Essays in Modeling the Consumer Choice Process

Taylor Bentley
Washington University in St. Louis

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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS

Olin Business School

Dissertation Examination Committee:
Tat Chan, Chair
Chakravarthi Narasimhan
Young-Hoon Park
Seethu Seetharaman
Raphael Thomadsen

Essays in Modeling the Consumer Choice Process
by
Taylor Baldwin Bentley

A dissertation presented to the
Graduate School of Arts & Sciences
of Washington University in
partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy

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Taylor Baldwin Bentley

Washington University in St. Louis

May 2015
Dedicated to Mom, Dad, Patrick, Alex, and Mikiah.
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Essays in Modeling the Consumer Choice Process

by

Taylor Baldwin Bentley

Doctor of Philosophy in Business Administration

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Professor Tat Chan, Chair

In this dissertation, I utilize and develop empirical tools to help academics and practitioners model the consumer’s choice process. This collection of three essays strives to answer three main research questions in this theme.

In the first paper, I ask: how is the consumer’s purchase decision impacted by the search for general product-category information prior to search for their match with a retailer or manufacturer (“sellers”)? This paper studies the impact of informational organic keyword search results on the performance of sponsored search advertising. We show that, even though advertisers can target consumers who have specific needs and preferences, for many consumers this is not a sufficient condition for search advertising to work. By allowing consumers to access content that satisfies their information requirements, informational organic results can allow consumers to learn about the product category prior to making their purchase decision.

We develop a model characterize the situation in which consumers can search for general information about the product category as well as for information about the individual sellers’ offerings. We estimate this model using a unique dataset of search advertising in which commercial websites are restricted in the organic listing, allowing us to identify consumer clicks
as informational (from organic links) or purchase oriented (from sponsored links). With the estimation results, we show that consumer welfare is improved by 29%, while advertisers generate 19% more sales, and search engines obtain 18% more paid clicks, as compared to the scenario without informational links.

We conduct counterfactuals and find that consumers, advertisers, and the search engine are significantly better off when the search engine provides “free” general information about the product. When the search engine provides information about the advertisers’ specific offerings, however, there are fewer paid clicks and advertisers at high ad positions will obtain lower sales. We further investigate the implications on the equilibrium advertiser bidding strategy. Results show that advertiser bids will remain constant in the former scenario. When the search engine provides advertiser information, advertisers will increase their bids because of the increased conversion rate; however, the search engine still loses revenue due to the decreased paid clicks. The findings shed important managerial insights on how to improve the effectiveness of search advertising.

In the second paper, I ask: how is the consumer’s search for information, during their choice process and in an advertising context, influenced by the signaling theory of advertising? Using a dataset of travel-related keywords obtained from a search engine, we test to what extent consumers are searching and advertisers are bidding in accordance with the signaling theory of advertising in literature. We find significant evidence that consumers are more likely to click on advertisers at higher positions because they infer that such advertisers are more likely to match with their needs. Further, consumers are more likely to find a match with advertisers who have paid more for higher positions. We also find strong evidence that advertisers increase their bids when there is an improvement in the likelihood that their offerings match with consumers’ needs,
and the improvement cannot be readily observed by consumers prior to searching advertisers’ websites. These results are consistent with the predictions from the signaling theory. We test several alternative explanations and show that they cannot fully explain the results. Furthermore, through an extension we find that advertisers can generate more clicks when competing against advertisers with higher match value. We offer an explanation for this finding based on the signaling theory.

In the third paper, I ask: can we model the consumer’s choice of brand as a sequential elimination of alternatives based on shared or unique aspects while incorporating continuous variables, such as price? With aggregate scanner data, marketing researchers typically estimate the mixed logit model, which accounts for non-IIA substitution patterns among brands, which arise due to similarity and dominance effects in demand. Using numerical examples and analytical illustrations, this research shows that the mixed logit model, which is widely believed to be a highly flexible characterization of brand switching behavior, is not well designed to handle non-IIA substitution patterns. The probit allows only for pair-wise inter-brand similarities, and ignores third-order or higher dependencies. In the presence of similarity and dominance effects, the mixed logit model and the probit model yield systematically distorted marketing mix elasticities. This limits the usefulness of mixed logit and probit for marketing decision-making.

We propose a more flexible demand model that is an extension of the elimination-by-aspects (EBA) model (Tversky 1972a, 1972b) to handle marketing variables. The model vastly expands the domain of applicability of the EBA model to aggregate scanner data. Using an analytical closed-form that nests the traditional logit model as a special case, the EBA demand
model is estimated with marketing variables from aggregate scanner data in 9 different product categories. It is compared to the mixed logit and probit models on the same datasets.

In terms of multiple fit and predictive metrics (LL, BIC, MSE, MAD), the EBA model outperforms the mixed logit and the probit in a majority of categories in terms of both in-sample fit and holdout predictions. The results show significant differences in the estimated price elasticity matrices between the EBA model and the comparison models. In addition, a simulation shows that the retailer can improve gross profits up to 34.4% from pricing based on the EBA model rather than the mixed logit model. Finally, the results suggest that empirical IO researchers, who routinely use mixed logit models as inputs to oligopolistic pricing models, should consider the EBA demand model as the appropriate model of demand for differentiated products.
Chapter 1

How Search Advertising Works: A Model of Consumer Information Search in Sponsored and Organic Links

1.1 Introduction

When searching keywords at search engines, consumers often face two lists of search results pointing to web pages relevant to their search query: a list of sponsored links that are paid for by advertisers and a list of organic links which are chosen by the search engine. The common belief is that sponsored search advertising works because it can lead to more qualified prospects, relative to other forms of online advertising, because advertisers can target consumers who have specific needs and preferences. This paper shows that for a significant proportion of consumers, this is not a sufficient condition for search advertising to work. Organic results, which primarily lead users to web pages that provide general information on topics related to the search query, are critical to induce clicks on sponsored links and to convert those clicks into purchases. By allowing consumers to access content that satisfies their information requirements, informational organic results can allow consumers to learn about the product category prior to making their purchase decision, and thus they can make better decisions.

