Spring 5-15-2015

The Knowledge of Others' Perceptions (KOP) Model: Practical Accuracy Among the Well-Acquainted

Brittany C. Solomon
Washington University in St. Louis

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS

Department of Psychology

Dissertation Examination Committee:
Joshua Jackson, Chair
Simine Vazire, Co-Chair
Cynthia Cryder
Joseph Goodman
Heike Winterheld

The Knowledge of Others' Perceptions (KOP) Model: Practical Accuracy Among the Well-Acquainted

by
Brittany Charlotte Solomon

A dissertation presented to the
Graduate School of Arts & Sciences
of Washington University in
partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy

May 2015
St. Louis, Missouri

Table of Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my dissertation committee for their involvement and review of my dissertation. I would especially like to express how grateful I am to my advisors, Simine Vazire and Josh Jackson, for all of their support and guidance throughout my time at Washington University. Finally, a special thank you to the members of the Personality and Self-Knowledge Lab, as well as the Personality Measurement and Development Lab, for their assistance in data collection and management.

Brittany Solomon

Washington University in St. Louis

May 2015

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

The Knowledge of Others' Perceptions (KOP) Model: Practical Accuracy Among the Well-Acquainted

by
Brittany Charlotte Solomon
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology
Washington University in St. Louis, 2015
Professor Joshua Jackson, Chair
Simine Vazire, Co-Chair

It is possible that people, especially those who are well-acquainted, have information about others that goes beyond their own impressions. While previous studies primarily focus on the accuracy of a perceiver's own impressions of a target, they may miss information about the perceiver's knowledge of a target's identity and reputation. The present study is based on the notion that there may be more to knowing a person than having an accurate perception of his/her personality in the traditional sense. From a practical standpoint, it might also be important to know when others' impressions of a close other, such as a friend or co-worker, differ from one's own impressions and to understand the nature of such perceptual discrepancies.

In the current study, two constructs that reflect a relatively novel type of other-knowledge were investigated: knowledge of identity and knowledge of reputation. Specifically, the knowledge of others' perceptions (KOP) model is introduced and used to examine the extent to which well-acquainted friends achieve such knowledge. First, *identity accuracy* and *reputation accuracy* were examined (i.e., accurate perceptions of a target's self-views and of how others view the target, respectively). Second, *identity insight* and *reputation insight* were examined (i.e., accurate perceptions of a target's self-views and of how others view the target, above and beyond a perceiver's own impressions of the target). Finally, characteristics of the target, perceiver, and dyad were tested as potential moderators to shed light on the circumstances under which knowledge of identity and reputation are likely to occur.

"Tact is the ability to describe others as they see themselves."

—Abraham Lincoln

"Whether true or false, what is said about men often has as much influence on their lives, and particularly on their destinies, as what they do."

—Victor Hugo, Les Misérables

It is possible that people, especially those who are well-acquainted, have information about others that goes beyond their own impressions. That is, they may have insight into another person's identity and reputation (see, e.g., Solomon & Vazire, 2014). A great deal of research has focused on the accuracy of interpersonal perceptions of personality based on the extent to which a perceiver knows a target individual's actual standing on a given trait (e.g., Funder & West, 1993; John & Robins, 1993; Vazire, 2010; Watson, Hubbard, & Wiese, 2000) and the extent to which a perceiver knows the patterning and ordering of a target's holistic personality across a set of traits (e.g., Biesanz, 2010; Chan, Rogers, Parisotto, & Biesanz, 2011; Furr, 2008). While such previous studies have focused on the accuracy of the perceiver's own impressions, they may miss information about the perceiver's knowledge of a target's identity and reputation, yielding a potentially incomplete picture of how accurate people are about others' personalities (i.e., other-knowledge). The present study is based on the notion that there may be more to knowing a person than having an accurate perception of his or her personality in the traditional sense. From a practical standpoint, it might also be important to know when others' impressions of a close other, such as a friend, co-worker, or roommate, differ from one's own impressions, and more importantly, to understand the nature of such perceptual discrepancies; that is, how they are different.

The focus of this research is to shed light on whether people have accurate perceptions of how close others see themselves and how those close others are seen by their friends. More specifically, I investigated two constructs that reflect a relatively novel type of other-knowledge: *knowledge of identity* and *knowledge of reputation*. I introduce the knowledge of others' perceptions (KOP) model, which I used to examine the extent to which well-acquainted friends have such knowledge. First, I examined whether people can accurately infer others' perceptions by assessing *identity accuracy* and *reputation accuracy* (i.e., accurate perceptions of a target's self-views and of how

others view the target, respectively). Second, I examined whether people can make the distinction between their own perceptions of a target and others' perceptions by assessing *identity insight* and *reputation insight* (i.e., accurate perceptions of a target's self-views and of how others view the target, above and beyond a perceiver's own impressions of the target). Finally, I also examined whether characteristics of the target, perceiver, and dyad moderate the circumstances under which knowledge of identity and reputation are likely to occur.

Examining whether people achieve this type of knowledge and when they are more likely to do so may provide novel information about the extent to which people maintain their own perceptions of others despite awareness of conflicting views. More broadly, this research may shed light on the person perception process in terms of what contributes to accurate perceptions of well-acquainted others. If accuracy "concerns the connections between our perceptions of reality and reality itself" (Funder & West, 1993, p. 459), then knowledge of a target's identity and reputation should serve as one way for this connection to occur. People are rarely provided with feedback about the accuracy of their interpersonal judgments, but having such knowledge of others' perceptions would compliment perceivers' own impressions and provide a basis for gauging how accurate (or biased) their judgments of others are. Presumably, having knowledge of others' perceptions, regardless of who is right or wrong, will provide individuals with a deeper understanding of the people in their everyday lives and should be associated with greater success in achieving social goals.

Models of Other-Knowledge

Someone who forms accurate perceptions of others knows what other people are like in reality (i.e., s/he has a high level of other-knowledge). Researchers have developed various models to explain how people form accurate personality judgments and provide frameworks for examining the conditions under which perceptions of others are most likely to be accurate. Based on a nomothetic level approach (i.e., a trait-based approach used to assess between-person individual differences one trait at a time), Funder's (1995) realistic accuracy model (RAM) organizes the process of forming an accurate perception of a given trait into four steps (relevance, availability, detection, and utilization). Each step must exist without error for "achievement" (i.e., accurate

judgment of personality) to occur. Also, each step can be enhanced under certain conditions, ultimately leading to a greater likelihood of accuracy (e.g., Blackman & Funder, 1998; Colvin, 1993; Funder & Dobroth, 1987; Funder & Colvin, 1988; Human & Biesanz, 2011a, 2011b; John & Robins, 1993; Letzring, 2008; Letzring, Wells, & Funder, 2006). Similarly, Kenny's (2004) model of interpersonal perception called PERSON (personality, error, residual, stereotype, opinion, and norm), which built off his Weighted-Average Model (WAM; Kenny, 1991), partitions each perceiver's judgment of a target's personality into six sources of variance that can then be used to explain factors that influence accuracy (e.g., Leising, Gallrein, & Dufner, 2014; Letzring et al., 2006). In contrast, other researchers take an idiographic level (i.e., profile-based) approach, emphasizing that knowing a person requires more than achieving accuracy for individual traits at the absolute level. For instance, following Furr's (2008) person-centered approach, Biesanz's (2010) social accuracy model (SAM) utilizes personality profiles to examine perceivers' knowledge of the within-person patterning of a set of individual differences, and also measures the effects of target and perceiver characteristics on accuracy.

Altogether, these models provide a strong foundation for examining other-knowledge in the traditional sense and indicate that the accuracy of interpersonal perceptions depends on a variety of factors associated with the target, perceiver, and situation. However, the traditional accuracy framework solely focuses on perceivers' own interpersonal judgments – the extent to which other-perceptions are accurate or biased. Having accurate perceptions of others is unquestionably important; yet, in a practical sense, it may be just as important for people to have accurate perceptions of others' subjective realities. Consider an employer who knows her employee's standing on a variety of personality traits at the absolute level. She is likely to accurately predict how satisfied he is at work and how well he will get along with his co-workers (Judge, Heller, & Mount, 2002; Mount, Barrick, & Stewart, 1998). However, the employer who knows how this employee sees himself and how his co-workers see him will most likely make management decisions that motivate the employee and facilitate a more harmonious work environment, regardless of whose perceptions are right or wrong in the traditional sense. This example demonstrates how other-knowledge can

include awareness of others' perceptions and that this type of knowledge can connect people to their social world and improve social transactions.

For the current study, I adapted the traditional accuracy framework to develop the KOP model for examining what perceivers know about a target that goes beyond their own perceptions of him/her. As previously mentioned, I focused on knowledge of a close friend's identity and reputation, as well as potential moderators of this type of other-knowledge.

Knowledge of Others' Perceptions: Practical Accuracy Among the Well-Acquainted

In contrast to the more traditional approach used to study other-knowledge, I took a pragmatic approach specifically to examine the notion that people have knowledge of others' perceptions of a well-acquainted target. This approach is based on the idea that the purpose of ascertaining knowledge is to use it and that achieving goals in different contexts will require different types of knowledge (Swann, 1984). Knowledge of others' perceptions of close others reflects several underpinnings of the pragmatic approach: (1) that it is important to understand the person perception process in naturally occurring contexts in daily life and (2) that accurate interpersonal judgments promote the social goals of the perceiver. Building off the idea that accuracy in the traditional sense is not the only path toward successful social interactions, knowledge of others' perceptions is theoretically important because such awareness of others' subjective realities may also be associated with positive interpersonal outcomes. More specifically, acquiring knowledge of a target's self-views (identity) and knowledge of others' views of that same target (reputation) are two potential ways through which people can reach their interpersonal goals, regardless of whether their own perceptions of a target are accurate or shared by others.

Discrepant perceptions. Based on the person perception literature, it is evident that perceivers tend to agree moderately with targets and other perceivers about a target's personality (for recent reviews, see Connolly, Kavanagh, & Viswesvaran, 2007; Kenny & West, 2010; Vazire & Carlson, 2010). On the one hand, this is thought to be relatively impressive, especially in the context of expected effect sizes. On the other hand, this same research simultaneously demonstrates that, despite such agreement, people still have discrepant perceptions of personality.

According to Vazire & Solomon's (2014) fourth "principle" of interpersonal perception, motives influence how we see others, and thus it should be unsurprising that people have discrepant perceptions (some accurate, some biased). Vazire's self-other knowledge asymmetry (SOKA; 2010) model outlines the aspects of personality that others (or perceivers) should be able to see especially clearly compared to the self (or target). Findings from a variety of studies have demonstrated that, as predicted by the SOKA model, asymmetries in self- and other-knowledge are quite prevalent (e.g., Carlson, Vazire, & Oltmanns, 2013; Fiedler, Oltmanns, & Turkheimer, 2004; John & Robins, 1993; Kolar, Funder, & Colvin, 1996; Smith et al., 2008; Spain, Eaton, & Funder, 2000; Vazire & Mehl, 2008). To highlight this point, even when examining self-other agreement (i.e., the extent to which other-perceptions of targets agree with targets' self-perceptions) for non-evaluative traits, correlations typically do not exceed about .60 with an average correlation ranging from .30 to .40 (e.g., McCrae et al., 2004; Watson et al., 2000). The magnitude of these effects is especially noteworthy given that self-other agreement on these types of traits (e.g., the Big Five personality traits) tends to be higher than it is for other individual differences (e.g., Carlson, Vazire, & Furr, 2011; John & Robins, 1993; Watson et al., 2000). Similarly, findings from profile-based approaches also indicate that self-other agreement exists at only small to moderate levels (e.g., Biesanz & West, 2000; Blackman & Funder, 1998; McCrae, 1993, 2008).

In addition to discrepancies among self- and other-perceptions, discrepancies also exist across perceivers, as even multiple other-perceptions of the same target can be idiosyncratic and disagree. For instance, perceiver effects indicate that perceivers tend to judge others in particular ways (Biesanz, 2010; Kenny, 1994), manifested and differentiated partially by the degree of positivity in their ratings (Wood, Harms, & Vazire, 2010). Other research has shown that perceiver effects are also multidimensional such that the effects for different traits are distinguishable from each other (Srivastava, Guglielmo, & Beer, 2010). As such, it is unsurprising that consensus among others is constrained (Biesanz & West, 2000; John & Robins, 1993; Kenny, 2004), and indeed, based on evidence across 32 studies, consensus correlations tend to range from zero to .30 (Kenny, Albright, Malloy, & Kashy, 1994). Although an average consensus correlation of .52 emerged in a

meta-analysis of round-robin studies (i.e., studies in which an individual judges multiple others and multiple others also judge the individual; Kenny & West, 2010), even this finding simultaneously demonstrates the reality that people have discrepant perceptions despite moderate agreement.

Is it possible for people to capitalize on these discrepancies? In other words, if people agree to disagree – or simply acknowledge that they disagree – they may benefit from knowledge of others' perceptions. When target self-perceptions are more accurate than other-perceptions (e.g., on traits such as "worried" and "introspective"; Vazire, 2010), having insight into how a target sees him/herself may be one path toward greater other-knowledge. Likewise, when other-perceptions are more accurate than self-perceptions (e.g., on traits such as "charming" and "likeable"; Vazire, 2010), having insight into how a target is seen by others could also lead to greater other-knowledge. Regardless of whether knowledge of identity and reputation may occur for individual traits versus more holistic personality profiles, such awareness of others' perceptions should supplement a perceiver's own impressions and be associated with a greater likelihood of acquiring accurate information about a target, regardless of how (in)accurate (in the traditional sense) or discrepant his/her own perceptions are.

Meta-cognitive ability. Do people understand that their own perceptions are not always universally shared? Even through adulthood, people continue to make egocentric social judgments in everyday life (e.g., Holmes, 1968; Krueger & Clement, 1994; Ross, Greene, & House, 1977), and thus it is not surprising that people have little awareness of their limitations in accurately perceiving others and tend to be overly confident about how accurate their impressions of others are (e.g., Dunning, Griffin, Milojkovic, & Ross, 1990; Swann & Gill, 1997). Nonetheless, it is possible for people to correct for their egocentric tendencies (Epley, Morewedge, & Keysar, 2004), especially when explicitly asked to consider others' perspectives (Lord, Lepper, & Preston, 1984). Previous research in the person perception literature has shown that people have impressive meta-cognitive skills when it comes to understanding how others' perceptions differ from their own self-perceptions. For instance, people have insight into others' perceptions of their own personality (i.e., meta-accuracy; Carlson & Kenny, 2012; Carlson, Vazire, & Oltmanns, 2011),

know how specific others see them (i.e., differential meta-accuracy; Carlson & Furr, 2009), and know that even close others do not see them exactly as they see themselves (i.e., meta-insight; Carlson, Vazire, & Furr, 2011).

While such previous research has focused exclusively on *self*-knowledge, perhaps these meta-cognitive abilities exist for *other*-knowledge as well. If this is the case, people may have knowledge of others' self-views and reputations, and may know when such perceptions differ from their own. Even if people are not well calibrated in their beliefs about the accuracy of their interpersonal perceptions (Dunning et al., 1990; Swann & Gill, 1997), acquiring knowledge of others' perceptions would allow them to acknowledge that others do not share their perceptions without having to admit that they are biased (or explicitly accuse others of being inaccurate). Currently, no model of other-knowledge has been developed to assess knowledge of identity and reputation. Accordingly, I introduce the KOP model as a framework to investigate this pragmatic type of other-knowledge (see the Analytical Model and Approach for a full description).

Knowledge of identity and reputation. Knowledge of identity and reputation are important regardless of whether others' perceptions reflect reality, as they reflect the subjective realities of targets and others. For instance, such awareness can promote interpersonal understanding, which is necessary for harmony in personal relationships (Finkenauer & Righetti, 2011) and achieving social goals in the workplace (Caruso, Epley, & Bazerman, 2006).

A recent study has conducted an initial test of the phenomena I have described with regard to a single characteristic (Solomon & Vazire, 2014). The authors compared target, romantic partner, and friend ratings of a target's physical attractiveness and examined romantic partners' knowledge of target and friend ratings. Their findings demonstrated that despite romantic partners' positively biased and somewhat idiosyncratic views of the targets, partners achieved knowledge of identity and reputation. Partners knew that their own perceptions of the targets' attractiveness were more positive than targets' and friends' views. It is especially noteworthy that romantic partners achieved this type of other-knowledge given that physical attractiveness is an overt attribute that is consistent across contexts. Thus, it was quite impressive that romantic partners' views were so discrepant, yet

they were able to separate their own views of targets' physical attractiveness from others' views at a conscious level. The KOP model builds upon the authors' suggestion that knowing another person well may require more than having an accurate impression of her in the absolute sense; rather, it may involve being able to see her from multiple perspectives, including her identity and her reputation.

One aspect of knowing a person well is knowing how she sees herself (i.e., her identity). Studying the extent to which people have awareness of others' self-perceptions has a long history (e.g., Bender & Hastorf, 1950; Cowden, 1955; Dymond, 1949; Gage & Cronbach, 1955; Taft, 1966), but is rarely utilized in personality research today (cf. Simms, Zelazny, Yam, & Gros, 2010). Similar to the way that empathic accuracy reflects one's ability to accurately infer another person's thoughts and feelings, identity accuracy reflects one's knowledge of another person's broader self-views. Some research has shown that romantic partners are aware of targets' self-perceptions of personality traits (Cowden, 1955; Dymond, 1954) and evaluative attributes such as physical attractiveness (Solomon & Vazire, 2014). Unsurprisingly, people want important others to know their identities (or self-perceptions; Goffman, 1959; Swann, 1996) and perceivers actively try to infer the identity that has been jointly negotiated with an individual (Goffman, 1959). One study found that identity comprehension by others (recognition of the relative importance of another person's identities) is associated with positive work outcomes (e.g., higher satisfaction and less absenteeism) for that person (Thatcher & Greer, 2008). Given that identity can be conceptualized as the self-perceptions that underlie one's personal goals and social transactions (Eccles, 2009), achieving knowledge of identity should lead to a better understanding of another person's motives and predictions of his/her behaviors.

