interest (which was least observed), reputational benefits (Chong, 1991) and bounded rationality (Ostrom, 2010). The presence of willing cooperators augers well for crime prevention policy and practice, as it indicates a resource that could be tapped and strengthened.

The Citizen Security Programme was initiated as a mechanism for growing collective efficacy to prevent crime at the local level against the backdrop of weakened private level social control, varying organizational efforts and strengths and varying leadership capacities. The CSP approach is reminiscent

of the implant hypothesis of the 1970s and 80s which argued that social control could be implanted by purposive action, in communities where it was lacking (Rosenbaum, 1988). Testing the implant hypothesis was obstructed for the most part, by the implementation of initiatives without due consideration for evaluations and the resulting lack of scientific studies (Rosenbaum). Skogan (1988) however highlighted a number of shortcomings of the earlier interventions, some of which have been avoided by the CSP and some not. The strengths of the CSP intervention were in the high dosage of technical support and capacity building provided to the local organizations, the clear funding channels, assistance with grant proposal writing for access to funding, the close attention to monitoring and evaluation, the engagement of expert NGO resources to aid in project implementation and the attempt at a scientific approach to crime prevention.

One of the observations Skogan (1988) made was that there was little change in the agendas of participating organizations, many of which simply sought to have program funding satisfy their existing agendas. While this was also observed in the study communities, the more important shortcoming was the absence of a concerted attempt at detailing a crime prevention plan that would clearly identify the risks and protective factors for attention in the respective communities, to which the various groups could then contribute initiatives. While for the most part CSP-funded initiatives targeted each category of risks, a comprehensive plan would have contributed to the targeting of risk and protective factors in a systematic manner.

The lack of a clear arrangement for engaging law enforcement agencies in support of the local efforts was another shortcoming of the CSP effort vis a vis best practice in community-based anti-crime efforts (Skogan, 1988; Howell & Curry, 2009). Another major cause for concern is the issue of the sustainability and the absence up to the conclusion of field work, of specific arrangements for the

continuity of the crime prevention focal point at the local level, as well as the continued access to dedicated funding.

While it is hypothesized that increased collective efficacy will result in reduced crime and violence through social programs scientifically positioned to address risk and protective factors, the study is unable to address the issue of whether the activities funded by the CSP resulted in a reduction in crime and violence. A number of issues are pertinent. First, information on crime and violence in non-CSP communities was unavailable, and this would have been instructive for comparison with CSP-partner communities. Second, the study was a snapshot of the CSP in its fourth year of implementation at the time of the study. Communities continued to implement a range of initiatives under the CSP for two years after the field work and it is anticipated that there should have been improvements in program quality over time. The study also excluded consideration of to what extent and how well risk factors were addressed. Moreover, an examination of program beneficiaries would help in an understanding of whether the most at risk residents were being targeted, and a longitudinal tracer study would be instructive to determine who how the local programs may have altered their life trajectories. The CSP is due to conclude in April, 2014.

The study however, attests to the CSP's contribution to building social cohesion and the local capacity for social control in tangible ways through the CAC structure, programming and capacity building, notwithstanding that the momentum gain varied with local community capacity. The programs restored a sense of community control, safety, unity and hope by residents in these crime-shattered communities. The CSP-funded activities such as camps, skills training, sport, and mentorships, engaged at-risk children and youth in a variety of wholesome pursuits as a distraction from lure of crime and violence, while exposing them to content that could positively influence their choices and outcomes.

Implications

The current study has revealed a number of important implications for research, policy and practice.

Implications for Research

Three areas for further research include study design issues, measurement issues, and determining whether and how CE could be increased.

Improve the study design

In terms of the quantitative analysis, the study was severely limited by the number (n=19) and homogeneity (low income) of the communities, resulting in a low effect size. A truer test of collective efficacy in Trinidad and Tobago should consider a larger number and wider range of communities. Increasing the sample and variety of communities may also facilitate the use of multi-level modeling as has been the standard in examining the intervening effect of collective efficacy. Additionally, in future studies of collective efficacy in Trinidad and Tobago, all 10 item measures of collective efficacy or carefully chosen and tested substitutes appropriate to the local context should be employed.

Overcome Measurement Challenges

Sampson et al. (1997) have presented highly reliable scale measures of collective efficacy. However, based on the tendency of researchers to substitute items in their collective efficacy studies, there appears to be insufficient agreement on the items that should be used to capture social cohesion and social control. Moreover, in this study two specific concerns have been noted. The first issue is the wording of the statement “People in this neighborhood share the same values.” It appears that Sampson et al. (1997) intended this statement to address the issue of shared values for community well-being instead of the wide range of personal values possible, and as such the measure needs to be more specific.

Secondly, social control as a construct can be defined in terms of Hunter's (1985) typology of the private, parochial and public levels of control. The items of the social control scale utilized by Sampson et al. (1997) and several other authors should more adequately address these three types of social control. In addition, researchers seem to disagree as to whether there should be a generic measure of social control as appears to be intended by Sampson et al. (1997), or measures relevant to different outcomes that would place emphasis on adult-youth relationships (Browning et al., 2005), adult-youth interventions against crime (Rankin & Quane, 2002) or organizational level interventions. It seems to be theoretically appropriate to develop and test a generic measure of social control that incorporates indicators of active engagement in the three levels of social control. In addition, social scales with indicators that zero in on each of these should be developed. This will allow the statistical examination of the type of agency for social control a community demonstrates the most capacity for. Each new scale should be appropriately named.

Examine the impact of interventions on CE

The breadth of this study resulted in an assessment of the contribution of the CSP to improving collective efficacy in the study communities that was limited to the perspectives of the respondents and the targeting of risks factors for crime and violence. However, the theory of CE provides an opportunity to test some variation of Rosenbaum's (1988) implant hypothesis. The implant hypothesis states that social control and related processes [CE] can be implanted by collective action, in communities where it is lacking (p. 327). Rosenbaum (1988) noted that the evaluations of community based crime prevention programs of the 1970s and 1980s were of largely of poor methodological quality and therefore provided tentative conclusions, with many suggesting that there were minimal positive effects on crime reduction. Additionally, as observed in this study, there was more success in improving cohesion and control in communities where a higher level of social organization was already in place. While the study

has provided qualitative evidence of the CSP contribution to collective efficacy, well designed (experimental or quasi-experimental) interventions research are needed to provide quantitative evidence of this association. Even more critical is the need to establish an association between improved local programming and the reduction of crime and violence.

Implications for social work practice

The empirical research provides Social Workers with some evidence to pursue increasing community based collective efficacy in the fight against crime. That is, by building the local capacity of residents and resident based organizations to take a guided leadership role in community based crime prevention. Such a strategy endows residents with a sense of control, confidence and hope. However, such an approach also demands considerable resources and sustained and structured intervention focused on best practices in crime prevention science. Residents must therefore be aided in their assessments of their communities and guided in terms of how to target needs and strengths so as to minimize risks and enhance protective factors for crime and violence. As such, the Social Worker must function as a facilitator, expert and technical resource to ensure guidance, knowledge transfer and the attraction of national resources to local efforts.

The strategy should also be two-tiered in terms of building cohesion and the capacity for social control. Social Workers must be aware that (i) efforts to build cohesion where there is a high degree of distrust and residents are disengaged have not typically been successful (Rosenbaum, 1988; Rosenbaum et al, 1998), perhaps because they failed to cater to the low and high emotional cost dynamic of contemporary communities unearthed in this study; (ii) the physical conditions (evidence of disorder, poor maintenance, ambience, walkability), degree of disinvestment and fear of crime, play important roles in attenuating trust and cohesion (Gibson et al, 2002; Bellair, 1997; Ross & Jang, 2000) and; (iii) collective action through local organizations was the most powerful facilitator of cohesion in the study

communities suggesting that creative strategies using collective action may be the most fruitful approach to cohesion building.

In addition, there is a need for strategies to build social control to be cognizant of the different levels of social control. As such, Social Workers need to assess community capacity for social control in the three spheres elaborated by Hunter (1985), build on its strengths and/or bolster its weak areas. Ideally, communities should have the capacity to deliver effective informal social control at the private (familial, extra-familial and civil); parochial (organizational) and public levels (political). Firstly, both Carr (2003) in Beltway and this study, have provided evidence that communities already employ an integrated approach to the latter two areas. Secondly, there is strong evidence that (i) attachment to family is important to reducing or avoiding juvenile delinquency (Sampson and Laub, 2005; Laub et al., 2006) and (ii) the most salient predictor of early involvement in deviance and problem behaviors is lack of parental control or monitoring (Rankin & Quane, 2002; Browning et al, 2005). Accordingly, strategies that target risks at the level of the family and seek to improve family/child management practices will be important imperatives for Social Workers in community based crime prevention.