Despite the growth of search advertising, and the fact that up to 95% of consumer clicks occur in the organic section (Jerath et al. 2014), limited research has been conducted to analyze [1]
the role of organic links for sponsored search advertising. This study contributes to the marketing and economics literature by empirically investigating the impacts of informational organic links\(^1\) on consumer behavior in information search, and optimal advertiser bidding strategy, and as a result on the effectiveness of search advertising. Using a micro-level click-through dataset obtained from a search engine, we find empirical evidence that organic results indeed create important value in search advertising. We focus on a commonly searched phrase, “Travel to Jeju Island”\(^2\) in this study. Data shows that the average click activity after the keyword is searched is quite low in sponsored search listing (85\% of searches never click on any of the sponsored links), even though the searched phrase indicates potential purchase interest.\(^3\) Among the 15\% of searches that click on sponsored links during the search process, 61\% click informational organic links, suggesting that organic links may have a major influence on whether consumers will eventually be attracted by sponsored advertisements. To rationalize such search behaviors, we develop a dynamic structural model of consumer search and learning. We assume that when a consumer searches a keyword on a search engine, she may have uncertainty regarding (i) her match value with the search query (e.g. how do I like Jeju Island as a vacation place?) which we refer to as her match value with the “product” and (ii) her match value related to advertisers’ offerings (e.g. are the hotel facilities or the flight schedules that the advertiser offers matching my preferences?). Our search and learning model explains how the two different types of match values interplay and characterizes an optimal search strategy of consumers which is often to find

\(^1\) By “informational organic results” we refer to organic links which are non-commercial. These are websites like Wikipedia, blogs, new articles, etc. which provide information related to the search query. These websites are not retailers, manufacturers, or anyone selling products related to the search query.

\(^2\) Jeju Island is a popular vacation destination in Korea not only for Koreans but also for tourists from other Asian countries.

\(^3\) According to research based on 28 million people in the UK, making a total of 1.4 billion search queries during June 2011, paid search only accounts for 6\% of total clicks from search engines versus organic search at 94\% of clicks (GroupM 2012).
information from informational organic results regarding the search query. We then analyze the search engine’s optimal decision when they can provide the consumer with information related to either (i) the general search query (the “product”), or (ii) the advertisers’ specific offerings.

We use a Bayesian learning model to describe how the consumer updates her belief of her match value related to the product from organic results. To model the search behavior, we assume that the consumer first decides whether to click organic links and (if so) sequentially determines how many organic links to click. Based on the updated belief of her match with the product, she next decides whether to click sponsored links for the opportunity to purchase from advertisers and (if so) how to optimally search based on the position of, and her preference for, each sponsored link on the search results page.

To model search in the sponsored section, we adopt the “ranked search” model (Bentley et al. 2015) to model the situation in which consumers can search through a list of options which have been endogenously ranked (e.g. songs on iTunes, books on the New York Times Best Sellers List, and movies at the box office are all ranked by sales). We use the signaling theory of advertising, which has been tested in the context of search advertising in our previous study (Bentley et al 2015), to model the learning of the match value related to the advertisers’ offerings and the dynamic search process in the sponsored search listing. The signaling theory suggests that advertisers’ optimal strategy of bidding for sponsored link ad positions is monotonically increasing with the advertiser-specific match value averaged across consumers, and consumers will sequentially search and update their beliefs about average advertiser match values during the search process in a manner consistent with such strategy.
We estimate the dynamic model from the search advertising data. One unique feature of the data is that commercial websites are restricted in the organic search listing. Organic links are therefore purely for general information about the search query, allowing us to identify consumer clicks as informational (from organic links) or purchase-oriented (from sponsored links). For an advertiser’s link to be viewed by the consumer, he must bid to be place in the top 5 sponsored link positions. Hereafter, all references to “organic links” refers to informational (non-commercial) organic links. With the estimation results, we are able to quantify the value of organic links for the consumers, advertisers, and search engine. We find that advertisers obtain 19% more sales and search engines receive 18% more revenue, as compared to the scenario without organic links. These findings suggest that organic links are an important factor in reducing consumers’ uncertainty, allowing consumers to learn whether or not they want to purchase the product and thus allowing search advertising to work. Organic links also benefit consumers, as we find that the consumer welfare is improved by 29%. We also find an asymmetric impact, as low ranked advertisers benefit more than their top-ranked competitors in terms of the percentage increase in sales.

Based on the estimation results, we further use counterfactuals to investigate the welfare changes when, in addition to the organic listing, the search engine provides consumers more reliable and precise information. Our first scenario assumes that “free” product information (e.g. pictures and suggested attractions of Jeju Island) is provided, while the second scenario assumes that the information is related to advertisers’ offerings (e.g. pictures and user ratings of hotels on Jeju Island). In both scenarios, we assume that the information is displayed at the top or the side panel of the search results page so that consumers can easily browse the information without incurring search costs. Major search engines such as Google have recently started such practices.
to facilitate the information search for their users, although the impact on search advertising remains unknown. Our policy experiments show opposing results from providing the two types of information. Providing general information related to the product will increase consumer welfare (9%), click-through rates on sponsored links (8%), and firm sales (8%). Providing advertiser-specific information, on the other hand, will reduce the click-through rates (-16%), increase consumer welfare (7%), and although aggregate firm sales increase slightly (1%), sales of advertisers at the top ad position will significantly decline (-15%). We further investigate how advertisers will change their bidding strategy in response to such policy changes, based on the lower and upper bounds of equilibrium bid amounts derived in Varian (2007), to measure the impact of such practices on the profits of advertisers and the search engine. We find that advertiser bids remain relatively constant when the search engine provides free product information, and the search engine’s revenue increases (8%). When the search engine provides free advertiser information, advertisers’ conversion rates will increase, so they will increase their bids; however, the search engine still loses revenue (-6%) due to the decreased click-through rate, including a decrease in click rate (-15%) for the advertiser in the top position, who is paying the most per click. These findings shed important managerial insights on how search engines may improve the effectiveness of search advertising via better information provision to consumers.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss the related literature. We discuss our data in section 3. Section 4 presents the dynamic search and learning model and section 5 discusses model estimation and identification issues. The results are presented in section 6. And we conclude in section 7.
1.2 Related Literature

In recent years, there has been an influx of research aimed at understanding how search advertising works. Rutz and Bucklin (2011) consider the dynamic effect of consumer clicks on sales. Chan et al (2011) study the lifetime value of new customers acquired from search advertising. They show that often sales generated through search advertising will lead to future sales, and this impact on the profitability of firms is large. A large number of empirical studies have documented the effects of ad positions on clicks and purchase conversions (Ghose and Yang 2009, Yang and Ghose 2010, Agarwal et al. 2011, Goldfarb and Tucker 2011, Rutz and Bucklin 2011, Yao and Mela 2011, Chan and Park 2014, Bentley et al. 2014, Narayanan and Kalyanam 2014). The common result is that the number of clicks increases dramatically as advertiser sponsored link moves up in the list. Athey and Ellison (2011) and Chen and He (2011) apply the signaling theory to explain these position effects. They study the optimal bidding strategy of advertisers with heterogeneous products or services competing against each other for search ad positions. Their analyses show that, when consumers who are searching for product information can rationally infer the strategies at equilibrium, advertisers with high average match value will bid more for high ad positions and thus we will observe a separating equilibrium. Bentley et al (2014) empirically test, and find significant support for, the predictions from the signaling theory. We adopt the signaling theory in the paper to model how consumers will optimally click on sponsored links and update their beliefs on the match value of advertisers at different positions. These papers, and the bulk of this literature, have focused on how search advertising affects consumers’ preferences for the advertisers’ offerings; in doing so, they have treated the consumers’ preferences for the product as exogenous. But as we have discussed, the
vast majority of clicks in search advertising occur in the organic section, often on non-commercial links.

