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Mediating War in Early Modern German Prose

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Mediating War in Early Modern German Prose

by

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A note on the text and translations: All translations, unless otherwise noted, are my own. Thanks to the help of Dr. Williams and Dr. Tatlock, many of these translations have been improved greatly over the last year. I have attempted to translate, or at least render comprehensible in English, all German, Latin, and French text. Speakers of modern German may be puzzled by some of the orthographic and grammatical idiosyncracies of early modern German quotations, but I have tried to reproduce, wherever possible, the linguistic conventions of the original text. With the exception of the umlaut, which I have always rendered in its modern German form, most early

modern spelling and printers' devices, including the use of a "/" where we typically use

a comma, have been reproduced exactly as they are in the orginal text, when it was

available to me.

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Not only is he powerful and strong—
Few in our age against him can prevail—
But so astute and cunning in the wrong
He perpetrates, no courage will avail
Against his evil practices for long.
All strength, all strategy must surely fail
Before a strange new weapon he possesses:
Along a metal tube a ball he presses,

And a rare powder; next a flame applies
To a small hole which scarcely can be seen,
As the physician does cauterize
And seal the severed ending of a vein.
Ejected by explosion, the ball flies
With a loud noise, so that men think there's been
A might tempest in which thunder crashes
And everywhere the lightning burns and flashes.

—Ludovico Ariosto, *Orlando Furioso*, IX.28-29

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Introduction: A Tale of Two Suits (of Armor)

> "Twice with this cunning arm he put to flight
> Our company and both my brothers slew:
> The elder first, his body-armour quite
> Fragmented and his valiant heart shot through;
> The second perished in the second fight.
> As, routed from the battlefield he flew,
> A blow upon his back the weapon cast
> And through his breast the deadly ball then passed."
> —Ludovico Ariosto, *Orlando Furioso*, IX.30[1]

Two German suits of armor stand next to each other in Gallery 125 of the "Arms and Armor" Collection at the St. Louis Art Museum. They are both crafted from steel and secured by leather fittings. The full-body field armor on the left (Figure 1), standing at sixty-eight inches tall, was the armor of Wilhelm von Worms the Elder (1497-1537). It was made between 1510 and 1525. Weighing almost forty-one pounds, Wilhelm's armor is by no means light, and it bears all of the markings of a suit that was meant for battle. The mitten gauntlets could flex at the wrist and ball into a fist. The steel plates linking the fingers protect them from being broken or sliced by glancing blows while allowing Wilhelm to grip swords, spears, lances, flails, and horse reigns. Taken in consideration with the curved hook on the upper right armpit, a lance bracket, and the full leg and foot coverings, the mitten fingers on the gauntlets tell us that this armor was designed with the medieval activities and weaponry of knights in mind.

The three-quarter suit of armor on the right (Figure 2), which extends from knees to helmet, was made sometime around or after 1625. Despite the fact that it is sixteen inches shorter than Wilhelm's suit, it weighs four pounds more. It also has dozens of

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[1] Ludovico Ariosto, *Orlando Furioso*, Vol. 1, trans. Barbara Reynolds (Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1975), 295.

overlapping metal plates that provide greater flexibility in the legs, shoulders, and hands. Unlike the mitten gauntlets of the older suit of armor, this suit has gloved gauntlets with individually bendable fingers. The 1625 armor has no jousting hook, and the leg coverings can be removed with the loosening of brass wing nuts. War had changed since Wilhelm's day, and armor had to change with it.

One hundred years of tactical and technological changes are inscribed on the second suit of armor described above. The additional weight in the newer armor added protection from bullets, shrapnel, and other gunpowder projectiles that were less common to the battlefield when Wilhelm von Worms fought on them than they were in the seventeenth century. The fingered gloves, flexible waist and shoulders, and the lack of lance bracket also tell us that the primary weapons of this cavalry soldier were pistols rather than lances. Wheel-lock pistols, which had become a staple of the European battlefield during the Schmalkaldic War of the 1540s, required a trigger finger to fire, and they had a greater striking range than lances.

The job of the knight, or German *Ritter*, in Wilhelm's day was to run into a group of infantry soldiers with a lance, axe, flail, sword, or some combination of them and "shock" the infantry's ranks, sending them into flight. His main concerns were that his legs would be hacked by weapons from below, or that he would end up jousting or sword fighting another knight. The leg protection allowed him to ride through groups of peasant soldiers without having his legs sliced. The body armor and helmet protected him against the blows of enemy knights. The detachable thighs of the seventeenth-century armor, on the other hand, and its missing calf and foot coverings, which could have been—but probably were not—lost at some point, tell us that the later soldier was not participating in the same kinds of shock attacks as Wilhelm. More likely, he was

running with a coordinated team of cavalry soldiers, *Reiter*, who would run up to their

enemies in a line (*en haie*) or in a block (*en masse*), discharge their pistols or muskets, and

then retreat to recharge their firearms and return. This attacking method, called the

caracole (similar to *carousel*), resembled the circular movements of the children's ride and

was based on the infantry counter-march system developed at the end of the sixteenth

century in the Netherlands.

Just as these two suits bear witness to the historical changes in military

technologies, tactics, and habits that took place between Wilhelm's era (ca. 1510) and the

time of the anonymous cavalry soldier in three-quarter armor (ca. 1625), the differences

between them are also telling of the social developments in warfare taking place

concurrently. As early as 1495, handheld gunpowder weapons were becoming a major

part of infantry tactics. Grouped together in large numbers, small caliber firearms (small

arms) overcame their poor accuracy and proved to be a serious challenge to the

hegemony of the knight on the battlefield. In 1525, at the battle of Pavia, approximately

1,000 to 1,500 Spanish *sclopetarii* [arquebusiers] slaughtered 13,000 Swiss pikemen and

French knights with their match-lock *archibugi*, forerunners of the musket.[2] Battlefield

reports claimed that "[t]hese penetrated not only one man-at-arms, but often two, and

two horses as well. Thus the field was covered with the pitiful carnage of dying noble

knights as well as with heaps of dying horses."[3] As knights became easier to kill, the

expensive upkeep they required paid fewer tactical dividends. Cheaper horses and

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[2] Bert Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1997), 180-82

[3] Paolo Giovo, *Le vite del Gran Capitano e del Marchese di Pescara*, trans. L. Domenichi (Bari: Laterza, 1931), qtd. in Hall, 182.

cheaper (read: lower-class) soldiers replaced the intrepid—but ineffective—noble horsemen.

Earlier, in the fifteenth century, artillery and medium-caliber gunpowder weapons had proven to be useful in specific military situations, especially during sieges and in the defense of fortified positions, but as of the Italian Wars (1494-1559) gunpowder weapons had found their place in the close combat of field warfare. Previously the domain of knights, the European battlefield was becoming the domain of the firearm and anyone armed with one. The developing officer caste absorbed the knightly caste, an evolution that was not fully realized until the end of the sixteenth century. Between 1510 and 1625, the approximate dates of creation for the two suits of armor found in Gallery 125 of the St. Louis Art Museum, the knight as he was known in the society, culture, and warfare of Middle Ages would cease to be.

In tracing the literary and cultural representations of gunpowder weapons in early modern German-speaking lands, the following chapters will try not to fall prey to the simplistic theory that firearms brought about the death of chivalry.[4] Rather, we will explore the variety of changes to weapons and warfare that occurred between 1400 and 1700 within a complex system of technological innovation, international economics, transnational politics, and European culture. In particular, this dissertation will focus on the material history of gunpowder weapons and their discussion in contemporary printed texts, both literary and non-literary, primarily in the German language. As a cultural and literary history of gunpowder weapons, it will draw heavily on both military and cultural historians in an effort to put the two into a closer conversation with

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[4] See Chapter One for my discussion of this argument and its opposition as discussed by military historian Bert Hall.

one another. Culture, in this study, encompasses all written and visual works, both high and low, literary and non-literary, as well as the material objects that those works discuss. This study strives to incorporate readings of a multiplicity of cultural artifacts including satirical epics, military treatises, books of war [*Kriegsbücher*], military broadsheets [*Flugblätter*], military novels [*Kriegsromane*], and plays, as well as poetry, engravings, paintings, medallions, and even the physical weapons themselves, not to mention suits of armor.

Black Powder Plots: Mediating War in Early Modern Germany

      The network of material, social, and intellectual artifacts left in the wake of gunpowder weaponry's technological development tells a story of change. Military historians have debated, since 1953, as to whether this change was "revolutionary" or "evolutionary." In the first chapter, we will look at the ways in which literary and cultural history, long at odds with purist military history, can intervene in the debate about the impact of gunpowder weapons on European warfare and society. The combination of military history with literary studies of texts about military topoi, such as Konrad Kyeser's *Bellifortis* (1405), Heinrich Wittenwiler's *Der Ring* (ca. 1409), and the *Feuerwerkbuch von 1420*, unlocks social and cultural perspectives on changes in warfare that supplement the tactical and technical information they convey. From military historians, especially those of the materialist school like Bert Hall, we learn that the early history of gunpowder technology had to contend with several technological deficits, including the limited availability of gunpowder's ingredients and the inability of European metallurgy to make strong, accurate gun barrels. Thus, between the first use of gunpowder in Europe (1330) and the composition of the *Feuerwerkbuch von 1420*,

gunpowder weapons served very little strategic value. With the increased domestic production of gunpowder beginning in the 1380s, however, cannons became a common part of European warfare. Foreshadowed to some degree by Heinrich Wittenwiler's peasant military farce, *Der Ring,* an actual peasant army of Czech Hussites under the leadership of Jan Zizka managed to defeat imperial forces—led by Teutonic knights—with the help of gunpowder weapons that were modified to suit the strengths of a peasant military force. Just as Zizka was creating a groundbreaking military innovation around 1420, the *Feuerwerkbuch* was making overtures for the social acceptability of gunpowder and *Büchsenmeister*, artillery masters. The effort to carve out a place in society for the masters of this new technology of destruction signals a break between medieval structures of warfare and early modern ones. Those who used gunpowder weapons were, undisputedly, treading a new path in the practice of warfare.

Evolution and revolution, it seems, are less insightful terms from a cultural perspective than are "ideal" and "actual." The cultural history of gunpowder weapons repeatedly reveals that early modern European people's most common concern about gunpowder weapons was their lack of historical precedent. Their "actual" use in the contemporary wars was always at odds with the "ideal," often aestheticized, representations of war passed down through epics, histories, and legends. Chapter Two explores the ways in which sixteenth-century *Kriegsbücher* [books of war], military manuals for officers and commanders, handled the encroachment of firearms into the European practice of war. In particular, Leonhard Fronsperger's *Kriegsbuch* (1573) depicts gunpowder as a negative but ultimately permanent addition to warfare. Firearms are presented in his works as "horrible," as "unmanly," and as clear challengers to the traditions (both social and aesthetic) of warfare. As he discusses the gendered

implications of firearms that allow any "Bub" [boy] to kill the manliest and noblest knight, Fronsperger also ponders the challenges of writing a book about warfare in an age when war has ceased to be "honorable." Ultimately, Fronsperger manages to decry gunpowder warfare while insisting on its manifest imminence. His logic mobilizes the rhetoric of an argument I call "loaded peace," that is, the justification of war as a means to create peace. Like other *Kriegsbücher*, Fronsperger's work reiterates this genre's compulsory assertion of loaded peace by including and ruminating on moral and theological discussions of peace by Desiderius Erasmus and Martin Luther. Aesthetically, Fronsperger's *Kriegsbuch* is invested in Horace's model of *prodesse et delectare* [to educate and to please]. Fronsperger, who looks around him and sees a degenerative culture of warfare that has lost the idealized sheen of ancient times, points to the past as a model for the future. In other words, Fronsperger—in addition to other *Kriegsbuch* authors such as Reinhard Solms, J. J. Wallhausen, and Wilhelm Dilich— measures the "actual" present against the "idealized" past and makes suggestions for how to remake the present in the image of the idealized past.

Chapter Three surveys one literary representation of war—the military broadsheet—that was, by definition, more concerned about the "actual" present than the idealized past. The *Flugblatt*, or broadsheet, was a print genre that conveyed news in image and text for broad and fast consumption. Military broadsheets, which reported on the movements and activities of armies and their commanders using a combination of narrative or allegorical image and narrative or allegorical text, demonstrate a certain moral flexibility toward the weapons that these armies used, choosing instead to allow the visual effect of gunpowder weapons firing to operate as narrative devices. As armies line up to kill one another, smoke from their discharging firearms tells the reader where

the battle lines are drawn and who fought whom. In some cases, the depiction of one army firing more guns than the other army can even hint at which side won. In allegorical or satirical military broadsheets, on the other hand, gunpowder weapons are deployed as both negative and positive symbols, depending on the satirical target. The third chapter focuses on the German campaign (1630-1632) of the Swedish King Gustav Adolf during the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) and finds that the King's death at Lützen (1632) by mixed small arms fails to become a watershed moment for critical discussions of gunpowder. His death, in broadsheet media, does not meet the expected torrent of denunciations of gunpowder weapons. Instead, the broadsheet's generic focus on the present—on the developing or just-developed story—trumps engagement with critical stances toward gunpowder weapons that were, by this point, commonplace in other print genres.

Despite its absence in the news media coverage of Gustav Adolf's campaign, the argument that gunpowder had negatively affected warfare in ethical-moral, gendered— especially with regard to ideals of "mannheyt" [manliness]—, and aesthetic ways remained viable through much of the seventeenth century. As late as the *Simpliciana* (1668-1672) of H. J. C. Grimmelshausen (1621-1676), we find condemnations of gunpowder technology through the portrayal of the death of noble heroes at the hands of base villains. In the war novels of J. M. Moscherosch (1601-1669) and Grimmelshausen, I argue, this novelistic depiction of gunpowder as negative stems from a combination of factors. One factor, which numerous scholars have observed, was the widespread violence against civilians prevalent during the Thirty Years War, which both Grimmelshausen and Moscherosch experienced first hand. Their determination to stage their stories as morality plays against the backdrop of the "German War" returned them

time and again to the weapons these soldiers used to torment their victims. But their focus on the gendered implications of warfare, mostly concerning warrior masculinity, also led them both to consider men's participation in warfare against an—uncritically— idealized past. In the case of Moscherosch, this comparison arises in his fictional trial of the legendary (German) inventor of gunpowder, Berthold Schwarz, by a jury of "ancient German heroes"; in Grimmelshausen's *Springinsfeld*, it arises through the murder of a Swedish officer at the Battle of Nördlingen (1634) by Springinsfeld's pistol. In both cases, traditional warrior ideology—grounded in masculinist values—is attacked, even executed, by gunpowder weapons and their less manly handlers. By demonstrating the challenges to the ideological system upon which the warrior hero's ethos is based, these novels reinforce the ideals of the past while criticizing the present. In a case of what I call "aesthetic dissonance," both authors pit the realities of the present against an idealized past and find rupture rather than coherence. In Grimmelshausen's novels, in particular, the aesthetic dissonance of gunpowder warfare is mirrored by the incoherence and instability of the metanarrative—the overarching series of events that links the protagonists of his *Simpliciana*. While gunpowder weapons claim multiple heroes throughout its history, the real victim of gunpowder in these novels is the literary hero, who disappears from war stories just as the knight vanished from the battlefield.

It is obvious, from contemporary war stories depicted in film, novels, and other media, that the hero did not disappear forever. But, seeing as how he was almost irrevocably buried by German literature of the seventeenth century, how was he resurrected? One possibility is that, along with the bandit armies of the Thirty Years War, he was nationalized. During the Thirty Years War, armies were disparaged for their looting and ransacking, for their torture of civilians, for their greed, and for their

endless capacity for violence. In the aftermath of the most devastating war of the seventeenth century, emerging nation-states began increasingly to institute standing armies rather than rely on *ad hoc* conglomerates of mercenaries and weekend warriors. If the hallmark of the gunpowder villain is his mercenary attitude, the hallmark of the post-gunpowder hero is his dedication to ideals, national ones most strongly among them. At the conclusion to this dissertation, we will look at one literary figure, the cavalier, who was converted from a mercenary into a national hero. As the tactical approximation of the post-gunpowder knight, the cavalier was his natural successor, but his bad behavior at home (in England and in Germany especially) made him an unlikely hero. Shipped abroad, with his violence turned against others, his less violent characteristics such as chivalry, romanticism, and cosmopolitan education could be highlighted by authors like Eberhard Happel (in Germany) and Aphra Behn and Daniel Defoe (in England). Cloaked in the rhetoric of economic prosperity and European supremacy, the cavalier recovered some of the chivalric luster that gunpowder smoke had tarnished during the seventeenth century. As European nations centralized their identities and power through global commerce and colonization, the increasing diversity of known cultures created a background against which the military prowess of the European warrior hero would flourish as he undertook the oppression of non-European peoples.

Gunpowder and Cultural Change: Gender, Morality, and Aesthetics

In surveying the changes to the culture of war ignited by the development of gunpowder technologies, this dissertation will tell a story of contingency, of flexibility, and of persistence. As a work influenced by and indebted to feminist scholarship, this

study confirms that masculinity is not an indivisible hegemonic ideal, but rather a fractured series of relational categories of identity and performance. Warrior masculinity, as we observe in Chapters Two and Four, is not an exception to this rule. It is more appropriate to speak of masculinities and, in turn, warrior masculinities as they change over time and between cultures. As technological and tactical changes to warfare brought about social and cultural changes, so too did the performance, representation, and construction of warrior masculinities change. Still, in a show of persistence through a series of cultural, rhetorical, and military innovations, the figure of the heroic warrior survived gunpowder warfare to become the masculine icon of nationalist and political literature in the age of colonial expansion.

With the recognition of contingent constructions of warrior masculinity comes the investigation of the morality and ethics of war. In the context of gunpowder warfare during the early modern period, these discussions clustered around two main themes. The first grouping questioned the morality of intra- and inter-Christian violence; the second interrogated the ethical system regulating the agents and victims of gunpowder violence. In the first discussion, concerns about violence between and among Christians were mollified by cries to direct gunpowder weapons at enemies abroad, especially the Ottoman Turks, who were—during the early modern period—constantly threatening to push deeper and deeper into Europe. In the second part of the discussion, writers contemplated the scenario in which any physically weak and immoral person, armed with a gun, could kill a strong and honorable *man*. Much of this latter discussion centered on assumptions about the ethical superiority of "noble" knights and the natural inferiority—in moral, ethical, and physical terms—of all other (read: peasant, Eastern European, and Muslim) soldiers. Both of these discussions were tied to a hierarchy of

warrior masculinity in which Christian knights were constructed as superior to all other

soldiers. Ottoman Turks, in particular, were constructed as effeminate, barbaric, or

brutish (and thus, closer to animals) depending on the desired message. Violence

directed downward in this hierarchy was always depicted less critically than violence

directed upwards.

Finally, this dissertation traces one of several changes in the aesthetic

representation of war that occurred between 1400 and 1700. The focus here is on

representations of idealized warrior masculinity, which might be called "heroic" warrior

masculinity. Primarily, we look at the ways in which the figure of the warrior hero was

simultaneously wrenched from and contrasted with the figure of the medieval knight

and his chivalric code. In addition to the aesthetic dissonance evidenced in the novels of

Moscherosch and Grimmelshausen, however, we will also see the ways in which

firearms were seen as useful but morally ambiguous objects. Not always represented as

troublesome instruments of destruction, firearms were often depicted as mere tools that

could be deployed for a variety of military and literary purposes. In war they could be

the key to winning; in war stories they could give shape and depth to the narrative; as

allegorical symbols of war they could be depicted either as the panacea for political

problems or the source of the problems themselves. For those who attempted to

represent the realities of warfare, gunpowder weapons were just another part of the

martial array. Those who believed they needed to measure the present against

representations of the past found that gunpowder had assassinated the heroic ideals of

ancient times. Despite these challenges, however, warrior heroism did persist as an

ideological concept, recast as an icon of colonial expansion and national and—

sometimes—European pride.

Chapter 1
The Military Revolution Debate and Gunpowder's Cultural History to 1525

"The experts in military history have mostly been content to describe what happened, without being overmuch concerned to trace out broader effects . . . Yet it remains true that purely military developments, of a strictly technical kind, did exert a lasting influence upon society at large."

—Michael Roberts[5]

"To Parker's observation . . . we can add the suggestion that behind the failure of armies in this period lay the fact that much more was expected of them than they could provide"

—Simon Adams[6]

Technology exerts a lasting influence upon society at large. In recent years, this claim has been tested as digital technologies not only alter our engagement with the world but also shape our understanding of the past. Analytical approaches to technological phenomena have mostly been the province of media studies, which has its origins in cultural history and cultural criticism. Media present the scholar with a multiplicity of challenges, as causal linkages between historical events and cultural artifacts—high, low, and popular—are not always apparent. We can usually pinpoint the ways in which cultural texts respond to historical events, but showing how culture shapes our world is more subtle than, say, the force of law or economic transactions. Yet we see digital technology both co-opting and revamping non-digital aspects of cultural exchange. The interfaces of everything from word processing programs and e-readers to social networking websites and online dating services try to replicate and enhance, digitally, the experiences of interpersonal communication. How do such technologies, in

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[5] Michael Roberts, "The Military Revolution," in *Essays in Swedish History* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967), 195-196.

[6] Simon Adams, "Tactics or Politics? 'The Military Revolution' and the Habsburg Hegemony, 1525-1648," in *Tools of War* (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1990), 47.

turn, shape our society and the cultural forms within it? The question is analogous for technologies of violence. Here I am particularly interested in how technologies such as gunpowder shape culture.

In the passage quoted above from his groundbreaking essay on renaissance warfare, Michael Roberts outlines the basic premise of his argument: "purely military developments" do have an impact on society as a whole. The relevance of Robert's thesis can be felt today, as we can state with certainty that technologies of war such as nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, automatic firearms, and airplanes (now even "drones") have impacted our lives. Anyone who has tried to cross an international checkpoint in the twenty first century or fly on an airplane knows the effects that such weapons have on society. People living in countries where the United States has a military presence know even better the terror of these war machines. Residents of the United States commonly see drones and planes on television or in cinematic representations of war; they have perhaps even seen footage of these weapons carrying out live missions. But to the civilians on the ground, these spectacles of technology are bearers of death.[7] So it was in the early modern period as guns (both cannon and infantry firearms) and gunpowder changed not only the aesthetic representation of war but ethical and gendered concerns about waging war as well.

Gunpowder has many histories: economic, technological, political, social, and literary. The goal of the cultural historian is to pull these histories together to present a coherent, if not comprehensive, overview of gunpowder's role in the creation and destruction of cultural forms and traditions. I begin this chapter by presenting the

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[7] In German literature the effect of air attacks has been explored in the aftermath of the Second World War. I have in mind: Ruth Klüger, *Weiter leben* (München: DTV, 2007), 188-189; W. G. Sebald, *Luftkrieg und Literatur* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2005).

original theory of a "military revolution" and its claims that technologies of war developed in the early modern period, in particular gunpowder, had lasting effects on society. I then discuss, in the second section of the chapter, the ways in which military historians have challenged this theory on mostly material grounds through analyses of the production and consumption of gunpowder and gunpowder technologies.[8] "Gunpowder technologies," as the concept is used here, signifies any technology that employs gunpowder for any reason, although historical analysis shows that gunpowder has been employed mostly to violent ends.

Literary and cultural historians do not often receive a fair hearing when it comes to military history. Therefore, the third section of this chapter will dismantle the questionable criticisms of military historians, who claim that literary and cultural histories have little to say about how gunpowder changed society. The fourth and final section of this chapter gathers the research of military, cultural, and literary historians into a history of gunpowder between 1400 and 1525 in German lands. It will lay the groundwork for this dissertation, which picks up this historical narrative at 1525. The foundational narrative of the final section presents a cultural history that respects and draws upon the wisdom of materialist approaches to military history while attempting to demonstrate the validity of literary history and criticism for the military revolution debate.

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[8] My recognition of the discussion of the "material history" of gunpowder weapons stems from a discussion with Matt Erlin (Washington University).

Roberts's "Military Revolution"

Historians have often reduced Roberts's "military revolution" to what they call the "gunpowder thesis" or the "gunpowder revolution."[9] This reduction is not amiss. Roberts's thesis turns on the shift from "individualist" warriors of the Middle Ages to the disciplined mass armies of the seventeenth century. One catalyst of that shift was gunpowder, but Roberts points to a number of other social and technical changes in warfare as well, such as the recruitment and training of soldiers. Roberts cites Londono, Justus Lipsius, and Maurice of Orange as examples of early modern military theorists who established training and drill as the primary means of creating of a well-organized and successful army.[10] Roberts also claims that, along with new techniques in training, the prevalence of mercenaries and growth of standing armies during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were indicators of the impact of the military revolution. The massiveness of armies during this period, especially during the Thirty Years War, was a matter of strategic consequence.[11] According to Roberts, this growth was the "result of a revolution of strategy, made possible by a revolution in tactics, made necessary by the circumstances of the Thirty Years War."[12] Roberts goes on to show that markers of military rank changed at all levels of armies to account for the evolving structure of

[9] Bert S. Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 2.

[10] Roberts, "Military Revolution," 197.

[11] Roberts, "Military Revolution," 204: "Men, no less than money, became in the seventeenth century the sinews of war." Gustavus Adolf had a functioning army of 175,000 men in 1632, at the height of the Thirty Years War. Roberts says that this extreme size, which had precise tactical purpose, was never to be repeated by Sweden in the early modern period. This is not surprising since, at its height, the Swedish Army was not primarily made up of Swedish citizens, but rather, groups of soldiers from Brandenburg, Bohemia, the Netherlands, and England, as well as soldiers from Catholic parts of the Holy Roman Empire.

[12] Roberts, "Military Revolution," 206.

military leadership. Europe increasingly turned to the term "Kriegsherr," or Commander-in-Chief, to identify the reigning sovereign for whom the army fought. With the rise of the "Kriegsherr," came the increasing conflation of social ideals and military activities. Vauban and Montecuccoli, for instance, were early modern military leaders who used French aesthetic ideals to transform military practice. In France, they sought to make parade ground symmetry adhere to the "model by which art and life must conform."[13] The use of aesthetics to control soldiers materialized in the institution of uniforms as well. Armies, large and potentially unruly, needed to be controlled through principles of "mass-subordination."[14] It is true that even as late as the Thirty Years War uniforms were not standard issue for most soldiers, but by the end of the seventeenth century militaries had largely adopted uniform clothing. Commanders of the early modern period learned that the army could no longer be a "brute mass" or a collection of bellicose individuals, but it must become an "articulated organism responding to impulses from above."[15] Uniforms provided an excellent vehicle for this transformation. Military science of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries oriented itself toward this goal, and by the end of the eighteenth century it had largely been accomplished on the European continent as evidenced by Clausewitz's famous dictum that war is "political commerce."[16]

If the reorganization of military training and hierarchy and the rapid growth of armies were the clear impact-sites of the military revolution, there were several others

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[13] Roberts, "Military Revolution," 206.

[14] Roberts, "Military Revolution," 198.

[15] Roberts, "Military Revolution," 198.

[16] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (New York: Knopf, 1993), 173.

that pointed to social changes in addition to military ones. Foremost, a need to integrate

social classes in the military resulted in armies that were more socially heterogeneous,

even if the commanders at the very top were still largely aristocratic. Roberts suggests

the following reasons for the integration of social classes: (1) larger armies meant a

greater need for subalterns and NCOs (non-commissioned officers) to organize soldiers

into manageable cadres; (2) changes in cavalry tactics opened up the cavalry to all who

could fire a pistol and who owned a horse; (3) as a result of changes in weaponry, light

cavalry became more prevalent than heavy cavalry; (4) the need for armor was

perceived as lower, since armor offered little protection from bullets; (5) musket balls

had social implications since they could be fired by anyone with practice, and they could

kill anyone regardless of social class; (6) the reduction of barriers between cavalry and

infantry soldiers, gentleman and others, was often noted in the seventeenth century.[17]

The mingling of classes in the army meant that aristocratic military traditions, especially

with regard to behavior and conduct of soldiering, had to be controlled by the military

elite. These regulatory efforts were not always effective, but they were well codified.

Gustav Adolf's *Kriegsartikel* (1621/1632), for example, set the standard for *jus in bello* —

military justice during a war—guidelines in the seventeenth century. His *Kriegsartikel*

were largely based on sixteenth century Germanic codes of martial law such as the

Artikulsbrief laid down by Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian I (r. 1508-1519) and

expanded by Maximilian's successors Karl V (r. 1530-1556) and Ferdinand I (r. 1556-

1564). Maximilian II (r. 1564-1576) further revised these rules and consolidated

additional legal articulations handed down by Karl and Ferdinand in the *kayserliche*

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[17] Roberts, "Military Revolution," 209.

Kriegsrecht (1570).[18] For Roberts's purposes, Gustav Adolf's *Kriegsartikel* attempted to hone a disorganized mass of men into disciplined units capable of trapping and destroying Austrian Habsburg forces.[19] Roberts also considers the legal code of Hugo Grotius (Hugo de Groot), the *De jure belli ac pacis* (1625). He presents Grotius's work as a brutal legislative reflection of the social impact of the military revolution. Not only did Grotius's legal theory permit the execution of prisoners of war and the devastation of enemy lands, but he also concluded that civilians had no special rights and that women and children were legitimate targets of military violence. Only juridically weak and therefore unenforceable "moral considerations" were urged by Grotius to temper these extreme measures. Roberts concludes that Grotius's interpretation of military law is the product of a transitional period in which the "kinks" of the military revolution were still being worked out.[20]

The hand-held firearm caused many of these "kinks." Below I will distinguish between two types of hand-held firearms, shoulder arms—such as muskets—and pistols. In addition to the social implications of the disciplined army subordinating its will to that of the commander-in-chief, Roberts places hand-held ballistic weapons at the center of his argument. That death could come suddenly from an unseen assailant was not new to war, but, for Roberts, the mechanization of that act presented the battlefield with a social leveler. The musket ball that could come from anywhere, be fired by anyone, and kill swiftly (or, worse yet, slowly) was a menace that made the social

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[18] Max Jähns, *Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften vornehmlich in Deutschland* (Munich: Oldenburg, 1891), I:757-773; Fronsperger, *Fünff Bücher von Kriegsregiment und Ordnung* (Frankfurt: Feyerabend, 1555).

[19] Roberts, "Military Revolution," 203.

[20] Roberts, "Military Revolution," 216-217.

mixing of the battlefield an uncomfortable event. Violence was no longer the birthright

of the aristocracy; anyone with access to a gun and knowledge of the weapon could

efficiently and violently exercise agency with less physical strength or expertise than any

other weapon required. The ability to kill was the ability to legislate, and thus legal

codes, evidenced by Maximilian I's imperial ban on wheel lock pistols and the

Landsfrieden of 1495, had to be updated in order to limit and punish the wielding of

violence by people who *should not* have that authority.[21]

If Grotius's law seems barbaric, it is because it had been written to take into

account the "feral warfare" of the Thirty Years War.[22] Equally barbaric was Adolf's

mantra: "Bellum se ipsum alet." The consequences of "self-sustaining warfare" were the

shattering of the bonds of social order within communities and an intense civilian

antipathy toward soldiers.[23] In theory, Adolf's strategy was a response to the logistical

nightmare of conducting war far from his home, Sweden. By setting up "base-areas"

throughout the Holy Roman Empire and turning each occupied area into a temporary

source of supplies, he hoped to take over the German lands and defeat the Habsburgs. It

was a strategy of gradual conquest and consolidation. In practice, the gradualist strategy

meant short-term looting and extortion which eroded sustainability in each occupied

region. This "thievery," as many contemporary civilians saw it, deprived the local

population of goods in order to supply Adolf's *Soldateska*. Sometimes the civilians were

"pro-Gustavus," but even if they were, the exploitation of the local populace was not

[21] Hall, 192; Otto Brunner, *Land und Herrschaft* 3rd Edition (Brünn: R.M. Röhrer, 1943), 73; Cf. Thomas Brady, *German Histories in the Age of Reformations* (NY: Cambridge UP, 2009).

[22] Roberts, "Military Revolution," 217.

[23] Otto Ulbricht, "The Experience of Violence During the Thirty Years War: A Look at the Civilian Victims," in *Power, Violence and Mass Death in Pre-Modern and Modern Times* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2004), 97-128.

sustainable from an economic, tactical, political, or moral standpoint. Moreover, as Roberts puts it, "soldiery came near to asserting a prescriptive right to massacre a recalcitrant civilian population."[24] Civilians began to defend their homes and villages with what weapons they had. Sweden's (and, to some degree, the Hapsburg monarchy's) unofficial war against the farmers and tradesmen of the German lands increasingly led to grass-roots anti-war discourse and, not uncommonly, to violent defensive action. Guns were widely used by farmers, villagers, soldiers, and aristocrats for guerilla and defensive warfare against whatever army currently occupied their lands.[25] The battlefield equalizer had become a social equalizer. In conflicts between soldiers and civilians, civilians often won.

In summary, Roberts's argument identifies a number of substrates for the "military revolution," among them gunpowder technology, shifts in social class, developments in political philosophy, and changes in military tactics and training. He lays out the historical circumstances that catalyzed these substrates as well, specifically the Thirty Years War and concludes that by 1660 the modern art of war had fully emerged. Mass armies, strict discipline, state control, and the martial subordination of the individual to the mass consciousness were the products of this new *ars belli*.

Beginning with an article in 1976 and continuing in the Lees Knowles Lectures at Trinity College at Cambridge in 1984, Geoffrey Parker appropriated the terminology of Roberts's thesis and expanded it. First, Parker postulated the starting date of the military

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[24] Roberts, "Military Revolution," 216.

[25] Guerilla warfare may be an anachronistic term here, but it describes the kind of insurgent strategies used by townspeople on a handful of occasions during the Thirty Years War. See Walzer's *Just and Unjust Wars* (1977), "Guerilla War," 176-196; Cf. Geoffrey Parker's *The Thirty Years War* (1997).

revolution as 1500, and he identified its conclusion in the colonial wars of the late

eighteenth century, a full century after Roberts's ending date (1660). Second, Parker

claimed that the military revolution was a "total transformation" of the military system

based on two key technological advancements: firearms and the *trace italienne*.[26] Parker

portrays these two technologies as consistently improving and driving the other

components of the military system to adapt with them. The introduction of firearms,

both artillery and small arms, meant a necessary shift in tactics and army composition, a

claim that Roberts had already made. But in the second technology, the *trace italienne*,

Parker sees the fulfillment of a revolutionary transformation. This fortification process,

which called for the construction of massive earthworks to strengthen already existing

medieval walls, hindered besieging armies from penetrating walls with their artillery.

Based on geometric calculations, the *trace italienne* also allowed for greater artillery and

small arms coverage from within the perimeters of fortifications. It required, according

to Parker, a great number of soldiers to defend the walls. The invention and use of the

trace italienne, therefore, also supports Parker's claims about army size. The Spanish

project to build a string of defensive fortifications and man them, in addition to the *tercio*

organization of armies in Europe, provides evidence for Parker's—and thus Roberts's—

argument that army size increased significantly between 1500 and 1700.

Parker's argument is widely accepted by those who believe that a military

revolution did indeed take place. Military historians between Roberts and Parker might

have never even heard about Roberts's theory if a senior historian had not praised his

argument in a series of lectures in the 1950s. Those who generally agree with Parker and

Roberts debate the specifics and causal linkages of technology, tactics, and political

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[26] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 203.

strategy; they either expand or contract the limits of the military revolution as suits a given country or culture. Scholars such as J.R. Hale in *Renaissance War Studies*, Jeremy Black in his two works on the military revolution, and David Eltis in *The Military Revolution in Sixteenth Century Europe* all promote themselves as acolytes of Roberts's original thesis or Parker's revisions.

The Materialist Counterarguments

Still, over the last two decades many historians have questioned the validity of the military revolution and gunpowder theses. These historians criticize Roberts's argument and Parker's revision on material grounds, especially the production and deployment of the "tools of war" such as soldiers, animals, weapons, money, food, and gunpowder. The material counterargument to the military revolution thesis is thus based on four tenets: (1) gunpowder was not as important to the early modern military as these theses suggest; (2) armies either did not expand as quickly as surmised or they were made to seem larger on paper than they actually were on the battlefield; (3) there was nothing revolutionary about the military revolution, instead, the period between 1400 and 1700 is characterized by slow and often ineffectual technological changes that move in fits and starts; (4) the military revolution thesis fails to establish credible causal linkages between its proposed catalysts of change and the practice of war in the seventeenth century. Numerous scholars have pursued this argument and have refuted the military revolution theory with evidence contrary to its main thrusts. Mostly, each of these scholars argues similar points in their conclusions: (1) gunpowder caused some military changes in the early modern period, but it was only one of a number of factors that contributed to these changes; (2) the massive expansion of armies occurred in some

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places at some times during the early modern period, usually as the result of distinct political events that required the mustering of large armies; (3) these armies were often not as large as they looked on paper, and their size did not translate to a tactical advantage over smaller forces; (4) the military revolution was more of an evolution rooted in medieval tactics which had been established before the rise of gunpowder.

Within the hotly contested arena of the military revolution, Bert Hall's *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe* presents a compelling analysis of the materials of war (weapons, soldiers, and money). Hall's comprehensive history of gunpowder weapons up to 1700 and his rebuttal of Parker and Roberts's claims strike a convincing blow at the basic assumptions of the military revolution (and more specifically gunpowder revolution) arguments. Hall invokes the long history of gunpowder in Europe to show that gunpowder was in use well before Roberts or Parker considered its impacts. According to Hall, by the sixteenth century when the military revolution supposedly took place, gunpowder weapons had already been deployed throughout Europe for two hundred years.[27] For example, the first uncontested use of cannons in battle was in 1331 at the siege of Cividale, two hundred years before the start of the military revolution.[28] Furthermore, gunpowder production in Europe, as distinct from the use of gunpowder above, had its roots in the fourteenth century.[29] Two hundred years is hardly a revolutionary gestation period, as far as Hall is concerned. In contrast to Roberts, Hall's argument rests on the *slow* integration of gunpowder technology into battlefield tactics due to the limiting factors of gunpowder's early development: the expense of the

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[27] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 2.

[28] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 43.

[29] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 43.

chemical components of black powder and the slow development of metallurgy required to make it useable in battle. Because gunpowder was so expensive before its domestic production and because technology was not suitable to make it effective in battle, the process by which gunpowder became an integral part of European warfare was marked by "fits and starts" rather than revolutionary change.

Europeans acquired gunpowder—or black powder—as a "developed modern technology" from Asia. As soon as gunpowder came to Europe, Europeans knew the percentage of saltpeter needed for ballistics.[30] Combined in the proper ratio (5:2:1—saltpeter:sulfur:carbon) with sulfur and carbon-charcoal, saltpeter turns into a powerful explosive that burns at rates sufficient for ballistic propulsion from metal tubes.[31] The challenge for military leaders in the early years of gunpowder was the expense of obtaining the explosive element of gunpowder, saltpeter, a nitrogen-based compound (NO_3) formed from decomposed organic material. This compound was not as naturally occuring in Europe as it was in Asia, where environmental conditions were conducive for its production. In the 1380s, however, a gunpowder cottage industry developed in Europe through the establishment of saltpeter plantations. The growth of a "petering" industry—as the process was called—reduced the cost of this raw material in Europe and thus expanded Europe's domestic consumption of gunpowder. By the early fifteenth century, this "peasant industry" was already a crucial "component in the underlying network of support for making a successful war."[32] These domestic products

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[30] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 42.

[31] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 81-85.

[32] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 64.

competed with the more expensive imported goods, and prices of gunpowder in Europe began to drop during the fifteenth century.[33]

Domestic "petering" promoted the spread of gunpowder weapons on the continent, but a second limiting factor kept firearms from becoming as effective as they could have been. Metallurgy had yet to match the technical demands that cheaper black powder produced, and the size of guns was limited by the strength of the metal being used to forge them.[34] The enormous stone-throwing siege guns of the fifteenth century, for example, often sacrificed ballistic performance for considerations of safety. Their large conical barrels caused the shot to lose contact with the barrel walls as it was pushed through the barrel. Gas build up behind the stone was released before sufficient pressure had been reached to fling the stone at a maximum velocity and distance.[35] This inefficient design also kept the gun from exploding. Such an explosion was fatal for gunners, and one is even depicted visually in the *Feuerwerkbuch von 1420.*[36] Hall believes that in the earliest stages of gunpowder warfare the tactical performance of cannons in field warfare was negligible.[37] Originally the use of artillery in the field was "retrograde" at best and contributed mostly a psychological advantage. Guns did little more than scare off peasant armies or bands of untrained belligerents.[38] In siege warfare—as opposed to field warfare—the cannon was slightly more effective as a defensive

[33] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 58.

[34] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 58-61.

[35] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 60-61.

[36] Rainer Leng, *Ars belli*, Vol. 1 (Wiesbaden: Reichert Verlag, 2002), Tafel 14 (ZBZ, Ms. Rh. Hist. 33b, fol 102$_r$).

[37] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 65.

[38] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 55.

weapon, but besieging forces often used guns effectively too. During sieges of fortified

cities and bastions in the fifteenth century, "the siege gun did not always achieve a

speedy resolution, but it seems to have done so often enough to be credible."[39] The fact

that towns fell to the large siege gun provides evidence for Parker's theory regarding the

proliferation of the *trace italienne*. But Hall affirms that its ineffectiveness in field warfare

bars the cannon from claims to revolutionary status: "Any successful employment of

guns in field warfare had to await technical changes that would make them, if not more

accurate, at least more plentiful."[40] Nonetheless, guns were ever more widely deployed

in battle throughout the fifteenth century.

Plenty arrived before accuracy in regard to firearms. Guns, flooding the

battlefields and grouped *en masse*, mitigated but did not solve their inaccuracy and

inefficiency on the sixteenth-century plains of Mars. Hall recognizes, even goes to great

lengths to prove, the prevalence of small arms on European battlefields, but he

overlooks the most revolutionary aspect of gunpowder—the social leveling of the

battlefield. Instead, Hall focuses on the inaccuracy and tactical inefficiency of artillery,

muskets, and arquebuses in battles of the sixteenth century.

His argument regarding heavy artillery is convincing: cannons could not be fired

very quickly and thus were only accurate if the target was very large and stationary, like

a wall, or large and slow, like a mass of soldiers.[41] Early modern gunning, as Hall so

eloquently explains, was a "stochastic process."[42] More missiles meant more effective

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[39] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 66.

[40] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 65.

[41] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 149.

[42] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 148.

hits. But large cannons were constantly in danger of being captured by the faster infantry or cavalry since artillery battalions were not equipped to defend themselves if they were overtaken. They consisted primarily of tradesmen and gunners, who were more skilled at math and carpentry than at close combat. Expensive artillery was not readily exposed to such hazards, and thus, was rarely a key component of field warfare. Just as it was in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, early sixteenth-century artillery was more a siege weapon than a field weapon.

Shoulder arms suffered similar weaknesses and—due to limitations of their ballistic and rate-of-fire capabilities—were only useful if they could be massed in sufficient quantities "to provide a virtual blanket of missiles over a short range."[43] If they were not amassed to provide a heavy volume of fire, small arms gunners were almost useless, since rifling—invented in the fifteenth century—would not become common until the nineteenth century.[44] Without rifling, which would have slowed the rate of fire due to a build-up of gunpowder residue in the barrel over several discharges, muzzle-loading shoulder arms prevented their users from performing individual feats of marksmanship.[45] Furthermore, since soldiers were vulnerable while reloading their arms, it was not possible to form a company entirely of arquebusiers. Gunners still required pikemen, *Landsknechte*, to protect them from cavalry shock attacks while they reloaded.[46] These limitations allow Hall to ruminate about the shortcomings of fifteenth century firearms: "from a purely technical perspective, shoulder arms should have done

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[43] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 132.

[44] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 148.

[45] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 176-179.

[46] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 133, 176-179.

more in the fifteenth century than they did."[47] But by the end of the sixteenth century, the countermarch was invented by William of Nassau and popularized by his cousin Maurice of Orange. The countermarch allowed squads of *Musketierer* to sustain a rate of fire necessary to eliminate the problems of inaccuracy and create the necessary blanket of fire without the protection of pikemen.[48] Still, and despite these tactical innovations, pikemen would not disappear from the infantry ranks until late in the seventeenth century since they delivered a modicum of protection for *Musketierer* against cavalry shock attacks and in hand-to-hand infantry combat.

Hall provides a detailed and comprehensive explanation of powder production, arms use, and ballistic limitations in order to prove his basic thesis: Developments in the technologies of gunpowder weapons were "slow and incremental, evolutionary, not revolutionary in character."[49] This semantic alteration to Roberts's original theory distracts from Hall's most persuasive argument, namely that gunpowder weapons and the tactics that accompanied them have a very long history and are not as teleological as medievalists or early modernists tend to claim. Besides criticizing the material and technical assumptions about gunpowder weapons, Hall also presents a material analysis of soldiers, the most important "tools of war" as John Lynn puts it.[50] Hall analyzes the troop strength of early modern armies relative to earlier European military forces. In doing so, he addresses the third of the "four changes in the art of war" which Parker

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[47] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 132.

[48] Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1988), 19; Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 133.

[49] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 104.

[50] John Lynn, "The Pattern of Army Growth, 1445-1945," in *Tools of War*, ed. John Lynn (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1990), 11.

identifies as central to Roberts' military revolution thesis: a dramatic increase in scale of armies.[51] While Parker and Roberts take this growth for granted, the counting of soldiers and international transhistorical comparisons undertaken by John Lynn, Simon Adams, David Parrott, and subsequently by Hall show that this assumption is not as well-founded as the military revolution argument would like us to believe.

Parker and Roberts both assumed that by comparing sample army sizes in the early sixteenth century and the late seventeenth century, they could identify an upward trend in the scale of armies. In the conference proceedings *Tools of War*, Adams and Lynn find that, in the French and Spanish systems at least, such growth was not linear but, instead, fluctuated heavily throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries depending on political circumstances. Looking at Germany, for example, Adams refutes Roberts's thesis that revolutionary army growth brought about the political circumstances that came to a head in the Thirty Years War: "It was the Thirty Years War that lead to the expansion of armies, not the converse."[52] Lynn, previewing Adams's conclusions, finds that "ideas" seem to have exerted more influence on the size of armies in the early modern period than "instruments."[53] Parrott similarly discredits the military revolution thesis in his dissertation "Administration of the French Army" and in his article "Strategy and Tactics in the Thirty Year's War," when he argues that Parker's causal chain is "obscure." It is more likely, he continues, that the growth of armies in the seventeenth century "owed most to the dramatic expansion of war aims and the

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[51] Parker, *The Military Revolution*, 1-2.

[52] Adams, "Tactics or Politics?", 46.

[53] Lynn, "Army Growth," 11

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imposition of new, unpopular regimes over entire states."[54] Most convincing among these arguments and damning to the military revolution argument is the fact that military size did not significantly increase at all when wider historical parameters are considered. If one accounts for the impact of the plague on late medieval army sizes, then any growth of armies during this period is much more a matter of overall population growth than the effect of new military tactics.[55] Hall views Roberts's focus on army growth as important, but he dismisses the possibility "that gunpowder somehow forced armies to grow bigger."[56]

The most common method of the material counterargument is quantitative analysis. Whether they count the prevalence or production of guns, the number of battles, or the number of soldiers in the field, materialist scholars of military history look for numbers. Like all good accountants, those who question the gunpowder and military revolution on a material basis keep an eye on the money. They ask how much things cost and how much money was circulating in the economy of war. Hall uses economic analysis to refute Parker's *trace italienne* thesis, but he falls victim to his own assumptions when he turns to the same method to debunk the impact of gunpowder on field warfare. First, I will turn to Hall's rebuttal of Parker's thesis, in which he questions just how widespread the *trace italienne* actually was in the sixteenth century. Then I will address his analysis of the effect of pistols on field warfare. This second point is vital to understanding the "military revolution" as a cultural phenomenon because the

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[54] David Parrott, "Administration of the French Army" (D.Phil. diss., Oxford University, 1985), qtd. in Adams, "Tactics or Politics?", 35.

[55] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 209

[56] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 205.

propagation of small arms in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had a significant

impact on cultural representations of the battlefield.

The Italian Wars of the early sixteenth century tested the military innovations of

the fifteenth century.[57] Heavy artillery, increased numbers of small arms, a growing

number of pikemen, and an "enhanced value" of cavalry became the center of an

experiment in military tactics.[58] Each of these "tools of war" filled a tactical niche mostly

"immune" to the others.[59] As the Italian wars progressed, the strengths and weaknesses

of each of these groups were tested against one another with predictable consequences:

> Siege guns could be used against pikes, for example, but
> the difficulty of transporting them and their slow rates of
> fire meant that they often were not. Siege guns were too
> expensive and too likely to be captured by cavalry to be
> exposed lightly to the hazards of the battlefield. [60]

Pikemen, too, although effective at defending against heavy cavalry shock attacks,

required missile support from the arquebusiers they were often used to protect in order

to pose an offensive threat to heavy cavalry.[61] In order to understand the evolution of

military tactics, it is important to recognize the strategic logjam that such a system

created. The immobilization of forces did not translate into a reduction of military

activities, but it did result in specialized uses of these combinations of military units.

The use of artillery by the French forces initially met with little resistance in Italy.

The medieval walls of Italian towns were ill equipped to withstand artillery barrages.

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[57] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 157.

[58] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 157; Phillipe Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, Trans. Michael Jones (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), 132-133.

[59] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 158.

[60] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 158.

[61] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 158.

When the Habsburgs were drawn into the fight, the Italian wars became a European war

fought on Italian soil. The *trace italienne*, a system of earthworks reinforcing medieval

curtain walls and outfitted with polygonal bastions at key points along the defenses,

was created in response to the effectiveness of French artillery in sieges.[62] J.R. Hale

argues that the *trace italienne* became widespread by the Italian Wars and was fully

realized in 1530. He places the origin of the polygonal *trace italienne* bastion in 1450.[63]

This matches the earliest written description of the system, which was composed

between 1440 and 1450 by Leon Battista Alberti in *De re aedificatoria* (1485).[64]

The *trace italienne* became a central component of the military revolution theory

in Parker's work, and Hall does not challenge its importance to military strategy of the

sixteenth century. But he does argue that "its overall effect was to restore an old

equilibrium, not to introduce a new revolution."[65] To demonstrate the potential hazards

of investing in *trace italienne* fortifications, Hall invokes the example of Siena. A "second-

class city-state" that became a pawn in the Franco-Spanish wars in Italy, Siena found

itself crushed by the massive cost of fortifying the city against further attack.[66] Bankrupt

and incompletely fortified, Siena was retaken by Habsburg forces in 1555 after the town

successfully drove them out in 1553. In the peace negotiations following the wars, Siena

was given to the Medici rulers as a fief in 1559. Despite their investments in fortifying

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[62] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 161.

[63] J.R. Hale, "The Early Development of the Bastion: An Italian Chronology, c. 1450-c. 1534," in *Europe in the Later Middle Ages*, ed. J. R. Hale, 466-95 (London: Faber & Faber, 1965).

[64] Hale, "Bastion," 471-481.

[65] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 163

[66] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 164

the walls, the town wound up broke and under the control of a "foreign" ruler. Furthermore, Hall adds, the "*trace italienne* could provide defense against conquest by cannon, but only for those who could afford the protection it offered."[67] Even Papal Rome gave up on building a *trace italienne* defense curtain after they footed a bill of 44,000 ducats for just one polygonal bastion.[68]

The directly causal impact of the *trace italienne* on military strategy was the extension of the duration of sieges.[69] "Each step of a besieger's progress was painfully slowed by improvements in fortress design and more powerful firearms and artillery."[70] Towns that reinforced their medieval walls with bastions and earthworks could expect that their town would hold for months instead of weeks.[71] Hall's argument focuses on a conservative balance of the competing elements: artillery and fortifications.[72] While gunpowder may have been revolutionary in the "so-called gunpowder empires" of Mughal India and the Ottoman and Russian Empires, it was part of a larger "dialectic of attack and defense in fortifications . . . beginning in the twelfth century."[73] Rather than interpret the *trace italienne* as a revolutionary check to siege guns, Hall calls it the logical counterbalance to the development of artillery.[74]

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[67] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 164

[68] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 164; Parker, *The Military Revolution*, 12

[69] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 163

[70] David Eltis, *The Military Revolution in Sixteenth-Century Europe* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995), 136.

[71] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 163.

[72] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 164.

[73] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 164, 162.

[74] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 162.

Hall's economic argument of gradual military change focuses sharply on the disruptions in production that kept any single change to the technology of war from dominating military strategic and tactical considerations. Artillery was hampered first by the paucity and the expense of gunpowder, next by the limits of metallurgy, and then finally by its tactical ineffectiveness in field warfare. Even where artillery provided some advantage, it was thwarted by the *trace italienne*, an effective but expensive solution for the besieged. The addition of shoulder arms to the battlefield was also hampered by economic and tactical concerns. The limitations of accuracy kept musketeers from revolutionizing the battlefield. Furthermore, shoulder arms were a new invention technically, but not tactically, since musketeers faced at least as many problems as the archers and still required the protection of pikemen on the battlefield. But Hall's tactical and economic arguments betray their assumptions when he attempts to explain the wheel-lock pistol, which he admits resulted in the widespread remaking of the cavalry. Whereas the cost of the *trace italienne* could be economically daunting to the most affluent ruler, the wheel-lock pistol drastically decreased in price over the course of the sixteenth century. Its invention in Nuremburg during the early sixteenth century had long-lasting social, political, and military consequences.[75]

It has been a commonplace saying since at least Miguel Cervantes that gunpowder brought about the demise of the knight. Certainly, gunpowder had something to do with the demise of the knightly class, but there are additional social and tactical considerations to this coup, as Eugene Frauenholz explains in his *Entwicklungsgeschichte des deutschen Heerwesens*. Knights—traditionally of the nobility—

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[75] Claude Blair, "Further Notes on the Origins of the Wheellock," *Arms and Armour Annual* 1 (1973), 28-47; Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 192.

were folded into the officer class during the later sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Officers were commissioned in both cavalry and infantry units.[76] Under the Dutch and Low-German military reforms of Maurice of Orange and his cousin Johann of Nassau, which were brought to a "conclusion" in the military structure of the Swedish army under Gustav Adolf, the cavalry became an increasingly egalitarian profession through a mixing of social classes, mostly from the nobility and burghers.[77] European martial codes (*Kriegsrechte*) demanded the continued nobility of the cavalry and separate treatment in criminal proceedings and punishments for nobility and commoners until the early seventeenth century, but the legal and practical integration of nobility and commoners took place in German-speaking lands with the establishment of universal courts-martial (*Militärgerichte*) in the "kaiserlichen Artikelsbrief" of 1570.[78]

The knight became obsolete with the invention of the wheel-lock pistol and the integration of dragoons (*Dragoner*), or mobile infantry, and cavaliers (*Reiter*), or light cavalry, into the cavalry ranks. Only a minor distinction between the noble *Lanzirer* and other cavalry soldiers such as *Dragoner* and *Curassierer* was reclaimed in the didactic and theoretical works of J.J. Wallhausen (*Kriegskunst zu Pferd*, 1620), Giorgio Basta (*Governo della Cavalleria* 1612, translated into German in 1614), and Lorenzo Melzo (*Cavalleria* 1611, translated into German 1625). The *Lanzirer*, who was armed—as his name suggests—with a lance and "ganz ritterlich gerüstet" [outfitted entirely like a knight], however, disappeared from the European battlefield during the Thirty Years War

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[76] Eugene von Frauenholz, *Entwicklungsgeschichte des deutschen Heerwesens*, Vol. 3: Pt. 1 (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1938), 34-35.

[77] Frauenholz, Vol 3: Pt 1, 34-35; Hans Delbrück, *Geschichte der Kriegskunst* (Berlin: 1920), Vol. IV, 199. Delbrück calls Gustav Adolf "der Vollender der Moritzschen Kriegskunst."

[78] Frauenholz, Vol 3: Pt 1, 23.

because he was tactically ineffective.[79] But mostly, the knight and his minor revision, the

Lanzirer, were too expensive for armies to maintain in the face of other mounting

military costs. In purely economic terms, the knight's cost-to-benefit ratio was too high.

He was replaced by the *Reiter*, who was typically armed with multiple wheel-lock

pistols—essentially ballistic lances—and a sword.[80] Frauenholz, whose work appeared

prior to the military revolution debate, emphasizes the social integration of the military

in German speaking lands during the seventeenth century.[81] Although he believes that

the infantry itself was less democratic than "in der Landsknechtszeit" of the sixteenth

century, Frauenholz identifies the stratification of officer and enlisted soldier as coeval

with the integration of nobility and non-nobility.[82] He interprets these social shifts as the

outcome but not necessarily the consequence of earlier socio-political processes. The end

of the knight, therefore, was the result of social and tactical shifts linked to technical

innovation.

For Hall "The End of Knighthood" proceeds directly from the invention of the

wheel-lock pistol. Invented either by Martin Löffelholz of Nuremburg or by Leonardo

da Vinci, the wheel-lock pistol was widely produced by craftsmen throughout the Holy

Roman Empire.[83] Increased production meant that the price of pistols plummeted over

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[79] Frauenholz, Vol 3: Pt 1, 40-41 and 60.

[80] Frauenholz, Vol 3: Pt 1, 39-41; Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 192. Frauenholz suggests that two pistols was the norm, but Hall notes that the use of vests that could hold up to six loaded pistols were not uncommon.

[81] It is tempting, but not particularly helpful, to read Frauenholz's *Entstehungsgeschichte des deutschen Heerwesens* (1938) against the political backdrop of National Socialism. I will avoid speculation as to his motivations here.

[82] Frauenholz, Vol 3: Pt 1, 34-35.

[83] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 191.

the course of the sixteenth century.[84] Perhaps not surprisingly, wheel-lock pistols, which were easier to transport and discharge than arquebuses and muskets, began to appear in large quantities on the European battlefield in the 1540s.[85] The cultural impact of this invention was first felt in German lands during the Schmalkaldic War, when mounted pistoleers became known as Black Riders (*Schwarzreiter*) because of their black battle vestments.[86] Later, the *Schwarzreiter* gave rise to the moniker *Reiter*, or "horsemen who made pistols their chief weapons."[87] New counter-infantry tactics such as the *caracole*—a cavalry version of the countermarch—accommodated this new breed of cavalry soldier, but the primary tactical value of the *Reiter* was to turn the *Lanzirer*, whose lance was no match for the more impressive range of the mounted pistoleer, into an obsolete tool of war. The old knightly class met its foil in the *Reiter*, a cheap and effective alternative to the financially burdensome knight.

The Literary Perspective

> "The strange, new, hollow weapon now appears,
> Which he intends shall now come into play;
> And down behind it as Orlando nears,
> He crouches like a huntsman in the lay . . ."
> —Ariosto, *Orlando Furioso*, IX.73[88]

Literature condemning gunpowder began with Petrarch and Ariosto and gained momentum with Cervantes's quixotic hero. It entered German literature a few years into

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[84] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 192.

[85] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 193.

[86] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 194.

[87] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 194.

[88] Ariosto, *Orlando Furioso*, 306.

the Thirty Years War with the works of Harsdörffer, Friedrich von Logau, Moscherosch and—eventually—Grimmelshausen. Their responses to gunpowder warfare were consistent. Both Moscherosch and Grimmelshausen maintained a critical stance against gunpowder's degenerative effects on warfare in general and its effect on the morality of soldiers specifically. But by Grimmelshausen's time—and arguably since Erasmus—German writers were in the habit of rigorously condemning anything related to warfare. Why should we, then, focus on gunpowder as a unique cultural trope among the many vagaries of war that German writers disparaged?