Further, the study suggests that concentrated disadvantage and sub-cultural norms facilitated negotiated coexistence with criminals considerably obstructed private level social control among adults. This suggests in the first instance, that the social work practitioners need to promote economic development, education and skills building strategies aimed at improving the employability of residents, thereby reducing reliance on the criminal economy. Alongside these efforts, Social Workers should facilitate dialogue within communities aimed at bringing to the forefront the norms that facilitate the criminal enterprise, and in this way assist residents to begin to generate strategies to counteract the transmission of these norms.

The CSP strategy is an important model for social work in community-based crime prevention practice which indicates that in the context of crime prevention science (Hawkins, 1999) a dedicated focal point at the governmental level is necessary to ensure that implications outlined above are addressed in a systematic manner.

Implications for policy

Collective efficacy as a focus of crime prevention policy

The successful mediation effect of collective efficacy in these fairly homogeneous lower income communities is an important finding for the theory of collective efficacy and for crime prevention policy. It suggests that on the one hand, collective efficacy is important to crime prevention in Trinidad consistent with the findings of other studies, and that building the capacity of local organizations can contribute to collective efficacy. On the other hand, the study notes that endogenous pressures and external socio-economic and administrative policies can especially attenuate private level social control. These two factors have clear policy implications. First, engaging with the social organizational arrangements in a community should be seen as an important but not the only component of any community-based crime fighting strategy. Second, wider macro socio-economic and administrative policies which impact local communities, including policies that affect the quality of education and employment, the availability and accessibility of opportunities for technical skill building and legitimate income creation are also critical. Moreover, the importance of re-taking control of and revamping the public works programs to ensure that they do not facilitate and finance criminal activities is absolutely essential.

A Government focal point for community based crime prevention

The CSP established a model for community based crime prevention in Trinidad and Tobago. Too often good models die with the conclusion of the project or the change of political administration.

It is essential that the momentum started by the CSP, as well as the structure, capacity building, mobilization of expert resources for local efforts, grant funding, and technical human resources be preserved as an ongoing initiative of the government. As such, the CSP should find a permanent home in an arm of government that would afford it the highest priority, and should retain its quasi-independent structure, professional status and remit for driving community based crime prevention efforts throughout Trinidad and Tobago. It is also critical that the resources be made available to the CSP to facilitate the conduct of crime prevention strategic plans with local organizations in keeping with crime prevention science.

Sensitive community policing

Another avenue of mistrust especially in lower income minority communities is the relationship with the police (Sampson et al, 2001). Trusting relationships between the police and the community can engender feelings of safety, encourage more locally based activities, reduce distrust among residents (Roman & Chalfin, 2008) and lead to greater social cohesion. Community policing strategies do not always work because of the stigma of discriminatory policing among minorities. Evidence of a successful community policing strategy-the Ten Point Coalition in Boston-- saw a brokered relationship between the religious community and the police in which, in return for “non-abusive and non-racist methods on the part of the police” the leaders took responsibility for social order among the youth (Berrien & Winship, 1999 in Sampson et al. 2001, p. 106). A policy towards similar types of brokered peace with law enforcement, which suggests free and frank dialogue with communities, should inform community/police relationships.

Conclusion

The study finds much support for the hypotheses outlined at Chapter 2. Bounded solidarity is an underlying stable presence in the communities, emerging from a common history and poor socio-

economic conditions. It is that sense of “we-ness” that inspires a desire to be connected with one’s neighbors, and underlies a shared commitment to community well-being. However, socio-economic, external and internal subcultural pressures heighten distrust and weaken social control especially at the private level, a situation that needs focused attention. In the context of those pressures however, residents forged new relational norms focused on getting along, maintaining cordial relations with low emotional cost. These new norms support the maintenance of working trust and the generation of collective activities expressing solidarity and social control. Local organizations and local organizational leadership are the main locus of social control and therefore critical for the task of crime prevention. The local organizational response to community well-being and violence prevention was enhanced by the intervention of the Citizen Security Programme, notwithstanding that local organizations are subject to the uncertainties, the non-random presence of quality leadership, and the sub-cultural pressures of the community. The CSP built community capacities for cohesion and control while supporting efforts to reduce risk and support protective factors in the communities, establishing a model of intervention that could be enhanced and up-scaled.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Measures used in the 2007 Crime Victimization Survey

Items	Questions	Response categories
<u><i>Fear of crime</i></u>		
In your home or apartment?		
On the streets of your community during the day?	How do you feel about your safety	1=Very safe, 2=safe, 3=very unsafe.
On the streets of your community at night?		
<u><i>Collective efficacy*</i></u>		
Social Cohesion		
People around here are willing to help their neighbors.	Now we would like to ask briefly about how close the members of your neighborhood feel toward one another	5=strongly agree, 4=agree, 3=neither agree nor disagree, 2=disagree, 1=strongly disagree.
People around here can be trusted.		
This is a close-knit community.		
Social Control		
Likelihood that neighbors would do something about children skipping school.	Now I'm going to ask you some general questions about your views of your neighborhood	5=Very likely, 4=likely, 3=neither likely nor unlikely, 2=unlikely, 1=very unlikely.
Likelihood that neighbors would intervene if a fight broke out in front of your home.		
Likelihood that neighbors would intervene if a child was showing disrespect to an adult.		
<u><i>Dissatisfaction with the police**</i></u>		
The police in your neighbourhood do a good job of preventing crime.	Now I am going to ask you some general questions about your views of police services. I'll read some statements about police effectiveness. For each statement, please tell me whether you:	5=strongly agree, 4=agree, 3=neither agree nor disagree, 2=disagree, 1=strongly disagree*
The police in your neighbourhood promptly respond to non-emergency calls for assistance.		
The police in your neighbourhood promptly respond to emergency calls for assistance.		
The police in your neighbourhood are helpful to people who have been victims of crime.		
Overall, the police are effective in		

dealing with the problems that really concern people in your neighbourhood.

The police in your neighbourhood are doing a good job working together with residents to solve local problems.

The police in your neighbourhood do a good job dealing with residents in a fair manner.

The police in your neighbourhood do a good job dealing with residents in a courteous manner.

Note:

*The collective efficacy items excluded from the CVS were as follows:

On the social control scale: What is the likelihood that neighbors would intervene if, “the fire station closest to their home was threatened with budget cuts” and “children were spray-painting graffiti on a local building.

On the social cohesion scale: How strongly you agree that “People in this neighborhood share the same values”, and “People in this neighborhood generally get along with each other

**Dissatisfaction with the police is the label chosen by the author for the study. The questions measured police effectiveness. These responses were reverse coded for use in the current study. For these questions also respondents were given the additional options of ‘refused’ and ‘don’t know.

Appendix B: Short questionnaire for adult participants



SHORT QUESTIONNAIRE FOR ADULT PARTICIPANTS

RESEARCH TEAM USE ONLY: PART.# _____

Date: _____ Location: _____

1. Name: _____

2. Address: _____

3. Age: _____

4. Gender (tick): a. Female: []
b. Male: []

5. Ethnicity:

a. African: []
b. Indian: []
c. Mixed: []
d. Other: []

6. Marital Status

a. Married Partnered: []
b. Single: []
c. Divorced/Separated: []
d. Widowed: []

7. Highest level of education:

a. Up to primary education: []
b. High school: []
c. Technical/vocational: []
d. Assoc. Degree/some college: []

e. Bachelors degree: []
f. Graduate/professional degree: []
g. Refused: []

8. Employment status: (if in a & b go to 9; if c to f go to 10)

a. Employed full time (> 35 hrs): []
b. Employed part time (up to 35 hrs): []
c. Currently seeking employment: []
d. In school or job training: []
e. Retired, not seeking employment: []
f. Other, not seeking employment: []
g. Refused: []

9. Occupation(s): _____

10. Total **monthly** household income: _____

11. Tenure status: _____

a. Owner-occupied home []

b. Renter-occupied home: []