Limited work has been done to examine the role and impact of organic listings on consumer search behaviors. Ghose and Yang (2008) analyze how the content of a keyword impacts sponsored search versus organic search, with respect to conversion rates and profitability, differently. They find that keyword characteristics, such as the length and the presence of a retailer, have a stronger influence on organic search. In a later work (Yang and Ghose 2010), they study the impact of search advertising when the advertising firm is also in the organic listings (as a commercial organic link). This is not the case with our data, as commercial firms are restricted from the organic section. Our paper is the first to study the impact of non-commercial organic link information on the effectiveness of sponsored search advertising.

A search engine's goal is to maximize revenue through using an optimal auction mechanism, creating a competitive environment, or designing the best search environment for users. A large collection of theoretical works have detailed how advertisers compete in "position auctions." The seminal paper in Vickrey (1961) is widely adapted to the generalized second price auction format often utilized by search engines. Aggarwal et al (2006), Edelman et al (2007), and Varian (2007) study the optimal bidding strategy of advertisers in a generalized second price auction. Edelman and Ostrovsky (2007) show that the revenue for Yahoo! is 10% lower than optimal due to a flawed design. Because search engines play the role as a platform providing services for both consumers and advertisers, they have an incentive to generate informative and relevant search results for consumers, and also have reason to share the information on keyword performance with advertisers. In a related work, Milgrom and Weber (1982) theoretically show that presenting information about an object being auctioned will increase the revenue for the
auctioneer. In empirical research, Yao and Mela (2011) simultaneously study user search and advertiser bidding behaviors, in order to understand how the auction mechanism and website design impact the search engine’s revenue. Chan and Park (2014) investigate where advertisers derive their value from the consumer search process, and find that the value mainly comes from consumers’ terminal clicks, rather than intermediate clicks or impressions. Their findings have direct implications on what type of performance metrics related to ad positions a search engine should provide to advertisers and how different pricing mechanisms that the search engine adopts will affect the competitive relationship between advertisers at different ad positions. The goal of this paper is similar to the above studies. We estimate a dynamic consumer search and learning model from data, and use the estimation results to help understand how search engines may improve their revenue by providing better information to consumers.

Our study is also closely related to the economics literature of consumer information search. Stigler's (1961) seminal paper introduces the concept that consumers engage in costly search. His model assumes a non-sequential search behavior in which consumers decide an optimal number of alternatives to search before the search starts. McCall (1970) and Mortensen (1970) expand the non-sequential search concept to sequential search, where an optimizing consumer will continue to search if the benefit of doing so outweighs the cost of searching an additional alternative. Weitzman’s seminal paper (1979) studies sequential search in a market with a limited number of alternatives, where consumers optimally decide their search sequences based on the reservation values of alternatives. Our paper adopts his solution concept to model how consumers will dynamically click on sponsored links. In empirical literature, Hortacsu and Syverson (2004) model how consumers search for differentiated products. De los Santos et al (2009) provide a framework to test whether sequential or non-sequential search better describes
consumer search behavior, and find non-sequential search to better fit their data. Honka and Chintagunta (2014) use data on consumer shopping behavior in the U.S. auto insurance industry to identify the search strategy consumers use and argue that larger insurance companies are better off when consumers search sequentially, while smaller companies benefit more when consumers search simultaneously.⁴

1.3 Data

The data for our analysis comes from a leading Korean search engine. It consists of detailed information on more than 1,200 keywords. When a consumer searches one of these keywords, they are presented with a list of five sponsored links, placed at the top of the page, followed by organic listings. The organic links are ordered based on popularity and relevance to the keyword via the search engine's proprietary method. There is no overlap between sponsored and organic links, as links from commercial sellers are explicitly excluded from the organic section. A firm’s link will only be exposed to consumers who search the keyword if it is placed in the sponsored section. Therefore, if a consumer clicks on an organic link, she is gaining information about the search query (the “product”), as opposed to searching for the opportunity to buy from commercial websites.

The search engine uses a page layout similar to Google, Yahoo, and Bing, with sponsored links at the top clearly separated from organic listings placed below. There are no sponsored listings along the side panel, as can be the case with other search engines. The order of the

⁴ De los Santos et al (2009) and Honka and Chintagunta (2014) utilize price data to infer sequential vs. non-sequential search type. We do not have price data, so we assume sequential search as it is generally optimal to non-sequential search.
sponsored listings is determined by a generalized second price auction, similar to other search engines; however, no quality score is applied to impact the ranking. Advertisers are ranked in decreasing order of bids and pay based on the second-price rule. They will pay the price each time a user clicks their link, which is known as the cost-per-click pricing mechanism. We observe from data the identity of each advertiser in the sponsored link section, and the advertiser’s bid amount as well as the price it pays for each click. Previous work that studies consumer behavior on sponsored and organic listings (e.g., Yang and Ghose 2010, Agarwal et al. 2012) often only have data on one firm. In contrast, our data has the complete list of sponsored link options presented to the consumer and the complete sequence of consumer clicks.

In this study, we focus on a single search query, "Travel to Jeju Island." We observe every search made on this keyword in the month of February, 2011. The data provides detailed information on the sequence of clicks made at sponsored and organic links, and the time of the user's click. The information on the sequence of organic clicks is important because it helps us to study the dynamic relationship between organic and sponsored clicks. A search sequence, our unit of observation, will include all of the consumer’s clicks after she searches the keyword.\footnote{If she returns to search at another point, we treat this as a separate sequence. We can track these potential returns using IP address information. As a robustness check, we reestimate the model characterizing a search sequence as all clicks under the same IP address and there is little change to the estimates. To estimate such a model, we need to make the following assumptions: the advertisers are the same for each visit, the individual (or group) searching is the same each time, and consumers remember the information from each previous visit. Given the strength of these assumptions, we will not focus on this specification.}

Advertisers on this keyword are mainly travel agencies, whose primary offerings are guided, all-inclusive tour packages.\footnote{An all-inclusive travel package includes a tour guide, scheduled tour activities, transportation, hotel stays, and food provision. Different from Orbitz or Travelocity who function as a middleman, travel agencies in our data are more similar to Funjet in the U.S.} Organic links lead consumers to web pages including blogs discussing experiences at Jeju Island, Wikipedia-like webpages, news articles, travelers’ itineraries, or
journal entries about their trips. There are also websites providing consumers general travel information and photos about the island and current relevant news articles.