Another aspect of knowing a person well is knowing how she is seen by others (i.e., her reputation). The theory of social reality suggests that knowing a target's reputation is knowing the target's actual standing on a particular trait (Hofstee, 1994). Without definitively knowing who is accurate, knowing the extent to which one's own perception is consistent (or discrepant) from others' perceptions of a target is, at the very least, one way for an individual to understand

how connected he is to social reality. Knowledge of reputation has received virtually no attention in the person perception literature (cf. Solomon & Vazire, 2014), however there is a small body of research examining a related concept referred to as third-party meta-perception (Kenny, 1994; Kenny & DePaulo, 1993; Laing, Phillipson, & Lee, 1966), which reflects how one person thinks another person perceives a third person. For instance, regardless of people's own impressions of a target, people can accurately guess how much another person likes a target (Kenny, Bond, Mohr, & Horn, 1996) and another person's level of romantic interest in specific others (Place, Todd, Penke, & Asendorpf, 2009). Also, high self-monitors seem to be especially accurate about the status dynamics of their social groups (Flynn, Reagans, Amanatullah, & Ames, 2006), suggesting that some people are naturally inclined to pay closer attention to others' perceptions of one another. More generally, understanding individuals' reputations is fundamental to social interactions and, thus, it is no surprise that keeping track of others' reputations is inherent in everyday life (Tennie, Frith, & Frith, 2010). With respect to evaluating the validity of informational cues about others, epistemic vigilance (defined as attention to how reliable the source of information is and how likely the information is to be true; Sperber et al., 2010) is theorized to serve as an important mechanism in reputation monitoring (Tennie et al., 2010). It is possible that such epistemic vigilance could help explain why people may achieve knowledge of reputation, as well as identity, even when their own views differ from others'.

Accuracy criteria for other-knowledge. In general, capturing accuracy in personality judgments is considered to be quite difficult (see Funder, 1987; Funder & West, 1993). According to Funder, the two best criteria for accuracy in the traditional sense are interjudge agreement (i.e., the agreement among judgments by different perceivers) and behavioral prediction (i.e., the degree to which perceptions of personality are associated with targets' behaviors or real-world outcomes; e.g., health, occupational success, divorce). However, interjudge agreement (most notably, self-other agreement, consensus, and realistic accuracy) relies on subjective reporting, which may or may not reflect reality (the target's actual personality). Even the more objective criteria associated with behavioral prediction (e.g., the controlled coding of "behavioral markers" of personality in

a laboratory (e.g., Back, Schmukle, & Egloff, 2009; Gottman, Coan, Carrere, & Swanson, 1998; Simpson, Winterheld, Rholes, & Oria, 2007; Vazire, 2010), and audio recordings that capture real-world behavior with the Electronically Activated Recorder (EAR; Mehl, Pennebaker, Crow, Dabbs, & Price, 2001; Mehl, Vazire, Ramrez-Esparza, Slatcher, & Pennebaker, 2007) are not ideal. For example, behaviors manifested in a laboratory lose some ecological validity (i.e., targets may behave differently in their natural environments) and EAR recordings require significant resources such as the cost of the device and time to transfer the recordings into usable data.

In addition to the problems associated with various traditional accuracy criteria for assessing other-knowledge, none of these approaches shed light on knowledge of others' perceptions or the extent to which people are consciously aware that others do not share their views of another person. Although the underlying questions that drive traditional accuracy research in the personality literature are compelling, examining identity and reputation accuracy and insight may provide a relatively clearer and simpler way to measure other-knowledge. Specifically, knowledge of a target's identity can be assessed by comparing a perceiver's impressions of a target's self-perceptions directly to the target's actual self-perceptions. Likewise, knowledge of a target's reputation can be assessed by comparing a perceiver's impressions of others' perceptions of the target directly to others' actual perceptions of the target. Not only can such reports be obtained easily from targets and others (e.g., friend and family informants) and at low-cost (e.g., Vazire, 2006), but such accuracy criteria also provide benchmarks that are absolute and serve as direct connections between "perceptions of reality and reality itself" (Funder & West, 1993, p. 459). Overall, examining this type of other-knowledge offers a straightforward way to operationalize reality by circumventing the thorny criterion problem associated with traditional accuracy research.

Accuracy Versus Insight

The primary focus of the current study was to examine knowledge of identity and knowledge of reputation, both of which have an accuracy component and an insight component. The operationalizations of accuracy and insight for both types of knowledge are later summarized in Table 2, but it is important to initially provide the rationale for understanding these two components in the context

of the current study. First, identity accuracy and reputation accuracy reflect a baseline estimate of the extent to which perceivers are able to infer targets' identities and reputations. However, it is possible that some perceivers will achieve identity and reputation accuracy simply by assuming that a target's identity and reputation are consistent with the perceiver's own views of the target. Thus, to rule out the possibility that knowledge of identity and reputation are simply driven by this type of similarity bias (also referred to as assumed agreement), I also examined identity and reputation insight. The insight components estimate explicit knowledge of others' perceptions beyond perceivers' own impressions of targets by controlling for the agreement between perceivers' own impressions of targets and targets' identities and reputations. By removing the variance explained by perceivers' own perceptions, I can shed light on the extent to which perceivers achieve knowledge of others' perceptions specifically when perceivers personally disagree with targets and others. In short, the accuracy model estimates knowledge of others' perceptions for all perceivers regardless of the overlap with perceivers' own perceptions, whereas the insight model estimates knowledge of others' perceptions only for perceivers whose own perceptions are distinguishable from targets' and others' views.

The accuracy versus insight issue described here is similar to other issues related to bias constructs that sometimes coexist with accuracy; e.g., assumed similarity (Kenny & Acitelli, 2001; Marks & Miller, 1987), projection (Krueger, 1998), and idealization (Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 1996). For instance, it is well established that when assumed similarity is combined with actual similarity, individuals can (coincidentally) achieve accuracy (Cronbach, 1955; Kenny & Acitelli, 2001) regardless of the conceptual differences between achieving accuracy in this way and having conscious knowledge. Thus, it is clear to see how accuracy could be spuriously high if it is entirely or mostly driven by assumed similarity (assumed agreement). Similar to how I operationalize identity and reputation insight by accounting for overlapping perceptions, previous researchers have introduced constructs such as "similarity-free agreement" (Cohen, Panter, Turan, Morse, & Kim, 2013) and "meta-insight" (Carlson, Vazire, & Furr, 2011) to overcome this issue. Nonetheless, because accuracy and insight capture different information, I examined knowledge

of identity and reputation in terms of both components.

Overview of Current Research

Simultaneously juggling multiple perspectives of a single target is a meta-cognitive process that has received little attention in the person perception literature. As described, the current study investigated the extent to which people have knowledge of others' perceptions of a well-acquainted target. To illustrate the questions I tested, consider the friendship pair comprised of Tim (the target) and Paul (the perceiver). Using the KOP model, I first examined the following questions: Does Paul have an accurate perception of Tim's identity and reputation (i.e., identity and reputation accuracy)? Does Paul have insight into Tim's identity and reputation even when those views differ from Paul's own perception of Tim (i.e., identity and reputation insight). After providing a basic foundation for understanding knowledge of others' perceptions, I then conducted exploratory moderation analyses. For instance, under what circumstances is Paul's knowledge of identity and reputation likely to be enhanced (or undermined)? The rationale and description of the analyses and findings for this final question follow the primary results.

As Solomon and Vazire (2014) point out, there may be more to knowing another person well than the traditional interpersonal perception literature suggests – knowing someone's identity and reputation reflects being able to see someone from the inside out. Following Swann's (1984) pragmatic approach to understanding the person perception process as it is "woven into the fabric of people's ongoing social relationships" (Swann, 1984, p. 472), I focus on knowledge of the subjective realities of the self and others that pertain to a well-acquainted friend. This may be an important avenue of research that is distinct from, yet compliments, the traditional approach toward assessing other-knowledge. That is, it may be possible for highly adept judges of personality to be tethered to reality in different ways: some may know a target's personality as it is actually manifested, and others may know practical information about a target's identity and reputation in relation to their own views.

Method

Participants

Participants used in the current analyses are referred to as primary participants, best friends, or general informants. Primary participants (N = 205 for knowledge of identity analyses and N = 180 for knowledge of reputation analyses) were a subset of undergraduates (at least 18 years of age; M = 19.4) who participated in a larger, longitudinal study at Washington University in St. Louis (total N = 435; the inclusion criteria are described below). Approximately 5% were Hispanic or Latino. Approximately 57% were Caucasian, 24% were Asian or Asian American, 10% were Black or African American, less than 1% were American Indian or Alaska Native, less than 1% were Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander, and 6% indicated "Other" for their race. Primary participants were recruited via the Psychology Department Human Subject Pool, flyers posted on campus, announcements made in classes, and postcards mailed to students. The data used were collected at Wave 1. At Wave 1, all primary participants completed self-report questionnaires about their personalities and other attributes (as well as a variety of other tasks and questionnaires) in person at the Personality and Self-Knowledge Laboratory on campus. Primary participants also provided reports about their romantic partners' and best friends' personalities and other attributes. They received monetary compensation for their participation.

Primary participants were asked to nominate up to ten informants who knew them well and would be willing to complete online questionnaires about the primary participants' personalities and other attributes throughout the course of the study. Specifically, participants nominated a local best friend who completed a longer questionnaire than the other informants and provided self-reports of his/her own personality. Several other friend informants, referred to as general informants, were also nominated (including a local friend or a roommate, a hometown friend, a friend of the opposite sex, and two other friends). In addition, participants were asked to nominate four non-friend informants when applicable (a romantic partner, an ex-romantic partner, a parent, and a sibling), although they were not included in the current analyses. On average, all informants were emailed within one month of their nomination with an explanation of why

they were contacted and instructions for completing the online questionnaire (Vazire, 2006). All informants and primary participants were told that their ratings were confidential and the primary participants would not have access to the informants' ratings. Up to three reminder e-mails (one time per week) were sent to informants who had not yet responded. Based on the varying length of questionnaires across informant types, informants received different amounts of monetary compensation. The response rates for best friends and general informants were 57% and 43%, respectively.

Inclusion criteria. For the analyses examining knowledge of identity, only primary participants whose best friend completed the informant questionnaire at Wave 1 were included. Because primary participants and best friends both provided ratings about themselves and each other, the data were fully dyadic, meaning that in these analyses primary participants and best friends could both serve as target (i.e., the individual being rated by the perceiver) and as perceiver (i.e., the individual rating the target). Two hundred five of the 435 potential primary participants (47%) met these inclusion criteria (27% male and 73% female), resulting in a total of 410 targets (205 dyads; approximately 67% were same-sex female, 20% were same-sex male, and 13% were opposite-sex).

For the analyses examining knowledge of reputation, only primary participants whose best friend and at least one general informant completed the informant questionnaire at Wave 1 were included. This was necessary because the general informant data were used as the criterion measure for reputation (how others actually see the primary participant). Unlike the analyses for knowledge of identity, these data were not dyadic – in these analyses, primary participants served only as targets and best friends served only as perceivers. One hundred eighty of the 435 potential primary participants (41%) were included (25% male and 75% female), resulting in a total of 180 targets (180 dyads; approximately 70% were same-sex female, 19% were same-sex male, and 11% were opposite-sex).

Primary Measures

The assessments of *identity*, *other-perception*, *perceived identity*, *reputation*, and *perceived reputation* were based on items from the Big Five Inventory (BFI; Benet-Martnez & John, 1998;

John & Srivastava, 1999). Two BFI items reflecting each Big Five trait were used (i.e., "is outgoing, sociable" and "tends to be quiet" for extraversion, "is sometimes rude to others" and "is considerate and kind to almost everyone" for agreeableness, "is a reliable worker" and "is lazy" for conscientiousness, "is relaxed, handles stress well" and "worries a lot" for neuroticism, and "is curious about many different things" and "has an active imagination" for openness).[1] Ratings were made on a 15-point Likert-type scale with the following descriptive anchors: 1 = *Disagree Strongly*, 8 = *Neither Agree nor Disagree*, and 15 = *Agree Strongly* (with the labels *Disagree Moderately* between 3 and 4, *Disagree a Little* between 5 and 6, *Agree a Little* between 10 and 11, and *Agree Moderately* between 12 and 13). When applicable, all perceiver ratings (i.e., other-perceptions, perceived identity ratings, and perceived reputation ratings) were provided for each BFI item before moving on to the next BFI item, and ratings could be changed if a subsequent question led to further deliberation about a previous rating. See Table 1 for summary statistics of the primary measures for each BFI item. (Correlation matrices across primary measures for each aggregated Big Five trait are available in the Supplemental Material.)

Identity. Primary participants and best friends provided self-perceptions (how primary participants and best friends actually see themselves; e.g., "I am someone who... is outgoing, sociable.").

Other-perception. Primary participants and best friends provided their own impressions of each other (how primary participants perceive their best friends and how best friends perceive the primary participants; e.g., "[*Best friend's/Primary participant's name*]... is outgoing, sociable.").

Perceived identity. Primary participants and best friends were asked to guess how the other person rated themselves (how primary participants believe their best friends see themselves and how best friends believe primary participants see themselves; e.g., "[*Best friend's/Primary participant's name*] sees him/herself... as outgoing, sociable.").

Reputation. General informants provided their own impressions of the primary participants (how others actually perceive the primary participants; e.g., "[*Primary participant's name*] is

[1] Only two items for each Big Five trait were used due to constraints related to the length of the questionnaire. As mentioned, the data used in the current study are part of a larger study about personality and self- and other-knowledge. Although self- and other-perceptions were collected for the full BFI measure, perceived identity and perceived reputation ratings were only collected for the ten BFI items described.

Table 1

Descriptive Statistics for Primary Measures

	Identity		Other-perception		Perceived identity		Reputation		Perceived reputation	
	M	*SE*	*M*	*SE*	*M*	*SE*	*M*	*SE*	*M*	*SE*
Outgoing, sociable	10.04	(3.74)	11.64	(3.04)	11.15	(3.36)	11.33	(2.85)	11.54	(3.30)
Tends to be quiet	8.77	(4.32)	10.28	(3.83)	9.82	(3.98)	9.55	(3.35)	10.03	(4.25)
Rude to others	9.26	(3.97)	9.83	(4.23)	10.20	(3.52)	10.21	(3.30)	10.35	(3.99)
Considerate and kind	11.37	(3.27)	11.85	(2.95)	11.84	(2.44)	11.91	(2.66)	12.04	(2.95)
Reliable worker	12.06	(2.72)	11.85	(2.97)	12.15	(2.33)	12.40	(2.22)	11.96	(2.79)
Lazy	8.51	(4.06)	10.11	(4.03)	9.87	(3.96)	11.16	(2.95)	10.52	(3.94)
Relaxed, handles stress well	6.65	(3.60)	6.60	(3.29)	6.63	(3.13)	6.38	(3.01)	5.71	(3.17)
Worries a lot	9.45	(3.98)	8.15	(3.74)	8.77	(3.60)	7.68	(3.30)	7.21	(3.54)
Curious	12.20	(2.54)	11.40	(2.69)	11.59	(2.50)	11.65	(2.06)	10.97	(2.55)
Active imagination	10.94	(3.32)	10.56	(3.01)	10.93	(2.67)	10.90	(2.58)	10.21	(2.79)

Note. Table reports mean values of primary measures for each Big Five Inventory (BFI) item. Standard deviations in parentheses.

someone who... is outgoing, sociable."). Reputation is the aggregate of all available general informant ratings.

Perceived reputation. Best friends were asked to guess how others would rate the primary participants (how best friends believe others see the primary participants; e.g., "Other people see [*Primary participant's name*] ... as outgoing, sociable.").

Analytical Model and Approach

Returning to my example about Tim and Paul, I used the KOP model to test the following questions: 1) Does Paul know how Tim sees himself (identity accuracy)? 2) Is this knowledge simply the result of Paul assuming Tim sees himself the same way he sees Tim, or does Paul have insight into how Tim's self-perception differs from Paul's own impression of Tim (identity insight)? 3) Does Paul know how others see Tim (reputation accuracy)? 4) Is this knowledge simply the result of Paul assuming others see Tim the same way he sees Tim, or does Paul have insight into how others' perceptions of Tim differ from Paul's own impression of Tim (reputation insight)?

See Table 2 for a summary of how each type of knowledge was assessed. Identity (targets' self-perceptions) and reputation (general informants' perceptions of targets) served as the dependent variables. For identity accuracy and reputation accuracy, identity and reputation were predicted from perceivers' perceived identity ratings and perceivers' perceived reputation ratings, respectively. The only difference between the models for accuracy and insight is the additional component in the insight models to control for perceivers' own perceptions (other-perceptions) of targets. This component enables the estimation of perceivers' insight into targets' identities and reputations above and beyond perceivers' own impressions of the target. As previously described, if such insight exists even with this control, I can rule out the possibility that knowledge of others' perceptions is merely a methodological artifact due to assumed agreement; rather, such insight would reflect explicit knowledge of others' perceptions at a conscious level when perceivers' own perceptions are discrepant from targets' and others'. The full equations for the insight model are presented in Appendix A.[2] For each type of knowledge, the extent to which perceived ratings (of identity or reputation) predict others' actual perceptions (actual identity or reputation) reflects knowledge of others' perceptions (knowledge of identity or reputation). Using the KOP model, coefficients (i.e., β_{1ij} in Appendix A) of 1 would reflect perfect accuracy or insight, while these same coefficients of 0 would reflect no accuracy or insight.[3]

To assess knowledge of identity and reputation in terms of both accuracy and insight, I used two approaches: a personality profile-based (idiographic) approach and a trait-based (nomothetic) approach. For the profile-based approach, I used a multilevel framework with varying intercepts and varying slopes at the item level to account for the variance across items.[4] I examined distinctive knowledge of others' perceptions (i.e., distinctive identity accuracy, distinctive identity insight, distinctive reputation accuracy, and distinctive reputation insight) to rule out the possibility that

[2]Specifically, I present the identity insight model as it is the most complex, and can be easily modified for each type of knowledge I assessed. See Appendix A for an explanation of how to adapt the KOP model to examine identity accuracy, reputation accuracy, and reputation insight.

[3]Because I standardized both target and perceiver ratings, this one-to-one comparison accounts for systematic differences in the variances of target and perceiver reports.

[4]For the profile-based identity models, I used non-hierarchical, multilevel models with cross-effects for both dyads and items.

Table 2

Knowledge of Others' Perceptions

	Identity	**Reputation**
Accuracy	Perceived identity ratings predict target self-perceptions	Perceived reputation ratings predict general informants' perceptions of targets
Insight	Perceived identity ratings predict target self-perceptions controlling for perceiver other-perceptions	Perceived reputation ratings predict general informants' perceptions of targets controlling for perceiver other-perceptions

people were achieving knowledge of identity and reputation simply by describing how the typical person sees himself and how the typical person is seen by others (the equivalent of controlling for normative or stereotype accuracy; Biesanz, 2010; Cronbach, 1955; Furr, 2008). Thus, distinctive knowledge of others' perceptions reflects perceivers' knowledge of the unique patterning of targets' identities (self-perceptions) and reputations (informants' perceptions of targets) across the ten BFI items – or knowledge of the deviations in targets' identities and reputations, respectively, from the average target's identity and reputation across each item. Distinctive variables (or distinctive personality profiles) for both dependent variables (identity and reputation) were computed by subtracting the normative mean for each respective BFI item. For example, distinctive identity reflects targets' self-perceptions on each of the ten items after subtracting the normative self-perception mean for each item.