Gunpowder is a pervasive topic in early modern German culture, and the criticism of gunpowder has a wider sweep than literary circles. Literary representation, then, is only one aspect of the German cultural condemnation of gunpowder. As far as my research has revealed, the history of critical stances against gunpowder weapons in German military treatises, for example, reaches back to Fronsperger whose work *Von Geschütz und Fewerwerck* (1557/64) simultaneously condemns gunpowder while instructing the reader in the use of it in warfare. Even earlier, condemnations of artillery appear in the writings of Erasmus, but only as one feature of the general wickedness of war. We even find a condemnation of wheel-lock pistols in the legislation of Emperor Maximilian I, who banned "selbstschlagenden hanndtpuchsen die sich selbst zundten" [self-igniting handguns that set themselves to firing] in 1517 because he believed that they were too easily concealed.[89] These, too, are a part of the cultural history of gunpowder in German-speaking lands since they contributed to early modern Germans' understandings of the moral, political, and social implications of gunpowder.

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[89] Qtd. in Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 192.

In *Weapons and Warfare*, Hall constructs his argument in opposition to two claims about early modern military history. The first, as I outlined above, is the military revolution thesis, which he deconstructs using semantic alterations and materialist methodologies. The second target of his criticism is less clear:

> In respect to gunpowder weaponry, the most common dichotomy pits the conservativism of the aristocratic knight against the challenges to upper-class status inherent in the technical progressivism of the common infantryman equipped with firearms and frames any narrative in the familiar terms summed up in the phrase 'the death of chivalry.' . . . This 'literary' perspective is difficult to sustain, however, in the face of any critical reading of medieval or early modern military history.[90]

It is not entirely clear what Hall means by the "literary perspective," but his claim is worth examining here. A footnote buried in the text reveals that Hall is considering only a single source as he attacks the phantom argument of "the death of chivalry": Eugene Rice's *The Foundations of Early Modern Europe* (1970). Yet Rice's work, a cultural history of early modern Europe, is not literary scholarship. Is Hall questioning the ability of cultural history to make claims about military change and its broader social effects? Or is his critique a claim that "literary" arguments—that is, arguments made by literary scholars—cannot sufficiently explain military phenomena? In either case, his critique oversimplifies two disciplines that have made very few claims on the subject at all. His dismissal of the "literary perspective" must be countered by an investigation of literary scholarship's and cultural history's engagements with the issues at play in the military revolution debate. This section will determine that cultural historians and literary scholars have actually been involved in debates about the military reformations of the early modern period to a lesser degree than Hall suggests.

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[90] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 10.

It is not just the broad strokes with which Hall dismisses any "literary perspective" that is problematically simplistic; his marginalization of literary and cultural studies is methodologically narrow-minded. Foucault might say that such an approach has an "impoverished idea of the real" at its core.[91] Historical change cannot be reduced to technological innovation alone. Since technology does not evolve in a vacuum but has been produced within and by culture, the material history of technology is linked to cultural changes too. And, while Peter Burke warns cultural historians not to treat "the texts and images of a certain period as mirrors" or "unproblematic reflections of their times," early modern texts about war do help us establish more than just material facts.[92] Linking several textual genres such as military treatises (Kriegsbücher), broad sheets (Flugblätter), and war novels (Kriegsromane) through a variety of interpretive methods allows us to construct a history of war and society that is both culturally rich and materially based.

Since the advent of *Kulturgeschichte* in the nineteenth century, historians have understood war as a cultural and social phenomenon, even as such a claim seems to imply inherent contradictions.[93] After all, war more often seems to disrupt culture rather than to create it. If we turn to German scholars, cultural histories of war abound prior to 1945. Two early works are pertinent to the cultural history of gunpowder: Max Jähns's *Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften vornehmlich in Deutschland* [History of Military Science particularly in Germany](1889) and Hans Delbrück's *Geschichte der Kriegskunst in einem*

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[91] Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994).

[92] Peter Burke, *What is Cultural History?* (Cambridge: Polity, 2004), 20

[93] Peter Burke, *What is Cultural History?*, especially Chapters One, which provides the historiography of cultural history (founded by German historians as *Kulturgeschichte*), and Six, on the scholarly conceptualization of war as a cultural event.

Rahmen der politischen Geschichte [*History of the Art of War*] (1920). Max Jähns's *Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften* was perhaps one of the earliest efforts at a cultural history of war. Although it is not a narrative history, his work uses philology and bibliography to present the culture of warfare through a collection of texts that created military science. Jähns assumes that the culture of war is reducible to a canon of military theory, shared by those who make and have made war. This amalgamation of texts constitutes, for Jähns, the fundamental basis of military culture. By collecting and organizing these texts into a three-volume series, Jähns historicizes the ideas of war as they were written down. Another early cultural history of war, Hans Delbrück's comprehensive *Geschichte der Kriegskunst*, sketches a history of warfare that contains heroes and villains, artists and frauds, patriots and traitors. Perhaps this history, even more so than Jähns, approaches the cultural historian's task of weaving hard material evidence, historical vignette, and the analysis of cultural artifacts into an organized narrative.

In the aftermath of the Second World War, the political implications of cultural histories became more apparent. In Germany the study of war fell out of favor temporarily, as a brief survey of historical books and articles produced in the Bundesrepublik between 1945 and 1975 demonstrates. The paucity of German historians writing about the cultural aspects of war in the post-Nazi era should not surprise us. Wolfgang Schivelbusch explains this phenomenon in broader cultural terms as a result of the initial paralysis and subsequent "forward-looking" of cultures defeated in war. The defeated want to ignore the causes of their defeat and think about the future instead.[94] In America and Britain, there was less hesitation in writing military history most likely due to the idealization of warfare that occurs in victorious cultures following

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[94] Wolfgang Schivelbusch, *The Culture of Defeat* (NY: Picador, 2004), 27-30.

a war. Although the American and British economies after the Second World War, like

the German economy, went back to work, the political dangers of war were not

perceived among the Allies the same way they were in Germany, especially in the

Bundesrepublik Deutschland (West Germany). When American and British historians

wrote about warfare in early modern Germany, they typically referenced Jähns,

Delbrück, Otto Brunner, and other German scholars of war who wrote between 1870

and 1945. With the exception of a handful of German works, however, British and

American scholars dominated the historical field of early modern war from 1945 until

the 1990s.

One of the major historical works to emerge from post-war Germany was the

Habilitation of Gerhard Oestreich. Notably, at the same time as Roberts was writing his

thesis, Oestreich was working on his equally groundbreaking study of the impact of

Justus Lipsius's neo-stoic philosophy on state-building in sixteenth century Europe.[95]

With it, Oestreich made the most important contribution to scholarship on the cultural

history of the early modern army within the German academy in the post-Nazi period.

In *Antiker Geist und moderner Staat bei J. Lipsius (1547-1606)* [*Neostoicism and the Early*

Modern State] (*Habil.* 1954), Oestreich posits a link between the neo-stoic philosophy of

Lipsius and the Dutch military reforms of Maurice of Orange. Those reforms remain—

even in Hall's critiques of the military revolution thesis—some of the most revolutionary

reforms of military best practices between the Middle Ages and the nineteenth century.[96]

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[95] Gerhard Oestreich, *Antiker Geist und moderner Staat bei J. Lipsius* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1989).

[96] Cf. Chapter 2.

Neo-stoic philosophy and its dedication to discipline, order, and hierarchy in the face of all obstacles seemed a happy partner for the martial visions of Maurice.

Oestreich's theory rests on his survey of the readership of Lipsius's works and the intellectual circles in which Lipsius participated. Even though he convincingly argues for the connection between Lipsius's neo-stoic philosophy and the establishment of "Dutch Drill," many military historians are skeptical of linking philosophical theory to military practice. After all, it could be argued equally strenuously that Maurice and his cousin Johann started drilling soldiers because of the technical requirements and limitations of shoulder arms. As Max Cohen explains, the "gunner" in the early modern period was conceived of as a nimble mechanic, who needed to master a number of complicated moves in order for his weapon to function.[97] Training the mechanic to work mechanically was an inherent aspect of Maurice's military "drill." Moreover, as Hall shows, the drilling of troops in tight formations can also be understood as a holdover from the Swiss phalanx formations, called *Haufen*. The employment of firearms in these formations made the inaccuracy of firearms an advantage by supplying a blanket of shot from soldiers who fired simultaneously. Due to ballistical limitations of unrifled firearms common to the early modern period, a single soldier could not hope to shoot very accurately. One soldier firing a gun was unlikely to hit a target 100 meters away, but ten soldiers firing simultaneously had much better odds of hitting many targets across the battlefield, even if they were not the ones each soldier had aimed at. Despite these two tactical and technological challenges, Oestreich's *Habilitation* remains an influential work on the cultural history of late sixteenth-century war.

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[97] Max Cohen, *Technology and the Early Modern Self* (NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), 115-134.

Eugene Frauenholz, Jähns, Delbrück, Brunner, and Oestreich appear most often in the bibliographies of American and British early modern military historians, but recent German cultural and literary histories of early modern war often frame their arguments within the historical and literary scholarship surrounding Grimmelshausen, and to a lesser extent, Moscherosch. The works of Grimmelshausen and Moscherosch have endured in part because they contain the broadest contemporary visions of the Thirty Years War. While I will review these works and their scholarship in depth in Chapter Four, it is worth mentioning a few of the scholars who have used Grimmelshausen and Moscherosch to reflect on the cultural impact of the Thirty Years War.

A number of articles have attempted to validate or dispute Moscherosch's and Grimmelshausen's descriptions of the "fury" of this war. Walter Ernst Schäfer, Ferdinand von Ingen, Eberhard Mannack, Michele Battafarano, Steffen Kaudelka, Hartmut Lehman and Yves Carbonnel have all supplied the historical, literary, and historiographical bases for claims on both sides. Most of them, however, avoid the military revolution debate and its material counterargument, often for good methodological reasons. After all, they are not attempting to make claims about material change but, rather, experience. At its core, literary scholarship is more interested in representation than reality, and so literary scholars attempt to limit their claims of historical facticity. The closest German literary scholarship comes to engaging the "gunpowder-revolution" thesis is Lynne Tatlock's work on Grimmelshausen, Moscherosch, and Happel. In her article on "The Simulacra of War," Tatlock engages questions of historical validity but from a perspective that associates the technology of war with the technology of printing, tropes common to both

Grimmelshausen and Moscherosch.[98] In Tatlock's work, we find the most compelling and nuanced explanation of gunpowder technology explored to date in these authors' works, but here too, the military revolution debate plays no role, as her argument is almost exclusively interested in literary representation, not reality per se.

This situation is perplexing for two reasons. A survey of literary scholarship and the field of cultural history and early modern war seems—contrary to Hall's statement—to be entirely uninterested in the military revolution debate or the kinds of causal claims that Hall dislikes. Despite his rather intense criticism of the "literary perspective," Hall is unaware of the claims that the "Literary Perspective"—writ large—actually makes. Yet, it should be noted that, with the exception of Max Cohen, the literary scholars and cultural historians most engaged in issues surrounding early modern war likewise ignore or are unaware of the military revolution debate. While cultural historians such as Hartmut Lehman, Hans Medick, Markus Neuman, Otto Ulbricht, and Herbert Langer have produced and called for interdisciplinary treatments of warfare, their concerns seem most oriented toward questions surrounding experience and representation rather than questions of the materiality of war. Most of these scholars want to know whether the horrifying descriptions of the Thirty Years War such as Grimmelshausen's are accurate. Thus, material histories of technologies appear not to inform the works of cultural historians or literary scholars of early modern war, just as cultural and literary histories are missing from the works of many military historians. Something is to be gained from the collaboration of these fields, however, and this dissertation attempts to pool their collective wisdom and put them into conversation with one another.

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[98] Lynne Tatlock, "Simulacra of War: New Technologies in War and Prose," *Daphnis* 22:1 (1993), 641-668.

A discussion of the "cultural history of war" especially regarding German scholarship must also mention the *Imagines medii aevi* series published by the Reichert Verlag. Four volumes in this series have illuminated the subject of war in the early modern period. Horst Brunner's *Der Krieg im Mittelalter und in der Frühen Neuzeit: Gründe, Begründungen, Bilder, Bräuche, Recht* (Bd. 3, 1999), as well as *Die Wahrnehmung und Darstellung von Kriegen im Mittelalter und in der Frühen Neuzeit* (Bd. 6, 2000), a separate anthology also edited by Brunner under the title *Dulce bellum inexpertis* (Bd. 11, 2002), and Rainer Leng's comprehensive *Ars belli* (Bd. 12, *Habil.* 2002) each contribute much to the understanding of the cultural history of early modern war in Germany. Works of literary scholarship, these volumes combine philological, historical, and textual summaries in nuanced ways. As we move into the next section and Chapter Two, I will show the value of this scholarship for a cultural history of gunpowder that strives for a more interdisciplinary conversation. This final section of Chapter One presents a cultural history of gunpowder in German speaking lands between 1400 and 1500 that draws on the work of military, cultural, and literary historians in order to set the stage for the subsequent three chapters, and it models the kind of history that I envision emerging from these collaborating disciplines.

A Cultural History of Gunpowder in German Speaking Lands around 1400

"Often the best place to start a story is in the middle." —B. Ann Tlusty[99]

The Hussite Wars and Heinrich Wittenwiler's *Der Ring*

Firearms first played a politically decisive role during the Hussite Wars of Bohemia (1419-1442), a conflict of European dimensions.[100] These wars began nearly one hundred years after the first undisputed use of cannon in European warfare (1331 at the Siege of Cividale in Friuli) and one hundred years before the Italian Wars crowned firearms as a *de facto* component of the European battlefield.[101] In the one hundred years of gunpowder technology that preceded the Hussite Wars, the only major change was the establishment of saltpeter plantations in Europe in the 1380s.[102]

The imprisonment and execution of Jan Hus, the leader of the Bohemian reform movement, touched off the Hussite troubles in 1415. Partisans of Jan Hus, divided theologically, but unified politically, formed a Hussite militia. This militia did not mobilize fully, however, until the Bohemian king Wenceslas (Vaclav) IV died. Following his death, his half-brother Sigismund claimed the crown of Bohemia and declared a crusade against the Hussites.[103] The Hussite movement united many socially diverse

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[99] B. Ann Tlusty, "Rumor, Fear, and Male Civic Duty during a Confessional Crisis," in *Masculinity in the Reformation Era*, eds. Scott Hendrix and Susan Karant-Nunn (Kirksville, MO: Truman State UP, 2008), 140.

[100] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 107-114.

[101] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 45.

[102] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 42.

[103] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 107.

people in its ranks and gained a strong political base through the combination of religious zeal, anti-clerical, and anti-German, Czech-inspired sentiments.[104] The task of collecting this disparate band of rebels into an army fell to Jan Zizka, who gained his military experience fighting as a mercenary in Poland against the Teutonic Knights.[105] His familiarity with the German *Ritterordnung* gave him unique insights into their weaknesses. He used these weaknesses and the strengths of his mostly peasant army (cart driving and urban skilled labors such as metal working and gunpowder production) to develop a military strategy based on mobility and defensive maneuvers. In turn he invented the *Wagenburg*, a moving fortress fusing mobility and defense that could be turned into a bastion immune to cavalry attacks.[106]

Prior to the Hussite Wars, gunpowder technology was not very successful in war except as siege and defensive weapons, almost exclusively as heavy cannon of some form. The *Wagenburg* gave firearms the chance to be mobile while still fulfilling their most effective role—defense. The *Wagenburg*, made of a circle of wooden carts chained together and fortified with thick wooden walls that were dropped into place at the outset of battle, allowed for the mounting of medium-caliber guns on the carts around the perimeter of the defenses.[107] Medieval heavy cavalry, commonly known as knights, mowed down infantry units by charging into them swinging clubs, swords, and maces. Military historians refer to this tactic as a "shock" attack, since it was best carried out by quickly breaking the formations of peasant infantry. The *Wagenburg* structure was

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[104] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 107.

[105] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 108.

[106] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 108.

[107] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 108.

immune to knights' shock tactics, and the mobility of the *Wagenburg* allowed for safer placement out of the range of larger guns. Zizka, whose invention testifies to his military genius, seems to have been a formidable leader as well. Under his command, the Hussite forces consistently defeated larger and better-trained imperial forces.

The *Wagenburg* utilized missile weapons of four varieties: *Tarasbüchsen*, *Karrenbüchsen*, and hand-held cannons and crossbows. *Tarasbüchsen* (*tarasnice* in Czech) were mounted on stands and placed between the gaps in the carts. They were protected with heavy shields called *pavesen*. *Karrenbüchsen* or *houfnice* in Czech, were mounted on carts to defend the gaps. These provided firepower for the *Wagenburg* while 15-20 soldiers, armed with hand cannons, crossbows, flails, halberds and war clubs, huddled behind the heavy wooden walls that protected the formation from cavalry penetration.[108] This arrangement made the best of the short-range effectiveness of firearms at the time. Like modern guerilla forces, the Hussites only needed to survive repeated encounters with enemy troops. They drew imperial troops into a battle and then set up a defensive position in order to wear down their enemy. Their strategy was effective, for the wagon fortresses made quite an impression on contemporaries: "Chronicle after chronicle records the shock and dismay that came when imperial troops assaulted these heavily armed defensive emplacements only to find that 'the heretics shot with their guns, which they had plenty of, and also used long hooks [halberds] to drag noble knights and pious soldiers from their horses.'"[109] Zizka's invention was not quickly forgotten, either. Military treatises by Solms (1542), Fronsperger (1564/1572),

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[108] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 108.

[109] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 110.

Dilich (1607), and Wallhausen (1620) describe and contain illustrations of the *Wagenburg* formation.[110]

Furthmore, the *Wagenburg* utilized gunpowder weapons despite these weapons' weaknesses. The ballistical capabilities of most small and medium caliber weapons made them effective only to a few hundred feet due to their smoothbore barrels.[111] But by outfitting the *Wagenburg* with large numbers of smaller gunpowder weapons Zizka accomplished what infantry and defensive tactics would later exploit: he created a blanket of fire hitting at least some of the attackers, and he supported it with foot soldiers to fight off those who made it past the gunpowder defenses.

Zizka chose medium-caliber gunpowder weapons because of their mobility and superior rate-of-fire as compared to larger gunpowder weapons. In the fourteenth century, cannon had proven to be only moderately effective on the battlefield, mostly as a psychological advantage. The physics of artillery had not yet come into its own, which meant that artillery could only—at best—launch medium size stones (100 to 200 pounds) into a general vicinity from a distance of a few hundred yards.[112] Jumbo caliber "bombard" that threw stones (not cannon balls) of 700 to 1500 pounds came in use during the fifteenth century, but even these behemoths were rare, dangerous to their handlers, and extremely expensive to transport.[113] In order to protect the handlers of artillery, effectiveness and accuracy were often sacrificed for safety. As I mentioned earlier, conical bores reduced the amount of pressure build-up behind the shot thus

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[110] See Chapter 2.

[111] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 142; citing Benjamin Robins, *New Principles of Gunnery* (London: Nourse, 1742).

[112] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 58.

[113] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 58-61.

reducing the distance the missile could be thrown, but it also kept the barrel of the cannon from exploding on the team of artillerists working it.[114] Zizka used the limitations of his attackers' guns to his advantage by making his forces mobile and by compensating for the inaccuracy of his own medium guns with quantity.

Medium-caliber weapons such as the kinds that Zizka posted around the *Wagenburg* and small-caliber weapons such as the ones that soldiers held in their hands lacked accuracy, but they were deadly even at a range of 100 meters (200 meters or more for medium caliber weapons).[115] This was more than enough space to stop a knight or charging foot soldier. Spherical bullets fired from muskets, as Austrian tests showed in the 1980s, leave a wound cavity approximately twice the size inflicted by a modern day assault rifle at 100 meters.[116] But spherical bullets—like modern day golf balls—are subject to the Magnus effect, proposed by Gustav Magnus in 1853.[117] When a spherical bullet spins, the air pressure around it decreases on the side that is moving in the same direction and increases on the opposite side. In the language of golf, this results in a "slice" as the spherical object curves in the direction of the low pressure. Experiments done by Benjamin Robins in the eighteenth century showed that musket balls fired from smoothbore guns could deviate up to 70 inches over the space of 100 yards.[118] Under those circumstances, a fired musket might hit a soldier two people down the line from where the musket ball was aimed. These studies were performed under ideal conditions

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[114] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 61.

[115] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 134-156.

[116] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 146.

[117] Gustav Magnus, "Über die Abweichung der Geschoße," *Annalen der Physik und Chemie*, Leipzig, LXXXVIII:1 (1853), 1-29.

[118] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 142.

using high quality weapons and advanced technologies. In Zizka's day, only 100 years after the first uses of gunpowder weapons on European battlefields, accuracy was probably more dismal, and the reliability of the powder and the shot were questionable at best. But by posting larger numbers of missile weapons on his *Wagenburg*, Zizka was able to assure a greater statistical chance of hitting mounted and moving targets.

Zizka's peasant army had already been imagined and mocked in German literature, especially in Heinrich Wittenwiler's *Der Ring* (1409/1410). Ironically, this German text could not predict the military effectiveness of the proto-Czech nationalist peasant force against the German knights they obliterated. Instead, Wittenwiler's peasants are hopelessly disorganized to the point of an apocalyptic demise. *Der Ring*, written just ten years before the outbreak of the Hussite wars, may be the earliest German literary representation of gunpowder, although gunpowder is absent until the very final pages. Wittenwiler's verse satirizes an armed conflict between the towns of Lappenhausen and Nissingen. Begun with the usual raunchy jokes of the *Märe* genre and the drunkenness of a Breughel painting, the plot of *Der Ring* disintegrates into a war between the two villages, during which the inhabitants of both villages (including the preternatural ones such as witches and dwarves) are slaughtered. The conflict begins with a rape during the wedding celebration of Bertschi Triefnas, whose family name means "Drippy Nose," of Lappenhausen and Mätzli Rüerenzumph [Touch the Penis] of Nissingen.[119] At the end, only Bertschi, crying over the body of his dead bride, escapes death. The narrative includes the intervention of the Nissinger war council (*Kriegsrat*),

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[119] Albrecht Classen, "Heinrich Wittenwiler," in *German Writers of the Renaissance and Reformation, 1280-1580*, eds. James N. Hardin and Max Reinhart, *Dictionary of Literary Biography* Vol. 179 (Detroit: Gale Research, 1997), 327.

which discusses—for the reader's edification—the rules of war, the wisdom of declaring war against Lappenhausen, and the practical considerations of such an undertaking.[120]

At the end of the battle, after they have burnt Lappenhausen to the ground, the Nissinger villagers besiege a haystack in which Bertschi Triefnas has taken refuge.[121] The moment, despite its narrative proximity to Mätzli's death, is meant to be a humorous one. Under fifteenth century imperial law, peasants could not declare war on one another, and even if they did it would look like the chaotic frenzy that ensues in the aftermath of the Nissingen-Lappenhausen wedding. The Nissinger attackers are baffled by the ineffectiveness of their siege machines on a haystack, just as peasants would be when led into a battle without a superior to guide them. Instead, the Nissinger have only Strudel, another peasant, to direct their attacks:

> 'Ir herren, merkt, was ich wil sagen!
> Ich han gehört pei meinen tagen:
> Mit werffen man das haus derwert,
> Mit schiessen man es nider zert.
> Dar umb schült es die armbrüst laden
> Und an hin schiessen nicht verzagen:
> Also mag er sich nicht gerüeren.
> Die katzen schol man an hin füeren
> Und stossen im die maur enzwai.'
> Secht, das halff nicht umb ein ai!
> Der turne der was innan vol
> Und nicht sam die andern hol.[122]
>
> ["Gentlemen, listen to what I say!
> I have heard in my own day:
> With trebuchets defend a house,
> With shooting them one tears it down,
> Therefore, load up your crossbows,

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[120] Pamela Kalning, *Kriegslehren in deutschsprachigen Texten um 1400* (Münster: Waxman Verlag, 2006), 140, 152-193.

[121] Kalning, 190.

[122] Heinrich Wittenwiler, *Der Ring* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1991), 548 (ln. 9571-9582) [Trans. mine.]

Do not pause a second, no.
Shoot that man to pin him low,
And with a ram, ready to go,
Smash in two his castle wall."
Look, that didn't work at all!
The tower was simply way too dense
Not hollow like others would have been.]

With nothing more than an "armbrüst" to attack Bertschi's fortification ballistically, and having already been stymied by the trench and thistles providing a defense against barefooted "infantry" attacks, the Nissinger—absurdly—try ramming down his haystack with a battering ram (*katzen* = *Rambock*). They discover that haystacks are not hollow like other towers and thus immune to this siege tactic. This first effort having failed, the Nissinger try digging under his defenses in order to topple the haystack, only to find the soil is too soft. An improvised trebuchet does little more than reinforce Bertschi's haystack by sinking rocks into the ground around it. As Kalning shows in her monograph on Wittenwiler, Seffner and Rothe, the attack on the haystack is actually a textbook siege based on Vegetius's *Epitoma rei militaris*, a Roman military treatise.[123] The Nissinger even fortify their attacking position with *pavesen*, the same kinds of shields that Vegetius describes in Book IV of his *Epitoma* and that Zizka used to defend his *Wagenburg*.[124] The Nissingers' attack fails not for a lack of comprehension of military theory, but because of their inability to apply Vegetius's theory to their situation strategically.[125]

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[123] Kalning, 190.

[124] Vegetius, *Epitoma rei militaris*, Book IV.

[125] Kalning, 191: "Die Anwendung der Taktik scheitert nicht an mangelnder Theoriekenntnis der Nissinger, sondern einfach daran, dass der Heuschober eben gerade keine Burg ist und sich daher bei der Erstürmung des Heuschobers keine Mauern einreißen lassen."

In the end their siege is a failure, Wittenwiler claims, because they did not have gunpowder. The peasants lament this lack: "Wie gern seu hieten gschossen do / Aus der büchsen gen im so! / Do hieten seu des pulvers nicht; / Dar umb ir stürmen was enwicht" [They would have gladly shot at him / With cannon had there not been / A lack of powder available / And that is why their siege did fail].[126] Their lack of gunpowder is not surprising. Even if they had it, they probably could not have used it very effectively. But in Wittenwiler's world where a trebuchet can suddenly appear out of nowhere, an apocalyptic war can break out between two villages, and witches and dwarves enter into the battle as partisan fighters, this moment of material realism is jarring. In particular, gunpowder's notable absence in the sources of Wittenwiler's story, the "Bauernhochzeitschwänke" of the fourteenth century "Meier Betz" and "Metzen Hochzit," suggests Wittenwiler's acute awareness of contemporary military developments.

Hall might argue that the expense of gunpowder in 1410 was still too great for it to be readily available to many princes, let alone peasants. As a cottage industry, petering had only been in Europe for thirty years. Yet, ten years after Wittenwiler's narrative appeared, Zizka managed to mobilize a mostly peasant army to defeat a larger and more highly trained imperial force. And Zizka used plenty of gunpowder. After 1420, when Zizka began a campaign with his Hussite guerilla force, readers of Wittenwiler's *Ring* might not have been so quick to laugh at the apocalyptic ending. After all, a historical mixture of peasants and gunpowder weapons did bring about a devastating war that seemed to harken the end of knighthood.

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[126] Wittenwiler, 550 [Trans. mine.]

Of course, setting Wittenwiler's Nissinger next to Zizka's Hussites provides for significant contrasts. The Nissingers possess neither the leadership nor the zeal of Zizka's military force. They are fighting against other peasants, drunkenly, and have an insufficient grasp of what Frontinus (first century AD) calls *Strategem*, the application of strategy to a given situation.[127] Zizka, on the other hand, was in control of his unique situation, tactically and strategically. But 1420 was the year in European history when gunpowder changed the outcome of a war for the first time, and we cannot help but celebrate the literary imagination that, a mere ten years earlier, claimed a peasant army failed because of their lack of gunpowder. This historical moment, if we can call a decade a moment, was pivotal in gunpowder's history. In German society and in German culture, gunpowder weapons had—between 1409 and 1430—become a prerequisite for military success. When the *Feuerwerkbuch von 1420* was written, a new era of military science and military culture emerged that would put gunpowder weapons at the heart of military operations and military science, *ars belli*. The cultural impact of this shift resonated through the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Knights disappeared from the battlefield as well as from the literature of war, and this disappearance would be mourned in many writings that highlighted the aesthetic, ethical, moral, and gendered impact of gunpowder weapons.

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[127] Sextus Iulius Frontinus, *Strategemata*, trans. Bennet (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2003), 3-7: "If there prove any persons who take an interest in these books, let them remember to discriminate between 'strategy' and 'stratagems'. . . . For everything achieved by a commander, be it characterized by foresight, advantage, enterprise, or resolution, will belong under the head of 'strategy,' while those things which fall under some special type of these will be 'stratagems.' The essential character of the latter, resting, as it does on skill and cleverness, is effective quite as much when the enemy is to be evaded as he is to be crushed."

Kyeser's *Bellifortis* and *Das Feuerwerkbuch* through the Fifteenth Century

Prior to the fifteenth century, knights' education relied heavily upon oral tradition and practical training.[128] Noble fathers hired a *Reitmeister* or *Fechtmeister* to teach the younger (male) generation to fight, and then these sons would further their training at a court or learn lessons in military science from their fathers, potentially through practical training on the battlefield.[129] The tournament, "die friedliche Variante des Krieges" [the peaceful version of war], became a place for intensive practice and spectacle, and would continue to serve this purpose into the early seventeenth century.[130] Although military treatises (*Kriegstraktaten*) and books of war (*Kriegsbücher*) had existed for over a millennium, the written word was not the standard pedagogical medium for young warriors. The preservation of such works as Vegetius's *Epitoma*, Frontinus's *Strategemata*, and Caesar's writings on war relied on the diligence of clerics. However, these works rarely made their way into the curriculum of knightly training.[131] It was also uncommon to find a person of the cloth with practical experience in the art of war, even though they may have read and recorded the ancient theoretical and historical texts about war. On the whole, the "Lehrstand" and "Wehrstand" remained true to their castes, even as they each contemplated *ars belli*.

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[128] Rainer Leng, I:96-97

[129] Leng, I:96: "Reit- und Fechtmeister finden sich regelmäßig im Gefolge von Fürsten. Sprößlinge adliger Familien wurden zur weiteren Ausbildung in den Hofdienst gegeben. Das Wissen über kämpfen im Krieg, das über die bloße körperliche Übung hinausging, mußte jedoch vom Vater auf den Sohn vererbt oder in langsamer Heranführung an kriegerische Auseinandersetzungen erfahren werden."

[130] Leng, I:97.

[131] Leng, I:96.

Some of the earliest *Kriegsbücher* from around 1400 mirror the oral tradition even in the written variant. For example, the war treatise of Herzog Ludwig the Bearded of Bayern-Ingolstadt and the *Kriegsbuch* of Philipp von Seldeneck are preserved in the form of letters to their sons.[132] The tradition of knighthood enshrined a two-fold privilege of violence: the privilege of men and the privilege of nobility. Symbolically and practically, the monopoly over violence was marked by the right of the knight to bear a sword.[133] Systemically, the privilege was preserved through the elite mediation of knowledge described above. Rainer Leng locates the fifteenth century as the period in which this previously oral tradition became a written one.[134] Even though war was an important topos of the "Literaturlandschaft" [literary landscape] of the medieval and early modern periods, the literary shift from a focus on knightly to peasant violence coincides with both the rise of gunpowder and the increased "Verschriftlichung" [writing down] of military science.[135]

The literary tradition of warfare from 1400 to 1525 focuses on the participation of commoners, often peasants and farmers, in battle. Wittenwiler's *Ring* and its forerunners in the *Bauernschwank* genre provide some of the earliest evidence of this shift; though, the peasant warrior does not enter the popular imagination—so far as written sources tell us—until the late fifteenth century with the rise of the *Landsknecht*, and, simultaneously, the printing press. This mercenary, whose weapon of choice was not a firearm but the lance, pike, or halberd (hence *lansquenette* or *Landsknecht*), became the

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[132] Leng, I:97.

[133] Leng, I:96.

[134] Leng, I:95-106.

[135] Leng, I:93: "Der Krieg ist ein gewichtiges Thema in der Literaturlandschaft des späten Mittelalters."

primary infantry soldier in the second half of the fifteenth century and would remain important throughout the sixteenth century.[136] The success of the Swiss *Haufen* in the fifteenth century proved the effectiveness of the infantry unit against cavalry shock attacks.[137] In a mass, with long lances to defend the unit, the *Haufen* was almost impervious to attacks from cavalry units. With hooked halberds they pulled the knights from their horses, and they beat the knights mercilessly once they had fallen to the ground. Because cavalry could no longer simply break apart infantry units by smashing into them, these groups of foot soldiers eventually combined forces with small caliber firearms to create mini-mobile artillery units. Widespread use of *Haufen* units of German *Landsknechte* and Swiss Pikes combined pikemen and arquebusiers (soldiers using the *Hackenbüchse*—hook-gun—or later *Arquebuse*) by the mid-sixteenth century. The pikemen defended the arquebusiers from the cavalry attacks, while shoulder arms gunners provided volleys of fire that incapacitated other infantry units.[138] By the sixteenth century, infantry soldiers were mostly grouped into the general category of *Landsknechten*, sometimes further divided into *Pikenierer* and *Musketierer* or *Arquebusierer* (in the German).

Since *Landsknecht* units elected their own NCOs (non-commissioned officers), they are often represented as forerunners of a democratic society, early communists, or indicators of a rising bourgeois military class.[139] But these units were never really in

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[136] See Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe* for more on the Swiss Pikemen and their rise during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

[137] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 157-158

[138] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 186-187

[139] See Engels, *Der deutsche Bauernkrieg* (Berlin: Dietz, 1987); Peter Blickle, *Die Revolution von 1525*; Jähns, I:658-666 ("Handwaffen"); Frauenholz, Vol 3: Pt 1, 10-12; and Hall for more on the social revolutionary qualities of the *Landsknechte*.

charge of the battle. While they may have been led by peers on the battlefield, they continued to be the pawns (German: *Bauer*) of their social and political superiors. But their tactical effectiveness created a frightening battlefield dynamic for the nobility. Hall describes the battle of Pavia (21 February 1525) as the most successful intermingling of pike and arquebuse soldiers in their early history. Near Pavia, a group of *Landsknechte* mowed down French mounted knights with their shoulder arms and, according to Paolo Giovio, a sixteenth century historian, forced them to face "ignoble and common" imperial soldiers on foot.[140] As Giovio describes the "pitiful carnage of dying noble knights," it is easy to imagine his distain for the rough yet effective mercenaries whose gunpowder weapons were responsible for these knights' demise.[141]

While the fame of the *Landsknecht* as a tool of war became an important tactical phenomenon of the sixteenth century, German writers such as Erasmus, Martin Luther, and Hans Sachs created works that focused on their adventures and vices. Erasmus attacked the moral depravity of the *Landsknechten* in at least three different works: *Against War: Dulce Bellum Inexpertis* (ca. 1514), *Querela Pacis* (1516), and *The Familiar Colloquies* (1518-1536). Although his condemnation of the *Landsknecht* fell within a broader critique of war, his focus on the *Landsknecht* as the face of warfare reflected the cultural position of *Landsknecht*. Many images of *Landsknechten* including some by Albrecht Dürer and Hans Baldung Grien circulated in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Hans Sachs, the Nuremburger patrician most famous as a playwright and a *Meistersinger* poet, often incorporated the soldier into his plays. In the emerging broadsheet market, popular poetic works displayed images of the *Landsknecht*

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[140] Qtd. at length in Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 181-183.

[141] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 182-183.

next to poems that described him (often in self-contradicting terms) as morally debauched or an adventurer. Luther's "Ob Kriegsleute auch in seligem Stande sein können" attempts to reconcile the job of the *Landsknecht* in the context of the *Türkenkrieg*.[142] Even if the *Landsknecht* was not explicitly linked to gunpowder weapons in these texts, later writers connected the rise of the *Landsknecht* to the increased use of gunpowder weapons. As Hall has shown, the stories of the *Landsknecht* and gunpowder are inextricably linked, but after 1525 the two appear to be synonymous in contemporary works. Eugene von Frauenholz even goes so far as to name the sixteenth century and its military innovation the "Landsknechtszeit," pointing to Leonhard Fronsperger, author of the *Kriegsbuch* (1573) and *Von Büchsen und Fewerwerck* (1564), as the apex of this military culture.[143] Despite their separate historical paths, the parallel historical narratives of the infantry soldier and gunpowder weapons did, in the long run, change the social composition and organization of military forces.

It would be a mistake to read this history as a disappearance of nobility from the battlefield or to view the aristocracy as technophobic resistors of a new military order. It would also contradict recent scholarship to say that changing roles of peasants in warfare meant an explosion in the size of armies. But it seems that a paradox needs to be clarified here. As *ars belli* became increasingly communicated in written form at a time when most of the population was illiterate, the literary imagination surrounding warfare increasingly focused on the participation of non-nobles in warfare.

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[142] Horst Brunner et. al., *Dulce Bellum Inexpertis: Bilder des Krieges in der deutschen Literatur des 15. und 16. Jahrhunderts* (Wiesbaden: Reichter Verlag, 2002), 343-347.

[143] Frauenholz, Vol 3: Pt 1, 29.

The "Zwang zur Verschiftlichung chemischen Wissens" [pressure to write down chemical science] may be one possible explanation, and the increasingly technological aspects impacting all levels of war required greater (written) accuracy.[144] In particular the expansion of petering and the invention of gunpowder corning in the fifteenth century turned the production and use of gunpowder into a scientific profession that required a basic standard of knowledge.[145] This resulted in the popularization of military scientific literature during the fifteenth century, in particular Konrad Keyser's *Bellifortis* (1405) and the anonymous *Feuerwerkbuch von 1420*.

Konrad Kyeser's *Bellifortis* is perched on a watershed in the culture of warfare between the waning hegemony of the medieval knight and the rise of the foot soldier and gunpowder weapons on European battlefields. If, as Hall claims, the fifteenth century represented a period in which gunpowder weapons and tactics were being developed and tested against medieval weapons and tactics, it also makes sense that the literature of war would begin testing the value of these relatively new developments. As Rainer Leng explains, the *Bellifortis* is as much a literary work as it is a technical one, and in some cases it is wholly useless from a technical perspective.[146] In the *Bellifortis*, "Technisches Wissen ist eher sekundär und dient als Vehikel für 'das Bedürfnis nach Glänzen mit Rythmus und Reim.'" [technical knowledge is secondary and serves as the vehicle for the urge to embellish with rhythm and rheim].[147] The book, a manuscript

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[144] Leng, I:106.

[145] Leng, I:106; Hall, *Weapons and Warfare*, 69; Howard, "Realities and Perceptions in the Evolution of Blackpowder Making," in *Gunpowder, Explosives and the State* (Vermont: Ashgate, 2006), 21-41.

[146] Leng, I:123.

[147] Leng, I:122.

widely distributed througout the fifteenth century in German speaking lands, is written in rhyming Latin hexameter quatrains.[148] Its topics include: "(1) Feldschlacht, (2) Belagerung, (3) Wassertechnik, (4) Steigzeug, (5) mechanische Schußwaffen, (6) Verteidigung, (7) Leuchtfackeln, (8) Pyrotechnik, (9) Wärmetechnik, (10) natürliche Kampfmittel."[149] Most likely read aloud in courtly settings at least as often as it was enjoyed in private, the *Bellifortis* was meant to please the listener "with haughty hexameter, boisterous references, and literary allusions."[150] In private, the work's multiple bright ["heiteren"]illustrations of weapons and battle scenes, added to the engaging text, provided the solitary reader with a magical, literary, humorous, and pseudo-technical picture of war.[151]

The *Bellifortis'* "vielgestaltiges Bild des Krieges" [multifaceted depiction of war] begs the questions of composition and use. Was this text composed for *prodesse* or *delectare*, or both? Was it used as an instructional manual, like the *Kriegsbuch* of the sixteenth century, or as a diversion? Other contemporary works such as Wittenwiler's *Ring* tended toward *Schwank*. *Prodesse*, insofar as military instruction is concerned, presented as digressions masked as plot or conversations between characters. Still other contemporary works such as Johann Seffner's "Ein ler von dem streitten" [A Lesson on Fighting] and Johannes Rothes's "Ritterspiegel" [Knight's Mirror], both dating from around 1400, show purely didactic aims conveyed in both prose and verse. As Pamela Kalning explains, these texts provide historical and practical lessons in warfare drawn

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[148] Leng, I:118-122.

[149] Leng, I:114.

[150] Leng, I:118.

[151] Leng, 1:118-138

from the Bible, the ancients, and medieval scholastics. Aside from warfare, the

"Ritterspiegel"—which is written in verse and oriented toward knights as its title

suggests—even includes a humanistic agenda that encourages knights to learn reading,

writing, and rhetoric.[152] The combined messages of these early works point to a few red

threads that can be found woven into the *Bellifortis* as well: the *artes liberales* serve as a

foundation of the *ars militaris*.

Hall's claim that Kyeser's *Bellifortis* is a "blend of magic and technology" and

Leng's claim that the *Bellifortis* "stellt sich in den Belangen des Kriegswesens mehr einen

Spiegel der adlig-höfisch Kultur des Rittertums dar, weniger ein bloßes Abbild von

Kriegsgerät" each focus on the raw content of the text more than the text's message and

context. Discussions of form in Leng's comprehensive overview of the *Bellifortis* are more

descriptive than contextualizing. Both Leng and Hall overlook the imaginative work that

the *Bellifortis* accomplishes.[153] Leng seems to understand the imaginative nature of the

text better than Hall, but Leng's conclusive reduction of the work to a mere

"reproduction" of a courtly ideal of war disregards the evidence of a political and

humanistic agenda apparent in the *Bellifortis*. A more sympathetic reading of Kyeser's

work must acknowledge the limited experience of European society with gunpowder

weapons around 1400, the political agenda of Kyeser's text, and the literary culture of

war that had preceded his *Bellifortis*.

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[152] Kalning, 95-99; Johannes Rothes, "Ritterspiegel," Kap. II.19 (v. 2605-2609): "Ez sted eyme gudin ritter wol / kunne her geschribin und gelesin; / Ist her gelart und kunste vol, / gar selig mag her wesin." (Reproduced in Kalning, 242)

[153] Bert Hall, *The Technological Illustrations of the So-called Anonymus of the Hussite Wars* (Wiesbaden, 1997), 20; Leng, I:133.

Let me begin with Kyeser. First, European society had limited experience with gunpowder weapons around 1400 and therefore Kyeser had very little practical knowledge of gunpowder's destructive potential to relate to his readers. Much of the anti-gunpowder rhetoric had not yet been established since, as Hall explains, gunpowder was not a decisive factor in military engagements until the Hussite Wars. Thus, Kyeser is not concerned with the gruesome "Realität der Schlachtfelder" [reality of the battlefield] since a magical aura followed the spectacle of this new technology of death.[154] Second, as Leng points out, the *Bellifortis* was written in response to the catastrophe of the last Crusade of 1396, which was led and lost by Emperor Sigismund.[155] Kyeser, who personally experienced the decimation of Christian forces at Nikopolis, harbored great resentment for this loss and—partly—conceived the *Bellifortis* as prevention against future calamities of a similar kind.[156] Motivated by political aims, therefore, this work seeks to deliver instruction in the art of war mediated through humanistic dedication to the liberal arts and the ideals of Christian society. Finally, as this dissertation argues about responses to gunpowder, to believe Kyeser's *Bellifortis* was capable of doing anything other than constructing an image of war that conformed to "der adlig-höfischen Kultur des Rittertums" [the aristocratic-courtly culture of the knightly class] is to ignore the force of aesthetic convention. We should read Kyeser's text as, to some extent, attempting to deal with an emerging technology of war within the available aesthetic tradition of courtly literature and through a set of aesthetic ideals unaccustomed to the deadliness of gunpowder weapons.

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[154] Leng, I:133: "Von der Realität der Schlachtfelder sind jene Bilder jedenfalls so weit entfernt wie das Publikum, das sich an Abbildungen und Versen delektierte."

[155] Leng, I:109.

[156] Leng, I:109.

The material, political, and aesthetic contexts of Kyeser's *Bellifortis* point to a culture of war located between politics and aesthetics. *Bellifortis* presents an image of war that is literary, multi-facetted, and colorful, as Leng shows. But the war of Kyeser's book is also filled with the technical tools that get the political work of warfare done.[157] Although, from a technical standpoint, we cannot read the *Bellifortis* as an instructional manual, we can read it as a representation of the culture of war around 1400. Still steeped in the knightly tradition though incorporating the "groben Zeichnungen der Feuerwaffen" [rudimentary drawings of firearms], which are as primitive as the technology they represent, Kyeser's text suggests a culture of warfare that has not yet realized or recognized the destructive potential of gunpowder technology from either an ethical or tactical standpoint.[158] Furthermore, the aesthetic representations of firearms in verse and image paired with the detailed technical explanation of gunpowder production supports Hall's thinking on gunpowder weapons: the technology of using gunpowder had not yet become as effective as the technology of producing it.

The *Feuerwerkbuch von 1420* represents a counterexample to Kyeser's *Bellifortis* in its commitment to gunpowder technology as a phenomenon of science and technology as well as of culture. Composed around 1420 and distributed widely throughout the fifteenth century in manuscript form, the *Feuerwerkbuch* is clearly a technological manual despite its lack of internal cohesion.[159] The *Feuerwerkbuch* contains two main parts, and

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[157] Leng, I:133: "Versteht man jenes als die Papier gewordenen Wahrnehmungen eines Zeitgenossen, so erscheint das Bild des Krieges bei Kyeser farbenprächtig, vielfach gebrochen, literarisch durchdrungen und facettenreich."

[158] Leng, I:121: "Gerade die relative groben Zeichnungen der Feuerwaffen, darunter auch schon Mehrfachgeschütze, fallen durch einen Zeichenstil aus dem Rahmen, der an die Verwendung von Vorlagen denken läßt."

[159] Leng, I:203-208.

most editions of the work passed down from the fifteenth century lack illustrations.[160] The first half establishes the nature of the profession of the *Büchsenmeister* and the history of the science of gunpowder. It is "einheitlich" [unified] and filled with "zahlreiche Vor- und Rückweise sowie regelmäßig eingefügte Verknüpfungen der Informationsblöcke" [numerous internal references as well as regular summations of the information] that speak to the "kompilatorischen Verfasser, der die ihm vorliegenden Quellen zu vereinheitlichen suchte" [compilatory author, who sought to pull together the sources laying before him].[161] The second section consists of a disorganized and almost spontaneous presentation of gunpowder recipes and uses in warfare. It is filled with "inconsistencies" and lacks a unified form as well as the "intertextual references" that are the hallmarks of the first section.[162] Despite their apparent juxtaposition, the two sections of the *Feuerwerkbuch von 1420* work with one another to "legitimate" the *Büchsenmeister* and his skills. Contrary to Leng, I believe we can read this book as intentionally coordinated.

The introductory section of the *Feuerwerkbuch von 1420* takes four steps to legitimate its contents and the occupation of *Büchsenmeister*. First the author frames the position of *Büchsenmeister* as part of the aristocratic responsibility to keep the peace (*Landsfrieden*) and protect the lower classes.[163] Second, since "Fürsten / herrn / Ritter . . . bedürffent das yr büchsenmayster guott mayster seyen" [princes, lords, and knights require that their *Büchsenmeister* be good masters], the author of the *Feuerwerkbuch*

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[160] Leng, I:198.

[161] Leng, I:201-203.

[162] Leng, I:201-203.

[163] Leng, I:201; Wilhelm Hassenstein, *Das Feuerwerkbuch von 1420: 600 Jahre Deutsche Pulverwaffen und Büchsenmeisterei* (München, 1941), 15ff.

provides a series of twelve *Büchsenmeisterfragen* [*Büchsenmeister* questions] to help

potential employers (i.e., princes) test their applicants on the foundational knowledge of

the artillery.[164] This second step assures that the *Büchsenmeister* possesses a minimum

corpus of knowledge, professionalizing the occupation.[165] Qualified *Büchsenmeister*

would not merely answer these fairly straightforward questions with a simple

explanation. Rather, they were expected to provide an advanced theoretical knowledge

supplemented with stories of their practical experience.[166] A third legitimating step was

the establishment of an occupational pedigree stemming from the mythical and

legendary creator of gunpowder, the German necromancer monk, Berthold.[167] The

cultural importance of this figure, whose history is uncertain and who went by the

aliases Bertholdus Niger, Berthold Schwarz, and "der schwarze Berthold," will be

discussed later in this dissertation; the role he plays in the *Feuerwerkbuch*, however, is

one of "historical legitimation."[168] The fourth and final means by which the first section

of the *Feuerwerkbuch* establishes the job of *Büchsenmeister* is by articulating expectations

superior to any other soldier or officer. A solid foundation in the science of gunpowder

weapons tested by the *Büchsenmeisterfragen* was a requirement of the job that combined

with a set of personal prerequisites that prescribed the moral, intellectual and physical

qualities of the *Büchsenmeister*. These requirements established a constructed ideal of

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[164] Leng, I:199; Hassenstein, *Feuerwerkbuch*, 16.

[165] Leng, I:200.

[166] Leng, I:199ff.

[167] Leng, I:200.

[168] Leng, I:201. For more on Berthold Schwarz, see Chapter Four.

masculinity; they demanded that the *Büchsenmeister* be God-fearing, a man of integrity, brave, sober, and capable of reading and writing, among other requirements.[169]

In the second section of the work, it is more difficult to identify a coherent path to the information that is presented. Unlike the first section, which carefully lays out the ways in which a *Büchsenmeister* is essential to defense, legitimated through knowledge, grounded in historical precedent, and morally irreproachable, the second section provides recipes and technical details of the trade. Historical or not, Berthold provides the key to a successful literary analysis of the second section.[170] This second part, with its chemical recipes and technical instructions, suggests that its contents are derived from the experiments of the German monk, that is, Berthold's missing urtext.[171] Thus the content and form of the second section reinscribe the (historical) legitimation that the first section attempts to secure. Reading outward from the text, the reader finds a concerted effort to legitimate the knowledge and profession of the *Büchsenmeister* in fifteenth century German society.

If we compare Kyeser's *Bellifortis* and the anonymous *Feuerwerkbuch von 1420* to the technological developments of the fifteenth century, we discover a culture that is just beginning to recognize and contemplate gunpowder technologies developed in the previous century. Although very little changed in the technology of gunpowder weapons between 1400 and 1500 in Europe, there emerges an increasing number of

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[169] Leng, I:201-202; Hassenstein, *Feuerwerkbuch*, 18; R.W. Connell, and Michael Messerschmidt, "Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept," in *Gender & Society* 19:6 (2005), 829-859.

[170] Leng, I:200ff: "Demnach is nicht nach Datum und Person, sondern dem Grund seiner literarischen Existenz zu fragen. Der vorgebliche Erfinder . . . erfüllt im Rahmen der Darstellung der Grundlagen der Büchsenmeisterei eine wichtige Funktion. Er schafft Tradition und Legitimation."

[171] Leng, I:205.

attempts to understand implications of gunpowder technology for warfare and culture. In the *Bellifortis*, we find an author grappling with conflicting aesthetics of warfare—between the courtly past and the technological present and future. Kyeser appeals to the vagueness of "Magie" to explain a phenomenon not yet fully understood or articulated in European culture: that gunpowder will not be just another social and political tool, but a fundamentally revolutionary technology of destruction. It is not until the second half of the fifteenth century that the works of Ariosto, Petrarch, and Erasmus would begin to establish increasing opposition to gunpowder's physical and social destructive capacities. By then, however, gunpowder technology had found its role on the battlefield, and the warnings of the humanists were already too late.

When we examine the *Feuerwerkbuch von 1420*, on the other hand, we find a work preoccupied with gunpowder technology's social and cultural legitimacy. It presents gunpowder weapons as objective, technological, and traditional tools of war, even though they would not establish their ability to decide the outcome of a battle until the same decade it was, allegedly, composed. The determination of the *Feuerwerkbuch* to secure an authoritative position in the culture of warfare extends beyond its science, however, to prescribe the personal characteristics and knowledge of the people who ought to practice it. The healthy, literate, sober, brave, and God-fearing man—pillar of German society—turns out to be the only acceptable candidate for the job of *Büchsenmeister*. This codification of idealized masculinity in the *Büchsenmeister* predicted, in a way, the kinds of moral and gendered trouble that followed gunpowder weapons into the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in German-speaking lands, even in *Kriegsbücher*, the very books that taught soldiers how to use them.

Chapter 2
A Loaded Peace: Gunpowder in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century *Kriegsbücher*

"I cannot predict just how long it will take to convince Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. . . . We will continue to review all options with our allies, but let it be clear: We will not let this aggression stand. . . . Our role, with others, is to deter future aggression."

—George H. W. Bush

"Dahero sagt auch Cornelius Nepos in Epaminonda, durch Krieg kompt der frieden / und sollen die jenige / so in fried und ruhe leben wollen / im wahffen geübte leute sein."

—Wilhelm Dilich[172]

In the West, modern representations of warfare, from news reports to Hollywood films, manipulate themes of technology and justice to impact us in various ways. During the First Gulf War, Italo Battafarano, the Grimmelshausen scholar, warned his readers—and himself—against conflating aesthetic representation and political conflicts, or more importantly, reducing actual human suffering to aesthetic representation.[173] No one seems to have listened, or it was already too late. In January of 1991, American nightly news bombarded viewers with awe-inspiring images of a military technological spectacle that was, no doubt, terrifying for the people being bombed. After all, on the other end of the bombs that we watched fall through Iraqi chimneys in images filtered into shades of night-vision green were people.[174] Human suffering became an aesthetic experience, but it was sanitized of gore with the aid of new, smart technologies.

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[172] Wilhelm Dilich, *Kriegsbuch* (1608), 1: "Thus, says Cornelius Nepos in Epaminonda, peace comes through war, and those who want to live in peace and quiet, should be people who are practiced at using weapons."

[173] Italo Battafarano, "Golf-Krieg, Schein-Krieg," *Glanz des Barock* (1994), 502.

[174] Howard Zinn, *A People's History of the United States* (NY: Perennial Classics, 2005), 596.

Television viewers were dazzled by the carefully selected videos demonstrating the precision of laser-guided smart bombs that only hit their targets about 60% of the time, according to Pentagon reports.[175] Despite Battafarano's warning, the news had reduced modern war to an aesthetic experience for us. The media gave it colors, names, and logos that adhered to the new technological, "smart" aesthetic of the bombs we were dropping and systems that delivered them. Furthermore, the United States government and and the U.S. Army used (gendered) epithets and rhetoric to contrast Western anti-aggression deterrence logic against the irrational and violent hyper-emotionalism of Saddam Hussein.[176] Modern war had become a media spectacle emerging from images, reports, and sound bites, a phenomenon which Battafarano called *Schein-Krieg* and which Lynne Tatlock refers to as "simulacra of war."[177]

Twenty years later, we found ourselves once again entranced by a spectacle of modern Western warfare. The special-forces team that entered Osama bin Laden's hideout on Sunday, May 1, 2011, executed its mission with the surgical precision of those bombs dropped on Iraq. A handful of residents were killed or wounded during the invasion, including one woman—bin Laden's wife—who allegedly threw herself in front of him when American troops opened fire. Osama bin Laden was killed, unarmed it seems, though the nature of his death is irrelevant here. The marketing of his death by the United States government, however, is important to this project. President Barack Obama told the world that night, in a special news conference, "The death of bin Laden

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[175] Zinn, 597.

[176] Krista Hunt and Kim Rygiel, eds., *(En)Gendering the War on Terror: War Stories and Camouflaged Politics* (Aldershot, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003).

[177] Lynne Tatlock, "Simulacra of War: New Technologies of War and Prose," *Daphnis* 22:1 (1993), 641-668.

marks the most significant achievement to date in our nation's effort to defeat al Qaeda. . . . Justice has been done."[178] The United States Ambassador to Indonesia, Scot Marciel, would later state in more clearly moralistic terms, "The unfortunate truth is the world is better without [Osama bin Laden]."[179] His crimes against humanity were listed in Obama's speech, including mass-murder of thousands of American citizens and non-American Muslims around the globe. He masterminded the attacks of September 11, 2001 and was destined to keep killing if he lived. The invocation of an age-old argument—loaded peace—publically justified the military action that killed bin Laden.

Especially in the United States, modern wars are often reduced to conflicts between smart and rudimentary technologies (the drone vs. the improvised explosive device, IED) and more or less rational or moral reasons for fighting (democracy vs. religious fundamentalism). These dichotomies attempt to pit a set of rational and discriminating principles of violence (Western) against emotional and indiscriminate violence (terrorist) without considering the layers of aesthetic and rhetorical maneuvers required to create such a dichotomy. Although the technologies of war have changed over the centuries, it seems that many of the debates and discussions surrounding war have not. Turning back to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, an age when Europe was being torn by Christian confessional strife and menaced by the Ottoman Empire, we find messages of technology and justification similar to those we encounter today. This

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[178] Barack Obama, "Speech on Osama bin Laden's Death," *CBS* (May 1, 2011), accessed May 2, 2011, http://www.cbsnews.com.

[179] Dion Bisara and Camelia Pasandaran, "Little Chance of Terror Backlash in Indonesia," *The Jakarta Globe* (May 4, 2011), http://www.thejakartaglobe.com.

chapter will preview the rhetoric of our contemporary "War Stories,"[180] such as those

cited above, by returning to a period in which gunpowder technology, far from being

technologically 'smart' and nearly as inaccurate as laser-guided bombs, became viewed

as a key component of the European battlefield.

As gunpowder emerged as an essential element of European warfare in the

fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, discussions of gunpowder also became more prevalent.

A crucial tactical tool, gunpowder technology was a prevalent theme in the growing

literature of military theory in the sixteenth century. It had become so critical to military

success that one prominent German military theorist claimed that no war could possibly

be won without gunpowder weapons.[181] In these works, gunpowder was usually

presented as a tool of war. And tools of war, by the logic of these texts, are used for the

maintenance of peace. Not all military theorists, however, were convinced that

gunpowder technology was a good thing even if it was necessary. Some military

theorists represented gunpowder as the primer of a military catastrophe that brought

betrayal, immorality, dishonor, and cowardice to military culture. This chapter considers

the tension between these two perspectives on gunpowder weapons, not as antithetical

to each other, but as a product of evolving discussions of peace and moral responsibility

indigenous to the age of confessional reformations and shifting forms of military tactics

and training.

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[180] Krista Hunt and Kim Rygiel, "(En)Gendered War Stories and Camoflaged Politics," in *(En)Gendering the War on Terror* (Aldershot, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006), 4: "Cooke examines what she calls the 'War Story,' that is the official, state authorized story about why we go to war and how wars are won."

[181] Fronsperger, *Kriegsbuch* (Frankfurt: Feyerabend, 1573), 1:CLXXII$_b$.