The keyword, "Travel to Jeju Island," provides a useful empirical context for calibrating our model for a number of reasons. First, consumers may have uncertainty regarding their match with the product (i.e. whether Jeju Island is a good fit with their travel preferences). Jeju Island is a popular vacation destination of the cost of South Korea. There are two major cities and a large variety of vacation attractions, including numerous beaches, museums, theme parks, festivals, water sport activities, resorts, and unique foods. It is unlikely that a consumer, even one who has visited Jeju Island in the past, will know everything there is to know about what a trip to Jeju Island may be like. Although they may have learned from other sources that the island is a popular vacation place, they can still be unsure whether it matches with their specific objectives that can be very heterogeneous (e.g. some travel alone, some as couples, and some with families). Because of the uncertainty, consumers may want to read reviews and blogs, see pictures of the island, or learn about popular activities on the island. These information sources are available in the organic section, and may have a significant impact on the choice of Jeju Island relative to traveling to other places. Second, consumers may be unsure of their match with the advertisers’ offerings (e.g. tour packages include visits to different attractions, different prices, different flight options, etc.). Third, the keyword involves a highly-fragmented market with many different advertisers. Consumers are not likely to have full information of the advertisers’ offerings, prior to clicking sponsored links. Further, prices of air tickets, hotels, etc. fluctuate regularly in the travel category; as flights tickets sell out, travel agencies receive discounts on tickets, and flight dates approach, ticket prices change significantly. Consumers are unlikely to have full information on the deals offered, especially with regard to a vacation.
destination, by all commercial websites. Thus, if consumers decide to travel to Jeju Island, there is a significant potential benefit from searching information at sponsored links. Fourth, we observe a large number of searches (19,479 in the month) and active bidding for ad positions, with all five ad positions occupied for the entire month and 19 different advertisers obtaining a position at some point during the month. Finally, the keyword implies some level of consumer purchase intent. "Travel to Jeju Island" suggests that the user is interested in traveling, as opposed to simply looking up facts about the island. If the latter were the case, the user may be more likely to search "Jeju Island" instead. Therefore, “Travel to Jeju Island” is the ideal empirical context for testing our consumer search model.

Table 1.1 provides some summary statistics for the five ad positions. Because of the second-price auction mechanism, an advertiser’s position may change throughout the day as firms alter their bids. We find that the average number of positions for an advertiser is 2.8 per day, with a standard deviation 1.3. The second column in Table 1.1 shows that each ad position has been occupied by many different advertisers. The third column shows that cost-per-click varies significantly across positions, from about US $0.50 for the 5th position to $0.71 for the top position. There is also a large variation in these prices. The fourth column shows that the click-through rate is monotonically declining from the top position (7.7%) to the 5th position (1.7%). When restricted to those searches that start with clicking at least one organic link, the last column of the table shows that the click-through rate is also monotonically declining from the top position (5.6%) to the 5th position (1.5%).

Figure 1.1 provides information on the number of organic links clicked per search, conditional that at least one sponsored or organic link has been clicked. In 50% of such
occasions, a single organic link is clicked, with most consumers clicking fewer than 6 links (96%). The majority of consumers only click on one organic link, then they will either stop the search or click sponsored links. Figure 1.2 reports statistics related to consumer clicking behaviors. The first two bars compare the proportion of searches that click on organic links only versus click on sponsored links only. Even though “Travel to Jeju Island” implies purchase intent, most consumers (85\%)\(^7\) will not click on any of the sponsored links to make purchases. The third and fourth bars compare the proportion of searches that start with clicking organic links versus start with clicking sponsored links. The vast majority (90\%) begin their search in the organic section. Conditional on at least one sponsored link is clicked during the search process, the last two bars compare the proportion of searches that click sponsored links only (39\%) versus start with clicking organic links then click on sponsored links (37\%). Thus, over a third of consumers who click on a sponsored link will begin their search by clicking on organic links. This illustrates that organic links may be very important for attracting consumers to click on advertisers’ links.

\(^7\)85\% is lower than most estimates of sequences without a sponsored link click. This occurs because the search engine restricts commercial websites from the organic section. At Google, for example, a consumer may be interested in purchasing and never click in the sponsored section if they find a desirable commercial website in the organic section. Here, this cannot be the case, as the consumer must click on a sponsored link to view commercial offerings.
Figure 1.1: Organic clicks per search.

Figure 1.2: Clicking behaviors.
Figure 1.3 shows the percentage of consumers who click a sponsored link, conditional on first clicking a number of organic links. For consumers who only click a single organic link, 10% will proceed to click a sponsored link. For consumers who click 5 organic links, 24% will proceed to click a sponsored link. The more organic links a consumer clicks, the more likely that consumer is to click a sponsored link. Now consider consumers who search the keyword, and then return later to search it again.\(^8\) Figure 1.4 provides information on the likelihood that these consumers will click sponsored links conditional on the organic links that they have clicked either in their current search or a previous search. The first two bars indicate that if a consumer clicked an organic link in their first search, their likelihood of clicking a sponsored link in their second search increases from 22% to 26%. The two middle bars indicate that if a consumer did not click an organic link in their first search, then their likelihood of clicking a sponsored link is 10%. The last two bars indicate that if a consumer clicked 3 or more organic links in their first search, then their likelihood of clicking a sponsored link in their second search increases to 25%. The line graph illustrates this trend.

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\(^8\) 50% of repeat searchers do so within an hour and a half, 93.2% do so within a week. For the following statistics, and later analysis with repeat searchers, we remove consumers who began their search either within the first or last week of the observation period.
sponsored link in their second search increases from 14% to 29% if they click an organic link in their return search. The two bars on the right show a similar result, although conditional on the consumer having clicked an organic link in their first search. These results indicate a strong correlation between organic link clicks and the potential for sponsored link clicks.

Figure 1.4: Click behavior in second search.

1.4 The Model

For an overview of the model, consider Figure 1.5. The consumer’s search will evolve in two stages. In the first stage, the consumer can click through organic links to learn about her preference for the product. She will perform a sequential search, and before each click she will decide whether to click an additional organic link or to stop. When she stops, she will have
developed her expected value for the product. If that expected value is high enough, the consumer may then wish to click through sponsored links in the second stage. Here, she will again perform a sequential search; before each click, she decides whether to click her next optimal seller or to stop. When she stops, she can decide whether or not to make a purchase. If she purchases, she will do so from the seller who offers her the highest expected utility.