12. Number of years of residence in this community: _____

13. List groups/organizations involved in based in this community, and period of involvement?

Appendix C: Short questionnaire for teenage participants



SHORT QUESTIONNAIRE FOR TEENAGE PARTICIPANTS

RESEARCH TEAM USE ONLY: PART.# _____

Date: _____ Location: _____

1. Name: _____

2. Address: _____

3. Age: _____

4. Gender (tick): a. Female: ☐
b. Male: ☐

5. Ethnicity: a. African: ☐ b. Indian: ☐ c. Mixed: ☐ d. Other: ☐

6. Do you attend school: a. Yes: ☐ (if yes, go to 7) b. No: ☐

7. What school do you attend? _____

8. Do you receive free lunches at school: a. Yes ☐ b. No: ☐

9. What is the current make-up of your family? (Extended means that other relatives such as aunt, uncle, grandparents also reside in the home)

a. Two parent/guardian family: ☐ d. One parent/guardian (father/male): ☐
b. Two parent/guardian & extended: ☐ e. One parent/guardian & extended: ☐
c. One parent/guardian (mother/female): ☐ f. Live with relatives: ☐

10. What is the employment status of the head of your household:

a. Employed full time (> 35 hrs): ☐ e. Retired, not seeking employment: ☐
b. Employed part time (up to 35 hrs): ☐ f. Other, not seeking employment: ☐
c. Currently seeking employment: ☐ g. Don't know: ☐
d. In school or job training: ☐ h. Refused: ☐

11. How many years have you lived in this community:

a. From birth: ☐ OR b. State number of years: _____

12. List groups/organizations involved in based in this community, and period of involvement?

Appendix D: Summary Report on Principal Axis Factoring for Data Reduction

Factor Analysis

The factors fear of crime, collective efficacy, social cohesion, social control, and dissatisfaction with the police were derived through principal axis factoring in SPSS 19.0. This method was considered suitable given its simplicity and ability to remove the unique and error variance from each of the measured variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007, p. 657). It is also said to be more robust to non-normality than maximum likelihood (Pison et al., 2001, Professor Ed Spitznagel, personal communication, June 3, 2012). The measured variables showed no multicollinearity and were appropriate for factor analysis, as confirmed by significant sphericity tests and favorable (> 0.6) Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin's measure of sampling adequacy (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).

Consistent with relevant theories, existing evidence and the goals of this study, I sought to extract one factor each from the respective measured variables as seen at Table 1, which provides a summary of the results of principal axis factoring. I used varimax rotation, an orthogonal rotation method which constrains items to correlate with one factor only (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Three statistics were used to determine the success of the resulting factors with eigenvalues greater than one. These included, the communalities, loadings and percentage variance explained by the factor. The communality expresses the variance shared by an item with other indicator items, while the loadings indicate how well the factor is represented by the item (Bowen & Guo, 2011). According to Tabachnick & Fidell (2007), acceptable item loadings should be at .32 and above while communalities of .2 are considered low.

Five factors were meaningfully extracted from the respective analyses with moderate to high communalities, and loadings well above acceptable limits. This means that the respective items performed well as fairly reliable indicators of the factors they represented. Additionally, all of the latent factors explained more than 50% of the variance in the set of variables.

Table 1: Summary results of principal axis factoring

Effect Items and factor labels	SMC	Loadings	Variance explained	KMO test	Sphericity
<i>Fear of crime</i>			73%	.68	$\chi^2 (3, 2133) = 2375.7, p < .0001.$
How do you feel about your safety:					
In your home or apartment?	.44	.67			
On the streets of your community during the day?	.86	.93			
On the streets of your community during the night?	.54	.73			
<i>Collective efficacy</i>			2.3%	5 82	$\chi^2 (15, 2133) = 4473.4, p < .0001.$
People around here are willing to help their neighbors.	.62	.75			
People around here can be trusted.	.60	.73			

This is a close-knit community.	.71	.79		
Likelihood that neighbors would do something about children skipping school.	.45	.58		
Likelihood that neighbors would intervene if a fight broke out in front of your home.	.50	.61		
Likelihood that neighbors would intervene if a child was showing disrespect to an adult.	.43	.55		
Social cohesion	76.2%	.726	$\chi^2 (3, 2133) = 2643.5, p < .0001.$	
People around here are willing to help their neighbors.	.62	.79		
People around here can be trusted.	.60	.78		
This is a close-knit community.	.71	.84		
Social control	64.1%	.680	$\chi^2 (3, 2133) = 1244, p < .0001.$	
Likelihood that neighbors would do something about children skipping school.	.45	.67		
Likelihood that neighbors would intervene if a fight broke out in front of your house.	.50	.71		
Likelihood that neighbors would intervene if a child was showing disrespect to an adult.	.43	.66		
Dissatisfaction with the police	59.4%	.896	$\chi^2 (28, 2133) = 9429.3, p < .0001.$	
The police in your neighborhood do a good job of preventing crime.	.52	.72		
The police in your neighborhood promptly respond to non-emergency calls for assistance.	.43	.65		
The police in your neighborhood promptly respond to emergency calls for assistance.	.50	.71		
The police in your neighborhood are helpful to people who have been victims of crime.	.50	.71		
Overall, the police are effective	.61	.78		

in dealing with the problems
that really concern people in
your neighborhood.

The police in your neighborhood .62 .79
are doing a good job working
together with residents to solve
local problems.

Overall, the police in your .57 .76
neighborhood are doing a good
job dealing with residents in a
fair manner

Overall, the police in your .55 .74
neighborhood are doing a good
job dealing with residents in a
courteous manner

Key variables - Primary Dataset

An important feature of the primary data is that it contains 23 items measuring collective efficacy. Twelve of these measure social cohesion and eleven measure social control. The measures were mostly taken from the Project on Human Development in Chicago. As with the measures in the CVS the items were subject to principal axis factoring with varimax rotation in SPSS 19.0. with the aim of deriving three sets of factor scores, each measuring collective efficacy, social cohesion and social control. I also examined each combination of items for multicollinearity prior to running factor analysis and found none. The responses on these measures were fairly well distributed across the items, with only very slight negative skewness (-1.08) and slight kurtosis (-1.13) on two social control effect items and very low kurtosis (-1.13) and (-1.14) on two social cohesion effect items.

I considered the factorability of these measures by examining Bartlett's sphericity tests and Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin's measure of sampling adequacy. The results of the Bartlett's sphericity test were all significant and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure was above .6 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007) for all the combinations except social control, which was .567. Malhotra (n.d.) argues that below .5 suggests that factor analysis is inappropriate.

Table 2: Results of Principal Axis Factor Analysis of collective efficacy, social control and social cohesion

Effect items	Collective efficacy	Social control	Social cohesion	Source
1...If there was a problem in the community, neighbors would get together to deal with the problem?	.42	.56		PHDCN*
2. If a child is showing disrespect to an adult, how likely is it that the people in the community will scold that child?	.43	.30		PHDCN

3. If there was a fight in front of your house and someone was being beaten how likely is it that neighbors would break it up?	.32	.49		
4. If the government planned to close the community center, how likely is it that people in this community would take action to prevent that?	.59	.48		PHDCN (revised)
5. How likely is it that someone would intervene if neighborhood children are seen at the wrong place at the wrong time (say out of school)?	.42	.44		PHDCN (revised)
6. This is a close knit community	.71		.59	PHDCN
7. People are willing to help each other	.26		.19	PHDCN
8. People trust each other enough to share confidential information.	.48		.60	PHDCN (revised)
9. People generally get along	.41		.41	PHDCN
10. People in this neighborhood share the same values	.37		.46	PHDCN
<i>Variance explained</i>	28%	37%	37%	
Kaiser-Meyer-Olin Measure of Sampling Adequacy	.69	.63	.65	
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	$\chi^2 (45, 59) = 64.6, p < .000$	$\chi^2 (21, 59) = 64.6, p < .000$	$\chi^2 (10, 59) = 24.2, p < .007$	

The aim of the PFA models was not to attempt to derive the best measurement model of collective efficacy, social control or social cohesion which is outside of the aims of this study, but rather

to examine the applicability of the existing measurement structure in the local context. As such I attempted to derive factor scores from the original ten items used in the 1995 study (Sampson et al., 1997). Among the social control items, one of the original items which asked whether neighbors would intervene if 'children were spray-painting graffiti on a local building' was not used in this study because the spraying of graffiti on local buildings is not a current problem in the local context. This was replaced with another PHDCN question which asked whether neighbors would get together to solve a local problem. In addition, the item which enquired about community intervention if the nearby fire station was threatened with closure, was adjusted to enquire of community intervention if the local community center was threatened with closure, as this is an issue that residents would be more readily able to identify with. Although these questions were not used in the original ten-item measure of collective efficacy, as can be seen from Table 2 they converged reasonably well with the other items.