First, this chapter will present an overview of a genre of military scientific literature that had a nearly four-hundred-year, international tradition. In German speaking lands, we will call this work the *Kriegsbuch*, or book of war, and we will consider generic distinctions between it and the *Kriegstraktat*, or war treatise. Recognizing the difference between these two genres is important to our understanding of the value of *Kriegsbücher* as cultural artifacts. Second, we will consider the role of gunpowder in one of the most famous examples of this genre, the *Kriegsbuch* of Leonhard Fronsperger. By analyzing discussions of gunpowder in Fronsperger's work, we will also explore issues of warrior ethics, masculinity, and aesthetic traditions linked to his negative perceptions of gunpowder warfare. Finally, this chapter will look to discussions of peace and war in *Kriegsbücher*. In each of these texts, we find a justification of war and armaments that is embedded in the maintenance of peace, an argument I call "loaded peace." By drawing a parallel between some medieval, early modern, and modern discussions of loaded peace, and by allowing for a few non-military opinions such as those of Erasmus and Luther, we will explore the language of the *Kriegsbuch* as one which justifies itself through rhetorical and poetic forms and Horace's aesthetic ideal: "to benefit and to delight"—*prodesse et delectare*.

The *Kriegsbuch* Genre in Early Modern Germany

It is worth distinguishing between military scientific literature's two genres, which though often cited by scholars have not been looked at separately. The *Kriegstraktat*, or war treatise, is a genre of formally unified military scientific literature. Any given treatise addresses a discrete number of specific topics such as fortifications, gunpowder, firearms, the *Wagenburg*, the training of soldiers, morality or tactics. It

addresses other topics only as they fit into an overarching theme. For example, gunpowder technology might make its way into a war treatise on fortifications, as it does in a treatise by Albrecht Dürer, "Etliche underricht zu befestigung der Stett Schlosz und Flecken" [Some Lessons on the Fortification of Cities, Castles, and Towns] (1527), but only because it addresses the specific issues regarding gunpowder technologies as they impact the structure, lines of sight, and strength of materials used in designing fortifications. To this genre of early modern German military scientific literature, we can assign such works as Fronsperger's *Geistliche Kriegsordnung* (1555) and *Von Geschütz und Fewerwerck* (1564), Martin Merz's "ballistische Traktate" (late fifteenth century), Johannes Rothes's *Der Ritterspiegel* (early fifteenth century) and the *Feuerwerkbuch von 1420*. Internationally, Machiavelli's *Il Principe* [*The Prince*] (Latin, 1513; Italian, 1532; English trans., 1588; German trans., 1714) and Leon Battista Alberti's *De re aedificatoria* (1485) can also be added to the genre of war treatise in its broadest sense, as can ancient war treatises, such those by Vegetius, Julius Caesar, and Sextus Julius Frontinus. These made their way from manuscript to print and eventually into German, often with proto-patriotic paratexts in which the translator links the imperial Roman past to the—Germanic—Holy Roman imperial present.[182]

The *Kriegsbuch*, on the other hand, emerges as a genre in the fifteenth century, when military theorists began to collect a variety of lessons from other sources—usually war treatises—and pull them together into compilations. While it is related to the war treatise in subject matter, style, and form, the *Kriegsbuch*, or warbook, in contrast to the war treatise, is rarely unified and almost never original. Instead, the *Kriegsbuch* functions

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[182] Christine Johnson, "Creating a Usable Past: Vernacular Roman Histories in Renaissance Germany," *Sixteenth Century Studies Journal* 40:4 (2009), 1069-1090.

as a kind of encyclopedia of *ars belli*, in which many sources and subjects related to

war—as well as opinions about them—appear. The *Kriegsbuch* is best understood as a

compendium; many of the pieces it contains may have been authored or heavily edited

by the compiler, but most of the materials are compiled rather than authored. Even

before the rise of the German *Kriegsbuch*, Christine de Pizan had experimented with this

compilation format in her *Livre de fait d'armes et de chevalerie* [*Book of Deeds of Arms and

Chivalry*](ca. 1400). Indeed, many military historians have lodged the same complaints of

"unoriginality" and plagiarism against her—with a note of misogyny—that they lodged

against later German *Kriegsbuch* editors such as Fronsperger.[183] Christine, like the

Kriegsbuch authors of the sixteenth century, drew heavily from other sources in

constructing her book of war. While there is no direct historical or bibliographical

evidence to link her work to those of the later German compilers, the structure of

Christine's book of war is reflected in those who came after her.

The contents of the *Kriegsbuch* can vary, but they are almost always inconsistent

and disjointed. The only unifying features were the voice of the editor and the

relationship of the contents to war. One of the earliest examples of the German

Kriegsbuch genre is the handwritten 'Kriegsbuch' of Ludwig von Eyb the Younger (1450-

1521), who composed the manuscript between 1500 and 1510. It is rich with images and

contents that he "vil auß ander landen orten zusamen bracht" [brought together from

those books from a number of other lands].[184] Eyb's *Kriegsbuch* contains elements from

fencing manuals, nobility shield books, descriptions of *Wagenburgen*, images from

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[183] Charity Cannon Willard, "Introduction," *The Book of Deeds of Arms and Chivalry* by
Christine de Pisan (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State UP, 1999), 1.

[184] Leng, I:271.

Kyesers *Bellifortis*, descriptions and images of armories, and so forth.[185] The book

contains nearly 600 drawings, but it displays very little cohesion, as Leng observes:

"Gezielte Auswahl oder besondere Schwerpunkte sind in der Sammlung Eybs

bestenfalls in nicht immer konsequent durchgeführten thematischen Gruppierungen zu

erkennen" [In Eyb's collection, neither a clear goal to the selection nor specific emphases

are to be found in his thematic groupings, which—even in the best cases—are not

always realized in consistent ways].[186] At this early stage, the *Kriegsbuch* as a genre

seemed to rely more on compilation than on organization. The label "nicht immer

konsequent" [not always consistent], which appears in early secondary literature as a

stylistic criticism and in more recent literature as a formal analytical comment, can be

applied to three of the five major war books considered in this chapter. From a formal

standpoint, it seems that "Inkonsequenzen" [inconsistencies]—as Max Jähns puts it—are

a marker of the genre rather than a defect of individual *Kriegsbuch* authors.[187]

Before the works of Eyb (writing ca. 1500) and Fronsperger (writing ca. 1555-

1573), a number of other German writers and soldiers produced works that are similar

to the printed *Kriegsbuch* genre as manuscripts. Philipp von Seldeneck (1442-1534)

composed a hand-written *Kriegsbuch* around 1485, which contains translations of

Vegetius, descriptions of a *Wagenburg*, oaths for various military ranks, and a system of

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[185] Leng, I:217-272.

[186] Leng, I:272.

[187] "Inkonsequenzen," or inconsistencies, is both a real and false cognate in German. Directly translated, "inkonsequenz" can mean both "unconsequential" and "inconsistent." In both cases, Meyer's *Großes Konversationslexikon* tells us, "inkonsequent" means "nicht folgerichtig; wankelmütig" [not *con*-sequential; fickle]. For the sake of Jähns's and Leng's formal analyses of these texts, they mean that the texts are disordered or inconsistent.

rules ["Ordnung"] for "Fußknechte."[188] The German aristocrat Philipp von Cleve (1456-

1528) composed a slim version of a *Kriegsbuch* in French, which was translated into

German and circulated widely in no fewer than seventeen manuscripts.[189] These

manuscripts and their translations varied, as evidenced by the differing versions

published in both Reinhard von Solms's and Leonard Fronsperger's *Kriegsbücher*. In each

of these major collections, the translations of Philipp von Cleve's *Kriegsbuch* are both

linguistically and structurally different from each other.[190] An international

phenomenon, the *Kriegsbuch* made its way into German culture just as different sources

made their way into the *Kriegsbücher* themselves: it was lifted from other traditions,

altered, and added in.

The German *Kriegsbuch* made two major printed appearances in the mid-

sixteenth century. When German military science of the sixteenth century is discussed in

scholarship of the last hundred years, Leonard Fronsperger and Reinhard von Solms are

the names mentioned most. Yet research on their works remains sparse. Rainer Leng's

Ars belli (Habil. 2002) and, a century earlier, Max Jähns's *Geschichte der*

Kriegswissenschaften (1889) approach Solms and Fronsperger through descriptive and

philological methods. Leng appears to have a better feel for literary analysis than Jähns,

but his work remains primarily a philological one. Neither scholar interprets military

treatises as artifacts that have cultural resonance outside of military science. Aside from

these two scholars, only a few military historians have touched the works of Fronsperger

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[188] Leng, I:295.

[189] Leng I:284.

[190] Cf. Solms, "Borgundische Kriegsordnung," *Kriegsbuch* (1559), unpag. and Fronsperger, "Herzog Philips von Cleve Kriegß Ordnung," *Kriegsbuch* (1573), LXXIII-LXXXV.

and Solms.[191] Many historians excerpt from them out of context or use them for illustrations, but they offer few scholarly readings of these works. This chapter will expand on Leng's research providing additional insight into the *Kriegsbuch* genre from a literary perspective, on the basis of close, historicized readings. Continuing this study's focus on gunpowder, this chapter will spend the greatest amount of time with Fronsperger's works. Fronsperger makes for a useful subject because his *Kriegsbuch* is so focused on moral issues surrounding gunpowder warfare. Admittedly, he stands alone among his peers for his condemnation of gunpowder weapons, but his wide readership makes him an important figure in the field of military science regardless of the singularity of his opinions.

What little we know about Fronsperger's biography comes from the work of Jähns, who wrote at length on Fronsperger in his three volume *Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften* (1890), and from Leng, who has added a few important facts to Jähns's biographical research in *Ars belli* (2002). Fronsperger was born somewhere in Bavaria in 1520 and died in Ulm in 1575. His name has a number of spelling variants ranging from Freundtsperger to Frönsperger.[192] Even in the sixteenth century, he was confused with Georg von Frundsperg (1473-1528), the famous general—often called "Vater"—of the *Landsknechte* during the Italian and confessional wars of the early sixteenth century. As a result of occasional confusion of Frunsperg and Fronsperger,

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[191] Many historians use these images, especially the illustrations by Jost Amman found in Fronsperger's *Kriegsbuch*, but even scholars such as John Lynn and Bert Hall, who are capable with German, provide very little close analysis of Fronsperger's text. The same can be said for Solms, who had a very small readership. Many know "of" him and perhaps even cite his contents, but few take the time to analyze what he says.

[192] Jähns, I:548.

however, Fronsperger's otherwise mediocre writings were considered extremely

important in the study of military science.[193]

Fronsperger's military career was impressive, although he served most of it in

bureaucratic capacities as a judge, quartermaster, armory officer, and military consultant

for the Hapsburg Empire. He began his career as a soldier early, seeing his first military

action at the Siege of Marseille in 1535 around the age of fifteen.[194] At the age of twenty-

one, he took part in the siege of Buda/Pest in 1541 and 1542, where the imperial army

ultimately lost with staggering casualties (around 16,000 soldiers).[195] Later, as a part of

the imperial army in the Rheinland and eastern France, Fronsperger took a post as

Zeugmeister, or armory officer, which may explain his penchant for writing about

weapons and how to organize them. During the Schmalkaldic War in 1546 he served in

the Imperial army and was most likely at the artillery duel in Ingolstadt.[196] He married

the daughter of a burgher from Ulm, and was—thanks in part to the personal

recommendation of Emperor Charles V—awarded the status of "Bürger zu Ulm," a title

he enthusiastically appended to his dedications in the *Kriegsbuch* (1573).[197] Twice he was

given leave by the city of Ulm to go abroad on imperial campaigns, first from 1553 to

1563 and again from 1568 to 1573. In 1566, during the war with the Turks, Fronsperger

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[193] Jähns, I:556: Jähns notes that a number of scholars, dating back to 1588, have confused the two. He notes, "Diese Verwechselung . . . scheint unausrottbar." This problem persisted even into the twentieth century, as evidenced by Hans Delbrück's conflation of the two historical figures into one person.

[194] Jähns, I:548.

[195] Jähns, I:548; Leng, I:305.

[196] Leng, I:305.

[197] Leng, I:305: "Auf Fürsprache Karl V. wurde er nach seiner Heirat mit einer Ulmerin Bürger der Stadt Ulm und erwarb dort ein Haus."; Every work of Fronspergers has a dedication page, which is signed: "Leonhard Fronsperger / Bürger zu Ulm."

was awarded the imperial rank of *Feldgerichtsschultheißen* [Judge Advocate General].[198]

Recently, Rainer Leng uncovered yet a further promotion to the rank of *Obersten Zeugmeister* [Captain of the Armory] for the ducal armory of Munich in 1567.[199] At his death, he was on retainer by Emperor Maximilian II as "kaiserliche Provisioner" in Ulm. Fronsperger died on May 23, 1575, when a cannon exploded and killed him during weapons testing.[200]

Fronsperger's publication history is a complicated combination of industriousness and recycling. The impressive length of his list of published works is tempered by the fact that most of them were copied from other sources or cut apart and recombined to produce new books under different titles. Here we will consider his major works on military topics, all of which were eventually included in his three-volume *Kriegsbuch* (1573). Fronsperger's military works all draw on selections from famous and obscure sources that he redacted for his use by paraphrasing, rewording, or copying. Between the pilfered excerpts, he sprinkles bits of his personal experience and ruminations on various topics. Every work he published contains a number of paratexts—such as prefaces and dedications—that are placed at the beginning of longer books and in between sections within those books. These paratexts contain running moral commentaries on everything from the war against the Turks to the use of gunpowder in warfare. They provide rich material for this study.

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[198] Jähns, I:548.

[199] Leng, I:305: "Bislang unbekannt war, daß Fronsperger zudem 1567 als Oberster Zeugmeister in das herzogliche Zeughaus in München eintrat."; Nota: München, Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Kurbayern, Hofzahlamt Rechnung Nr. 12 von 1567, fol 389$_r$-390$_r$.

[200] Leng, I:305.

Fronsperger's first military work, *Fünff Bücher Von Kriegß Regiment und Ordnung*,

appeared in 1555 followed by a shorter work called *Von Geschütz und Fewerwerck* in

1557.[201] These works discussed the organization of an army and the design and use of

gunpowder weapons, respectively; *Von Geschütz und Fewerwerck* also contains a long

section on making fireworks for fun, too. A new edition of *Von Geschütz und Fewerwerck*

appeared again in 1564 and was subsequently appended to the *Fünff Bücher Von Kriegß*

Regiment und Ordnung. This combined edition was released under a new title, *Von*

Kayserlichen Kriegßrechten, by Feyerabend in 1565.[202] In the same year, Fronsperger

published a moral treatise on war, the *Geistliche KriegßOrdnung*, in which he drew

heavily on the pacifist arguments of Erasmus in order to make an extended argument in

favor of *just* warfare. He received military promotions corresponding chronologically to

these last three publications. In 1573, Fronsperger published his *Kriegsbuch*, which

appeared in three folio volumes under Sigmund Feyerabend's colophon, a visual

allegory of fame. This edition, which is also the final version that Fronsperger worked

on, will be the central source for this study, since all of Fronsperger's prior military

treatises found a home in these three volumes.[203]

Each of his works reflects his consistent self-identification as both a loyal subject

of the emperor and a *Burgher* of Ulm. His loyalty to the Holy Roman Empire is

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[201] KO = "Fünff Bücher Von Kriegß Regiment und Ordnung" (1555); GF = "Von Geschütz und Fewerwerck" (1557).

[202] The 1565 edition of *Kaiserlichen Kriegsrechten* (KK) is a sequentially numbered compilation of KO and GF, and in one copy passed down from holdings at Erxleben, has been bound together with several other works by Fronsperger, including the *Geistliche Kriegsordnung* (1565), an apparent *Raubdruck* of the *Fünff Bücher* dated 1560, and another brief war treatise printed by Feyerabend in 1563, and a reworking of part of Solm's *Kriegsbuch* dated 1556. (HAB Signatur: S. Alv. : Ia 13 2°).

[203] A posthumous version of the *Kriegsbuch* was published by Feyerabend's son in 1596. I will defer authority to the 1573 edition because of its status as *editio letzter Hand*.

proclaimed in every one of his writings by the paratextual framing, which dedicates the

works to either Charles V, Ferdinand I (r. 1558-1564), Maximillian II (r. 1564-1576), or

various other imperial officers, depending on the tracts' publication dates and whether

they appeared in print or manuscript form.[204] Additionally, his dedications and

forwards contain formalistic apologies to the reader and repeated assertions that anyone

might amend what he has written and printed if they should to find better texts to

include.[205]

Max Jähns, in his *Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften*, criticized Fronsperger's work

for a lack of tactical knowledge and—unjustly and anachronistically—for plagiarism, in

addition to the following complaint:

> Schlimmer jedoch ist . . . Fronspergers traurige Art die
> benutzten Originale zu entstellen, u. zw. sowohl dem
> Inhalte als der Form nach. . . . Gar nicht selten ist just der
> beste Kern der ursprünglichen Arbeit von ihm verkannt
> und bei Seite gelassen worden, und durch weg steht die
> Sprache Fronspergers unvergleichlich viel tiefer als die
> jenige seiner Vorgänger. . . . Sein Deutsch ist barbarisch
> zuweilen sogar unsinnig.[206]
>
> [What is even worse is Fronsperger's pathetic way of
> mixing up the orginal source, and moreover both the
> content and the form. . . . It is not seldom that he
> disregards the best piece of the original work and simply
> leaves it out, and in the process is Fronsperger's language
> more obtuse than the language of his predecessors. . . . His
> German is barbaric as well as nonsensical.]

Jähns's concern that Fronsperger has not only stolen but also ruined the writings of

others is somewhat harsh. It is not clear to which texts Jähns alludes, but his criticism

presents a gateway to enter Fronsperger's corpus of military writings. Jähns's strong

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[204] Leng, I:305-308.

[205] Fronsperger, *Kriegsbuch* (1573), 1:Dedication [unpag.], leaf 1.

[206] Jähns, I:555.

criticism of Fronsperger does fairly describe portions of Fronsperger's work. For example, Fronsperger is far from being a master stylist, a fact that he himself admits, and he is an even worse poet. Undoubtedly, in comparison to his contemporaries such as Schwendi and Solms, he has an eager penchant for punctuation that makes his lines puzzling at times. And his poor sense of meter never hinders his boundless capacity for writing and revising didactic verses. Yet, of his own stylistic intentions Fronsperger writes, "so hab ich doch umb desselben willen / und in bedenckung / daß in diesem Werck mehr an den gemeinen und leichten verstandt / dann an der Wolredenheit gelegen" [thus I have out of the same desire, and with intention, placed more emphasis in this work on common and easy understanding than on fine language].[207] His language may be barbaric, as Jähns claims, but its simplicity seems intentional.

In addition to his criticism of Fronsperger's rhetorical and editorial shortcomings, Jähns also comments that Fronsperger contributed very little to the development of military tactics. Another way to read Fronsperger's texts, beyond their role in the history of military strategy, is to read them for their depictions of the practice and the culture of war in the Holy Roman Empire, on which Fronsperger comments a great deal.[208] Jähns overlooks Fronsperger's textual framings such as dedications, introductions, and even title pages, and thereby misses the rhetorical and cultural complexity of Fronsperger's books. Considering their thematic breadth and their longevity, these works cannot be

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[207] Fronsperger, *Kriegsbuch* (1573), 3:Dedication (unpag.), leaf 5.

[208] A few historians of women have read Fronsperger's texts as cultural artifacts, John Lynn, for example in *Women, Armies, and Warfare in Early Modern Europe*, turns to Fronsperger's depiction of the "Hurenweibel" [Sergeant of the Whores]. Sadly, he references Fronsperger only through another scholar's use without engaging the original works.

dismissed as mere plagiarism or for their plain writing. Rather, they must be analyzed for their textual and cultural contexts and content.

Rainer Leng, too, has leveled criticisms against Fronsperger, albeit with less vitriol and a greater understanding for Fronsperger's motivations. Leng repeats Jähns's complaint about the "unsystematisch" [unsystematic] method of Fronsperger's compilations: "Er benutzte alle Quellen, die er nur finden konnte und kombinierte sie auf immer neue Weise mit älteren Teilen seiner eigenen Schriften, die ebenfalls Kompilationen darstellten" [He used every source that he could find and combined them in ever different ways with older parts of his own writings, which were themselves compilations].[209] Leng's scholarship highlights Fronsperger's recycling word for word of individual sections of previous works, yet Leng also explores a biographical context of Fronsperger's works that accounts for the differences between Fronsperger's social status and the status of other authors of similar military treatises. What Fronsperger, a burgher and loyal servant of the empire, hoped to gain through these works was social status and access to positions closed to him without the help of the renown brought by these texts.[210] At the time, Fronsperger's works were very popular; they sold so fast that they must have been "Feyerabend förmlich aus den Händen gerissen" [positively ripped from Feyerabend's hands].[211] According to Leng, new—backdated—editions had to be published to keep up with the demand. One could even suggest that these works functioned like job applications. A host of reprints and even some new editions such as

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[209] Leng, I:307.

[210] Leng, I:307: "Fronsperger wird zu seiner Zeit ebenfalls nicht wenig an den Drucken verdient haben . . . Im Unterschied zu Achterdingen . . . setzte der Ulmer Landsknecht ganz auf den persönlichen Ruhm, den ihm die repräsentativen und voluminösen Drucke einbrachten."

[211] Leng, I:308.

Kayserliche Kriegsrechten (1564), a military justice treatise, and his *Geistliche Kriegsordnung* (1565), a moral military treatise, appeared just before Fronsperger received the title of *Feldgerichtsschultheiß* in 1566. Leng suggests that Reinhard von Solms—a nobleman and military commander—who witnessed the surprising popularity of Fronsperger's early works, had hopes that his own limited and elite circulation of military treatises, and eventually his complete *Kriegsbuch* (1559-1561), would bring him fame similar to Fronsperger's.[212]

On the basis of a more nuanced understanding of Fronsperger's life and works, Leng delivers a more generous reading of Fronsperger than Jähns. Leng sees Fronsperger as a compiler and editor of military tracts, who published in an almost frenzied fashion for a chance at upward mobility. Along with his consideration of Feyerabend's energetic publishing practices, Leng also gives Fronsperger a creative but ultimately limited role in the production process of the books themselves. Fronsperger was the editor of the *Kriegsbuch*, but neither the printer, in whose hands the financial success of the book lay, nor the author, who was responsible for providing the content.

Fronsperger, like many of the authors of *Kriegsbücher*, could perhaps be better understood as an editor or redactor (*Redakteur*) than an author. His book's apparent lack of a system and its numerous inconsistencies were a product of the *Kriegsbuch* genre rather than Fronsperger's individual failure. In editing and publishing the compilation of texts, he claims authority as someone who has learned from them and reassembled them for others to learn from them too, not as their creator. Indeed, it is often not clear what is his own work and what he has copied. Under some circumstances he makes his

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[212] Leng, I:308: "Graf Reinhard der Ältere von Solms (1491-1562) muß von den großen Erfolgen der ersten Fronspergerschen Drucke stark beeindruckt gewesen sein."

sources—such as Martin Luther or Erasmus—explicit, while in other places he does not reveal the author. When not citing other sources, Fronsperger frames these texts, and here I quote from his *Geistliche Kriegsordnung* (1565), as having been taken "auß ander fürtrefflicher / Gottsverstendiger / gelehrter Männer Bücher" [from other upstanding, Godly, and learned men's books]. This assertion of the moral value of his sources, even if he does not name them, is mirrored by his "hope" that "es werden die Kriegsleut sich darinn ersehen / mir in diesem fall nich abstehen/ sonder mit mir bessern / und frömmer dardurch werden" [warriors will take heed of what is in them, and will not dismiss me in this case, but rather will improve with me and become more pious in the process].[213] Here, as elsewhere, Fronsperger defers to others for the sake of giving his material greater moral authority. But, each time he defers, his messages remain consistent even if the subjects seem disjointed. He acknowledges that he has compiled this work, not written it, and he has done so for the benefit of others in the Holy Roman Empire.

To say that Fronsperger defers to other when it comes to the authority over the *collected texts* does not diminish his claims to authority over the *collection of texts*. His readership and the commentators from the sixteenth through eighteenth century, among them Schulenberg (*Deutsche Lebengeschichten*, 1588), Tobias Wagner ("Entwurf einer Soldatenbibliothek," 1725), J.G. Laurentius ("Abhandlung von den Kriegsrechten," 1757), Oberst von Nicolai ("Versuch eine Grundrisses zur Bildung des Offiziers," 1775), promoted him as an authority in military matters, and they viewed his collection as a foundational source for military science.[214] Furthermore, he presents himself as an

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[213] Fronsperger, *Kriegsbuch* (1573), 1:CCXXXVII$_b$.

[214] Jähns, I: 556-557.

authority when it comes to his compilation. In the statement above, and in countless others like it, Fronsperger makes explicit suggestions about how he wants his collection to be used, and by whom. That is, he insists on his authority over the *Kriegsbuch* and his earlier compilations by explaining how to use them. In his introduction to the second volume of the *Kriegsbuch*, he goes so far as to claim that the book should find its way onto or near battlefields rather than be shelved for display or collection, "So hab ich doch darneben bey mir selbst ermessen / wie daß solche Werck nicht viel Doctriern / oder zierlicher wort / sonder viel mehr erfahrenheit / im Feldt / mit und bey zu seyn / dann hinderm Ofen / und bey dem Wein zusitzen / erheischet" [Thus I have decided for myself, that such a work should not be doctored or imbued with uppity words, but rather with experience, and kept with and near those in the field, rather than sit behind the oven and next to the wine].[215] At least one edition of Fronsperger's work at the Herzog August Bibliothek seems to have been carried into few battles. In addition to heavy water damage, mildew, and a crumbling vellum binding, the edition has mud on the cover and on a few pages.[216] Without dismissing the various cultural and literary qualities of Fronsperger's works, we can understand from Fronsperger's paratexts that he intends his works to have more practical value as sources of information than aesthetic value as objects.

The fact remains, though, that the apparent disorganization of the work's contents has kept scholars from viewing the *Kriegsbuch* as a coherent and cohesive whole. Adding to such scholarly perturbence is the fact that the work contains multiple

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[215] Fronsperger, *Kriegsbuch* (1573), 2:I$_a$.

[216] Fronsperger, *Geschütz und Fewrwerck* (Frankfurt: Feyerabend, 1562), HAB Signatur: 128 Quod. 2° (1-3).

similar texts that say the same things in slightly different ways. For example, descriptions of military offices and ranks, their pay scales, and the formulation of their oaths appear several times in prose and once in verse in all three volumes of Fronsperger's *Kriegsbuch*. In comparison to the tightly organized, one-volume *Kriegsbuch* (1559) by Reinhard von Solms containing exactly eight "books" that each address distinct topics, Fronsperger's *Kriegsbuch* (1573) appears chaotic, at best. To discern the cohesion behind Fronsperger's apparent chaos, this study first looks at the publication history of these works to see how they were reorganized through their various iterations. In a second step, it considers how Fronsperger framed his works. Concerning the first step, I have defered to Leng's historical insight and added my own observations where it seems fitting. In the second step, I will contribute my own textual analysis to aspects of the text that Leng has yet to explore, paying particular attention to the moral considerations of gunpowder warfare. Before moving on to the close textual analysis of Fronsperger, however, we will review other major military theorists who wrote important war books and treatises during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.

Reinhard von Solms (1491-1562), whose wealth and nobility supplied him the freedom to pursue almost any profession, composed his *Kriegsbuch* with very different motives from Fronsperger. He also approached the project in a different, more organized way.[217] Solms was educated at the courts of Franz von Sickingen and Fredrick III (the Wise), whose protection Luther also enjoyed.[218] His education is reflected in the careful editing and revision of his *Kriegsbuch* (1559-61), which consists of eight books

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[217] Leng, I:308.

[218] Leng, I:308.

bound together.[219] Because of his wealth, Solms was able to practice war differently from

Fronsperger. Whereas Fronsperger was assigned the bureaucratic tasks of organizing,

writing, interpreting, reading, and recording, Solms played the role of military leader

and *Kriegsherr*. Leng indentifies Solms with the growing class of *Kriegsunternehmer* [war

entrepreneurs], who made money through the organization of private miltary units.

Such units were not necessarily mercenaries, as they could have loyalties to specific

states and sovereigns, but they were usually for-profit operations. As a *Kriegsherr* and

Kriegsunternehmer, Solms saw plenty of military action in a variety of places, both as the

leader of a supporting unit and as a commander. Not surprisingly, then, Solms had a

greater understanding of battlefield tactics than Fronsperger as exemplified by his

inclusion of a tactical card game in his seventh book. The game consists of sheets

divided into smaller sections which the player is meant to copy from the book and turn

into playing cards. Leng observes, "Das Stück stellt wohl das älteste militärische

Planspiel dar, das auf höchst didaktische Weise taktische Kombinatorik, Umgang mit

Ressourcen und Aufstellungsvarianten schulen sollte" [The piece represents one of the

oldest military tactical games, which through the most didactic means is meant to teach

tactical combinations, use of resources, and formation variations].[220] The inclusion of

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[219] These books need not be bound together, but it is not clear how he marketed them, as individual volumes or as books that were meant to be bound together. Several examples exist in which portions of the *Kriegsbuch* are bound separate from the others. Each book has distinct pagination, title pages, and colophons. It was not printed in single copy during his lifetime. Indeed, the print release was rather small and self funded. Copies were, for the most part, sent directly to noble friends, and bound as they were. The HAB 1559 edition (Signature: A: 2.3 Bell 2°) is bound in this way, with a dark vellum cover, the books organized 1-8 with an unnumbered book, a translation of Philip von Cleve, at the end.

[220] Leng, I:311.

such a game in this work suggests didactic intentions directed at the neophyte and

Kriegsherr alike.[221]

Solms's *Kriegsbuch* covers many of the same topics as Fronsperger's, but with

greater economy of language, print, and paper. In fact, sections of Solms's work seem to

reflect a reliance on Fronsperger's earlier texts such as the *Fünff Bücher* and *Von Geschütz*

und Fewerwerck. In comparison to the 1,730 pages (865 sheets) of Fronsperger's 1573

version of the *Kriegsbuch*, Solms uses just under 692 pages (346 sheets).[222] Instead of

providing multiple views and sources excerpted and printed almost as found, Solms

carefully edited and joined what he knew with what he learned from other sources. He

also revised his prose with each edition.[223] Yet Solms was also reaching out to a very

specific audience. His was a book for the aristocratic warrior class. It was meant to be

encyclopedic, concise, economical, stylistically sound, and practical. These qualities

reflected the way Solms — and his colleagues — perceived war, "Wie Frundsperger,

Achterdingen, und Bemmelberg zählte Reinhard von Solms zu den Praktikern des

Kriegswesens, das er in disziplinarischer, taktischer, technischer und auch fiskalischer

Hinsicht beherrschte" [like Frundsperger, Achterdingen, and Bemmelberg, Reinhard von

Solms belonged to the practitioners of warfare, which he mastered with disciplinary,

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[221] Solms, *Kriegsbuch* (1559), Book 8:3$_b$: "Dise beschribene Karten dienen einem Obersten wol / daß er mit sienen Kriegßräthen und Bevelchßleuten sich berede / wie sie den andern tag wann mann ziehen wirt."

[222] Page and sheet count based on 1573 edition of Fronsperger's *Kriegsbuch* (HAB Signature: 10.2 Bell. 2°/10.1 Bell. 2°), including unpaginated front and back matter, and the 1559 edition of Solms' *Kriegsbuch* (HAB Signature: A: 2.3 Bell. 2°), including front, middle, and back matter. Solms: Book 1 = 84 pages (42 sheets); Book 2 = 178 pages (89 sheets); Book 3 = 136 pages (68 sheets); Book 4 = ~70 printed pages / 88 total pages (44 sheets), multiple illustrations of cannon and fold-out illustrations printed on one side; Book 5 = 56 pages (28 sheets); Book 6 = 56 pages (28 sheets); Book 7 = 40 pages (20 sheets); Borgundische Kriegsordnung = 54 pages (27 sheets).

[223] Leng, I:308.

tactical, technical, and fiscal competence].[224] Solms's audience was elite, and he updated

the editions only slightly each year to be released to a close circle of colleagues.[225]

Lazarus von Schwendi (1522-83), who once helped to free Solms from

imprisonment during a private dispute, would have been among those who read

Solms's work. Schwendi, who studied in Basel in the 1530s and 1540s, also wrote a

number of war treatises.[226] He owned a substantial library, and to this day we have

access to his heavily annotated copy of Machiavelli's *Discorsi* (1517).[227] Schwendi's

prolific political and military writings are mostly occupied with strengthing the power

of the emperor and the empire with a nod to "ein späthumanistischen

Reichspatriotismus" [a late humanistic imperial patriotism], similar to the sensibilities

found in the translations of ancient military texts mentioned above.[228]

His report to Emperor Maximilian II, entitled "Zustand des heil. Reiches 1570,"

demonstrates this imperial patriotism. He highlights the political challenges to the Holy

Roman Empire in the context of a perceived decline in German masculinity, military

power, and virtue. He closes his report with a proposal of a tri-partite solution. First, he

suggests reform of the electoral system and the selection of an appropriate successor to

assure continuity after Maximilian II's reign. Second, he suggests judicial reform, in

particular reform of the regulations governing individual principalities, including the

enforcement of capital punishment by the "Cammergericht" for any prince who breaks

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[224] Leng, I:308.

[225] Leng, I:312ff.

[226] Leng, I:321.

[227] Leng, I:321ff.

[228] Leng, I:321.

the "landfriden" [peace of the land].[229] Third, Schwendi recommends instituting a centralized imperial army as a defense against external threats.

As an additional benefit, military service could help return the German people to "alle alte teutsche zucht, frombkeit und biderkeit" [all of the old German discipline, piety, and honesty].[230] Such an action, he argues, will keep "der Teutschen fleisch und blut" [flesh and blood of the Germans] as well as "die teutsche sterke und mannschaft" [German strength and manliness] from being bought by foreign mercenary armies and used against the Empire.[231] Furthermore, a strong central military will make the people more "gehorsam" [obedient] to the emperor and the imperial project.[232] Basically, Schwendi's solution for the failing empire is the institution of martial law and securing of the Empire's borders through military expansion. By increasing the role of the state-funded military, Schwendi believes that the German people, who are by nature and history inclined toward all things military, will strengthen their support of the empire and pledge unwaivering allegiance to the emperor.

Three decades of confessional wars throughout most of Western Europe followed Schwendi, Solms, and Fronsperger. The military industry boomed, and countries rich in minerals and manpower became wealthy. Sweden saw a period of economic growth beginning around 1600, thanks largely to economic reforms, natural resources, and the national weapons industry, which supplied raw materials and

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[229] Lazarus von Schwendi, "Diskurs und Bedenken über den Zustand des Hl. Reiches von 1570," in *Staatslehre der frühen Neuzeit*, ed. Notker Hammerstein (Frankfurt: Deutsche Klassiker Verlag, 1995), 213.

[230] Schwendi, 215.

[231] Schwendi, 216.

[232] Schwendi, 216-217.

weapons to principalities all over Europe throughout the seventeenth century.[233]

German steel became a much sought after commodity as well. It was exported all over

Europe because of its superior strength and quality. By the seventeenth century, the

British prized German steel breastplates, which—based on twentieth century

experiments in Austria—were more effective at protecting soldiers from bullets than

English breastplates.[234] Furthermore, following the Schmalkaldic War, the *Reiter* became

an increasingly important component of the military. This meant the slow

disappearance of heavy cavalry from the battlefield during the second half of the

century, as well as the proliferation of wheel lock pistols on the battlefield.[235] Subsequent

reforms in military training and military philosophy abroad (especially in the

Netherlands with the development of "Dutch drill") also led to a more efficient

deployment of gunpowder weapons.

Despite these changes, many of which did not become widespread until after

1600, Fronsperger's *Kriegsbuch* remained in circulation and in the canon of German

military education with few significant newcomers until the seventeenth century. Near

the turn of the seventeenth century, Fronsperger's *Kriegsbuch* even gained a publicity

boost. A posthumous edition of Fronsperger's *Kriegsbuch* appeared in 1596 with

Feyerabend's press in Frankfurt, now under the direction of Sigmund Feyerabend's son.

The new edition still contained the original illustrations by Jost Amman, plus a

dedicatory poem to Fronsperger's memory—possibly written by Sigmund Feyerabend

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[233] Cf. Michael Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus* (New York: Longman, 1992), as well as my
discussion in Chapter Three.

[234] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 147.

[235] Cf. Chapter 1.2: Wheel-lock pistols had a major production hub in and around
Nuremburg during the sixteenth century.

himself.[236] Fronsperger's work was not the only German military text on the market at the turn of the century. A number of military treatises appeared in various languages between 1570 and 1610. But they explored specific topics such as artillery, training, military law, fortifications, nautical warfare, field warfare, and the cavalry, more than they attempted to create an encyclopedic overview of military science. At the outset of the seventeenth century, Fronsperger's work remained the dominant and most widely published German-language contribution to the field of military science.

In 1607, Wilhelm Dilich (1571-1655*), "Geograph und Histor" as well as engineer, illustrator, architect, and topographer, ventured into the German genre of the *Kriegsbuch*.[237] Dilich studied in Wittenberg and Marburg in the late sixteenth century. After his studies, he lived in Hessen for several years and produced a number of chronicles and accompanying illustrations in quick succession, including *De Electoribus Saxonicis* (1590), *Ungarische Chronica* (1601), and *Hessische Chronica* (1601/1617). A few moral and philosophical works of his also appeared, such as the *Brevis Lipsiae descriptio* (1594).[238] Following a trip to the Netherlands, where he witnessed the military training reforms of Maurice of Orange, Dilich wrote his *Kriegsbuch* (1608).[239] Smaller (octavo) and shorter (329 pages) than any of its sixteenth century cousins, Dilich's *Kriegsbuch* also

[236] Leonard Fronsperger, *Kriegsbuch* Vol. 1-3, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt: Feyerabend, 1596). HAB Signature: Schulenb. J 2° 25a.

[237] Dilich, *Kriegsbuch* (1608), Dedication unpag.;Carl Julius Caesar, "Dilich, Wilhelm Schäffer, genannt," *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*, (Historischen Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften: 1877), 5:225–26.

[238] Horst Nieder, *Wilhelm Dilich (um 1571-1650): Zeichner, Schriftsteller und Kartograph in höfischem Dienst* (Institut für Architektur-, Kunst- und Kulturgeschichte in Nord- und Westdeutschland: Weserrenaissance-Museum Schloß Brake, 2002).

[239] "Wilhelm Dilich," *Neue Deutsche Biographie*, Bd. 3 (Berlin: Duncker & Humbolt, 1957), 718.

offered a twist on the genre by including historical examples and comparisons from the ancient Greeks and Romans as compliments to each section on modern tactics.

Dilich's *Kriegsbuch* represents the final example of the *Kriegsbuch* genre in the German language under consideration here. This book also represents a departure from the formal tendency of the German *Kriegbuch* toward compilation. Instead, Dilich presents an original comparative analysis of ancient and contemporary military practices. Drawing on the writings of "Ferettus, H. Wilhelm von Bellai her zu Langei / der Her de La Nove, wie auch H. Lazarus von Schwendi," Dilich constructs his book around two activities of war: preparation for war [*Apparatu*] and battle [*Congressu*].[240] The sections are organized comparatively. For example, Dilich places German ranks next to their Roman counterparts, and he invents or latinizes ranks that did not have exact Roman equivalents.[241] Like other *Kriegsbücher*, Dilich's demonstrates pedagogical intent, "daß sich dz kriegswesen nicht allein im felde lernen lass / sondern man müsse auch darneben schrifftliche erinnerung haben / dadurch man vor und neben der erfahrung . . . etwas berichts zur anleitung innemen" [so that one does not learn of warfare only in the field, but one must also have written knowledge along with it, so that one can comprehend lessons before and after an experience].[242] Its tight organization makes this book accessible and searchable, even with little previous knowledge of its contents. Though he presents this book as a guide to war, Dilich also adds some moral warnings

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[240] Dilich, Dedication unpag.; Dilich, 7.

[241] Dilich, 22-23. Dilich draws all of his Latin names from various Latin military terms, but the distinction of the "Tribunus Munitionis," for example, stretches to incorporate ancient uses of "artillery" into contemporary ones. The *munitiones* in the Roman military were involved with building and defending walls.

[242] Dilich, Dedication unpag.

against unjust wars.[243] As a corollary, he sees his book as training soldiers—especially those new in war, the *Tyrones*—"dem gemeinen Vatterlandt zu gutem nach hohen ritterlichen thaten / ehr unnd ruhm durch Thugent und manheit streben" [to strive through the practice of virtue and manliness for the good of the common fatherland to great knightly deeds, honor, and glory].[244]

 Johann Jacobi von Wallhausen (neé Tautphoeus, ca. 1580-1627) presents a final example for this review. His main works of military theory appeared between 1615 and 1622, at the outset of the Thirty Years War. Jähns hails him as "der bedeutendste Militärschriftsteller Deutschlands in dem Lustrum vor Ausbruch des großen Krieges" [the most important military writer of Germany in the period prior to the outbreak of the great (Thirty Years) War].[245] In a dissenting opinion, Hans Delbrück calls him "wie seine Schriftstellerei vermuten läßt, ein unsolider Charakter" [as his writing suggests, a weak character].[246] Wallhausen studied in Marburg between 1596 and 1599.[247] After killing a man in a duel, he entered military service in the Netherlands under Maurice of Orange and then spent several years serving as an officer in Hungary and Russia. During this time, he changed his last name from Tautphoeus to Wallhausen. He became a captain in the Danzig military service in 1613.[248]

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[243] Dilich, 2-5.

[244] Dilich, Dedication unpag.

[245] Jähns, II:930.

[246] Hans Delbrück, *Geschichte der Kriegskunst* (Berlin: Georg Stilke, 1920), 4:275.

[247] Hans Zopf, "Jacobi von Wallhausen (Tautphoeus), Johann," in *Neue Deutsche Biographie*, Bd. 10 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1974), 238.

[248] Delbrück, 4:275; Zopf, 238.

His first military work, *Kriegskunst zu Fuß* [The Art of War on Foot] (1615), was followed by *Kriegskunst zu Pferdt* [The Art of War on Horse] (1616), *Ritterkunst* [The Art of the Knight] (1616), and *Kriegskunst von Feuerwercken* [The Art of War for Artillery] (1617).[249] These works were translated into French, Dutch, Latin, and Russian during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, an indication of his international reputation as a military theorist despite claims of plagiarism that plague his work to this day.[250] Other works, *Corpus Militare* [The Military Body] (1617), *Camera Militaris oder Kriegskunst Schatzkammer* [Treasure Chamber of War] (1621), and *Defensio patriae oder Landrettung* [Defense of the Fatherland] (1621) rounded out his more important war writings. The breadth of topics he addressed as well as his encyclopedic approach to the topic of war point to his efforts at creating a *Kriegsbuch* of his own, most likely in the tradition of Solms's serial revisions and tight organization. Wallhausen's encyclopedic approach to war and his importance to military culture of the seventeenth century including his short stint at the German Military Academy in Siegen (1617-1618) mandate the inclusion of his works into this reference frame.

Gunpowder Warfare in Fronsperger's *Kriegsbuch*

As we saw in the early cultural and material history of gunpowder technology in Chapter One, gunpowder had a slow but revolutionary effect on the conduct and representation of warfare. Gunpowder technology first established itself during the Hussite Wars as an indispensable military tactical tool. Pioneered by the Hussite commander Jan Zizka in the 1420s, the *Wagenburg* [wagon fortress] took advantage of

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[249] Jähns, II:1035ff; Zopf, 238.

[250] Delbrück, 4:275.

gunpowder weapons and the German reliance on heavy cavalry—knights—by combining defensive construction with mobile light artillery. The *Wagenburg* could easily move out of range of enemy cannons to a position where its occupants would await a cavalry or infantry attack destined to falter in the face of the fortification and weaponry of the *Wagenburg*.

The rise of the *Wagenburg* did not result in the immediate disappearance of the knight from European battlefields. Instead, as a tactical tool, the knight persisted in various forms until well into the seventeenth century. As a central figure in war narratives, the knight would remain present much longer, but his role would be altered from what was passed down from the Middle Ages. Aesthetically, the knight in the age of rising nation states became a marker of nationalist pride and a source of historical roots in national identity rather than a central component of the tactical progression of war. In Moscherosch's *Philander von Sittenwalt*, for example, the medieval German knight—riddled with bullets and literally raised from the dead—represents the idealized, heroic, and manly national past. In the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, cavalry lost its aristocratic sheen. A mediocre horse and a sufficient arsenal were the primary requirements for joining the cavalry during the Thirty Years' War.

Gunpowder technology in (a large) part drove these shifts in military infrastructure, from the training and organization of soldiers to battlefield combat. While historians have debated just how much and when gunpowder technology impacted European warfare and politics, a cultural perspective that observes the effects of gunpowder technology over a longer time confirms the significant impact of gunpowder on European society in a number of ways. This impact is apparent in

writings from the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century German speaking lands, which were particularly burdened by the "plague" of warfare between 1500 and 1650. These lands bore witness to devastation inflicted on them by gunpowder weapons. Yet gunpowder brought more than physical destruction. Early modern Germans were beset by the troubling effects of gunpowder warfare found in the behavior of a new breed of soldier armed with gunpowder weapons. Already in the sixteenth century, Hans Sachs, Desiderius Erasmus, Sebastian Franck, and Martin Luther expressed concerns about the brutalization of soldiers in the age of gunpowder warfare. By the Thirty Years War, the violence inflicted by soldiers on civilians confirmed the concerns of sixteenth-century writers.

Military theorists, as well as humanists and reformers, complained about gunpowder warfare in German lands. The military man most perturbed about warfare in the age of gunpowder weapons was the one who wrote—or, at least, edited—one of the most important books on it, Leonard Fronsperger. The *Kriegsbuch* contains several sections that present the moral and ethical dilemmas of gunpowder warfare and offer advice about how to resolve them. These sections treat topics such as waging war against the Ottoman Turks and against other Christians, starting a war, finishing a war, recruiting soldiers, and controlling the immoral behaviors of soldiers ("cursing, drinking, gambling" is the common triad). Unexpectedly, in Fronsperger's commentaries, we find a surprising level of anti-war rhetoric. In particular, he decries the relatively new technological innovations of war in one of his most overlooked messages, namely, when he avers that there is something wrong with gunpowder warfare.

One of the most convincing claims against the theory of the gunpowder revolution, the materialist argument, demonstrates that gunpowder weapons were not new when the "gunpowder revolution" allegedly took place. According to Hall, the history of European gunpowder technology dates back to the early fourteenth century. Its development from the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries is marked by a number of technological fumbles and tactical failures that kept gunpowder from becoming a clearly identifiable agent of the so-called military revolution. Yet a number of early modern written sources represent gunpowder as a new and groundbreaking technology. Fronsperger was no different. He, too, saw gunpowder as a newcomer to the practice of warfare. In his dedication of the *Kriegsbuch* to Maximillian II, he writes, "Aber jedoch so ist offenbar / daß sich die läuffe / sonderlich in Kriegßanschlegen / in den anderthalbhundert Jaren eyner / fürnemlich des Geschütz halben / sehr geendert / so hat doch auch die unvermeidlich notturfft erfordert die Befelch und ämpter mit gelegenheit der zeit und läuff nach zu verordnen/ und anders dann bey den Alten gebreuchlich gewest/anzustellen" [But in any case it is now apparent that the progression of war stratagems in particular have changed much in the last century and a half, primarily because of firearms; thus, it has become unavoidably necessary to reorganize the ranks and offices to the circumstances of the moment, and differently from the way they were used by the ancients].[251] By estimating that gunpowder has changed warfare during the "last century and a half," Fronsperger identifies the Hussite

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[251] Fronsperger, *Kriegsbuch* (1573), 1:1-2. I have translated this sentence loosely, but I have chosen to translate "Kriegßanschlegen" as "stratagems" because this is how Marcus Tacius's translation presents the title of Frontinus's *Strategemata* in the *Kriegsbuch* (1573), and in his original translation from 1545.

Wars as a technological turning point in warfare.[252] His timeline is consistent with

materialist histories of gunpowder warfare. According to Fronsperger, the early

fifteenth century presents a break between old and new, cause and effect. The cause is

"primarily gunpowder" and the effect is a number of changes including "stratagems"

[*Kriegsanschlegen*], ranks, and offices. As a result, even the deployment and varieties of

soldiers have changed from ancient times. While a hundred and fifty years is a long

time, Fronsperger's sense of history still relies on ancient precedence for evaluating

contemporary behavior. With such a view of history, revolutionary change could take

hundreds of years.

Throughout his writings Fronsperger repeats his concern that gunpowder

warfare is markedly different from warfare of the past. He worries about the loss of

traditions and values which he attributes to an imagined past inhabited by Germanic

knights and manly heroes. Yet Fronsperger's practicality keeps him from dwelling on

historical theories about the Germanic past. He never approaches history in any critical

way.[253] His sense of history is not periodic but didactic; figures and events of the past are

exempla for the present. Fronsperger incorporates a number of idealized Germanic,

Greek, and Roman texts and examples in the third volume of the *Kriegsbuch* as models

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[252] Fronsperger first published this dedication in 1565 in his *Kaiserlichen Kriegsrechten*, which means that the 150 years in which "warfare has changed" started right around the outbreak of Hussite tensions in Bohemia (Jan Hus executed 1415, Hussite Wars started ca. 1419). While I am not arguing that Fronsperger views the Hussite conflict as the start of the military revolution, I do believe that he has a good grasp on the time period in which gunpowder technology started having the most impact on military tactics and culture.

[253] In contrast to Wilhelm Dilich, for example, who studied history.

for soldiers of his day.[254] Against this anachronistic background, Fronsperger sets up the problems of gunpowder weapons. He sketches a negative picture of gunpowder warfare through several rhetorical tropes. In the following, I will focus on three of these in particular: gunpowder as plague, gunpowder as unmanly, and gunpowder as an aesthetic dilemma.

Gunpowder Warfare as Plague

Fronsperger's characterization of gunpowder as a "Pestilenz" draws on biblical language to portray it as a divine punishment. He presents this view of gunpowder in a variety of sections of the *Kriegsbuch*. Ironically, his harshest criticism of gunpowder can be found in the works that promote the technology by informing readers how to use it. For example, at the outset of "Von Geschütz und Fewerwerck," lifted from its original publication in 1564 and inserted into Book Eight in the first volume of the *Kriegsbuch*, Fronsperger writes,

> Darumb der Allmechtig Barmhertzig Gott erst zu diesen unsern letzten Zeiten das aller greuwelichst werck mit Pulffer und Kugeln auß Büchssen zu schiessen / und auß Mörschern oder andern Instrumenten zu werffen / hat an tag kommen lassen und verhengt / ist dem Menschlichen verstandt zu ergründen und zu erforschen nit wol müglich / oder gebürlich / Allein dieweil solchs einer grauwsamen ernstlichen straff gar wol gleich sicht / wil ich michs zu schliessen nit hoch bekümmern. Unsere unauffhörliche / uberschwenklich / grauwsame Sünd / büberey und laster / haben den Göttlichen zorn der massen uber uns gereizt und erweckt / das der Allmechtig Gott auch diese Ruhten uns hertiglich damit zu straffen in die Hand genommen.[255]

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[254] In particular, in the third volume of the *Kriegsbuch*, the translation of Frontinus's *Strategemata*, translated by Marcus Tatius as "Kriegsanschläge," (3:CCXXC$_a$-CCLXXXII$_b$) and a section on "Alte KriegßOrdnungen / Exempel / Sitten und gebräuche" (CXCVII$_b$-CCVIII$_a$) are examples of Fronsperger's idealization of ancient warfare.

[255] Fronsperger, *Kriegsbuch* (1573), 1:CLXXII$_a$.

> [It is beyond the realm of human understanding to declare
> or even question, with any hope of success or benefit, why
> the omnipotent and merciful God has allowed the
> existence of and imposed on us, in these last days, that
> most horrible work of shooting from firearms with powder
> and ordinance and of throwing them from mortars and
> other instruments. I am not going to apply myself at length
> to discovering why there seems to be such a terrible and
> serious punishment. Our incessant, excessive, and horrible
> sin, foolishness, and arrogance have awoken and
> instigated this mass of divine wrath, so that God has
> picked up these rods in order to punish us swiftly.]

By linking gunpowder technology to a biblical plague—a repayment for "horrible sin, foolishness, and arrogance"—Fronsperger constructs an argument that works in two ways: Gunpowder is evil but it is also unavoidable. The moniker of "plague" [*pestilenz*], invoked just a few lines after the ones cited above, allows him to criticize gunpowder technology while also maintaining that humans ultimately have little control over it. The rhetoric of divine punishment is strengthened by the apocalyptic phrase, "zu diesen unseren letzten Zeiten," which simultaneously alludes to the "end of days" and the perceived newness of gunpowder technology.[256] The imagery of the punishing "rod," or in this case "rods," extends the biblical language to depict God as the angry father punishing his children. Thus afflicted, humans have little choice but to employ the technology to the best of their ability. Christians, he goes on to suggest, ought to use it for good rather than for evil.

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[256] Mark Häbberlein (Otto-Friedrich-Universität Bamberg) encouraged a double reading of this line during a talk I gave there in June, 2011. The "end of days" and "the last few years" both seem to be valid interpretations of what Fronsperger means here. Clearly he has a historical view of gunpowder warfare as a relatively recent phenomenon, but it would be hasty to dismiss the biblical allusion that grounds such a phrase in the overall motif of divine retribution.

Fronsperger presents the use of gunpowder weapons in warfare as both a moral

and tactical issue. He notes that firearms have become necessary to win wars, "Alle

Kriegßanschläg ligen allein am Geschütz / wo dasselbig recht trifft / oder wann ein

Hauff den andern mit der menning der Büchssen uberdringt / der hat schon obgesiegt"

[every stratagem relies only on the firearm, and where it is able to strike well, for when

one battalion gains an advantage over another with guns, it has already won the

battle].[257] As long as one wants to win wars, one should be "practiced" in the use of

gunpowder and hire talented and God-fearing *Büchsenmeister* to assure military

dominance.[258] Yet, Fronsperger claims that war, as well as "inflation and pestilence"

[*Theuerung und Pestilenz*] are neither simple effects of "unserm eignen finantz / oder

teglichen Hendeln" [our own finances or daily commerce] nor of "der influentz deß

Himmels" [the influence of the stars] and "die uneinigkeit der Potentaten" [the disunity

of the nobility] but rather they are a punishment from God.[259] Fronsperger derides

people who are "verhertet und verbaint" [hardened and ignorant] to the possibility that

God's punishing hand is behind such devastation.[260] Since war is, in itself, a pestilence

sent by God, only the eradication of war through the love of God can wipe out firearms

too.

Fronsperger also presents firearms as a plague beyond the battlefield. Small arms

such as muskets and pistols contribute to social tragedy since these weapons allow the

[257] Fronsperger, *Kriegsbuch* (1573), 1:CLXXII$_b$

[258] Cf. Fronsperger, *Kriegsbuch*, 1: LXXI$_b$.

[259] Fronsperger, *Kriegsbuch*, 1:CLXXII$_a$. N.b. on translation: The phrase "der influentz deß Himmels" is clearly a reference to astrology and not to divine intervention since the final clause of the sentence here invokes the punishment of God. Hence the translation of "Himmel" as stars rather than "heaven(s)."

[260] "verbaint" = "verbeint" (turned into bone, in other words, "bone-headed")

movement of gunpowder violence from the battlefield to civilian life. After the battle is over, firearms remain a threat to public peace: "Dann wann wir schon den Feind nit im Land haben / so darff sich doch schier keiner auff seinem eignen Acker oder grund vor diesem greuwlichem Geschütz recht sicher schetzen / sondern er muß allzeit besorgen / einer erschieß in auß einer stauden herauß" [Even when we don't have the enemy in our lands anymore, no one can think that he is safe from the horrible firearm on his own field or land, but he must always worry that someone will shoot at him from inside a bush].[261] Symbolizing the whole spectrum of those affected, from lowly farmers to grand princes, the "Acker oder grund" [field, land] are meant to be places of peace and security where the laws of the household or the laws of the sovereign keep order. Firearms disrupt this security and present a threat to social and commercial life. The field, a symbol of productivity, on which the health of society relies for nourishment, is a vulnerable part of the body social. Distress in the fields will lead to famine for all other organs.

Gunpowder Warfare as Unmanly

In addition to the image of gunpowder as a plague in Fronsperger's writings, gunpowder technology also threatens the link between masculinity and bravery. The threat comes from afar to wreak havoc on the productive and autonomous social unit, such as the farmstead or the principality, but the intrusion also attacks "auß einer stauden" [from inside a bush], that is, from a hidden place. Thus, gunpowder technology represents, here, an intrusion by an external force that refuses to face the person it attacks. Attacking distance and subterfuge are two of the most serious ethical

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[261] Fronsperger, CLXXII$_a$: stauden (mhd.) = "ferner" (Lexer).

problems informing debates about firearms in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Whether written by Fronsperger, Moscherosch, or Grimmelshausen, many texts express concerns that the firearm allows people to kill from far away while remaining hidden. The situation described by Fronsperger of an attacker killing a person from behind a bush is a common motif in early modern critiques of gunpowder technologies.

Yet, anonymous death inflicted from afar was not new to the history of warfare or to technologies of violence. Earlier weapons such as the long bow, the catapult or trebuchet, the crossbow, the siege bolt, and even the spear, could kill from a distance. The difference between the early modern firearm and earlier weapons lies in the mechanical and chemical nature of gunpowder weapons and its symbolic assault on warrior masculinity. With the exception of siege machines, personal weapons that could kill at a distance were physically challenging to fire. The bow requires practice and skill to shoot accurately and great strength to shoot it far. The bone structure of English longbowmen, for instance, was actually affected by their training, which began at a very young age.[262] The crossbow was also not an easy weapon to use on the battlefield. It required the cranking of a heavy metal gear and was cumbersome as well as slow to reload. On the other hand, firearms, especially the musket, archebuse, and pistol, were light enough to be supported by most adult-sized people and could be reloaded with relative ease. While they could be heavy, they were also easier to carry around loaded. They could even be concealed and transported on horse or on foot. The development of the pistol in the early sixteenth century meant that firearms became even lighter but remained just as deadly at close range. Maximilian I, who had some misgivings about

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[262] Stephen Morillo, Jeremy Black, et al., *War in World History: Society, Technology, and War from Ancient Times to Present* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2009), 1:232-237.

small firearms, outlawed the wheel-lock pistol because he believed that it was too easily concealed and promoted duplicity.[263] These explanations do not entirely account for why many people believed that firearms presented more challenges to warrior masculinity than other medium or long range weapons. Yet, it is clear from the consistent language of these criticisms that the trouble with gunpowder technology was that, in some way, it seemed to deprive warfare of its "manliness."

The way masculinity is depicted in Fronsperger's critique of gunpowder indicates that strength and bravery are the key components of masculinity that are adversely impacted by gunpowder technology.[264] Strength, in particular physical strength, becomes less relevant when gunpowder weapons are employed on the battlefield, especially in the scenarios often put forth by gunpowder's critics. For example, Fronsperger notes that gunpowder weapons such as cannons have a destructive power that no man can counter with bodily strength. Moreover, a cannonball has the ability to kill not just one man, but many, "Welche Pestilenz hat jemals in einem Augenblick so viel starcker streitbarer Mann hinweg genommen/ als wann das Geschütz in einer Schlachtordnung recht antrifft" [What pestilence has ever taken away so many strong and battle-ready men in the blink of an eye, as when a cannon hits a battle corps head on].[265] The image of the cannonball striking the orderly ranks of soldiers is disturbing to Fronsperger because of the speed, strength, and

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[263] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 90.

[264] Fronsperger's deconstruction of warrior masculinity spends little time distinguishing between classes of soldiers, such as officer or enlisted; rather, he seems to appeal to a threatened hegemonic warrior masculinity, modeled on knightly ideals. The distinction of class is negotiated in sections that construct the ideals of masculinity, but—as evidenced in the passage about the field above—issues of estate are often muddled when he speaks of threats to "manliness." We will tease out estate distinctions later.