Using the trait-based approach, I examined knowledge of others' perceptions one trait at a time at the level of the entire sample (i.e., there were no within-person estimates). Thus, it was unnecessary to account for the variability across traits and to include the distinctive variables described above. Importantly, however, in order to appropriately compare the coefficients across the trait-based and profile-based approaches, I used the standardized distinctive dependent variables in the trait-based models (this choice was necessary because the standard deviation of the distinctive variables is different from the standard deviation of the non-distinctive variables). Before running any analyses, I first computed scale scores for each of the Big Five traits (i.e., the average of the

two BFI items for each trait, after recoding any reverse-score items) for each primary measure.[5]

Finally, for all knowledge of identity analyses, I also used multilevel modeling to account for the interdependence of ratings within dyads (as each member of the friendship pairs was both a target and a perceiver).[6] Accounting for such interdependence was unnecessary for assessing knowledge of reputation because the perceived reputation measure was only obtained for one member of each dyad (specifically, for primary participants), and thus each primary participant and best friend were included in the analyses once (serving only as target and perceiver, respectively). All continuous variables were standardized for ease of interpretation.

Primary Results

Do well-acquainted friends agree (or disagree) with others?

Before examining knowledge of identity and reputation, I examined the extent to which well-acquainted friends (i.e., perceivers) agree with targets' self-perceptions (i.e., identities) and with others' perceptions of targets (i.e., reputations) using both a profile-based approach and a trait-based approach.[7] I refer to these associations as target-perceiver agreement and informant-perceiver agreement, respectively. I predicted target identity and reputation from perceiver other-perceptions and employed multilevel modeling when appropriate (i.e., to account for the variability across traits when using the profile-based approach and the interdependence within dyads when predicting identity); see Table 3 for these results.[8] First, using the profile-based approach, I found evidence of target-perceiver agreement.

[5]The alpha reliabilities of the five composites for each primary measure were not all above the minimum acceptable level of .70 (e.g., DeVellis, 1991; Nunnally, 1967; Robinson, Shaver, & Wrightsman, 1991). See the Supplemental Material for these statistics. Nonetheless, the primary analyses were not affected, as the focus was on assessing knowledge of perceptions of personality as opposed to using personality itself as a predictor of a given dependent variable.

[6]However, because each person was rated by and rated only one person, the model cannot differentiate between target effects and perceiver effects. Instead of target effects and perceiver effects, the KOP model can estimate target-perceiver effects, which would reflect the effect of a specific target being perceived by a specific perceiver.

[7]Similar to the trait-based approach described for assessing knowledge of identity and reputation, it was unnecessary to account for the variability across traits and to include the distinctive variables when assessing agreement using the trait-based approach. Importantly, however, in order to appropriately compare the coefficients across the trait-based and profile-based approaches, I used the standardized distinctive dependent variables in the trait-based models (again, this choice was necessary because the standard deviation of the distinctive variables is different from the standard deviation of the non-distinctive variables).

[8]For the results I report, I allowed both the intercepts and slopes for perceiver other-perceptions to vary randomly by item (when using the profile-approach). The results were similar when I also allowed the slopes for perceiver other-perceptions to vary randomly by dyad, but I report the more parsimonious models without these random slopes

The results indicated that perceivers' own perceptions of targets predict targets' distinctive identities; that is, perceivers moderately agree with targets (b = .39, SE = .04, t = 10.25, 95% confidence interval (CI) [.32, .46]) about the unique patterning of targets' personalities across the ten BFI items. Using the trait-based approach, I also found some evidence of target-perceiver agreement for each Big Five trait (b = .72, SE = .05, t = 15.12, 95% CI [.62, .81] for extraversion; b = .33, SE = .05, t = 7.28, 95% CI [.24, .42] for agreeableness; b = .44, SE = .05, t = 8.91, 95% CI [.35, .54] for conscientiousness; b = .45, SE = .05, t = 9.00, 95% CI [.35, .55] for neuroticism; b = .29, SE = .05, t = 5.82, 95% CI [.19, .39] for openness). Consistent with the personality literature, the magnitude of target-perceiver agreement (traditionally referred to as self-other agreement) varies by trait.

With regard to agreement with others, I first found evidence for informant-perceiver agreement using the profile-based approach. The results indicated that perceivers' own perceptions of targets moderately agree with others' (aggregated) distinctive perceptions of targets (i.e., distinctive reputation) across the BFI items (b = .44, SE = .04, t = 12.41, 95% CI [.37, .51]). Using the trait-based approach, the results showed that perceivers also agree with others on each Big Five trait (b = .75, SE = .07, t = 10.54, 95% CI [.61, .89] for extraversion; b = .45, SE = .07, t = 5.96, 95% CI [.30, .59] for agreeableness; b = .39, SE = .07, t = 5.87, 95% CI [.26, .51] for conscientiousness; b = .58, SE = .08, t = 7.05, 95% CI [.42, .74] for neuroticism; b = .34, SE = .07, t = 4.68, 95% CI [.20, .49] for openness); see Table 3.

Altogether, these findings demonstrate that friends (like Paul) generally agree with targets (like Tim) and others (like Tim's other friends) when it comes to the unique patterning of targets' personalities as well as targets' standings on individual Big Five traits. Consistent with previous research demonstrating that consensus is greater than self-other agreement (e.g., John & Robins, 1993; Kenny & West, 2010), the current results trend in a similar direction – friends agree more with other perceivers (i.e., informant-perceiver agreement) than with targets (i.e., target-perceiver agreement).

for the sake of simplicity, as I examine dyad effects in the analyses of dyad-level moderators.

Table 3

Standardized Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors Predicting Agreement and Knowledge of Others' Perceptions

	Profile-based Approach		Trait-based Approach									
	Personality Profile		Ext		Agr		Con		Neu		Ope	
	b	*SE*	*b*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*
Target-Perceiver Agreement												
Other-Perception	.39*	(.04)	.72*	(.05)	.33*	(.05)	.44*	(.05)	.45*	(.05)	.29*	(.05)
Informant-Perceiver Agreement												
Other-Perception	.44*	(.04)	.75*	(.07)	.45*	(.07)	.39*	(.07)	.58*	(.08)	.34*	(.07)
Identity Accuracy												
Perceived Identity	.41*	(.03)	.68*	(.04)	.40*	(.05)	.52*	(.05)	.46*	(.05)	.35*	(.05)
Identity Insight												
Perceived Identity	.27*	(.03)	.49*	(.08)	.26*	(.07)	.37*	(.08)	.29*	(.08)	.32*	(.09)
Other-Perception	.18*	(.03)	.26*	(.09)	.16*	(.07)	.19*	(.08)	.22*	(.08)	.03	(.09)
Reputation Accuracy												
Perceived Reputation	.42*	(.03)	.70*	(.07)	.43*	(.08)	.47*	(.07)	.48*	(.09)	.33*	(.08)
Reputation Insight												
Perceived Reputation	.12*	(.04)	.22	(.19)	.03	(.17)	.48*	(.15)	-.04	(.14)	.06	(.14)
Other-Perception	.35*	(.05)	.54*	(.20)	.42*	(.16)	-.01	(.14)	.61*	(.13)	.30*	(.13)

Note. Table reports the standardized regression coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) for predicting agreement and each type of knowledge of others' perceptions. Ext = Extraversion, Agr = Agreeableness, Con = Conscientiousness, Neu = Neuroticism, and Ope = Openness. For all values, * $p < .05$ (two-tailed test).

Identity and Reputation Accuracy

I next examined identity and reputation accuracy to understand the extent to which friends' perceptions of targets' identities and reputations agree with targets' actual identities and reputations, regardless of how any overlap between perceivers' own views of targets and targets' identities and reputations influences the accuracy effects. First, when using the profile-based approach, the results indicated that perceivers achieve moderate levels of distinctive identity accuracy (b = .41, SE = .03, t = 12.85, 95% CI [.35, .47]). Similarly, perceivers achieve identity accuracy for each Big Five trait as well (b = .68, SE = .04, t = 16.81, 95% CI [.60, .76] for extraversion; b = .40, SE = .05, t = 7.74, 95% CI [.30, .50] for agreeableness; b = .52, SE = .05, t = 10.16, 95% CI [.42, .63] for conscientiousness; b = .46, SE = .05, t = 9.44, 95% CI [.37, .56] for neuroticism; b = .35, SE = .05, t = 6.96, 95% CI [.25, .44] for openness); see Table 3.

Next, the results showed that perceivers achieve moderate levels of distinctive reputation accuracy using the profile-based approach (b = .42, SE = .03, t = 14.20, 95% CI [.37, .48]). Similarly, using the trait-based approach, I also found that perceivers achieve reputation accuracy for each Big Five trait (b = .70, SE = .07, t = 10.06, 95% CI [.56, .83] for extraversion; b = .43, SE = .08, t = 5.24, 95% CI [.27, .59] for agreeableness; b = .47, SE = .07, t = 6.77, 95% CI [.33, .60] for conscientiousness; b = .48, SE = .09, t = 5.10, 95% CI [.29, .66] for neuroticism; b = .33, SE = .08, t = 3.98, 95% CI [.17, .49] for openness); see Table 3.

In other words, friends have accurate perceptions of the unique within-person patterning of targets' identities and reputations, as well as accurate perceptions of targets' identities and reputations for individual traits. However, because perceivers' own impressions of targets also agree significantly with targets' identities and reputations (see previous section), it is possible that such identity and reputation accuracy is driven entirely by the similarity of perceivers' own perceptions. Such accuracy could be due to perceivers actually agreeing with targets' identities and reputations or correctly assuming that their own perceptions of targets agree with targets' identities and reputations. Because the latter scenario reflects achieving accuracy by chance rather than explicit knowledge of others' perceptions, I next examined identity and reputation insight to test the extent to which

perceivers are aware of targets' identities and reputations even when their own perceptions differ from targets' and others' views.

Identity Insight

Do people have insight into their friends' identities, even when they personally see their friends differently from how their friends see themselves? Although the initial findings I reported indicated that friends and targets tend to have similar perceptions of targets' personalities (i.e., target-perceiver agreement), there is still a significant amount of disagreement among friends and targets. Testing for identity insight allowed me to examine whether friends can see beyond their own discrepant perceptions and understand how targets' self-views differ from their own. For example, it is possible that Paul has knowledge about Tim's self-views that goes above and beyond Paul's own perceptions of Tim. To test this idea, I examined the extent to which perceivers have insight into targets' identities, controlling for the agreement between perceivers' own perceptions of targets and targets' identities (i.e., target-perceiver agreement). Using the profile-based approach, the results indicated that perceivers achieve distinctive identity insight (b = .27, SE = .03, t = 8.19, 95% CI [.21, .34]). Using the trait-based approach, I found that perceivers also achieve identity insight with regard to each Big Five trait (b = .49, SE = .08, t = 6.27, 95% CI [.34, .64] for extraversion; b = .26, SE = .07, t = 3.52, 95% CI [.12, .41] for agreeableness; b = .37, SE = .08, t = 4.62, 95% CI [.21, .53] for conscientiousness; b = .29, SE = .08, t = 3.49, 95% CI [.13, .45] for neuroticism; b = .32, SE = .09, t = 3.67, 95% CI [.15, .49] for openness); see Table 3.

In other words, well-acquainted friends have insight into targets' unique patterning of self-perceptions across the BFI items and targets' self-perceptions on individual traits, regardless of how they personally see the targets. As such, I can infer that identity insight is not driven simply by assuming targets' self-views are the same as perceivers' own views of targets; rather, perceivers achieve knowledge of identity at a conscious level.

Reputation Insight

Do people have insight into their friends' reputations, even when they personally see their friends differently from how others see their friends? Similar to the overlap between friends'

perceptions of targets and targets' identities (i.e., target-perceiver agreement), the initial findings demonstrated that friends' perceptions of targets also tend to agree with targets' reputations (i.e., informant-perceiver agreement). Nonetheless, it is possible that in addition to such agreement, people like Paul can accurately infer how others see their close friends like Tim, even when Paul's own perceptions differ from others' views. This time I examined the extent to which perceivers have insight into targets' reputations, controlling for perceivers' own impressions of targets. The results indicated that perceivers achieve distinctive reputation insight using the profile-based approach (b = .12, SE = .04, t = 3.02, 95% CI [.04, .19]), although this finding appears considerably weaker than the finding for identity insight. Also, when using the trait-based approach, perceivers only achieve reputation insight with regard to conscientiousness (b = .48, SE = .15, t = 3.10, 95% CI [.18, .78]); see Table 3.

In other words, regardless of how they personally see the targets, well-acquainted friends have some insight into the unique patterning of others' perceptions of targets across the BFI items, although they have no insight into targets' reputations for individual Big Five traits (with the exception of conscientiousness). Thus, friends have some awareness of the discrepancies between their own views of targets and others' views at the idiographic level (they do not always rely on informant-perceiver agreement or assume others' share their views), but overall, they lack insight into targets' reputations for specific traits.

What Moderates Knowledge of Others' Perceptions?

The goal of this research not only pertains to the extent to which people achieve knowledge of identity and reputation, but also concerns the conditions under which people are more likely to acquire such knowledge. That is, under what circumstances is Paul's knowledge of Tim's identity and reputation likely to be enhanced (or undermined)? I used previous research to inform several exploratory moderation tests based on three of the four factors currently thought to moderate the accuracy of other-perceptions (Funder & Colvin, 1997): judgability, judgmental ability, and information level. Below I separated the potential moderators I examined into individual-level and dyad-level factors and provide a general rationale for conducting each test.

Individual-level factors

Achieving knowledge of identity and reputation may depend on individual-level characteristics associated with target judgability and perceiver judgmental ability. Similar to the good target and good judge moderators of the RAM (i.e., targets who are easy to read and perceivers who tend to have accurate perceptions, respectively; Funder, 1995), I examined the extent to which characteristics of both the target and perceiver moderate knowledge of others' perceptions.

Gender. First, I examined the conditional effects of gender. Recent research on the good judge indicates that women might be better than men at judging the personality of a minimally acquainted target because they have more insight into what the average person's personality profile is like (Chan et al., 2011). Similarly, other studies have found that women are also more accurate when judging intelligence (Murphy, Hall, & Colvin, 2003) and individual personality traits (Ambady, Hallahan, & Rosenthal, 1995; Vogt & Colvin, 2003), as well as thoughts and emotion (Graham & Ickes, 1997; Hall, 1984; Klein & Hodges, 2001). With respect to target gender, women may be better targets because they are more accurate in their nonverbal expressions than men (Hall, 1984). However, empirical findings do not support the myth that women are more talkative than men (Mehl et al., 2007), indicating that men and women provide the same amount of verbal information. Altogether, these studies provide a foundation for exploring whether gender moderates achieving knowledge of others' perceptions.

Perceived relationship quality. Second, although the actual quality of the relationship between a target and perceiver is a characteristic of the dyad, it is possible that targets and perceivers have different perceptions of their relationship. Potentially, higher relationship quality (reported by the target or the perceiver) is associated with good information (Funder, 1995) and ultimately greater knowledge of a target's identity and reputation. For example, a target who reports a high level of relationship quality may disclose more intimate information to the perceiver and a perceiver who reports a high level of relationship quality may prioritize spending time with the target, both of which could positively affect a perceiver's knowledge of the target's self-perceptions and others'

perceptions of the target.[9] These predictions are consistent with previous research suggesting that relationship satisfaction is positively associated with accuracy (Connelly & Ones, 2010; Luo & Snider, 2009; Neff & Karney, 2005).

Personality traits. Third, I focused on the extent to which knowledge of others' perceptions depends on the Big Five personality traits as the Big Five model (Goldberg, 1990; John, 1990; McCrae & Costa, 1987) is the most widely accepted and extensively researched framework for personality today. In the traditional sense of accuracy, psychologically well-adjusted individuals are perceived more accurately by others and perceive others more accurately (Colvin, 1993; Human & Biesanz, 2011a, 2011b). More specifically, in terms of the Big Five, one study found that judgeable people (people who are known versus misunderstood) tend to be high in extraversion, agreeableness, and conscientiousness, and low in neuroticism (Colvin, 1993). Although the correlates of the Big Five with judgmental ability are not well established despite a long history of intrigue and empirical investigation (Colvin & Bundick, 2001; Davis & Kraus, 1997; Taft, 1955; Vernon, 1933), being highly agreeable seems to be associated with accuracy in interpersonal perceptions (Letzring, 2008).

It is possible that highly judgeable targets – based on the traditional operationalization of accuracy – are similar to targets who help facilitate knowledge of identity and reputation. For instance, given that people who are highly extraverted are especially expressive, sociable, and talkative (Wilt & Revelle, 2009), extraverted targets may provide more opportunities for perceivers to ascertain information about how targets see themselves and to observe others in response to targets. Also, it is possible that people choose to spend more time with highly agreeable targets because such targets tend to be good-natured, cooperative, and compassionate (Borkenau, 1988; Graziano & Tobin, 2009). Similarly, highly conscientious targets may also be desirable for socializing because they plan ahead, are dependable, and keep their promises (Jackson et al., 2010; Roberts, Jackson, Fayard, Edmonds, & Meints, 2009). As such, target agreeableness and conscientiousness

[9]Of course, the directionality issue inherent in correlational research precludes inferences regarding whether higher quality relationships lead to greater transmission of good information or good information promotes higher quality relationships.

may facilitate more opportunities for perceivers to acquire relevant information about targets' self-views and reputations. In contrast, targets who are highly neurotic may have inconsistent or negative self-views and tend to be anxious (Widiger, 2009). Consequently, they may be motivated to conceal their self-perceptions and withdraw from social situations, ultimately undermining the ability of perceivers to achieve knowledge of identity and reputation, respectively. Given that openness has fewer social components and consequences, I do not expect that target openness moderates knowledge of others' perceptions.

Although less is known about the relationships between Big Five traits and judgmental ability, some research suggests that perceivers who promote environments in which targets can act naturally are more likely to make accurate judgments (Letzring, 2008). I expect that by creating such open atmospheres, these perceivers are more likely to ascertain relevant information about others' perceptions as well. Accordingly, it is possible that extraverted perceivers are less likely to achieve knowledge of others' perceptions because of their tendency to dominate conversations (Harms, Roberts, & Wood, 2007) and desire to be the center of attention (Ashton, Lee, & Paunonen, 2002; Hogan & Hogan, 2001), both of which can occur at the cost of inadvertent disregard for others' perspectives or hindering others from expressing themselves (Grant, Gino, & Hofmann, 2011). This notion that being extraverted could undermine one's ability to see targets from multiple points of view is consistent with research on the "dark sides" of extraversion (Hogan & Hogan, 2001; Judge, Piccolo, & Kosalka, 2009) and the negative association between high status and understanding others' thoughts, feelings, and visual perspective (Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006). Also, anxiety in perceivers is negatively associated with judgmental accuracy (Colvin & Bundick, 2001) and, similarly, high neuroticism in perceivers may interfere with achieving knowledge of others' perceptions by making others feel less comfortable and willing to disclose how they see themselves and others.