Varimax rotation was selected as I required only one factor from each model. The number of factors requested was therefore restricted to one. In addition, I opted for a loading cut off of .3 given that this is only the second of such examinations in the Caribbean and given my small sample size. Tabachnick & Fidell (2007) identify .32 and above as meaningful. As indicated at Table 2, the items mostly loaded within the selected range save item seven (7) which had a sub-standard performance on both the collective efficacy and social cohesion factors. I kept this factor in the model as reciprocity is a key component of social cohesion (Sampson, 2006; Browning et al. 2004).

The factors collective efficacy (CEFSORG), social control (SCNMXD) and social cohesion (SCHORG) were very normally distributed with non-significant Shapiro-Wilks and skewness and kurtosis values below ± 1 (Tabachnick & Fidell (2007)). A full list of model variables is provided at Table 4.6. In addition to the factors discussed above, control variables for the analysis include individual characteristics including age, gender, ethnicity; socio-economic characteristics such as individual income, highest education, employment status, occupational category, and home ownership status. Variables reflecting the respondent's level of community attachment including years of residence and organization affiliation were also included.

Appendix E: Revised key informant interview guide

January 27, 2011.

REVISED KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW GUIDE

ID: _____

Interview date (dd/mm/yy): _____

Start time: _____ : _____ am / pm

< Not to be read to participants >

Purpose:

Questions 01-08: To understand individual perceptions about their community

Questions 09-11: To understand the community's social cohesion

Questions 12-14: To understand social networks in the community

Questions 15-22: To understand the informal social control and problem solving ability

Questions 23-28 To understand the community's perception of their involvement in crime prevention

Questions 29-34 To understand the impact of the CSP on social cohesion and control

Questions 35-36: Closing questions

Thank you for taking the time to meet with me today. I am doing a study on how residents are informally engaged in regulating life in their neighborhood and how cohesive the community is. I would like to get your feedback on several questions about your impressions of, changes in the community over time, how your community informally regulates and controls resident behavior as well as on the degree of interaction and closeness among residents in this area. You can refuse to answer any question that you may feel uncomfortable answering, and we can stop the interview at any point if you do not wish to continue. Are there any questions before we start?

Are you willing to give up to two hours of your time to participate in this interview?

Let us begin.....

I am going to ask you about your perceptions of the community, and how it might have changed over time.

If a friend said that they were planning to move to *(name of community)* what would you tell them were the **best** things about living in this area? [Adapted from PHDCN 1.A.]?

Follow-up

a. Are there other things you **like** about living in *(name of community)*

- Probe:

Location?

Good neighbors, good friendships, family, support, activities?

Physical conditions (roads, sidewalks, housing, clean)?

Cherished experiences?

If a friend said that they were planning to move to *(name of community)* what would you tell them were the **worst** things about living in this area? [Adapted from PHDCN 1.B.]

Follow-up

a. Are there other things you **don't like** about living in (name of community)

- Probe:

Reputation?

Location?

Physical conditions (roads, sidewalks, housing, clean)?

Poor relationships, conflict, lack of support?

Gangs, crime?

What are the boundaries of this community to the east west north and south?

Would you like to be living here in the next three years? Give reasons for your answer if they differ from questions 2 & 5 above? *[Adapted from PHDCN 10.]*

.

Would you say over the last 10 years , (or since you've been here) physical conditions (roads, sidewalks, housing-abandoned/not looked after-, cleanliness and general maintenance, graffiti) have:

Improved []

Worsened []

Remained the same []

- Probe:

What has improved?

What has worsened?

What has remained the same?

Would you say over the last 10 years, (or since you've been here) social conditions (loitering and rowdy behavior, public drunkenness, drug selling and abuse, gangs and out-of-control youth, crime, resident relations) have:

Improved []

Worsened []

Remained the same []

- Probe:

What has improved?

What has worsened?

What has remained the same?

Discuss each issue from questions 7 and 8 independently

Instruments of Social Capital Assessment Tool-Annex 1B-Community Questionnaire]

Source: Questions 5-6_ World Bank Social Capital Assessment Tool-Community Questionnaire.

I am going to ask some questions about your personal involvement in the community.

For persons who indicated on the short questionnaire that they **were involved** in local organizations.
What prompted you to become involved in the social life of the community?

For persons who were **not involved** in local organizations.

8. Can you share why you chose not to be involved in the social of your community?

I am going to ask some questions about relationships and closeness in the community.

What are some of the things you do in this community that makes this community special and unique?

Probes:

What the community might traditionally do together at specific holidays, times of the year (summer vacation), special family events (weddings, deaths, baby dedications etc).

What other types of events the community engages in / participation level / frequency?

I am going to read some statements about things that people in your neighborhood may or may not do.

For each of these statements, please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree, and tell me the reason for your answer? *[Adapted from PHDCN 11, 20, 21, and 22.]*

Statements	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Dis-agree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know	Ref-used	WHY
This is a close knit community								
People are willing to help each other								
People trust each other enough to share confidential information.								
People generally get along								
If I had to borrow \$50.00 in an emergency, I could borrow it from a neighbor								
If I were sick, I could count on my neighbors to shop for groceries for me or bring food for me.								
People in this neighborhood share the same values								
People in this community ask each other for advice about personal things such as child rearing, domestic problems, job openings.								
When people in this community have parties or other get-togethers they invite their neighbors.								
People in this community visit in each other's homes or talk on the street.								
People in this community come out and support local activities and events.								

Can you share with me some of the **negative** ways neighbors relate to each other in the community?

- Probes:

Is there a lot of conflict? How widespread?

Mistrust

Jealous of the other's progress

Steal from each other

I am going to ask some questions about your social network in the community.

How many of your relatives (sisters, brothers, cousins, nieces, nephews, grandparents, aunts, uncles) or in-laws live in this community?

-Most -a bit more than half -about half -a bit less than half -few/none -dk -ref

How many persons in this community would you consider your friends, that is, you trust them to watch your children, your property or may visit their homes, share confidential information?

-None -One or Two -Three to Five -Six to Nine -Ten or more -Don't know -Refused

Probe:

What are your reasons for trusting these people?

If no trusted friends, ask about associates (persons you hang out with but don't really trust)

How many of the people you would call your friends (trusted friends/confidantes) live outside of this community?

-None -One or Two -Three to Five -Six to Nine -Ten or more

-Don't know -Refused

Probe:

What are your reasons for trusting these people?

If no trusted friends, ask about associates (persons you hang out with but don't really trust)

[Qu 14-16 Adapted from PHDCN 17.]

I am going to ask some questions about informal social regulation.

I am going to read some additional statements about things that people in your neighborhood may or may not do. For each of these statements, please tell me whether it is very likely, likely, unlikely, very unlikely that people in the neighborhood would act in the following manner. *[Adapted from PHDCN 11, 12.]*. Give the reason for each answer? What would neighbors do otherwise?

Statement	Very likely	Likely	Neither likely nor unlikely	Unlikely	Very unlikely	Don't know	Refused	WHY
If there was a problem in the community, neighbors would get together to deal with the problem? <i>See question 21 below follow-up.</i>								
How likely it is that children in the community would find that they could look up to the adults? <i>See question 19 below follow-up.</i>								
If I am not in the community how likely is it that my neighbors will keep their eyes open for possible trouble to my place.								
If a child is showing disrespect to an adult, how likely is it that the people in the								

community will scold that child?								
If there was a fight in front of your house and someone was being beaten how likely is it that neighbors would break it up?								
If I am not at home, how likely is it that adults in this neighborhood would watch out that my children are safe and don't get in trouble								
If the government planned to close the community center, how likely is it that people in this community would take action?								
If the government planned to put a rehab center for drug addicts or vagrants in this community, how likely is it that people in this community would take action to prevent it?								
How likely is it that someone would intervene if neighborhood children are seen at the wrong place at the wrong time (say out of school)								
How likely is it that someone would intervene if suspicious persons are seen doing something illegal in this community?								
How likely is it that someone in this community would make a report to the police about the activities of residents involved in criminal activities?								

Follow-up question to #15 (ii)

How many persons can you think of in this community whom the youth can look-up to and get good advice from?

- Probes:

Tell me a bit about these people...age group, gender, reputation?

What are some of the things folks can't get away with doing in this community?

- Probes:

Incorrect dumping of garbage, loud music, encroaching on neighbor's property

What would happen if he or she does that? How would others respond?

Now for some questions about informal social problem solving in of the community and community leadership.

Follow-up question to #15 (i)

Can you provide examples of neighbors or the community coming together to address community problems?