![Figure 1.5: Model overview.](image)

In this framework, the consumer has two sources of uncertainty. She is uncertain about her match with the product (e.g. what types of food, attractions, scenery, and museums does Jeju Island offer?), and she is uncertain about her match with the different advertisers (e.g. what tours, prices, and flights does each advertiser offer?). The consumer can resolve her uncertainty about the product by clicking on the organic links and she can resolve her uncertainty about the

---

9 While it is possible for consumers to click on sponsored links, then return to the organic section, then move back to sponsored links, this type of click sequence occurs in only 1% of our observations. So, for simplicity in estimation, we remove organic clicks after the consumer has clicked on sponsored links.
advertisers by clicking on the sponsored links. This framework will apply to any keyword in
which consumers have these two sources of uncertainty (e.g. experience goods, fashion goods,
technological products, etc.); more generally, it will also apply to any purchase decision in which
the consumer is uncertain about whether to purchase from the general product category and has
the ability to search for product information prior to deciding from which seller to purchase (e.g.
cars, smart phones, new homes, etc.).

We assume that consumer $i$’s utility for buying from an advertiser at ad position $j$ in the
sponsored link section (advertiser $j$), $U_{ij}$, is the following:

$$U_{ij} = q_i^* + v_{ij}$$

where $q_i^*$ is the (true) value for the consumer that is associated with the “product.” In our
example, the attributes associated with a trip to Jeju Island constitute the product. The product
preference represents what a consumer can expect to experience when making a purchase from
an advertiser. This is heterogeneous across individuals since the product (Jeju Island) has
attributes that appeal differently to different people (i.e. it may be an ideal vacation place for
families but not so for couples). We assume that $q_i^*$ is common for all advertisers. The consumer
may only have limited prior knowledge regarding this value but she can obtain more product
attribute information by browsing web pages linked from the organic results section. We assume
that $q_i^* \sim N(\bar{q}, \sigma_q^2)$ across all consumers who search for the keyword.\(^{10}\)

By purchasing (e.g. buying a tour package) from advertiser $j$, the consumer will obtain a
match value $v_{ij}$ that is individual- and advertiser-specific. $v_{ij}$ represents how the advertiser’s

\(^{10}\) We do not model the choice of keyword, so the distribution of $q_i^*$ represents the population distribution
conditional on having chosen to search the keyword.

[18]
offering differs from the consumer’s expectation about a purchase of a product \( q_i^* \). We specify the match value as

\[
v_{ij} = \mu_{ij} + \xi_j + e_{ij}
\]

where \( \mu_{ij} \sim N(0, \sigma_\mu^2) \) is the consumer’s preference for advertiser \( j \)’s offering that is known prior to clicking on \( j \)’s sponsored link.\(^{11}\) This represents the consumer’s partial knowledge about what advertiser \( j \) may offer (e.g. prior knowledge about prices or flights). Also, the consumer may have a specific preference for the advertiser if she has previously purchased from the firm. \( \xi_j \) represents the average match value across all consumers, and \( e_{ij} \sim N(0, \sigma_e^2) \) measures the individual-specific match value of the advertiser’s offering. The former captures the advertiser’s average match value (i.e. pricing, quality of service, quality of hotels, and travel options with regard to a Jeju Island tour at the time of search), and the latter captures how the offering matches with the consumer’s specific needs (i.e. prices of packages at the time at which the consumer would like to travel, the timing of the available flights relative to the consumer’s preferred flight times). Both components are unknown to the consumer and will only be revealed after the consumer clicks on the sponsored link to browse the advertiser’s website.

If the consumer chooses not to buy from any of the advertisers, we normalize the utility of the outside option to be 0. For “Travel to Jeju Island,” the outside option may include traveling to a different destination (thus the consumer may search other travel-related keywords) or opting not to travel.

\(^{11}\) We assume \( \mu_{ij} \) to be mean 0 for computational simplicity. This is a fragmented market with many small travel agencies. Without this assumption, bidding equilibriums become unclear, and it is not clear what will be gained substantially.
1.4.1 Consumer Learning

1.4.1.1 Prior Beliefs and Learning from Organic Results

We assume that, prior to keyword search, the consumer has a prior belief about her own $q_i^*, q_i^0$. We assume that this prior belief across all consumers is distributed as

$$q_i^0 \sim N(\bar{q}, \sigma_0^2) \quad (1.3)$$

where $\bar{q}$ is the (true) average value across all consumers, $\sigma_0^2$ is the variance in prior beliefs across consumers, and $q_i^0$ is constructed from $i$’s prior information about the product. This assumption implies that consumers are not systematically biased in prior beliefs. The consumer understands that, because of limited information, her prior belief may be incorrect; therefore, her perceived value for $q_i^*$ is modeled as

$$q_i^* \sim N(q_i^0, \sigma_1^2) \quad (1.4)$$

where $\sigma_1^2$ captures the magnitude of the consumer’s initial uncertainty.\(^{12}\)

This modeling construction implies that

$$\sigma_q^2 = \sigma_0^2 + \sigma_1^2$$

We assume $\sigma_0^2 < \sigma_q^2$ because prior preferences based on limited information should be more concentrated than the true heterogeneity. In the example of Jeju Island, most consumers have heard that the island is a fun place to visit, so their prior beliefs may be similar with each other.

\(^{12}\) We assume $\sigma_1^2$ to be common to all consumers. We do not have the data to identify heterogeneity in uncertainty of initial product preference, so we make a reasonable assumption. This assumption will not alter the substantial results unless some correlation between level of uncertainty and $q_i^0$ exists.
However, there are many things that the island offers (e.g. weather, food, activities, expenditures etc.) that some visitors may love and some visitors may dislike. The dispersion of true preferences therefore should have larger variance than the dispersion of prior beliefs. With this setup, prior beliefs and true preferences are positively correlated, i.e., \( \text{cov}(q_i^0, q_i^*) > 0 \), which we believe is a reasonable assumption as the consumers have some sense of the product prior to clicking organic links.

With each organic click, the consumer receives information about her true value, via pictures, blogs, reviews, informative websites, etc.\(^ {13}\) This informs her about \( q_i^* \). Suppose the consumer clicks on an organic link \( k \) and browses the web page. We assume that she will receive a signal about \( q_i^* \). The signal is distributed as follows

\[
S_{ik} \sim N(q_i^*, \sigma_s^2)
\]

where \( \sigma_s^2 \) represents the magnitude of the noise from the signal. As no website can fully reveal every attribute of the product, the information that the consumer obtains will never be perfect; however, as long as there is no systematic bias from organic results, clicking more organic links will reduce the consumer’s uncertainty, and her updated belief will converge to the true \( q_i^* \).