In contrast, highly agreeable perceivers may be especially good at achieving knowledge of others' perceptions, in the same way that they achieve accuracy in the traditional sense (Letzring, 2008), because they facilitate an atmosphere for natural and open conversation. Moreover, highly

agreeable perceivers make efforts to get along and avoid interpersonal conflict (Graziano & Tobin, 2009), which should motivate perspective-taking (i.e., a highly agreeable perceiver is likely to be more successful in cooperating with others if s/he understands others' perceptions). Also, although strong empirical support has not been found linking conscientiousness with traditional operationalizations of accuracy (Christiansen, Wolcott-Burnam, Janovics, Burns, & Quirk, 2005), it is plausible that conscientious perceivers acquire knowledge of others' perceptions as a way of fulfilling their interpersonal goals. Specifically, highly conscientious people tend to have better interpersonal outcomes (Roberts et al., 2009), potentially because their persistence and goal-oriented behaviors are particularly beneficial when they are motivated to succeed in their interpersonal relationships (Wiggins & Trapnell, 1996). Thus, ascertaining knowledge of a target's self-view and reputation could help conscientious individuals reach this type of social goal. Finally, based on research demonstrating that rigidity in thinking is negatively associated with perspective-taking ability (e.g., Leith & Baumeister, 1998), I expect that perceivers who are high in openness will be more likely to have knowledge of identity and reputation.

Global attachment style. Finally, another type of individual difference that could moderate knowledge of others' perceptions is global attachment style, which reflects relatively enduring patterns of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors in close relationships in general. Whereas securely attached individuals tend to have more intimate friendships (Grabill & Kerns, 2000; Mayseless, Sharabany, & Sagi, 1997), insecurely attached individuals have less satisfying and lower quality friendships (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991; Bippus & Rollin, 2003; Markiewicz, Doyle, & Brendgen, 2001). As such, having an insecure attachment style could affect judgeability and judgmental ability in a variety of ways; typically undermining knowledge of others' perceptions, but potentially enhancing such knowledge under certain circumstances.

Previous research has shown that anxiously attached romantic partners underestimate how emotionally distant they are (Simpson, Rholes, & Winterheld, 2010) and avoidantly attached individuals have lower quality friendships (Fraley, Roisman, Booth-LaForce, Owen, & Holland, 2013). Combined with the more general finding that targets who are insecurely attached are less

willing to reveal personal information (Grabill & Kerns, 2000), I expect that insecurely attached targets hinder knowledge of identity because they engage in less intimate interactions. In contrast, with respect to knowledge of reputation, it is possible that perceivers of insecurely attached targets may understand that others have different perceptions of the targets than they personally do. For instance, attachment anxiety and avoidance could inhibit targets from acting naturally in social situations, ultimately leading others to see them in a misconstrued light. As such, perceivers may be especially likely to detect this difference in insecurely attached targets' behaviors, actually enhancing the opportunity to achieve knowledge of reputation. In short, with respect to target attachment, I expect that anxiety- and avoidance-related attachment are both negatively associated with knowledge of identity and that anxiety- and avoidance-related attachment are positively associated with knowledge of reputation.

Perceiver attachment style could also moderate knowledge of others' perceptions, but in slightly different ways. Given that avoidantly attached individuals have less accurate perceptions of others (Letzring, 2008), it is possible that avoidantly attached perceivers also ascertain less knowledge of identity and reputation by avoiding deep, personal conversations (Mikulincer & Selinger, 2001), thereby limiting the amount and quality of information they are able to acquire from targets and others. In addition, previous research has indicated that attachment avoidance is negatively associated with empathic accuracy among strangers (Izhaki-Costi & Schul, 2011), which is consistent with my expectation that avoidantly attached perceivers have more difficulty accurately inferring targets' reputations. In contrast, anxiously attached perceivers may have developed skills that help in achieving knowledge of identity, similarly to how anxiously attached romantic partners achieve higher levels of empathic accuracy (by constantly attending to the targets) compared to their less anxious counterparts (Simpson, Ickes, & Blackstone, 1995; Simpson, Ickes, & Grich, 1999). However, anxiously attached perceivers are less accurate in judging facial expressions of emotion, despite being more vigilant when detecting changes in such expressions (Fraley, Niedenthal, Marks, Brumbaugh, & Vicary, 2006). Given that individuals use facial expression cues to infer others' cognitions (Salovey & Mayer, 1990), being less skilled in accurately identifying

facial expressions may put anxiously attached perceivers at a disadvantage with regard to knowledge of reputation. Overall, with respect to perceiver attachment, I expect that anxiety-related attachment is positively associated with knowledge of identity, whereas avoidance-related attachment is negatively associated with knowledge of identity. I also expect that anxiety- and avoidance-related attachment are both negatively associated with greater knowledge of reputation.

Dyad-level factors

Knowledge of identity and reputation may also depend on dyad-level characteristics. Building on the notion that there is an interaction between a good judge and a good target, referred to as a relationship effect (Funder, 1995), I expected that certain aspects of the friendship itself are important for achieving knowledge of others' perceptions.

Gender composition. First, I explored whether the gender composition of the dyad moderates knowledge of others' perceptions. With regard to knowledge of identity, individuals in same-sex female dyads may not only be more accurate in their own perceptions of one another (Funder, 1995), but they may also achieve greater identity accuracy and insight than individuals in same-sex male dyads due to the more intimate nature of their relationships (Fehr, 2004). This notion is based on research demonstrating that women tend to spend their time together discussing emotions and relationships, whereas men do activities or talk about impersonal topics (see Fehr 1996 for a review). With regard to knowledge of reputation, an evolutionary perspective on mate selection may suggest that individuals in same-sex dyads are especially likely to be aware of each other's reputations because it is important to know how their competition is perceived by others (Eagly & Wood, 1999).[10] More generally, it is possible that individuals in same-sex dyads may be more likely than individuals in opposite-sex dyads to accurately assume that each other's self-view and reputation are similar to their own self-view and reputation. As previous research has demonstrated, assumed similarity leads to accuracy when two people are actually alike (Cowden, 1955; Kenny & Acitelli, 2001), and thus individuals in same-sex dyads may achieve greater knowledge of identity and reputation if they correctly assume that targets' identities and reputations are similar to their

[10]This particular example assumes that targets and perceivers are heterosexual; thus, such a prediction is constrained in its potential for identifying a moderator that is generalizable to everyone in the population.

own.

Relationship duration. Second, I examined the conditional effects of relationship duration with the expectation that good information is likely to influence knowledge of identity and reputation similarly to how acquaintanceship (information level) is positively associated with accurate personality judgments in the traditional sense (e.g., Biesanz, West, & Millevoi, 2007; Blackman & Funder, 1998; Colvin & Funder, 1991; Funder & Colvin, 1988; Letzring et al., 2006). For instance, relationship duration could lead to more opportunities for self-disclosure (by the target) or observing others' responses to a target (by the perceiver), ultimately leading to greater knowledge of a target's identity and reputation. Although length of acquaintance does not always predict greater accuracy in the traditional sense (e.g., Kenny, 2004; Watson et al., 2000), it is possible that a moderation effect exists for knowledge of others' perceptions.

Moderation Measures

To test potential moderators, I assessed the following individual- and dyad-level variables.

Individual-level. 1) *Gender* (0 = male, 1 = female), 2) *Perceived relationship quality* (assessed via primary participant and best friend reports on five aggregated items (for the knowledge of identity analyses: α = .89 and α = .92, respectively, and target-perceiver agreement r = .21; for the knowledge of reputation analyses: α = .87 and α = .93, respectively, and target-perceiver agreement r = .21); see Appendix B for the wording of these items), 3) the *Big Five personality traits* (assessed by using primary participant and best friend self-perceptions on the ten BFI items previously described for the primary analyses),[11] and 4) *Global attachment style* (anxiety-related attachment and avoidance-related attachment were assessed by using primary participant and best friend self-reports, using a 7-point Likert-type scale, on the Relationship Structures questionnaire of the Experiences in Close Relationships Revised (ECR-RS; Fraley, Waller, & Brennan, 2000), modified for global attachment).[12]

[11] When testing whether the Big Five personality traits moderate knowledge of identity, only the effects of perceiver (but not target) personality could be examined because targets' self-perceptions on the BFI items also comprised the measure of identity (the dependent variable). However, with respect to knowledge of reputation, both target and perceiver personality were tested as moderators because the measure of reputation (the dependent variable) is distinct from the moderator variables (i.e., target and perceiver self-perceptions of the Big Five traits).

[12] The two subscales (anxiety-related attachment and avoidance-related attachment) correlated positively with each

Dyad-level. 1) *Gender composition* (assessed with two categorical variables: one dichotomous variable indicating whether the dyad is opposite-sex (1 = yes, 0 otherwise) and one dichotomous variable indicating whether the dyad is same-sex female (1 = yes, 0 otherwise)) and 2) *Relationship duration* (assessed by averaging responses by primary participants and best friends about how long they have known each other; M = 2.6 years and M = 2.3 years for the knowledge of identity and reputation analyses, respectively; target-perceiver agreement r = .83 and r = .79).[13]

Moderation Analyses

Going back to the example of Tim and Paul, the last question I examined was: 5) Under what circumstances is Paul's knowledge of Tim's identity and reputation likely to be enhanced? To explore potential moderators, I tested whether achieving knowledge of identity and knowledge of reputation (for both accuracy and insight) depends on characteristics of the target, perceiver, and dyad. Specifically, I included interactions between perceived identity and reputation ratings and each potential moderator (e.g., perceived identity rating $\times$ relationship duration) in the KOP model, separately for each individual- and dyad-level variable (see Appendix A for the full equations). These pathways are depicted in Figure 1a, 1b, 1c, and 1d. To provide a context for understanding moderators of knowledge of others' perceptions, I also examined whether these same factors moderate target-perceiver agreement and informant-perceiver agreement by including interactions between perceivers' own perceptions of targets and each potential moderator (e.g., other-perception $\times$ relationship duration; see Figure 2a and 2b).[14] The interpretation of positive interaction terms is described in Appendix A. To reduce the chance of false positives, I examined moderators only using the profile-based approach and did not examine moderators for each trait separately.

---

other (for the knowledge of identity analyses: r = .20 and r = .19 for primary participants and best friends, respectively; for the knowledge of reputation analyses: r = .16 and r = .23 for primary participants and best friends, respectively). Both subscales had high reliabilities across respondents (for the knowledge of identity analyses: α = .87 and α = .88 for primary participant anxiety- and avoidance-related attachment, respectively, and α = .93 and α = .87 for best friend anxiety- and avoidance-related attachment, respectively; for the knowledge of reputation analyses: α = .86 and α = .88 for primary participant anxiety- and avoidance-related attachment, respectively, and α = .93 and α = .89 for best friend anxiety- and avoidance-related attachment, respectively).

[13]The relatively short average relationship duration is most likely due to the requirement that primary participants could only nominate local (as opposed to long distance) best friends.

[14]The full results for the moderation analyses pertaining to target-perceiver agreement and informant-perceiver agreement are available upon request.



Figure 1. Moderation pathways for knowledge of identity (accuracy and insight) and knowledge of reputation (accuracy and insight).



Figure 2. Moderation pathways for target-perceiver agreement and informant-perceiver agreement.

Moderation Results

Individual-level Moderators

As described, the individual-level factors I examined include gender, perceived relationship quality, personality, and global attachment style for both the target and the perceiver. See Table 4 and Table 5 for a summary of these results. Knowledge of identity is captured by the marginal effect of perceived identity on actual identity, and likewise, knowledge of reputation is captured by the marginal effect of perceived reputation on actual reputation. Marginal effects are reported for each group when testing gender (a categorical variable) and for low and high levels (1 standard deviation below and above the mean, respectively) when testing relationship quality, personality, and attachment (continuous variables). (The full results for each interaction I ran are available in the Supplemental Material.) I describe these findings below, one potential moderator at a time, first with regard to knowledge of identity for both target and perceiver factors and then with regard to knowledge of reputation.

Gender. First, I examined the extent to which knowledge of identity depends on target and perceiver gender. I found that identity accuracy and insight are stronger for female targets and female perceivers than male targets and male perceivers – although friends of both female and male targets, as well as both female and male perceivers, achieve significant levels of identity accuracy and insight (see Table 4). I also found that both target and perceiver gender moderate target-perceiver agreement in the same way. In other words, friends achieve greater levels of identity accuracy and insight when perceiving a female target and when they are female, and the extent to which friends agree with targets' self-views is also greater when the target or the perceiver is female rather than male.

I then examined the extent to which knowledge of reputation depends on target and perceiver gender and found different results (see Table 4). Reputation accuracy and insight are stronger for male targets than female targets – although friends of both male and female targets achieve significant levels of reputation accuracy and insight. Perceiver gender does not moderate reputation accuracy or insight. The results also indicated that neither target nor perceiver gender moderate

Table 4

Individual-Level Moderators of Knowledge of Others' Perceptions

	Identity Accuracy		Identity Insight		Reputation Accuracy		Reputation Insight	
	Marginal Effect	χ^2	Marginal Effect	χ^2	Marginal Effect	χ^2	Marginal Effect	χ^2
Male Target	0.32∗		0.19∗		0.49∗		0.19∗	
Female Target	0.44∗		0.31∗		0.40∗		0.09∗	
Male vs. Female Target		20.45∗		19.38∗		4.53∗		5.21∗
Male Perceiver	0.32∗		0.19∗		0.41∗		0.11∗	
Female Perceiver	0.44∗		0.30∗		0.42∗		0.12∗	
Male vs. Female Perceiver		18.19∗		16.41∗		0.08		0.01
Low Target Relationship Quality	0.42∗		0.26∗		0.42∗		0.13∗	
High Target Relationship Quality	0.51∗		0.36∗		0.42∗		0.10∗	
Low vs. High Target Relationship Quality		7.48∗		8.42∗		0.00		0.50
Low Perceiver Relationship Quality	0.47∗		0.32∗		0.37∗		0.09∗	
High Perceiver Relationship Quality	0.48∗		0.29∗		0.47∗		0.16∗	
Low vs. High Perceiver Relationship Quality		0.12		0.47		7.06∗		3.94∗
Low Target Anxiety	0.44∗		0.30∗		0.49∗		0.16∗	
High Target Anxiety	0.38∗		0.24∗		0.33∗		0.02	
Low vs. High Target Anxiety		7.18∗		7.46∗		15.68∗		12.37∗
Low Target Avoidance	0.45∗		0.31∗		0.37∗		0.04	
High Target Avoidance	0.37∗		0.23∗		0.47∗		0.16∗	
Low vs. High Target Avoidance		10.79∗		10.63∗		7.61∗		10.47∗
Low Perceiver Anxiety	0.39∗		0.24∗		0.41∗		0.08†	
High Perceiver Anxiety	0.44∗		0.30∗		0.45∗		0.14∗	
Low vs. High Perceiver Anxiety		4.16∗		7.53∗		1.51		3.26†
Low Perceiver Avoidance	0.39∗		0.24∗		0.43∗		0.11∗	
High Perceiver Avoidance	0.43∗		0.30∗		0.41∗		0.13∗	
Low vs. High Perceiver Avoidance		2.54		6.49∗		0.45		0.35

Note. Table reports the marginal effects for each group for categorical variables and for low and high levels (1 standard deviation below and above the mean, respectively) for continuous variables. Table also reports the chi-square significance tests for each comparison. For all values, * $p < .05$, † $p < .10$ (two-tailed test).

informant-perceiver agreement. Altogether, friends achieve greater knowledge of reputation when perceiving a male target, whereas knowledge of reputation does not depend on a perceiver's own gender, and the extent to which friends agree with others' views of targets does not depend on the gender of either the target or the perceiver.

Perceived relationship quality. Second, I explored whether target- and perceiver-reports of relationship quality moderate knowledge of others' perceptions (see Table 4 for these results). Starting with knowledge of identity, I found that friends of targets who reported higher relationship quality tend to have greater identity accuracy and insight than friends of targets who reported lower relationship quality. I found similar positive effects of target-reported relationship quality when examining target-perceiver agreement. In other words, identity accuracy, identity insight, and agreement between perceivers and targets all tend to be greater when targets experience higher (rather than lower) relationship quality; in contrast, no moderation effects emerged for perceiver-reported relationship quality (with the exception of a marginally statistically significant positive effect on target-perceiver agreement).

I then found that only perceiver-(not target-)reported relationship quality moderates knowledge of reputation; specifically, perceivers who experience higher relationship quality tend to achieve greater reputation accuracy and insight than their counterparts who experience lower relationship quality. See Figure 3 for an illustration of this effect on reputation accuracy. Neither target- nor perceiver-reported relationship quality moderates informant-perceiver agreement. The correlation between target-reported and perceiver-reported relationship quality is quite weak (r = .21), which could help explain the different findings that emerged for target and perceiver factors. Possible explanations for such discrepancies between target and perceiver relationship experiences and their impact on knowledge of identity versus reputation are raised in the General Discussion.

Personality traits. Third, I examined the extent to which knowledge of identity is moderated by personality (see Table 5). Because personality traits were measured using self-reports, I could not test the effects of target personality on knowledge of identity (see Footnote 11), but found several significant moderation effects of perceiver personality. Consistent with my expectation, I



Figure 3. The y-axis reflects reputation accuracy (the marginal effect of a 1 standard deviation increase in perceived reputation ratings on targets' actual reputations). As such, this graph represents perceivers' predicted reputation accuracy depending on perceiver-reported relationship quality.

found that higher perceiver extraversion hinders identity accuracy and insight (see Figure 4 for an illustration of this effect on identity insight). That is, intraverted perceivers have greater knowledge of identity than extraverted perceivers. I also found marginally statistically significant effects of openness such that highly open perceivers achieve greater knowledge of identity, although I did not expect to find this effect. With regard to target-perceiver agreement, significant results emerged for perceiver neuroticism and openness such that agreement is higher when perceivers report being less neurotic and more open.