[265] Fronsperger, CLXXII_a.

number of men killed. Like Erasmus, who laments the speed and destruction of people

and towns made possible by gunpowder weapons in the *Querela pacis*, Fronpserger is in

awe of gunpowder's ability to destroy many people with a single shot. However, for

Fronsperger, the symbolic destruction of values that comes with the physical destruction

of warriors' bodies is more important than their personal suffering. In the next line he

writes, "Allda hört alle tapfferkeit / sterck / redlichkeit / tugent / und mannheit auff"

[In that moment, all bravery, strength, fortitude, virtue, and manliness cease to be].[266]

Thus, one problem with gunpowder weapons lies in their symbolic attack on masculine

values tied to his sense of warrior masculinity. The warrior, who is brave, strong,

upstanding, virtuous, and manly, is helpless in the face of gunpowder weapons.

On a smaller scale, as I have shown above, the hand-held firearm as opposed to

the cannon, also presents an imminent danger to the bodily integrity of the warrior.

Fronsperger oscillates between his reflections on large-bore weapons such as cannons

and mortars and small bore weapons such as pistols and shoulder arms. To some

degree, though, he sees them as equally damaging to the traditions of warfare and to the

bodies of the warriors they kill:

> All freydigkeit und mannlicher mut / so vor alten zeiten
> viel golten / und dermassen hoch berühmmt geweßt / das
> etwan ein herrlicher Sieg einem gantzen Kriegßhauffen
> durch eines einigen Manns geschicktlichkeit / sterck und
> mannheit ist zugestanden / und erhalten worden /
> müssen jetzt vor dem greuwlichen Geschütz ernider ligen.
> Dann welcher hertzenhaffter Held / oder grosser starcker
> Riß / möcht auch vor einem geringen Geschoß
> bestehen?[267]

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[266] Fronsperger, 1:CLXXII_{a-b}.

[267] Fronsperger, *Kriegsbuch*, 1:CLXXII_{b}.

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[All audacity and manly bravery, which used to count for
so much in ancient times and were, in that same vein,
highly celebrated when at once a great victory for an entire
army could be won and secured by the experience,
strength, and manliness of a single man, must now lay
down before the horrible firearm. Because what hearty
hero or great war horse could possibly withstand even the
smallest shot?][268]

Fronsperger laments the fact that even the smallest "shot" can lay low the brave and

"hertzenhaffter" [hearty] warrior, and his choice of the word "Held" [hero] is revealing

for the kind of warrior he imagines. The hero, who embodies exemplary physical and

moral qualities, is the one who has the most to lose from gunpowder weapons. To be

shot by a firearm reveals the meaninglessness of the pursuit of an ideal form of warrior

masculinity, and it hints at the obsolescence of such masculinity. Gunpowder

technology deprives this version of masculinity, which is based on the ideals of strength,

honor, and bravery, of both its military and symbolic value. If such values no longer

guarantee victory on the battlefield, then there is less reason to pursue them.

Gunpowder Warfare as an Aesthetic Dilemma

Fronsperger, the idealist, mourns the symbolic destruction of these heroic values.

In an effort to recover them in the practice of warfare, he conceives of his *Kriegsbuch* as

an aesthetic as well as didactic project. By teaching and entertaining according to an

aesthetic model that can be traced back to Horace's *Ars Poetica*, his book provides a

method by which ancient virtues can be reconciled with military life in the age of

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[268] Translation mine. The translation of "Riß" here is a little problematic. I have chosen to
assume that Fronsperger is talking about a being "Ritt" or "Roß" that is, a warhorse or
possibly a cavalryman. The orthography of the original text can also be transcribed as
"Risz," which—according to Grimm's dictionary—means, an "area, field, neighborhood,
structure" as well as a "tear, rip, cut." This translation needs wide leeway for that reason.
The second most likely translation is "a big strong building" [Risz].

gunpowder weapons. To do so, Fronsperger assembles texts that teach virtuous

traditions of warriors through aestheticized means such as visual depictions, didactic

verse, and historical vignettes. Moreover, Fronsperger regularly turns to the ancients not

just as sources of military tactical knowledge, but as models of behavior that his

contemporaries should follow. Even in the passage already cited in the paragraph

above, he looks to the virtues of "freydigkeit und mannlicher mut" [audacity and manly

courage] as the qualities that contemporary warriors fail to acquire. His idealistic

description of warfare imagines a past in which a single hero was capable of winning a

battle. This past is the past of the knight and the past of the ancients. In contrast to the

stories of bold warriors like Roland or Achilles, Fronsperger sees his time as an age of

non-heroes. Yet, heroes are not absent because they do not exist, but rather because they

have no chance to do the kinds of deeds they once did.

Fronsperger presents a similar message in other sections of the *Kriegsbuch* by

highlighting the disrupted hierarchy of battle. In the foreword to "Von der Arckelley

Geschutz und Munition" ["On Artillery Weaponry and Munitions"] (Vol. 1: Bk. 4), for

instance, Fronsperger writes again of the demise of a hero at the hands of gunpowder:

> Wenn ich recht darvon reden solt / wie sichs gebürt / so
> wirdt schier kein mann oder dappferkeit in Kriegsachen
> mehr gebraucht / dieweil aller list / betrug / verrähterey
> / sampt dem greuwlichen Geschütz / sogar uberhand
> genommen / also das weder fechten / balgen / schlahen /
> Gewehr / waffen / sterke / kunst / noch mann[heit] oder
> dapfferkeit mehr helffen oder etwas gelten wil: Denn es
> geschicht offt und viel / das etwan ein mannlicher
> dapfferer Heldt von einem losen verzagten Buben durch
> das Geschütz erlegt / welcher sonst einen nicht
> freffentlich[269] dörfft besehen oder ansprechen.[270]

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[269] 'freventlich' [audaciously, boldly].

[270] Fronsperger, *Kriegsbuch*, 1:LXXXVIIIₐ.

[If I were to speak properly, as it appears, then the there is
hardly any manliness or bravery practiced in the activities
of war anymore, whereas all kinds of cunning, betrayal,
treachery, together with the horrible firearm have gained
the upper hand, so that neither sword play, hand-to-hand
combat, battle, swords, weapons, strength, artistry, nor
manliness or bravery can help nor are worth anything any
more. Because it is very often the case that a manly and
brave hero is brought down by pathetic little brat with a
gun, who otherwise wouldn't even be bold enough to look
at him or talk to him.]

Here, Fronsperger constructs a complaint focused on single combat, as the firearm

conveys personal and ethical, rather than political and social, danger. The absence of

"manliness and bravery" in battle has given way to a chaotic frenzy of ignoble "betrayal

and treachery."

Like the passage from "Von Geschütz und Fewerwerck," this example links the

demise of the warrior's body to the symbolic erasure of the values that his body

represents and the hierarchy that organizes the battlefield. The figure of the heroic

warrior trained to become "manly and brave" has absorbed these values into his warrior

persona through the traditions passed down by those before him, the heroes and

knights. While in the earlier example the man was attacked from behind a bush [*aus

einer Stauden*] with a firearm, now the hero is being laid low by a man physically and

socially inferior to him, the "Bub." Not brave enough to speak to the hero under normal

circumstances, the "Bub" is only emboldened by his power and safety behind the trigger.

The literary representations of firearms in the works of Grimmelshausen and

Moscherosch reprise these descriptions of the hero who is defeated by a socially,

morally, and physically inferior enemy with the help of gunpowder. In those works, the

"Roßbub" who dispatches the "Held" with a musket shot represents gunpowder's effect

on the narratives of war in nuce. The stories of heroes have given way to the stories of

the stable boy and the rogue in the age of the picaresque. Philander, Don Quixote, Simplicius, Courasche, and Springinsfeld step in when Maximilian I's *Weisskunig* is forced to leave by a new technology. In the context of the *Kriegsbuch*, such a message can be interpreted as both a neo-stoic lesson and a lament. Those who read the *Kriegsbuch* should be aware that their game of war may end in ignominy, but they should model heroic values despite such danger.

Fronsperger's idealization of ancient heroes and their heroic deeds can be understood as a didactic and aesthetic project. In the third volume of the *Kriegsbuch*, Fronsperger gathers a variety of texts that present more literary than tactical, technical, or procedural perspectives on war. Among the contents of the final volume of the *Kriegsbuch* are found a hundred pages of legal details, including the "peinliche Halsgericht" [capital penal code or *Constitutio Criminalis Carolina*] of Charles V, and several pages of repetitive details about military tribunals followed by doggerel renditions of the various military ranks "vom höchsten biß zu dem nidersten" [from highest to lowest].[271] Additional comments on ranks precede an extended compilation of historical examples and lessons on biblical, classical, and medieval warfare. Finally, several sections pertain to the war against the Ottoman Empire, including descriptions of the sultan's banquets and a sermon against the Turk by Martin Luther. Additional moral and historical ruminations punctuate spaces in between.

In contrast to the preceding two volumes, much of the third volume is dedicated to the cultural issues surrounding warfare, as they relate to history, religion, military and civilian crime, international politics, and social class. With an eye to the social and

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[271] Fronsperger, *Kriegsbuch*, 3: LXII_a: "Folgen allerley Bevelch unnd ämpter / von dem höchsten biß zu dem nidersten verzeichnet . . . in 20 Reimen / sampt seinen zugehörigen Figuren verfast und erklärt worden."

cultural impact of war, the third volume also identifies a different audience. Rather than just military men, he addresses "Allen Oberkeiten / Bevelchshabern / und Kriegßleuten hohes und niders Standts / Auch denen so zu schönen Historien lust haben" [All leaders, commanders, and warriors of upper and lower classes, as well as those who are interested in nice histories].[272] These multiple readers are also linked to the different ways in which the volume can be read. The "schönen Historien" [lovely/nice histories] appear to be different from the next line, "sehr nutzlich und nötig zu wissen" [very useful and necessary to know], which marks the book as a work of *Fachliteratur* rather than entertainment. Yet this distinction between "pleasure" and "education" can also be interpreted as an overarching aesthetic of the work itself, as it relates to the tradition of *prodesse et delectare*. Beautiful engravings by Jost Amman are found on most leaves of the book, even when they bear little or no relationship to the text. At other times, they instruct the reader in very technical ways. Thus, Fronsperger's *Kriegsbuch*, and particularly the third volume, appears as a work meant to entertain as well as to instruct. The histories that Fronsperger's *Kriegsbuch* presents in the third volume such as the "alte KriegßOrdnungen / Exempel / Sitten und gebräuche" [ancient war systems, *exempla*, *mores*, and uses],[273] the translation of Sextus Iulius Frontinus's *Strategemata* [*Kriegsanschläge*],[274] and reflections on Alexander, Charlemagne, and ancient Germanic

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[272] Fronsperger, *Kriegsbuch*, Vol. 3, Title page. Volume 2, on the other hand, is aimed at "Allen Kriegßverständigen / Auch Bauwmeistern / und andern Kunstliebenden" [To those who understand war, including building masters, and those who love the arts (of war or engineering)]. Volume 1 lacks such an explicit audience altogether, although the forward directs it toward both experienced and inexperienced soldiers.

[273] Fronsperger, *Kriegsbuch*, 3: CXCVII$_b$.

[274] Fronsperger, *Kriegsbuch*, 3: CCXXV$_a$; for further information on this translation see forthcoming, Patrick Brugh, "Frontinus's *Strategemata*: The Deployment of Translation in Sixteenth Century German War Treatises."

warrior women are historical examples intended to teach contemporaries how to behave and stories pleasant to read.

If we consider the tension between idealized models of a military past and the military actions of Fronsperger's present, it becomes clear that firearms, which had no precedent in the former, were going to cause a problem for the execution of the latter. As Fronsperger makes clear, there is no *acceptable* precedent for the use of firearms in war. The ethical conundrum created by gunpowder technology presents a moment of aesthetic dissonance that Fronsperger must resolve for the sake of his project. After all, he promises to teach useful things for the present with the help of (hi)stories from the past. From this perspective, the conflicts of morality, masculinity, and the aesthetics of war that he addresses explore the problems of gunpowder weapons while instructing soldiers to behave ethically despite the fact that their weapons seem to occupy a realm unregulated by ethics. Jost Amman's images combine with the "beauty" of the *Kriegsbuch*'s war stories and the usefulness of the book's contents to frame this work's aesthetic as guided by the tandem of both teaching and pleasing. The *Kriegsbuch*, according to this model, is meaningless without the ability to carry both aesthetic and ethical value, a task that gunpowder weapons make all the more difficult for him to execute.

Returning to the three motifs impacted by gunpowder weapons, morality, masculinity, and aesthetics, we find that each plays a role in Fronsperger's idealized past, as projected in the *Kriegsbuch*. First, the rhetorical comparison of firearms to a plague sent by God represents firearms as a form of penance to be suffered by humanity. Soldiers have no control over the plague, but they do have control over the direction in which it moves. As good Christians, soldiers must learn the values that help

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them to use firearms in moral—that is, Christian—ways. They are to turn them against the Turks rather than against fellow Christians. Second, the discussion of firearms as unmanly and thus dangerous to battlefield ethics, serves as an "Ermahnung" [exhortation] to soldiers to emulate heroic models of the past. They ought not to be the "Bub" hiding in a bush, but virtuous and manly soldiers who are both brave and open in their confrontations. Third, the aesthetic dilemma must be reconciled through a reassertion of the didactic value of past models and the moral potential of aesthetic representation, that is, through Horace's mixture of *prodesse et delectare*.

Fronsperger's paradigm turns out to be circular. The aesthetic representation of war provides the model for its perpetuation, even if the making of war is altered by technological innovation. We can read his work, especially in light of his anti-gunpowder rhetoric, as an attempt to create a foundational system of texts that resolves the aesthetic dissonance of gunpowder warfare. This aesthetic dissonance, the conflict of idealized narratives of the past with the realities of the present, is intertwined with issues of ethics, morality, and gender, because the aesthetic model of *prodesse et delectare* demands that beauty and education coalesce. The *Kriegsbuch* thereby justifies itself as a source of advice for how soldiers ought to behave and how wars ought to be fought in order to bridge the aesthetic and ethical gap opened by gunpowder technology. The key to avoiding the moral pitfalls of gunpowder warfare, according to Fronsperger's project, is the proper education of warriors from greatest to least.

Men of War; Men of Peace

Kriegsbücher taught readers both how to fight wars and how to justify them. In the sixteenth century, the violence conveyed by these books had to compete with an

increasingly radical and independent Christian consciousness borne out of the Protestant Reformation. A "coalition between Protestantism and print-capitalism" meant that the spread of print culture also brought about a freeing of the individual conscience.[275] "Thou shalt not kill" became a matter of personal rather than institutional interpretation. Writing his various versions of the *Kriegsbuch* between 1555 and 1575, Fronsperger clearly recognized the growing sense of personal responsibility, "darzu ist auch sonderlich einem Christen zu bedencken / daß Christenlichen ist gewalt zu leiden denn unbillich gewalt thun" [moreover a Christian is expected to consider that it is in the Christian's power to suffer violence rather than to inflict it].[276] Even Wallhausen, whose military career began after he killed a man and fled to the Netherlands, writes, "unnöthige Kriege und Blut vergiessen anzufangen hat Gott uns verbotten" [God has forbidden us to undertake unnecessary wars and bloodshed].[277] Killing, then, had to be reconciled with scriptural teachings in order to make it a morally acceptable act. Indeed, *Kriegsbücher* emerged in their mature form in the middle of the sixteenth century, some thirty years after Martin Luther, Sebastian Franck, and Erasmus had pondered the spiritual and moral status of the soldier, a trained killer.

We will consider Erasmus's and Luther's reflections on peace and war below, but first we will turn to discussions of peace and war inherited from the Middle Ages. In the introduction to a volume on the idea of peace in the Middle Ages, T.B. Lambert notes two words for "peace" that in the Middle Ages also denoted "protection": the Old English "gri∂" and the Latin "pax." To these, we might add the Middle High German

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[275] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (New York: Verso, 1991), 40.

[276] Fronsperger, *Kriegsbuch* (1573), LXXI_b

[277] Wallhausen, *Ritterkunst* (1616), 8.

words "vride" and "lantvride"[peace of the land][278] as Otto Brunner describes their social

and legal connotations in *Land and Lordship*. *Gri∂* and *pax* in England, *vride* and *pax* in

German lands, were nearly interchangeable, and they conveyed a clear message: "If

anyone then causes harm to the protectee, the protector is entitled, even obliged, to

impose some sort of penalty on the attacker."[279] Under these medieval concepts of peace,

the threat of punishment prevents unsanctioned violence. Putting it differently, Otto

Brunner ties medieval notions of peace to friendship:

> Doch ist der ursprüngliche Sinn des Wortes nicht wie heute
> wesentlich negativ, Ausschaltung der Feindschaft, sondern
> er hat eine aktive Bedeutung. Er schließt den Begriff des
> Schutzes in sich, der Sicherheit, die die Freunde einander
> gewähren, der Hilfe und des Beistandes, zu denen sie
> einander verpflichtet sind.[280]
>
> [Unlike today, when the term peace merely means the
> absence of enmity, the original meaning was far more
> active. It included the concept of protection, the security
> that friends provide each other, the help and support to
> which they are mutually bound.][281]

Brunner continues to explain that peace—in this sense—is linked to a notion of kinship

and family that is broader than our current ones. In medieval Germany, and well into

the sixteenth century after Maximilian's imperial invocation of the *Landfriede* (1495),

peace was woven into a constellation of legal and social concepts that included—besides

kinship and friendship—"Fehde" [feuds], "Feindschaft" [enmity], and "Friedlose"

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[278] Henceforth "Landfriede"(nhd.).

[279] T. B. Lambert, "Introduction: Some Approaches to Peace and Protection in the Middle Ages," in *Peace and Protection in the Middle Ages* (Toronto, Canada: Durham UP, 2009), 2.

[280] Otto Brunner, *Land und Herrschaft*, 4th ed. (Wien: Rudolf M. Rohrer Verlag, 1959), 21.

[281] Otto Brunner, *Land and Lordship: Structures of Governance in Medieval Austria*, trans. Howard Kaminsky and James Van Horn Melton (Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), 18.

[enemies of the peace, criminals].[282] Peace demarcated the interpersonal border between friends and enemies rather than a situational distinction between fighting and not fighting. The peace of friendship, which we see in the studies of Brunner and Lambert and which is echoed in the speeches of George H.W. Bush, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama, is also linked to the protective form of peace—*pax/grið/vride*—that threatens violence as a just response to violence. I call this form of peace "loaded peace."

In Brunner's and Lambert's examples, an absolute authority over moral claims to justice is bound to notions of sovereign authority. Feudal society was politically and morally organized from the top down. Only those who possessed moral authority could start wars, even small ones called *Fehde* [feuds].[283] Those people, therefore, could sanction and justify their acts of violence. It is not surprising, then, that war in medieval Europe was rarely viewed as a moral dilemma. At the most elite levels, it was not completely clear who possessed the moral authority over violence. The *Fehde*, long considered the right of German princes, broke the peace of the land, the *Landfriede*. Politically, the *Landfriede* of the fifteenth century, which was issued as imperial law by Maximilian I at Worms in 1495, brought the aristocratic right to violence into question.[284] Yet even with the term *Landfriede*, the issue was not whether violence would be used to punish violence, but whether the emperor had the ultimate authority over the perpetration of violence in the German lands. Maximilian I's contested invocation of the

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[282] Brunner, 20, 34.

[283] Brunner, 50-51: "Die bekannte Formel, das Recht zu Fehde stehe nur dem völlig wehrfähigen, im Mittelalter dem rittermäßigen Mann zu, Bürger und Bauer seien auf die Totschlagfehde, die Blutrache beschränkt, den gänzlich Wehrlose Klerikern, Kinder, Frauen, und Juden stehe kein Fehderecht zu kann im großen und ganzen als richtig bezeichnet werden."

[284] Thomas Brady, *German Histories in the Age of Reformations, 1400-1650* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009), 100; Brunner, 34.

Landfrieden can be read as an effort to centralize the sanctioning of violence by taking away the rights of minor princes to declare wars and *Fehde*.[285] Though it was sometimes unclear who did have authority over violence, it was always clear who did not possess moral authority. Under imperial law, the subaltern almost never had sanctioned recourse to violence without the legal advocacy of his lord.[286] While a knight could, even if illegally, protect his honor through *Absagen* [challenge], "der bäuerliche Absager wird ehrlos" [the peasant who challenged forfeited his honor].[287] Some peasant feuds and challenges did occur, and a handful of these were successfully and legally accomplished with noble support.[288] But for the most part, peasant challenges and feuds were viewed on the same level as other "unrechtfertigen Dingen wie Mord und Diebstahl, es ist unsühnbar" [like murder or theft, the peasant challenge was considered . . . *inexpiable*].[289]

Looking at one literary representation of war, we note that the subaltern's lack of access to sanctioned forms of violence is what makes Wittenwiler's *Der Ring* (1409/10) so absurd. It may also be why the tale ends so badly. A war between peasants, such as the one described in *Der Ring*, is destined to end catastrophically because of their lack of political autonomy, moral authority, and tactical training. Forbidden from exercising retribution through *Fehde* or *Absagen* [challenge], peasants were not empowered to enforce *justitia*, except in the case of *Blutrache* [blood feud].[290] In the Middle Ages,

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[285] Brady, 115ff, 232.

[286] Brunner, 73 [Trans. 63].

[287] Brunner, 68 [Trans. 58].

[288] Brunner, 69-73 [Trans. 59-63].

[289] Brunner, 65 [Trans. 56].

[290] Brunner, 50-51 [Trans. 44]. A blood feud was possible only in the case of murder.

discussions regarding justice were left to "those who pray" [*Lehrstand*] and "those who fight" [*Wehrstand*].[291] The absolute control of the aristocracy and Church over the thoughts and actions of the lay people and the restriction of learning to a select few meant that only a small number of people could speak out against the immorality of war. Those who made war were considered invested by God as the leaders of those in their care and under their moral authority. During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, which were rife with social, confessional, and intellectual turmoil, the absolute centrality of moral authority began to disperse.

It is intellectually dishonest and anachronistic to suggest a continuous narrative of "loaded peace" from the Middle Ages to Barack Obama. The landscape of political and moral thinking on war has been affected by countervailing attitudes toward *pax*/*grið*/*vride* concepts of peace, most influential among them were those of Thomas Hobbes in the seventeenth century and Immanuel Kant in the eighteenth century.[292] The sixteenth century also provides examples of radical pacifist thinking that exposed a circularity in the *pax*/*grið*/*vride* system. For example, Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam conceptualized peace in productive rather than dialectical terms. Between 1510 and 1530, three different pacifist works appeared under his name. Two of them addressed peace exclusively: *Querela pacis* [*Complaint of Peace*] and *Dulce bellum inexpertis* [*Against War*]. Each of these tracts handles similar themes and attempts to reveal the ungodliness

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[291] Brunner makes an attempt to elucidate the subaltern's sense of justice in medieval Austria. He notes that, when peasants did submit challenges [*Absagen*], they seemed to be sincere efforts to pursue noble courses of retribution such as the *Fehde*. That peasants were, for the most part, forbidden from pursuing this form of justice does not mean that they did not have thoughts about what justice meant but that their opinions about justice were often legally suppressed or ignored altogether.

[292] Cf. Stephanie Schwarzer, *Zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit: Die Ästhetisierung kriegerischer Ereignisse in der Frühen Neuzeit* (München: Martin Meidenbauer, 2006), 101ff.

of human warfare and the justifications of loaded peace. In particular, Erasmus focuses

on the "unnatural" way in which humans fight one another. Unlike animals, who only

fight with the weapons God gave them, humans invent countless machines of

destruction, "Allen andern thiern hat [die Natur] ir wör und wapen und behelff gegeben

/ sich damit zuo schützen und zuo retten. Allein den menschen hat sie wörloß od

unbewapnet und schwach geschafft" [Nature has bestowed all other animals with the

defenses and weapons that they need, in order to protect and save themselves. Only the

human did she craft without armor, unarmed and weak].[293] His logic is not always

consistent. Erasmus's pacifist messages are sometimes contradictory when he employs

animal analogies. In other portions of these texts, he claims that there is peace among the

animals, whereas this quotation suggests that they fight, but only with the weapons God

gave them.

Erasmus's conception of peace as productive, however, does remain consistent.

Pertinent to the notions of peace highlighted here, the *Querela pacis* addresses humans

from the perspective of Peace, personified. Erasmus's ventriloquism allows Peace to

define *herself*, "ich frid / der durch die stymm und red der heiligen und menschen

gebreyßt und gelobt ist / bin ein brunt / mutter / ernererin / mererin / und

beschützerin aller guotten ding / die antweders der hymel oder aber das erdtrich in im

hat" [I, Peace, who has been praised and proclaimed in the voices and speeches of saints

and men, am a lover, a mother, a caretaker, a producer, and protector of all good things,

which heaven and earth hold].[294] Here, Peace is markedly different from *grið*, *pax*, or the

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[293] Erasmus, *Clage des Frids* (Straßburg: Schurer, 1522), trans. Georg Spalatinus, Biii$_c$; Erasmus, *Querela pacis* (1517) [Trans. mine.]

[294] Erasmus, *Clage des Frids* (Straßburg: Schurer, 1522), trans. Georg Spalatinus, Bi$_b$; Erasmus, *Querela pacis* (1517) [Trans. mine.]

Landfried of the Middle Ages. Erasmus's peace is developmental and nurturing rather than "loaded" or violent.[295] The authority of the mother, who cares for her children and gives them what they need—"ernererin" [one who provides nutrition, caretaker]—is invoked in place of patriarchal authority, which threatens violence if peace is broken. Indeed, Erasmus connects this motherly Peace to the care of babies after birth, "ein mensch verdürb so bald er geborn würd / und verlür dz leben im yngang des lebens / wann nicht freüntlich handtreichung einer Hebammen oder weemuotter" [a human must perish as soon as it is born, and lose its life just as it comes into it, if not for the friendly embrace of a midwife or wet-nurse].[296] Peace is not the threat of war but the calm pursuit of commerce; in the idiom of Erasmus's German translator, Georg Spalatinus, in 1520, Peace is a "mererin" [multiplier, producer].[297]

Martin Luther, friend of Georg Spalatinus and critic of Erasmus, had a great deal to say about war and peace, but not with the radical pacifism of Erasmus. Luther's thirst for peace was tempered by an insistence that violence be used in defense when necessary, especially against the Turks. Yet he is wary of linking the war against the Ottoman Turks with any kind of Christian duty. In his sermon "Von Krieg wider den Türcken," for example, Luther begins not with a polemic but an exegesis: Christ "sey darumb kommen / daß er die Welt selig macht / nicht daß er die Leut tödte" [has come

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[295] Christy McCrory described Erasmus's peace as a "developmental" peace.

[296] Erasmus, *Clage des Frids* (Straßburg: Schurer, 1522), Biii_c; *Querela pacis* (1517) [Trans. mine.]: Note on translation: "Hebamme" and "weemuotter" are both, literally, "midwives." Betty Radice ("Querela pacis," *Collected Works of Erasmus*, Vol. 27: 295) translates the Latin into English as "midwife" and "nurse." I have chosen to avoid repetition in my translation of Spalatinus's German.

[297] It is worth noting the feminine ending on the German word "mererin" used by Spalatinus.

in order to bless the world, not so that he could kill people].[298] Although Luther

eventually agrees that, for political and social reasons, the Turk must be defeated, he

rejects any claims that the war against the Turk is a "Christian" war. From his

perspective, it is not the duty of the Church to fight the Turk, since the only Holy War is

one waged against Satan. "The Devil," Luther claims, "will not be defeated with guns,

but with love."[299]

Concerning war, the separation of church and state lends itself to dual notions of

peace. If we understand Luther correctly, Erasmus's notion of peace remains outside of

political necessity. Luther's sermon allows for war to intervene in times of political need

while maintaining the primacy of Christian peace as theorized in the writings of

Erasmus. Luther's resistance to the labeling of the Turkish wars as "Christian" came from

his interpretation of the New Testament and his distrust of worldly authorities

adjudicating religious claims. In the sixteenth century, the Catholic Church lost

significant influence over the everyday lives of many people and a number of German

princes. Yet, turning Protestant, German statesmen and princes now had to measure

their actions by Scripture. The Bible and its messages had become more accessible to lay

people, owing to Luther's German translation of the Bible in 1534 (New Testament in

1522). Theoretical conceptions of peace developed beyond *pax/grið/vride*, which

resulted in a conflict between two distinct conceptions peace: loaded peace, on the one

hand, and developmental peace, on the other.

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[298] Luther, "Vom Krieg wider den Türcken," in Fronsperger *Kriegsbuch* (1573), 3:CCCXXX$_b$.

[299] Luther, "Vom Krieg wider den Türcken," in Fronsperger *Kriegsbuch* (1573), 3:CCCXXXII$_a$: "Den Teufel wird nicht von Büchsen niederlegt sondern von Liebe."

Still, the Turkish threat to peace was on everyone's minds. The Turkish army was encroaching quickly on German territory and defeating imperial forces more often than not. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, an overwhelming fear of the Turks gripped the Holy Roman Empire.[300] As Thomas Brady explains in *German Histories in the Age of Reformations*, this terror was perpetuated—to some degree—by ubiquitous images of Muslims engaged in horrifying acts of violence against Christians and by news of the perennial conflicts between the Holy Roman Empire and the Ottoman Turks in the borderlands of the *Reich*. One of the four common themes in images of Turks composed after 1526 in German lands, imagines the Turk as a wicked foe, "a tyrant who cruelly misused, enslaved, or slaughtered his Christian captives."[301] A number of such images, created by Jost Amman, can be found in Fronsperger's *Kriegsbuch*. One in particular shows Ottomans leading Christians into slavery while a village burns in the background. In the foreground of the image, an infant is impaled on a spike (a common motif).

This fear was not unfounded. The Ottoman army, under the leadership of Suleiman, had pushed its way through Hungary to the gates of Vienna, where it laid siege to the capital of the Holy Roman Empire in 1529. This "close call" sparked nearly two hundred years of European anxiety that found its way into *Kriegsbücher* in numerous forms—visual images, sermons, political and tactical considerations—many of them referencing gunpowder. Luther, who after a long exposition finally concluded that the souls of soldiers fighting against the Turks were protected, was writing in the wake of this international turmoil. Erasmus took a different position. In *Querela pacis*, he

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[300] Brady, 353.

[301] Brady, 355.

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writes, "dise so unchristliche gethat verschönen und bedecken sie mit einem Christlichen Titel" [they defend this un-Christian action and cover it up with a Christian moniker].[302] Still, and despite his pacifism, the Turks are outsiders for Erasmus; they are disruptors rather than makers of peace, which for him is a distinctly Christian concept. Indeed, his personification of Peace chastises the princes who enter into treaties with Turks but fight other Christians.[303] Erasmus cautions that it is better to fight against Turks than against Christians, but even here he refuses to extend complete support to the imperial line, perhaps because his international travels had made him deaf to imperial patriotic rhetoric.

For early modern people in the Holy Roman Empire, though, any hope for peace had to come from the defeat of what appeared to be an unstoppable, non-Christian force. With an eye toward the Turkish threat, the loaded-peace argument is found in many of these war treatises and *Kriegsbücher*. Vanquishing the Turk is depicted as the only pathway to peace. The persistence of the loaded-peace argument is captured in this historical moment. Threatened by internal pressures for a different conceptualization of peace among Christians, the loaded-peace argument turned to an external threat to continue justifying war. Largely due to the writings of Luther, Erasmus's "Peace" lost authority. She was relegated to the utopian fantasies of a Christian world free of external pressures and coded as a fanciful dream. As the Middle Ages evolved into the early-modern period through a series of religious reformations, the idea of *pax/grið/vride* faced new challenges at home but capitalized on extra-European threats to maintain its relevance. Radical pacifism was made possible by the distribution of vernacular

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[302] Erasmus, *Clage des Frids*, Eiii$_c$.

[303] Erasmus, *Clage des Frids*, Eiii$_a$.

translations of Scripture and the spread of humanism throughout Europe. Loaded

peace, however, especially when invoking the Turkish threat, presented a powerful

counterargument to pacifism. War treatises had to justify not only individual wars, but

their own bellicosity. The man of war, now increasingly accountable for his actions on

the basis of Scripture, had to be a man of peace, if he was to fight justly.[304]

Fronsperger's disdain for gunpowder weapons and his condemnation of them as

a scourge of God makes him an outlier among his colleagues. Few among the writers of

military treatises seem to share his moral concerns. Yet there are viable links between

neutral depictions of gunpowder weapons and Fronsperger's negative assessments.

What connects all German military treatises is a need to justify warfare as a human

activity and to justify the *Kriegsbuch* or *Kriegstraktat* itself. On the basis of circular logic,

warfare is posed as an inescapable and necessary evil. One example is the distinction

between "our side" and "their side," which identifies "our side" by processes of linguistic,

religious, and cultural exclusion.[305] Books of war are written in order to make sure that

the right side—"our side"—wins. In his dedication to *Kriegskunst zu Pferd* (1616),

Wallhausen makes the our-side/their-side distinction an integral part of his loaded-

peace statement, "Der außländische Feind / . . . durch was mittel halten wir ihn auß

unsern Grenzen? Allein durch wolerfahrend Kriegsleut und schrecken der Waffen" [The

foreign enemy, . . . by what means do we keep him out of our borders? Only through the

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[304] There is still a great deal to do here. In particular, additional paragraphs could approach this issue by looking at Fronsperger's engagement of Erasmus's pacifist writings.

[305] Geoffrey Baldwin, "The Translation of Political Theory in Early Modern Europe," In: *Cultural Translation in Early Modern Europe*, Ed. Peter Burke and R. Hsia (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007), 103.

well-trained army and the fear of weapons].[306] By posing scenario of a vague, but

probably Turkish, external threat, Wallhausen rallies his reader to an equally vague

uniform identity, which can be conceived by each reader. Since Wallhausen's texts

appeared in several languages, German, Imperial, French, Christian, or even European

identities could be supposed as the imagined construction of contemporary readers. The

Kriegsbuch, which leads to the better training of troops, is a tool of warfare that assures

peace at home by externalizing the threat. One way to look at such justifications is

through the nation-building rhetoric of exclusion and inclusion though a less

complicated view might read these works as simply justifying their own existence.

Fronsperger's simultaneous condemnation of and apology for gunpowder

weapons is linked to the same self-sustaining rhetoric: gunpowder is a plague that must

be controlled. He writes in defense of his project,

> Unnd so ich nun jetzt von solchem greuwlichen Geschütz
> zuschreiben fürhab / so wirdt villeicht diese mein arbeit
> von vielen getadelt werden / also / ob ich der sey /
> welcher diß greuwlich werck (das billicher solt
> undergedrückt und außgetilgt werden) erst recht an tag
> bringen wolt. Dar wider gib ich zweierley antwort /
> erstlich / das die geschwindigkeit zuschiessen also
> offenbar / das schier kein geschindere rüstung mehr
> erdacht werden mag. Zum andern / kan mennigklich
> darmit umbgehen / das nicht wol möglich / solches weil
> die Welt stehet / auß der gedechtnuß der Menschen
> zureissen.[307]

> [And since I intend to write about this horrible firearm, my
> work will probably be mocked by many, as if I were the
> one who first invented this heinous thing (which should be
> outlawed and exterminated). To those I provide two
> answers: First, that the knowledge of shooting is so
> widespread, that no more horrible weapon can possibly be

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[306] J.J. Wallhausen, *Kriegskunst zu Pferd* (1616), Dedication, unpag.

[307] Fronsperger, *Kriegsbuch*, 1:CLXXIII_a.

conceived; Second, so many people use it, that is is
unlikely that—so long as the world exists—it can be
excised from the minds of men.]

His answers to those who would "censure" or "disparage" him for his books are the
widespread knowledge of gunpowder technology and the inability of humanity to ever
let it go. With such a technology widely available, his *Kriegsbuch* presents a model for
tempering its moral, gendered, and aesthetic dangers. The "exempel oder beyspiel"
[*exemplum* or example], as he presents it to his reader, provides the key component of
long-term military success with gunpowder technology. Marcus Tacius (ca. 1500-1567),
whose translation of Frontinus's *Stratagemata* is included in the third volume of the
Kriegsbuch, makes the connection between moral education and military strenght even
clearer. He writes, "weil ich . . . meine Bücher / ein Türckensteuwer zugeben
angegrieffen / und . . . Frontinum / vom Latein zu Teutsch verändert / damit alle
Hauptleut / geschickte und ungeschickte / . . . / zu aller not gehaben mögen" [because I
have reached for my books to pay my *Turk Tax*, and translated Frontinus from Latin to
German, so that all officers, both new and experienced, can have it whenever they need
it].[308] Loaded peace, re-outfitted for gunpowder warfare, is not only a matter of better
weapons in the age of gunpowder warfare but of better knowledge, too. And this
knowledge offers the ability to reconcile old models with new technologies.

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[308] Tacius, "Kriegsanschläge," in Fronsperger *Kriegsbuch* (1573), 3:CCXXVIₐ.

Chapter 3
Gustav Adolf's Gunpowder Demise: The Early Modern German Military Broadsheet
(1630-1632)

"A prince should assume personal command and captain his troops by himself."
—Niccolò Machiavelli[309]

"The dangers of attending great affairs of state fall sometimes upon those who undertake them, sometimes upon the state. . . . It is our duty, then, to be more ready to endanger our own than the public welfare and to hazard honor and glory more readily than other advantages."

—Cicero[310]

The German term "Flugblatt" has been in circulation since the fifteenth century.

Early efforts by Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) and Joachim Heinrich Campe

(1746-1818) to establish the etymology of the term operated under the assumption that

the *Flugblatt*—or broadsheet, in English—was intended as a medium of speed.[311] Thus,

they surmised that the *Flugblatt* was "ein fliegendes Blatt" [a flying sheet] because broad

dispersal and quick consumption were its chief assets as a medium.[312] Yet the *Flugblatt*

was not the only print news medium of the early modern period; nor was it the most

widely read. *Flugschriften* [pamphlets, often polemical in nature], *Relationes* or *Avisen*

[news items], and *Neue Zeitungen* [news papers] were also commonplace in the early

modern print media landscape, and each of these genres had its own conventions. To

distinguish them from these other media, scholars also often term *Flugblätter*

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[309] Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*, trans. George Bull (New York: Penguin Books, 1999), 40.

[310] Cicero, *De Officiis*, trans. Walter Miller (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2001), 85.

[311] Wolfgang Harms, "Historische Kontextualisierungen des illustrierten Flugblatts," in *Das illustrierte Flugblatt der Frühen Neuzeit* (Stuttgart: Hirzel Verlag, 2008), 24.

[312] Harms, "Historische Kontextualisierungen des illustrierten Flugblatts," 24.

"Einblattdrucke" [one-sheet prints] because they are typically printed on a single sheet of paper.[313] In a number of cases, breaking news sold in *Flugblatt* form used the titles "Relation" or "Aviso" to express the newness of their contents. The *Flugblatt*, however, in comparison to the *Flugschrift*, almost always contains both an image and text. They were typically sold as single sheets, either by the printers themselves or by *Kolporteure* [peddlers] in city centers and around the countryside.[314]

Scholars of early modern German broadsheets, even scholars of political broadsheets such as Paas, Schilling, and Harms, have generally avoided the questions of military tactics or the history of battles, preferring to analyze broadsheet depictions of the political and social impact of war. Still, their scholarship sheds light on an important fact regarding *Flugblätter* (henceforth primarily referred to as broadsheets): they were distributed, consumed, and collected in a variety of ways.[315] They were read aloud by peddlers to increase their sales;[316] they were read in private by women and men of various classes;[317] they were collected and categorized for private purposes;[318] and they

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[313] To avoid getting bogged down in terminology here, it is also common to find *Relationes* and *Avisen* (which appeared periodically) that are printed on single sheets and, thus, also qualify as "Einblattdrucke." The relationship between these two nearly interchangable genres and the *Flugblatt* differed from historical circumstance to circumstance. Often, however, there is overlap between the texts of *Avisen/Relationes* and *Flugblätter*.

[314] Michael Schilling, "Flugblatt und Drama in der frühen Neuzeit," *Daphnis* 37:1/2 (2008), 261.

[315] See especially, Schilling/Harms, *Das illustrierte Flugblatt* (2008).

[316] Schilling, "Flugblatt und Drama in der frühen Neuzeit," 261; Brednich, *Liedpublizistik*, 285ff (Anm. 15, S. 25 in Harms/Schilling); Harms, "Historische Kontextualisierungen," 25.

[317] Harms, "Historische Kontextualisierungen des illustrierten Flugblatts, 24"; Kathleen Smith, "Curating the Collector: Exploring Representations of Early Modern German Women Book Collectors (1650-1780)" (PhD Diss., University of Illinois Champaign Urbana, 2012), 223.

were collected and summarized for redistribution by novelists and chroniclers.[319] The

diversity of audience does not mean, however, that they were universally consumed or

that the public universally comprehended them.[320] Diverse readers of diverse

educational backgrounds approached these broadsheets differently. Many might

understand an image, but only in a superficial way; others might interpret both the text

and image more deeply; still others might have heard them read aloud or glanced at

them in public places.

Through their various formats broadsheets also fulfilled multiple roles for

printers. As Harms explains, the layout of broadsheets was just as diverse as the

readership and was used to convey different topoi.[321] A glance at broadsheet

publications covering the defeat of the Imperial commander Johan Tserklaes von Tilly

by the Swedish king and Protestant commander Gustav Adolf at Breitenfeld in 1631, for

instance, reveals the great diversity of *Flugblatt* and *Einblattdruck* formats. Of the

Breitenfeld broadsheets analyzed in this chapter, two contain only battlefield scenes and

a small heading; one contains a heading, an image of the battlefield *in media res*, a prose

narrative of the battle, and a legend for the image; and a final broadsheet satirizes the

event with an allegorical image and derisive verse. Even beyond these three broadsheet

sub-genres (image only, news report with image, and satirical commentary), other

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[318] Helga Meise, "Medienkonsum oder Wissensdispositif: Zur Stellung von Flugblättern und Flugschriften in Marcus zum Lamms Thesaurus picturarum (1564-1606)," *Daphnis* 37:1/2 (2008), 153-177.

[319] Gerhild Scholz Williams, *Ways of Knowing in Early Modern Germany: Johannes Praetorius as a Witness to his Time* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006), 8-13; Gerhild Scholz Williams, "A Novel Form of News," *Daphnis* 37:3/4 (2008), 523-545.

[320] Burke, *What is Cultural History?*, 20.

[321] Harms, "Historische Kontextualisierungen des illustrierten Flugblatts," 23.

broadsheet combinations of text and image (including songs, plays, true crime reports, and prognostications) accompany virtually every major political event of the sixteenth and seventeenth century.[322]

The material nature and artistic quality of images and texts found in broadsheets also varied. Some contain images based on cheap woodcuts while others are based on masterful and complex engravings from metal plates. Even the paper quality, as anyone knows who has handled broadsheets in person, differs greatly from one to the next. Likewise, the texts of broadsheets range from nothing more than a title and an alphanumeric legend, to simple doggerel or sparse prose, to carefully crafted rhetoric and verse. The most celebrated *literati* of the German lands composed many of these texts; semiliterate tradesmen eked out others. Many broadsheets combine texts and images that were not intended to go together. Two of the broadsheets considered in this chapter are composed of several pieces of paper pasted together in more-or-less organized ways. The texts of numerous broadsheets do not reference the affixed image(s) at all. Moreover, battle scene images labeled with numbers and letters often lack a legend that explains what those alphanumeric ciphers are meant to indicate. Such broadsheets pose an analytical dilemma since they are neither complete nor coherent texts, in the broadest sense of the term.

Because of the number of broadsheets and the variety of ways in which image and text are rearranged or revised from printer to printer, it is not always clear what the "ur"-text or "ur"-image of a certain set of broadsheets may have been. John Roger Paas has diligently collected and categorized thousands of broadsheets and compared many

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[322] Cf. Wolfgang Harms and Michael Schilling, *Deutsche illustrierte Flugblätter des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts: Die Sammlung der Herzog August Bibliothek*, 2nd Edt., Vol. II: Historica (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1997). Henceforth "Harms, DiF II, page" in footnotes.

of them with one another. But even in his collection we find some gaps that only become

visible when one digs very deeply into a specific subset. This chapter analyzes only a

fraction of the military broadsheets found in Paas's collection, and it thus adds a depth

of analysis to those broadsheets that Paas could not include in his opus. But we must

also limit the scope of materials for the sake of this analysis; therefore, we can only hope

to scratch the surface of the number of functions gunpowder serves in military

broadsheets. Despite such limitations, we are still able to analyze a large number of

broadsheets, nearly fifty.[323] The list of military broadsheets analyzed in this chapter can

be reduced to those covering the battles of Breitenfeld (1631), Rain am Lech (1632), and

Lützen (1632), in addition to references to a handful of other examples.

Black Powder, Smoke, Lead

Black powder does not explode. It deflagrates. It burns upon ignition,

propagating a spray of molten salts between its grains, and it releases gas in the form of

smoke. Packed behind a cannon or musket ball, deflagrating black powder fills the

chamber with gas and propels the shot out of the barrel at a high velocity. As the shot

exits the firearm, the built up smoke puffs from mouth of the barrel. In the interest of

narrating and illustrating war stories, early modern writers and artists needed to

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[323] Table 1 in the Appendix can be used to navigate the complex relationships between these broadsheets.In Table 1, these have each been assigned a different alpha-numeric cipher to distinguish between different versions of similar broadsheets. They are B_n for Breitenfeld, R_n for Rain am Lech, and L_n for Lützen, where 'n' denotes the specific version of the broadsheet reporting on the battle. This chapter will reference these tables only in order to aid the reader in distinguishing between similar but slightly different broadsheets, a task that would otherwise take months of studying individual broadsheets. The tables also provide references to various electronic and print reproductions of these broadsheets in order to make locating and accessing the original versions less onerous.

transform these technical and chemical processes, which took place relatively quickly, into written descriptions and visual images. A news medium that reported on battles and military engagements during the early modern period, the military broadsheet combined text and image for the edification of a news-hungry public. In the process, this medium needed to respond to the complex visual and narrative differences of gunpowder warfare in order to make news reports of battle comprehensible to a broad readership. Each of these forms of representation—text and image—had limitations and advantages, as well as conventions, for describing gunpowder warfare. This chapter will examine gunpowder as both an object of representation and a metonymic symbol in the medium of the military broadsheet during Gustav Adolf's campaign in German lands between 1630 and 1632.

The previous chapters have shown that gunpowder technology did not change the face of warfare overnight, tactically or culturally. Instead, the military history of gunpowder technology is marked by two hundred of years of tactical and technological innovation that was not always successful. Between 1330 and 1525 in Europe, gunpowder weapons did not always provide clear tactical advantages or decisive capabilities, and innovations in gunpowder technology did not always function optimally. In early modern culture the literary representation of gunpowder was not immediately met with either praise or resistance. Although later generations of writers in German-speaking lands would often demonize it, the earliest literary reactions to gunpowder such as Konrad Kyeser's *Bellifortis* stress its novel and mysterious qualities rather than the technical details and moral dangers of its use. By 1410, Heinrich Wittenwiler had recognized that gunpowder was a crucial component of warfare. Just

over a century later, Erasmus, Ariosto, and a host of other writers were condemning the invention entirely.

There is certainly an abundance of negative reactions to gunpowder technology. They are easy to locate because their complaints deviate very little from one another. Gunpowder is often castigated as a tool of Satan; a sign of the end of times; or an affront to bravery, nobility, and manly virtue.[324] But many representations of gunpowder weapons between 1300 and 1700 were neutral or ambivalent, suggesting that gunpowder technology did not represent a universal ontological social crisis. Attitudes toward gunpowder technology in *Kriegsbücher*, for example, are mostly non-negative. Indeed, the previous chapter traces and explains the prevalence of negative attitudes toward gunpowder in Fronsperger's *Kriegsbuch* (1573). But Fronsperger was an exception rather than the rule. Even the underlying reasons for Fronsperger's concerns about the "new" and "horrible" gunpowder weapons were questionable. For all of his grumbling about how bad they are, Fronsperger spills a lot of ink on the effective use gunpowder weapons. One way to explain his contradictory reactions to gunpowder is to analyze the formal qualities and historical context of the *Kriegsbuch*. As I argue above, this contradiction is part of a long-standing circular argument that simultaneously condemns and justifies war—loaded peace. It is found in virtually every German *Kriegsbuch* written between 1550 and 1620.

For other *Kriegsbuch* authors such as Solms, Wallhausen, and Dilich, who made loaded-peace arguments without demonizing gunpowder technology, firearms and cannons represent an essential part of the military toolbox. As tools of war, they required a mastery, which these books make accessible to their readers. Yet, despite

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[324] Cf. Chapter 2.

being considered and valued as tools, gunpowder weapons were also woven into the fabric of aesthetic representation in *Kriegsbücher* on several different levels. First, they were given names that symbolized their tactical uses and visual attributes. Some of these names, like "Schlangen, Falken, Falkenette," [Snakes, Falcons, and Falconettes], draw comparisons to violent animals and elevate them to physical embodiments of natural metaphors. Second, cannons became objects of design and thus were decorated—in *Kriegsbuch* illustrations and on the battlefield—with markings that served no technical purpose. Third, gunpowder weapons were used in narrative images that tell didactic stories in *Kriegsbücher*. These images depicted hypothetical battle scenarios or historical situations, which were meant to school both novice and veteran warriors in battle tactics, military nomenclature, and military history. Each of these representations of gunpowder weapons as military tools found in *Kriegsbücher* was translated into the sub-genre of military broadsheets, especially when they were describing battles. Here, they are referred to as "narrative military broadsheets" or "battle reports," which are distinct from allegorical military broadsheets, a sub-genre we will also explore below. In this chapter we will trace the number of ways in which these military broadsheets represented and deployed gunpowder weapons as supple symbols and narrative devices. Examining these representations, we will consider not only the distinctions between broadsheets and other genres of military literature in early modern Germany, but also consider their implications for contemporary readings of multimedia texts.

Breitenfeld, 1631: Gunpowder Warfare and Visual Narrative

Generally, broadsheets employ a combination of text and image to guide the reader's understanding of an event. In the case of narrative military broadsheets, battle

reports, text and image work together to guide the reader through the conflict. They narrate the story of the battle. If separated, text and image become disabled to some degree. The image alone carries limited narrative weight though it does make more vivid the textual recollection of the battle. Images are limited in their ability to narrate the progression of time without the help of additional images or the explanation of a text. Text alone, on the other hand, cannot narrate multiple scenes simultaneously without breaking narrative flow. The history of printing and the circulation of print materials demonstrate that image and text were often separated from one another. One broadsheet at the Herzog August Bibliothek, L_4 in Table 1, has even been pasted together from two different broadsheets. Whether this was done for personal consumption or commercial distribution remains unclear because we have only a single example. Moreover, printers often copied images from other broadsheets and combined them with their own text. Although some research has made a case for the hypertextual reading of broadsheets (that is, the non-linear consumption of early modern broadsheets' texts and images) the narrative impact of a broadsheet's text, image notwithstanding, is limited by the technology of print media and, therefore, tends to narrate in very linear ways.

Before we can consider military broadsheets for their macroscopic aspects, however, we must explore some of the formal functions found in military broadsheets, in particular as they relate to firearms. "Functions" as defined by Vladimir Propp are "stable constant elements in a [text], independent of how and by whom they are fulfilled."[325] In this examination, functions of gunpowder in images such as "shoulder

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[325] Vladimir Propp, *Morphology of the Folktale* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005), 21.

arms discharging," "cannons discharging," or "explosion" will be considered as important and meaningful elements that we can recognize through the close reading of military broadsheets. Functions in written texts, such as "artillery captured," "indices," or "fallen officers listed," will be likewise understood as important and meaningful elements of the text that either do or do not act in tandem with the image. In this section, we will investigate three forms of military broadsheets through a case study of the Battle of Breitenfeld (September 1631). First, we will look at images by themselves by considering two illustrations from the battle of Breitenfeld that lack text altogether. Second, we will consider a broadsheet that presents both the illustration of the battle as well as a narrative text (which was created as an explanation of the image). Finally, we will look at a satirical literary representation of the battle that combines facets of the battlefield background with an allegorical foreground.

Among the holdings of the Herzog August Bibliothek in Wolfenbüttel, Germany, there are two single sheet prints of the Battle of Breitenfeld that contain only a title and an image.[326] These two examples provide a case study for the use of visual cues based on gunpowder weapons in the purely pictorial narration of battle. When they are compared to one another, it becomes apparent from their consistent artistic style, composition, and markings that the same artist conceived them as a pair.[327] First we will analyze them separately and then compare them to each other. Broadsheet Einbl. Xb 4° 221, henceforth

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[326] I will refer to these two images by their HAB call numbers, Einbl. Xb 4° 221 (B_4 in Table 1) and and Einbl. Xb 4° 220 (B_3 in Table 1).

[327] Though I have not yet confirmed this, these images may be the same as those reproduced by Paas P-1854 (B_8 in Table 1) and P-1855 (B_9 in Table 1). Paas does not indicate that this is the case, and no electronic versions of 220 or 221 exist. However, based on my research notes, they are extremely similar in terms of style and composition. They are also very similar to the two Matthäus Merian illustrations of Breitenfeld, but were not made by him.

referred to as "221," shows a formation of soldiers in lines that are separated across the battlefield from one another. Alluding to the support of a legend, numbers mark units on the battlefield, but no such legend exists in or around the image. Only the title tells us who is fighting: Swedish and Saxon forces against Tilly's Imperial army. The arrangement of the armies helps to differentiate the opposing sides from one another, but without the aid of a legend or prior knowledge of the battle it is impossible to distinguish the armies from one another. Individual units, even at the level of the soldier on the edges of the units, are depicted in detail. Cavalry units, groups of mounted horsemen, are visually distinct from infantry and artillery. The battle line runs horizontally through the image. The observer gets a bird's eye view from behind the armies at the bottom of the image. From this perspective, the battlefield is neatly and clearly stretched out before the viewer. The soldiers are not yet engaged in personal combat, which suggests that this is the start of the battle. Only a handful of gunpowder weapons are firing; some are muskets and some are artillery pieces. Small puffs of smoke emerging from the weapons signal that they have been discharged, but the smoke does not obscure the view. Only the army at the bottom of the image, however, is firing weapons. The army at the top of the image remains silent. The frame around the image is undisturbed by ornamentation or text.

Broadsheet Einbl. Xb 4° 220 (henceforth "220"), on the other hand, depicts a heated engagement between two armies. We know that the battle is well underway, even without the help of 221, because smoke obscures much of the fighting. Smoke from discharging firearms creates a thick line between the two armies, but the exact battle lines are no longer distinct. Units from each army penetrate the other's lines in hot conflict. Cavalry and infantry engage each other. Although the army at the top of the

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image shows infantry soldiers deep within the enemy's battle lines, soldiers at the top of the image are retreating from the battle. Cavalry units from the bottom army are driving the cavalry of the top army's right flank into flight, while mixed infantry units fire into the cavalry. On the right hand side of the image, cavalry units from both armies are engaged at right angles. Meanwhile, near the right angle formed by the flanking cavalry, infantry units face each other while the bottom army's artillery fires into the top army's infantry lines. In the bottom left corner, the infantry units from the top army have moved deep behind the lines, engaging the mixed infantry and cavalry units from the bottom army. The infantry units establish this battle line, but cavalry units from the bottom army are supporting the infantry and holding the line between each infantry. The sides of the engagement are relatively easy to discern once the mix of battle lines is distinguished. The frame does not contain a legend although the units in the image are numbered. At the bottom left hand corner we see an array of weapons, allegories of combat.

When understood as a representation of the Battle of Breitenfeld and when paired with a written description of the battle, these two images become more comprehensible. Image 221 depicts the opening positions of the armies at Breitenfeld, a battle that the Swedish army, supported by Saxon cavalry, dominated. Firing weapons in a show of strength, the Swedish army is at the bottom of the image. The top army (the Imperial Army led by General Tilly) stands quietly, about to be defeated. Image 220 depicts the battle at its most dramatic crescendo. Although Tilly's army penetrated deep into the Swedish line after driving off the Saxon units on the Swedish left wing, Tilly's troops were stranded without support and annihilated by the Swedish forces under Field Marshall Gustav Horn (1592-1657). On the right hand side, the Swedish cavalry—

set at a right angle to the main battle line and led by Gustav Adolf and Johan Banér (1596-1641)—had engaged the Imperial cavalry under Count Pappenheim (1594-1632) throughout the battle. When the two images of the battle are viewed next to each other, the event becomes easier to comprehend since the numbered units remain the same in both images. By following the numbers, one can track the movement of different groups of soldiers across the battlefield. Moreover, in the second image, shadows on the ground behind the clashing soldiers show where they were originally standing. Several of the numbers present in the first image are missing in the second image because those units were destroyed during the battle. Some injured and dying soldiers can be seen strewn about the battlefield, but the bodies of fallen soldiers do not distract from or obscure the engagement.

Gunpowder provides a multifaceted narrative device for this story. In the individual pictures, gunpowder distinguishes between sides and demarcates the battle lines. In the first image, these lines are neatly arranged, and therefore require fewer gunpowder puffs as visual cues. In the second image, gunpowder smoke obscures much of the battle and contributes a sense of chaos, but it also shows where the armies are fighting one another. Moreover, in the second image, gunpowder smoke highlights parts of the battlefield that need to be distinguished. Although the historical battlefield was, most likely, covered with smoke even when guns were not firing, the sections of the second image clear of gunpowder smoke allow the viewer to see how the soldiers moved around the battlefield. In both images, gunpowder also signals that the Swedish army was the clear victor since the Swedish cannon and muskets appear to be firing more frequently than the Imperial side. Although the second image can rely on the retreating soldiers at the top to indicate that the Swedish army has won, the illustrator

emphasizes the outcome by showing more Swedish cannons firing while many Imperial cannons remain silent. The first image conveys the same message more extremely: despite being a representation of the initial battle dispositions, lopsided gunpowder discharges indicate who will ultimately win.

These two uses of gunpowder smoke (to provide visual cues about battle lines and to denote the victor) are found in other broadsheet illustrations of Gustav Adolf's battles. In depictions of gunpowder battles that attempt to narrate the engagement in a realistic way, gunpowder almost always demarcates battle lines. In the images of Lützen that we analyze below, for instance, gunpowder exclusively serves this purpose. On the other hand, illustrations and paintings that focus on a purely artistic rendering of battle or that do not have tactical considerations at the forefront of their depiction use gunpowder smoke to highlight the chaos of the battlefield or draw attention to the main subject of the work. For example, "Relation / von Victoria der Christen / so sie bey Entsatz der Stadt Wien / Gegen die Türcken erhalten" (Hamburg, 1683), combines an accomplished artistic image with a detailed report of the defense of Vienna against the Ottoman Turks.[328] Although gunpowder smoke is a central component of the image, it does not support the narration of the conflict. Instead, it frames charging "knights" in the bottom left corner and the besieged city of Vienna in the distance. Paintings of battles, such as Johann Walter's (1594-1632) painting of Gustav Adolf at Breitenfeld or—later— Francois-Joseph Heim's (1787-1865) depiction of the Battle of Rocroi (1643), commonly use this technique by foregrounding the main subject of the painting, a victorious general for instance, against a background of gunpowder smoke. In these images, the

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[328] "Relation / von Victoria der Christen / so sie bey Entsatz der Stadt Wien / Gegen die Türcken erhalten" (Hamburg: Heinrich Heuss, 1683); HAB Signatur: M: QuN 31 (3); VD17 23:647234Z.

grand narrative is subordinated to the specific narrative. Broadsheets tend to do the

opposite; they bend time and space, reducing individual soldiers to scribbles in order to

portray a broad temporal-spatial perspective of the battle.[329] The other use of

gunpowder weapons, as a symbol of power or victory, is less common though present in

several broadsheets, especially those from Gustav Adolf's campaigns.