- Probes:

Cleaning/building roads/drains, loud music, child abuse, domestic violence, removal of social/public services

Who takes the lead

Who generally gets involved (youth, middle aged, men, women etc)

Are external organizations engaged

What is the track record in terms of the results of such interventions? Why?

Who would you say were/are the key persons most likely to be involved in pursuing the well-being of the community in general and youth in particular?

- Probe:

How and why do residents respond to their leadership

How long have they been taking the lead

What made them good or bad leaders?

What are the local organizations which work towards the improvement of this community?

- Probe:

Community development, Women, Youth / sport, PTAs, Cultural, Religious, Cooperatives / business, Neighborhood watch

Which are most visible and/or successful?

Who is involved in these organizations?

What is the extent of community involvement?

- Follow-up:

How would you rank the work of these organizations in terms of the importance for crime prevention? Why?

What externally based organizations or agencies are at work in this community?

- Follow-up:

What services do they supply?

How beneficial are they to the community?

What is the likelihood that residents in this community would turn to external agencies including political, government, corporate sector, media or other sources for policies, programs or resources to improve conditions in the community?

Follow-up:

Who are some of the persons who make these connections?

Crime prevention.

What is the likelihood that a person in this community is a friend, relative or associate of a person involved in illegal activities?

Probe: Ask of each relationship in turn and allow participants to choose from points on the scale.

i. Would you say, very likely, somewhat likely, unlikely or very unlikely?

Based on the response to question above:

How do you feel about living around individuals in this community who are known to be involved in illegal activities, some of whom might have committed a crime against you or your family?

- Probes:

Have persons holding leadership positions in this community been suspected of corrupt practices?

Is the community likely to cooperate with such an individual being in a leadership position in the community?

Follow-up:

Tell me about times or situations when you don't feel safe in this community?

Tell me about times or situations when you don't feel your children are safe in this community?

Many persons in this community have had personal experiences being the victim of crime. What have you observed/experienced as some of the reactions to having had these experiences? Please elaborate?

What are some of the ways in which this community is involved in crime prevention?

Follow-up:

Please share how and when did this (these) start?

How widespread is this throughout the community?

Is there evidence of success?

What are the barriers to residents being involved in strategies to reduce crime?

- Probes:

A lot of new residents?

Different values?

Parents defensive about kids behavior?

- Follow-up:

What role do the following play in preventing resident involvement in crime prevention? Please explain?

Distrust of neighbors, the police?

Sympathy for offenders in terms of lack of alternatives to earn sufficient income.

Friendship with offenders

Financial/other support by gang leaders?

Parents' inaction/protection/involvement?

How do you feel about the role of the police in addressing crime in this community?

The next few questions are about the Citizen Security Program.

What do you know about the Citizen Security Program

- Probe:

What are the goals of the CSP?

Who is involved at the community level...Community Action Council?

What kinds of projects have been implemented?

Who benefits?

(Share a bit about the CSP if nothing is known)

Do you think the CSP is helping the community to be better at preventing crime? Why? Why not?

- Probe:

What aspect(s) of the CSP is creating this effect?

Do you think the CSP is helping to bring community residents together and improve relationships? Why? Why not?

What do you believe are the main benefits experienced by the community from its participation in the CSP?

Follow-up:

What aspects of the CSP are working well? Why? Why not?

What obstacles might there be to the impact of the CSP on crime?

- Probe:

What are your thoughts on the effectiveness of the persons involved in the CAC?

What are your thoughts on the nature of the projects funded by the CSP?

Unemployed / idle youth?

How do you think the CSP could be improved?

We're almost finished. I have just two more questions for you.

Is there anything else concerning the nature of your community or the CSP that you would like to share, that we did not already talk about today?

We talked a lot about key leaders in the community. Can you share with me the names of these leaders or other members of the community whom you believe can provide useful insights about how this community is organized, or persons who have been most active in pursuing the wellbeing of the community?

Appendix F: Socio-Economic data on selected communities

Item	Never Dirty	Mt. Dor		Samaroo Village/Mootoo Lands	Pinto Road
	%	%		%	%
Home ownership	78	68		84	86
Rental of home	22	30		15	13
Female headed households	35	40		34	35
Afro-Trinidadians	60	70		52	41
Indo-Trinidadians	19	10		12	12
Trinidadians of Mixed descents	19	19		36	45
No qualifications	38	40		17	41

Secondary level education	44	50		67	57
Higher education	16	9		10	4
Professional, legal, managerial professions	23	13		17	10
Craft, service and clerical professions	49	49		45	47
Elementary, and plant occupations	26	33		30	41
Married	36	27		32	27
Unmarried (single, divorced, widowed)	61	69		63	69
0-14 years	28	28		27	31
65 years and over	8	8		6	4
15-64 years	35	36		35	38
<i>Source: 2000 Census data, Central Statistical Office</i>					

Appendix G: List of documents reviewed



1. Assessment of Rapid Impact Project, the rehabilitation of the Felix Farrier children's play park in Pinto Road, Arima, May 2009.
2. Citizen Security Programme - Achievements report as at June 2011.
3. Citizen Security Programme - Achievements report for fiscal year 2012.
4. Citizen Security Programme - Community Building Programme for Never Dirty, Morvant. Terms of reference (LO-1965/OC-TT).
5. Citizen Security Programme - Crime data, 2008 - September 2013.
6. Citizen Security Programme - Report on the sensitization sessions for community action councils in Basic Monitoring and Evaluation Concepts and Strategies.
7. Citizen Security Programme, Intermediate Results, May 2011.
8. Citizen Security Programme, Results Framework, September 2013 (V2).

9. Evaluation of the Reaction Productions Limited (LoveUntil Foundation) Community building programme in Never Dirty. Prepared by the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit, CSP, May 2011.
10. Families in Action - Report of the Confident parenting workshops conducted for the Citizen Security during the period May- June, 2010.
11. Final report - Mt. Dor Summer Camp, July 2011.
12. Final report - Mt. Zion Spiritual Baptist Healing Church, Vocational Bible School August, 2010.
13. Final report - Never Dirty Village Council, Children's Water Fest, September 2011.
14. Final report - Never Dirty Village Council, Family Day and Talent Show, May & June, 2011.
15. Final report - Reaction Productions Ltd, Grand Health Fair and Clinic, November 2011 - March 2012.
16. Final report - Reaction Productions Ltd, Grand health fair and clinic, October 2011.
17. Final report - Reaction Productions Ltd, Never Dirty musical recital, December 2011.
18. Final report, Never Dirty Village council, Stars on disc, July - August 2010.
19. Final report, Never Dirty Village Council, Sweat, July - September, 2009.
20. Final report, Never Dirty Youth Council, Sport Development Programme, 2010.
21. Final report, Pinto/Santa Rosa Heights Community Council & Santa Rosa Heights Community Council, August 2011.
22. Final report, St. David Empowerment and Development Organization (SDEDO), Strengthening, Training, Empowerment Programme (STEP), October - December 2011.
23. Final report, Ville Ventures Films, Music production training, July - August 2010.
24. Kairi Consultants (2013). 1st quarter report. Monitoring and Evaluation of Initiatives under the Community Action Component of the CSP.
25. Project completion report, Boys Nature Nurture Camp, June-July 2011.
26. Project completion report, Equip to respond, Mt. Zion Spiritual Baptist Church Pinto Road, October - December 2010.
27. Project completion report, Essence - The new me. Santa Rosa Government School Parent Teachers' Association, September - November 2010.
28. Project completion report, Football training camp, Mt. Dor July-Sept, 2010.
29. Project completion report, Pinto Road computer centre, February - June 2010.
30. Project completion report, Precious gems youth orchestra, Arima West Government Primary School, 2011.
31. Project completion report, Together we Achieve Growth (TAG), Families in Action, September-December 2011.
32. Proposal for an evening of music, dance and fashion in Samaroo Village/Mootoo Lands, May 2010.
33. Reaction Productions Limited (2010). Report for the Citizen Security Programme Community Building Project at Never Dirty Morvant. First Quarter Report (February - April 2010).
34. Reaction Productions Limited (2010). Report for the Citizen Security Programme Community Building Project at Never Dirty Morvant. Second Quarter Report (May-July 2010).
35. Reaction Productions Limited (2010). Report for the Citizen Security Programme Community Building Project at Never Dirty Morvant. Third Quarter Report (Aug. - Oct. 2010).
36. Reactions Productions Limited (2011). Addendum to final report for the Citizen Security Limited (Nov. 2010 - Jan. 2011).