With respect to personality and knowledge of reputation, consistent with my expectation, the results indicated that higher target neuroticism hinders reputation accuracy and insight. Contrary to my expectations, I found that knowledge of reputation does not depend on target extraversion or agreeableness, and higher levels of target conscientiousness and openness decrease reputation accuracy and insight. Also contrary to my expectations, neither perceiver extraversion nor openness moderate knowledge of reputation. The most consistent finding for perceiver personality emerged for neuroticism such that knowledge of reputation is greater when perceivers report being more neurotic. The statistically significant results that emerged for agreeableness and conscientiousness

Table 5

Individual-Level Moderators of Knowledge of Others' Perceptions (Continued)

	Identity Accuracy		Identity Insight		Reputation Accuracy		Reputation Insight	
	Marginal Effect	χ^2	Marginal Effect	χ^2	Marginal Effect	χ^2	Marginal Effect	χ^2
Low Target Extraversion					0.40∗		0.09∗	
High Target Extraversion					0.41∗		0.08∗	
Low vs. High Target Extraversion						0.06		0.01
Low Target Agreeableness					0.39∗		0.09∗	
High Target Agreeableness					0.43∗		0.10∗	
Low vs. High Target Agreeableness						1.56		0.14
Low Target Conscientiousness					0.46∗		0.14∗	
High Target Conscientiousness					0.38∗		0.05	
Low vs. High Target Conscientiousness						4.34∗		6.49∗
Low Target Neuroticism					0.48∗		0.15∗	
High Target Neuroticism					0.36∗		0.07	
Low vs. High Target Neuroticism						12.04∗		5.77∗
Low Target Openness					0.49∗		0.17∗	
High Target Openness					0.34∗		0.03	
Low vs. High Target Openness						16.33∗		15.42∗
Low Perceiver Extraversion	0.44∗		0.31∗		0.40∗		0.10∗	
High Perceiver Extraversion	0.38∗		0.23∗		0.44∗		0.13∗	
Low vs. High Perceiver Extraversion		7.92∗		10.46∗		1.76		0.75
Low Perceiver Agreeableness	0.40∗		0.27∗		0.44∗		0.14∗	
High Perceiver Agreeableness	0.41∗		0.26∗		0.41∗		0.08†	
Low vs. High Perceiver Agreeableness		0.09		0.14		0.85		3.26†
Low Perceiver Conscientiousness	0.42∗		0.29∗		0.39∗		0.10∗	
High Perceiver Conscientiousness	0.40∗		0.26∗		0.45∗		0.13∗	
Low vs. High Perceiver Conscientiousness		0.49		1.63		3.04†		1.08
Low Perceiver Neuroticism	0.42∗		0.28∗		0.40∗		0.07	
High Perceiver Neuroticism	0.40∗		0.27∗		0.46∗		0.16∗	
Low vs. High Perceiver Neuroticism		1.07		0.29		3.58†		8.12∗
Low Perceiver Openness	0.38∗		0.25∗		0.43∗		0.12∗	
High Perceiver Openness	0.43∗		0.29∗		0.42∗		0.11∗	
Low vs. High Perceiver Openness		3.56†		3.20†		0.02		0.03

Note. Table reports the marginal effects for each group for categorical variables and for low and high levels (1 standard deviation below and above the mean, respectively) for continuous variables. Table also reports the chi-square significance tests for each comparison. For all values, * $p < .05$, † $p < .10$ (two-tailed test).



Figure 4. The y-axis reflects identity insight (the marginal effect of a 1 standard deviation increase in perceived identity ratings on targets' actual identities, controlling for perceivers' own perceptions of targets). As such, this graph represents perceivers' predicted identity insight depending on perceiver extraversion.

are somewhat inconsistent across reputation accuracy and insight. Specifically, reputation insight (but not accuracy) is greater when perceivers report being low in agreeableness, and reputation accuracy (but not insight) is greater when perceivers report being high in conscientiousness (although these effects were only marginally statistically significant). See Table 5 for a summary of these findings. Finally, informant-perceiver agreement appears to be higher when targets are low in openness and when perceivers are high in neuroticism. Overall, I hesitate to draw inferences about these results due to the large number of moderation tests; the findings, however, are discussed below.

Global attachment style. Fourth, I examined the extent to which knowledge of others' perceptions depends on global attachment (see Table 4). First, with respect to knowledge of identity, the results indicated that, as expected, identity accuracy and insight are greater when targets are low in anxiety- and avoidance-related attachment and when perceivers are high in anxiety-related attachment. While I expected avoidantly attached perceivers to have less of knowledge of identity, the results indicated the opposite effect (highly avoidant perceivers achieve greater identity insight than their more securely attached counterparts, although there was no moderation effect for identity



Figure 5. The y-axis reflects reputation insight (the marginal effect of a 1 standard deviation increase in perceived reputation ratings on targets' actual reputations, controlling for perceivers' own perceptions of targets). As such, this graph represents perceivers' predicted reputation insight depending on target anxiety-related attachment.

accuracy). With regard to target-perceiver agreement, agreement is higher when targets are low in anxiety- or avoidance-related attachment, whereas perceiver attachment does not moderate this association.

I then examined attachment and knowledge of reputation. Consistent with my expectation, reputation accuracy and insight are greater when targets are high in avoidance-related attachment, perhaps because perceivers can detect discrepancies in these targets' behaviors across social and one-on-one situations. Contrary to my expectation, however, knowledge of reputation is also greater when targets are low in anxiety-related attachment (see Figure 5 for an illustration of this effect on reputation insight). No moderation effects emerged for perceiver attachment (with the exception of a marginally statistically significant effect suggesting that reputation insight is greater when perceivers are high in anxiety-related attachment). With regard to informant-perceiver agreement, only one significant effect emerged; specifically, agreement is higher when targets are low in anxiety-related attachment. Again, due to the large number and exploratory nature of these tests, I am reluctant to draw inferences about these results.

Dyad-level Moderators

Finally, I tested whether dyad-level factors moderate knowledge of others' perceptions. See Table 6 for a summary of these results (also, see the Supplemental Material for the full results of each test). This table reports the marginal effects for each group when testing gender composition (based on categorical variables) and for low and high levels (1 standard deviation below and above the mean, respectively) when testing relationship duration (a continuous variable).

Gender composition. First, examining gender composition was helpful for better understanding the individual-level moderation effects of gender that emerged for both types of knowledge of others' perceptions. Starting with knowledge of identity, I found that perceivers in same-sex female dyads achieve greater identity accuracy and identity insight than perceivers in same-sex male dyads and perceivers in opposite-sex dyads (although perceivers in all three types of dyads achieve identity accuracy and insight). Perceivers in same-sex female dyads also achieve higher target-perceiver agreement than perceivers in same-sex male dyads and perceivers in opposite-sex dyads (although perceivers in all three types of dyads also achieve target-perceiver agreement). Knowledge of identity and target-perceiver agreement were statistically indistinguishable between same-sex male and opposite-sex dyads.

With regard to knowledge of reputation, I found that gender composition moderates both reputation accuracy and insight (but only at a marginally statistically significant level). Specifically, perceivers in same-sex male dyads achieve greater knowledge of reputation than perceivers in opposite-sex dyads, although the difference between same-sex male dyads and same-sex female dyads is not statistically significant. Also, perceivers in all three types of dyads achieve reputation accuracy and insight (with the exception of perceivers in opposite-sex dyads who do not achieve reputation insight). Gender composition does not moderate informant-perceiver agreement, indicating that the extent to which perceivers agree with others about a target's personality does not depend on the combination of their own gender and the targets' gender (perceivers in all three types of dyads achieve informant-perceiver agreement).

Relationship duration. Lastly, when testing relationship duration as a potential moderator,

Table 6

Dyad-Level Moderators of Knowledge of Others' Perceptions

	Identity Accuracy		Identity Insight		Reputation Accuracy		Reputation Insight	
	Marginal Effect	χ^2	Marginal Effect	χ^2	Marginal Effect	χ^2	Marginal Effect	χ^2
Opposite-Sex Dyad	0.35∗		0.22∗		0.35∗		0.05	
Same-Sex Male Dyad	0.31∗		0.19∗		0.47∗		0.17∗	
Same-Sex Female Dyad	0.45∗		0.31∗		0.41∗		0.11∗	
Opposite-Sex Dyad vs. Same-Sex Male Dyad		0.71		0.70		3.18†		3.21†
Opposite-Sex Dyad vs. Same-Sex Female Dyad		7.24∗		6.58∗		1.26		0.96
Same-Sex Male Dyad vs. Same-Sex Female Dyad		20.57∗		19.06∗		1.44		1.93
Low Relationship Duration	0.38∗		0.25∗		0.42∗		0.11∗	
High Relationship Duration	0.43∗		0.30∗		0.43∗		0.12∗	
Low vs. High Relationship Duration		4.59∗		3.61†		0.00		0.12

Note. Table reports the marginal effects for each group for categorical variables and for low and high levels (1 standard deviation below and above the mean, respectively) for continuous variables. Table also reports the chi-square significance tests for each comparison. For all values, * $p < .05$, † $p < .10$ (two-tailed test).



Figure 6. The y-axis reflects identity accuracy (the marginal effect of a 1 standard deviation increase in perceived identity ratings on targets' actual identities). As such, this graph represents perceivers' predicted identity accuracy depending on relationship duration (how long the target and perceiver have known each other).

I found that perceivers who have known targets for a longer (rather than shorter) duration tend to achieve greater identity accuracy and insight (although the effect on insight only reaches a marginally statistically significant level), as well as higher target-perceiver agreement (see Figure 6 for an illustration of the effect of duration on identity accuracy). In contrast, relationship duration does not moderate knowledge of reputation or informant-perceiver agreement. Altogether, knowledge of how a target sees himself and agreement with a target's self-views both depend on relationship duration, whereas knowledge of how others see a target and agreement with others' views of a target do not depend on relationship duration.

General Discussion

Although egocentrism – seeing the world only from one's own perspective – was initially thought of as a component of childlike thinking (Piaget, Gabain, & Gabain, 1959), adults continue to make egocentrically biased judgments throughout their everyday lives (e.g., Holmes, 1968; Krueger & Clement, 1994; Ross et al., 1977). Perhaps motivated by the desire to have successful social interactions (Mead, 1934), adults are able to correct their egocentric interpretations of the

world (Epley et al., 2004) and understand that others may have discrepant points of view (e.g., people understand that others do not perceive them exactly as they see themselves (Carlson, Vazire, & Furr, 2011) and differ in terms of how much they like another person (Kenny et al., 1996)). Building on these insights, the current study provides further evidence that people can overcome their egocentric tendencies: well-acquainted friends have the meta-cognitive ability to understand that others' perceptions of a target's personality may differ from their own and even appropriately correct for such differences when inferring others' perceptions.

To summarize the results from the current study, I found that, in addition to target-perceiver agreement and informant-perceiver agreement (both of which are based on the more traditional approach used to assess other-knowledge), well-acquainted friends achieve two types of pragmatic other-knowledge. Specifically, using both the profile-based and trait-based approach, I found that friends have accurate perceptions of targets' self-views and others' views of targets (i.e., identity and reputation accuracy). In addition, even after controlling for friends' own perceptions of targets, friends are able to predict targets' self-views (i.e., identity insight) using both analytical approaches. However, again when controlling for friends' own perceptions, friends are only able to predict targets' reputations (i.e., reputation insight) at the idiographic (profile) level of analysis, with the exception of achieving reputation insight for the trait of conscientiousness when using the trait-based approach. At a glance, informant-perceiver agreement appears to be higher than target-perceiver agreement for extraversion, agreeableness, neuroticism, and openness, which suggests that it may be more difficult to achieve insight into reputation than identity because perceivers seem to agree more with others' than targets' views. Put another way, there are less discrepant perceptions among perceivers and informants and, thus, fewer opportunities for perceivers to detect differences between others' views and their own. Moreover, the reputation insight finding that emerged with the profile-based approach may have been driven by a single trait (conscientiousness). This possibility highlights the importance of taking multiple approaches when analyzing data, especially for novel constructs.

While identity and reputation accuracy cannot distinguish between knowledge of others' perceptions

at a conscious level and assumed agreement (or similarity), identity and reputation insight are especially valuable constructs because they provide evidence that even people who are well-acquainted can see beyond their own perceptions of one another. Research suggests that people inherently have blind spots about alternative perspectives even when they are motivated to be fair and accurate, but when they are explicitly presented with an opportunity to see someone in a different light, as in the current study, people are more likely to consider other possibilities (Lord et al., 1984). For instance, Lord and colleagues' (1984) "consider the opposite" technique involves actively contemplating alternative, discrepant points of view in the face of a preexisting perception. It is unclear from the current analyses whether people typically juggle multiple perceptions of a target in addition to their own or only contemplate alternative views when prompted to do so. Either way, achieving insight into others' perceptions could lead people to reflect on the accuracy of their own and others' views, and ultimately to knowledge of self- and other-biases. Potentially, continuing this line of research may clarify whether achieving knowledge of others' perceptions is an effective debiasing strategy or perhaps just a tactful way to claim knowing better than others.

Theoretically, acquiring knowledge of others' perceptions has pragmatic value. First, knowing how people perceive themselves can be important for predicting their behaviors in certain situations or for motivating them in ways that could be beneficial for a group (or, more selfishly, for oneself). For instance, being able to put aside one's own views of an employee and seeing him as he sees himself could result in assigning that employee to tasks that would boost his self-confidence in the workplace. Second, knowing how people are perceived by others may be important for a perceiver in terms of re-examining his own views or knowing when to smooth over social situations. For instance, being aware that others have less positive views of one's spouse may lead an individual to make decisions that preemptively protect his spouse's feelings. Thus, simultaneously juggling multiple perspectives could be quite advantageous in navigating through one's social arena from day to day, regardless of the desire to get ahead or get along.

Knowledge of Others' Perceptions May Be Enhanced

I also found that knowledge of others' perceptions depends on characteristics of the individuals within the friendship and the friendship itself.

Gender and gender composition. With respect to gender factors, knowledge of identity (both accuracy and insight) is greater when the target is female, when the perceiver is female, and when the dyad is comprised of two females. Similar to the traditional accuracy findings in the literature (e.g., Chan et al., 2011; Vogt & Colvin, 2003), these results indicate that women tend to be better targets and better judges than men with regard to knowledge of identity; specifically, females' self-perceptions are easier to detect and female perceivers are more likely to accurately infer how targets see themselves, respectively. It is particularly impressive that female perceivers are able to achieve knowledge of identity given that, compared to males, they also have especially high levels of agreement with targets about the targets' personalities (target-perceiver agreement b = .42 and b = .31 for females versus males, respectively, and this difference is statistically significant, χ^2 = 18.16, $p < .05$).

In contrast, knowledge of reputation (both accuracy and insight) is greater when the target is male and, to an extent, when the dyad is comprised of two males. Whereas it was not particularly surprising that females do a better job of understanding their friends' self-views (based on the what is currently known about gender and the accuracy of other-perceptions; Chan et al., 2011), the finding that perceivers seem to do a better job of accurately monitoring others' perceptions of their friends when their friends are male is quite novel. At this point, it is unclear why this gender differential exists. However, in a dating context, one study found that it is easier for a third person to judge the romantic interest of males than females (Place et al., 2009). Place and colleagues (2009) suggest that this may be associated with a biological need for women to be more covert and deceptive in their true romantic intentions whereas it is less risky for men to express their true interests. Although the authors assessed knowledge of another person's romantic interest, their finding could be relevant for the current results – in both studies perceivers were asked to guess what other people think of another person. Given that most targets in the current study

nominated same-sex informants, male targets (whose reputations were more accurately judged than female targets) had reputation measures mostly comprised of other males' perceptions. Thus, it is plausible that inferring a male target's reputation is easier because, like Place and colleagues' (2009) findings, male friends are more willing to be overt in their opinions of another person when in front of outsiders, whereas female friends may be inhibited or worry about the consequences of transparency.

Individual differences. The results indicated that knowledge of others' perceptions may depend on target and perceiver personality traits and attachment orientation, but due to the exploratory nature and large number of moderation tests conducted, I hesitate to make inferences about these findings without replication. Moreover, the current moderation analyses were limited to only using a profile-based approach, but findings from a trait-based approach could indicate that achieving knowledge of others' perceptions depends more on individual Big Five traits and global attachment style than my findings suggest, at least for individual differences associated with the perceiver. That is, it may be the case that a "takes one to know one" or a "takes one to know *who's not* one" model could influence knowledge of others' perceptions by using oneself as a baseline for comparison. For example, it is possible that if Paul is especially neurotic, he will be more attentive to how Tim sees himself and how others see Tim on this particular trait.

Interestingly, a distinction has been made between having perspective-taking ability and using this ability (Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003; Wu & Keysar, 2007), and it is possible that other characteristics beyond individual differences may also moderate knowledge of others' perceptions of personality. Indeed, Wu and Keysar (2007) found that Chinese and Americans can both distinguish between their perspectives and others', yet Chinese are better when it comes to actually taking others' perspectives and utilizing that information. Likewise, cultural differences and contextual factors may also contribute to the understanding of what moderates knowledge of identity and reputation.

Relationship factors. With respect to relationship quality, I found that target-reported quality seems to be important for achieving knowledge of identity whereas knowledge of reputation depends on perceiver-reported quality. Although I cannot infer causal direction, it is plausible that targets

who are happier with the friendship disclose more (or targets who reveal more about themselves become happier with the friendship), thereby enhancing the extent to which perceivers know how targets see themselves. Interestingly, perceivers who are happier with the friendship do not seem to obtain more information from targets than perceivers who are less happy with the friendship, indicating that the ability to achieve knowledge of identity is driven primarily by the target's experience within the friendship.

Rather than probing targets directly for more information about themselves, perceivers who experience higher quality friendships may seek and attend to cues from others about how they see the target, resulting in greater knowledge of reputation. Perhaps this is a way to gauge the accuracy of their own perceptions of the target (e.g., misjudging someone's personality could lead to betrayal or deception), whereas perceivers who experience lower quality friendships are more apathetic and less likely to detect and utilize relevant information from others. I was somewhat surprised by the weak correlation between target- and perceiver-reported relationship quality (r = .21), however previous research has demonstrated that, indeed, friendships are not always reciprocal (Vaquera & Kao, 2008). Some targets in the current study may have been overly positive when assessing the quality of their friendship because they explicitly nominated this person as their "best" friend; in contrast, some of the friends who were nominated may not have viewed the targets as their reciprocal best friends and were less motivated to rate their friendship in the same overly positive manner.

Finally, I found that relationship duration moderates identity accuracy and has a marginally statistically significant effect on identity insight. These results are somewhat consistent with the traditional accuracy literature, which is mixed (some studies find that accuracy increases with duration (Biesanz et al., 2007; Blackman & Funder, 1998) and others do not (Kenny, 2004; Watson et al., 2000)). It is plausible that duration would have a stronger effect on identity insight and knowledge of reputation if participants had not been limited to nominating only best friends who lived locally. Because the current participants were undergraduates and many of their long-term, hometown best friends probably attended other universities in different cities, their local best

friends knew the targets for a relatively short period of time. Indeed, whereas the best friends in the current analyses knew targets for an average of 2.4 years, the hometown friends also nominated by targets knew the targets for an average of 8.2 years.