Still, in spite of their artistic accomplishments, many military broadsheets did not

employ tactically or geographically accurate depictions of gunpowder battles. Yet the

use of a distorted image does not mean that the broadsheet printer thought the battle

report any less accurate than other broadsheets. Even those broadsheets that include

seemingly mangled reproductions of the battlefield lay claim to accuracy and truth. One

broadsheet, "Warhafftige Abbildung und Beschreibung deß grossen und gewaltigen

Treffens," (B$_6$ in Table 1) provides a good example of the production of tactically

inaccurate images accompanied by narrative text.[330] Like the two images discussed

previously, "Warhafftige Abbildung und Beschreibung" [Truthful Image and

Description] reports on the Battle of Breitenfeld. The image printed on this broadsheet

was widely circulated and shows up on a number of broadsheets combined with

variations of a narrative text. In contrast to the two examples described above, this

broadsheet is also most consistent with the "standard" format of a broadsheet. It is a

single folio sheet, oriented vertically, with an image at the top, the title beneath it, and a

descriptive text that references the letters and legend provided by the image.

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[329] Götz Pfeiffer, "Bild-Zeitung und Moral-Büchlein—der Dreissigjährige Krieg in Druckgraphiken von Matthäus Merian und Abraham Hogenberg, Jacques Callot und Hans Ulrich Franck," in *Der Dreissigjährige Krieg in Hanau und Umgebung* (Hanau, Germany: Hanauer Geschichtsverein, 2011), 257.

[330] "Warhafftige Abbildung und Beschreibung deß grossen und gewaltigen Treffens" (1631); HAB Signatur: Einbl. Xb FM 96; VD17 23:300673Q.

The title of the broadsheet, "Warhafftige Abbildung und Beschreibung"

[Veritable Illustration and Description] (Figure 3; B₅ in Table 1), suggests that the reader

will gain a "true" impression of the battle. But the image distorts a number of tactical

details such as the formation of the two armies and the shape and layout of the

battlefield. Moreover, Saxon cavalry units are missing from the image. The image

accurately depicts the six Imperial tercios that attacked the Swedish left flank, but little

else. The formation of the historical battle was a U-shaped pocket surrounding the

Swedish center. This image, however, depicts the Swedish armies closing in around the

Imperial army. The battle line runs vertically through the image. Imperial soldiers are

retreating at the top of the image. Dead cover the battlefield, but they are mostly on the

Imperial side. Finally, the image depicts overwhelming Swedish firepower. Almost

every Swedish cannon is firing simultaneously, yet not a single Imperial cannon returns

the barrage. Likewise, more soldiers on the Swedish side are firing their muskets than on

the Imperial side.

These visual cues as well as the text demonstrate partisan sympathies for the

Swedish king. Like many of these battle broadsheets it produces the report of the battle

in the form of an address to the victorious party. The author of the text addresses both

the Elector of Saxony and Gustav Adolf. At one point, describing the Swedish pursuit of

the retreating Imperial army, he writes, "wie dann Ihr Königl. Maj. von Schweden mit

rechten Heldenmuht ihren Feind biß nacher Leipzig . . . verfolget" [just then His Royal

Majesty of Sweden chased his enemy to Leipzig with proper heroic bravery].

Furthermore, the phrase "rechten Heldenmuth" [proper heroic bravery] simultaneously

mimics courtly rhetorical flourishes and the language of epic battle descriptions. The

author's auspicious adulations of the Swedish king are a key component of this

subgenre. Broadsheets reporting on battles tend to replicate the tenor of official battle reports, even though the intended audience is much wider than the military elite.

Only half of the text recounts the battle. Despite its brevity, it relates several key components of the battle report subgenre of military broadsheets:

(1) the main commanders and the size of their armies,

(2) the turning point of the battle, and

(3) the list of captured assets (guns, prisoners, provisions, equipment).

The author's description of the commanders and their armies highlights the strength of the Swedish and Saxon forces. Together they comprise nearly 42,000 combatants, 18,000 of whom were under Saxon command. The author writes that the Swedish and Saxon armies, "die besten vortheil eingenommen / sein Geschütz gepflanzt" [having taken the best postion, planted their artillery]. Tilly had nearly 30,000 soldiers, but the text fails to mention both this fact and the tactical positions of his forces. The description of the battle is brief, only 13% of the entire text:

> . . . ehe sich dieselbe in batalle recht stellen können / mit
> dem grossen Geschütz / so bey 2. stund gespielet /
> Salutiret, und darauff mit grosser gewalt und furi ernstlich
> angegriffen / daß es auch fast das ansehen gehabt / als ob
> er Tilly die Victori in seinen Händen: So hat sich doch das
> Blat balden gewendet / in deme durch hertzhafften
> Widerstand der Chur Sächsischen unnd Schwedischen
> Armee der General Tilli biß auffs Haupt geschlagen / das
> Feld raumen.[331]

> [. . . as soon as the same was organized into battle
> formation, the large cannons began to exchange fire for
> about two hours, then it began in earnest with great
> violence and fury, so that it appeared almost as if Tilly had
> the victory in his hands. Just then the page turned, and
> through stout resistance the army of the Saxon Elector and

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[331] Percent determined by word count (80/600).

Sweden turned on General Tilly and forced him to clear
the field.]

It focuses on the dramatic change of fortune for the Swedish and Saxon forces "durch
hertzhafften Widerstand" [because of stout resistance], and relegates the rest of the story
(not quoted here) to the placement and displacement of the armies before and after the
battle. The two-hour artillery duel acts as a prelude to the "gewalt und furi" [violence
and fury] once the battle begins in earnest. At the end, the author lists the Swedish
bounty from the battle, notably "23. Stück/ und darunter etzliche mit dem Röm Adler"
[23 field pieces, among which a few were stamped with the Roman eagle]. While other
histories of Breitenfeld, such as Richard Bonney's rendition in *The Thirty Years' War*,
focus on the unusually high number of standards that the Swedish army captured
(altogether 99), the author of this text is interested in the material blows to Tilly's
army.[332] Captured standards were a symbolically important measure of tactical victory
for early modern armies,[333] but to this broadsheet author, wagons, men ("darunter viel
Gräfliche und andere hohes StandsPersonen" [among whom a number were dukes and
other persons of nobility]), and guns were more important markers of victory than flags.

The lack of tactical details and the focus on the Swedish victory in the text mirror
the composition of the broadsheet's image. If we return to the conventions deduced
from images 221 (B$_3$) and 220 (B$_4$), we find a correlation in "Warhafftige Abbildung und
Beschreibung" (B$_6$) between the visual representation of firepower in the image and the

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[332] Bonney, *The Thirty Years War* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2002), 44.

[333] Liemandt, 68 (Anm. 248): "Grund dafür war das Fehlen einheitlicher Uniformen bei
den Soldaten, was die Fähnleinführer zum beinahe einzigen Zugehörigkeitskennzeichen
werden ließ. . . . Die Zahl der gewonnenen Fähnchen konnte anzeigen, wieviele
Regimenter des Gegners geschlagen worden waren oder zumindest ihre Einheit im
Kampf verloren hatten."

outcome of the battle. The massive discharge of gunpowder weapons by the Swedish army as compared to the relatively weak use of gunpowder weapons by Tilly's forces convey to the reader who won the battle. Yet the image, which the title claims to be "veritable," also demonstrates the weak correlation between details and "truth" in this and other military broadsheets. The text tells the reader that two hours were spent firing artillery, yet—in the image—only the Swedish army is firing any cannon at all. The knowledgeable consumer—perhaps a statistical rarity in 1631—would also recognize that the image misleadingly portrays the Swedish army surrounding the Imperial army. Finally, the lances of the Swedish units are pointed forward, a symbol of aggression and conquest. The visual representation of Swedish aggression and victory gives the viewer a sense that the battle was nothing less than the Swedish annihilation of a surrounded Imperial army. As the text explains, however, the historical reality of the battle was more complicated and dramatic. This conflict of textual and visual details suggests that the "truth" of the image lies not in its narrative accuracy but in the message it conveys: the Swedes won at Breitenfeld.

Another variety of military broadsheet, the allegorical military broadsheet, uses gunpowder weapons as primarily symbolic rather than narrative tools. Whereas the main subject of the battle report broadsheet is to narrate the battle, the main subject of the allegorical military broadsheet is the outcome of or participants in a battle. The allegorical military broadsheet sometimes includes narrative elements, but the reduction of a battle or of a commander to allegorical and often satirical representation is the main thrust of the allegorical military broadsheet. One version of the well-known "Confect-Taffel" series, the "Neugedeckte Confect-Taffel" ["Newly Set Confectionary Table"] (Figure 4), provides an example of a figurative interpretation of battle that employs both

visual and textual motifs from narrative military broadsheets in combination with

allegorical framing.[334] This broadsheet, which was widely circulated, copied, and even

serialized, combines the satirical goal of the work with the generic markers of battle

reports.[335] Three additional versions of this broadsheet, which Harms has reproduced in

a sequence in *Deutsche illustrierte Flugblätter des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts*, will be

considered as points of comparision. The "Neugedeckte Confect-Taffel" contains a title,

image, and poem, followed by a transcription of a "Küchen und Taffel-zettel / so

General Tylli Abends vor der Schlacht von Leipzig [Breitenfeld] begehret" [kitchen and

table note, which Tilly desired the evening before the Battle of Breitenfeld].[336] Because of

its opulence, the "Taffel-zettel," allegedly left behind on the battlefield after Tilly's army

fled, becomes the central subject of the satire. The joke of the broadsheet coalesces

around the juxtaposition of feasting (pleasure) and fighting (pain). As Schilling suggests

in his reading of yet another broadsheet, the function of the allegory of sugary

confectionary is to play upon "the bitter pill of truth."[337] In the "Confect-Taffel," both the

text and image portray the sweet feast as a fleeting pleasure laced with painful

consequences. Schilling reads this broadsheet as a parody of the misadventures of Tilly's

army in Saxony. He suggests that it represents the story of the "Niederlage der

Kaiserlichen Truppen in Sachsen als mißglückten Versuch . . . , ungebeten und ohne

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[334] Michael Schilling, "Allegorie und Satire auf illustrierten Flugblätter des Barock," in *Das illustrierte Flugblatt der frühen Neuzeit*, eds. Wolgang Harms and Michael Schilling (Stuttgart: Hirzel Verlag, 2008), 325.

[335] Schnorr von Carolsfeld, "Tilly nach der Schlacht von Breitenfeld," *Archiv für Literaturgeschichte* 6 (1877), 58-59.

[336] "Neugedeckte Confect-Taffel" (1631), HAB Signatur: Einbl. Xb FM 62; Harms, DiF II, 418-419 (#239). The HAB image is the reverse of the version found in Harms.

[337] Schilling, "Allegorie und Satire," 323.

Absicht zu bezahlen, von einer köstlichen Konfekttafel zu naschen" [the defeat of the
Imperial troops in Saxony as an unlucky attempt, uninvited and without intention of
paying, to feast at a delicious table of confections].[338] This may be, but a closer analysis
of the symbolic linkages of food and weapons in this broadsheet suggests that the
critique may be obliquely directed toward gunpowder warfare in general, as
perpetrated by commanders such as Tilly.

The image of the "Neugedeckte Confect-Taffel" depicts a banquet table in the
foreground under an "open sky."[339] The table is covered with food of all sorts including
cakes, poultry, and wine, as well as candy and fruits. Around the table crippled soldiers
reach for the food. Many of them are missing their hands or legs. In front of the table a
man lies on the ground, stretched out on his side in repose; his right hand covers his eye,
and his severed left hand has fallen next to him. A cup rolls from the dismembered
hand, and the bones are visible in his sliced forearm. Cannon balls are lying on the
ground in front of the table near the cup. On the left, a general dressed in armor,
probably Gustav Adolf, accompanied by two commanders hits one of the "guests" in the
head with a field marshal scepter.[340] To the right of the table, more crippled soldiers
clutch their heads in pain. One soldier, who has already (over)eaten and recovered,
returns for more by holding out his bowl; another soldier his head wrapped and his leg
amputated crawls toward the table, stretching his arm toward the food. In the
background, a scene reminiscent of the Battle of Breitenfeld unfolds as pictured in
Merian's illustration (B$_1$). Behind the table dismembered bodies, dead horses, and

[338] Schilling, "Allegorie und Satire," 325.

[339] Harms, DiF II, 419 (#239).

[340] Harms, DiF II, 419 (#239).

soldierless weapons litter the ground. Imperial troops flee from advancing Swedish forces across the fields between two towns. The battle is at its end, just as the feast seems to be coming to a conclusion. Those who have partaken of the feast are already nursing their—literally—crippling hangovers, yet the hosts Gustav Adolf and Johann Georg von Sachsen urge them to keep eating.

The accompanying poem, composed in thirty alexandrine couplets, tells of the Imperial soldiers fighting over the "Confect-Taffel" and destroying one another in the process. The narrator, perhaps Gustav Adolf himself, patronizingly chastises them for their greediness,

> WIe/wie/jhr Brüder/wie? begehrt ihr keine Gäste?
> Ein jeder reisst für sich/und legt ihm vor das beste.
> Je haltet/haltet doch/jhr kriegt doch alle satt.
> Seyd jhr doch alle bey der Stadt/da man vollauff gnug hat/
> Warumb jhr euch so drengt. Je keuet doch die Bissen/
> Eh jhr daran erworgt. Ich möchte gerne wissen/
> Wie lang jhr nicht gespeist/daß/weils euch wird so gut/
> Ihr so verhungerlich/so arg nach süssem thut/
> Das jhr vorlängst gehofft/nicht aber so begehret.
> Leert jmmer weidlich auß. Jhr solt wol sein gewehret.
> Und wer es zwölff mal mehr. Leert nur die Schalen auß.
> Hier ist Confect genug. Hier haltet euren Schmaus.
> Ich bit euch noch einmal/jhr wolt doch so nicht eylen/
> Dringt doch nicht / reisst nicht so / Jhr schlagt einander Beulen.
>
> [What now, my brothers, what? Do you want no other guests?
> Each one grabs for himself and takes for himself the best.
> But just a second now, you all will get your fill
> Since you are by the town, which yet has plenty still.
> Why are you pushing so? Chew your food a second
> Or you will choke on it. I'd really like to reckon
> When you last ate a bite, for it makes you so damn happy
> Frenzying for food, so eager for a goody,
> For which you longed and hoped but did not see 'til now.
> Empty your bowls like men, ready your appetite to sate.
> Be it twelve times more, just keep cleaning off your plate.
> Here there's plenty tasty treats. Here you have your feast.
> I beg you once again not to hurry so,

Not to shove, not to grab, or give each other blows!][341]

As the Imperial army scrounges greedily at the food before them, the narrator alternatingly arouses their hunger and then mocks their ravenous consumption. Harms suggests that the narrator is luring them to a trap.[342]

The Catholic troops' unchecked gluttony has its consequences. A rhetorical bridge connects the Battle of Breitenfeld to the overriding metaphor of having eyes bigger than one's stomach. This connection confirms the message that "Die Ironie besteht darin, daß die Niederlage der Kaiserlichen in der Schlacht als Folge des ungebührlichen Verhaltens beim Konfektessen dargestellt wird" [The irony is that the destruction of the Imperial army in the battle is represented as the consequence of imprudence while eating sweets].[343] The narrator lists the injuries sustained and the complaints of the injured soldiers, while holding up the evidence of their destruction before their eyes,

> Hier sitzen jhrer viel/und klagen über Rücken.
> Dort wandern etliche mit unterstürtzten Krücken.
> Ein jeder zeigt sein Leid/daß jhm zu viel geschehn/
> Und wüntscht er hette nie das Breitefeld gesehn.
> Wo hastu guter Freund/dein halbes Bein verlohren?
> Und du/was suchestu so sehnlich hindern Ohren?
> Ich halte/das Pistol/das dich hat auffgelöst.
>
> [Here, sit many round, bemoaning their back pain.
> There, held up by crutches, wander several men.
> Each decries his woe, that to him too much befell,
> And wishes that he'd never laid eyes on Breitenfeld.
> Where is it, my good friend, that you lost half a leg?
> And you, what do you seek behind your ears with such dismay?

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[341] [Trans. mine.] I have translated "weidlich" here as "like men" because of its sarcastic connotation surrounding "bravery." Cf. *Adelung Online*, s.v. "weidelich," accessed February 28, 2012, http://woerterbuchnetz.de/.

[342] Harms, DiF II, 419 (#239).

[343] Harms, DiF II, 418.

Here I hold the pistol that blew your brains away.]

The narrator confronts the soldiers with their own injuries as well as the injuries of the others. Invited to a feast, they find themselves strewn about a field of bodily misery. As he mocks the injured with their own injuries, the narrator advises them not to complain about getting what they asked for,

> Ihr dörffet sagen nicht/das jhr nicht gnug empfangen/
> Ist einem jeden doch man selbst entgegen gangen /
> Und hat jhm auffgedient. Da können wir nicht für
> Daß mancher viel von sich/und wol sich selbst lest hier/
> Das seyd jhr selbsten Schuld. . . .

> [You can't possibly say, that you've not had your fill,
> Has not every man gained his fate by his own will,
> And served himself. This is simply not our fault,
> That many here their selves and parts thereof have lost;
> That is your own fault. . . .]

There follows next a verse rendition of the foods found on the "Taffel-Zettel" left behind by Tilly's army, starting with the "dreissig Fuder Wein" [27,000 liters of wine] that makes the soldiers "schweisset" [sweat or bleed] "wie die Schweine" [like pigs].[344] The comparison of the Imperial soldiers to pigs and the imagery of bleeding or sweating (red) wine paint a portrait of the soldiers as drunken, gluttonous, and brutish. In the following verses, the amounts of food listed emphasize this point. As Harms notes, "hier [wird] durch die Menge und die Exklusivität der Genußmittel ein negatives Bild von den kaiserlichen Soldaten und besonders Tilly entworfen" [a negative image of the Imperial soldiers and Tilly in particular is sketched by the quantity and exclusiveness of the pleasant foods].[345] The listing of the exquisite and sumptuous spread and the

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[344] *Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob Grimm und Wilhelm Grimm*, s.v. "schweiszen," Bd. 15 (Leipzig, 1854-1961. Quellenverzeichnis: Leipzig, 1971), accessed January 26, 2012, http://www.dwb.uni-trier.de/. Thanks to Gerhild Williams for this notation.

[345] Harms, DiF II, 419 (#239).

counting of food items in unimaginable quantities—twelve barrels of fresh herring, twenty-four barrels of butter, 600 pounds [272 kilograms] of fresh fish, and large quantities of candies and fruits—discredit Tilly and his soldiers as gluttons.[346] Indeed, other versions of the "Confect" series add lechery to the vices of Tilly and his soldiers. A few versions include a virginal serving girl waiting on the table, an allegory for the city of Magdeburg, as a jab at his sexual as well as epicurean excesses.[347]

Just as other broadsheets of the "Confect" series, the "Neugedeckte Confect-Taffel" seeks to disqualify Tilly and his army morally through mockery.[348] In versions such as "Tyllische Confect-Gesegnung"[349] and "Sächsisch Confect,"[350] Tilly is presented as a thief and a freeloader, seeking to plunder the goods of Saxony without paying for them. But the message of the "Neugedeckten Confect-Taffel" is more consistent with that of another satirical broadside, the "Wolbestalter Ligistischer Lautenschläger," in which Tilly is portrayed as a lute player who tightens his strings to the point that they snap. The "überspannte Saiten" [over-tightened strings] are unmistakably tied to a vain quest for glory [*Ehrgeiz*] that destroys itself, as the tale of Icarus unfolding in the background of the "Lautenschläger" broadside makes clear. In the "Neugedeckten Confect-Taffel," the combination of image and text offer a similar message of gluttony for honor (sweetness) that only leads to dishonor (pain). The physical destruction of the Imperial

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[346] Harms, DiF II, 419 (#239).

[347] Magdeburg, literally translated, means "maiden city," a point that the Protestant media emphasized in their demonization of Tilly's siege and then sack of the town from 1630-1631. See, Krustenstern/Medick, *Zwischen Alltag und Catastrophe* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999).

[348] Harms, DiF II, 419 (#239).

[349] Harms, DiF II, 417 (#238)

[350] Harms, DiF II, 421 (#240)

soldiers in the image is linked to the symbolic destruction of their pride, yet—hobbled as they are by severed limbs and hangovers—they continue reaching for what disabled them in the first place. Their immoderation turns pleasure into suffering. At stake in this critique is not simply an indictment of Tilly and his troops but of all warriors who fail to understand their limits and the principles of moderation, even—perhaps especially—in war. Here, war is a feast best when not gobbled.

Gunpowder weapons do tell a story in the "Neugedeckten Confect-Taffel" just as they do in other military broadsheets, but they primarily serve as the vehicles of satire. In the "Neugedeckte Confect-Taffel" image, the battle scene in the background uses gunpowder smoke and retreating soldiers to allude to the routing of Imperial forces at Breitenfeld. Like the weapons in the bottom corner of 220 (B_3), gunpowder weapons in the "Neugedeckte Confect-Taffel" image also act as visual cues—metonymies—of heated battle. Discarded firearms litter the battlefield near piles of bodies and body parts. The musket on the ground is as much a lost part of the soldier as the severed arm; both function as a synecdoche for fallen soldiers. Yet gunpowder weapons attend to the allegorical scene in the foreground of the image as well. The cannonballs in the foreground, discarded alongside fallen goblets clutched in dismembered hands, mirror the "Confect" that covers the banquet table. Just as feasting becomes the analog to fighting, the seemingly pleasant sweets are actually weapons that harm. The narrator of the text also uses firearms in the verses that link the allegory of the feast to the battlefield, "Ich halte / das Pistol / das dich hat aufgelöst / Und aus Barmherzigkeit so weidlich abgestöst" [I hold the pistol that blew you away / And so bravely laid you low out of pity]. The mocking tone of the narrator, who displays the weapon for the destroyed soldier to see, even turns to the informal and sarcastic word "weidlich"

[bravely] to describe the pistol.[351] The pistol, which—like the soldier—is openly mocked, lacks the ability to be "brave" just as it lacks the agency to fire itself. Thus, the soldier is "aufgelöst" [literally: dissolved, disintegrated] by a disembodied machine of war. If the weapons and the violence glorified by images and stories of war draw soldiers to the battlefield,[352] then this broadsheet reminds them that those are also the things that destroy them.

The natural outcome of eating too many sweets is, of course, rotten teeth. A final satirical broadsheet, titled "Der alte Teutsche Zahnbrecher" (Figure 5), from the "Confect" series links gunpowder weapons to both the cause and cure of these toothaches.[353] In the image, a "Zahnbrecher" [tooth-cracker, dentist], aided by a Jesuit and a Dominican extracts one of Tilly's teeth as he sits clasping the arms of a wooden chair. While Tilly writhes, a half-dozen soldiers clutching their jaws or pointing to their teeth observe the surgical spectacle. Several of the soldiers are on crutches. In the foreground of the image, just below Tilly, a number of weapons—primarily firearms— are strewn about on the ground and piled on a stool. Three oversized tobacco pipes are lying around the scene. On the left side of the image an elderly woman cuts tobacco at a table and the "böse Feind" [the devil] starts a small fire with flint. Powder kegs, a small cannon, and pistols at the center of the image link the events on either side of them. To

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[351] *Adelung*, s.v. "weidlich," accessed February 28, 2012, http://woerterbuchnetz.de/.

[352] Martin Knauer, "Krieg als Todesmahnung. Überlegungen zu Funktion und Bedeutung von druckgraphischen Bildfolgen des Dreißigjährigen Krieges," in *1648: Krieg und Frieden in Europa*, Vol. 2 (Münster, 1998), 509-516, accessed February 6, 2012, *Internet Portal: Wesfälische Geschichte*, http://www.lwl.org/westfaelische-geschichte/portal/Internet/. Especially when considered in the tradition of the "Capriccio" which glorified war in images and text for the sake of drawing men to the military life with the promise of adventure.

[353] "Der alte Teutsche Zahnbrecher" (ca. 1632); Harms, DiF II, 493 (#282).

the right of the weapons, where Tilly's teeth are being pulled, the weapons seem to be

the very things removed from his mouth. To the left of the weapons, the woman cuts the

tobacco, the "Thu-weg," meant to help ease the pain of Tilly's rotting teeth. In that

context, the weapons seem to be payment for the medicine that this charlatan peddles.

The text describing this scene mixes imagery of smoke, powder, and the color black to

draw a comparison between medicine and gunpowder:

> Die schnitt' euch den Taback / und Pulverweis' umbtrug /
> Da uber ihrer Glut das edle Kraut getreuget /
> Das auch die Asche sich an manchem Ort eräuget.
> Gebraucht euch dieser Asch / gebraucht doch gleichen Rauch /
> Wem schwarztz von Zucker seynd die Zähn' und wüten auch.
>
> [They cut for you tobacco, and pulverize it too,
> So glowing bright, the noble herb can help you to recover,
> Since these ashes tend to spread themselves all over,
> You, whose blackened teeth with crushing pain do choke,
> You should use this ash and use its healing smoke.]

The "Taback" [tobacco] is ground into a powder, like gunpowder. The author refers to it

as a "Kraut" [herb], whose double implication makes possible a reading of it either as a

medicinal herb or as an abbreviated form of "Zündkraut" [the finely ground priming

powder used to charge a musket flash pan]. Non-gunpowder weapons also vacillate

between pain-inducing and pain-relieving imagery. If Tilly doesn't want to use the

"ashes" to fix his teeth, the dentist offers to clean his ears with "Ohrlöffel" [ear-spoons]

and clean his teeth with "ZahnStocher" [toothpicks], which are marked in the image as

piles of clubs and sharp pitchforks and maces respectively: "Seid ihr dann gar zu fest /

braucht ungebrandte Asche / Das man mit solcher Laug die Köpff euch sauber wasche:

/ Zahnstocher schawet hier / Ohrlöffel auch dabei" [If you are too tight, and need

unburned ashes / Then wash your head with a caustic solution: / Here you see my

toothpicks, I've got ear-spoons here as well]. The central metaphor suspends dentistry

between tormenting and healing, a notion that perhaps still resonates with us today. The purification of dirt from Tilly's head—from his mouth and from his ears—is the ultimate goal of the dentist. That dirt is the residue of his excessive confidence that brought him defeat.

The Uses of Gunpowder in Protestant German Military Broadsheets (1630-1633)

The above analysis of representations of gunpowder weapons in German broadsheets surrounding the Battle of Breitenfeld suggests that gunpowder can function as both a narrative and symbolic device in this medium. As a tool of war gunpowder becomes a means for narrating warfare. In broadsheet images of battle, the smoke from gunpowder weapons orients the reader to the movement of the battle and the major points of conflict. By tracing the lines of gunpowder smoke and browsing the accompanying text, the reader can follow the progress of the battle. If no text is present, as is the case with 221 and 220 (B_4 and B_3), the viewer must rely on other written accounts of the battle or on the careful reading of the two images side-by-side in order to understand who the combatants are, how they engaged one another, and which army was ultimately victorious.

On the other hand, the depiction of overwhelming or one-sided firepower aids the narration of battle by symbolically denoting the victor, especially when the broadsheet does not employ a tactically accurate image. In this vein, the example of the "Warhafftige Abb. und Besch. deß grossen und gewaltigen Treffens / . . . den 6. (16.) September 1631" (B_6) provides an inaccurate visual depiction of the tactical unfolding of Breitenfeld. Anyone familiar with the battle must immediately recognize that there are not enough soldiers on the battlefield, that the battle lines are inverted, and that the

Swedish army did not fire all of its artillery simultaneously while Tilly's army retreated without a single shot. Yet the tactical formation of the battlefield is not relevant to the "truth" that this broadsheet claims to display. In this case, the reader of the broadsheet grasps the message that the Swedish army won the battle by recognizing the overwhelming use of firepower by the Swedish army. This artist's commitment is to the dramatic, rather than technical, narrative truth of the battle.

Gunpowder weapons can also serve as allegory in satirical broadsheets about warfare. Two broadsheets from the "Confect-Taffel" series that appeared in the aftermath of Breitenfeld use gunpowder weapons, especially pistols and cannonballs, as symbols for the pain (as opposed to the glory) of warfare. Both the "Neugedeckte Confect-Taffel" and the "Teutsche Zahnbrecher" compare warfare to the gluttonous consumption of sweets, alcohol, and rich foods, which brings toothaches, hangovers, and stomachaches. In both images—as soldiers either indulge in or suffer the consequences of gluttony—cannonballs, pistols, and powder kegs mirror the sweets on the banquet table and the teeth that are being pulled by the "Zahnbrecher." The text often makes this comparison clear, especially in the "Confect-Taffel," where the narrator mocks the soldier with the disembodied pistol that has "dissolved" him. As metonyms for war in these broadsheets, pistols and cannonballs symbolize both the pleasure and pain of war.

A glance at other military broadsheets from the time period, both satirical ones such as the "Wolbestalte PritzschSchule" (1631),[354] "Bäpstische Pfaffen beicht, vnd Schwedische Soldathen Buß" (1631),[355] and "Wie gewonnen / so zerronnen" (1631),[356] as

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[354] Harms, DiF II, 440-441 (#254).

[355] Harms, DiF II, 442-443 (#255).

well as battle reports like the "Rückeroberung Bambergs durch Tilly" (1632),[357] and the

"Einnahme Freistatts am 9. August 1632,"[358] deploy representations of gunpowder

weapons similar to those described above. Perhaps most interesting in such uses is the

fact that gunpowder never becomes an object of disdain in and of itself. Instead,

gunpowder is only represented negatively in these examples when it is connected to the

excessive or immoral conduct of war. Furthermore, negative depictions of gunpowder

weapons appear to be limited to Protestant critiques of General Tilly, who was widely

despised for his destruction of Magdeburg. Thus, these are not really negative

depictions of warfare *per se*; rather, these critiques are partisan and polemical, aimed at

specific, inimical perpetrators of (gunpowder) warfare rather than at gunpowder

warfare in general.

The Case of Gustav Adolf

If Protestants were going to criticize gunpowder weapons or gunpowder warfare

using partisan polemic, they would have done so after Gustav Adolf, "the Lion of the

North," was shot and killed at the Battle of Lützen in 1632. Historical accounts differ

widely as to how he died and who shot him, but he is—unanimously—said to have been

killed by gunpowder weapons, plural.[359] The death of Gustav Adolf was politically and

strategically the greatest blow that Protestant forces could have received. In only four

years he had transformed the Protestant military situation from an abyss of dismal

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[356] Harms, DiF II, 486-487 (#279).

[357] Harms, DiF II, 431 (#246).

[358] Harms, DiF II, 476 (#273).

[359] Frank Liemandt, *Die zeitgenössische literarische Reaktion auf den Tod des Königs Gustav II. Adolf von Schweden* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1998), 41.

failures into a mounting range of successes. With the help of native German forces and

Scottish imports, Gustav Adolf had expanded Swedish and Protestant military influence

by defeating and expelling Imperial forces while taking new territory in the process. By

1632, Gustav Adolf, the king of Sweden, had in a practical and nearly political sense

more power and influence in the German lands than Emperor Ferdinand II.[360] We will

briefly consider Gustav Adolf's ascent to political and military power to have proceeded

in two phases: first, his rise to power as king of Sweden; and second, his entry into the

German Imperial conflict, "The German War," that soon became known as the Thirty

Years War.

In Sweden, Gustav Adolf, a prodigy by aristocratic acclamation after his father's

death in the fall of 1611, assumed the throne at an early age (16) because the Swedish

nobility was eager to secure the financial and political future of Sweden under a

internationally strong but nationally flexible Protestant monarch.[361] Gustav Adolf was

forced to make concessions that favored the lesser nobility in order to gain the throne,

but he was also given wide berth for instituting financial and bureaucratic reforms that

centralized the financial, commercial, and military organization of Sweden. With the

help of his trusted teacher and advisor, Axel Oxenstierna (1583-1654), he consolidated

the financial systems of Sweden in order to develop a national surplus.[362] Among other

ventures, he increased the export of raw minerals such as iron and copper, especially

from the mines at Falun.[363] By 1619, just eight years into Gustav Adolf's reign, Sweden

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[360] Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus* (London: Longman, 1992), 1-2; Cf. Brady, 394.

[361] Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, 22-23.

[362] Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, 24; Brady, 394-395.

[363] Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, 117-118.

began seeing increased sales revenues from his exports, and "by the end of the reign [Sweden had] become a large exporter of bar-iron and a considerable exporter of cannon."[364] Aided by a lack of serious competition, except that of Transylvania and Japan, Sweden continued to be a major exporter of metal ore until well into the eighteenth century. Gustav Adolf's vision of Sweden as a commercial powerhouse was supported by his plans to make Sweden a major political player in the economic affairs of the North Sea. By strengthening his naval and shipping forces and by pursuing a program of bold military action in Sweden's continental territories such as Denmark, Poland, and the Baltic States, Gustav Adolf was able to secure, to a greater degree than his predecessors, a foothold in trade and military politics on the European continent.

As the German conflict grew, Gustav Adolf found himself increasingly drawn into it. And, according to his correspondence with Oxenstierna between 1628 and 1629, he knew the risks of entering into the fray.[365] Historians are far from unified in their explanations as to why he committed himself and his country to the ever-expanding conflict.[366] Most likely, it was a combination of his desire to defend the Protestant cause, to secure sea power in the North and Baltic Seas, and to check Habsburg expansion into territories under Swedish influence, such as Poland and Denmark.[367] It could be said that he sought this involvement by positioning his forces in key geographical locations,

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[364] Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus and the Rise of Sweden* (English University Press, 1973), 120.

[365] Liemandt, 39; Lundkvist, "Schwedische Kriegsfinanzierung 1630-1635," Paraphrased in: Hans Rudolf, *Der Dreißigjährige Krieg* (Darmstadt: Wege der Forschung 451, 1977), 302.

[366] Liemandt, 37; Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, 184; Brady, *German Histories*, 392; Felix Berner, *Gustav Adolf: Der Löwe aus Mitternacht* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1982), 308-338.

[367] Liemandt, 37.

especially in the northern reaches of Poland and Brandenburg. His martial resolution of

the territorial conflict with Denmark in 1613 had entangled him in the brambles of the

Holy Roman Empire, but he managed to avoid direct altercations, for strategic reasons,

until 1630. At the time he entered the Thirty Years War, Gustav Adolf had enacted far

reaching military reforms in Sweden that encompassed the engineering of fortifications,

the creation of new brands of artillery, and—following the Maurician, or Dutch model—

the comprehensive training of soldiers. Gustav Adolf's army was quite small, about

4,000 soldiers in all, when he landed in the liberated Stralsund in 1630.[368] His army grew

through recruitment at Stralsund while he fortified key alliances with Saxony and the

Northern German princes. Cut off from the direct supply lines to his native land, The

King knew these alliances were crucial to the short-term success of his dictum "war

ought to sustain itself" [bellum se ipsum alet] and, therefore, to the survival of his army.

He spent the rest of his campaign occupying, securing, and fortifying areas of operation

that drew supplies from within their boundaries. The Battle of Breitenfeld in 1631

marked the start of an offensive that ended in the conquest of most of the German lands.

As the "Lion of the North" marched through the German territories waves of German

Protestant print propaganda followed, reporting and cheering his every move.

Gunpowder and the Rise of Gustav Adolf in Military Broadsheets (1631-1632)

The Protestant broadsheets that followed Gustav Adolf's military victories

tended to employ gunpowder weapons in ways similar to those considered above.

Gunpowder weapons operated as both narrative tools and allegorical signifiers. They

helped to tell the stories of battles in both image and text as they reported the military

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[368] Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus and the Rise of Sweden*, 128.

successes of Gustav Adolf. Moreover, representations of gunpowder technology also functioned metonymically and metaphorically in allegorical broadsheets. As the example of the allegorical broadsheet "Schwedischer Zug / Das ist: Guter Anfang" [Swedish Momentum: That is, a Good Start] (1632) demonstrates, often gunpowder weapons bear symbolic weight equal to that of non-gunpowder weapons. [369] In "Schwedischer Zug" (Figure 6), Gustav Adolf, triumphantly rides a chariot, which is blown by the wind and drawn by two lions, a leopard, and a dog. The chariot is also pushed by the "Vertriebene Fürsten" [ousted princes], who had sought his aid. He holds a sword in his right hand and bears a cannon on the front of his chariot. For the items lacking labels in the image, the letters A to Z provide a legend that is explained in fifteen Alexandrine couplets.[370] Before the chariot, a woman—possibly an early depiction of Germania—holds a nearly equal number of muskets (3), lances (4), and a pike (1) as well as a bag of money that reads "1000." Of the woman, next to whom the letter 'W' is inscribed, the text explains, "Dann was er mangel hat / kan ihm W. Gott schicken zu" [What he lacks, God can send to him 'W']. Each of these items, the "sinews of war," holds equal reference value for the military allegory.[371] The upraised sword, a symbol for heroism and nobility, is balanced by the forward facing cannon, which symbolizes aggression; meanwhile, the weapons, which the woman bears in the crook of her left arm, are balanced by the bag of money she proffers.

Less balanced, more polemical or satirical broadsheets unambiguously employ gunpowder technology as the vehicle for representing war. One broadsheet, "Der

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[369] "Schwedischer Zug / Das ist: Guter Anfang" (1632); Harms, DiF II, 454-455 (#261); HAB Signatur: IH 208; VD17 23:675804P.

[370] Harms, DiF II, 454.

[371] Brady, *German Histories*, 381.

Königl. Majestät zu Schweden / und Churfürstl. Durchl. zu Sachsen / . . . Apotheck"

(1632), substitutes an arsenal of primarily gunpowder weapons for the vials of the

apothecary shop.[372] In the foreground of this broadsheet, found reproduced in Figure 7,

Gustav Adolf (Sweden) and Johann Georg (Saxony), both dressed in armor, speak to

each other and point to a cannon and a pile of cannonballs to their left. Around them

and in the building behind them lie six cannons, one mortar, eight muskets, three

pistols, over three hundred cannonballs (in piles), twenty to forty pistol and musket

balls, three kegs of gunpowder, and six lances. On the right side of a trench, being dug

by miners, stands an army of Imperial soldiers (led by a Jesuit and a few officers),

mostly armed with pikes and lances. The Imperial army seems to possess only two

muskets though it has mobilized far more men than can be seen on the Protestant side of

the trench.

The text, not unlike the "Confect-Taffel" and "Zahnbrecher" broadsheets and in

explicit reference to the image above, links gunpowder weapons to the pills, potions,

and medical instruments of a physician.[373] Comparing the Imperial army to a

"fressenden Wurm," the author of the text suggests curing it "mit Kanonenkugeln

(*Pillen*), Schießpulver (*Artzeney*), und Waffen (*die scharffen Jnstrumente*)" [with

cannonballs (*pills*), gunpowder (*medicine*), and weapons (*sharp instruments*)].[374] Relaying

the prescription of Gustav Adolf, "der Artzt" [the doctor], the author writes in

Alexandrines:

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[372] "Der Königl. Majestät zu Schweden / und Churfürstl. Durchl. zu Sachsen / . . . Apotheck," (1632); Harms, DiF, II, 494-495 (#283); HAB Signatur: IH 218; Henceforth: "Apotheck."

[373] Harms, DiF, II, 494.

[374] Harms, DiF, II, 495 (#283).

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> Er sprach: Ich weiß schon recht für solche böse Dinger /
> Weist auff die Tonnen hin / und Kugeln mit dem finger /
> Hierinn ist meine Chur / die Pillen geb ich ein /
> Und misch ein Artzeney auß Büchsen groß und klein.
> Darauff nam er zur Hand die scharffen Instrumente /
> Griff die fresswürmer an / mit Macht er sie durchrendte.
>
> [He said: I know the thing to cure this wicked ailment,
> Pointing to the kegs and balls with a finger movement,
> Herein lies my cure, I'll stick in a couple pills,
> And mix a medicine of firearms big and little.
> At that he grabbed a handful of sharp instruments,
> He hooked the parasite and then began to rend it.]

As Gustav Adolf pulls the "worm," which is "Fett" [fat] with "Jeswitter Witz" [Jesuit wit],

he tears the head, legs, and arms from its (the worm's) body and then wishes the patient,

Germany, a good recovery, "Wol dir / du Vatterland / dir wündsche ich nun Glück"

[Feel better, you *Fatherland*; I wish you now good luck].[375] The narrator ends the poem

with the doctor destroying the parasite at the "wellspring" [*Brunnen*]. This conquest is

followed by an appeal to Catholics not to abide every whim of their dubious leaders:

> Ihr närrisch-kluges Volck deß Pabstes / sehet / sehet
> Wie doch ewr Witz und List für rechter Sach bestehet /
> Wie Butter an der Sonn / O lernet klüger seyn /
> Und lasst mit Gottes Wort ewr Klugheit stimmen ein.
>
> [You smart and foolish popish people, look, look and see
> How your wit and cunning is passed off as honesty
> Like butter in the sun. O, learn to be much smarter,
> Let God's word with your reason resonate much harder.]

The good-hearted appeal to the Catholic "närrisch-kluges Volck" [smart and foolish

people], rings of the Protestant promises of "freyheit," "liberiren," "erretten," and

"erlösen" [freedom, liberation, saving, and salvation] that appear throughout the text.

The "Klugheit" [intelligence] of the people needs to overcome the "Witz und List" [wit

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[375] Harms, DiF, II, 495 (#283).

and cunning] of the Catholic leaders, especially the "Jesuwitter."[376] Moreover, the text

appeals to a lay Catholic German audience by exposing confessional strife as a German

problem eating away at the "TeutscheLand," which the narrator compares to a sick body

and, further, to the "body of the church":

> Also hat auch bißher einen fressende Rotte
> Das gute TeutscheLand . . .
> Durchgraben / wie die Würm / gefressen vmb sich weit /
> Gesogen auß das Blut / gemacht viel Hertzeleid /
> Geschwächt den Kirchen-Leib . . .
>
> [What's more, good Germany has had to this point
> A carnivorous parasite . . .
> Digging through it, like a worm, eating all around,
> Sucking out the blood, causing heart-rending suffering,
> Weakening the body of the church . . .]

What is more, Johann Georg of Saxony, the person who begins to battle this sickness is

described as a "Teutscher Held" [German hero] rather than a Protestant hero, for he sees

the far-reaching dangers that the parasite poses to the German body social.

More often than do battle reports, allegorical German broadsheets of the Thirty

Years War intimately connect image and text. The "Apotheck" broadsheet is no

exception. The text's description of the "digging worm," the "gesturing doctor," "the

cannonball pills," "gunpowder medicine," and "sharp instruments" precisely match the

image and deepen its allegorical thrust as the reader links signifier and signified with

political message. There are, however, some contrasts to the other allegorical

broadsheets considered above. As in the "Confect-Taffel" broadsheets, gunpowder

weapons as symbolic vehicles resonate more heavily with the tenor of war than do

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[376] Schilling, "Allegorie und Satire," 330: "Jesuwider" is a play on words that combines the German pronunciation of "Jesuit" with the direct German translation of "anti-Christ": "Jesu wider" or "wider Jesu." The word "Witz" [wit] also takes on a particularly negative connotation as something closer to "trickery."

swords and pikes. Yet, the "Apotheck" portrays firearms as the solution to, rather than the cause of, (social) bodily suffering. This positive depiction of gunpowder weapons is consonant with the allegorical register of the "Schwedischer Zug" broadsheet. Gunpowder weapons, however, are a more potent vehicle in "Apotheck" than in "Schwedischer Zug," where guns are simply one of many tools of war such as pikes, swords, money, men, and political influence. In "Apotheck," neither money nor men are necessary for the "doctor" and the "German hero," to prevail. Their superior (gunpowder) arsenal aided by a few "sharp instruments" is sufficient to wrench from the ailing German body the blood-sucking parasite, depicted in the image as an army led by a few Jesuits.

As noted in the analyses of Image 220 (B_4) and B_6, the visual representation of overwhelming, one-sided firepower could inform the viewer who won the battle. One broadsheet report of the Swedish army's route of Tilly's forces at Rain am Lech in Bavaria in April of 1632 (Figure 8) combines the symbolic use of overwhelming firepower with an extreme bias of perspective to relate Tilly's dramatic defeat.[377] This battle proved catastrophic for Catholic forces, for it became the breaking point of the "Swedish storm" that swept over Bavaria in the summer and autumn of 1632.[378] The image portrays a broad perspective in the bottom left corner with a very narrow horizon point in the top right corner. Tilly's forces flee down a wooded path toward the horizon as trees hit by cannon-fire fall around them. Swedish forces take up well over 75% of the frame while Tilly's forces are relegated to approximately one eighth of the image. Every

[377] See Table 1 for a comparison of five versions of this broadsheet. Not all versions employ gunpowder in this way despite the fact that four of the five broadsheets share the same perspective.

[378] Brady, 394.

cannon on the Swedish battle lines, which occupy both banks of the river Lech, fires simultaneously. The only guns discharged on the Imperial side come from a small cavalry vanguard of dragoons, who are in the process of being out flanked by Swedish *Reiter*. The Imperial camp—seen in the top right of the image—sits abandoned as the Imperial troops flee through the forest in a hasty and disorganized retreat. The text corroborates the image's partisan bias, for the opening sentence twice refers to the Imperial army as "der Feind" [the enemy] before finally referring to it as "Tillyscher Armee" [Tilly's army].

While the image suggests Swedish domination over Tilly's forces, the text depicts the victory in even more dramatic terms. The Swedish success was not as complete as the image suggests. The author speaks of Tilly's "gepflanzte Stücken" [planted artillery pieces] that besieged the Swedish forces as they built a bridge across the river. The Swedish forces, according to the text, had to conquer a determined and heavily armed foe by blinding his infantry and artillery with a gunpowder diversion,

> Haben selbe 27. klein und grobe Stück / gegen Tillyscher Armee in Eyl Creutzweiß pflantzen lassen / unter welchen / die zur rechten Hand scharpff mit Hagelgeschoß / die zur Lincken aber blind / und so geladen daß sie einen dicken Rauch von sich geben/ welches dann in die fünff stund mit etlich tausent Musquetirern ohn auffhören Continuirt / da es beyderseyts manch schönen Mann gestanden: Unter dessen aber / in bey wesen ihrer Königl. mayst. zu Schweden und anderer Fürsten und Herren / wurde die brucken / über den Läch unvermerckt deß Feindes / auch wegen deß Continuirlichen dicken Rauchs / gantz verfertigt . . .[379]

> [27 small and large artillery pieces were planted in a crosswise fashion against Tilly's army, among which the pieces on the right hand side were loaded with shrapnel shot, but the pieces on the left hand side were loaded *blind*

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[379] Harms, DiF II, 501 (#287); HAB Signatur: IH 563.

so that they gave off a thick smoke. This continued for five
hours with a couple thousand musketeers without pause,
because on both sides there were a number of stout-
hearted men: among them His Royal Majesty of Sweden
and other princes and lords. The bridge over the river Lech
was completed entirely unnoticed by the enemy because of
the continual thick smoke . . .]

As the bridge is completed and the troops begin crossing, skirmishers, comprised of

Tragoner [dragoons] and then *Infanteri* [infantry], cross the bridge to check the strength

of the Imperial positions. They find a bastion, not depicted in the image, and they

bitterly fight for it. Eventually, "etlich Troppen Reuter / so von den Sch[w]edischen übel

empfangen und ihren vortheil wider zusuchen bezwungen worden / im mittel

brachten[.] Ihr Mayest dero Armee zu sampt den Stücken je länger je näher dem Gschütz

/ hoffent / der Feind würde sich gantz präsentiren" [a few troops of riders, who were

thrashed by the Swedes and forced to try and regain their breastworks, broke into the

middle. His Majesty, whose army was closing in on the artillery pieces, hoped that the

enemy would present himself entirely].[380] This skirmish, which is depicted as the sole

engagement of soldiers in the image, turns out to be yet another diversion, this time by

the Imperial army, so that the rest of Tilly's forces can retreat. With the Protestant

victory come the deaths of two Imperial generals, Tilly and Altringer, mortally wounded

by musket fire.[381] The capture of the Imperial cannons and the destruction of the forest

by cannon fire occupy an entire paragraph, second in importance only to the strategic

advantage gained by bridging the Lech, and the grace of God that delivered such a

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[380] Harms, DiF II, 501 (#287); HAB Signatur: IH 563.

[381] Cf. Brady, 394.

victory. These closing comments in the text on captured artillery, outcome, and providence round out common elements of the battle report sub-genre.

In a rare example of Catholic-Imperial propaganda, one broadsheet, "Eigentliche Abildung Welicher gestalt . . . Tilli . . . den Schwedischen VeldtMarschall Horn vor und in Bamberg attaquirt," tells the story of the defeat of Field Marshall Gustav Horn and his expulsion from Bamberg by Tilly (March, 1632).[382] The picture takes up most of the broadsheet. The only text is the title at the top and a description of just four lines in the bottom right-hand corner. The image depicts the city of Bamberg, viewed from afar. The largest figure in the image is Tilly on horseback, consulting with a standard-bearing non-commissioned officer in the bottom left-hand corner as they watch the occupation of the town unfold. The vanishing point is up and to the right centered on the Altenburg castle, which looks down on the city. The text is punctuated with the letters A through H, which label the progression of the invasion into the town. Each of the letters refers to conflicts between units of soldiers, explained in the legend. As with Images 220 and 221, gunpowder acts as a narrative tool here. In those images, however, gunpowder smoke primarily gives spatial rather than temporal shape to the battle. In the Breitenfeld examples, the combination of text and image (or the placement of two "before and during" images together) supplies the work with a temporal dimension. In contrast, puffs of gunpowder smoke in the "Bamberg" broadsheet lend the image both temporal and spatial dimensions. As the Imperial forces drive the Swedish soldiers through the city and meet pockets of resistance along the way, the alphabetical legend and the smoke of gunpowder guide the reader through the progression of the battle, which snakes across the Regnitz river and through the city into one of the market places. Since

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[382] Harms, DiF II, 532 (#303).

Bamberg sits on a series of hills, the natural elevation of the town allows the events to unfold visually upwards as the Swedes are driven through Bamberg. Every exchange between soldiers is present in one frame.

Visually, the first confrontation between Imperial forces and Horn's troops coexists with the subsequent conflicts, even though each one can be understood as taking place at unique points in time during the battle. Neither synchronic (many simultaneous events in one space) nor diachronic (events unfolding in many frames over time),[383] this broadsheet uses a visual mode that I, borrowing from Heike Polster, term "heterochronic."[384] By heterochronicity I mean "temporal layering within the same image space."[385] Through such temporal layering the early modern artist manipulated time and space to tell a story.[386] Heterochronic visual depiction is one of many early modern forms forms of visual grammar, a means of localizing "iconic" images into "a specific narrative context," that is, of turning a series of images into a comprehensible story.[387]

The Bamberg broadsheet is stylistically unique among the military broadsheets of this period, but not unique in its heterochronic visual depiction of events, even military events like battles. The temporal-spatial depth, which other military broadsheets achieve through a combination of text and image, is rendered in this image with visual cues and minimal text. Visual depictions of discharging gunpowder

[383] Sonja Zeman, "'Grammaticalization' within Pictorial Art? Searching for Diachronic Principles of Change in Picture and Language," *IMAGE* 14 (July 2011), 10, accessed February 18, 2012, www.bildwissenschaft.org.

[384] Heike Polster, *The Aesthetics of Passage: The Imag(in)ed Experience of Time in Thomas Lehr, W. G. Sebald, and Peter Handke* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neuman, 2008), 64.

[385] Polster, 64.

[386] Zeman, 6.

[387] Zeman, 9.

weapons, aided only by the ciphers of the legend, explicate these narrative clues as the

conflict unfolds both spatially and temporally. Still, this broadsheet is not unique in its

depiction of time or its unfolding of time within a single frame. Two other examples of

well-known broadsheets demonstrate that the early modern single-sheet medium was

capable of narrating both spatial and temporal change without the help of extensive

textual narration. In the genre of military broadsheets, the most famous example is the

depiction of the murder of Wallenstein (1634) first printed by Matthäus Merian.[388] In

most versions of broadsheets depicting his assassination, Wallenstein's murder is

rendered through a series of single frame images that progress chronologically in a

downward fashion, as if the viewer were reading the images like words on a page: left to

right, and then downwards to the next line of images.[389] Another broadsheet from 1620

uses a similar system of chronological tableaus to narrate a series of battles (as opposed

to a single battle) between the Protestant rebels and the Imperial army.[390]

Yet there are also examples of visual narration in early modern broadsheets that

use a heterochronic single frame to illustrate the temporal unfolding of events. As one

might expect, heterochronicity in an engraving typically requires the distortion of spaces

where the events took place. The Bamberg broadsheet demonstrates this tendency. The

size and positions of buildings are clearly altered in order to accommodate the depiction

of the conflicts between soldiers. Only the natural elevation provided by the

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[388] Wüthrich, *Das druckgraphische Werk Mathäus Merians d. Ae* (Basel: Bärenreiter-Verlag, 1966), 1:164 (#595).

[389] "Ermordung Wallensteins am 25. Februar 1634 in Eger," (1634); Harms, DiF II, 539 (#308); HAB Signatur: IH 568.

[390] "Wahrhafftige und Eygentliche Abbildung / was in der neulicher Zeit vorgangenen blutigen Schlacht . . . in Namen Ihrer Kay. May." (1620), HAB Signatur: IH 527a; Paas P-595.

geographical lay of the city permits the use of a single vantage point. Other broadsheets used a similar method to narrate non-military events. Perhaps the most famous examples of German broadsheets that often turn to heterochronic visual depictions are the reports of criminals and their executions. One such broadsheet relates the story of Peter Stump, convicted in 1589 of sorcery for changing into a wolf and devouring victims. The broadsheet's image depicts Stump's crime, capture, interrogation, confession, execution, and his burial in a single frame as separate events that snake through the image.[391] As is the case with the Bamberg broadsheet, Stump's example employs a legend to guide the reader's viewing of the image.

Almost a year after Gustav Adolf's death, one military broadsheet depiction of the battle of Pfaffenhofen (Lothringen) attempts to avoid extensive spatial distortion common to battle report broadsheet images.[392] In this image, much like Images 220 and 221 above, the artist illustrates troop movements with the use of shadows. But by extending his perspective high above the battlefield using "Vogelperspektive," the artist avoids the shift in perspective that would require the use of a multiple images.[393] Handily, the sweeping displacements of both armies during the battle allowed the artist to depict the rotation of the forces and their final position in the conflict. As is the case with other heterochronic examples analyzed above, the narrative of the broadsheet relies more heavily on image and legend than on text. The only 'narration' emerges from the combination of these two aspects of the broadsheet and the use of shadows and gunpowder smoke to denote movement and conflict. Once again, however, gunpowder

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[391] Meise, 156-157, and "Peter Stump" broadsheet from Abbildung 1 in the same article.

[392] "Schlacht bei Pfaffenhofen (Lothringen) am 31. Juli 1633"; Harms, DiF II, 533 (#304); HAB Signatur: IH 565.

[393] Ulrike Fuss, *Matthaeus Merian der Ältere* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2000), 41.

weapons allow the conflict to become spatially accessible to the reader, who can see which units engage each other and which units stand in reserve. Similar to broadsheets that focus purely on the tactics of the battle, however, the Pfaffenhofen broadsheet image does not reveal the outcome of the battle.[394] Instead, the outcome is reported in the title and legend. Text, even very brief text, remains crucial to the viewer's comprehension of the news that this broadsheet offers.

Lützen, 1632: The Demise of Gustav Adolf

The defeat and death of Tilly at the Battle of Rain (Lech) had two effects that will figure into this study: (1) it opened Bavaria to Swedish conquest, and (2) it sent Emperor Ferdinand II into a panic that caused him, in April 1632, to re-instate Wallenstein, the general he and his Imperial Diet had shamed and dismissed just two years earlier.[395] Wallenstein went to work immediately. He recruited an army and invaded Saxony essentially occupying the area that Gustav Adolf had just left and threatening the Swedish supply lines.[396] Then, at the beginning of November 1632, Wallenstein made a grave mistake: he dispersed his army to winter quarters because he assumed that the Protestant forces would do the same.[397] Two days later, on November 6 (16) the Swedish army caught Wallenstein off-guard with an assembled force of about 19,000 men.[398] At Lützen, just south of Leipzig, Swedish and Catholic armies—roughly the same size—

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[394] Pfeiffer, 257.

[395] Brady, 394; Bonney, *The Thirty Years' War*, 42, 53.

[396] Brady, 394.

[397] Brady, 394.

[398] Brady, 394; Liemandt, 45.

engaged in a daylong bloodbath that left about 6,000 casualties on each side.[399] The

Swedish attempt to trap and destroy the Imperial army with a right wing attack failed.[400]

The Swedes held the field, and Wallenstein retreated to Bohemia leaving behind his

supplies and artillery. The Swedish forces suffered the loss that turned their German

adventure into a misadventure. Shot repeatedly, Gustav Adolf was found dead and

stripped to his undergarments.[401] The Swedish army, made up mostly of mercenaries,

was so dedicated to the charismatic fallen King that, in his absence, they mutinied twice

in the next six months. Previously willing to forgo timely payment while the King was

alive, they now refused to fight until they were compensated for their service.[402]

> At [Gustav Adolf's] death Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna
> (1583-1654) began his long service as both Swedish
> commander in the German lands and chief regent for the
> dead king's daughter, Queen Christina[.] By nature a
> shrewd, cautious man, the chancellor abandoned the dead
> king's grandiose political ambitions . . . Lacking sufficient
> charisma to rally the German Protestant princes,
> Oxenstierna watched his army sink into ever deeper
> dependence on French subsidies.[403]

Though Gustav Adolf died "den Soldatentod" [the soldier's death] his loss destroyed his

army's military potential and crushed its morale.[404]

News of Gustav Adolf's death did not immediately circulate. Wallenstein did not

even hear credible reports of Adolf's death until nearly two weeks after the battle,

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[399] Bonney, *The Thirty Years' War*, 49.

[400] Droysen, *Gustav Adolf*, Vol. 2, 664.

[401] Brady, 394-395; Liemandt, 41.

[402] Brady, 395.

[403] Brady, 395.

[404] Droysen, 665.

around November 20 (30).[405] Indeed, some reports even circulated the news, with great

imaginative flourish, that Gustav Adolf was alive.[406] Other reports were simply

unsure.[407] Eventually a series of *Relationes* and broadsheets broke the news. A massive

funeral march delivered the King back to his homeland, showing his body lying in state

along the way. Images of his corpse on its bier were circulated in various media in 1633,

including prints from engravings and circulating coinage.[408] Broadsheets handled the

news of the Swedish King's demise in the same ways they treated his successes. A series

of matter-of-fact and allegorical broadsheets employed the standard rhetorical and

visual devices of the genre to spread the news. Considering how central gunpowder

weapons had been to his demise, they played a subdued role in the accounts of his

death. A single notable exception was the descriptions of the number of times and the

circumstances of how he was shot. In Catholic-leaning *Relationes* and *Flugschriften*, the

King is often presented as having ridden mistakenly between the battle lines because he

was "off balance" or "weakened" from an earlier "close call" with a cannon ball.[409] In

Protestant versions of the story, Gustav Adolf sees his lines failing and rides bravely into

the fray to bolster the spirits of his men. In both versions, he is often shot many times.