We assume that the consumer knows \( \sigma_1^2 \) and \( \sigma_s^2 \), and updates her belief in a Bayesian manor. The updating process is similar to Erdem and Keane (1996), although in this process the consumer is learning about her true individual preference for the product rather than about the mean preference of the population, \( \bar{q} \). After clicking \( K \) organic links, the updated belief will be

\(^{13}\) The links may either include information about Jeju Island, or information about “travel” to Jeju Island which can inform the consumer about the general costs, difficulties, airlines, and alternative travels options, along with tips and tricks for travelers. In our data, nearly every organic link relates to information about Jeju Island, as opposed to the “travel” information.
\[ q_i^* \sim N(q_{i,K1}, \sigma_{i,K1}^2) \]  

where

\[ q_{i,K1} = q_{i,K1-1} + \frac{\sigma_{i,K1}^2}{\sigma_{i,K1}^2 + \sigma_\delta^2} (S_{ik} - q_{i,K1-1}) \]  

and

\[ \sigma_{i,K1}^2 = \frac{1}{\frac{1}{\sigma_\xi^2} + \frac{K_1}{\sigma_\delta^2}} \]  

Notice that \( \sigma_{i,K1}^2 \) evolves deterministically with each click, and the distribution of potential signals from the \( i \)'s perspective at any click, \( \sigma_{\omega}^2 \), is given by

\[ \sigma_{\omega}^2 \sim N(q_{i,K1}, \sigma_{i,K1}^2 + \sigma_\delta^2) \]  

1.4.1.2 Prior Beliefs and Learning from Sponsored Links

The consumer is also uncertain about how the advertisers’ offerings match with her specific needs and preferences. This uncertainty involves \( \xi_j \) and \( e_{ij} \) from equation (1.2). The advertisers are ranked in the sponsored section, and this ranking was endogenously determined by the bidding strategy of the advertisers. Thus the ranking may provide information to the consumer. We adopt the signaling theory, applied to the search advertising context, to model the consumer’s prior belief of the average match value \( \xi_j \). Consistent with Athey and Ellison (2011) and Chen and He (2011), we assume firm bids are increasing in average match value, \( \xi_j \). Therefore firms are ranked according to average match value, as we assume that \( \mu_{ij} \), the consumer preference for advertiser \( j \) prior to clicking any sponsored links, is averaged at 0 across consumers. Thus, in aggregate, no advertiser has an advantage in generating sales over the others.
if consumers are not informed about $\xi_j$. The incentive of signaling if the advertiser has a high $\xi_j$ will be strong. Our model setup therefore is consistent with the necessary conditions for the signaling theory to work. Bentley et al. (2014) provide significant empirical evidence supporting this theory. They find that advertisers with higher average match values bid more for better positions and will increase their bids when their match value increases. Furthermore, consumers can infer this strategy and are more likely to click higher-ranked links.

To model search with ranking information, we adopt the “ranked search” model (Bentley et al. 2015) to model the situation in which consumers can search through a list of options which have been ranked according to average consumer preferences. We assume that each of 5 advertisers receives a draw of $\xi_j$ from the $N(0, I)$ distribution. Based on these $\xi'$s, advertisers place their bids. Advertisers are then ordered, in position, by their bids; the one with the highest $\xi$ obtains the top position and so forth. We assume that the consumer can rationally infer the advertisers’ bidding strategy and the outcomes. Although she cannot observe the bid amount from each advertiser, she will form her prior beliefs about $\xi'$s based on ad positions. Let $P_t = \{P_{t1}, ..., P_{t5}\}$ be the collection of the ad positions of the five advertisers. The prior expectation of $\xi_j$ for the advertiser at the $j$-th position can be derived from order statistics

$$E[\xi_j|\xi_1 \geq \cdots \geq \xi_j \geq \cdots \geq \xi_5]$$

with the prior variance denoted as $\sigma^2_{j,0} = var(\xi_j|\xi_1 \geq \cdots \geq \xi_j \geq \cdots \geq \xi_5)$.

Upon clicking a link at the $k$-th position, $\xi_k$ (and $e_{ik}$, see equation (1.2)) is revealed. The consumer will update her belief of $\xi_j, j \neq k$. If the $j$-th position is higher than the $k$-th position, the updated expected $\xi_j$ is

[23]
\[ E[\xi_j|\xi_1 \geq \cdots \geq \xi_j \geq \cdots \geq \xi_{k-1} \geq \xi_k, \xi_k] \]  

(1.11’)

That is, given \( \xi_k \), the consumer will form an expectation conditional on the order relationship \( \xi_1 \geq \cdots \geq \xi_j \geq \cdots \geq \xi_{k-1} \geq \xi_k \). Likewise, if the j-th position is lower than the k-th position, the updated expected \( \xi_j \) is

\[ E[\xi_j|\xi_k \geq \cdots \geq \xi_j \geq \cdots \geq \xi_{k-1} \geq \xi_k, \xi_k] \]  

(1.11”)

The variance for \( \xi_j \) will be updated correspondingly. The above updating equations suggest that, given \( \xi_k \), the distribution of \( \xi_j \) is truncated either from below (if the j-th position is higher than the k-th position) or from above (if the j-th position is lower than the k-th position), and the consumer expectation of \( \xi_j \) and its variance are derived from such a truncated distribution that also takes account of the order relationship of \( \xi'_s \) that have not been revealed. If the consumer has clicked more than one link, she will update her expectation and variance in a similar manner.

Let’s consider an example to highlight this updating. Say the consumer expects prices for a Jeju tour to be around $2,000, and let price be the only attribute constituting average match value. So she clicks on the top-ranked firm, expecting it to offer the best price, but she sees that prices are closer to $4,000. Given that this firm is the top-ranked advertiser, it is unlikely that the lower-ranked firms are priced so much lower, at around $2,000. These firms are likely to be priced closer to $4,000, or above, so the consumer will update her expectations. In a standard search model, we would have to impose that the consumer does not update her expectations and still expects advertisers to be priced at $2,000, regardless of what is learned in her first click. In a “ranked search” context, this assumption would be wrong.
The updated expectations and variances, under the normal distribution assumption for \( \xi' \)'s, do not have a closed-form expression. In model estimation, we rely on the simulation method to calculate the updated beliefs. More details will be provided in the model estimation section.