Limitations and Future Directions

The results I have reported are encouraging with regard to better understanding what people know beyond their own perceptions of others and when they are more likely to achieve knowledge of others' perceptions. Building off of previous research on the accuracy of other-perceptions, meta-cognitive skills associated with self-knowledge, and pragmatic accuracy, the current study may contribute to what is known about pragmatic other-knowledge among well-acquainted individuals. Nonetheless, there are several aspects of this study that could be improved upon.

First, the primary analyses were limited to include only global (Big Five) personality traits. Examining a broader range of individual differences that vary in evaluativeness and valence would provide more information about the extent to which and under what conditions people are likely to achieve knowledge of identity and reputation. Given that higher agreement tends to occur for the Big Five traits than other individual differences (e.g., John & Robins, 1993), it is possible that greater discrepancies in perceptions of characteristics, such as "arrogant" and "likeable," are associated with increased ability to detect such differences – and thus, greater knowledge of others' perceptions.

Second, the current operationalization of reputation might have affected the knowledge of reputation results. Again, because targets could only nominate local best friends, these perceivers may have had a substantial disadvantage when inferring others' perceptions of the targets if targets' general informants tended to be hometown friends who the local best friends never met. It is currently unclear whether perceivers had exposure to the individuals whose perceptions comprised the reputation measure. Relatedly, future studies should disentangle the extent to which perceivers' knowledge of reputation is driven by differential or stereotypical accuracy; that is, do perceivers know how others see targets because they are speculating about specific others or because they generally expect others to apply certain stereotypes to the targets? In addition, the reputation

measure was an aggregate of anywhere from one to five informants' perceptions, which meant that some targets had more reliable reputation measures than others, which could influence the likelihood of accurate inferences about others' perceptions.

Third, my measure of the Big Five may be problematic for making inferences about the extent to which target and perceiver personality moderate knowledge of others' perceptions in multiple ways. Most notably, personality was assessed using self-reports as opposed to an aggregate of self- and other-reports or an alternative, more objective measure. Thus, at best, the various significant moderation effects that emerged could only suggest that knowledge of others' perceptions depends on self-perceptions of personality, not personality itself.

Also, on the one hand, it is possible that the moderation findings for target and perceiver personality are not valid, based on the below adequate alpha reliabilities of the Big Five scale scores (with the exception of extraversion; see Footnote 5). Previous research has demonstrated that shorter measures of the Big Five, such as the Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI; Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003), are considered to be less reliable and correlate less strongly with other variables. Moreover, unlike the TIPI, the psychometric properties of the two-item personality measure used in the current study is not established. Thus, it is plausible that a) using the full 44-item BFI or other multi-item measures of the Big Five or b) using a well-validated shorter measure such as the TIPI, would alter the extent to which my findings indicate that knowledge of others' perceptions depends on target and perceiver personality. On the other hand, shorter measures do reach adequate levels of convergent and discriminant validity, test-retest reliability, and patterns of external correlates (Gosling et al., 2003), and thus it is also possible that the current findings based on a subset of the BFI (the BFI itself being exceptionally well-validated) capture some degree of truth. Importantly, replication using a more psychometrically sound measure of the Big Five will contribute to what is actually known about the moderating effects of personality on this type of other-knowledge. Nonetheless, the primary findings related to knowledge of identity and reputation were not affected by the low alpha reliabilities, as they reflect knowledge of perceptions of personality rather than the predictive validity of personality itself.

Lastly, the validity of the moderation analyses could be improved in three additional ways. With regard to gender factors, a sample comprised more equally of men and women would help in bolstering the moderation results related to gender and gender composition. The subsamples used are unbalanced and having a larger sample of males and same-sex male dyads would provide smaller confidence intervals and more precise estimates of the moderation effects. Next, in terms of individual differences, previous research has demonstrated that other individual differences that are even broader than the Big Five personality traits and attachment style, such as psychological adjustment, also influence accuracy in the traditional sense (e.g., Human & Biesanz, 2011a, 2011b). Thus, it may be worth examining whether achieving knowledge of others' perceptions depends more so on broad psychological constructs such as adjustment and well-being and pervasive characteristics such as narcissism (e.g., narcissists know how others' perceptions differ from their own self-views; Carlson, Vazire, & Oltmanns, 2011) relative to the Big Five and attachment orientation. Finally, regarding relationship factors, it is possible that I limited my ability to detect conditional effects of duration on knowledge of others' perceptions by constraining who targets could nominate as their best friends. That is, because it was specified that best friends must live locally, the range of variation in the relationship duration variable was significantly restricted (consequently, the null moderation effect of duration for knowledge of reputation may have been affected by a reduced correlation).[15]

In addition to improving upon some of the issues I have discussed, another important future direction related to this research involves explicitly studying outcomes associated with achieving knowledge of others' perceptions. Presumably, having this type of other-knowledge will enable people to influence their own or others' behaviors and social situations. Previous research has shown that perspective-taking impacts behaviors in both competitive and cooperative environments (Epley, Caruso, & Bazerman, 2006). Also, perspective-taking is positively associated with creativity (Grant et al., 2011), improvement in romantic relationship functioning (Arriaga & Rusbult, 1998),

[15]For instance, in a separate study, using a different sample of respondents from the same undergraduate population, participants were asked to nominate their best friends with no constraints, which they reported knowing for approximately 5.2 years (as compared to the 2.4 years duration in the current analyses).

and decreases in outgroup bias (Galinsky & Ku, 2004). Similarly, knowledge of identity and reputation of personality traits may be associated with goal-oriented behaviors that promote more successful social transactions, regardless of self- vs. other-focused psychological motives. As such, I believe that an important extension of the present model is to examine how and when such pragmatic knowledge leads to positive interpersonal outcomes (e.g., cooperation and less conflict) in both personal and professional contexts.

Finally, beyond this study, little is known about the meta-cognitive processes that are associated with understanding others' perceptions of personality. Unlike empathic accuracy, in which a perceiver cannot dispute what a target was actually thinking or feeling, a perceiver can disagree with a target and others about a target's actual personality. It is unclear, however, whether people tend to believe that they are accurate (and thus others are biased) when they report that their own views of a target are different from a target's identity and reputation. Understanding whether people think that they are accurate or admit that they are biased in relation to others is an important component of understanding the meta-cognitive mechanisms (e.g., epistemic vigilance (Sperber et al., 2010) and considering-the-opposite (Lord et al., 1984)) that underlie knowledge of others' perceptions and awareness of bias in self- and other-perceptions of personality. As I have demonstrated, people may be inextricably egocentric and aware: they knowingly maintain their discrepant perceptions, even after weighing the validity of alternative views against their own.

References

Ambady, N., Hallahan, M., & Rosenthal, R. (1995). On judging and being judged accurately in zero-acquaintance situations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *69*(3), 518 - 529.

Arriaga, X. B., & Rusbult, C. E. (1998). Standing in my partner's shoes: Partner perspective taking and reactions to accommodative dilemmas. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *24*(9), 927 - 948.

Ashton, M. C., Lee, K., & Paunonen, S. V. (2002). What is the central feature of extraversion? social attention versus reward sensitivity. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *83*(1), 245 - 252.

Back, M. D., Schmukle, S. C., & Egloff, B. (2009). Predicting actual behavior from the explicit and implicit self-concept of personality. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *97*(3), 533 - 548.

Bartholomew, K., & Horowitz, L. M. (1991). Attachment styles among young adults: A test of a four-category model. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *61*(2), 226 - 244.

Bender, I. E., & Hastorf, A. H. (1950). The perception of persons: forecasting another person's responses on three personality scales. *The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, *45*(3), 556 - 561.

Benet-Martnez, V., & John, O. P. (1998). Los cinco grandes across cultures and ethnic groups: Multitrait-multimethod analyses of the big five in spanish and english. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *75*(3), 729 - 750.

Biesanz, J. C. (2010). The social accuracy model of interpersonal perception: Assessing individual differences in perceptive and expressive accuracy. *Multivariate Behavioral Research*, *45*(5), 853-885.

Biesanz, J. C., & West, S. G. (2000). Personality coherence: Moderating selfother profile agreement and profile consensus. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *79*(3), 425 - 437.

Biesanz, J. C., West, S. G., & Millevoi, A. (2007). What do you learn about someone over time? the relationship between length of acquaintance and consensus and self-other agreement in judgments of personality. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *92*(1), 119 - 135.

Bippus, A. M., & Rollin, E. (2003). Attachment style differences in relational maintenance and conflict behaviors: Friends' perceptions. *Communication Reports*, *16*(2), 113 - 123.

Blackman, M. C., & Funder, D. C. (1998). The effect of information on consensus and accuracy in personality judgment. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *34*(2), 164 - 181.

Borkenau, P. (1988). The multiple classification of acts and the big five factors of personality. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *22*(3), 337 - 352.

Carlson, E. N., & Furr, R. M. (2009). Evidence of differential meta-accuracy: People understand the different impressions they make. *Psychological Science*, *20*(8), 1033 - 1039.

Carlson, E. N., & Kenny, D. A. (2012). Meta-accuracy: Do we know how others see us?. In *Handbook of self-knowledge* (p. 242 - 257). Guilford Press.

Carlson, E. N., Vazire, S., & Furr, R. M. (2011). Meta-insight: Do people really know how others see them?. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *101*(4), 831 - 846.

Carlson, E. N., Vazire, S., & Oltmanns, T. F. (2011). You probably think this paper's about you: Narcissists' perceptions of their personality and reputation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *101*(1), 185 - 201.

Carlson, E. N., Vazire, S., & Oltmanns, T. F. (2013). Selfother knowledge asymmetries in personality pathology. *Journal of Personality*, *81*(2), 155 - 170.

Caruso, E. M., Epley, N., & Bazerman, M. H. (2006). The good, the bad, and the ugly of perspective taking in groups. *Research on Managing Groups and Teams*, *8*, 201-224.

Chan, M., Rogers, K. H., Parisotto, K. L., & Biesanz, J. C. (2011). Forming first impressions: The role of gender and normative accuracy in personality perception. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *45*(1), 117 - 120.

Christiansen, N. D., Wolcott-Burnam, S., Janovics, J. E., Burns, G. N., & Quirk, S. W. (2005). The good judge revisited: Individual differences in the accuracy of personality judgments.

Human Performance, *18*(2), 123 - 149.

Cohen, T. R., Panter, A. T., Turan, N., Morse, L., & Kim, Y. (2013). Agreement and similarity in self-other perceptions of moral character. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *47*(6), 816 - 830.

Colvin, C. R. (1993). 'judgable' people: Personality, behavior, and competing explanations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *64*(5), 861 - 873.

Colvin, C. R., & Bundick, M. J. (2001). In search of the good judge of personality: Some methodological and theoretical concerns. In *Interpersonal sensitivity: Theory and measurement* (p. 47 - 65). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers.

Colvin, C. R., & Funder, D. C. (1991). Predicting personality and behavior: A boundary on the acquaintanceship effect. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *60*(6), 884 - 894.

Connelly, B. S., & Ones, D. S. (2010). An other perspective on personality: Meta-analytic integration of observers' accuracy and predictive validity. *Psychological Bulletin*, *136*(6), 1092 - 1122.

Connolly, J. J., Kavanagh, E. J., & Viswesvaran, C. (2007). The convergent validity between self and observer ratings of personality: A meta-analytic review. *International Journal of Selection and Assessment*, *15*(1), 110 - 117.

Cowden, R. C. (1955). Empathy or projection?. *Journal of Clinical Psychology*, *11*, 188 - 190.

Cronbach, L. (1955). Processes affecting scores on 'understanding of others' and 'assumed similarity.'. *Psychological Bulletin*, *52*(3), 177 - 193.

Davis, M. H., & Kraus, L. A. (1997). Personality and empathic accuracy. In *Empathic accuracy* (p. 144 - 168). Guilford Press.

DeVellis, R. F. (1991). *Scale development: Theory and applications.* Sage Publications, Inc.

Dunning, D., Griffin, D. W., Milojkovic, J. D., & Ross, L. (1990). The overconfidence effect in social prediction. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *58*(4), 568 - 581.

Dymond, R. F. (1949). A scale for the measurement of empathic ability. *Journal of Consulting Psychology*, *13*(2), 127 - 133.

Dymond, R. F. (1954). Interpersonal perception and marital happiness. *Canadian Journal of Psychology/Revue canadienne de psychologie*, *8*(3), 164 - 171.

Eagly, A. H., & Wood, W. (1999). The origins of sex differences in human behavior: Evolved dispositions versus social roles. *American Psychologist*, *54*(6), 408 - 423.

Eccles, J. (2009). Who am i and what am i going to do with my life? personal and collective identities as motivators of action. *Educational Psychologist*, *44*(2), 78 - 89.

Epley, N., Caruso, E., & Bazerman, M. H. (2006). When perspective taking increases taking: Reactive egoism in social interaction. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *91*(5), 872 - 889.

Epley, N., Morewedge, C. K., & Keysar, B. (2004). Perspective taking in children and adults: Equivalent egocentrism but differential correction. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *40*(6), 760 - 768.

Fehr, B. (1996). *Friendship processes.* Sage Publications, Inc.

Fehr, B. (2004). Intimacy expectations in same-sex friendships: A prototype interaction-pattern model. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *86*(2), 265 - 284.

Fiedler, E. R., Oltmanns, T. F., & Turkheimer, E. (2004). Traits associated with personality disorders and adjustment to military life: Predictive validity of self and peer reports. *Military Medicine*, *169*(3), 207 - 211.

Finkenauer, C., & Righetti, F. (2011). Understanding in close relationships: An interpersonal approach. *European Review of Social Psychology*, *22*(1), 316 - 363.

Flynn, F. J., Reagans, R. E., Amanatullah, E. T., & Ames, D. R. (2006). Helping one's way to the top: Self-monitors achieve status by helping others and knowing who helps whom. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *91*(6), 1123 - 1137.

Fraley, R. C., Niedenthal, P. M., Marks, M., Brumbaugh, C., & Vicary, A. (2006). Adult attachment and the perception of emotional expressions: Probing the hyperactivating strategies underlying anxious attachment. *Journal of Personality*, *74*(4), 1163 - 1190.

Fraley, R. C., Roisman, G. I., Booth-LaForce, C., Owen, M. T., & Holland, A. S. (2013).

Interpersonal and genetic origins of adult attachment styles: A longitudinal study from infancy to early adulthood. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *104*(5), 817 - 838.

Fraley, R. C., Waller, N. G., & Brennan, K. A. (2000). An item response theory analysis of self-report measures of adult attachment. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *78*(2), 350 - 365.

Funder, D. C. (1987). Errors and mistakes: Evaluating the accuracy of social judgment. *Psychological Bulletin*, *101*(1), 75 - 90.

Funder, D. C. (1995). On the accuracy of personality judgment: A realistic approach. *Psychological Review*, *102*(4), 652 - 670.

Funder, D. C., & Colvin, C. R. (1988). Friends and strangers: Acquaintanceship, agreement, and the accuracy of personality judgment. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *55*(1), 149 - 158.

Funder, D. C., & Colvin, C. R. (1997). Congruence of others' and self-judgments of personality. In *Handbook of personality psychology* (p. 617 - 647). Academic Press.

Funder, D. C., & Dobroth, K. M. (1987). Differences between traits: Properties associated with interjudge agreement. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *52*(2), 409 - 418.

Funder, D. C., & West, S. G. (1993). Consensus, self-other agreement, and accuracy in personality judgment: An introduction. *Journal of Personality*, *61*(4), 457 - 476.

Furr, R. M. (2008). Framework for profile similarity: Integrating similarity, normativeness, and distinctiveness. *Journal of Personality*, *76*(5), 1267-1316.

Gage, N. L., & Cronbach, L. (1955). Conceptual and methodological problems in interpersonal perception. *Psychological Review*, *62*(6), 411 - 422.

Galinsky, A. D., & Ku, G. (2004). The effects of perspective-taking on prejudice: The moderating role of self-evaluation. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *30*(5), 594 - 604.

Galinsky, A. D., Magee, J. C., Inesi, M. E., & Gruenfeld, D. H. (2006). Power and perspectives not taken. *Psychological Science*, *17*(12), 1068 - 1074.

Goffman, E. (1959). *The presentation of self in everyday life.* Doubleday.

Goldberg, L. R. (1990). An alternative 'description of personality': The big-five factor structure. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *59*(6), 1216 - 1229.

Gosling, S. D., Rentfrow, P. J., & Swann, W. B. J. (2003). A very brief measure of the big-five personality domains. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *37*(6), 504 - 528.

Gottman, J. M., Coan, J., Carrere, S., & Swanson, C. (1998). Predicting marital happiness and stability from newlywed interactions. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, *60*(1), 5 - 22.

Grabill, C. M., & Kerns, K. A. (2000). Attachment style and intimacy in friendship. *Personal Relationships*, *7*(4), 363 - 378.

Graham, T., & Ickes, W. (1997). When women's intuition isn't greater than men's. In *Empathic accuracy* (p. 117 - 143). Guilford Press.

Grant, A. M., Gino, F., & Hofmann, D. A. (2011). Reversing the extraverted leadership advantage: The role of employee proactivity. *Academy of Management Journal*, *54*(3), 528 - 550.

Graziano, W. G., & Tobin, R. M. (2009). Agreeableness. In *Handbook of individual differences in social behavior* (p. 46 - 61). Guilford Press.

Hall, J. A. (1984). *Nonverbal sex differences: Accuracy of communication and expressive style.* Johns Hopkins University Press.

Harms, P., Roberts, B. W., & Wood, D. (2007). Who shall lead? an integrative personality approach to the study of the antecedents of status in informal social organizations. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *41*(3), 689 - 699.

Hofstee, W. K. B. (1994). Who should own the definition of personality?. *European Journal of Personality*, *8*(3), 149 - 162.

Hogan, R., & Hogan, J. (2001). Assessing leadership: A view from the dark side. *International Journal of Selection and Assessment*, *9*(1-2), 40 - 51.

Holmes, D. S. (1968). Dimensions of projection. *Psychological Bulletin*, *69*(4), 248 - 268.

Human, L. J., & Biesanz, J. C. (2011a). Target adjustment and self-other agreement: Utilizing trait observability to disentangle judgeability and self-knowledge. *Journal of Personality*

and Social Psychology, *101*(1), 202 - 216.