Since he had been elevated in the Protestant media to an invincible demigod, his demise

was reported as a dramatic one, perhaps even the result of treachery. For example, in

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[405] Parker, *The Thirty Years War*, 212; Liemandt, 55, 69.

[406] Liemandt, 49.

[407] For example L_8; Liemandt, 49.

[408] Adam Wieçek, *Sebastian Dadler: Medalier Gdański 17 Wieku* (Gdansk/Danzig, 1962), 113. The piece by Sebastian Dadler (Danzig, 1633-1634) and the piece from the town of Wolgast, Pommerania (1633) are two notable examples that copy the image of Gustav Adolf's corpse circulated in *Flugblätter*.

[409] Liemandt, 67-80.

"GVSTAVUS ADOLPHUS VICTOR" (1632), a Protestant *Flugschrift* [pamphlet], the

King's death is explained through a conspiracy plot of "Ertzmördere" [arch

murderers].[410] In that scenario the King receives "innumerable" shots and beatings before

he dies.[411] In another widely circulated broadsheet, he is shot five times before dying.[412]

Gustav Adolf, the superhuman paragon of heroic warrior masculinity in the Protestant

broadsheet media, dies so horribly because he could only die nothing less than an

"unvermuthlichen Todt" [inconceivable death] in a hail of bullets.[413] In some of the

Catholic versions, on the other hand, Gustav Adolf falls because he is faint, confused, or

merely foolhardy.

The historical reality of Gustav Adolf's death continues to be contested. Since he

was known to have worn no armor into battle, it is reasonable to believe that he—

undertaking a cavalry charge—could have, as most sources report, been wounded by

multiple gunshots. Indeed, he had been shot numerous times before, twice in 1627

alone.[414] The most commonly repeated numbers for Lützen are between three and five

bullet wounds. Since some sources report that he was shot in the back, others speculate

that he may have been (accidentally or intentionally) shot by his own soldiers, knocked

from his horse, and dragged by one leg across the battlefield. But it is just as likely that

he was shot in the back at any point while falling from his horse or while on the ground.

The scandalous depiction of the stripping of the body may also be tempered by the fact

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[410] "GVSTAVUS ADOLPHUS VICTOR" (1632), Aiij$_r$; qtd. in Liemandt, 63.

[411] Liemandt, 63.

[412] "Eigendliche Abbildung," HAB Signatur: IH 561.

[413] "KlageLiedt . . . Gustavi Adolphi" (1633), VD17: 14:004873M.

[414] Richard Brzezinksi, Richard Hook, *The Army of Gustavus Adolphus: Cavalry* (Oxford: Osprey, 1993), 5-6.

that most fallen soldiers would have been stripped of their valuables. If an Imperial soldier had recognized the body of the fallen Swedish King, he would have likely tried to capture and ransom rather than strip it. The stripping of the King, therefore, was more likely a case of mistaken identity, an oversight—based on how famous Gustav Adolf's visage was—that may be more egregious than the desecration of a random body on the battlefield.

While the death of Gustav Adolf was sensationalized in partisan news presses (*Zeitungen* and *Relationes*), burial sermons, and pamphlets, the story of his death was reported with earnest gravity in the *Flugblätter* of 1632 and 1633. The earliest broadsheet reports of his death are found in battle reports such as "Eigendliche Abbildung . . . Der grossen und blutigen Schlacht . . . bey den Städtlein Lützen."[415] These were quickly followed by allegorical mourning broadsheets—or "TrawerPosten"—such as "Der Schwede lebet noch" (1633) and "KlageLiedt" (1633).[416] Regardless of their tone, however, the sheer volume of German broadsheets surrounding Gustav Adolf's death outweighs that of the broadsheet media devoted to any other event during his lifetime, including some of his greatest military victories like Breitenfeld. The composition of "TrawerPosten" tends to be consistent—title, image, poem—and the image of Gustav Adolf's corpse on its bier is nearly identical in each broadsheet. Even a handful of Reichsthaler coins minted in 1633 and 1634, notably including a piece by Danzig medallion artist Sebastian Dadler (1586-1657), quote visual material from no fewer than

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[415] "Eigendliche Abbildung . . . Der grossen und blutigen Schlacht . . . bey den Städtlein Lützen," (ca. 1632); Harms II, 477 (#274); HAB Signature: IH 561.

[416] "Der Schwede lebet noch" (1633); Harms II, 534-535 (#305); HAB Signatur: IH 227. "Klage Liedt" (1633); VD17 14:004873M.

three military and mourning broadsheets.[417] The events and figures that surround the corpse do change from broadsheet to broadsheet, shifting to accommodate the poems that follow each image. When it comes to gunpowder weapons depicted in the backgrounds of these broadsheets (and on Dadler's coin), the artists employ a set of visual cues similar to those of the broadsheets analyzed above. The texts deviate very little from the battle reports, mentioning in their most descriptive moments the large number of musket balls that killed the Swedish King, "Bald hie bald dort mit deinem Schwerdte schweiffen / Biß ohn gefahr / Flogen daher / Der Kuglen viel / die theils dich thaten treffen" [Now here now there you swung your sword / Until one day / There flew your way / Musket balls many, a few of which made you their mark].[418] They refrain from demonizing the weapons that killed him, focusing instead on adulations of his bravery.

One broadsheet depiction of the Battle of Lützen, "Eigendliche Abbildung . . . der grossen und blutigen Schlacht" (Figure 9; L$_3$ in Table 1), presents a classic example of a partisan battle report military broadsheet.[419] The sheet is oriented vertically with an extended and descriptive title at the top followed by a legend for the image and a detailed image of the battle. This is followed by the text, which includes a detailed index of the military units and commanders depicted in the image. Images of Gustav Adolf and Bernhard of Saxony ("generalis illustrissimus") inset in the corners of battlefield foreground its Protestant bias. A tactical depiction of the battlefield is centered at the top

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[417] Cf. Adam Więcek, *Sebastian Dadler: Medalier Gdański 17 Wieku* (Gdansk/Danzig, 1962), Tablica XXVII; Karl Domanig, *Die deutsche Medaille in kunst- und kulturhistorischer Hinsicht* (Wien: Verlag von Anton Schroll & Co., 1907), 51, and Tafel 36 (#328).

[418] "Klage Liedt" (1633); VD17 14:004873M.

[419] "Eigendliche Abbildung . . . der grossen und blutigen Schlacht," Paas, *German Political Broadsheets*, P-1865 (L$_3$ in Table 1).

of the battlefield. The main image appears *in media res* with nearly all units engaged on

the field simultaneously. It bears a close resemblance to the almost panoramic depiction

of the battle published by Matthäus Merian, first in broadsheet form and then again in

Volume 2 of the *Theatrum Europaeum*.[420] This particular image is signed by Nicolaus

Weishun (1607-1687) in the bottom right hand corner, but the signatures of other artists

such as Johann Jacob Gabler (d. 1640) can be found on nearly identical images from the

same year.[421] Put simply, there are many versions of this illustration by many different

artists. Although most of the differences in the battle depictions are minimal (an extra

cannon here, one less windmill there), the details of the foreground and the portraits in

the top corners do vary from edition to edition.

Like the more tactically accurate depictions of the Battle of Breitenfeld, the image

in this broadsheet provides a number of markers to aid the viewer's understanding of

the image. First and foremost, the tactical diagram at the top of the image and the

accompanying indices allow the reader to discern the two opposing forces. In addition,

the tactical image is oriented the same way as the narrative image, with the Imperial

forces at the bottom of the image and the Swedish forces at the top. The clear

demarcation of landmarks in both the tactical and narrative images enables the reader to

compare the chaos of the colliding armies with their original positions before the

opening of hostilities. In particular, the windmills on the right flank of the Imperial army

(F), the Imperial munitions wagon in the *Tross* (Q), the gallows and execution place (P),

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[420] Wüthrich, 1:193 (#626). Merian's illustration of Lützen first appeared in the second
edition of Volume 2 of the *Theatrum Europeum* (1637). The first edition of Volume 2 must
have gone to print before this illustration could be included.

[421] "Glaubwürdiger Bericht und Erzehlung," Paas, *German Political Broadsheets*, P-1858 (L₇
in Table 1).

and the town of Lützen (D) provide stable landmarks, around which the viewer can imagine the battle unfolding.

Some of these markers, especially the windmills (F), the Imperial munitions wagon (Q), and the town of Lützen (D), also provide visual clues about the progression of the battle by their destruction. Most obvious among these is the munitions wagon; depicted as intact in the tactical image on the broadsheet, it explodes in the narrative image. A ring of smoke, bursting from a central location and still marked (Q), flings pieces of debris, body parts, bodies, wagon wheels, and muskets. Because of its central position in the image, it catches the eye. The chaos portrayed in the narrative image forces the reader to negotiate between the tactical image, narrative image, indices, and text in order to discover what has happened to the previously undamaged munitions wagons. As in other battle images discussed above, this explosion also signifies the image's heterochronicity. Combined with the contest over the mills and the simultaneously firing cannon, the explosion of the *Tross* highlights the multiple temporal moments depicted in this single image. As an "Eigendliche Abbildung," this image like its relatives—which are usually titled in a similar fashion as "glaubwürdig" [veritable] or "warhafftig" [truthful]—is an example of the adjustment of temporal-spatial reality to a broad notion of "truth."

Gunpowder adds chaos to the battlefield, but it also enables the hypertextual representation of battles in the military broadsheet. A comparison of the combination of text and image in this broadsheet with other partisan broadsheet depictions of the battle reveals that this version is one of the most "truthful"—or at least most specific—renditions of the battle to be found. In particular, the indices allow the reader to navigate quickly between text and image, tracing the progression of the battle from start to finish.

Moreover, the narrative portion of the text refers to the numbers found in the indices, aiding the reader in navigating the hypertextual triangle of narrative, index, and image on a single sheet. This construction supports Horst Wenzel's interpretation of the *Flugblatt* as a hypertextual medium, in which "the structures of ideas are not sequential."[422] Though the narrative text favors a sequential view of the battle, the hypertextual (if analog) 'links' in the form of indices allow the reader to navigate between parts of the page as one would a modern-day website. Just as the image bends time and space to depict "Wahrheit" [truth], so does the entire broadsheet allow for the breaking of the chronological navigation of the battle narrative: "Die Hypertexte . . . sind navigierbare Texte, deren Struktur die Linearität der Fließtext-Literatur aufbricht und durch den Einbau von Links, die jeweilige Bezugstextpassagen aufblenden[,] viel komplizierter angelegt ist" [Hypertexts are navigable texts, whose structure breaks out of the linearity of single-stream literature and is produced more complexly through the creation of links, which blend together the passages of the reference text].[423] Wenzel's hypertextual reading of early modern broadsheets suggests what the visual—print— depiction of gunpowder battles made necessary: the bending and blending of temporal-spatial realities. Only through this blending could the story of a complex battle be reproduced, consumed, and comprehended in a printed form. That we label an early modern text such as this "hypertextual" is not to pre-suppose that all readers would (or could) navigate it in the ways outlined, but it does provide evidence of non-linear thinking prior to the digital age. Gunpowder weapons simultaneously complicated war

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[422] Ted Nelson, qtd. in Horst Wenzel, "Text und Hypertext," Daphnis 37:1-2 (2008), 179-180; Cf. Gerard Genette's definition of "hypertext" in *Palimsests: Literature in the Second Degree* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 1-10.

[423] Wenzel, "Text und Hypertext," 181.

stories by bringing enlarging the battlefield and accelerating the events taking place and, in the visual components of the broadsheet medium, rendered the story comprehensible through the visual cues gunpowder weapons provide, such as smoke and explosions.

The representation of gunpowder in this broadsheet (L_3), much as in the other battles considered above, plays an important—but morally neutral—role. This neutrality is historically surprising yet conventionally expected since, from a formal standpoint, both the text and the image reinforce the common narrative uses of gunpowder found in the broadsheet images of Breitenfeld. Visually, gunpowder smoke separates the armies. It demarcates the belligerents and spatially orients the reader in the battlefield. This is true for both the inset tactical image and narrative image. Puffs of gunpowder smoke coming from the artillery batteries on both sides and from the Imperial trench between the two main bodies of soldiers in the inset tactical image indicate the following:

(1) the boxes at the top of the image (above the trenches) constitute one army and the boxes below the trenches another; and

(2) the army at the bottom occupies the territory from the bottom of the image to the trench.

If the reader consults the legend at the top of broadsheet, it becomes clear that the Swedish army is the top army and the Imperial army is the bottom army.

Quite incidentally, as the result of historical and tactical developments specific to this battle, gunpowder became a major part of the dramatic action in reports of Lützen. Whereas broadsheet battle reports typically comment on the number of cannon captured or lost by each of the armies, gunpowder weapons uniquely impacted the Battle of Lützen:

(1) The Imperial artillery battery (G) at the front left of the Imperial battle line changed and was redirected a number of times.

(2) The Imperial artillery battery in front of the windmills (G/F) inflicted severe damage on the Swedish forces, and thus became the target of a cavalry attack.

(3) Mixed small arms killed Gustav Adolf during the faltering of the right wing cavalry offensive against Piccolomini.

(4) The explosion of the Imperial munitions wagon (Q) depicted in the image provides a visually stunning but tactically unimportant moment in the battle.

Three of these four instances constitute military tactical events of little political significance, yet they represent moments of dramatic energy for the story of Lützen. They are depicted both in the text and in the image with the same set of narrative and visual cues that other broadsheets use. The death of Gustav Adolf, in contrast, was of great political significance. The text describes it in the following way:

> . . . sondern auch Ihr. Kön. May. sselbst / weil sie mit 11. als Schmaländern zu tieff hinein gesetzt / tödlich beschädigt / iren Geist in armis / so sie allein *pro Deo & religione tuenda* ergreiffen müssen / ritterlich und seliglich auffgeben / und der Königliche Cörper zimlich spolirt / an welchen 5. Schösse und etzliche Wünden observirt / eine viertel Stunde hernach erst gefunden worden.[424]

> [. . . but also His Royal Highness himself, because he plunged in too deeply with 11. the Småland Cavalry, was mortally injured and gave up his ghost in arms in a knightly and honorable fashion, just as he alone must comprehend in his regard for God and religion; and the Royal Body — on which 5 bullet wounds and other injuries were found — was only first discovered quite torn up a quarter of hour later.]

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[424] "Eigendliche Abbildung," HAB Signatur: IH 561 (L₃ in Table 1).

The repeated formality, "Ihr. Kön. May." [His Royal/Kingly Majesty], reinforces the author's Protestant partisan allegiance. Additionally, as we noted above, the embedded numerical indices allow the reader to trace the Swedish King's movements across the battlefield from beginning to end. That the cavalry squadron he was leading is further distinguished by the text also enables the viewer to trace the exact group of riders and perhaps imagine that one of the fallen bodies or charging horsemen is the King himself.

Indeed, the text mixes the messages of The Swedish King's death as the result of either bravery or foolhardiness. Although the author allows that he charged "zu tieff hinein" [in too deep], the Swedish King dies "ritterlich und seliglich" having sacrificied his body "for God and religion." The King's body, which has been "zimlich spolirt" [quite torn up] and riddled with *five* bullets and lacerated with *multiple* wounds, is not recovered until a quarter of an hour later. Consistent with other Protestant reports of his death, Gustav Adolf suffered a number of injuries. The *invulnerable* King could only be brought down under exceptional circumstances and by "inconceivable" injuries. Death by a stray bullet, as some scholars and sources have suggested may have happened, is the kind of death that in the eyes of Protestant commentators the Imperial General Tilly deserved, not King Gustav Adolf.[425]

Most of the battle broadsheets disseminated in the months following Lützen use a similar combination of indexical and narrative text next to or beneath tactical and narrative images. Indeed, most of them share the same image or some slight variation thereof. Excluding duplicate plates with different typefaces, I have found that eight of the German battle report broadsheets that I have catalogued share the same format: title,

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[425] Cf. "Rain am Lech" Broadsheet (R$_2$ in Table 1); Harms, DiF II, 501 (#287).

narrative image, tactical image, narrative text, indexical text.[426] The four broadsheets that

are different fall into two categories. Two of the images (L$_4$ and L$_{11}$ in Table 1) represent

detailed tactical images from the same perspective as the other indexed versions. The

image from L$_4$ (Figure 10) is the same image found in the broadsheet discussed above;

the image from L$_{11}$ is entirely different, noticeably lacking landscape details present in

other versions. We will discuss at length below the L$_{11}$ broadsheet, of which the Uppsala

Universitetsbibliothek has the only recorded example.[427]

The other two, non-indexed images, marked as L$_8$ and L$_9$ in Table 1, are non-

tactical depictions of the battle. Interestingly, the content and typeface of the text of L$_9$

match the text that has been glued to the image in L$_4$. The jerry-rigged product suggests

that the "creator" of L$_4$ cut apart two — possibly damaged — broadsheets and glued them

together at an unknown date.[428] The image in L$_9$ shows the battlefield from a vertical

perspective, with the Swedish army located on the left side of the battlefield and the

Imperial army on the right side. A small, inset index containing nine letters incorrectly

labels several groups of soldiers and officers on the battlefield, including Gustav Adolf.

The landscape lacks detail. Missing are a number of crucial landmarks such as the

windmills, the exploding munitions wagon, and the burning town of Lützen. The image

does, however, use heterochronicity to trace the movements of various commanders

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[426] I have counted duplicate broadsheets with slightly different typefaces and title ornamentation as "one" example, since my interest is in the narrative, pictorial, and compositional differences. See for example Paas, P-1863 through P-1865 for identical broadsheets with only slight alterations to font, darkness, and ornamental frames. For my cataloguing of these broadsheets see Table 1.

[427] "Eigentliche Abbildung der Zwischen Naumburg und Lützen . . .ergangener Schlacht," Paas P-1866 (L$_{11}$ in Table 1).

[428] L$_4$ exists only at the Herzog August Bibliothek. The glue on the back of the broadsheet is visible, and the lines on both parts of the broadsheet have been cut cleanly. There are no other known examples.

such as Gustav Adolf and Wallenstein. The viewer finds them marked in multiple locations across the battlefield, supposedly the places where they were located at various points during the battle. Additionally, despite the absence of tactical details, gunpowder weapons are used to indicate the battle lines and clashing groups of soldiers.

The depiction of the battlefield at Lützen presented in L$_8$ (Figure 11), on the other hand, is entirely non-tactical. It depicts soldiers fleeing from a town (Lützen?) as they fight off a few advancing bands of enemy soldiers. The figures are crudely etched and the battle lines are unclear. Two sets of artillery firing in opposite directions suggest that the battle line is drawn diagonally through the image from one corner to another. Towns burn in the background and lines (not the typically block formations) of soldiers appear to move chaotically through the image in different directions. More important than the battle formations, however, are the five crosses drawn in the sky, which serve as the "Wunderzeichen" reported in the text, "Ist auch selbigen Tag von Morgen biß um 9. Uhr am Himmel Wunderzeichen als grosse und k[l]eine weisse [sic] Creutz und Fewerstralen gesehen worden" [On the same day in the morning around 9 o'clock, such wondrous signs as large and small white crosses and fiery beams were seen.].[429] Despite its Protestant sympathies, this broadsheet fails to mention Gustav Adolf's death. Instead, after listing several Imperial casualties, the author writes, "Was auff unserer seiten blieben ist noch unwissend" [It is still unknown who died on our side].[430] The absence of this critical information combined with the roughness of the illustration, suggests that this broadsheet was one of the earliest that circulated after the battle.

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[429] "Eigentlicher Abriß der grossen Feldschlacht," Paas P-1861 (L$_8$ in Table 1).

[430] "Eigentlicher Abriß der grossen Feldschlacht," Paas P-1861 (L$_8$ in Table 1).

Many of the battle broadsheets from Lützen that contain indices for reader use required them because of the complexity of the image and the narrative. Even with the index, the reader—who most likely knew few details about the battle prior to reading the broadsheet—would take a long time to decipher the links between image and text to reach a coherent understanding of the battle. One non-indexed broadsheet, "Eigentlich Abbildung" (L₁₁ in Table 1), simplifies the reader's navigation of the battle image by eliminating the key points of the battlefield's landscape and the shape of the battle lines.[431] As with the majority of battle report broadsheets, the illustration in "Eigentliche Abbildung" uses the discharges from gunpowder weapons to delineate the battle lines, but they do not represent the tactical shape of the battle.

Using landscape markers to indicate where units of soldiers engaged one another, the most common broadsheet images of Lützen depict the battle lines spread across the complex landscape of the battlefield. This version, however, reduces the battle lines to an inverted parabola. It shares the perspective that Merian's version uses, but lacks his tactical and geographical details. Only two roads, labeled according to the towns to which they lead, give a sense of location. Imperial and Swedish artillery pieces are concentrated in the middle of the image as if they were dueling. On each side of the artillery, various units of cavalry and infantry are engaged. Perhaps symbolically, although not tactically, the Swedish army seems to be closing in around the Imperial army. Fleeing Swedish soldiers in the top left corner indicate the place where the Swedish line collapsed just before Gustav Adolf charged in to reinforce it. Labels around the battlefield indicate the most important commanders, including Wallenstein, Breda,

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[431] "Eigentliche Abbildung der Zwischen Naumburg und Lützen . . . ergangener Schlacht," Paas P-1866 (L₁₁ in Table 1).

and Pappenheim on the Catholic side, and Löwenstein, Bernhard of Saxony, and Gustav Adolf on the Protestant side. Although both Pappenheim and Breda also died at Lützen, only the Swedish king has the additional label, "König aus Schweden bleibt Thot" [The king of Sweden lies dead]. Beside the label, which is on the right wing of the Swedish army, a soldier wearing flared pants lies dead with his sword stretched out as if he were leading a charge.

The text depicts the circumstances of Gustav Adolf's death. Instead of being shot five times as he is in L_3, he is shot only three times in L_{11}, "Der König selbst ist in dem ersten Treffen erstlich in den Arm / hernach hinden in den Rücken / letzlich aber mit einer Pistol in den Kopff geschossen" [In the first engagement, the King was shot first in the arm, then in the back, and finally with a pistol in the head].[432] Common to this report is a commentary on his lack of armor, "der König / weilen er ohne Rüstung und Harnisch die Avantguardi selber geführt / sein Leben auff geopffert" [the King, because he led the *advanced guard* himself without any armor, sacrificed his own life]. Although he is occasionally chided as foolhardy for risking so much in such a cavalier fashion, the focus of this broadsheet is on his bravery. Unusual is the lack of bias found in the text of this broadsheet, which praises Pappenheim's death as equal to the death of Gustav Adolf in terms of honor and equates the fortitude of the Protestant forces with that of the Catholics: "Einmahl ist gewiß/ daß beyde Armeen gegen einander / als steynere Mawren gestanden / unnd gestritten haben / Ja es haben auch beyde Kriegshelden Jhr Excel. Graf von Pappenheimb und der König einen solchen Heldenmuth gegen einander zu geritten" [One thing is for certain, that both armies stood and fought against one

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[432] "Eigentliche Abbildung der Zwischen Naumburg und Lützen . . . ergangener Schlacht," Paas P-1866 (L_{11} in Table 1).

another like stone walls. Yes, both war heroes His Excellence Count von Pappenheim and the King rode against one another with heroic bravery].[433] Although the label does not speak of his death, closer inspection of the area near his name shows that Pappenheim, too, is left on the field with his arm outstretched like the dead Swedish King.

"Reading" Gunpowder in Early Modern Military Broadsheets

A survey of allegorical and narrative military broadsheets from Gustav Adolf's campaign during the Thirty Years War suggests that depictions of gunpowder weapons functioned as a both narrative tools and allegorical signifiers in these texts rather than as an object of criticism and moral concern. This non-negative cultural deployment of gunpowder technology is consistent with the representations of gunpowder found in most *Kriegsbücher*, such as those by Solms, Dilich, and Wallhausen. Historical debates over the use of gunpowder have produced arguments for both reactions, pitting moral outrage at the gunpowder revolution (the military revolution thesis) against a neutral evolution of gunpowder technology and military tactics (the materialist counterargument). The representation of gunpowder weapons in military broadsheets supports the materialist argument without dismissing the revolutionary effects of gunpowder technology. As Hall explains in *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, the gunpowder revolution thesis that "firearms were resisted by the aristocracy" is misleading since aristocrats were not "technophobes" regardless of how much they idealized traditional—medieval or chivalric—notions of knighthood or warrior

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[433] "Eigentliche Abbildung der Zwischen Naumburg und Lützen . . . ergangener Schlacht," Paas P-1866 (L$_{11}$ in Table 1).

masculinity.[434] New military technologies, whether crossbows, longbows, bombards, or muskets, were deployed when they proved to be tactically advantageous, not when they were considered to be "honorable" or "moral." The same can be said for the variety of depictions of gunpowder weapons in broadsheets.

This chapter has looked at a period in which the dissemination of military knowledge through broadsheets was quickly expanding. Between 1630 and 1633, Gustav Adolf's campaign in Germany significantly raised the levels of militarization in German-speaking lands. This development was accompanied by an increasing flow of military-related information in print media. Previous studies have suggested that the demonization of gunpowder weapons in German war narratives, especially novels, of the seventeenth century was linked to the experience of militarization in Germany during the Thirty Years War. It may, however, be more accurate to say that it was linked to specific behaviors of soldiers during the last two decades of the war or that it was linked to specific literary genres, perhaps both.[435] The depictions of battles included in the preceding analysis of German military broadsheets demonstrate that widespread militarization did not automatically lead to negative attitudes toward gunpowder weapons. Likewise, not all early modern German representations of gunpowder weapons necessarily condemned them. Instead, the ways in which gunpowder weapons are textually and visually represented in these broadsheets demonstrate the breadth of opportunities and challenges that gunpowder warfare presented for authors and artists.

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[434] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 10.

[435] Cf. Chapter 4.

Genre and Depiction: Hypertext and Heterochronicity

Despite the most extreme turmoil of gunpowder battle represented, these broadsheets deployed gunpowder weapons as malleable symbols and narrative devices. In allegorical broadsheets, gunpowder weapons serve as a morally flexible metonym for warfare. The negative or positive depiction of the satirical object (usually an army or a general) determines whether gunpowder weapons are construed positively or negatively. In the "Zahnbrecher" broadsheet, for instance, gunpowder weapons (along with other weapons) are analogs for Tilly's rotting teeth. In the "Confect-Taffel" broadsheet, gunpowder weapons become the "sweets" in which soldiers over-indulge and objects that remind the soldiers of their excessive pride. On the other hand, in the "Apotheck" broadsheet, gunpowder weapons are compared to a medicine that will help the "Artzt" (Gustav Adolf) cure the "Imperial disease." In all of these texts, the object of the satire determines the moral value assigned to gunpowder weapons as an allegory of war; gunpowder, when used symbolically in these texts, does not inherently connote moral value.

In narrative military broadsheets, usually of the "battle report" variety, gunpowder weapons serve at least two distinct functions. Most commonly, they help the viewer gauge the orientation of the battlefield by delineating the battle lines and indicating the location of conflicts on the battlefield. Alternatively, but not mutually exclusive, gunpowder weapons can also tell the reader who won the battle. This happens when one army is depicted as producing overwhelming firepower, that is, as firing more gunpowder weapons than the other army. In both cases, the heterochronicity of battle images adjusts both temporal and geographical realities in favor of a grand narrative of the battle. We, as readers and viewers of military

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broadsheets, should know that every gun on the battlefield did not fire simultaneously; nor did one army fire all of its guns at once while the other army sat silently and absorbed the barrage.

One explanation for why battle images were willing to sacrifice temporal-spatial details in the quest for creating a "veritable" depiction of battles might be found in the distinction between large-format and small-format war illustrations. In his essay on visual depictions of the Thirty Years War, Götz Pfeiffer assigns the historically fixated view of battle—such as those found in broadsheets—to "großformatig" [large-format] battle images such as those by Merian and Hogenberg.[436] He describes this artistic mode as a contrasting vision of war to the "kleinformatig" [small-format] series of engravings of the Thirty Years War by artists like Jacques Callot (1592-1635) and Hans Ulrich Franck (1603-1675). These images, he implies, are small both in terms of the size of the engraving plates and the scope of the subjects.[437] In battle images by Merian, Hogenberg, and other military broadsheet artists, there are "größere Ansammlungen von Fußtruppen mit Feuerwaffen und langen Spießen, daneben auch einzelnen Soldaten, die aus dem Gefecht laufen. Zwar ist . . . kein Soldat ein Individuum" [large collections of infantry soldiers with firearms and long spears, near them even single soldiers, who run from the battle. To be sure, no soldier is an individual].[438] The largeness of scale and the distortion of temporal spatial details also demanded the use of text to help the reader comprehend the battle. The titular "truth" advertised in the "large-format" military broadsheet is not found in the image alone or the text alone but rather

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[436] Pfeiffer, 259.

[437] Pfeiffer, 259, 265.

[438] Pfeiffer, 259.

in the combination of text (title/narrative/legend) and image(s) as hypertext.[439] Today's

reader of early modern military broadsheets, therefore, can contemplate

heterochronicity and hypertextuality in military broadsheets in the age of gunpowder

warfare as surprisingly old techniques of narrative representation.

Contextualizing Gunpowder in Broadsheets: Between *Kriegsbücher* and *Kriegsromane*

The death of Gustav Adolf presents a historical example of the most extreme

negative scenario in gunpowder warfare, which was repeatedly depicted in the works of

Fronsperger and, as we will see in Chapter Four, in the writings of Grimmelshausen,

Moscherosch, and Harsdörffer, among other early modern European writers. These

works commonly lament that, because of gunpowder weapons, the lowliest (and

morally corrupt) person could kill the greatest and most moral warrior. Adding to the

gloom of this tableau is the possibility that the gunshot comes "out of a bush" [*aus einer

Stauden heraus*], that is, surreptitiously. Gustav Adolf's death in a spray of anonymous

bullets at Lützen exemplifies the historical manifestation this commonly theorized

scenario. One could imagine that early modern broadsheet authors and artists would

have been forced to reflect on this widely held concern when they were depicting the

death of the great Gustav Adolf, the Lion of the North. So why do their representations

of his death seem to overlook it?

There are two possible answers: one anchored in historical considerations; the

other steeped in the specific conventions of genre. It is possible that the negative views

of gunpowder weapons expressed during the Thirty Years War by authors such as

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[439] Fuss, 148 (regarding Merian's depiction of Lützen): "Das Bild selbst gibt wenig
Aufschluß über das eigentliche Geschehen."

Moscherosch (whose "Soldatenleben" appeared in 1640) and Grimmelshausen (whose

Simplician novels appeared between 1668 and 1672) were actually tied to the bad-

behaviors of soldiers prevalent in the second half of the Thirty Years War, not the mass-

mobilization of armies. After all, Swedish hostilities in Germany began only twelve

years into the Thirty Years War, and Gustav Adolf was dead three years later. The often

condemned behaviors of soldiers, a function of their long-term garrisoning with and

exploitation of the local population, only became a widespread complaint after his

death. Moreover, only with the sack of Magdeburg by Tilly in 1631 did questions of

military violence against civilians begin to appear in print media. Jacque Callot's

influential cycle of eighteen prints, *Misères et les Mal-heurs de la Guerre* [The Miseries and

Maladies of War], for example, was not published until 1633.[440] Hans Ulrich Frank's set

of equally disturbing engravings were also produced much later, first in 1643 and then

again in 1655 and 1656.[441] Even Gryphius' mournful anti-war sonnet "Thränen des

Vaterlandes" [Tears of the Fatherland] is dated "Anno 1636."[442] What was unbearable in

the aftermath of Gustav Adolf's campaign seemed only a minor—if terrible—

inconvenience to civilians who were still convinced that the German War was a

confessional one while he lived. The open alliance of Catholic France and Protestant

Sweden after the death of Gustav Adolf chipped away the last vestiges of this pretense.

Literary and generic conventions might also explain why broadsheet depictions

of warfare during Gustav Adolf's campaign do not criticize gunpowder weapons as

novels of the Thirty Years War or even Fronsperger's *Kriegsbuch* do. Each of the three

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[440] Pfeiffer, 259.

[441] Pfeiffer, 266.

[442] Andreas Gryphius, "Thränen des Vaterlandes," in *Die deutsche Literatur in Text und Darstellung: Barock* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2003), 69-70.

genres central to this study—the *Kriegsbuch*, the military broadsheet, and the war novel—deployed gunpowder weapons in different ways. Fronsperger's *Kriegsbuch* criticized gunpowder weapons, in general, as tools only to be used for the maintenance of peace as he turned to the circular arguments of loaded peace. For Fronsperger, the desire for peace justified arms and armies, violence and bellicosity, and he pointed to gunpowder as a troublesome but inevitable tool of military activities. Broadsheets took up gunpowder weapons differently. Military broadsheets served as a medium of news for a wide audience. In varying degrees, they distributed the news of battles and military events through a combination of text and image, in order to inform their readers about an event and possibly spin the event according to political bias. Their tacit condoning of military violence on behalf of their cause prevented them from attacking the weapons of war in a way that might undermine their own side. Instead, gunpowder weapons were used symbolically to besmirch the enemy in satirical broadsheets while they acted as narrative cues in the images of battles in battle reports. As we will see in the next chapter, the deployment of gunpowder technology in German war novels of the late seventeenth century followed yet another set of conventions particular to their genre. As literary authors who conceived of their war novels as both entertaining and moralizing tales, Moscherosch and Grimmelshausen revived the moral, aesthetic, and gendered concerns about gunpowder technology in their fictional representations of the Thirty Years War.

Chapter 4
The Aesthetics of Gunpowder in Seventeenth Century German War Novels

"Speaking properly, I must say that manliness and bravery are no longer commonly practiced in the activities of war."—Leonard Fronsperger[443]

"The space of modern warfare is vulnerable by definition and no longer belongs to anyone."—Fredric Jameson[444]

There are many genres of print media that reacted to changes in warfare; however, military historians from both the military revolution and materialist camps often ignore or marginalize literary texts and literary scholarship on war. Although they commonly draw inspiration from authors such as H.J.C. Grimmelshausen, Miguel Cervantes, Christine de Pizan, and Ludovico Ariosto, among others, military historians tend to overlook—often for methodological reasons—the literary and cultural importance of these works. Yet literary texts tell us how war was imagined, even if not how it was practiced. And texts on war help us to think about war in cultural terms, even if claims about historical change must be advanced carefully. Literary analysis contemplates both aesthetics and content, and it is the task of literary historians to illuminate the use of aesthetic and rhetorical forms in the context of historical and cultural epochs. Therefore, literary historians should be aware of the importance of military technologies and tactics when making claims about the relationship of war literature to the actual experience of war. According to Horace's *Ars poetica*, widely

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[443] Leonhard Fronsperger, *Von Geschütz und Fewerwerck* (Frankfurt: Feyerabend, 1564), II$_a$. Hereafter cited parenthetically as *Geschütz* followed by either "[section] unpag." for unpaginated introductory material or the folio page for paginated excerpts. Excerpts come from the Newberry Library's 1564 edition and I have kept orthography and punctuation as true to the original as possible. [English translations mine.]

[444] Fredric Jameson, "War and Representation," *PMLA* 124.5 (October 2009), 1537.

accepted in Europe as a foundational treatise on aesthetic forms in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, aesthetic representation should also educate. Early modern Europeans often asserted that aesthetic forms such as painting, sculpture, poetry, and fiction are meant both to please [*delectare*] and to teach [*prodesse*] us how to interpret the world around us on moral terms—good and bad. Today, we might more readily recognize similar arguments espoused in Friedrich Schiller's *On the Aesthetic Education of Man*, in which the poet explicitly links artistic representation to moral training. In both Horace's and Schiller's formulations, material objects become objects of moral education when they are rendered through poetry, prose, or visual representation. Technology does not exist outside of these philosophical considerations. When a technology like gunpowder appears in literary representations of war, there are moral implications for consumers of these cultural artifacts of war, in our case, the reader.

Recently, in a *PMLA* issue dedicated to the special topic of "War," Fredric Jameson provided a theoretical framework to explain at least a part of this phenomenon. Expanding on formalist notions of "*ostranenie*, or defamiliarization (estrangement)," Jameson shows how realist representations tend to dismantle stereotypical (idealistic and mytho-heroic) perceptions of war by bringing it "before us in all its nameless freshness and horror."[445] Jameson's claim that all attempts at representing war contain the tacit suspicion that "war is ultimately unrepresentable" limits his efforts to classify the ways war is (not) represented in narrative variants of eight kinds: (1) the existential experience of war, (2) the collective experience of war, (3) leaders, officers, and the institution of the army, (4) technology, (5) the enemy landscape, (6) atrocities, (7) attack on the homeland, and (8) foreign occupation. Separate from these is the genre of "spies

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[445] Jameson, 1533.

and espionage," a genre which itself developed only in the nineteenth century with the rise of nation-states and, thus, nations to betray—Chaucer's *Troilus and Chriseyde* (ca. 1380) and his "calculating Calchas" might be a rare exception. Drawing on Kenneth Burke's "dramatistic pentad," Jameson further differentiates between "act, agent, agency, [and] purpose," which he proposes correspond to the first four categories above, and "scene," which dictates the final four categories of war narratives. The geometric expansion of Jameson's typology is as dizzying as his impenetrable sentences, but Jameson is mostly concerned with this "cutting" suspicion of the unrepresentability of war. His analysis of mostly German war narratives, including Grimmelshausen's, touches on the flux of technologies of warfare, too. In combination with shifting "aesthetic modes and transformations (allegory, realism, modernism, postmodernism)," and multiplied by the "radical changes in warfare historians document," these changing military technologies give us an infinite number of types of war stories.

Jameson's formal typology of the war story threatens to spin them out of reach while oversimplifying the underlying motivations of their authors. But he teases out the "technology" thread in a sophisticated way. As he draws on Alexander Kluge's historical vignette, "The Bombing of Halberstadt," Jameson lights upon the insightful postwar statement of one of the American bomber pilots: "how do you surrender to a squadron of bombers?"[446] Surrender, an age-old method of halting violence, loses its effectiveness in the age of technological warfare as the mechanisms that drive war become increasingly distant from the interests and decisions of the soldiers. The bombers can no more readily stop the bombing than the civilians and soldiers on the ground, in Halberstadt and elsewhere in Germany, who are thwarted in their efforts to surrender,

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[446] Qtd. in Jameson, 1545.

communicate, and run away from the attacks.[447] The moral conundrum of this scene

precedes the act of violence.[448] Targets, chosen ahead of time by those in command, are

strategic and impersonal.[449] In Jameson's examples, one can discern the shift from the

"hand-to-hand combat in the plains before Troy" to the impersonal bombing of

Halberstadt, but he relegates the multitude of technological innovations in between to

mere "structural changes in warfare."[450] There appears to be a disconnect in his logic

between his invocation of Adorno's "slingshot to megaton bomb" teleology and the

rupture between Hegelian notions of "epic" and the corrupted "prose of the world." The

former supposes a linear and unproblematic evolution of projectile violence while the

latter observes the historical shift of literary forms that record violence. Jameson fails,

meanwhile, to account for the fits and starts of technological advances that Bert Hall so

carefully outlines in his historical analysis of gunpowder warfare. Instead he flattens

technology to an ahistorical theme that "wanders across all our tale types."[451] In the

German Baroque novel, however, gunpowder technology does not wander; rather, it

explodes and ruptures the narrative just as completely as it decimates the aesthetic

precedence—the act, agents, agency, and purpose—of war.

Jameson's explanation provides for us a model to organize the pervasive

"atrocity" of modern warfare in formalist terms of act/agent/agency, purpose, and

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[447] Alexander Kluge, *Chronik der Gefühle* (Frankfurt: Surkamp, 2004), II:27-82.

[448] There is evidence to suggest that bomber pilots exercised moral agency outside of their command structures by dropping bombs in unpopulated areas intentionally; however, we must imagine that these acts of mercy were the rare exception, and not the rule in World War Two bombing raids. (Kluge, II:63.)

[449] Kluge, II:63.

[450] Jameson, 1533.

[451] Jameson, 1534.

scene. However, in early modern war novels, the technology of gunpowder—as an organizing motif—is ever present as a moral, ethical, gendered, and aesthetic signifier of destruction in and of itself. Gunpowder is not the only evil of modern warfare in the narratives of Grimmelshausen and Moscherosch, but it is linked to all other facets of the experience of war. For these early modern writers, aesthetic pleasure [*delectare*] was always linked to moral education [*prodesse*].[452] Jameson suspects correctly that war presses on the limits of representation, but it was not always that way. Epics, for example, do not seem to be faced with this conundrum.

Somewhere along the line warfare ceased being a space in which meaning was stable, in which good and bad were clearly recognizable. That conceptual break corresponds with the introduction of gunpowder to European battlefields. As we will explore below, and as Jameson knows, "the act and its actantial categories always presuppose a name, and thereby a preexisting concept of the event identified (as already with the word *war*)."[453] That is, an act or activity already has a history, a precedent, that lets us know what it is and what it should be. War, as a concept, is formed by a constellation of ideas, stories, rules, and tools that follow it through history and that influence the way new generations think war should look.

Those who experience war and describe war are linked by their depictions to those who only know war as consumers of descriptions of warfare. As those who represent war in art and literature inevitably cast moral judgments on warfare in the process of recording it, readers—and here we include the viewers of artworks about

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[452] Moral education is not, of course, the only form of *prodesse*, but it is an important one, and one that is constantly invoked by both Grimmelshausen and Moscherosch.

[453] Jameson, 1534.

war—draw moral meaning from these aesthetic descriptions, a phenomenon that the deployment of gunpowder weapons in broadsheets demonstrated in Chapter Three. Take for instance the "old lie" of Wilfred Owen's First World War poem, "Dulce et decorum est." Owen's poem calls to judgment Horace's ode in which he, ventriloquizing through a young woman, cries, "Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori" [it is sweet and fitting to die for one's country].[454] Horace, urging his young countrymen "Angustam amice pauperiem pati" [to suffer hardness with good cheer], exhorts young soldiers to defend Rome for a supposedly objective good. But we must recognize that, embedded in Horace's original inscription, and then again in Owen's dirge, are two conflicting moral constructions of war. Horace elevates the body of the fallen soldier to a moral good; Owen finds only a cultural lack, a lie, and a moral failure of politics, a waste of human bodies. Owen's description of a gas attack highlights in thick description the terrifying consequences of chemical warfare: "Gas! GAS! Quick, boys! . . . / But someone still was yelling out and stumbling / And flound'ring like a man in fire or lime.— / . . . As under a green sea, I saw him drowning." Owen's poem ends with his own exhortation: "My friend, you would not tell with such high zest / . . . The old lie."[455]

The temptation for our analysis, in which we are considering the impact of technology on aesthetic representations of war, is to read these differing reactions to war against their technological backdrops. Perhaps Owen's reaction to Horace's moral claim is only a product of witnessing or describing a gas attack. But such a simplification denies the existential experience of warfare as Owen sees it. Owen's claim is that war is

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[454] Horace, "Hor. Carm. 3.2," *Horace Odes and Epodes*, eds. Paul Shorey and Gordon Laing (Chicago: Sanborn & Co., 1919), http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/.

[455] Wilfred Owen, "*Dulce et Decorum est*," in *The Penguin Book of First World War Poetry* (NY: Penguin Books, 2006), 141.

always immoral and that Horace's "old lie" was a lie even when it was new. For the moment, we gain more from this juxtaposition of claims by recognizing that aesthetic representation has long tied war to moral questions. Gunpowder necessarily entered this conversation when it became a requisite tool of European warfare sometime in early fifteenth century, as I have proposed, and eventually a central component of war stories. In order to understand the connection between the technology of gunpowder, its aesthetic significance for war stories of the early modern period, and its moral implications in those stories then and now, we need a model of aesthetic theory that links aesthetic representation to moral education.

Horace's *Ars Poetica* [*The Art of Poetry*](ca. 8 B.C.E.) has influenced two millennia of literary thinking, and "is the only classical essay on literary criticism that has been known with something like continuity from the date of its composition to the present day."[456] From the Middle Ages to the early modern period, scholars and poets cited the *Ars Poetica* widely; the advent of the printing press circulated it even more quickly throughout Europe, including German lands. One printed edition appeared in Leipzig as early as 1512.[457] Attesting to the tenacity of its acolytes is the reconciliation, as opposed to replacement, of the *Ars Poetica* with Aristotle's *Poetics* after its rediscovery around 1535.[458] Written in dactylic hexameter and organized in a tight didactic style, Horace's *Ars Poetica* is most often classified as an epistle although its standard title

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[456] O.B. Hardison, Jr and Leon Golden, *Horace for Students of Literature: The "Ars Poetica" and its Tradition* (Gainesville: UP of Florida, 1995), 3.

[457] Q. Horatij Flacci, *Poete Venusini ars poetica* (Leipzig: Jakob Thanner, 1512). VD16 H 4895.

[458] Hardison, 3.

["ars"] suggests something closer to "handbook."[459] In either case, Horace's *Ars Poetica* combines a pleasant and often playful style with a distinct didactic program. This combination is fitting, since the *Ars Poetica* is famous for its claim that poetry should both teach and please:

> Aut prodesse volunt aut delectare poetae
> aut simul et iucunda et idonea dicere vitae. . . .
> omne tulit punctum qui miscuit utile dulci,
> lectorem delectando pariterque monendo.
>
> [Poets aim either to benefit or to amuse,
> or to utter words at once both pleasing and helpful to life. . . .
> He has won every vote who has blended profit and pleasure,
> at once delighting and instructing the reader.][460]

Early modern authors—both poets and prose authors alike—took these lines to heart in attempting to mix *prodesse* and *utile* [utility] with *delectare* and *dulce* [pleasure]. From Wittenwiler's lessons on warfare, slipped between moments of peasant farce, to Fronsperger's presentations of "schönen Historien" [lovely histories] which are also "nutzlich" [useful], most of the writers considered in this analysis took great pains to nurture and advertise both the pleasurable and educational aspects of their works.[461] Most often, as is the case with Grimmelshausen and Moscherosch in addition to the numerous authors already mentioned, the lessons to be learned were moral in nature. The pleasurable story serves simultaneously as an effective vehicle for moral education

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[459] Hardison, 26-28.

[460] Horace, *Satires, Epistles and Ars Poetica*, Trans. H. Rushton Fairclough (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1955), 479.

[461] Cf. 1.4 and 2.3

and an aesthetic object itself. Under the tenets of *prodesse et delectare* the two are

inseparable.[462]

Schiller's *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man* (1794), which reiterates Horace's

assumptions about the dual purpose of art, provides a set of terms that help us link

aesthetic experience [*dulce*/*delectare*] and moral judgment [*utile*/*prodesse*]. Schiller's

terms, in particular "absolute reality" and "absolute formality,"[463] are useful for

describing gunpowder's impact on the morally charged literary landscape of warfare.[464]

Considering warfare, we reflect on the effects of new technologies of war as we balance

between absolute reality and absolute formality. Aesthetic representations of war are

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[462] The "pleasant story" was not the only aesthetic medium that carried moral weight. Images, especially allegorical artworks and emblems were meant to be both pleasant and educational. Cf. Niefanger, *Barock*, 71-74.

[463] Friedrich Schiller, *On the Aesthetic Education of Man, in a Series of Letters* (London: Routledge & Paul, 1954), 146.

[464] Contemporary readers—and early modern people as well—interpret morality in war stories against a backdrop of technology and the ways in which it has been and is used. To interpret the moral meaning of war stories we turn to aesthetic precedence, which usually understands warfare in polarized ways—that is, as extremely good or extremely bad. In the Middle Ages war was widely recorded through epics and legends. Thus it should not surprise us that the consensus of epic European literature was that war produced beautiful stories of goodness and heroism. Yet, when perceptions of present circumstances do not match our imagination of the ideals surrounding them, a conflict between what Schiller calls "absolute reality" [*absolute Realität*] and "absolute formality" [*absolute Formalität*] occurs. Speaking of the play between these two poles, Schiller writes, "The Beautiful is not to be mere life, nor mere shape, but living shape—that is, Beauty— as it dictates to mankind the twofold law of absolute formality and absolute reality." (cf. previous note) Here, Schiller claims that the Beautiful [*das Schöne*]—and he is refering to aesthetic forms that include the Beautiful's opposite "the Ugly" and counterpart "the Sublime"—dictates absolute reality and absolute formality. Humans use the beautiful to mediate between the two. For Schiller, absolute reality exists in our world before we bring moral judgments to bear on it. But we need aesthetic education in order to understand what these "absolute realities" are and to interact with them, judge them, and make use of them. Absolute formality, then, is the pure aesthetic representation of an object devoid of material reality. Humans interact—in Schiller's words, "play"—with the world between these two poles. We shift between what we encounter materially— things—and what we have imagined or seen depicted through aesthetic forms—ideas of things.

often idealized, but they are, and according to Horace[465] must be, plausibly linked to reality.[466] New technologies of warfare create aesthetic dissonance when the material and moral expectations of absolute reality are distant from the ideal of absolute formality. For example, if we have learned about war only through stories of knights, then we will be hard-pressed to make sense of an experience of war that involves nuclear weapons. In a less extreme but nonetheless distressing way, early modern people had a difficult time coping with the impact of gunpowder weapons on the conduct of warfare. In surveying the textual history of war from 1400 to 1680, we find a revolution in the literary imagination of warfare due to the proliferation of gunpowder technologies. During this period, many European writers lashed out against gunpowder technologies as they attempted to compensate aesthetically for the disconnection between what they thought war should look like and what they perceived as its reality. I agree with Lynne Tatlock's assessment that early modern war literature, and seventeenth century German prose works in particular, attempted to neutralize gunpowder technologies with aesthetic forms such as the satirical novel in order to make sense of the new ways in which warfare was waged.[467]

A literary historical account of gunpowder's impact on society should mediate between how gunpowder was deployed on battlefields and how its use was represented in art and literature in order for us to understand the way people thought about this technology. Gunpowder not only changed the way people fought wars, but it

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[465] Horace, *Ars Poetica*, 479: "ficta voluptatis causa sint proxima veris" [fictions meant to please should be close to the real].

[466] This articulation is thanks to feedback from the German Department's 2010-2011 Dissertation Colloquium and Dr. Matt Erlin (April 1, 2011).

[467] Lynne Tatlock, "Simulacra of War," 646.

observably and radically changed the way people imagined such wars. As we consider the literary ways of imagining against the historical backdrop of ways of fighting, we will find that gunpowder technologies had three implications for the narration of war in early modern Europe: aesthetic, gendered, and ethical-moral. By aesthetic, I mean the qualities tied to the imaginative representation of a subject, whether intrinsic to a genre, such as rhyme to poetry, or linked to an artistic theme, such as the heroic figure is to war. By gendered, I mean the process by which culture constructs the qualities that are expected in performances of masculinity and femininity. By ethics, I refer to the regulations that direct behavior in human interaction, such as the written and unwritten rules of war. Finally, by moral, I mean the way people judge things as either "good" or "bad," judgments that in early modern German lands were generally conflated with Christian teachings and societies in contrast to non-Christian ones.

The Aesthetics of Warrior Masculinity

There is a literary (and historical) identity at stake in the questions presented by the influence of gunpowder on warfare. Warrior masculinity, an axis of gender often accessed and performed by both male and female soldiers and civilians in different literary and historical moments, seems to have been threatened by the aesthetic dissonance of gunpowder warfare. Under consideration here are the literary representations of warrior masculinity common to war literature and military treatises. Inevitably, however, literary versions of this form of masculinity both reflect and anticipate real and historical identities to some degree. We will maintain our focus on literary archetypes and limit claims about the historical reality of warrior identity, except where supported by scholarship, plausible inference, or evidence. Using feminist theory

and literary history, we will investigate warrior masculinity first as a characterization that is both historically fluid and transhistorically present in the literature of war, and then as a literary figure to which authors of war narratives—from epics to autobiographies—most often turn for their representations of war. Finally, we will observe the historical and material conditions of gunpowder warfare that challenged the stability this literary fixture.

Feminist scholars have demonstrated that gender is not a static concept. In the early history of feminism, however, statements about gender tended to be directed toward women only. Two disciplines helped to spur closer examination of masculinity as a gender identity: psychoanalysis and sociology. Beginning with Sigmund Freud, psychoanalysis had much to say about masculinity and masculine desire, but psychoanalytic readings of masculinity are historically limited because they are linked to historically specific understandings of the self. Sociological explanations of masculinity, on the other hand, provide a framework within which masculinity as an idea can be performed and observed in relation to other people, regardless of how it is understood subjectively. Using this model, R. W. Connell discovered that even within masculinity there are diverse forms of masculine identity that struggle for power.[468] Connell appropriated the concept of "hegemony" to postulate that masculinity is not a coherent structure that oppresses women unilaterally; rather, patriarchy—the system that elevates the value of masculine-coded attributes—creates hierarchies within itself. While such a methodology has limitations for explaining the subjective experience of

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[468] R. W. Connell, *Masculinities* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1995).

masculinity, it provides critical insight into how masculinities are organized socially:

Not all masculinities are created equal.[469]

Such findings are important for the study of early modern texts and culture because they demonstrate the diversity of masculinities and the flexibility of their internal structures and their relationships to other forms of masculinity. This hierarchical organization of masculinities is easier to imagine in the early modern period when social classifications of men are compared with one another. More simply, we might consider, for instance, that the vagabond—a common literary and historical figure in Germany after the Thirty Years War—held a lower social and cultural status than the pastor of a church. In turn, the pastor of a church may not have the same claims to social power as an aristocrat or a university professor, depending on various geographical and social factors. Each of those men would understand their manhood as having greater and lesser power in relation to other men around them. Studies of early modern German masculinities are newer and becoming more numerous. They range from explorations of transgressive gender performance in literary works, including those by Grimmelshausen and Moscherosch, to historical and biographical explorations of masculinity.[470] With the exception of historian Ann Tlusty, however, scholars have not considered early modern warrior masculinity as an identity with roots in literary and social models of

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[469] R. W. Connell and Messerschmidt, "Hegmonic Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept," *Gender and Society*, 19 (December 2005), 859.

[470] Especially Scott Hendrix and Susan C. Karant-Nun, eds., *Masculinity in the Reformation Era* (Kirksville, MO: Truman UP, 2008); Karl Otto, ed., *A Companion to the Works of Grimmelshausen* (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2003); Merry Wiesner, *Women and Gender in Early Modern Europe* 3rd Ed. (NY: Cambridge UP, 2008).

masculinity.[471] A number of early modern scholars have discussed soldiers themselves, perhaps a few have even noted that these soldiers were men who adhered to certain expectations of manliness, but these scholars often fail to account for the ways in which representations of warrior masculinity and masculinity itself are always preoccupied with—even anxious about—their fragile construction and tenuous cultural legitimacy.

The multiplicity and contingency of warrior masculinities (or any axis of masculinity, for that matter) should, of course, provoke some skepticism about our ability to define it in a given historical moment. But a survey of discourses of warrior masculinity in early modern German texts provides us with a set of terms to consider as we analyze its appearance. The distinction made earlier, that of the officer and the enlisted man, can help us to orient ourselves toward the kinds of warrior masculinity developed out of this network of texts. As noted earlier, the end of the sixteenth century saw the folding of aristocratic courts martial into a general court martial in the Swedish *Kriegsartikel* [Articles of War] (1621/1632) and imperial *Kayserliche Kriegsrechte* [Imperial Laws of War] (1570) in effect during the Thirty Years War.[472] Preceding this shift was a general removal of special "aristocratic" branches of the military such as knights. These positions disappeared in the late sixteenth century due to their tactical obsolescence which resulted from the use of the wheel lock pistol and the success of the *Reiter*, the mounted pistoleer. Along with this evolution from estate-based organization to tactical branches focused on specific tasks—infantry [*Fußvolck*], artillery [*Arteley/Arckeley/Artollerey*], and cavalry [*Reuter*]—came the reorganization of these

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[471] B. Ann Tlusty, "Rumor, Fear, and Male Civic Duty during a Confessional Crisis," in *Masculinity in the Reformation Era*, 140.

[472] Frauenholz, Vol. 3: Pt. 1, 23.

branches into hierarchies of officers and enlisted soldiers.[473] Each of these military

classes—officers and enlisted men—, which persist in today's military structures,

brought with them their own sets of behaviors based on historical precedents. It is not

surprising that both aristocratic and non-noble officers, as an elite class of soldiers,

would adopt the traditions and *mores* of the elite class that preceded them, namely

knights. Yet this distinction also recognized the enlisted soldier as semi-autonomous,

which he had not been in previous eras. He was no longer beholden to a lord that

controlled his life from cradle to grave; rather, he owed his allegiance to a political

ideology, or a commander, or—more often in the early modern era—money.[474] Such

devotion was more fickle than the medieval allegiance to the absolute power of the

feudal lord.[475] The enlisted man—especially the mercenary—was still a lowly subject,

beholden to his commanders and the money that could be found in the profession of

arms, but more and more, he was becoming an agent rather than a tool of violence.[476]

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[473] Wilhelm Dilich, *Kriegsbuch* (Cassell: Wilhelm Wessell, 1608), 57: "Reuter, Fußvolck, und Artelery oder 'Arckeley.'"; Frauenholz, Vol. 3: Pt. 1, 34-35

[474] Hall, 225-234; Frauenholz Vol. 3: Pt. 1, 51.

[475] Otto Brunner, *Land und Herrschaft*, 4th ed. (Wien: R. M. Rohrer, 1959), 57; Trans. Kaminsky and Van Horn Melton, *Land and Lordship*, 4th ed. (Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), 49.

[476] Brunner's scholarship on the status of the mercenary in medieval and sixteenth century Germany is worth noting here: "Ohne Zweifel rekrutierte sich ein großer Teil dieser Söldnertruppen aus einer halb unterirdischen Welt von Deklassierten, von Fahrenden und Verbrechern. Der ohnehin Friedlose war jederzeit bereit, sich gegen Geld als Feind brauchen zu lassen. Zeitgenössische Berichte sprechen von diesen Leuten in den schroffsten Worten der Verurteilung" [Many mercenaries were undoubtedly recruited from the demimonde of *declassé* drifters and criminals. A man who was outside the peace anyway was always ready to serve for money in someone's war. Contemporaries condemned such people in the harshest terms...] (Brunner, 58-59; trans., 50).

Military treatises of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries distinguish between the kinds of men who make good officers and the ones who make good soldiers. For example, starting with the *Feuerwerkbuch von 1420* [*Firework Book of 1420*], the ability to read and write increasingly became a distinction for the officer class as military training demanded a combination of theoretical and practical learning.[477] Thus, we should not be surprised that the expectations of intellect and morality are consistently higher for officers in the works of Fronsperger, Dillich, and Wallhausen. In Dillich's *Kriegsbuch* (1608), for example, forty-eight of the sixty-one officer ranks listed required some level of literacy, whereas only three of the twenty-three enlisted ranks required basic arithmetic, at the most. The minimum moral expectations for officers were also higher, possibly because of their closeness to the *Kriegsherr*. But it can also be inferred from these texts that membership in certain social groups presupposed possession of these moral qualifications, which were mostly conflated with religious and estate affiliations. These expectations were unevenly mapped onto different military classes. While officers were expected to exemplify "Christian" behavior, in all its various confessional forms, the allowances for "un-Christian" behavior for enlisted men were greater. In hierarchical terms, such a differential is not surprising since "der gute Christ" [the good Christian] was the moral standard of early modern Germans and thus a facet of the hegemonic ideal of masculinity.