37. Report on Pan Camp with a Difference, August 2010.
38. Report on Pan Camp with a Difference, August 2011.
39. Report on Pinto road Seventh-day Adventist Church Anti-Drug March and Health Fair, June 2010.
40. Review of the Mt. Dor Rapid Impact Project - Computer lab and homework centre. Monitoring and Evaluation Unit, Citizen Security Programme, March 2012.
41. Review of the Youth Summer Programme of the Mt. Zion Spiritual Baptist Healing Church, Never Dirty, 2009.
42. Spreadsheet providing details on all CSP projects 2008-2013.
43. WINAD-Inception report for the implementation of the Inter-generational Women's Leadership Programme to the Citizen's Security Programme, July 8, 2011.
44. WINAD Inter-generational Women's Leadership Programme-target matrix.
45. WINAD - Project Completion Report, Inter-generational Women's Leadership Programme, 2011.

Appendix H: Univariate data on item measures of social cohesion and social control

Univariate data on relational measures of social cohesion






Figure 4: Percentage of persons in agreement with the presence of reciprocal social cohesion mechanism by community






Figure 6: Percentage of respondents in agreement with associational measures of social cohesion



Appendix I: Summary of research which explored the role of local organization in the generation of social control

Author(s)	Variable description	Type of Research	Findings
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Peterson, R. D., Krivo, L.J., Harris, M.A., 2000	<i>Presence of social institutions by location:</i> retail chains, banks, recreation centers, bars & other places with liquor licenses.	Quantitative	Types of institutions e.g. bars and recreational centers, had differential associations with violent crime
*Morenoff, J.D., Sampson R.J., & S.W. Raudenbusu, 2001	Resident reported institutional density: Number reported in the survey. Intensity of local associations: the number involved in such entities.	Quantitative	Voluntary organizations and associations relatively unimportant in predicting homicides
Carr, 2003	Local interpersonal networks and interlocking local institutions: (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993) stores, churches and local organizations	Qualitative	Social control is effected through the what he calls the new parochialism which is essentially a marriage of the parochial and public levels of social control.
Roman, C.G., & Moore, G.E., 2004	<i>Organizational capacity:</i> organizational stability, leadership, human financial and technical resources, community outreach, services and related capacity, products.	Quantitative	The type and location of organizations combined impacted well-being; high capacity organizations associated with social control, cohesion and trust.
Krishna, 2007	<i>Organizational strength:</i> Self-initiated, agreed upon rules, a leader who generates rules.	Quantitative	Where these three criteria exist, they are associated with higher levels of social capital.

Appendix J: Programs initiated by local organizations prior to/independent of the CSP

Programs initiated by local organizations prior to/independent of the CSP

Project Type	Source	Community location	Project description
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Programs initiated by local organizations prior to/independent of the CSP

Project Type	Source	Community location	Project description
Skills training	MCD	All	Community Education Programme (CEP): A skills training program designed as an income substitution program for youth and families. The VCs selected the CEP courses to be run in the community. Courses run in the respective communities between 2010-2011 included: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <u>ND</u> - advanced upholstery, tile laying, small appliance repair, bread, cake and pastry making, cake decoration, employment oriented computer literacy; - <u>MD</u> - PVC furniture, batik & tie dye, cake decoration, African garment design, make-up artistry, employment oriented computer literacy; - <u>SVML</u> - PVC furniture, garment construction, cabinet making and fabric design; - <u>PR</u> - advanced cake making, cake decoration, Christmas cuisine, hair dressing and cosmetology, upholstery, small appliance repair.
	MCD	ND & PR	Geriatric Adolescent Partnership Programme (GAPP): Training of young adults as care givers for the elderly.
	OCEG	SV/ML	Initiated a skills transfer programme where residents with skills taught others (Omera Court Enhancement Group) Provided training in various musical instruments during the school vacation (Resident)
	PRVC	PR	Established a computer training center with computers purchased through loans taken by VC members. This was intended as a Distance Learning Center but this aspect did not get off the ground.
	MCD	ND, MD & PR	Community Center (CC) Construction/expansion Programme. This varied by community as follows: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ND - in the 1960s first CC built with resident labor and MCD funds. Initiated the CC expansion within the guidelines provided by the MCD (installation of library, computer room, pre-school, kitchen, tiling of the floors, meeting rooms). - MD - installation of upper floor for MDCP, tiled CC, upgraded the kitchen, and bathrooms, improved security. - Built first CC (1960s) with resident labor and CDD funds. Initiated the CC expansion within the guidelines provided by the CDD (installed a kitchen, computer room, pre-school, meeting rooms, and tiled floors)
Community Center Construction/ Repairs			
Other infrastructure projects	MLG		Facilitated infrastructure projects and utility installations (roads, drains, steps, street lighting, water connections, electrification); (roads, drainage, steps and hand rails, retaining walls, street lighting).
	NSHC, OG HOA, ML	ND & MD	Initiated their own infrastructure projects via the Self Help Commission: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MD:- (Residents of Community Drive & Industry Lane respectively). - Home Owners Association (HOA) Mootoo Lands (roads, drainage, street lights, garbage collection, postal agency)
	MLG, VC		Consulted on or initiated infrastructure projects in the community financed by the Regional Corporation. The VC also provided the foremen and a number of laborers from the community (roads, drainage, steps and hand rails, retaining walls, street lighting).
Education	VC/MOE	ND & PR	Establishment of pre-school
	VC	ND & PR	Homework center. In ND the center catered to 200 children.
	VC	ND	Adult literacy classes

Programs initiated by local organizations prior to/independent of the CSP

Project Type	Source	Community location	Project description
Life skills & mentorship	VC	ND	Established library
	VC	ND	Hosted story telling activities
	OG	PR	Organized annual School Book Programme for children
	OG	MD	Awarded in excess of 40 sport scholarships tenable at foreign universities, to budding athletes from the community. This initiative spanned over a period of 30 years (New Horizons).
	OG	PR	Conducts weekly coaching (football) & mentoring for 20-25 ²⁶ children 7-11 years. (MDCC)
Parenting	OG	PR	Established a Police Youth Club in 2011 which meets weekly and caters to about 125-175 children and youth 5-18 years. (Resident who is a Police Officer supported by parents)
	OG	PR	Established youth life skills program in 2007/8 and caters to 30 13-19 years olds in ever cycle. (Youth Stars)
Culture	Resident	SVML	Established a parent support group for counselling and support to youths and their parents (Resident)
Employment	MCD	All areas except Pinto Road	Best Village Trophy Competition ²⁷ (BVTC)
	VC	ND	Initiated annual week long community festival of culture and sports
	MLG & VC	All areas	Facilitated resident participation in Government's make-work programmes by determining projects, identifying needy residents for work, and supervising performance of work gangs almost exclusively until about 1986
Crisis intervention	VC, MCD	ND	Commenced construction of a Trade School and Bakery
	VC	ND & MD	Assisted the community in the event of natural disasters, and individual crises (fire, medical emergency etc)
Health	OG	PR	Hosted annual Health Fare supplying nurses, doctors and other Health Care Professionals providing medical testing, medical and dental services, nutrition support (Seventh Day Adventist Church).
Welfare	OG	PR	PR: VC and SDA Church hosted Soup Kitchens respectively
	VC, OG	SVML/PR	Provided welfare support (books and uniforms for back to school, to children and as needed and emergency support to needy parents.
Sports	VC, OG, Min of Sport	ND	- ND-Hosted intra and inter community competitions in sports including: football cricket, netball.
	OG	SV/ML	Provided football coaching and mentorship for approximately 50 children

²⁶ This number is said to increase to 60 plus children during the school vacation (interview with group member in Mt. Dor)

²⁷ An annual competition in areas including: Village Chat, Poetry, Short Story, Folk Theatre/Folk Presentations, La Reine Rive (Queen competition), Handicraft, Clean/Beautify Village, Village Olympics. The Best Village Unit coordinates the overall events and provides tutors to help groups prepare for competition.