1.4.2 Two-Stage Information Search

The consumer information search process evolves in two stages. In the first stage, the consumer optimally searches in the organic section to learn about the product, and thus her true preference \( q_i^* \). We assume that there is a constant marginal cost of clicking an organic link and browsing the web page, \( c_{org} \). With each click at an organic link, the consumer can decide to either click an additional organic link and remain in the first stage search, or move to the second stage of search. If the consumer moves to the second stage, she will have developed her expected preference for the product. In the second stage, she will decide to either stop the search and leave the search results page (in which case there will be no purchase from any advertisers), or to sequentially choose sponsored links to click for the opportunity to purchase from the advertisers. Suppose she has clicked \( K_2 \) sponsored links and the \( \xi' \)'s and \( e \)'s of those links are revealed. She may leave the search results page (so no purchase will be made), or return to purchase from one of the links that have been clicked which brings her the highest expected utility, depending on which choice has higher expected value. If she has not clicked all sponsored links, she can also choose to click an additional sponsored link for the opportunity to find a better match. We assume that there is another constant marginal cost of clicking a sponsored link and browsing the commercial website, \( c_{spon} \).
We allow $c^{org}$ to differ from $c^{spom}$. The cost of clicking represents the net of the utility and disutility components for each click. For organic clicks, there is a disutility of time, but there may also be a positive utility from reading stories regarding vacation activities or traveling experience or enjoying beautiful pictures of the island. Conversely, browsing a commercial website can be a different experience. The time spent on organizing exactly what time to get a flight to and from the island, to weigh the cost of a layover, and to compare prices etc. can be tedious and longer. In data, the median time spent on an organic click is 89 seconds, and 117 seconds on a sponsored click. The consumer must also consider how much money they are willing to spend on a flight/hotel/car rental, etc. It may take more cognitive resources to complete those tasks. We thus expect the cost of a sponsored click to be greater than the cost of an organic click.

In the remaining part of this section, we will develop the dynamic search model in which the consumer will optimally search for the product-related information and advertiser-specific information in the two stages.

1.4.2.1 First Stage - Organic Clicks

In the first stage, the consumer can resolve her uncertainty about the product. After clicking $K1$ organic links in the first stage, the consumer obtains $K1$ signals and her updated belief will be $q_i^* \sim N(q_{i,K1}, \sigma_{i,K1}^2)$ (see equations (6) to (8)).\(^{14}\) Let $\mu_i = \{\mu_{i1}, ..., \mu_{i5}\}$ be the collection of the consumer’s known preferences for the five advertisers from the top to the lowest position. The

\(^{14}\) K1 can be zero. In which case, the consumer does not have any new information and only holds the prior belief. That is, $q_{i,K1} = q_i^0$ and $\sigma_{i,K1}^2 = \sigma_i^2$. 

[26]
state variables that will determine the optimal search strategy in the first stage, include \(X_{i,K1} = \{q_{i,K1}, \sigma_{i,K1}^2, \mu_i\} \).

Let \(Z^0_i = \{q_{i,K1}, \mu_i\}\). This is the set of state variables that determine the search strategy when the second stage search at the sponsored links section (details are below) starts. Let \(V(q_{i,K1}, \mu_i)\) represents the expected value of the consumer when she adopts the optimal search rule in the second stage. The transition of the state variables \(X_{i,K1}\) with the \((K1+1)\)th search is as follows: \(\mu_i\) remains unchanged and \(\sigma_{i,K1+1}^2\) will evolve deterministically via equation (1.8). The only stochastic component in the state variables is \(q_{i,K1+1}\), which transitions depending on the signal \(S_{i,K1+1}\) with the distribution function in equation (1.5). Conditional on \(S_{i,K1+1}\), \(q_{i,K1+1}\) will evolve via equation (1.7). The expected value of an additional search in the organic section, conditional on \(q_{i,K1}\) and \(\mu_i\), can be written as

\[
EV_{K1+1}(q_{i,K1}, \mu_i) = \int \max \{V(q_{i,K1+1}, \mu_i), EV_{K1+2}(q_{i,K1+1}, \mu_i) - c^{org}\} dF(S_{i,K1+1}) \tag{1.12}
\]

Thus, the consumer’s value function in the first stage is

\[
W_K(q_{i,K1}, \mu_i) = \max[V(q_{i,K1}, \mu_i), EV_{K1+1}(q_{i,K1}, \mu_i) - c^{org}] \tag{1.13}
\]

As the additional search incurs cost \(c^{org}\), the consumer will stop first stage search if and only if

\[
V(q_{i,K1}, \mu_i) \geq EV_{K1+1}(q_{i,K1}, \mu_i) - c^{org} \tag{1.14}
\]

Otherwise she will continue to click on the \((K1+1)\)th organic link.

Equation (1.1) implies that the consumer is risk neutral and her objective of information search is to maximize her expected utility. However, if the consumer has a relatively low prior...
belief $q_i^0$ so that her prior expectation of $U_{ij}$ (see equation (1.1)) is negative, it may be still optimal to conduct keyword search and click on organic links. The reason is that she always has the outside option valued at 0. Since she has uncertainty about her true $q_i^*$, there is a positive probability that the true value is high enough to make $U_{ij}$ positive for at least one of the advertisers. She can learn $q_i^*$ by clicking organic links. If she receives a positive signal, perhaps by seeing beautiful pictures of the island or reading favorable reviews, she will update her belief of $q_i^*$. Given the updated belief, it may become optimal for the consumer to click on sponsored links, as there is now a greater likelihood that the revealed $U_{ij}$ will become positive. It may also be optimal for the consumer to click organic links even if she would have clicked a sponsored link without organic links. This is because there is a positive probability that highest $U_{ij}$ among all advertisers is actually negative. Therefore, it may be optimal for her to learn about the true $q_i^*$ from organic links and, if the updated belief of $q_i^*$ is low, she can avoid purchasing a product that would have provided lower utility than her outside option, and she can also save her search costs ($c_{spon}$) by not searching any sponsored links.

So, intuitively, why will a consumer click organic links? She can click organic links to gain information to make better purchase decisions and avoid mistakes. For example, if she was planning on going to Jamaica instead of Jeju Island, she may learn that she would prefer Jeju to Jamaica and gain the additional utility of going to a more-preferred destination. Or, if she was planning on a trip to Jeju, she may learn that she would prefer Jamaica instead and, again, gain the additional utility of traveling to a more-preferred destination.
1.4.2.2  Second Stage - Sponsored Clicks

In the second stage, the consumer can resolve her uncertainty regarding the advertisers’ offerings. She has formed her updated expectation of $q_i^*, q_iK_1$ (see equation (1.7)), in the first stage. This expectation will not change throughout the second stage information search. In our Jeju Island example, because the advertisers are travel agencies, it is unlikely that by browsing their websites the consumer can learn unbiased information about the activities, sight-seeing places, food, etc. on Jeju Island. Conditional on the state variables $Z_i^0 = \{q_iK_1, \mu_i\}$, and the prior expectation of $\xi_j$, $E[\xi_j | \xi_1 \geq \cdots \geq \xi_j \geq \cdots \geq \xi_5]$, for each of the advertisers that is derived from their ad positions, we assume that the consumer will search sponsored links optimally in a sequential way. After a sponsored link, say, at the $k^{th}$ position is clicked, $\xi_k$ and $e_{ik}$ are revealed. State variables will be updated to be $Z_i^1 = \{q_iK_1, \mu_i; \xi_k, e_{ik}\}$, which will determine the optimal search strategy in the next step. The consumer will either click one of the four remaining links, or terminate the search by one of the two options, buying from advertiser $k$ or choosing the outside option with value 0. If she chooses to click a remaining link, state variables will be updated and the next dynamic decision has to be made, similar to the previous step.