There were, however, some expectations that applied to both officers and enlisted soldiers according to these texts. Soldiers of all kinds were expected to be hearty and healthy individuals capable of the physical labor required of soldiering and able to withstand harsh environmental conditions. Dillich advises that the prince hire "strong

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[477] Cf. Section 1.4

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and hearty men" who are "used to work" and "relatively young" as soldiers, both officers

and enlisted.[478] Moreover, the ideal soldiers sought by recruiters were "junge gerade /

starcke und manliche persohnen" [young, upright, strong, and manly persons] (Dillich

15). Dillich's physical qualifications for soldiers—some of which, such as "gerade"

[upright], seem to apply to moral qualities as well—are not specific to the seventeenth

century. In the *Kriegsbücher* and *Kriegstraktaten* of the sixteenth century by Fronsperger,

Feyerabendt, and Schwendi, too, we find physical descriptions of ideal soldiers that

match Dillich's expectations.[479] The manly and strong individual was an ideal soldier for

any rank.[480] Before Maurice of Orange's late sixteenth century military reforms, little was

done to make sure that soldiers remained as "gerade" and "starck" as they were

supposed to be when they were recruited, however. The prescribed warrior masculinity

of the seventeenth century differs significantly from the previous century in focusing on

discipline.[481] The *agitatio corporis* [bodily exercise] for soldiers prescribed by Dillich in

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[478] Dillich, 15: "soll ein Fürst sich umb starcke und beherzte männer / und so dir arbeit wohl angewohnet umbthun / und ist hierinn wahr zu nehmen / das alter und geschichlichkeit der leiber. Und seindt leute von zimlichen jungen jahren die beste / auch ein gerader einem dölpishen ungeschickten menschen weit vorzuziehen." [A prince should look for strong and hearty men, who are used to hard work, and be sure to look after the age and apportion of their bodies. And people of a relatively young age are the best, furthermore a straighter person should be put ahead of a rougher and unpolished person.]

[479] Schwendi, "Zustand des hl. Reiches von 1570," 222; Feyerabendt, *Kriegspractica*, Intro.

[480] Almost any rank; the so-called "Hurenweibel" [Whore-Sergeant]—the soldier in charge of prostitutes and camp followers—was supposed to be a crippled, ideally castrated, veteran enlisted soldier.

[481] Military exercises were used in early warfare, especially during the Roman Empire, but the Middle Ages saw a decreased practice of military training of an organized sort (Cf. Section 1.4). The exception would be the English long-bowmen who were trained from a very young age to be expert marksmen.

1608, such as "orderly marching and walking, running, jumping, climbing, and swimming," resulted from Maurician military reforms (Dillich 68).

Alongside a strong body—and despite the kinds of moral and intellectual distinctions made between officers and enlisted men—there was a yet another attribute which was expected of the early modern soldier, officer and enlisted alike: "die Begierde nach Ruhm und Ehr" [the desire for fame and honor].[482] The "desire for fame and honor" as a defining principle of the ideal warrior has its traditions in Homer's Achilles, as well as the classical military treatises of Tacitus, Vegetius and Julius Caesar, and the knight of the Middle Ages epitomized by the Arthurian legends.[483] But this ideal is only that: an ideal, not a universal virtue of soldiers. As certain as the early modern period saw crippled and weak—as well as unmanly[484]—soldiers, it saw soldiers of fortune at least as often as idealistic soldiers. The virtues imagined by military theorists of the early modern period were regularly transgressed. Dillich even provides a system of financial penalties to punish soldiers who fail to live up to his (lofty) expectations during troop review [*Musterung*].[485] Still, military theory—by definition—sets up idealized standards tempered by practical concerns. Where do these ideals come from?

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[482] Gábor Tuskés, "Der Krieg bei Grimmelshausen im Spiegel der Militärwissenschaftlichen Werke Miklós Zrínyis," *Simpliciana* XXVI (2004): 48.

[483] Tuskés, 48.

[484] This is wordplay at best, pun at worst. Critiques of the "unmanliness" of soldiers, such as those found in the epigraph from Fronsperger at the beginning of this chapter abound in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. But there is another tradition which began in at least the seventeenth century of women dressing as men to go to war. This is subject of a number of seventeenth century German novels including *Courasche* (1670) by Grimmelshausen and *Der insulanische Mandorell* (1682) by Eberhard Happel. Cf. Epilogue.

[485] Dilich, 110.

If we divide the expectations of warrior masculinity into two categories, the physical and the mental, we discover that these categories actually represent competing sets of expectations independent from each other. That is, one can be (1) morally corrupt and physically strong, (2) physically weak and morally upright, (3) morally upright and physically strong, or (4) morally weak and physically weak. As is often the case with masculinity it is easiest to tell which of these categories ideal warrior masculinity is *not*. Being both morally and physically weak is unacceptable for the masculine warrior according to the military treatises we have seen above. But any of the other three categories provide a likely chance of falling on the spectrum of warrior masculinity. At his most accomplished, the ideal warrior is physically and morally strong, with a desire for fame and honor centered on ideals of bravery and nobility. The level beneath this ideal would be occupied by the physically strong soldier with a range of unscrupulous behaviors, which sometimes border on the flagrantly immoral and "un-Christian." There we could also place the physically weak but morally strong soldier, capable of serving behind the lines but never able to attain glory in battle. The binary of officer and enlisted man further stratifies this system by complicating distinctions of rank and honor.[486] While I will not argue that this model persists through all historical periods, cultures, or aesthetic traditions, I believe that—at least since the development of gunpowder—this hierarchy has remained relatively stable within western military systems and cultural representations of war, even as the terms on which it is based (physical and moral strength) are renegotiated and changed.

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[486] Marcia Kovitz, "The Roots of Military Masculinity," in *Military Masculinities,* ed. Paul Higate (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003), 9.

The information that such a system provides is a hegemonic ideal of warrior masculinity in early modern German military culture, a model to which all other performances of warrior masculinity were beholden. The physically and morally strong soldier is always present in the aesthetic traditions of war. In war literature, we call this figure "the hero." But the hero, as recent scholarship has shown, is an inherently unstable figure.[487] The title of hero is typically bestowed based on individual acts of moral and physical strength, but such a momentary act of human (most often masculine) perfection is unsustainable. The hero disappears the moment the act has been carried out, and a new act must be performed to maintain heroic status, making the task daunting, if not impossible. We can and do capture heroic moments in monuments, paintings, songs, poems, and stories—that is, aesthetically—but in valorizing the hero we gloss over any unheroic aspects that might detract from the hero's iconic status.

The performance of warrior masculinity revolves around expectations of form and content displayed outwardly by individuals and modeled in art and literature. Warrior masculinity, as idealized in the heroic figure, is a persistent theme in war literature and artistic production from ancient to present times. But as persistent as such a figure is, the hero is always in danger of disappearing, and, as we find in stories from Hercules to King Arthur, the hero is always required to reassert his heroic qualities. Heroes can fail, but they must redeem themselves. The aesthetic of warrior masculinity is tied to the heroic and must always reassert its value to society in its claim to structured violence, which, in political—or state—societies, is the defense against

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[487] Kevin Alexander Boon, "Heroes, Metanarratives, and the Paradox of Masculinity in Contemporary Western Culture," *Journal of Men's Studies* 13 (2005), 301.

internal and external violence.[488] Warrior masculinity can no longer lay claim to heroic

status when it falls short of the ideal that provides its sole legitimation. Gunpowder, as a

technology of war, presented an immediate and violent threat to warrior masculinity's

heroic claims because it called into question the necessity of physical strength and

bravery (moral strength) for battle.[489] This lapse was interpreted as aesthetic dissonance

by German war novelists of the seventeenth century. As several scholars have noted in

different articulations, for Grimmelshausen, war—and here we will specify "gunpowder

warfare"—is a location of "unheroic chaos."[490]

Narrating Gunpowder Warfare

Grimmelshausen's protagonists in *Simplicissimus Teutsch* (1668), *Courasche* (1669),

and *Springinsfeld* (1670) repeatedly witness war up-close, sometimes as bystanders and

other times as participants. Turning to these fictional experiences of war, we find battle

scenes such as Grimmelshausen's description of the Battle of Wittstock (4 October 1636;

ST Book II, Ch 27) from *Der abentheuerliche Simplicissimus Teutsch* (1668) that portray

gunpowder warfare as a chaotic and ontologically confused.[491]

Prior to the battle, the teenage Simplicius has been taken into custody by

Imperial troops as a suspected spy because he is dressed as a young woman. Just as the

"Generalauditor" is about to torture him for information, battle ensues nearby and the

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[488] Kovitz, "The Roots of Military Masculinity," 7.

[489] Kovitz makes this claim from a more modern perspective regarding the inclusion of
women in armies when she writes, "changes in military technology have diminished the
need for brute strength" (2).

[490] Battafarano, "Neue Kriege, Neue Waffen," 14; Tuskés, 41.

[491] H. J. C. Grimmelshausen, *Der abentheuerliche Simplicissimus Teutsch* (Edition to be
Determined). Henceforth cited parenthetically as (ST).

"Prozeß" is interrupted (ST 222). Historically and tactically speaking, the Swedish

commander Baner had cut off imperial troops and forced them to dig in at Wittstock;

this maneuver resulted in a strategic win for the Swedes, but at the expense of crippling

the Swedish forces. The massive battle hinged upon the coordinated baiting and

trapping of the imperial troops.[492]

Grimmelshausen's description of the Battle of Wittstock reads differently from

other historical records, indeed, "Bei Grimmelshausen ist das militärisch Fachliche dieser

Schlacht dagegen Nebensache" [In Grimmelshausen's description, the technical military

aspects are secondary to this battle].[493] A captive during the battle, Simplicius narrates

from the heart of the action:

> gleich anfänglich kämpften die Armeen um den Vortel,
> und gleich darauf um das schwere Geschütz, dessen die
> Unserigen stracks verlustigt wurden: Unser Profos hielte
> zwar ziemlich weit mit seinen Leuten und den Gefangenen
> hinder der Battalia, gleichwohl aber waren wir unser
> Brigade so nahe, daß wir jeden von hinderwärts an den
> Kleidern erkennen konnten; und als eine schwedische
> Eskadron auf die Unserige traf, waren wir sowohl als die
> Fechtende selbst in Todsgefahr, dann in einem Augenblick
> floge die Luft so häufig voller singenden Kugeln über uns
> her, daß es das Ansehen hatte, als ob die Salve uns zu
> Gefallen gegeben worden wäre . . . im Treffen selbst aber
> suchte ein jeder seinem Tod mit Niedermachung des
> Nächsten, der ihm aufstieß, vorzukommen; das greuliche
> Schießen, das Gekläpper der Harnisch, das Krachen der
> Piken und das Geschrei beides der Verwundten und
> Angreifenden, machten neben den Trompeten, Trommeln
> und Pfeifen ein erschröckliche Musik! da sahe man nichts
> als einen dicken Rauch und Staub, welcher schiene, als
> wollte er die Abscheulichkeit der Verwundten und Toten
> bedecken, in demselbigen hörete man ein jämmerliches
> Weheklagen der Sterbenden, und ein lustiges Geschrei
> derjenigen die noch voller Mut staken. (ST 222-23)

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[492] Wedgwood, *The Thirty Years War* (NY: New York Review of Books, 2005), 402-403.

[493] Battafarano, "Neue Kriege, Neue Waffen," 16.

Much has been made in Grimmelshausen scholarship about the originality of this passage because he lifted two parts almost word for word from the *Theatrum Europaeum*.[494] Yet, as Battafarano has argued, the originality of the passage is irrelevant since Grimmelshausen adopts it for an aesthetic purpose.[495] He constructs, as Battafarano calls it, a "Schein-Krieg" [Simulated War] by cobbling together eyewitness accounts into fully integrated narratives.[496] Moreover, we know that Grimmelshausen did historical research on the war, that he was personally involved in combat and possibly even at Wittstock, and that much of the passage is, in fact, originally his.[497] Using historical sources and his personal experiences of war, Grimmelshausen constructed this passage purposefully, an important claim to make in order to interpret his description of the battle as an aesthetic one. The aesthetic conditions of Wittstock allow for wider speculation about the role of war, and in particular gunpowder warfare, in his larger narrative.

The senses of sound and sight dominate Grimmelshausen's description of Wittstock and contribute to competing experiences of sensory perception and sensory

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[494] Gustav Könnecke, *Quellen und Forschungen zur Lebensgeschichte Grimmelshausens*, (Weimar: Gesellschaft der Bibliophilen, 1926), I:200-202: "Es liegt auf der Hand, daß für Grimmelshausens Schlachtbericht, wenn er vom Vorteile und dem schweren Geschütz spricht, diese Stellen des *Theatrum Europaeum* seine Quellen waren"; Battafarano, "Neue Kriege, Neue Waffen," 12.

[495] Battafarano, "Golf-Krieg, Schein-Krieg," 502; Battafarano, "Neue Kriege Neue Waffen," 12.

[496] Battafarano, "Golf-Krieg, Schein-Krieg", 502.

[497] Könnecke goes to great lengths to establish what Grimmleshausen might have personally experienced during the war and what he might have copied from various sources later. Könnecke tells us that the *Theatrum Europaeum* and the *Florus Germanicus*. A diagram and description of the Battle of Wittstock can be found in the *Theatrum* III, 706-707 (Könnecke, I:199).

overload. Much of what is "seen" and "heard" in the passage is connected to gunpowder

warfare, as a tactical and material history of gunpowder warfare shows.

Grimmelshausen tries in vain to make sense of his discordant scene, but he finds only

distortion and distorted meaning. The chaotic frenzy of sight and sound depicted in this

passage is the direct reflection of gunpowder warfare. Aurally, the trope of music—a

meaningful or at least intentionally arranged collection of sounds—throughout the

passage represents an effort to distill meaning from cacaphony. The deadly, flying

bullets become "singende Kugeln" [singing bullets] that seem as if they are meant to

please [*Gefallen*] rather than endanger [*Todesgefahr*]. Furthermore, the sounds of a

gunpowder battle—such as the clashing of metal harnesses worn by *Reiter*, the popping

of gunpowder fired by musketeers, and the clacking of pikes used to protect the

musketeers—provide a singularly horrible "erschröckliche Musik" [horrible music] as

they combine with the actual musical instruments played by the armies' bands. Finally,

amplifying the discord of this martial soundscape, the screams of the dying and

wounded compete with the cries of combatants still battling in the fray. The sounds are

of two kinds depicted in the narrative: the pleasing (the band and the charging soldiers)

and the horrifying (of weapons and dying men). Joined together they become

indistinguishable. Sound constructs dual meanings through paradoxical structures that

use musical—or at least aural—descriptions of gunpowder warfare. Singing bullets

please and kill, weapons and musical instruments play upon the ears, and brutish

sounds echo from the throats of dying and fighting soldiers alike. Thus, on the

battlefield at Wittstock, sound is neither entirely pleasant nor wholly horrible. Aurally, a

gunpowder battle erases the distinction.

Much like the sounds, the optics of battle obscure meaning. Simplicius'

observations alternate between vision and blindness as well as distance and nearness.

These visual shifts lend the episode a hectic and stereoscopic effect. As Simplicius

watches the Imperial—"die Unserigen" [our own]—troops being pushed back by the

Swedish, the scene shifts from far to near. The description of the battle starts in the

distance as troops fight over the lowest and most outward part of a fortification. From

afar, the battle looks like nothing more than a "Kinderspiel und Kurtz-Weile der

Menschen" [children's game and people's pastime].[498] But the attacking Swedish soldiers

bring the danger closer as they take "das schwere Geschütz" [the heavy artillery] and

move toward Simplicius's position near the center of the bastion. Simplicius's ability to

distinguish between the individual soldiers from farther back suggests the view of a

commander looking down on a battle unfolding before him. Although he is relatively

close to the middle of the fortified lines, that is, well behind the battlements, he can still

see the fighting and see who is doing it. However, as the battle closes in on him, and the

"singenden Kugeln" become more dangerous to him and his fellow captives, it suddenly

becomes more difficult to see what is going on around him. The battle in the distance

was easy to discern but battle up close becomes chaotic and blinding. "Rauch und Staub"

[smoke and dust], the products of gunpowder weapons firing around him, obscure his

vision. He describes the cloud as mercifully veiling "die Abscheulichkeit der

Verwundten und Toten" [the disgustingness of the wounded and dead]. The visual

paradox confronts the reader: the closer one is to a battle, the less comprehensible it

becomes; viewed from afar, an unfolding battle seems easy to discern.

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[498] Qtd in Battafarano, "Neue Kriege, Neue Waffen," 14 (ST 158, 18).

It is not just vision and sound that obscure meaning in this scene. People, animals, and objects reveal aspects of themselves not typically considered part of their nature.[499] Consider, for example, the objects already discussed: weapons act as musical instruments and musical instruments become instruments of terror. Animals, too, show a tendency to act in extraordinary ways. Horses become fierce defenders of their masters, "die Pferd selbst hatten das Ansehen, als wenn sie zu Verteidigung ihrer Herrn je länger je frischer würden" [the horses themselves seemed to become stronger the longer the defended their masters] (ST 223). Not only do they defend their riders, but the horses are not unlike the soldiers considered in the passage quoted at length above. Like the soldiers who seek their deaths "mit Niedermachung des Nächsten, der ihm aufstieß" [with the destruction of the next man who engages him], the horses are described as "tot darniederfallen, voller Wunden, welche sie unverschuldterweis zu Vergeltung ihrer getreuen Dienste empfangen hatten" [dropping dead, full of wounds, which they received unrighteously in demonstration of their loyal service] (222-223). As horses seem to become more like humans, humans in warfare seem to become little more than animals. Erasmus had already voiced this critique of war in the early sixteenth century when he wrote the complaint of "Dame Nature," who endows beings with only what befits their essence, "Behold thyself . . . , thou furious warrior, and see if thou mayst by any means recover thyself again. . . . From whence hast thou that shining helmet? From whence those iron horns?"[500] Following Erasmus's critique of war, Grimmelshausen comments that humans unlike animals do not fight with the weapons given them by

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[499] Battafarano, "Neue Kriege, Neue Waffen," 14-16.

[500] Desiderius Erasmus, *Against War*, 16ff.

nature.[501] The unnaturalness of human warfare, such as gunpowder weapons, is responsible for the hermeneutic confusion of the experience of war. In Grimmelhausen's description of Wittstock, there is no coherent code to decipher gunpowder warfare, only competing interpretations. Humans are both worse than and the same as animals, then. Worse, because they resort to increasingly horrible technologies—Erasmus calls them "artifices"—to kill one another. Humans, in the course of battle, lose their humanity. In the description of battle above, humans and animals become indistinguishable as their limbs, blown off by cannonballs, bullets, and explosions, are strewn unidentifiably across the battlefield. Gunpowder weapons reduce them to equals.[502] Just as the horses fight for their masters until their own deaths; the men fight for generals as if they have no choice but to die.

In addition to objects and creatures, the land which has been turned into a battlefield is altered by this violent conflict: "Die Erde, deren Gewohnheit ist, die Toten zu bedecken, war damals an selbigem Ort selbst mit Toten überstreut" [The earth, whose practice it is to cover the dead, was itself strewn with the dead in that particular place] (223). Moreover, the bodies which cover the field are themselves deprived of their essence: bodies are severed from heads, souls are torn from bodies, and bodies are drained of blood.[503] In the heat of battle, objects, animals, and people are altered and deprived of their natural states; the disorder of gunpowder warfare changes the

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[501] Battafarano, *Simpliciana Bellica* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2011), 118; Erasmus, "A Complaint of Peace: Querela pacis undique gentium ejectae profligataeque," trans. Betty Radice, in *Collected Works of Erasmus*, vol. 27, ed. A. H. T. Levi (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1986), 306.

[502] Battafarano, "Neue Kriege, Neue Waffen," 15: "Menschliche und tierische Körperteile mischen sich dort mit Bruchstücken von Gewehren und Kannonen."

[503] He paints the picture of "entseelte Leiber [beraubet] ihres eigenen Geblüts" (ST 223).

meaning of things in chaotic and unintelligible ways. In the words of Battafarano, the impact of the firearm on this representation of battle is "dis-integration" at both the physical and narrative levels.[504]

In *Simplicissimus Teutsch* gunpowder warfare up-close de-essentializes, dis-integrates, everything it touches just as the Thirty Years War, gunpowder warfare on a grand scale, tears Simplicius from his true identity and forces him to search for it his entire life. As Battafarano notes, "Die Schlacht bringt vielen Soldaten einen grausamen Tod, sie zerstört aber auch die natürliche Zuordnungen und bewirkt die Auflösung jeder Ordnung" [The battle brings many soldiers to a horrible death, but it also destroys the natural order of things and effects the conclusion of order].[505] It is important to recognize, however, that depriving an object of its essence or a person of identity also provides a new one. Although Grimmelshausen's works are largely constructed as anti-war, Simplicius's identity, like Grimmelshausen's, owes much to the experience of war. This is apparent in the opening page of the novel through the allegorical *Kupferstich* and poem in which Simplicius compares himself to a phoenix rising from the ashes. He concludes in that poem, despite these troubles "in solchem Umbschwermen macht ich mir bekandt" [through such meandering I came to know myself]. For Grimmelshausen, war as a destructive event also functions as a formative experience. War, as Gábor Tuskés puts it, is an organizing trope of Grimmelshausen's narrative: "Der Krieg und das satirische Erzählen gehören zusammen." [War and the satirical narrative belong together].[506] But why do they belong together?

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[504] Battafarano, *Simpliciana Bellica*, 117.

[505] Battafarano, "Neue Kriege, Neue Waffen," 15.

[506] Tuskés, 40ff.

Springinsfeld's Pistol and Gunpowder on Trial

Tatlock has convincingly argued that, as a technology of war, gunpowder weapons sapped "the heroic plot" of its "vitality" in seventeenth century German prose narratives of war.[507] She demonstrates that three of Grimmelshausen's close contemporaries, Moscherosch, Harsdörffer, and Happel also wrestled with the impact of gunpowder technology on the narration of war. Each of these author's narratives, both through content and form, reveal that the figure of the hero is absent or in danger of disappearing altogether because of the gunpowder technologies and their widespread use in warfare. Although we find the heroic figure under constant threat in these narratives, we will also turn—in the final section of this dissertation—to the hero's reemergence in war stories, such as those by Eberhard Werner Happel. In this investigation, for the moment at least, we will focus on the works of Grimmelshausen and Moscherosch and the phenomenon of the "disappearing hero."

While each novel's narrative is at the center of this analysis, the metanarrative of the *Simpliciana*, Grimmelshausen's series of novels and prose works, colludes in the dislocation of the hero. As scholars have argued, these novels lack a heroic figure, and they avoid naming the real author by employing a series of mirrors to obscure the actual 'authority' behind the work.[508] Jameson, whose analysis of *Simplicissimus* is not altogether persuasive, succeeds in articulating this narrative displacement in

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[507] Tatlock, "Simulacra of War," 645.

[508] For recent scholarship on the structure of the *Simpliciana* see: Karl Otto, *A Companion to the Works of Grimmelshausen* (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2003); Andreas Solbach, "Early Modern German Narrative Prose," in *Early Modern German Literature 1350-1700* (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2007), 467; Alan Menhennet, *Grimmelshausen the Story Teller* (Columbia, SC: Camden House, 1997).

contemporary terms when he calls it "rhizomatic, a kind of hypertext throwing off all kinds of ancillary episodes."[509] To understand the *Simpliciana* as a system of rhizomes—tubular root systems that produce offshoots from plants—is to read Grimmelshausen's *Simplician* stories as organic systems that multiply themselves, referencing and reproducing each subsequent narrative. This description of the metanarrative structure of the *Simpliciana* confirms its sleight of hand.

The publication history of the *Simpliciana* shows that, in being rhizomatic, its metanarrative structure distorts both the flow of the narrative and the text's authority. The first novel of the *Simpliciana*, *Der abentheuerliche Simplicissimus Teutsch* (1668), is a fictional autobiography penned by Simplicius, the protagonist and central figure of the series. It records the story of his life growing up in war-torn Germany, and it is divided into five "books" structured in picaresque episodic form. The novel ends with Simplicius fleeing the civilized world into the wilderness. A section added a year after the initial publication of *Simplicissimus*, the *Continuatio* (1669), revises the novel's fictional prehistory by claiming that the entire work had been written on palm leaves on a desert island where a Dutch ship captain discovers Simplicius by accident. Simplicius has no desire to return to Germany, but he sends back his story to be published.

The next novel, *Die Landstörzerin Courasche* (1669), is presented as the transcription of Courasche's oral autobiography, recorded by the fictional Philarcho Grosso. Courasche's repeated references to *Simplicissimus* and the titular claim to be "trutz Simplex" [against Simplex] make it clear that Courasche is telling her story in order to refute some of Simplicius's lies. She makes her story public in order to lend her own voice to the *Simplician* constellation of characters. Over the course of Courasche's

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[509] Jameson, 1542.

tale, the reader learns that both Simplicius and Courasche were independently affiliated with Springinsfeld, Courasche's ex-lover and Simplicius's lackey.

Not until the third novel, *Der seltzame Springinsfeld* (1670), does the frame of the trilogy close.[510] *Springinsfeld* begins with Philarcho Grosso, the scribe of Courasche's autobiography, resting at an inn. He meets Simplicius, who has recently returned from his desert island exile and has reunited with his family. While the two are drinking wine, a man with a wooden leg enters and begins playing a violin and making odd music with his mouth. When Simplicius recognizes the man as his old friend Springinsfeld, he invites him to his table. In turn, Springinsfeld narrates his autobiography to Philarcho, who records it for a small payment from Simplicius.

With the exception of his initials at the end of *Simplicissimus*, Grimmelshausen's name never appears in these novels. Thus, the authority of the overarching narrative—the metanarrative arc—of the *Simpliciana* remains hidden within the first printing of the series. Indeed, not until over a decade after Grimmelshausen's death did his printer attach Grimmelshausen's name to the *Simpliciana*.[511] Alongside this attempt to conceal the author, we also find that the metanarrative resists naming a sympathetic hero. The eponymous figure—Simplicius—is far from heroic. Like the description of Wittstock, the structure of the *Simpliciana* hides and reveals as it toys with the reader by obscuring what is fact and what is fiction.

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[510] H. J. C. Grimmelshausen, *Der seltzame Springinsfeld* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1969). Hereafter cited in the text as S; English translations my own.

[511] Rolf Tarot, "Einleitung," *Der abentheuerliche Simplicissimus Teutsch* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1984), XLI; Cf. Jan Hendrik Scholte, *Probleme der Grimmelshausen Forschung* (I. Groningen, 1912).

In addition to the metanarrative dislocation of authority and hero, we find that the hero and the figure of the hero are destroyed in the narrative by the characters. In one episode, Springinsfeld relates his experience at the Battle of Nördlingen (September 1634) in which he participated as an imperial soldier. Having lost his horse and his general at Landshut in the summer, Springinsfeld finds himself without transport or a commander and suffering from an undefined illness. Sick and "unberitten"—horseless— and "vermögens halber ein vast armer Schelm" [in terms of material wealth, a poor bastard], Springinsfeld is ignored by his officers so gar daß man meiner auch nicht achtete noch mich irgendhin commandirte / als die Schweden kamen die belägerte Statt zuentsetzen" [so much so that no one even noticed me or directed me to go anywhere when the Swedes arrived in order to free the besieged city] (S 82). Reduced to a pitiful state and facing mortal danger from the enemy, hunger, and sickness, he decides to find some loot or "das Leben darüber zuverlieren" [die trying in the process] (S 82). He "heroically" rises from his sickbed and rushes to battle alone, horseless and without weapons. He would rather be dead than a "Bärnhäuter"—a doormat, a low-life.[512] Yet his goals are purely selfish. He attaches no value to the outcome of the battle, because "mirs gleich golte / ob Kayser oder Schwed siegen wurde / wann ich nur mein Theil auch darvon kriegte" [it was all the same to me whether the Emperor or the Swede were to win, so long as I got my share from it too] (S 82). Mostly, Springinsfeld experiences the battle from a prone position. Each time the armies charge by him he falls over into the pile of bodies he is busy plundering "[um] mich denjenigen gleich zustellen" [in order to

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[512] H.J.C. Grimmelshausen, *Kleinere Schriften* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlage, 1973): The origins of the term "Bärnhäuter" is discussed in a short story written by Grimmelshausen called "Der erste Beernhäuter" (1670).

pretend to be dead like them] (S 83). He watches as other troops run back and forth, leaving more bodies for him to plunder each time they pass.

Gunpowder emerges as a villain when Springinsfeld rises from a pile of bodies and discovers "ein ansehenlicher wohlmondirter Officier (der dort lag / sein Pferd beym Zaum hielte / und den einen Schenckel entzwey geschossen: den andern aber noch im Stegraiff stecken hatte)" [a well-outfitted, respectable officer (who was lying there holding his horse by the reign, his one leg shot in two and the other still stuck in the stirrup)] (S 83). The officer cries out for his help, but Springinsfeld takes no pity on him. He asks to which army the officer belongs and is told: "gut Schwedisch" [Well, Swedish] (S 83). At this, Springinsfeld grabs the officer's horse and, with a pistol from the officer's belt, ends "den wenigen Rest des bittenden Lebens" [the short remainder of his pathetic life] (S 83). He steals the officer's "unvergleichlichs Soldaten Pferd" [incomparable war horse] and safely rides off the battlefield (S 84). One can infer Springinsfeld's heartlessness, desperation, and greed from this scene, but Springinsfeld offers a different interpretation. He explains, "und dis ist die Würkung des verfluchten Geschützes / daß nemblich ein geringer Bernheuter dem allerdapffersten Helden / nach dem er zuvor villeicht auch durch einen liderlichen Stallratzen ungefähr beschädigt worden / das Leben nemmen kann" [and this is the effect of the cursed firearm, namely that a meager doormat can take the life of the most brave hero already greatly diminished by a lively engagement] (S 83). Placing moral culpability on the pistol specifically and guns in general is not meant to free him of responsibility for his actions. He readily admits limitations of his moral compass. Instead, his comment attacks the technology of gunpowder and its (mis)use in warfare.

Tatlock (1993) and Battafarano (2004) have proposed that gunpowder weapons are troublesome props in the novels of Grimmelshausen, Moscherosch, and Happel because they contribute to (1) the anonymity of enemy soldiers, and (2) the inability to determine whether their victims are good or bad.[513] Historically speaking, however, the anonymity of soldiers is not specific to gunpowder weapons; and, in literary terms, the question of the "righteous kill" is at least as old as Homer's depiction of the slaying of Patroclus. This is not to say that these two concerns are not a part of Moscherosch and Grimmelshausen's sensibilities, or — as I will argue — that Happel does not imagine the rekindling of the heroic aesthetic with the righteous and worthy kill, rather that these are only two of the concerns which are advanced by a much larger network of anxieties surrounding early modern firearms. As we have seen in the history of gunpowder (Chapter One), gunpowder weapons up to the nineteenth century were very inaccurate due to the principles of smoothbore ballistics. Thus, the concerns about "Anonymität" and "die Unberechenbarkeit und Wahllosigkeit der Treffer" [indeterminability and inability to choose the targets] may actually have been wrapped up in the technological limitations of firearms as much as they were wrapped up in the psychological effect of gunpowder warfare.[514]

The link between firearms and soldiers' behavior is not exclusive to Grimmelshausen's novels. There is a clear connection between gunpowder weapons and the behavior of soldiers found in both Grimmelshausen's *Simpliciana* and Moscherosch's "Soldatenleben." These two aspects of war are linked in three ways in the narratives: (1) the construction and maintenance of the ideals of warrior masculinity, (2)

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[513] Tatlock, "Simulacra of War," 642; Battafarano, "Neue Kriege, Neue Waffen," 15.

[514] Battafarano, "Neue Kriege, Neue Waffen," 15.

the aesthetic of warrior masculinity based on heroic models, and (3) the ethics of the

battlefield and the morality of warfare. Some scholars have posited that gunpowder

warfare's effect on the battlefield required literary maneuvering on the part of war

novelists. I argue that these three topics represent the main themes contested in these

texts. Furthermore, the renegotiation of these three aspects of war narratives in general

and early modern war stories in particular occurs on the battlefield and near battles.[515]

As we have seen, the battlefield in Grimmelshausen's narrative seems to be a space of

dislocation, yet meaning—like the phoenix from the ashes—rises out of this destruction.

In their reflections on gunpowder warfare, Grimmelshausen and Moscherosch break

down the presuppositions of the aesthetics of war and expose the ways in which the

"old" aesthetics of heroic figures are no longer viable models for narrating gunpowder

warfare.

The passage from *Springinsfeld* discussed above revolves around the triad of

gender, ethics, and aesthetics. Springinsfeld claims that the invention of the "cursed

firearm" has corrupted battlefield ethics, the expectations of behavior in battle based on

the model heroic warrior masculinity. Springinsfeld continues ruminating on what he

has perpetrated and observed as he reloads his freshly pilfered pistol and rides away,

"ich [mußte] gleichwohl bei mir selbst erseufftzen und gedencken / wann der

unüberwündliche starke Herkules ietziger Zeit selbst noch lebte / so konte er solcher

Gestalt so wohl als diser prave Officier auch von dem aller geringsten Roß-Buben erlegt

werden" [I had to sigh to myself and consider that even the invincible, mighty Hercules,

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[515] Tatlock, "Simulacra of War," 646: "Literary representations of such [gunpowder] warfare required new strategies of writing, strategies that described, translated, interpreted, and ultimately—even if inadvertently—reconstructed the battlefield as a locus for the production of meaning."

if he were alive today, could be laid low by the most humble stable boy just as easily as this brave officer] (83). By drawing a parallel between Hercules and the wounded Swedish officer he just murdered, Springinsfeld illuminates two traditions of warfare that were radically altered by the introduction of gunpowder. First, he observes that bodily strength and bravery, traditionally associated with warrior masculinity and epitomized by Hercules, are useless qualities for the soldier if a weak and cowardly person can kill with the help of gunpowder. Secondly, by invoking Hercules's name, Springinsfeld recalls and renders meaningless a tradition of warrior narratives that dates back to antiquity. He upends this heroic archetype by imagining the "Roß-Bub" [stable boy] assassinating Hercules. This assassination destroys the symbolic power of the mythical hero for those who draw inspiration from such figures. As a technology of war, gunpowder simultaneously kills soldiers and attacks the aesthetic traditions upon which their ideals of masculinity rest. The tension between aesthetics and battlefield reality demonstrates the implications of aesthetic dissonance for gunpowder warfare. When new technology, an "absolute reality," can dismantle an aesthetic ideal, an "absolute formality," there is a dissonance that is difficult to render consonant again.

Moscherosch's *Philander von Sittenwalt* (1640, 1643, 1650)[516] suggests the same triad of concerns surround gunpowder as the writings of Grimmelshausen. In the episode "Soldatenleben" from *Philander von Sittenwalt*, Moscherosch explores the moral consequences of gunpowder by putting its legendary inventor, Berthold Schwarz, on trial. This trial, conducted by a council of ancient German heroes [*Helden-Rath*], pits the greatest German invention (the printing press) against the one that Moscherosch

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[516] Dirk Niefanger, *Barock* (Stuttgart: Weimar, 2000), 203. For a more complete account of the publication history of Moscherosch's *Philander*, see Max Reinhard, Edt., *Early Modern German Literature 1350-1700* (Rochester: Camden House, 2007).

perceives as the worst. The heroes in charge of the trial have returned from the grave to judge Berthold, but they are also there to judge the state of the Germany—a nation without a country. To a certain degree, the trial is about a perennially contested subject: German national identity. As these ancient German heroes, who represent the past to which the collective imaginary German nation can appeal for historical legitimacy, weigh one invention against the other they decide that the printing press has done more good than guns have done harm. The *Helden-Rath* passes the following judgment, "wann man den trefflichen Schaden des Geschützes gegen den erfrewlichsten vnd vnaußsprechlichsten Nutzen der Bücher halten wil, sich befinden wird, daß viel tausend Menschen mehr durch die Bücher an ihrer Seele sind erhalten als durch jenes dem Leibe nach verdorben vnnd vmbgebracht worden" [when one compares the certain damages of the firearm with the most wonderful and outstanding uses of books, it will be found that several thousand more people have had their souls saved by books than have had their bodies ruined and killed by the firearm].[517] While the proto-nationalist flavor of their judgment is interesting, it is not the most important part of their decision for the argument at stake here. More pertinent for the current argument is the way in which Berthold Schwarz's invention is measured against another German invention, and found to be guilty as charged.

The legendary basis of Berthold Schwarz as the inventor gunpowder was discussed earlier, but his cultural importance for the time between the fifteenth and twentieth centuries is worth revisiting briefly here. Berthold Schwarz, who goes by a number of aliases such as Bertholdus Niger and Bertchold Schwartz, is said to have been a Capuchin monk who lived in Mainz in the early fourteenth century (born ca. 1290).

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[517] Moscherosch, *Philander*, 386.

The evidence of his historical existence is scant, and we know today that he had no hand in inventing gunpowder since gunpowder arrived in Europe as a developed technology from Asia well before Berthold's supposed birth.[518] Still, debates by German military historians over his existence persisted into the twentieth century often as a point of nationalist pride.[519] For example, Jähns, writing in the late nineteenth century, reports that one Belgian military scholar placed the date of gunpowder's invention by a German at 1313 because of a post-dated entry in a city register. Furthermore, Jähns tells us, a note in an obscure financial folio in the Paris National Library reports that the French king, Jean I (b. 1316) heard in May 1354 that a German named "Bertholde Schwartz" had invented gunpowder.[520] Jähns interprets this international consensus that "some German" invented gunpowder as a tacit recognition of the importance of Germany in the early history of gunpowder weapons.[521] However, the kinds of evidence about the necromancing monk's historical validity are less important than how such evidence was received and deployed in other texts during the early modern period. While Schwarz is mentioned from time to time in the fourteenth century, it is only in the *Feuerwerkbuch von 1420* that he emerges as the historical legitimator of the *Büchsenmeister* profession.[522] In the *Feuerwerkbuch*, Berthold lends historical validity to the profession, and his

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[518] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe*, 42.

[519] Leng, I:200, Anm. 855.

[520] Jähns, I:225.

[521] Jähns, I:225-227: "Unter allen Umständen wird man annehmen müssen daß ein deutscher Mönch entschiedenen, allgemein anerkanntlich Einfluß auf die Herstellung und Anwendung der Feuerwaffen geübt hat . . . [A]ber die Erfindung wird da fixiert, wo sie die entscheidende Folge hatte, und das war hinsichtlich der Feuerwaffe . . . Deutschland."

[522] Jähns, I:398.

plausible existence as a "nygermanticus und . . . auch großer Alchyme" [necromancer and great alchemist] connects the second, loosely organized section of the *Feuerwerkbuch* to the first, tightly organized section.[523] In the *Feuerwerkbuch*, Berthold Schwarz is portrayed as a sympathetic and culturally important character, as well as the founder of an honorable—and masculine—profession.[524] But Moscherosch's trial of Berthold Schwarz demonstrates that Moscherosch saw gunpowder and its inventor as arch-villains. Just as he brings back the *Helden-Rath* from the grave to cast their verdict about seventeenth century Germany and its conflicting technologies, so he brings back the founder to face the deleterious effects of his invention.

The trial of gunpowder in Moscherosch's *Philander* unfolds just as Philander has gained his freedom from a band of Croatian soldiers after winning a duel. Going on his way, he secures the salvation of his eternal soul after reading the "Soldaten Lehr-Brieff,"—a moralizing pamphlet about how soldiers ought to behave. He wakes up one morning to find himself in a German town where unusual disputations are taking place. Shouts outside his window announce that a trial is about to commence. The voice bellows the charges with heated language: "dieser ist der gewissenloseste Mänsch, der jemahl in Teutschen Landen gelebet! Der Gott-vergessene Tropff, der zu so vieler vester Helden vnverschuldenem, vnverhofftem Todt allein Vrsach vnd Anlaß gegeben!" [this is the most unscrupulous person who has ever lived in the German lands! The God-forsaken bastard who singlehandedly caused so many strong heroes an early and untimely death] (M 381). Philander sees "vier vortreffliche Helden gegen den Gerichts-Schrancken eylen, welche einen Mönchskutte vnd grossem Bart vor ihnen her stoßten

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[523] Qtd. in Jähns, I:398.

[524] Cf. Chapter One.

vnd vmb schleunig Recht sich anmelden liessen" [four impressive heroes hurrying up to the jury box, pushing along a monk with a long beard before them, and requesting swift justice] (M 381). At the head of the "Hoffräthe" sits Hanß Thurnmeyer as judge.

Moscherosch quickly draws a parallel between the mythical "Held" who takes the witness stand and the German soldiers dying on the battlefield. The hero, pointing to gunshot wounds on his body, uses the first person plural pronoun to express solidarity with contemporary soldiers, "wir [müssen] durch das verdampte Pulffer-Geschöß vnser Leben verlieren, vnd zwar Verrätherische weise, von Gottlosen Buben hindergangen" [we must lose our lives to the damned powder weapons and moreover in spurious ways, caught in the back by these Godless wretches] (381). Such a linkage of these ancient heroes to current soldiers is curious, since Moscherosch spends the first half of the "Soldatenleben" denouncing seventeenth century soldiers' immorality. Yet these ancient German heroes, among them Ariovistus and Barbarossa, represent a military tradition rooted in an ethic just as Hercules did for Grimmelshausen. Moscherosch's claims, voiced through this *Helden-Rath*, sound similar to Grimmelshausen's sentiments about gunpowder,

> Dan mein, was kan die alte Teutsche Tugend vnnd
> Redlichkeit auff der Welt mehr nutzen; wann der
> allermächtigste kühneste Held muß in den stündlichen
> Sorgen stehen, daß auch der allerschlimste verzagteste
> Bößwicht vnd Bub ihm mit einer Kugel von ferne her vnd
> hinder einer Hecken verborgenen mag das Leben
> abstehlen![525]
>
> [Therefore, what use can the ancient German virtue and
> nobility serve in this world if the most powerful and brave
> hero must always live in fear that the most wretched and
> wicked villain and waif, hidden behind a bush
> somewhere, can steal his life with a bullet fired from afar?]

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[525] Moscherosch, *Philander*, 381.

As with Springinsfeld's story of Nördlingen, the reader is confronted with the image of the hero laid low by either a physically or morally inferior combatant through a vision of the topsy-turvy battlefield. The language of the passage emphasizes the cowardice of the attacker. The "wrong-doer" and "boy" only constitute mortal threats to the hero because of gunpowder weapons which allow the "most brave hero" to be killed by someone "far away and hidden under a hedge." Both the killer and his means of killing are under moral scrutiny here, but the fact that an assailant no longer needs to face the hero in order to kill him is equally distressing. Furthermore, the death of the hero is compared to a theft—his life is "stolen away." The assailant takes a life that does not "belong" to him. "Particularly devastating," Tatlock writes of this scene, "is that combat has become anonymous; no one is able to determine whether the target of his bullet is virtuous or vicious, and the bravest soldier can be laid low by the most despicable one."[526] The technology of gunpowder gives the coward and the reprobate a place in battle since he no longer needs to face his enemy. Gunpowder presents a gateway that allows entry for a greater range of potential combatants thus destabilizing the noble ethics of warfare as well as the "Tugend" [virtue] required to participate.

The juxtaposition of guns and books presents us with a problematic conclusion. Moscherosch is markedly invested in the heroic aesthetic of the past and the power of books to preserve it. Yet, based on this reading of the demise of the heroic aesthetic in *Philander*, it seems that Moscherosch does not recognize how easily the aesthetic tradition of war is corrupted by gunpowder technology. The *Helden-Rath*, whose very existence is necessary because of gunpowder, is physically riddled by bullet holes and

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[526] Tatlock, "Simulacra of War," 642.

rendered useless by gunpowder weapons. The wounded ancient hero—much like the

officer whom Springinsfeld executes—is physically and symbolically destroyed. Here,

the aspect of nationalist pride, which invokes "national" heroes as manly archetypes,

adds a new dimension to the conundrum of gunpowder weapons. Firearms threatened

to break the symbolic value of ancient heroes because it turns them into unviable models

of masculinity. In addition to the heroes, ancient weapons and ways of battling are

entirely obsolete in the face of guns, "Spiesse, Degen, Dolchen, Säbel, Stilleth ist nichts

als Kinderwerck gegen diesen Mordwaffen zu achten" [spears, swords, dagger, sabers

and spikes are nothing more than child's play in comparison to these murderous

weapons] (Moscherosch 382). And moreover, the *Helden-Rath* argues, even the power of

nature seems to have been eclipsed by this invention, "Der Hagel, Blitz, Donder, Strahl

vnd alle grausamste Wetter, welch der Zorn Eyffer Göttlicher Mayestät auff die Erden

geschüttet, haben so viel Menschen nicht hingerichtet alß die Pistolen, Mußketen,

Karpiner, Feldstücke, Schlangen, Falckoneten, Mörser, Petarten, Hagelgeschoß" [Hail,

lightning, thunder, downpours and all the most horrible kinds of weather, which the

wrath of the Godly majesty pours down on the earth, have not killed so many people as

pistols, muskets, carbines, fieldpieces, *Snake* cannon, *Falconettes*, mortars, *petards*, and

buckshot] (382). The power to destroy masses of people, "die Menschen tausendtweiß,

"and people in masses, "Städte, Flecken, vnd Dörffer," underscores the apocalyptic

prognosis of the *Helden-Rath* (382). Yet, the heroes are just as concerned for the people

who bear weapons as they are for those who are killed by them. After all, it is they—the

soldiers—who are putting both their bodies and their eternal souls at risk thanks to

gunpowder.

"Der ist deß Teufels": The Immoral Soldier

In the narratives of Grimmelshausen and Moscherosch, the invention of gunpowder clearly impacts the aesthetics of war, the cultural legitimacy of warrior masculinity, and ethical conduct in battle. These implications are measured against the aesthetics of ancient epics and tales of knights. Gunpowder disrupts war stories because it disenfranchises the heroic ideal. This disruption of aesthetic precedence is recorded in a deterioration of warrior masculinity that, in turn, is read as a deterioration of battlefield ethics. Up until now, the definitions of morality and ethics have remained vague in this analysis. After all, the authors unproblematically interchange notions of morality and ethics by concluding that gunpowder is morally bad because it upends the ethical hierarchy of the battlefield. The aesthetic and gender problems surrounding gunpowder warfare, therefore, have both ethical and moral dimensions. The threatened disappearance of the heroic aesthetic presents ethical problems because it opens up warfare and representations of warfare to a version that is no longer determined by presuppositions about heroism. The logic is circular, but it is the logic employed the many of these texts.

In the literary works discussed here and in the war treatises of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, to speak of morality is to rely specifically on Christian teachings. To be a good Christian is to be morally good. There is a moral concern and, read more broadly against the backdrop of the Turkish threat to the Holy Roman Empire, a political concern that the corruption of battlefield ethics has lead to the widespread immorality among soldiers. Gunpowder is not the sole agent of immorality for soldiers, but it is always *an* agent and signifier of corruption. Within these novels, the immorality of soldiers is not always linked to gunpowder, but wherever it appears gunpowder is

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always linked to soldiers' immoral behaviors and the corruption of battlefield ethics.[527]

The vacuum left by the destruction of these warrior ideals will be filled—in the most

apocalyptic versions of these works—by the utterly immoral, possibly female, un-

Christian warrior.

The danger to warrior masculinity is also always coded as moral and ethical, a

point made clear by Grimmleshausen's *Courasche* and its final warning to the

(masculine) reader to avoid women like Courasche, who are "inwendig so voll an

Franzosen und auswendig voller Blatter" [filled inside with syphillis and covered

outside with pox] (C 131). Yet, Courasche poses a threat to masculinity, and not just

individual men, since she is capable of performing masculinity as well as and often

better than men. The beginning of the novel, in which she masquerades as a male

soldier, and the frontispiece, in which she wears pants and is physically elevated above

a man, makes her fraught relationship to men and masculinity clear. On a moral level

she endangers individual men with her sexual allure and promiscuity. She, "die

gefährliche Chimäris" [the dangerous chimera], and her poisonous immorality are

always waiting to unman, cuckold, and corrupt (C 130). Like the "Sirenen," she leads the

"züchtige Jüngling" [brave youth] astray into "allerhand Unreinigkeit, Schand, Spott,

Armut und Elend" [all around immodesty, dishonor, shame, poverty, and suffering] (C

130). In the aesthetic of warrior masculinity, to be morally debauched in such a way is to

have one's masculinity, and by extension one's status as warrior, questioned. As a moral

danger to individual men, she symbolizes a danger to the ideals of masculinity.

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[527] Thank you to the WashU German Department's 2010-2011 Dissertation Colloquium
for this articulation (April 1, 2011).

Courasche also finds an opening in performance of warrior masculinity. The concerns raised by gunpowder about battlefield hierarchies among men in Grimmelshausen's novels allows for the possibility of female interlopers, as seen in Courasche's story. The upending of battlefield ethics persists in Courasche's lack of reliance on men to do the fighting for her. She scavenges, fights, and kills on her own—often violently—and she is, moreover, almost always victorious in fistfights with male soldier. Courasche just as happily beats her domestic partner Springinsfeld into submission as she slices the head off of a captured major in the heat of battle after discharging her own pistols.[528] There is an underlying concern here that the weakening of warrior masculinity, which is in part a corruption of gunpowder warfare, will result in the domination of men by women. Certainly, Courasche uses guns as easily as men since she spent many of her childhood years disguised as an adolescent boy in the army. She even claims that, as a result of a magic spell, she is bulletproof! But, in the end, the narrative's concern is that the leveling of the battlefield—an effect of the firearm— allows women to be as successful as men in warfare, thus making warrior masculinity irrelevant. In Courasche's case, the worst-case scenario for devotees of warrior masculinity, her success on the battlefield translates to her physical power over men off of it.

The conflation of ethics and morality is present in the works of both Grimmelshausen and Moscherosch. Yet the purely moral impact of gunpowder

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[528] Courasche wins two notable fistfights (one against a fellow soldier while she is disguised as man and the other against Springinsfeld). She also beheads a major in a gunpowder battle in order to escape: "dann ich nahme in der Caracole einen Major . . . al ser die Charge reduplieren wollte, und als ihn einer von den Seinigen zu erretten gedachte und mir zu solchem Ende eine Pistol und den Kopf losbrennete . . . bezahlte ich ihn dergestalt mit meinem Säbel" (*Courasche* 42).

technology on warfare and the danger of the immoral, un-Christian soldier become clear in the behaviors and treatment of soldiers off the battlefield. Battle between combatants, often considered by military theorists to be a space where moral judgment is temporarily suspended, and which is seen by pacifists to be a space of *de facto* immorality, always has an ethical component containing notions of fair play, heroic behavior, and camaraderie even as morality is suspended or absent.[529] But when we make assumptions about the absence of morality in battle, we still make claims about both the morality of wars and warfare and the morality of combatants. We do this through heroic tropes and ideals, which are, inevitably, constructed through national, regional, or local discourses. Ethical concerns—concerns about behavioral codes—give way to purely moral concerns in all discussions of warfare when we talk about *jus ad bellum* and *jus ex bello* issues: that is, when we question the reasons for going to war and think about the interaction of soldiers and civilians.

Both Moscherosch and Grimmelshausen are preoccupied with this moral question, in particular because their novels, which have long been regarded as realistic representations of the Thirty Years War, are so intimately concerned with the "Alltag" [everyday] of the war.[530] In a historic sense, the Thirty Years War was fought off the battlefield more than it was fought on it. In fact, being forced into a head-to-head confrontation in the mid-seventeenth century was considered a tactical failure. Gustav Adolf's self-sustaining strategy of warfare in the German lands turned into a military offensive against the civilians, upon whom both the Swedish and imperial armies

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[529] Cf. Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, 3rd edt. (New York: Basic Books, 2000).

[530] Hans Medick and Benigna von Krustenstjern, "Die Nähe und Ferne des Dreißigjährigen Krieges," in *Zwischen Alltag und Katastrophe* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999), 13.

counted for provisions and, to a large extent, money. Questions of military offensives against civilians typically fall under the categories of *jus in bello* [justice in war] or *jus ex bello* [justice outside of war]. Yet modern philosophical considerations, which would assert the illegality of these soldiers actions, are anachronistic when applied retrospectively. Turning to legal codes of the seventeenth century, we find the opposite position. Martial law of the time such as Hugo Grotius's legal code asserted the legality of such actions, even though the literature and eyewitness accounts of the Thirty Years War often perceived soldiers behaviors as immoral, if not illegal.

Returning to Moscherosch's "Soldaten-Leben," we find a narrative that traces the capture of Philander by a band of soldiers and his adoption into their ranks. At the beginning of the "Soldaten-Leben," Philander is captured by soldiers who spare him because of his ability to help them (he can read the messages being sent to them). Along with another prisoner, a doctor, Philander finds himself slowly accepting and adopting the habits of the soldiers. He relishes the fact that he is not tortured while others are, and he basks in his new job, namely to read secret messages aloud. As Grunwald writes, "At the beginning he feels compassion for the victims of his captors, then after a while he becomes callous and ceases to protest against atrocities. Gradually he learns that, for example, if one wants to torture a farmer effectively one should let another peasant do it."[531] Furthermore, over the course of his 'captivity,' Philander finds himself using "wir" with more frequency when referring to the soldiers.[532]

The change in Philander's attitude toward the soldiers in this section is crucial to understanding the relationship of this text to war. Philander finds himself pulled into

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[531] Grunwald, 56.

[532] Grunwald, 56.

the soldiers' lifestyle, slowly adopting vices such as smoking, robbing, and torturing.[533] The soldiers he accompanies, most prominently Grschwbtt, Bbwtz, Bttrwtz, Zwerch and Lffl, are Croatian troops under the imperial command. While Philander intervenes in their actions a few times by pleading with them not to kill a particular person or to take pity on a poor farmer, for the most part he finds himself conspiring in their crimes. Moscherosch's message in this "Gesicht" is clear, the quintessence of the "Soldatenleben" is moral depravity and corruption. Only near the end of the "Gesicht" thanks to "spiritual regeneration through religion" is Philander redeemed.[534]

Over the course of the "Gesicht," Philander goes through a moral decline spurred on by his increased participation in the soldiers' activities. Yet the soldiers themselves, and not just their lifestyle, are important to Philander's moral weakening because they actively encourage him to partake in their misadventures and vulgar conversations. Grschwbtt, in a moment of true smugness after Philander makes a scatalogical joke, even exclaims, "Philander wird gut warden . . . wann er noch ein Zeit bey vns bleibet" [Philander will be all right. . .if he stays with us for a while longer] (M 306). The soldiers truly believe they will change Philander for the better, and they—ironically—see themselves as paragons of bravery and instruments of divine will on earth, worthy of emulation. They articulate these thoughts through a soldier's code which opposes Christian moral ethics. The teachings of this code, articulated in the form of an inverted Cathechism, all begin with, "der ist deß Teuffels" [he belongs to the devil] and act as

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[533] Grunwald, 56: Moscherosch sees all of these as base behaviors, but smoking, in particular, becomes a outward indicator of Philander's moral degeneration.

[534] Grunwald, 57.

warnings against misconduct.[535] The kinds of "soldier doctrine" which the Croatian

soldiers espouse are sometimes comical but more often disturbing. A sampling of these

formulations follows:

> "Der ist des Teuffels, sprach [ein Knecht], der ihn nit tödet"
> (283)
> "Der ist deß Teuffels, sprach [Bbwtz], der ihm das Geld
> nicht alles nimpt" (284)
> "Dann ist der deß Teuffels, sprach mein Vatter, der sein
> Lebtag mehr ein Vatter Vnser bettet" (307)
> "Der ist deß Teuffels, sprach Lffl, der der Frömbste ist"
> (307)
> "Der ist deß Teuffels der sich vber einen Bawren erbarmet"
> (309)
> "Der ist des Teuffels, der nicht alles niderschlägt, vnd
> insonderheit dich Bawren" (309)
> "Der ist des Teuffels, der nicht fluchet" (309)
> "Der ist des Teuffels, sprach [Bbwtz], der eine [Frau] freyet,
> wer wolt sich die Lust so enge spannen lassen; Freyen ist
> gut, wans frey und täglich new" (311)[536]

Taken together, they form the ethical code by which the soldiers live. Eventually,

Philander recognizes their worldview as twisted when measured against Christian

teachings: "sie [vmbkehren] die Gebott Gottes" [they invert the commandments of God]

(M 340). According to Philander's judgment, what is immoral about their claims and

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[535] Moscherosch, *Philander*, 340: Philander even uses this word, "Ich hab, sprach ich, in meiner Jugend auch den Cathechisms vnnd Gebott Gottes gelernet, nemblich: wer nicht Predig höret, wer den Oberen nicht Gehorsam ist: wer nicht Busse thut: wer tödet: wer saufet: wer huret: wer stihlet: wer diß und daß thut, der seye verdampt. [...] Aber mein Gott, was wunderliche Theologiam, vnnd H. Schrifft, was für einen Her Gott müssen die Leuthe [die Soldaten] haben?"

[536] Translations: "He belongs to the devil, said one soldier, who does not kill him"; "He belongs to the devil, said Bbwtz, who does not take all of the money from him"; "Then he belongs to the devil, my father said, who prays more than a single *Our Father* in his life"; "He belongs to the devil, said Lffl, who is the most chaste"; "He belongs to the devil, who feels sorry for a farmer"; "He belongs to the devil, who does not destroy everything, especially the farmers"; "He belongs to the devil, who does not curse"; "He belongs to the devil, who frees a woman, who might be able to sate one's lust; Freeing is good, if it is free and new each day."

behaviors is the contradiction and inversion of God's laws and Christian teachings. Immorality, in this sense, is inverted Christianity.

The soldiers' un-Christian code provides their justification for the regular assault of civilians. As one soldier demands the death of a farmer who has no money to pay his ransom, Philander intervenes, "als ich [dem Knecht] aber zugesprochen, er solte den guten Mann, der vielleicht zu Hauß arme Kinder sitzen hätte, nicht eben so gleich hien, ohn Gewissens-Forcht tödten!" [when I said to the soldier though that he should not kill the good man, who may have poor children sitting at home ... without fear of conscience] (M 283). After searching the man's body including "heimlichen Orten, ja, das ich ohne Scham nicht melden kann" [secret places, that I can't even mention without shame] and finding nothing, the soldier summarily executes the captive and exclaims as quoted above, only "der deß Teuffels" would not kill him (M 283). This scene, like many in this chapter, is most disturbing for its arbitrary violence. But if one looks at the other Cathechismic inversions, one finds a clear pattern: the devil, his followers, or the people through whom he works are the ones who do not kill, steal, rape, feel pity, or pray. This (im)moral ethical system frames the "Soldier's Lives" and their actions in the text by authorial design. The message Moscherosch conveys is that the soldiers of his world are not the upright heroes of the past.