Programs initiated by local organizations prior to/independent of the CSP

Project Type	Source	Community location	Project description
Sports & Family Days Police intervention Other social events	VC	PR	up to 15 years (Net Warriors/resident) Hosted an annual sports camp for the children serving over 200 children, covering cricket, football, netball.
	OG	PR	Established a sport club in 2007 designed to engage children & youth (9-35 years) especially from high crime areas of the Pinto Road Community and provide mentorship, life skills, literacy as well as professional level sport as a means of mobility (Pinto United)
	OG	ND	Hosting of Sport and Family Days, All Fours competitions (Grasshoppers Sports & Cultural Club (GSCC)).
		SV/ML	Sport and Family Day organized by a resident in SV/ML.
	VC	PR,	Lobbied police (successfully) for increased patrols temporarily;
	OG	MD	Confronted petty bandits in the community; negotiated peace between Mt. Hope and Mt. Dor when gangs were at war (SKY Connection)
	OG	ND	Hosted Easter and Emancipation party & fashion shows as well as Christmas treat for children. Started 2010 (Angelina Terrace Women's Group)
	OG	MD	Hosted Christmas Dinner and Awards Function for elderly and past leaders (Mt. Dor Coaching Clinic (MDCC))
	VC/OG	ND & MD MD	Hosted excursions, dances. Spearheaded hamper distribution to needy residents (Society of St. Vincent de Paul).
	Family OG	SV/ML SV/ML MD	Easter bonnet MLASO Organized annual Christmas party for children (Star Life Promotions) Organized an annual care day, dinner and awards function for the elderly as well as facilitated a monthly opportunity for old age pensioners to meet with Officers of the Social Welfare Division.
	VC	PR	Hosted annual community Sport and Family Day traditionally over Easter Weekend including a Team from Point a Pierre. Internal matches were held on Boxing Day.

NB: Abbreviations used in the 'Source' column include MCD-Ministry of Community Development, MLG-Ministry of Local Government, MOE-Ministry of Education, NSHC-National Self-Help Commission, VC-Village Council, OG-Other local organization, HOA-Home Owners Association, OCEG-Omera Court Enhancement Group.

Appendix K: CSP-funded initiatives in the study communities – 2008-2012(February) associated with risk factors for violence prevention

Table 1: CSP-funded initiatives in the study communities – 2008-2012(February) associated with risk factors for violence prevention

Risk Factors	Never Dirty (ND)	Mt. Dor (MD)	Samaroo Village/ Mootoo Lands (SVML)	Pinto Road (PR)
COMMUNITY				
Community norms favorable toward drug use, firearms, violence and crime	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. CE: One day event-‘Let the Children Play’ in honor of International Children’s Day. Twenty (20) children. (Nov’08) 2. CBSI*: 4-session Support Group addressing issues of abuse of alcohol, home & community violence, gangs. Twenty two (22) adults (Jan’11)[RPL] 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. CE: 3-days Interactive Street Theatre with dramatist & comedienne Roy & Gloria. Eighty persons (80). (Jan’11) [CAC Interactive Team] 		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. CE: 1-day Anti-drug March & Health Fair. Three hundred & fifty (350) participants (Jun’10) [PR-SDA Church]. 2. CE: 1-day Anti-drug March & Health Fair. Three hundred & fifty (350) participants (Aug’11)[PR-SDA Church]. 3. CE: Three Street Theatre Sessions addressing issues of violence and appropriate responses. (Jan-Feb. 2012)[CAC].
Availability of drugs Availability of firearms Availability of gangs*	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. CE: 5-wk Sport Camp-Camp Reach4 ’08. Twenty five (25) youth. (Jul-Aug’08)[NDYC]. 2. ICON: 4-mth Sport Dev. Program including a 1-mth. coaching clinic in cricket and football and a 3-mth. competition. Forty (40) youths (Jan-Apr’10) [VC]. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. ICON: 3-mth Football training camp-Game On. Twenty six (26) 6-18 yr. olds (Jul-Sept’10) [VC]. 		

Table 1: CSP-funded initiatives in the study communities – 2008-2012(February) associated with risk factors for violence prevention

Risk Factors	Never Dirty (ND)	Mt. Dor (MD)	Samaroo Village/ Mootoo Lands (SVML)	Pinto Road (PR)
Economic deprivation and a lack of mobility	3. CE : 8-wk Small Goal Football Competition-SWEAT ND. One hundred & forty four (144) (Jul-Oct'11) [VC].			
	1. ICON : 24 contact hrs. Training in Music Production & Development of a studio. Fifteen (15) 15-25 yr. olds. (Jul-Aug'10) [VV].	1. CE : 5-day Coaching and Sport Development Training for coaches. One (1) person. (Mar-Apr'11) [TTASPE].		1. ICON : Establishment of Computer Training and Resource Center. Ninety three (93) persons 12-60 yrs. Short lived due to theft of computers. (Feb-Jun'10) [VC/MCD].
Low neighborhood	2. ICON : 48 contact hrs. DJ Training by Institute of Broadcasters . Twenty three (23) graduates, 16-42yrs. (Nov-Dec'11)[VC].			2. CE : 5-day Coaching and Sport Development Training for coaches. Two (2) persons. (Mar-Apr'11) [TTASPE].
	3. CBSI : 205 food hampers to 154 persons over 12 months (Feb'10-Jan'11) [RPL].			3. CE : Establishment of a cottage industry producing and packaging local sweets and delicacies as gifts. (Jun-Oct'11). [Covenant Evangelistic Lighthouse Church CELC].
	4. CBSI : 6-Session Computer Literacy Class. Forty (40) persons (Jul-Aug'10)[RPL/MCD].			
	5. CBSI : 8 modules by SIDAICO Image Services. Fifteen (15) females. (Aug-Oct'10) [RPL].			
	1. CE : 1-day family fun event	1. CE : 1-day Sport and Family	1. CE : 1-day Evening of Music	1. RIP : Refurbishment of Felix

Table 1: CSP-funded initiatives in the study communities – 2008-2012(February) associated with risk factors for violence prevention

Risk Factors	Never Dirty (ND)	Mt. Dor (MD)	Samaroo Village/ Mootoo Lands (SVML)	Pinto Road (PR)
attachment	<p>which had approx. five hundred (500) residents. (Apr'10) [NDYC].</p> <p>2. CE: 2-day Family Day & Talent Show. Approx. four hundred (400) persons (May/Jun'11) [VC].</p> <p>3. CE: 1-day Children's Water Fest-abt. One hundred (100) persons (Sept'11) [VC].</p> <p>4. CE: 1-day Health Fair/Clinic. Seventy one (71) persons (Oct.'11) [VC].</p> <p>5. CBSI: Nine 1-day Health Clinics including heart disease, diabetes, hypertension, dental, vision screening. 294 persons (2010-11) [RPL].</p>	<p>Day including football competition, marathon and bouncy castle for kids.</p> <p>One hundred and 50 persons. (Aug'09) [SKY Connection].</p>	<p>and Dance. Approx. three hundred (300) participants anticipated (May 10)[CAC]</p>	<p>Farrier Children's Play Park-children friendly space for approximately 1100 children (May'09) [CAC].</p> <p>2. CE: 1-day Sports Day hosted by Friends of Pinto, New Achievers & Ministry of Sport. Approx. 200 participants. (Jul.'09).</p>
FAMILY				
<p>Family history of problem behaviors</p> <p>Family management problems</p> <p>Family conflict</p> <p>Favorable parental attitudes and</p>	<p>1. CBSI: 6-session Parenting Workshop. Twelve (12) persons. (3rd Qtr'10) [RPL].</p>	<p>1. CBSI: 3-day Confident Parenting Workshop by Families in Action (FIA) Seventeen (17) participants (71% attended 2/3 sessions), 18-52 years (Jun'10).</p>		<p>1. ICON: 12 contact hrs. Essence the New Me-Pt. 1- Parenting Workshop, twenty five (25) adults 26 yrs. & over. Pt.2 Social Etiquette eighty (80) adolescents 18 & under.</p>

Table 1: CSP-funded initiatives in the study communities – 2008-2012(February) associated with risk factors for violence prevention