Human, L. J., & Biesanz, J. C. (2011b). Through the looking glass clearly: Accuracy and assumed similarity in well-adjusted individuals' first impressions. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *100*(2), 349 - 364.

Izhaki-Costi, O., & Schul, Y. (2011). I do not know you and i am keeping it that way: Attachment avoidance and empathic accuracy in the perception of strangers. *Personal Relationships*, *18*(3), 321 - 340.

Jackson, J. J., Wood, D., Bogg, T., Walton, K. E., Harms, P. D., & Roberts, B. W. (2010). What do conscientious people do? development and validation of the behavioral indicators of conscientiousness (bic). *Journal of Research in Personality*, *44*(4), 501 - 511.

John, O. P. (1990). The 'big five' factor taxonomy: Dimensions of personality in the natural language and in questionnaires. In *Handbook of personality: Theory and research* (p. 66 - 100). Guilford Press.

John, O. P., & Robins, R. W. (1993). Determinants of interjudge agreement on personality traits: The big five domains, observability, evaluativeness, and the unique perspective of the self. *Journal of Personality*, *61*(4), 521 - 551.

John, O. P., & Srivastava, S. (1999). The big five trait taxonomy: History, measurement, and theoretical perspectives. In *Handbook of personality: Theory and research (2nd ed.)* (p. 102 - 138). Guilford Press.

Judge, T. A., Heller, D., & Mount, M. K. (2002). Five-factor model of personality and job satisfaction: A meta-analysis. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *87*(3), 530 - 541.

Judge, T. A., Piccolo, R. F., & Kosalka, T. (2009). The bright and dark sides of leader traits: A review and theoretical extension of the leader trait paradigm. *The Leadership Quarterly*, *20*(6), 855 - 875.

Kenny, D. A. (1991). A general model of consensus and accuracy in interpersonal perception. *Psychological Review*, *98*(2), 155 - 163.

Kenny, D. A. (1994). *Interpersonal perception: A social relations analysis.* Guilford Press.

Kenny, D. A. (2004). Person: A general model of interpersonal perception. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, *8*(3), 265 - 280.

Kenny, D. A., & Acitelli, L. K. (2001). Accuracy and bias in the perception of the partner in a close relationship. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *80*(3), 439 - 448.

Kenny, D. A., Albright, L., Malloy, T. E., & Kashy, D. A. (1994). Consensus in interpersonal perception: Acquaintance and the big five. *Psychological Bulletin*, *116*(2), 245 - 258.

Kenny, D. A., Bond, C. F. J., Mohr, C. D., & Horn, E. M. (1996). Do we know how much people like one another?. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *71*(5), 928 - 936.

Kenny, D. A., & DePaulo, B. M. (1993). Do people know how others view them? an empirical and theoretical account. *Psychological Bulletin*, *114*(1), 145 - 161.

Kenny, D. A., & West, T. V. (2010). Similarity and agreement in self- and other perception: A meta-analysis. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, *14*(2), 196 - 213.

Keysar, B., Lin, S., & Barr, D. J. (2003). Limits on theory of mind use in adults. *Cognition*, *89*(1), 25 - 41.

Klein, K. J. K., & Hodges, S. D. (2001). Gender differences, motivation, and empathic accuracy: When it pays to understand. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *27*(6), 720 - 730.

Kolar, D. W., Funder, D. C., & Colvin, C. R. (1996). Comparing the accuracy of personality judgments by the self and knowledgeable others. *Journal of Personality*, *64*(2), 311 - 337.

Krueger, J., & Clement, R. W. (1994). The truly false consensus effect: An ineradicable and egocentric bias in social perception. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *67*(4), 596 - 610.

Laing, R. D., Phillipson, H., & Lee, A. R. (1966). *Interpersonal perception: A theory and a method of research.* Springer.

Leising, D., Gallrein, A.-M. B., & Dufner, M. (2014). Judging the behavior of people we know: Objective assessment, confirmation of preexisting views, or both?. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *40*(2), 153 - 163.

Leith, K. P., & Baumeister, R. F. (1998). Empathy, shame, guilt, and narratives of interpersonal

conflicts: Guilt-prone people are better at perspective taking. *Journal of Personality*, *66*(1), 1 - 37.

Letzring, T. D. (2008). The good judge of personality: Characteristics, behaviors, and observer accuracy. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *42*(4), 914 - 932.

Letzring, T. D., Wells, S. M., & Funder, D. C. (2006). Information quantity and quality affect the realistic accuracy of personality judgment. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *91*(1), 111 - 123.

Lord, C. G., Lepper, M. R., & Preston, E. (1984). Considering the opposite: A corrective strategy for social judgment. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *47*(6), 1231 - 1243.

Luo, S., & Snider, A. G. (2009). Accuracy and biases in newlyweds' perceptions of each other: Not mutually exclusive but mutually beneficial. *Psychological Science*, *20*(11), 1332 - 1339.

Markiewicz, D., Doyle, A. B., & Brendgen, M. (2001). The quality of adolescents' friendships: Associations with mothers' interpersonal relationships, attachments to parents and friends, and prosocial behaviors. *Journal of Adolescence*, *24*(4), 429 - 445.

Marks, G., & Miller, N. (1987). Ten years of research on the false-consensus effect: An empirical and theoretical review. *Psychological Bulletin*, *102*(1), 72 - 90.

Mayseless, O., Sharabany, R., & Sagi, A. (1997). Attachment concerns of mothers as manifested in parental, spousal, and friendship relationships. *Personal Relationships*, *4*(3), 255 - 269.

McCrae, R. R. (1993). Agreement of personality profiles across observers. *Multivariate Behavioral Research*, *28*(1), 25 - 40.

McCrae, R. R. (2008). A note on some measures of profile agreement. *Journal of Personality Assessment*, *90*(2), 105 - 109.

McCrae, R. R., & Costa, P. T. (1987). Validation of the five-factor model of personality across instruments and observers. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *52*(1), 81 - 90.

McCrae, R. R., Costa, P. T. J., Martin, T. A., Oryol, V. E., Rukavishnikov, A. A., Senin, I. G., ... Urbnek, T. (2004). Consensual validation of personality traits across cultures. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *38*(2), 179 - 201.

Mehl, M. R., Pennebaker, J. W., Crow, D. M., Dabbs, J., & Price, J. H. (2001). The electronically activated recorded (ear): A device for sampling naturalistic daily activities and conversations. *Behavior Research Methods, Instruments & Computers*, *33*(4), 517 - 523.

Mehl, M. R., Vazire, S., Ramrez-Esparza, N., Slatcher, R. B., & Pennebaker, J. W. (2007). Are women really more talkative than men?. *Science*, *317*(5834), 82.

Mikulincer, M., & Selinger, M. (2001). The interplay between attachment and affiliation systems in adolescents' same-sex friendships: The role of attachment style. *Journal of Social and Personal Relationships*, *18*(1), 81 - 106.

Mount, M. K., Barrick, M. R., & Stewart, G. L. (1998). Five-factor model of personality and performance in jobs involving interpersonal interactions. *Human Performance*, *11*(2-3), 145 - 165.

Murphy, N. A., Hall, J. A., & Colvin, C. R. (2003). Accurate intelligence assessments in social interactions: Mediators and gender effects. *Journal of Personality*, *71*(3), 465 - 493.

Neff, L. A., & Karney, B. R. (2005). To know you is to love you: The implications of global adoration and specific accuracy for marital relationships. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *88*(3), 480 - 497.

Nunnally, J. C. (1967). *Psychometric theory.* McGraw-Hill.

Piaget, J., Gabain, M., & Gabain, R. (1959). *The language and thought of the child (3rd ed.).* Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group.

Place, S. S., Todd, P. M., Penke, L., & Asendorpf, J. B. (2009). The ability to judge the romantic interest of others. *Psychological Science*, *20*(1), 22 - 26.

Roberts, B. W., Jackson, J. J., Fayard, J. V., Edmonds, G., & Meints, J. (2009). Conscientiousness. In *Handbook of individual differences in social behavior* (p. 369 - 381). Guilford Press.

Robinson, J. P., Shaver, P. R., & Wrightsman, L. S. (1991). *Measures of personality and social psychological attitudes.* Academic Press.

Ross, L., Greene, D., & House, P. (1977). The false consensus effect: An egocentric bias in social

perception and attribution processes. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *13*(3), 279 - 301.

Salovey, P., & Mayer, J. D. (1990). Emotional intelligence. *Imagination, Cognition, and Personality*, *9*, 185-211.

Simms, L. J., Zelazny, K., Yam, W. H., & Gros, D. F. (2010). Self-informant agreement for personality and evaluative person descriptors: Comparing methods for creating informant measures. *European Journal of Personality*, *24*(3), 207 - 221.

Simpson, J. A., Ickes, W., & Blackstone, T. (1995). When the head protects the heart: Empathic accuracy in dating relationships. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *69*(4), 629 - 641.

Simpson, J. A., Ickes, W., & Grich, J. (1999). When accuracy hurts: Reactions of anxiousambivalent dating partners to a relationship-threatening situation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *76*(5), 754 - 769.

Simpson, J. A., Rholes, W. S., & Winterheld, H. A. (2010). Attachment working models twist memories of relationship events. *Psychological Science*, *21*(2), 252 - 259.

Simpson, J. A., Winterheld, H. A., Rholes, W. S., & Oria, M. M. (2007). Working models of attachment and reactions to different forms of caregiving from romantic partners. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *93*(3), 466 - 477.

Smith, T. W., Uchino, B. N., Berg, C. A., Florsheim, P., Pearce, G., Hawkins, M., ... Yoon, H.-C. (2008). Associations of self-reports versus spouse ratings of negative affectivity, dominance, and affiliation with coronary artery disease: Where should we look and who should we ask when studying personality and health?. *Health Psychology*, *27*(6), 676 - 684.

Solomon, B. C., & Vazire, S. (2014). You are so beautiful to me... seeing beyond biases and achieving accuracy in romantic relaitonships. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*.

Spain, J. S., Eaton, L. G., & Funder, D. C. (2000). Perspectives on personality: The relative accuracy of self versus others for the prediction of emotion and behavior. *Journal of Personality*, *68*(5), 837 - 867.

Sperber, D., Clment, F., Heintz, C., Mascaro, O., Mercier, H., Origgi, G., & Wilson, D. (2010). Epistemic vigilance. *Mind & Language*, *25*(4), 359 - 393.

Srivastava, S., Guglielmo, S., & Beer, J. S. (2010). Perceiving others personalities: Examining the dimensionality, assumed similarity to the self, and stability of perceiver effects. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *98*(3), 520 - 534.

Swann, W. B. (1984). Quest for accuracy in person perception: A matter of pragmatics. *Psychological Review*, *91*(4), 457 - 477.

Swann, W. B. (1996). *Self-traps: The elusive quest for higher self-esteem.* W H Freeman/Times Books/ Henry Holt & Co.

Swann, W. B., & Gill, M. J. (1997). Confidence and accuracy in person perception: Do we know what we think we know about our relationship partners?. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *73*(4), 747 - 757.

Taft, R. (1955). The ability to judge people. *Psychological Bulletin*, *52*(1), 1 - 23.

Taft, R. (1966). Accuracy of empathic judgments of acquaintances and strangers. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *3*(5), 600 - 604.

Tennie, C., Frith, U., & Frith, C. D. (2010). Reputation management in the age of the world-wide web. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, *14*(11), 482 - 488.

Thatcher, S. M. B., & Greer, L. L. (2008). Does it really matter if you recognize who i am? the implications of identity comprehension for individuals in work teams. *Journal of Management*, *34*(1), 5 - 24.

Vaquera, E., & Kao, G. (2008). Do you like me as much as i like you? friendship reciprocity and its effects on school outcomes among adolescents. *Social Science Research*, *37*(1), 55 - 72.

Vazire, S. (2006). Informant reports: A cheap, fast, and easy method for personality assessment. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *40*(5), 472 - 481.

Vazire, S. (2010). Who knows what about a person? The self-other knowledge asymmetry (SOKA) model. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *98*(2), 281 - 300.

Vazire, S., & Carlson, E. N. (2010). Self-knowledge of personality: Do people know themselves?.

Social and Personality Psychology Compass, *4*(8), 605 - 620.

Vazire, S., & Mehl, M. R. (2008). Knowing me, knowing you: The accuracy and unique predictive validity of self-ratings and other-ratings of daily behavior. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *95*(5), 1202 - 1216.

Vazire, S., & Solomon, B. C. (2014). Self- and other-knowledge of personality. In M. L. Cooper & R. J. Larsen (Eds.), *Handbook of personality processes and individual differences.* Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Vernon, P. E. (1933). Some characteristics of the good judge of personality. *The Journal of Social Psychology*, *4*, 42 - 58.

Vogt, D. S., & Colvin, C. R. (2003). Interpersonal orientation and the accuracy of personality judgements. *Journal of Personality*, *71*(2), 267 - 295.

Watson, D., Hubbard, B., & Wiese, D. (2000). Selfother agreement in personality and affectivity: The role of acquaintanceship, trait visibility, and assumed similarity. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *78*(3), 546 - 558.

Widiger, T. A. (2009). Neuroticism. In *Handbook of individual differences in social behavior* (p. 129 - 146). Guilford Press.

Wiggins, J. S., & Trapnell, P. D. (1996). A dyadic-interactional perspective on the five-factor model. In *The five-factor model of personality: Theoretical perspectives* (p. 88 - 162). Guilford Press.

Wilt, J., & Revelle, W. (2009). Extraversion. In *Handbook of individual differences in social behavior* (p. 27 - 45). Guilford Press.

Wood, D., Harms, P., & Vazire, S. (2010). Perceiver effects as projective tests: What your perceptions of others say about you. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *99*(1), 174 - 190.

Wu, S., & Keysar, B. (2007). The effect of culture on perspective taking. *Psychological Science*, *18*(7), 600 - 606.

Appendix A

Full Equations for the Knowledge of Others' Perceptions (KOP) Model

$$TI_{ijk} = \beta_{0ij} + \beta_{1ij}PI_{ijk} + \beta_{2ij}POther_{ijk} + \epsilon_{ijk} \quad (1)$$

$$\beta_{0ij} = \beta_{00} + \mu_{0i} + \mu_{0j} \quad (2)$$

$$\beta_{1ij} = \beta_{10} + \beta_{11}Mod_{ijl} + \mu_{1i} + \mu_{1j} \quad (3)$$

These equations specify the model used for knowledge of identity. Because the equations for examining identity insight using the profile-based approach are the most complex, I detail them here and conclude with a description for how to adapt the model to examine identity accuracy, reputation accuracy, and reputation insight, as well as how to apply the trait-based approach for assessing each type of knowledge.

In the model above, TI_{ijk} (the dependent variable) corresponds to the distinctive identity (self-perception) of Target i in Dyad j on item k after grand mean centering within item (centered validity measures produce estimates that are easier to interpret; ?, ?). The intercept is represented by β_{0ij}. PI_{ijk} represents the perceived identity rating of Target i in Dyad j on item k (reported by Target i's perceiver). β_{1ij} is the regression coefficient for the distinctive identity insight slope: the relationship between the perceived identity rating of Target i in Dyad j on item k and Target i in Dyad j's distinctive identity measure on the same item k, with the normative profile (i.e., the mean target self-perception for item k) partialled out. $POther_{ijk}$ represents the other-perception (the perceiver's own perception) of Target i in Dyad j on item k. β_{2ijk} is the regression coefficient for the target-perceiver agreement slope: the relationship between the perceiver's own perception of Target i in Dyad j on item k and the distinctive identity of Target i in Dyad j on the same item k, with the normative profile (i.e., the mean target self-perception for item k) partialled out. The intercept is allowed to vary across dyads and items. β_{00} reflects the average levels (i.e., fixed effects) of distinctive target identity. I allowed the slope for PI_{ijk} to vary randomly by item. β_{10} reflects the average level of distinctive identity insight holding the group level predictor constant at its mean. I had no theory to support allowing the slopes for PI_{ijk} to vary randomly by dyad, and

given that I examine dyad effects in the analyses of dyad-level moderators, I report the results for the more parsimonious models (i.e., varying slopes by item only).

To examine potential individual-level moderators (e.g., target gender and perceiver gender), individual-level variable l is entered as a moderator of the identity insight slope. In equation 3, Mod_{ijl} is Target i in Dyad j's score on moderator l (which could reflect characteristics of the target or the perceiver). In equation 3, β_{11} is the regression coefficient for individual-level variable l moderating distinctive identity insight. A positive interaction between variable l and the perceived identity rating of Target i predicting Target i's distinctive identity (or a positive value for β_{11}) would indicate that individuals higher in variable l are more likely to achieve distinctive identity insight. Because variable l reflects a characteristic of either the target or the perceiver, a positive value for β_{11} would indicate that either (a) targets higher in variable l are more likely to facilitate distinctive identity insight for the perceiver or (b) perceivers higher in variable l are more likely to achieve distinctive identity insight. In equation 3, μ_{1i} reflects target-perceiver random effects for distinctive identity insight main effects averaged across targets. μ_{1j} reflects dyad random effects for distinctive identity insight main effects averaged across targets. A similar approach was used to examine dyad-level moderators (e.g., relationship duration) of distinctive identity insight. Rather than entering an individual-level factor l as a moderator of the identity insight slope, these variables were replaced with dyad-level factors and the models estimated between-dyad effects.

To adapt the KOP model for assessing accuracy (rather than insight), I simply excluded the component controlling for perceivers' own perceptions of targets ($POther_{ijk}$) from equation 1. To adapt the KOP model for assessing knowledge of reputation, I replaced the dependent variable TI_{ijk} with TR_{ijk} (reflecting targets' actual reputations with the normative reputation profile partialled out). Then, I replaced $\beta_{1ij}PI_{ijk}$ with $\beta_{1ij}PR_{ijk}$ (reflecting perceivers' perceived reputation ratings). The models for examining knowledge of others' perceptions using the trait-based approach are the same as the models described using the profile-based approach except that the variation in item k is not accounted for because knowledge of others' perceptions are examined one trait at a time.

Appendix B

Perceived Relationship Quality Items

Each of the following items were assessed on 7-point Likert-type scales.

1. How close (in terms of your relationship) are you to this person? (1 = *Not at all close*, 7 = *Extremely close*)

2. How important is your relationship with this person? (1 = *Not at all important*, 7 = *Extremely important*)

3. How would you rate the quality of your relationship with this person? (1 = *Not good*, 7 = *Extremely good*)

4. How much do you like this person? (1 = *Not at all*, 7 = *Very much*)

5. How satisfied are you with your relationship with this person? (1 = *Not at all satisfied*, 7 = *Extremely satisfied*)

Supplemental Material

The remainder of this document includes all of the supplemental material referenced in the main text.

The alpha reliabilities for each primary measure for each Big Five trait are listed below.