This "Gesicht" contains encounters emphasizing the contradiction between the behaviors of soldiers and the expectations of how soldiers should behave. While Moscherosch makes it clear that these soldiers are utterly depraved, he uses the voices of several non-soldiers, such as clergy, farmers, and an innkeeper, to portray the moral expectations of a good (Christian) soldier as a counterpoint to these marauders' behaviors. One scene provides comic relief as a captured farmer explains his own ideal

of a soldier. Lffll, in a moment of jocundity, interrogates the farmer, who wishes aloud that common soldiers were more like their generals and that they would pray before their attacks.[537] Lffll asks the farmer, "Aber wie soll ich einer betten?" [But how should I say a prayer?] (M 304). The farmer, who believes Lffll's curiosity to be genuine, attempts to teach him and his comrades to pray,

> Ihr Herren, . . . wann ihr etwas vor habt, ein Treffen, ein Scharmützel, ein Party; so bedenckt von ersten, wem ihr dient; nicht thut wie manche, die da sagen, ich nehme Geld vnd diene dem Teuffel, dan wer wider seinen Glauben dient der ist ärger als ein Heyde. Darnach so denckt, ob ihr Fug vnd Recht habt. 3. Ob es zur Ehre Gottes, zu Dienst ewers Gn. herren vnd zu des Vatterlands heyl angesehen?[538]

> [Sirs, . . . when you have something planned, a battle, a skirmish or a party; you should first consider whom you serve; do not do as many do, who just say, "I take money and serve the Devil!", because whoever acts against his beliefs is more of a scoundrel than a heathen. Next, you ought to consider if you have just cause. Thirdly, whether it can be considered for the honor God, in the service of your merciful Lord, and for the well-being of the Fatherland.]

Following his description of this tripartite meditation on the soldier's purpose—whom one serves, whether one has a right to fight, and whether it is for the glory of God—the farmer recites a prayer that asks God to help soldiers act in accordance with divine will and fight only for just causes. The farmer is clearly not aware that he is imploring a group of men whose ethical code obliges them to murder and steal that they ought not to act against their beliefs. His appeal to the soldiers falls short of modifying their behavior.

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[537] This wish betrays a belief that generals are more moral than their soldiers, an idea that is very different from Grimmelshausen's tree of war.

[538] Moscherosch, *Philander*, 305. [Trans. mine.]

Bobtz replies, "Der ist des Teuffels . . . der so lang betten möchte." [He belongs to the devil who would want to pray for so long.]

To which Grschwbtt adds, "Wann ich Morgens auffstehe . . . so spreche ich ein gantz A.B.C. darinnen sind alle Gebett auff der Welt begriffen, vnser Herr Gott mag sich darnach die Buchstaben selbst zusamen lesen vnd Gebette drauß machen, wie er will" [When I get up in the morning, I say the whole alphabet, since every prayer in the world is contained in it. Our Lord can assemble the letter later and make a prayer out of them as he sees fit] (M 306).

Bbwtz suggests that he "laß einen Streichen" [lets one fly] as soon as he wakes up as a morning prayer for the good of his body, while Philander—perhaps at a moral low point—responds with the equally vulgar contribution, "Ich leg mich nider" [I sit myself down (on the toilet)] (M 306).

The conflicting expectations of the soldiers' behavior stem from the farmer's belief that soldiers fight for a cause and, thus, have good reason to engage in battle. The farmer's call to prayer is a call to self-reflection and an act of meaningful language, but the soldiers and Philander are more interested in their bodily functions and conservation of mental energy. Their snide remarks, witty and crude, function in much the same way that their ethical code does; they "pray," but only on their own terms.

Turning back to the litany of the "der ist deß Teuffels" statements, one finds another salient aspect of soldier's lives as represented by Moscherosch: money.[539] The Thirty Years War posed great financial hardships for regional governments, armies, and civilians. The soldiers were often perceived as the cause. For the soldiers in Moscherosch's *Philander*, money is the primary source of joy, sadness, and anger. The

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[539] Money as the "wrong" (immoral) motivation for war.

example of the captive, whom they murder for having no belongings, is just one of these instances. In another scene, when the soldiers sink a ferry while it is carrying civilians—"bey denen auch etliche Weiber sassen" [among whom there were also some women]—across a river, Philander explains their unusual reaction to the death of so many people (M 269). He claims, "Dieser trawige Anblick hat etliche von vns fast beweget; doch war es den meisent nicht vmb das arme Volck zu thun, sondern wegen deß Verlusts der Güter, die sie da gehofft hatten" [This sad sight moved a number of us; yet, for most, it had nothing to do with the poor people, rather because of the loss of goods, which they had hoped to gain] (269). It is not clear which loss grieves Philander, but it is clear from subsequent discussions that he sees the moral paucity in valuing goods over human life.

The most nihilist of statements quoted above is Zwerch's claim that he does not feel any pity for farmers and that he sees the entire world as worthy of destruction: "Der ist deß Teuffels, der nicht alles niderschlägt" [He who does not destroy everything belongs to the devil.] (M 309). Zwerch's utter lack of empathy belies his nihilism, brought on by killing too many people. He brags of the number of "Witwen vnnd Weysen" [widows and orphans] he has made, and he attributes his lack of empathy to his occupation: "Wann einer einmal einen nidergemacht hat, so wird er voller Teuffel, daß ihn nichts mehr erbarmet vnd ihn eben ist, als ob er einen Hund erschösse, wann er ein Menschen niderlegt, oder einen Bawren Büchset; vnd gibt mir ein rechten Lust wann ich sehe das Blut also herauß springen" [Once one has killed someone else, he is so filled with demons, that he no longer feels sympathy and he becomes desensitized, as if he has shot a dog when he kills a man in his tracks or blown away a farmer; and it really gives me great pleasure when I see blood spurt out of someone] (M 309).

His psychopathy does not come without its consequences; when he is unable to kill one particular "Bawr" a frightening episode ensues. Zwerch "sprang . . . auff vnd rauffte sich selbst die Haar auß, bisse sich in die Leffzen vnd Finger, daß das Blut hernach lieffe" [jumped up and tore out his own hair, bit his lips and fingers, so that blood ran from them] (M 309). Philander and other onlookers are particularly disturbed, as "mit so Gottslästerlichen Fluchen erfüllete er die Stube, daß die Beampte all wolten davon gehen vnd dem aller Gottlosesten das Hertz wehe thate" [he filled the room with such blasphemous curses, that the civil servants wanted to leave, and that even the most Godless person's heart had to be hurt] (M 309). In addition to the harm done to others, Moscherosch exposes the danger of gunpowder violence for the soldiers themselves. The immorality of soldiers as a result of murdering with gunpowder weapons has long lasting effects of a deep psychological nature in this scene. The ease of violence and the process of desensitization to murder wreaks havoc on the soldier who is forced to confront a society where such actions are forbidden. Surrounded and compelled by the regulators of government and law—the "Beampte"—Zwerch goes insane. Confronted by this scene, Philander soon decides to leave the company of the Croatian soldiers and witnesses the trial of Berthold Schwarz, the legendary inventor of gunpowder weapons.

Reading Gunpowder in Early Modern German War Novels

Scholars have often concluded that the horrified reactions of seventeenth-century German authors to gunpowder weapons stem from the terrifying experiences of the Thirty Years War.[540] The debate over the historical validity of the claims that the Thirty

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[540] In particular Benigna von Krusenstjern and Hans Medick, *Zwischen Alltag und Katastrophe,* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999); Geoffrey Parker and Simon Adams, *The Thirty Years' War* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), 340.; Otto

Years War was as horrifying as fiction writers of the period made it out to be has been widely discussed in literary and cultural histories. Even Jameson, whose article is not concerned with historical facts, does not seem to escape the question of "atrocity" when discussing Grimmelshausen's narratives.[541] However, the ramifications of gunpowder for this debate have been overlooked. A survey of some of the material and textual histories of early modern technologies of war allows us to draw the following conclusions: (1) The condemnation of gunpowder weapons was neither specific nor new to the seventeenth-century and its literary and cultural discussions of war. (2) The concerns of seventeenth century German war novelists are grounded in international literary traditions, the discourse of military science, and the material history of gunpowder weapons. (3) Early modern German people writing about gunpowder weapons in the context of war focus on three primary concerns: the aesthetic, ethical-moral, and gendered implications of gunpowder.

Returning to Springinfeld's story and the trial of gunpowder, we find a long aesthetic tradition upended by gunpowder technology. The hero of the past disappears not only in Grimmelshausen's and Moscherosch's works—their protagonists are, largely, unheroic—but heroes are also assassinated by anti-heroic, mostly immoral characters in the narratives. The Swedish officer's ignoble death at the hands of the cowardly and self-involved Springinsfeld is an officer's death as well as the death of the heroic tradition

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Ulbricht, "The Experience of Violence During the Thirty Years War: A Look at the Civilian Victims," in *Power, Violence and Mass Death in Pre-Modern and Modern Times* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), 97-159; Eberhard Mannack, "Der Streit der Historiker und Literaten über den Dreißigjährigen Krieg und Westphälischen Frieden," *Daphnis* 31 (2002), 701-12; Walter Schäfer, "Der dreißigjährige Krieg aus der Sicht Moscherosch und Grimmelshausens," *Morgen-Glantz* 9 (1999), 13-30.

[541] Jameson, 1537.

through gunpowder. The ethical and moral dilemma of gunpowder warfare arises from this aesthetic contradiction. The commentary on the "pestilence" of the "horrible firearm" is commonplace in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Even in the works of military theorists like Fronsperger and his book about how to use guns, we find moral condemnations of firearms linked to ethical concerns. Gunpowder is repeatedly judged as morally bad because it disrupts a traditional battlefield ethics based upon bravery and nobility. These were the moral homing beacons of the aesthetic of warrior masculinity idealized in figures like Hercules and the medieval knight. Finally, central to the ethical and aesthetic concerns are the physical and moral qualities of the masculine warrior as found in the *Feuerwerkbuch*, Fronsperger's works, and the novels of Moscherosch and Grimmelshausen. Warrior masculinity, a tradition that had been passed down to the early modern period through a seemingly stable aesthetic had become a corrupted brand of masculinity. The *Simpliciana* are, on one level, narrative exercises in the impact of war on various constructs of masculinity. By the seventeenth century, the knight was dead not only in the tactical framework of military theory but in the literature of war as well.

How did gunpowder technology change narratives of war? According to the narratives themselves and the *Kriegsbücher* that informed the waging of war, gunpowder temporarily disabled warrior masculinity by exploding the moral and aesthetic presuppositions of warfare passed down through an idealizing aesthetic. In order to deal with the aesthetic dissonance between the idealized tradition of war and the "absolute reality" of the kind of warfare waged at that time, early modern authors used narrative genres such as the satirical novel to highlight the technology they saw as culpable for this corruption. The renegotiation of the aesthetics of war would eventually

recalibrate the figure of the heroic warrior through the use of religious and nationalistic

rhetoric in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the new literary figure of the

"cavalier."

Cavalier Endings: Colonial Expansion and the Recovery of the War Hero
in Eberhard Happel's *Der insulanische Mandorell* (1682)

"Both cavalier and steed fell to the ground,
But, while in one all signs of life had ceased,
The other leapt up nimbly with one bound,
As though his strength and vigour were increased."
— Ariosto, *Orlando Furioso*, IX.77

The disappearance of the knight from the battlefield, or, better put, the

transformation of knights into an aristocratic (and upper-bourgeois) officer class in the

sixteenth century was, to some extent, the result of the wide spread use of gunpowder

weapons on the battlefield. Regardless of the semantic register with which military

historians frame the alterations to warfare that coincide with the rise of gunpowder

technology, the social and cultural implications of gunpowder weapons seem to suggest

a synthetic rather than decisive answer to the two camps. Found in the works of military

theorists, proto-journalists, literary authors, graphic artists, and humanists, depictions of

gunpowder technology in early modern German lands display a continuum of reactions

to gunpowder weapons that ranges from cautiously supportive to vehemently critical.

This spectrum of reactions indicates that gunpowder weapons occupied a

contingent position in the German cultural landscape. Seen as problematic by those who

compared their experiences of war to the idealized depictions of ancient and medieval

warriors, gunpowder weapons could be disparaged as evidence of the moral, gendered,

and even aesthetic degeneration of war and warriors. Other representations of

gunpowder, such as those found in military broadsheets and seventeenth-century

Kriegsbücher, depicted them as either positive or negative depending on who used them.

Representations of gunpowder weapons in poetry, not considered in depth in the

preceding study, confirms their malleability as symbols. Pro-war poetry, such as Paul

Fleming's (1609-1640) "Lob eines Soldaten zu Fuße" [Praise of a Foot Soldier], presents

gunpowder positively,

> . . . Wer Pulver riechen kann,
> auf Balg und Stoß besteht, nicht die Kartaunen scheuet,
> der ist ein Mann wie ich; ist einer der sich freuet,
> wenn itzt der laute Lärm mit vollen Spielen geht
> und uns der kühne Feind im blanken Felde steht.
> So bin auch wahrlich ich's. Wir treuen Kameraden
> stehn als für einen Mann: die schießen, jene laden.[542]

> [. . . Who can smell the whiff of powder,
> And lives for rough and tumble, and does not fear the field guns,
> He is a man like me; he is the one who takes pleasure
> When suddenly the loud battle horns cry in full bellows,
> And the bold enemy stands across from us on an open field.
> Truly, that is what I am, too. We true comrades
> Stand together as a single man: these shoot; those load.]

Anti-Thirty-Years-War poetry, such as Johannes Rist's (1607-1667) dirge "Ermahnung zu

Wiederbringung des Edlen Friedens" [Exhortation for the Reinstatement of Noble

Peace], makes a predictably negative counterpoint with regards to firearms,

> Ich sehe ja die Luft mit dickem Rauch erfüllet,
> das grüne Meer mit Blut gefärbet überall,
> den güldnen Sonnenglanz mit Dunkelheit verhüllet,
> ich höre Donner, Blitz und der Kartaunen Schall.

> O seligs Vaterland, wirst du die Zeit erleben,
> daß man aus Schwertern und Pistolen Sensen mach,
> daß keine Fahnen mehr um ihre Zelten schweben, . . .
> daß man die Speisen kocht mit der Musketen Schäften . . .[543]

> [I can see the air filled with thick smoke,
> The green sea dyed with blood all over,
> The golden shimmer of sunlight caked in darkness,

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542 Paul Fleming, "Lob eines Soldaten zu Fuße," in *Deutsche Barocklyrik* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1975), 26.

543 Johannes Rist, "Ermahnung zu Wiederbringung des Edlen Friedens," in *Deutsche Barocklyrik*, 27.

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I hear the thunder, lightning, and echo of cannons.

O blessed Fatherland, you will see the day,
When swords and pistols are beat into scythes,
When flags no longer fly around their tents, . . .
When meals are cooked with the stocks of muskets . . .]

Each of these poets laureate demonstrates polarized poetic tendencies.[544] Fleming

upholds guns as the weapons of heroes dedicated to each other as brothers, or as a team

working in unison; Rist paints firearms as a disruption of German society and enemies

of natural beauty. Novelistic depictions of the Thirty Years War, on the other hand, seem

less flexible with their representations of firearms than German verse.

In an effort to tell moralizing stories about the Thirty Years War, seventeenth-

century German novelists, as discussed above, cast gunpowder weapons as a distinctly

negative development in European warfare. In the novels of both Moscherosch and

Grimmelshausen, firearms are the tools of a dysfunctional and oftentimes cruel (even

demonic) *soldateska*. These works are also presented them as evidence of the corruption

of war (which presupposes a time when war was not corrupt), as metonyms for

cowardice, emasculation, dishonor, and immorality. Represented, then, as the tools

and—metonymically—the traits of bad soldiers, gunpowder weapons find further

condemnation in the "ostranenie" and destruction of heroic figures in these novels.[545]

Embodied for example in the euthanized Swedish officer in Grimmelshausen's

Springinsfeld and the bullet-riddled "ancient German hero" in Moscherosch's *Philander*,

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[544] Niefanger, *Barock*, 75.

[545] Jameson, 1533.

heroic warriors are murdered by base villains, in most cases with gunpowder weapons.[546]

As un-heroic and ignoble as the characters from these novels often are, however, there are a number of German novels from the seventeenth century that elevate heroic warrior characters without hesitation. The distinction is that these warrior-positive novels do not tend to portray contemporary warriors. Instead they turn to an idealized past. Two well-established genres, the so-called courtly-historic novel or "höfisch-historischer Roman" and its close relative the gallant novel or "galanter Roman," epitomize this particular characterization of the warrior hero. And yet, their characters also hold the key for explaining the post-gunpowder heroic paradox. With Daniel Caspar von Lohenstein's *Arminius* (1689-1690) as its quintessential example, the courtly-historical novel has no problem spinning an endless string of narration in support of its titular hero. By relying on heroic figures from ancient times, Lohenstein avoids the moral hazards of contemporary warfare that Moscherosch and Grimmelshausen face. In a similar way, the gallant novel avoids the messy world of gunpowder warfare by focusing on courtly rhetoric. Gallant novels, explains Dirk Niefanger, "vertreten ein galantes Verhaltensideal, das auf Kommunikations- und Komplimentierkunst baut. Sie haben nicht die moralische Besserung des Menschen im Sinn. Vielmehr wollen sie sein Zurechtfinden in der (höfischen) Welt verbessern" [represent a gallant ideal of behavior, which is based on the arts of communication and courtesy. They do not have the moral bettering of mankind in mind. Rather, they are interested improving its positioning in the courtly world].[547] The fact that the characters are typically aristocrats, one of the

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[546] Cf. Chapter Four.

[547] Niefanger, *Barock*, 214.

distinguishing characteristics separating "high" from "low" novels, allows the author to play out the story in more decorous milieus than those the satirical novel inhabits.[548]

In this final chapter, I argue, through an analysis of the figure of the cavalier in Eberhard Happel's *Der insulanische Mandorell* (1682), that—in addition to the long established generic differences between high and low novels—we should consider the role that stock literary characters played in reviving the heroic warrior tradition in the age of firearms. Since the knight disappeared from the battlefield, his natural successor in the lineage of heroic warrior characters seemed most likely to come from the cavalry officer class. This group of men, as we noted in Chapter One, were—to some degree— fashioned by themselves and by military theorists as modern day knights with pistols instead of lances. Their dress on the battlefield, which mimicked the knight's habit, including the use of plumage and—lighter, more flexible—armor, suggested that the "Reiter" was an evolution of the "Ritter." The distinction between enlisted and officer further stratified this group of horse-mounted soldiers into an elite circle that wielded both social and tactical value. One sub-category of the officer cavalry class is the cavalier, who becomes the literary inheritor of knightly heroic aesthetic.

Historical and Literary Aspects of the Cavalier

The cavalier, in his later literary iterations, is a cosmopolitan purveyor of violence, love, and knowledge on horse. In his early history, he was less romantic. Named for his means of transportation, the cavalier—in military historical terms—was simply another word in several languages, including German, for "Reiter," horse-rider. He was a light cavalry soldier armed with pistols and a sword, who was—as I discussed

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[548] Niefanger, *Barock*, 214.

earlier—drawn from many social strata. As Hall has argued, his pistols lent him some "upper-class cachet," perhaps more than he really deserved. Indeed, today's usage of "cavalier" in English to mean haughty, rude, or inconsiderate, falls in line with the kind of arrogance that cavalry soldiers emanate in literature and art of mid-seventeenth-century Germany. Even in their military hey-day they, especially the enlisted men, were "less-than-knights," the inferior inheritors of the chivalric tradition.

Cultural depictions of cavaliers during the Thirty Years War did little to improve this image. From Jacques Callot's depiction of a cavalier riding down two peasants in cold blood (1634) to Friedrich von Logau's (1604-1655) satirical "Kriegshund" [War Dog] ballad, cavaliers are portrayed as oppressive and unscrupulous:

> Aber ich bin von den Hunden,
> Die sich in den Krieg gefunden,
> Bleibe nur wo Helden bleiben,
> Wenn sie Küh und Pferde treiben, . . .
> Kann die schlauen Bauern suchen,
> Wenn sie sich ins Holz verkruchen,
> Wenn sie nach den Pferden kommen,
> Die mein Herr hat wo genommen, . . .
> Kann durch Schaden, kann durch Zehren
> Helfen Haus und Hof verheeren.
> Cavalliers, die kann ich leiden,
> Bauern müssen mich vermeiden;
> Bin nun drum in meinem Orden
> Hunde-Cavallier geworden.[549]
>
> [Yet, I come from that breed of dogs,
> That has found its way into war,
> I only stay where the heroes stay,
> When they take cows and steeds away, . . .
> I can find those tricky farmers,
> When they hide themselves in the wood,
> When they come to retrieve their horses,
> That my master took by force, . . .
> By biting or by growling, I

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[549] Friedrich von Logau, "Ein Kriegshund redet von sich selbst," in: *80 Barock-Gedichte*, edt. Herbert Heckmann (Berlin: Wagenbach Verlag, 1976), 15.

> Can help to ravage house and farm.
> Cavaliers, with them I'm happy,
> Since farmers have to avoid me;
> Because I've been, in my quarter,
> Promoted to Dog-Cavalier.]

In Logau's poem, the dog—interchangeable with his master—is little more than a thief who aspires to the position of cavalier. His eventual promotion is won through his cruelty toward civilians, not through his bravery in battle. And yet, despite these and many other negative depictions found on the continent during and just after the Thirty Years War, cavaliers did not entirely lose their claim to heroic status.

Indeed, the word "cavalier" could be used to describe such a vast group of soldiers and pistols-for-hire that cavaliers gained a romanticized reputation as well. In the seventeenth century English context, for instance, the "cavalier" was, specifically, a supporter "of the English monarchy during the English civil war period."[550] When the Royalists lost, many fled abroad. During the English Restoration period, Aphra Behn (1640-1689) and Daniel Defoe (ca. 1659-1731) were among English writers who lent the cavalier—in the context of the English Civil War—a romantic, if not entirely positive, status. Behn's cavalier play, *The Rover* (1677), which takes place after the beheading of Charles I in the 1650s, places the "Banished Cavaliers" Wilmore, Belvile, Frederick, and Blunt in Naples during Carnival, where they mix in masquerade with various women, from aristocrats to a "jilting wench."[551] Between sword- and pistol-play, fisticuffs, and amorous flirtations, the English cavaliers—despite being trapped several times—

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[550] Aphra Behn, *The Rover*, ed. Anne Russel (Petersborough, Canada: Broadview Press, 2002), 59 fn.

[551] Anne Russel, "Introduction," In: Aphra Behn, *The Rover* (Petersborough, Canada: Broadview Press, 2002), 23.

demonstrate a kind of international superiority that repeatedly bests (sometimes by forfeit) the Italian and Spanish men on stage.[552]

Defoe, too, in his *Memoirs of a Cavalier* (1720), describes the life of an English cavalier who fights on both sides of the Thirty Years War, first under Tilly and then under Gustav Adolf, before returning to the fight for the Royalists in the English Civil War. Through a faux-autobiographical account, Defoe constructs an image of the anonymous Cavalier's impetuous and bellicose youth tempered by experiences of war abroad and at home. Over the course of the novel, he becomes "a sympathetic, experienced, and qualified judge," who "In keeping with his modesty . . . admits to [moments of] cowardice, ignorance, naïveté; . . . he is even-handed, meritocratic, militarily experienced, and able to mix in high and low company."[553] He never makes himself into a hero, and becomes all the more likeable for it. Moreover, "he is gradually humanized, fleshed out as a character, moving away from the mercenary spirit that carried him through the Thirty Years War."[554]

These two depictions of English cavaliers from the aftermath of the English Civil War set the bar for the pan-European literary figure of the cavalier. Indeed, the key aspects of the cavalier are—besides being English—(1) his interest in and aptitude for war, especially close combat with swords and pistols; (2) his ability to speak several languages, and general ease abroad; and (3) his unmitigated nobility, which is determined not only by social class, but by a capacity for bravery and self-reflection.

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[552] The notable exception being the length of the Spaniard's "sword" when they all draw swords to compare. Behn, *The Rover*, 165 (Act V, Scene i).

[553] Nicholas Seager, "'A Romance the likest to Truth that I ever read': History, Fiction, and Politics in Defoe's *Memoirs of a Cavalier*," *Eighteen Century Fiction* 20:4 (Summer 2008), 496.

[554] Seager, 497.

Beyond these characteristics, the cavalier also (4) defeats international foes or recognizes in them a noble spirit equal to his own, thus (5) winning international fame and favor among those he meets, even those he defeats in combat. While the literary cavalier need not be English, European literature shows a strong inclination to make him so. In analyzing Happel's novel, *Der insulanische Mandorell*, we will consider the degree to which these aspects of the cavalier, represented in the novel by Mandorell himself, become the hallmarks of heroic warrior masculinity in a post-gunpowder era of colonial conquest.

Eberhard Werner Happel's *Mandorell* in the Age of the Cavalier

Eberhard Werner Happel (1647-1690) was a prolific and popular Hamburg journalist, polyglot, and novelist whose works, after a decades-long absence of critical scholarly engagement, are being rediscovered by Germanists in Europe and America.[555] Much of this work has been made possible by the scholarship on Happel by Gerd Meyer, Lynne Tatlock, Gerhild Williams, and Flemming Schock during the last two decades.[556] Furthermore, the recent re-publication of Happel's *Mandorell* as a critical edition by Stefanie Stockhorst and the digitalization of his *Relationes Curiosae* and *Deß Engelländischen Eduards* by the Herzog August Bibliothek has made scholarship on

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[555] Flemming Schock, *Die Text-Kunstkammer: Populäre Wissenssammlungen des Barock am Beispiel der "Relationes Curiosae" von E. W. Happel* (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2011), 13.

[556] Lynne Tatlock, "Selling Turks: Eberhard Werner Happel's Turcica (1683-1690)," *Colloquia Germanica* 28 (1995), 307-335; Tatlock, "The Novel as Archive in Modern Times," *Daphnis* 37:1/2 (2008), 350-373; Gerhild Scholz Williams, "A Novel Form of News: Fact and Fiction in Happel's *Geschicht-Romane* (*Der Teutsche Carl – Der Engelländische Eduard – Der Bäyerische Max* [1690-1692])," *Daphnis* 37:3/4 (2008), 523-545; Williams, "Staging novelties: the theatre of passions and politics in Eberhard Happel's Deß engelländischen Eduards (1690/91)," in *Welt und Wissen auf der Bühe* (Wolfenbüttel: Herzog August Bibliothek, 2011), 361-378.

Happel's *oeuvre* easier for scholars without access to the original editions.[557] For scholars,

one of the most appealing aspects of Happel's works (novels and *Buntschrifstellerei* alike)

is his "multimedia blend of news accounts, geographies, reports on politics and

economics, on wonders and science . . . covering what would then have been on a global

scale."[558] In his fictional works, Happel's "relentless" and prolific mixing and matching of

real information with lengthy narratives of violence and romance pulls at the seams of

modern-day definitions of the novel.[559] And, yet, Happel was keenly aware of and

critically engaged with theories of the novel during his lifetime:

> Wie im Titel des *Mandorells* angedeutet, liegt Happels
> Beitrag zur zegenössischen Romandiskussion darin, dass
> er den *Traitté de l'origine des romans* (1670) von Pierre
> Daniel Huet (1630-1721) ins Deutsche übersetzte. Einem
> der Protagonisten seienes Romans legt Happel die Theorie
> Huets in den Mund.[560]
>
> [As the full title of *Mandorell* suggests, Happel's
> contribution to contemporary discussions of the novel lies
> within his translation of the *Treatise on the Origin of the
> Novel* by Pierre Daniel Huet into German. He
> ventriloquizes Huet's theory through one of his
> protagonists.]

Importantly, the protagonist who recites Huet's treatise in *Der insulanische Mandorell*, is

not just any protagonist, but the titular hero himself, the English cavalier Mandorell.

Der insulanische Mandorell, a "geographische Informationsroman" [geographical

informational novel] as Gerd Meyer has called it, claims to describe for the reader "Aller

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[557] Eberhard Happel, *Der insulanische Mandorell*, edt. Stefanie Stockhorst (Berlin: Weidler Buchverlag, 2007).

[558] Williams, "A Novel Form of News," 523.

[559] Williams, "A Novel Form of News," 523-24; Stefanie Stockhorst, "Nachwort," In: *Der insulanische Mandorell* (Berlin: Weidler Buchverlag, 2007), 648-649.

[560] Schock, *Die Text-Kunstkammer*, 65.

und jeden Insulen Auff dem gantzen Erd=Boden" [each and every island on the face of the entire Earth].[561] Split between the overlapping tales of two primary protagonists, the novel traces the adventures of the Sumatran princess Podolla and the apparently exiled cavalier Mandorell. The novel begins with Podolla's entry into the world of adventure when she asks her father to allow her to hunt a wild boar that has been plaguing their kingdom.[562] Her successful boar hunt morphs into an unexpected encounter with a "bewaffnete Jungfrau" [armed virgin], who is locked into a heated battle with a huge snake. After killing the snake, this "frembde Amazonin" [foreign amazon], named Granipa, saves Podolla from a Tiger and earns Podolla's undying affection (Bk. 1, Ch. 2). A series of shipwrecks (Ch. 5, 14), fights (Ch. 11-13), and a hidden identity and amorous affair (Dallopo, Ch. 10), leads Podolla to meet Mandorell, who pulls her from the water after yet another shipwreck (Ch. 21), defends her honor (Ch. 25), loses her and then rescues her once more (Bk. 2, Ch. 18-19). Along the way, Mandorell collects a band of Asian warrior friends from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Rim while battling various villains and having sundry adventures on different islands. After Mandorell and Podolla (dressed as a man) ultimately defeat the "Amazonische" Tisca in a joust (Bk. 3, Ch. 1), King Coxinga—until now a spectral villain of sorts—reveals that he was actually Granipa, Dallopo, and Tisca in disguise the whole time (Ch. 2). Podolla and Coxinga stay together, and Mandorell continues on his journey home via the Americas (Ch. 3), bringing with him men from his crew, first, Cowattiar and, later, Aguel (Ch. 10). As the novel concludes, Mandorell has been reintegrated into the restored English aristocracy

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[561] Schock, *Die Text-Kunstkammer*, 64; Happel, *Mandorell*, 5.

[562] Happel, *Mandorell*, 16: "ich PODOLLA allein will das ungeheure wilde Schwein erlegen / ich wil allein darthun / daß unter den Kleidern PODOLLAE nicht ein Weib sondern vielmehr ein Fürst / das ist ein mänliches Hertz verborgen liege."

under Charles II, and Cowattiar returns home, having lost Aguel (now named Suiah) "an einer Colica" [to a colic] in Sophia, Bulgaria (Ch. 20). The plot is wildly entertaining, bordering on absurd in its liberal use of hidden identities, bizarre coincidences, and an endless chain of episodic adventures. The same cannot be said for Happel's equally liberal inclusion of lengthy lists, essays, news reports, and geographic descriptions, which suspend the action with tedious trivia. Admittedly, it is easy to skip over them in search of the next action packed chapter. A paginated plot summary at the end lends a hand to any reader who has no patience for erudition.

While the ease of Mandorell's movement in South East Asia and his comfort with various cultures, languages, and races might hint that the novel is uninterested in supporting details (like language proficiency) or unconcerned with the differences between European and Asian cultures, a closer inspection of the novel reveals that these issues are omnipresent in both the foreground (among Mandorell's travel companions) and background (of European colonial expansion). Mandorell happily intermingles with many different peoples, even becoming admiral for the Sumatran King Seladion's navy (Bk. 2, Ch. 15). Yet he and his companions also frequently encounter "natives" ["Barbarischen Völcker"], with whom they often cannot quite communicate and are subsequently forced to fight. Happel is also sure to note, above and beyond Mandorell's cosmopolitan comfort, that he is constantly the superior of those around him, even his friends. Considering how self-sufficient and adept at warfare Podolla is, for example, she is permanently in Mandorell's debt for saving her from certain death or captivity time and again.

Mandorell also pursues an agenda of cultural colonization. This agenda is subtextual and—often—unconscious, but it betrays an embedded message of European

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superiority nonetheless. He is repeatedly reported delivering lessons to his travel companions on various topics ranging from "Irrlichtern" (Bk. 1, Ch. 32) to the origin of the European novel (Bk. 3, Ch. 3-8). The discourse regarding the novel, in particular, highlights the clear cultural hierarchy at work in the narrative. As Mandorell and Cowattiar set sail for Europe, Cowattiar—an Asian islander prince, whom Mandorell "has taught a number of European languages"—discusses the pleasure and usefulness of novels for the acquisition of foreign tongues.[563] When he invites Mandorell to speak at length about the origin of the novel, a number of sailors (Asian and European) gather around to listen. His easy learning is translatable into his superiority over these travel companions, even if his tone is not arrogant.

The opening scene of the novel, in which Podolla proves herself to be more "manly" than any male-bodied Sumatran, read in conjunction with the jousting scene, in which Mandorell defeats Coxinga after Tisca dismounts Podolla, suggests that there is a gendered element to Mandorell's benevolent colonialism. While Coxinga and Podolla are both disguised as the opposite sex (as Tisca and Lofien, respectively) through their clothing, Mandorell (who never disguises his gender) remains the last 'man' standing in the tournament. After Podolla is knocked from her horse, Coxinga casts some disparaging words about the "hoffärtigen Europeer" [arrogant European], which Mandorell must avenge, "Es war dem Mandorell unmöglich diesen Höhnspruch der gantzen Europeischen Nation zu schimpf außgestossen / mit gedultigen Ohren anzuhören" [It was impossible for Mandorell to listen patiently to this insult, tossed provocatively at the entire European nation].[564] Mandorell wins in a dramatic

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[563] Happel, *Mandorell*, 432.

[564] Happel, *Mandorell*, 421.

competition that pits "Asiatische Ehre" [Asian honor] against European pride.[565] The series of events sets up a masculinist hierarchy in which Mandorell stands alone over the defeated Coxinga, the Amazonian Podolla, and – at the bottom – the entire male sex of Sumatra, and by extension Asia.

Notably, almost none of the physical altercations between main characters in the novel take place with gunpowder weapons. Instead, the characters fight one another with the classic weapons of the knight, the sword and lance, thus explaining Happel's anachronistic use of the word "Ritter" [knight] to describe Mandorell. Tatlock has noted this absence, suggesting that, in other works by Happel, "fictions of combat thrive without gunpowder, even as the books in which they appear specialize in supplying of the raw statistics of real wars."[566] Likewise, in *Mandorell*, gunpowder weapons are omnipresent but suppressed, a prop that is only seldom touched by the main characters in specific moments. In *Mandorell*, those moments fall into two categories: (1) during times of colonial conquest or native encounters and (2) when the activities of war—on a large scale—are being described. Thus, the reader encounters gunpowder weapons when Dallopo (Coxinga) has to scare off some "Wilden" [wild people] (Bk. 2, Ch. 1) and when Mandorell's countryman, Joris, describes his attack, armed with cannons and muskets, on a mountain tribe in Cardanang (Bk. 2, Ch. 26), among other scenes of colonial violence. The use of gunpowder weapons in various wars, some European and some colonial, also makes its way into the novel as background or conversation material. The pervasive presence of the colonizing "Holländern" and the "Chinesischen" pirates

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[565] Happel, *Mandorell*, 422-23.

[566] Lynne Tatlock, "Simulacra of War," 667.

also reminds the reader of naval gunpowder warfare.[567] Additionally, as one might expect, Mandorell's fleet is outfitted with "8 Canonen," and most sea battles, including the siege of Coxinga's castle (Bk. 2, Ch. 27), seem to involve a decent amount of cannon fire. This deployment of gunpowder weapons in Happel's *Mandorell* is in line with Tatlock's description of it in his "Geschichts-Romane." Firearms function as a superficial reminder of large-scale warfare but not as an issue to be explored in depth.

Cavalier Beginnings: Reviving the Heroic

The cavalier's cultural development from violence against his own civilians to violence against foreigners abroad presents a tidy but still open conclusion to this study of gunpowder weapons. Much like Fronsperger's claim that gunpowder weapons should not be used against other Christians but rather turned against the Turk, the cavalier's capacity for violence is directed away from the homeland in order for his heroic qualities to be recognized. At home, in Germany and England especially, the cavalier is stained with the blood of his own people. The way to save the cavalier from himself is to ship his unique skills for violence abroad. In exporting Mandorell to Asia, Happel is able to mold a colonializing version of the heroic warrior, whose assaults against natives are balanced by his slightly condescending friendships with the more civilized, politically powerful, and masculine Asians that he meets. His lack of pistols, a puzzling omission, can be explained either—humorously—by his repeated dips in the ocean, which would ruin the powder, or by the fact that the people around him lack the technology of the European continent. Never personally attacked with gunpowder weapons, he never needs to engage in gunplay. Even when attacked with arrows by

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[567] Happel, *Mandorell*, 410-16.

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natives, Mandorell and Cowattiar—protected by their armor—fight their way out of a dead end with their swords, killing "6 von den Wilden" and capturing two others (Bk. 1, Ch. 33).[568] And yet, as we have seen, gunpowder weapons remain present in the plot as the tools for global expansion alongside warriors, like Mandorell.

Weapons, men, and money—the tools of war—have long been the triad for successful military campaigns. Within this constellation of martial objects, myths and stories mystified or criticized their interrelatedness. Heroic masculinity, a cultural linkage of warriors to their weapons through a set of aesthetic, ethical, and gendered tropes, was perennially challenged by the development of new military technologies. In this dissertation, we have looked at the role that firearms played in disrupting the medieval myths of warrior heroes and constructing new myths around warriors in the age of gunpowder warfare. Those myths were not always positive. To some extent, especially with the invention of the wheel-lock and, later, the flint-lock pistol, the slow disappearance of the knight from the battlefield coincided with the rise of anti-soldier sentiments in military, humanist, and literary writings. Even when depictions of gunpowder were positive or non-negative, such as in many of the broadsheets we looked at in Chapter Three, the symbolic register of firearms was always a contingent one.

The cultural responses to gunpowder weapons, from *Kriegsbücher* to *Flugblätter* to *Kriegsromane*, have allowed us to examine the aesthetic, moral-ethical, and gendered changes to warfare in Germany (and Europe) during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. At times these texts have also allowed us to consider how technologies of war affect both aesthetic and political representations of war today. For instance, we might

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[568] Happel, *Mandorell*, 174.

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consider—in addition to the impact of gunpowder weapons—the role that planes, helicopters, drones, sniper scopes, and global positioning systems have come to play in modern day depictions of warfare. Seventeenth-century German war novels integrate gunpowder into their plots and aesthetic descriptions to highlight a variety of moral issues, just as artistic and literary works about the First and Second World Wars reflect on chemical weapons and bombing raids, or films about the Vietnam war integrate the sights and sounds of helicopters into a variety of scenes with similar moralizing or idealizing effects, or sniper scopes, drones, and smart bombs become signs, in twenty-first century war narratives, of the distinction between the "smart" precision of Western weapons against the undiscerning and barbaric violence of terrorists' "improvised explosive devices," "weapons of mass destruction," and rusting soviet-era machine guns. Both war hawks and pacifists rely on different aesthetic deployments of technology in order to support their messages.

The aesthetic, colonial, moralistic, patriotic, pacifist, and propagandistic messages found in various early modern texts also reveal gunpowder weapons to be flexible signifiers. In *Kriegsbücher*, for instance, we saw that criticisms of gunpowder weapons are linked to the arguments of loaded peace and the justification of warfare. Even if firearms brought deceit and treachery to the practice of war, driving the knight from the battlefield, they must still be harnessed to assure military success. In military broadsheets of Gustav Adolf's campaign in Germany, we saw the malleability of gunpowder as a symbol, which held positive or negative value depending on the object of satire. In moralizing novels of the Thirty Years War, gunpowder becomes a straw man for the corruption of warfare and the degenerate values of soldiers as experienced in Germany between 1618 and 1648. A few years later, in Happel's *Mandorell*, however,

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gunpowder is just another example of European global superiority like the cavalier hero, who saves the day wherever he goes. Despite negative ethical implications, gunpowder weapons continued to figure in both positive and negative representations of warfare.

Throughout this dissertation, we have also seen various versions of warrior masculinity before and after the invention of gunpowder. Notably, the soldiers represented after the invention of gunpowder are depicted in more negative terms than their pre-gunpowder forerunners. Even the heroic figures of post-gunpowder literature, such as Mandorell and—nearly two hundred years earlier—Maximilian's Weiskunig, define their heroic qualities through sword fighting and jousting, rather than firearms. Yet the narrative frames of war between the Weiskunig and Mandorell also prove to be fragile since they are constantly penetrated by rogues (Moscherosch), lunatics (Cervantes), vagabonds and runagates (Grimmelshausen), and, even earlier, peasants (Wittenwiler). Thus, the rise of gunpowder weapons, when considered against a literary background, also allows us to consider the friability of the masculine warrior ethos. As a stable whole it secures the idealized warrior's prerogative for violence, yet its whole can also be fragmented by technological and social changes to practice of war. Gunpowder weapons, both tactically and theoretically, made warrior elites more vulnerable than ever before. With the help of gunpowder weapons, anyone (no matter how novice, weak, un-masculine, or ignoble) could kill anyone else (no matter how veteran, strong, manly, or honorable). Rhetorical efforts to retain the iconic status of knight, even mere semantic alterations (Ritter/Reiter) and tactical changes (Ritter/Lanzirer), were unsuccessful. The knight disappeared just the same, left only in literary representations of a military past-that-once-was. Never a secure category, therefore, warrior masculinity is both historically bound and constantly evolving as it has had to cope with

technological and aesthetic challenges to its ideology, including—between 1300 and 1700—gunpowder. It is a category never at ease even when its past seems simple and sturdy, as sturdy as suit of armor.

Figure 1: "Field Armor of Wilhelm von Worms" (ca. 1510-1525), St. Louis Art Museum, Gallery 125. Source: http://www.slam.org/.

Figure 2: "Three-Quarter Armor" (ca. 1625), St. Louis Art Museum, Gallery 125. Source: http://www.slam.org/.

Figure 3: "Warhafftige Abbildung und Beschreibung / deß grossen und gewaltigen Treffens . . ." (ca. 1631), B$_5$ in Table 1. Source: VD17: 23:300673Q.

Figure 4: "Neugedeckte Confect-Taffel" (ca. 1631). Source: Herzog August Bibliothek: Einbl. Xb FM 62.

Der alte Teutsche Zahnbrecher,

Welcher die verlogene exsincerirte Auffschneider vnnd Confect-Fresser, (weil sie schwartze/stinckende/wurmstichtige/böse Zähne darvon bekommen,) Allamodisch vnd besser dann kein Charlantan cujoniret, oder wolt ich sagen curiret.

Halt mein Sohn es ist das Confecktes gar so viel gewest So du gessen hast,

Zahnstocher — *Ohrlöffel*

Dawag vnd Deutsch, Dawag pfeiffen

Je nun ihr Herren/wie? Wie stets mit ewern Zähnen?
Wolt ihr dann werden doll? Wornach thut ihr euch sehnen?
Verheist ein wenig doch! Ich wil euch helffen bald/
Ich bin der rechte Mann: Halt lieben Söhne halt!
Ich kont vor Zeiten ja die Zähne stracks außpfeiffen/
Wann ich sie angerührt mit eim Stück meiner Seiffen/
Die ich nicht also bald eim jeden machte weiß:
Jetzt wil sie helffen nichts/was mach ich armer Greiß?
Ihr müst zuviel Confect ja jrgend habn gefressen/
Die Zähne sind so schwartz/die Stiffte hinein gesessen;
Ich kan sie fassen nicht mit keinem Zänglein:
Ihr werdet setzen Euch hier zwischen meine Bein.
Ob ich dann besser solt ihn können gehn zu Leibe/
Damit ich Euch darauß das Wüten recht vertreibe.
Ey halt! Ich habe ihn nun gegeben einen Stoß:
Was gilts/ sie sind erschreckt / vnd ihr des Wesens loß.
Die Stiffter stecken Euch doch Marter-tieff im Fleische/
Das auffgeschwollen ist. Streicht doch/ehe ich es heische/
Ihr Mönch vnd Pfaffen hier! Seht wie ihr euch nur stellt!
Da ewerthalben Till jetzt gar in Ohnmacht fellt.
Ey tröstet Ihn doch was/ könt ihr Ihm nichts zureden?
Ich glaub ihr seid nun gar erstaunet von den Schweden.
Hör alter Corporal/ hilfft dieser Kropff-Stoß nicht/
So sol noch ein Recept dir werden zu gericht.

Das Zahn-Fleisch ist gar roh/ Ihr habt zuviel gekawet/
Auch ists noch nirgend nicht im Magen recht verdawet:
Es giebt der Dünste viel vnd Flüsse mancherley/
Davon Zähn Wehtag kömpt vnd andre Hudeley.
Auch entspringt dannenher das Sausen vnd das Brausen
In Ohren/ ja die Haut fängt einem an zu grausen:
Dafür braucht Schmauch-Taback/die Pfeiffen ligen hier/
Der Schwede bracht sie mit/ der legt sie euch für.
Die alte Sachsen-Magd dort vnten an der Elbe
(Weil diesen Handel erst ewr Volck gelehrt dieselbe/
Da euch der böse Feindt das Fewr stracks auffschlug;)
Die schnitt euch den Taback/ vnd Pulverweis vmbtrug/
Da vber ihrer Glut das edle Kraut getreuget/
Das auch die Asche sich an manchem Ort erdauget/
Gebraucht euch dieser Asch/gebraucht doch gleichen Rauch/
Wem schwartz von Zucker seynd die Zähn vnd wüten auch.
Seid ihr dann gar zu fest/ braucht vngebrandte Aske/
Das man mit solcher Laug die Köpff euch sauber wasche:
Zahnstocher schawet hier / Ohrlöffel auch darbey.
Doch hoff ich der * Thu-Weg sol euch noch helffen frey/   * Taback
Wann euch der Dampff außgeht zur Nasen/ Augen/ Ohren/
So sol der Schmertzen bald seyn gantz vnd gar verlohren:
Kein Zahn thut euch mehr weh/ Ihr kämpt dann an den Ort/
Da stets Zähnklappern ist vnd Heulen fort für fort.

Gedruckt im Jahr 1632,

Figure 5: "Der alte Teutsche Zahnbrecher" (1632). Source: VD17: 14:003854B.

Figure 6: "Schwedischer Zug" (1632). Source: VD17: 23:675804P.

**Der Kön. May. zu Schweden/ vnd Churf. Durchl. zu Sachsen/ etc.
wolbestalte Apotheck/ wider den fressenden Wurm.**

Hr Ertzte wisset wol/ wie schwer darnieder ligen/
Die den fressenden Wurm in jhre Glieder krigen/
Denn es ist ein Affect/ der alles inficirt/
Was er mit seinem Gifft vnd Seuche nur berührt.
Erb bleibt nicht an dem Ort/ da er erst ist gesessen/
Sondern man sihet jhn weit vnd breit vmb sich fressen/
Wo man jhm wehret nicht/ nimpt er den Leib gantz ein/
Vnd muß für seinem Fraß kein Glied verschonet seyn:
Also hat auch bißher eine fressende Rotte
Das gute Deutsche Land (zwar jhr nur selbst zum Spotte)
Durchgraben/ wie die Würm/ gefressen vmb sich weit/
Gesogen aus das Blut/ gemacht viel Hertzeleid/
Geschwecht den Kirchen-Leib/ zerrissen Christi Glieder/
Vnd sie so jämmerlich geworffen hin vnd wieder/
Daß also Christi Braut/ die sonst die schönste ist/
Verblasset/ wie es pflegt/ wo solcher Wurm einfrisst.
Diß lies also geschehn der Vater in dem Lande
Obs jhm schon selber war nicht eine kleine Schande/
Vnd ob jhn schon mit Bitt die Kinder liessen an/
Auch Frembde mit Gewalt/ Er solt doch Hülfe thun.
Diß sah ein Deutscher Held/ dem gienge es zu Hertzen/
Denn er sah/ daß es jhn auch künfftig würde schmertzen/
Gedacht/ man wehren muß den Würmen wie das Fewr/
Eh es mehr vmb sich frisst/ wer die Cur noch so thewr.
Er nam das Werck zur hand/ vnd griff frisch in die Wunden
Der Vngeziefer Köpff fast alle empor stunden/
Denn es war jhnen frembd/ daß man wolt widerstehn/
Vnd nicht nach jhrem Sinn/ willig zu Grunde gehn.
Ersah dort einen Held im freyen Felde stehen/
Vnd gienge zu jhm hin/ bath jhm doch beyzustehen/

Damit errettet würd mit glückseliger Hand/
Vom vorstehen den Tod das krancke Vaterland.
Der Aertz gantz willig war/ zu jhm sich bald gesellet/
Denn er war lang zuvor von Gott dar zu bestellet/
Vnd hatte hin vnd her die Proba schon curirt/
Vnd von der Kranckheit groß/ drey Länder liberirt.
Er sprach: Ich weis schon recht für solche böse Dinger/
Weist auff die Tonnen hin/ vnd Kugeln/ mit dem Finger/
Hierinn ist meine Cur/ die Pillen geb ich ein/
Vnd misch ein Artzeney aus Büchsen groß vnd klein.
Darauff nam er zur Hand die scharffen Instrumente/
Griff die Fretzwürmer an/ mit Macht er sie durchrendte.
Sie hielten beyde wol/ die Cur gerieth so fein/
Daß hier bald lag ein Kopff/ dort bald ein Arm vnd Bein.
Den Teuffels Thieren ist der Fraß nicht wol bekommen/
Das macht sie hattens gar zu fett zu sich genommen/
Vnd hatten gar zu viel bey sich Jeswiter Witz/
Der sie so truncken macht in allzu grosser Hitz.
Wol dir/ du Vaterland/ dir wünsche ich nun Glücke/
Daß du erlöset bist/ daß dein Feind muß zu rücke
Mit Schanden/ der dir sonst nach deinem Leben stund/
Dein Kirche vnd Freyheit wolt reissen gar zu Grund.
Jtzt wendet sich das Blat/ der Artzt leufft nach dem Brusten/
Daher der Gifft entspringt/ ist den zu stopffen gesinnen/
Damit er la nicht mehr künfftig ons vberschwemm/
Vnd vnser Haab vnd Gut/ Leib/ Seel mit sich hinnehm.
Ihr närrisch-kluges Volck des Pabstes/ sehet/ sehet/
Wie doch ewr Witz vnd List für rechter Sach bestehet?
Wie Butter an der Sonn/ Olernet klüger seyn/
Vnd lasst mit Gottes Wort ewr Klugheit stimmen ein.

Figure 7: "Apotheck" (ca. 1632). Source: VD17: 23:698506G (Herzog August Bibliothek).

Figure 8: "Warhafftige Beschreibung . . . eine Brücken über den Lech" (1632), R₂ in Table 1. Source: Harms II, 287.

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Figure 9: Nicolaus Weishun, "Eigendliche Abbildung . . . Der grossen und blutigen Schlacht" (ca. 1632), L₃ in Table 1, image and title only. Source: VD17: 23:676214S.

Figure 10: "Warhafftige Abbildung und Beschreibung / Deß grossen und gewaltigen Treffens" (ca. 1632), L₄ in Table 1. Source: VD17: 23:713264U.

Eigentlicher Abriß der grossen Feldschlacht so ihr Königl. Mayest. in Schweden zwischen Leipzig vnd Lützen wider die Päpstische Liga/deſſen General der Hertzog von Fridlandgeweſen/glücklichen gehalten/den 6. November Anno 1632.

Figure 11: "Eigentlicher Abriß der grossen Feldschlacht" (1632), L$_8$ in Table 1. Source: VD17: 32:653152C.

Table 1: Image and Text Comparison of Military Broadsheets (follows on the next page)

Battle / Event	Merian Illustration In: Wüthrich, *Das druckgraphische Werk von Matthäus Merian d. Ae.* (Year of Illustration)	*Flugblatt* Reports (*= possible variation of Merian's illustration)
Breitenfeld (1631) Also: Schlacht bei Leipzig Marker = B	B_1 "Schlacht bei Leipzig" (1632) Wüthrich [1966], #625, I:193 Notes: Orientation of armies before battle; circulated in *Flugblatt* form with indices (not located) B_2 "Schlacht bei Leipzig" (1632?) Wüthrich, NOT FOUND Notes: Armies during battle; 2 plates. *Theatrum Europaeum* <u>Volume, Page (Edition, Year)</u> II, 488a/b (1st: 1633) = B_1 + B_2 II, 422 (2nd: 1637) = B_1 + UNK II, 432 (1646) = ALT + B_2	B_3* "Abris der blutigen Schlacht" (ca. 1631) HAB Sig: Einbl Xb 4 220 Notes: No text; during battle; pair with Einbl Xb 4 221. B_4* "Schlacht-Ordnung" (ca. 1631) HAB Sig: Einbl Xb 4 221 Notes: No text; before battle; pair with Einbl Xb 4 220. B_5 "Warhafftige Abbildung und Beschreibung / deß grossen und gewaltigen Treffens" (1631) VD17: 1:092225G Bibl. data: PAAS P-1410, P-1409 {CHECK} Notes: Image not tactically accurate; text partially matches B_6; indices unclear. B_6 "Warhafftige Abbildung und Beschreibung deß grossen und gewaltigen Treffens" (1631) HAB Sig: Einbl Xb FM 96 VD17: 23:300673Q Bibl. data: Drugulin Nr. 1889; Paas P-1411 Notes: During battle; non-tactical; overwhelming firepower; text excerpted from B_5; contains indices. B_7* "PRAELII" (1631) Bibl. data: Paas P-1417 B_8* "Warhafftiger und beglaubter Bericht" (1632, first anniversary of the battle) VD17: ? Bibl. data: Paas P-1854 Notes: Orientation of battle field almost exactly like B_2, except with a greater elevation, and the right Swedish flank smashed into the corner; shape of battle lines resembles my sketches from B_3 because of the extreme angle of the Swedish right flank (possibly the same image); text matches B_9 exactly, "Gedruckt Bey Johann Albrecht Mintzeln" (1632).

		B_9* "Warhafftiger und beglaubter Bericht" (1632) VD17: ? Bibl. data: Paas P-1855 Notes: Image shares perspective and battle field orientaiton with B_1; may be same image as B_4; text same as B_8, partially destroyed. B_{10} SEE PAAS P-1405 thru P-1415
Rain am Lech (1632) Also: Schlacht bei Rain Marker = R	R_1 "Rain am Lech" (1632?) Wütrich [1993], #XXX, III:165 Notes: Detailed view of the battle; includes tactical details on both sides of the river crossing, including imperial bastions and artillery placement; complex illustration of imperial retreat. *Theatrum Europaeum* <u>Volume, Page (Edition, Year)</u> II, 634 (1646) = R_1	R_2* "Wahrhafftige Beschreibung … Brücken über den Lech" (1632) HAB Sig: IH 563 Bibl. data: Harms II, 287 (image only, no other information); Paas P-1668 Notes: Narrative image; foreground close copy of Merian image R_1; background a simplified depiction of the imperial retreat; little detail on opposite side of river. Most likely copied from R_1 due to diminished topographical detail. R_3 "Eigendliche Abbildung" (1632) VD17: ? Bibl. data: Paas P-1665 Notes: Different perspective and image orientation from R_1/R_2/R_4/R_5, more elevated perspective; figures significantly smaller; detailed depiction of imperial retreat; includes indices in bottom left corner of text; text different from other examples. R_4* "Kurtzer Abriß/und warhafftige Beschreibung" (1632) VD17: ? Bibl. data: Paas P-1666/P-1667 Notes: Image perspective and orientation same as R_1/R_2; style/detail closely resembles R_2 with different level of clarity and some altered details (smoke, trees, script, cannons, number of soldiers). R_5* "Treffen beym Lech" (1632) VD17: ? Bibl. data: Paas PA-283 Notes: Perspective matches R_1/R_2/R_4; tactical detail matches R_1; topographical detail closest to R_2/R_4; text matches R_2/R_4 closely; includes indices.

| Lützen (1632)
Marker = L | L₁ "Schlacht bei Lützen" (1633)
Wüthrich, #626, I:193
Paas PA-301
Notes: 2 plates; narrative image; tactically accurate; horizontal orientation.

L₂ "Schlachtordnung ... bey Lützen" (1633)
Wüthrich, NOT FOUND
Notes: Tactical image; square.

Theatrum Europaeum
Volume, Page (Edition, Year)
II, 666 (2nd: 1637) = L₁
II, 746 (1646)= L₁ + ALT? | L₃* "Eigendliche Abbildung ... der grossen und blutigen Schlacht" (1633?)
HAB Sig: IH 561 (P-1865)
VD17: 23:676214S
Bibl. data: Harms II, 274; Paas P-1863 thru P-1865 (only differences are typset/frame)
Notes: Vertical orientation; narrative image with tactical inset image; may be versions of L₁/L₂, compressed to allow for vertical format; image by Nicolaus Weishun (1607-1687, inscr. bottom right); text close match to L₅/L₇, but without paragraph breaks.

L₄* "Wahrhafftige Abbildung und Beschreibung/ Deß grossen und gewaltigen Treffens" (1633)
HAB Sig: Xb FM 269
VD17: 23:713264U
Bibl. data: Paas P-1863
Notes: Image same as L₃; text from L₉; top half has cut from L₃ and glued to text from L₉; VD17 version matches Paas' image only.

L₅* "Glaubwürdiger Bericht"
HAB Sig: Einbl Xb FM 233
VD17: 23:701313X
Bibl. data: Paas P-1859; Drugulin 2, 181.
Notes: Two images may be the same as L₁/L₂; *Flugblatt* oriented horizontally; battle description is minority of text, mostly a recounting of military events between Breitenfeld and Lützen, close match to L₁₂; indices in bottom right hand corner; indices match L₃; 38.7 cm x 105 cm.

L₆* "Abbildung der Schlacht so bey Lützen" (1632)
Source: Wikimedia (Bayerischen Staatsbibliothek München)
VD17: NOT YET FOUND.
Notes: Combination of images from L₁/L₂; text close to L₃; 60.5 cm x 104 cm.

L₇* "Glaubwürdiger Bericht und Erzehlung"
VD17: ?
Bibl. info: Paas P-1858.
Notes: Image composition matches L₅, including the small tactical drawing in the top right corner, but it is not exactly the same the image; image by Hans Jacob |

| | | Gabler; indices match L_3/L_5; text matches L_3/L_5.

L_8 "Eigentlicher Abriß der grossen Feldschlacht" (1633)
VD17: 32:653152C
Bibl. data: Paas P-1861
Notes: Does not match any other image of this battle; vantage point unclear; non-tactical; includes "Wunderzeichen" of crosses in the sky in both the image and the text; text focuses on the movement of the armies before and after battle.

L_9 "Warhafftige Abbildung und Beschreibung / Deß grossen und gewaltigen Treffens" (1633?)
VD17: ?
Bibl. data: Paas P-1862
Notes: Non-tactical image; battle line is vertical to image; text matches L_4/L_{10} exactly, same letterpress.

L_{10}* "Abriß der Blütigen Schlacht bey Lutzen" (1633?)
VD17: ?
Bibl. data: Paas P-1867
Notes: Image is familiar, and is not extremely different from other versions of L_1, but it is different in style, depiction of town in top right corner, and the space behind the battlefield; text matches L_4/L_9.

L_{11}(*) "Eigentliche Abbildung der Zwischen Naumburg und Lützen" (1633)
VD17: ?
Bibl. data: Paas P-1866
Notes: Battle lines very clear, with perspective matching L_1 et al.; somewhat tactically accurate with compression of the battle formation for formatting; almost no landscape details (ex: no windmills); no indices, uses labels; death of GA labelled. |

| | | L$_{12}$* "Glaubwürdiger Bericht" (1633)
VD17: ?
Bibl. data: Paas P-1860
Notes: Image 1 (left) close match to L$_3$; image 2 (right) close match to L$_2$ "Frid. Hulsius Excudit"; horizontal orientation; indices match L$_3$; text is related to L$_9$/L$_{10}$ and shares several close wording matches with slight alteration, also this text is longer, including military events between Breitenfeld and Lützen. Right image can be found in Munich: http://opacplus.bsb-muenchen.de/search?oclcno=164561366. |

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