Risk Factors	Never Dirty (ND)	Mt. Dor (MD)	Samaroo Village/ Mootoo Lands (SVML)	Pinto Road (PR)
involvement in problem behavior		2. CBSI : 3-mth workshop for youth and parents on inter- personal skills, conflict management & reducing anti-social behaviors. Thirty six (36) (Sept-Dec'11) [FIA].		(Sept-Nov'10) [PTA]
INDIVIDUAL/PEER				
Alienation/ rebelliousness Friends who engage in problem behavior Favorable attitudes towards problem behavior Early initiation of problem behavior	1. CE : 2-wk Summer Camp (craft, woodwork, fabric design). Eighty six (86) 5-16 yr. olds (Jul'09) [MVSBC]. 2. CE : 3.5-wk Dance and Drumming Camp. Thirty four (34) 7-19yrs. (Aug-Sept'09) [Warriors of Hope]. 3. CE : 1-day critical incident debriefing due to trauma suffered by children & facilitators at a dance camp who were exposed to a crime scene. Fifteen (15) (Aug'09) 4. CE : 2-mth workshop on the spoken work and poetry. (Oct-Dec'11)	1. CE : 2-wk Summer Camp. Forty five (45) 10-14 yr. olds (Jul'11) [MDCC]	1. CE : 2-wk Pan Camp-music theory, practice & motivational sessions. Thirty five (35) 5-18 yr. olds (Aug'10) [resident] 2. CE : 2-wk Pan Camp. Twenty five (25) 5-18 yr. olds (Aug'11) [resident]. 3. CBSI : 12-mth prog. of assessment and healing in a therapeutic environment intervention for children 8-12 yrs who were exposed to violence. Three (3) persons. (Jul'11-Aug'12) [Dolly & Associates].	1. CE : 3-wk Vacation Camp addressing issues of health and safety, goal setting and various sports. Two hundred & fifty (250). (Aug 3-21'09)[VC and other local CBOs/ NGOs] 2. CE : 6-day Children's Camp (Intensive information & Life skills). Sixty five (65) 4-18 yr. olds (Aug'11)[PR&SHVCs] 3. CBSI : 6-mth Big Sister/Litter Sister Mentorship Program. Eight (8) female mentees 12-17 yrs. old (Jul-Dec'11)[WINAD]. 4. CBSI : 12-mth prog. of assessment and healing in

Table 1: CSP-funded initiatives in the study communities – 2008-2012(February) associated with risk factors for violence prevention

Risk Factors	Never Dirty (ND)	Mt. Dor (MD)	Samaroo Village/ Mootoo Lands (SVML)	Pinto Road (PR)
	[Community Transformation Committee].			a therapeutic environment intervention for children 8-12 yrs who were exposed to violence. Three (3) persons. (Jul'11-Aug'12) [Dolly & Associates].
	5. CE : 4-mth Men Start Project on life skills and character building. Twenty five (25) males, 15-25yrs. (Nov'11-Mar'12) [RPL].			
	6. CE : 2-wk Vacation Bible School. Seventy (70) 5-16 yr. olds from ND & environs (Aug'10) [MZSBC].			
	7. CE : 2-wk Summer Camp. Fifty one (51) 2-11 yr. olds ('11) [MZSBC].			
	8. CBSI : Easter Camp- Craft, life-skills, sports, drama, puppet show on bullying & peer pressure. Twenty seven (27) children (Apr'11) [RPL].			
	9. CBSI : 12-mth prog. of assessment and healing in a therapeutic environment intervention for children 8-12 yrs who were exposed to violence. One(1) person. (Jul'11-			

Table 1: CSP-funded initiatives in the study communities – 2008-2012(February) associated with risk factors for violence prevention

Risk Factors	Never Dirty (ND)	Mt. Dor (MD)	Samaroo Village/ Mootoo Lands (SVML)	Pinto Road (PR)
	Aug'12) [Dolly & Associates]. 10. CE : 1-wk Music Recital. Twenty two (22) participants. (Dec'11) [RPL]			
SCHOOL				
Early and persistent anti-social behavior				
Low commitment to school	1. CBSI :2-days wkly. Home Work Assistance Center & 2 life-skills sessions. Thirty seven (37) children 5-14yrs (Feb'10-Feb'11). 2. ICON :6-mths. Home -work assistance, remedial reading and drama. Twenty two (22) children, 5-14yrs (Sept'11-Mar'12) [RPL]	1. CE : 3-session Post S.E.A. Workshop & Parenting Session to prepare students /parents for secondary school. Twenty five (25) persons including 10-12 students (Jun'10) [FIA]. 2. RIP : Establish Computer Lab & Home-work Center including 3-mth cycles of Computer Literacy. One hundred (100) persons 11-25 yrs. (Mar-May'11 ongoing) [CAC/MDCC].	1. ICON : Students Development Project. Sixty six (66) students. (Aug'11) [MLSA]	1. SBVP : Music Program modeled on El Sistema in Venezuela. Twenty five (25) children. (Sept-Dec'11) [Arima West Government Primary (AWGP)]
Academic failure				

Table 2: CSP-funded initiatives in the study communities – 2008-2012(February) associated with protective factors for violence prevention

Protective Factors	Never Dirty (ND)	Mt. Dor (MD)	Samaroo Village/ Mootoo Lands (SVML)	Pinto Road (PR)
COMMUNITY				
Social capital	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Established Community Action Council (CAC) 2. Encouraged re-establishment of Village Council (VC) 3. Negotiated for re-opening of Community Center 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Established CAC 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Established CAC. 2. Encouraged the establishment of a youth organization called Pinnacle Stars. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Established CAC
Community Support networks				
Community empowerment	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. 2-day Domestic Violence workshop on beliefs attitudes, identification and legal issues '08. Six (6) persons. [Coalition Against Domestic Violence CADV]. 2. 2-day Child Abuse Prevention Training addressing risk factors, warning signs and legislation '09. Nine (9) attendees [Rape Crisis Society RCS]. 3. HIV/AIDS Awareness Program. [Family Planning Association (FPA)] 4. 12-day Introduction to 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. 2-day DMV Workshops in '09 & '10. Nine (9) persons. [CADV] [FIA] 2. 2-day Child Abuse Prevention Workshops in '09 & '10. Fourteen (14) persons. [RCS] 3. HIV/AIDS Awareness Program. 4. 6-month Introduction to Counselling. Four (4) persons. 5. Advanced counselling. One (1) person. 6. 3-day Proposal writing training (Nov-Mar'11) [Veni Apwann] 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. 2-day DMV Workshops in '08 & '10. Eleven (11) persons. [CADV] [FIA] 2. 2-day Child Abuse Prevention Workshop'10. One (1) person Five (5) persons. [RCS] 3. 12-day Introduction to Mediation course'10. One (1) person. [DRC] 4. 6-month Introduction to Counselling'10. Four (4) persons.[UWI-OC] 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. DMV Workshops'08 & '10. Six (6) persons. [Coalition Against Domestic Violence] [Families in Action] 2. Child Abuse Prevention workshops'09 & '10. Fifteen (15) persons. [Rape Crisis Society]. 3. 12-day Introduction to Mediation course'10. One (1) person. [Dispute Resolution Center] 4. 6-month Introduction to Counselling. Four (4) persons. [UWI Open Campus] 5. ICON: 24-contact hrs.

Table 2: CSP-funded initiatives in the study communities – 2008-2012(February) associated with protective factors for violence prevention

Protective Factors	Never Dirty (ND)	Mt. Dor (MD)	Samaroo Village/ Mootoo Lands (SVML)	Pinto Road (PR)
	Mediation course. [Dispute Resolution Center (DRC)].		5. RIP : Organizational Enhancement Workshop'11. Thirteen (13) persons.[CAC & Tagallie & Associates]	Equip to Respond- Introduction to counselling. Thirty five (35) 19-60 yr. olds. (Oct-Dec'10)[MZSBC]
	5. 6-month Introduction to Counselling. Three (3) persons. [UWI Open Campus (UWI-OC)]		6. CE : Event Management Training.(Aug 6-11,'11) [Dynamic Youth Foundation]	6. 3-day Proposal writing training (Nov-Mar'11) [Veni Apwann]
	6. 3-day training for CBOs applying for ICON funds to enhance project management skills (Sept-Oct'10) [Veni Apwann].		7. 3-day Proposal writing training (Nov-Mar'11) [Veni Apwann]	
	7. ICON : STEP-Organization Strengthening, Training and Empowerment Program. Twenty seven (27) persons. (Oct-Dec'11) [St. David Empowerment & Development Org.]			
	8. 3-day Proposal writing training (Nov-Mar'11) [Veni Apwann]			

NB: Only the social capital and community empowerment aspects of protection are included here as many programs have the capacity both to minimize risks and enhance protection.

Appendix L: Summary of the major CSP-funded projects in the study communities 2009-February 2012

<i>Summary of the major CSP-funded projects in the study communities 2009-February 2012</i>								
<u>Fund</u>	<u>Never Dirty</u>		<u>Mt. Dor</u>		<u>Samaroo Village/Mootoo Lands</u>		<u>Pinto Road</u>	
	CBO	NGO	CBO	NGO	CBO	NGO	CBO	NGO
RIP			1		1		1	
CE	10	5	3	2	3	1	7	1
ICON	3	1	1		1		2	
CBSI		9		2		1		2
SBVPP							1	
<i>Total no.</i>	<i>13</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>11</i>	<i>3</i>

<i>% within community</i>	46.40%	53.60%	62.50%	37.50%	85.70%	14.30%	91.70%	8.30%
<i>% of total</i>	50.90%		14.50%		12.70%		21.80%	