Extraversion
Primary participant/best friend reported **Identity**: .78/.83
Primary participant/best friend reported **Other-perception**: .82/.77
Primary participant/best friend reported **Perceived Identity**: .80/.78
General Informant reported **Reputation**: .78
Best friend reported Perceived **Reputation**: .84

Agreeableness
Primary participant/best friend reported **Identity**: .57/.58
Primary participant/best friend reported **Other-perception**: .71/.74
Primary participant/best friend reported **Perceived Identity**: .71/.66
General Informant reported **Reputation**: .75
Best friend reported Perceived **Reputation**: .79

Conscientiousness
Primary participant/best friend reported **Identity**: .63/.54
Primary participant/best friend reported **Other-perception**: .63/.64
Primary participant/best friend reported **Perceived Identity**: .52/ .51
General Informant reported **Reputation**: .63
Best friend reported Perceived **Reputation**: .75

Neuroticism
Primary participant/best friend reported **Identity**: .69/.67
Primary participant/best friend reported **Other-perception**: .72/.68
Primary participant/best friend reported **Perceived Identity**: .69/.70
General Informant reported **Reputation**: .71
Best friend reported Perceived **Reputation**: .75

Openness
Primary participant/best friend reported **Identity**: .62/.70
Primary participant/best friend reported **Other-perception**: .62/.66
Primary participant/best friend reported **Perceived Identity**: .53/.65
General Informant reported **Reputation**: .65
Best friend reported Perceived **Reputation**: .70

Table SM-1 *Correlation Matrices*

Extraversion

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1. Identity	1.00				
2. Other-perception	.62∗	1.00			
3. Perceived identity	.63∗	.84∗	1.00		
4. Reputation	.66∗	.61∗	.58∗	1.00	
5. Perceived reputation	.59∗	.94∗	.81∗	.60∗	1.00

Agreeableness

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1. Identity	1.00				
2. Other-perception	.41∗	1.00			
3. Perceived identity	.41∗	.65∗	1.00		
4. Reputation	.34∗	.41∗	.31∗	1.00	
5. Perceived reputation	.38∗	.88∗	.61∗	.38∗	1.00

Conscientiousness

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1. Identity	1.00				
2. Other-perception	.33∗	1.00			
3. Perceived identity	.42∗	.81∗	1.00		
4. Reputation	.34∗	.43∗	.40∗	1.00	
5. Perceived reputation	.35∗	.89∗	.78∗	.45∗	1.00

Neuroticism

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1. Identity	1.00				
2. Other-perception	.50∗	1.00			
3. Perceived identity	.53∗	.79∗	1.00		
4. Reputation	.56∗	.49∗	.46∗	1.00	
5. Perceived reputation	.42∗	.80∗	.63∗	.34∗	1.00

Openness

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1. Identity	1.00				
2. Other-perception	.31∗	1.00			
3. Perceived identity	.34∗	.85∗	1.00		
4. Reputation	.24∗	.31∗	.25∗	1.00	
5. Perceived reputation	.30∗	.81∗	.76∗	.27∗	1.00

Note. For all correlation matrices, $*$ denotes $p < .05$ (two-tailed test).

Table SM-2

Results of Moderation Analyses for Identity Accuracy Using Individual-Level Factors

Perceived Identity	0.32∗	0.32∗	0.46∗	0.47∗	0.41∗	0.41∗	0.41∗	0.41∗
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Target Gender	0.15∗							
	(0.04)							
Perceiver Gender		0.09∗						
		(0.04)						
Target Quality			0.11∗					
			(0.03)					
Perceiver Quality				−0.02				
				(0.03)				
Target Anxiety					−0.06∗			
					(0.01)			
Target Avoidance						−0.12∗		
						(0.01)		
Perceiver Anxiety							0.05∗	
							(0.01)	
Perceiver Avoidance								0.02
								(0.01)
Perceived Identity × Target Gender	0.12∗							
	(0.03)							
Perceived Identity × Perceiver Gender		0.11∗						
		(0.03)						
Perceived Identity × Target Quality			0.05∗					
			(0.02)					
Perceived Identity × Perceiver Quality				0.01				
				(0.02)				
Perceived Identity × Target Anxiety					−0.03∗			
					(0.01)			
Perceived Identity × Target Avoidance						−0.04∗		
						(0.01)		
Perceived Identity × Perceiver Anxiety							0.02∗	
							(0.01)	
Perceived Identity × Perceiver Avoidance								0.02
								(0.01)

Note. Table reports the regression coefficients for the independent variables used in the moderation analyses and for the interaction terms. Standard errors in parentheses. For all values, * $p < .05$ (two-tailed test).

Table SM-3

Results of Moderation Analyses for Identity Accuracy Using Individual-Level Factors (continued)

Perceived Identity	0.41∗	0.41∗	0.41∗	0.41∗	0.40∗
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Perceiver Ext	−0.09∗				
	(0.01)				
Perceiver Agr		−0.06∗			
		(0.01)			
Perceiver Con			−0.03∗		
			(0.01)		
Perceiver Neu				−0.01	
				(0.01)	
Perceiver Ope					−0.08∗
					(0.01)
Perceived Identity × Perceiver Ext	−0.03∗				
	(0.01)				
Perceived Identity × Perceiver Agr		0.00			
		(0.01)			
Perceived Identity × Perceiver Con			−0.01		
			(0.01)		
Perceived Identity × Perceiver Neu				−0.01	
				(0.01)	
Perceived Identity × Perceiver Ope					0.02†
					(0.01)

Note. Table reports the regression coefficients for the independent variables used in the moderation analyses and for the interaction terms. Standard errors in parentheses. Ext = Extraversion, Agr = Agreeableness, Con = Conscientiousness, Neu = Neuroticism, and Ope = Openness. For all values, * $p < .05$, † $p < .10$ (two-tailed test).

Table SM-4

Results of Moderation Analyses for Identity Insight Using Individual-Level Factors

Perceived Identity	0.19∗	0.19∗	0.31∗	0.30∗	0.27∗	0.27∗	0.27∗	0.27∗
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Other-Perception	0.17∗	0.17∗	0.20∗	0.22∗	0.18∗	0.18∗	0.18∗	0.18∗
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Target Gender	0.13∗							
	(0.04)							
Perceiver Gender		0.08∗						
		(0.04)						
Target Quality			0.11∗					
			(0.03)					
Perceiver Quality				−0.05				
				(0.03)				
Target Anxiety					−0.06∗			
					(0.01)			
Target Avoidance						−0.12∗		
						(0.01)		
Perceiver Anxiety							0.05∗	
							(0.01)	
Perceiver Avoidance								0.02
								(0.01)
Perceived Identity × Target Gender	0.11∗							
	(0.03)							
Perceived Identity × Perceiver Gender		0.11∗						
		(0.03)						
Perceived Identity × Target Quality			0.05∗					
			(0.02)					
Perceived Identity × Perceiver Quality				−0.01				
				(0.02)				
Perceived Identity × Target Anxiety					−0.03∗			
					(0.01)			
Perceived Identity × Target Avoidance						−0.04∗		
						(0.01)		
Perceived Identity × Perceiver Anxiety							0.03∗	
							(0.01)	
Perceived Identity × Perceiver Avoidance								0.03∗
								(0.01)

Note. Table reports the regression coefficients for the independent variables used in the moderation analyses and for the interaction terms. Standard errors in parentheses. For all values, * $p < .05$ (two-tailed test).

Table SM-5

Results of Moderation Analyses for Identity Insight Using Individual-Level Factors (continued)

Perceived Identity	0.27∗	0.27∗	0.27∗	0.27∗	0.27∗
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Other-Perception	0.18∗	0.18∗	0.18∗	0.17∗	0.18∗
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Perceiver Ext	−0.09∗				
	(0.01)				
Perceiver Agr		−0.07∗			
		(0.01)			
Perceiver Con			−0.03∗		
			(0.01)		
Perceiver Neu				−0.01	
				(0.01)	
Perceiver Ope					−0.08∗
					(0.01)
Perceived Identity × Perceiver Ext	−0.04∗				
	(0.01)				
Perceived Identity × Perceiver Agr		0.00			
		(0.01)			
Perceived Identity × Perceiver Con			−0.01		
			(0.01)		
Perceived Identity × Perceiver Neu				−0.01	
				(0.01)	
Perceived Identity × Perceiver Ope					0.02†
					(0.01)

Note. Table reports the regression coefficients for the independent variables used in the moderation analyses and for the interaction terms. Standard errors in parentheses. Ext = Extraversion, Agr = Agreeableness, Con = Conscientiousness, Neu = Neuroticism, and Ope = Openness. For all values, * $p < .05$, † $p < .10$ (two-tailed test).

Table SM-6

Results of Moderation Analyses for Reputation Accuracy Using Individual-Level Factors

Perceived Reputation	0.49∗	0.41∗	0.42∗	0.42∗	0.41∗	0.42∗	0.43∗	0.42∗
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Target Sex	0.17∗							
	(0.04)							
Perceiver Sex		0.14∗						
		(0.04)						
Target Quality			0.03					
			(0.02)					
Perceiver Quality				0.05∗				
				(0.02)				
Target Anxiety					−0.03			
					(0.02)			
Target Avoidance						−0.04∗		
						(0.02)		
Perceiver Anxiety							0.00	
							(0.02)	
Perceiver Avoidance								−0.05∗
								(0.02)
Perceived Reputation × Target Gender	−0.09∗							
	(0.04)							
Perceived Reputation × Perceiver Gender		0.01						
		(0.04)						
Perceived Reputation × Target Quality			0.00					
			(0.02)					
Perceived Reputation × Perceiver Quality				0.05∗				
				(0.02)				
Perceived Reputation × Target Anxiety					−0.08∗			
					(0.02)			
Perceived Reputation × Target Avoidance						0.05∗		
						(0.02)		
Perceived Reputation × Perceiver Anxiety							0.02	
							(0.02)	
Perceived Reputation × Perceiver Avoidance								−0.01
								(0.02)

Note. Table reports the regression coefficients for the independent variables used in the moderation analyses and for the interaction terms. Standard errors in parentheses. For all values, * $p < .05$ (two-tailed test).

Table SM-7

Results of Moderation Analyses for Reputation Accuracy Using Individual-Level Factors (continued)

Perceived Reputation	0.41∗	0.41∗	0.42∗	0.42∗	0.42∗	0.42∗	0.42∗	0.42∗	0.43∗	0.43∗
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Target Ext	0.10∗									
	(0.02)									
Target Agr		0.06∗								
		(0.02)								
Target Con			0.01							
			(0.02)							
Target Neu				0.07∗						
				(0.02)						
Target Ope					0.02					
					(0.02)					
Perceiver Ext						0.05∗				
						(0.02)				
Perceiver Agr							0.04∗			
							(0.02)			
Perceiver Con								0.02		
								(0.02)		
Perceiver Neu									−0.01	
									(0.02)	
Perceiver Ope										−0.02
										(0.02)
Perceived Reputation × Target Ext	0.00									
	(0.02)									
Perceived Reputation × Target Agr		0.02								
		(0.02)								
Perceived Reputation × Target Con			−0.04∗							
			(0.02)							
Perceived Reputation × Target Neu				−0.06∗						
				(0.02)						
Perceived Reputation × Target Ope					−0.07∗					
					(0.02)					
Perceived Reputation × Perceiver Ext						0.02				
						(0.02)				
Perceived Reputation × Perceiver Agr							−0.02			
							(0.02)			
Perceived Reputation × Perceiver Con								0.03†		
								(0.02)		
Perceived Reputation × Perceiver Neu									0.03†	
									(0.02)	
Perceived Reputation × Perceiver Ope										0.00
										(0.02)

Note. Table reports the regression coefficients for the independent variables used in the moderation analyses and for the interaction terms. Standard errors in parentheses. Ext = Extraversion, Agr = Agreeableness, Con = Conscientiousness, Neu = Neuroticism, and Ope = Openness. For all values, * $p < .05$, † $p < .10$ (two-tailed test).

Table SM-8

Results of Moderation Analyses for Reputation Insight Using Individual-Level Factors

Perceived Reputation	0.19∗	0.11∗	0.11∗	0.12∗	0.09∗	0.10∗	0.11∗	0.12∗
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Other-Perception	0.34∗	0.34∗	0.35∗	0.33∗	0.36∗	0.36∗	0.35∗	0.34∗
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Target Sex	0.15∗							
	(0.04)							
Perceiver Sex		0.12∗						
		(0.04)						
Target Quality			0.03					
			(0.02)					
Perceiver Quality				0.03				
				(0.02)				
Target Anxiety					−0.04∗			
					(0.02)			
Target Avoidance						−0.04∗		
						(0.02)		
Perceiver Anxiety							0.01	
							(0.02)	
Perceiver Avoidance								−0.03
								(0.02)
Perceived Reputation × Target Gender	−0.09∗							
	(0.04)							
Perceived Reputation × Perceiver Gender		0.00						
		(0.04)						
Perceived Reputation × Target Quality			−0.01					
			(0.02)					
Perceived Reputation × Perceiver Quality				0.04∗				
				(0.02)				
Perceived Reputation × Target Anxiety					−0.07∗			
					(0.02)			
Perceived Reputation × Target Avoidance						0.06∗		
						(0.02)		
Perceived Reputation × Perceiver Anxiety							0.03	
							(0.02)	
Perceived Reputation × Perceiver Avoidance								0.01
								(0.02)

Note. Table reports the regression coefficients for the independent variables used in the moderation analyses and for the interaction terms. Standard errors in parentheses. For all values, * $p < .05$ (two-tailed test).

Table SM-9

Results of Moderation Analyses for Reputation Insight Using Individual-Level Factors (continued)

Perceived Reputation	0.09∗	0.10∗	0.10∗	0.11∗	0.10∗	0.12∗	0.11∗	0.12∗	0.12∗	0.12∗
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Other-Perception	0.36∗	0.35∗	0.36∗	0.34∗	0.35∗	0.34∗	0.35∗	0.34∗	0.35∗	0.35∗
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Target Ext	0.10∗									
	(0.02)									
Target Agr		0.06∗								
		(0.02)								
Target Con			0.02							
			(0.02)							
Target Neu				0.05∗						
				(0.02)						
Target Ope					0.01					
					(0.02)					
Perceiver Ext						0.05∗				
						(0.02)				
Perceiver Agr							0.04∗			
							(0.02)			
Perceiver Con								0.02		
								(0.02)		
Perceiver Neu									−0.01	
									(0.02)	
Perceiver Ope										−0.02
										(0.02)
Perceived Reputation × Target Ext	0.00									
	(0.02)									
Perceived Reputation × Target Agr		0.01								
		(0.02)								
Perceived Reputation × Target Con			−0.05∗							
			(0.02)							
Perceived Reputation × Target Neu				−0.04∗						
				(0.02)						
Perceived Reputation × Target Ope					−0.07∗					
					(0.02)					
Perceived Reputation × Perceiver Ext						0.02				
						(0.02)				
Perceived Reputation × Perceiver Agr							−0.03†			
							(0.02)			
Perceived Reputation × Perceiver Con								0.02		
								(0.02)		
Perceived Reputation × Perceiver Neu									0.05∗	
									(0.02)	
Perceived Reputation × Perceiver Ope										0.00
										(0.02)

Note. Table reports the regression coefficients for the independent variables used in the moderation analyses and for the interaction terms. Standard errors in parentheses. Ext = Extraversion, Agr = Agreeableness, Con = Conscientiousness, Neu = Neuroticism, and Ope = Openness. For all values, * $p < .05$, † $p < .10$ (two-tailed test).

Table SM-10

Results of Moderation Analyses for Identity Accuracy Using Dyad-Level Factors

Perceived Identity	0.31∗	0.41∗
	(0.04)	(0.03)
Opposite-sex Dyad	0.11	
	(0.06)	
Same-sex Female Dyad	0.17∗	
	(0.04)	
Duration		0.01
		(0.02)
Perceived Identity × Opposite-sex Dyad	0.04	
	(0.04)	
Perceived Identity × Same-sex Female Dyad	0.13∗	
	(0.03)	
Perceived Identity × Duration		0.02∗
		(0.01)

Note. Table reports the regression coefficients for the independent variables used in the moderation analyses and for the interaction terms. Standard errors in parentheses. For all values, * $p < .05$ (two-tailed test).

Table SM-11

Results of Moderation Analyses for Identity Insight Using Dyad-Level Factors

Perceived Identity	0.19∗	0.27∗
	(0.04)	(0.03)
Other-Perception	0.17∗	0.17∗
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Opposite-sex Dyad	0.09	
	(0.06)	
Same-sex Female Dyad	0.16∗	
	(0.04)	
Duration		0.01
		(0.02)
Perceived Identity × Opposite-sex Dyad	0.03	
	(0.04)	
Perceived Identity × Same-sex Female Dyad	0.13∗	
	(0.03)	
Perceived Identity × Duration		0.02
		(0.01)

Note. Table reports the regression coefficients for the independent variables used in the moderation analyses and for the interaction terms. Standard errors in parentheses. For all values, * $p < .05$ (two-tailed test).

Table SM-12

Results of Moderation Analyses for Reputation Accuracy Using Dyad-Level Factors

Perceived Reputation	$0.47*$	$0.43*$
	(0.05)	(0.03)
Opposite-sex Dyad	0.13	
	(0.07)	
Same-sex Female Dyad	$0.18*$	
	(0.05)	
Duration		0.02
		(0.02)
Perceived Reputation $\times$ Opposite-sex Dyad	-0.12	
	(0.07)	
Perceived Reputation $\times$ Same-sex Female Dyad	-0.06	
	(0.05)	
Perceived Reputation $\times$ Duration		0.00
		(0.02)

Note. Table reports the regression coefficients for the independent variables used in the moderation analyses and for the interaction terms. Standard errors in parentheses. For all values, * $p < .05$ (two-tailed test).

Table SM-13

Results of Moderation Analyses for Reputation Insight Using Dyad-Level Factors

Perceived Reputation	$0.17*$	$0.12*$
	(0.05)	(0.04)
Other-Perception	$0.34*$	$0.35*$
	(0.05)	(0.05)
Opposite-sex Dyad	0.09	
	(0.07)	
Same-sex Female Dyad	$0.15*$	
	(0.05)	
Duration		0.01
		(0.02)
Perceived Reputation $\times$ Opposite-sex Dyad	-0.12	
	(0.07)	
Perceived Reputation $\times$ Same-sex Female Dyad	-0.06	
	(0.05)	
Perceived Reputation $\times$ Duration		0.01
		(0.01)

Note. Table reports the regression coefficients for the independent variables used in the moderation analyses and for the interaction terms. Standard errors in parentheses. For all values, * $p < .05$ (two-tailed test).