The optimal search rule can be computed using backward induction. Given five advertisers placed at the sponsored links section, we can calculate, after four sponsored links are clicked and their $\xi$’s and $e$’s are revealed, the expected value of clicking the last remaining link. This expected value is derived from the distribution of $\xi$, conditional on the revealed $\xi$’s, and the distribution of $e$, of the last link. Given the expected value, we can calculate, after three sponsored links are clicked, the expected value of clicking either of the two remaining links. The procedure will repeat in a backward way, until the first step when the consumer has to decide
which of the five sponsored links should be clicked. Such a procedure, however, is computationally very intensive. Given that the conditional expectation of $\xi$ (given $\xi$’s from other ad positions) does not have a closed-form expression, we have to rely on simulation method to calculate the expected value of clicking a link at every step. The number of simulation draws and the number of calculations increase exponentially with the number of sponsored links, and make this backward induction procedure infeasible in our empirical context.

Weitzman (1979) introduces calculating the reservation price for each search alternative to simplify the optimal search rule. After clicking $K_2$ links, define

$$U^*_{i,K_2} = \max\{0, \max_{k \in K_2} \{E_U_{ik}\}\}$$ (1.15)

where for link $k$ that has been clicked,

$$E_U_{ik} = q_{i,K_1} + \mu_{ik} + \xi_k + e_{ik}$$ (1.16)

represents the updated expected utility of buying from the advertiser. “0” inside the outer brackets represents the outside option value. The consumer will calculate the reservation price for each remaining link $j$, $R_j$, which is the utility level such that the consumer is indifferent between clicking the link and accepting the reservation price and terminating the search. For an attractive advertiser either with higher $\mu$ or at a higher ad position, a higher utility level (reservation price) is required to make the consumer indifferent between clicking and stopping. Therefore, the advertiser will have a higher reservation price. Under optimal search, Weitzman (1979) shows that the consumer will click the link with the highest reservation price, say, $R_j$ if $R_j > U^*_{i,K_2}$; otherwise the consumer will stop the search and receive $U^*_{i,K_2}$. Suppose the consumer clicks a remaining link, state variables will be updated and she has to compute the new
reservations prices for the remaining links. This is because, as $\xi$ of the newly clicked link is revealed, the distributions of $\xi$’s of the remaining links will change and thus their reservation prices have to be updated. Similar procedure will iterate until the consumer stops, or all five sponsored links have already been clicked, at which point the consumer will receive $U_i^*$, the alternative with the highest utility level.

Thus the consumer’s value function in the second stage, conditional on advertisers ranked as $R$, is as follows

$$V^{K2}_{i, K1, I; \xi_j, e_{ij} \forall j \in K2|R} =$$

$$\max \left\{ 0, \max_{j \in K2} \{EU_{ij} \}, \max_{j' \notin K2} \{EV^{K2+1}_{i, K1, I; \xi_j, e_{ij} \forall j \in K2+1; \xi_j', e_{ij}'|R} \} - c^{sp} \right\} (1.17)$$

Before any click, the consumer has three options. If $V^{K2} = 0$, the consumer will stop her search, accept her outside option, and not make a purchase. If $V^{K2} = \max_{j \in K2} \{EU_{ij} \}$, implying $\max_{j \in K2} \{EU_{ij} \} > 0$, the consumer will stop her search and purchase from the advertiser she has clicked who offers her highest expected utility. Note that if the consumer has not clicked on a sponsored link, $K2$ is the null set and this option will not be available to her. If $V^{K2}$ equals the third term in the brackets, the consumer will continue her search and click the advertisers who maximizes her forward-looking utility.

There is a caveat when applying such a reservation price rule to our empirical context: Weitzman (1979) makes the assumption that expected utilities for options are independent. Therefore, this rule may not be optimal if the expected utilities between sponsored links are dependent, which is the case for our model. Clicking link $j$ will reveal $\xi_j$, and the consumer will use this information to update the distribution for the $\xi$’s of links that have not been clicked.
Clicking link $j$ therefore will change the expected utility of clicking other links. Although this can be an issue, we argue that the reservation price rule can approximate closely the true optimal search rule. Assume that the reservation price $R_j$ is higher than $R_k$. The only reason that the consumer will choose to click link $k$ before link $j$ is if doing so will reveal more information regarding the $\xi$’s of sponsored links that have not been clicked. However, clicking link $j$ will also reveal information for other links. The probability that the increased information value of clicking link $k$ first dominates the difference between $R_j$ and $R_k$ thus should be very small.

Another scenario may occur in which $R_j$ will not be informative about other links (e.g. she is considering clicking the top link, and she has already clicked the second link), and thus the consumer will not benefit from revealing information in the same way she would if she clicks $R_k$.

For $R_k$ to be optimal, it must update a third options $R_l$ such that $R_l$ becomes preferred to $R_j$, and is still optimal to click conditional on $R_k$, often enough to outweigh the myopic disutility of choosing $R_k$ before $R_j$. This is an unlikely scenario.

To investigate whether the reservation price rule is a good approximation of the optimal dynamic decision rule, we simulate the consumer search behavior under both rules, using the estimated model parameters. We use backward induction method, as discussed above, to calculate the standard dynamic optimization decisions, we then also calculate decisions using reservation utilities, and we compare. For computational feasibility, we assume that there are only three alternatives: two sponsored links and an outside option. We simulate 5,000 click sequences under both search rules and compare. For the 5,000 simulated click sequences, there is not a single difference for the simulated clicks under the two search rules. This will not always be the case, but clearly the reservation utility decision provides a close approximation for the standard dynamic optimization. Further, the computation using the optimal dynamic search rule
took more than 2 days (with 2,000 draws per simulation) and increases exponentially with additional options, while the reservation price rule took only minutes and increases linearly with additional options. Therefore, the “ranked search” model can be estimated with a large number of ranks.

1.5 Estimation

In this section we detail the approach to estimating our model parameters $\Theta = \{\sigma_\mu, \sigma_e, \sigma_0, \sigma_1, \sigma_s, \bar{q}, c^{org}, c^{spon}\}$. Note that for identification we normalize $\sigma_\epsilon$ to 1. We use the simulated likelihood approach to evaluate the likelihood of observed click sequences $n_i^0$, the number of organic links that have been clicked, and $y_i^s$, the sequence of sponsored links that have been clicked, in model estimation. We will then discuss the model identification issue in this section.

1.5.1 Model Estimation

Let $N$ be the total number of searches in data. We obtain our estimated parameters by maximizing the likelihood function:

$$\hat{\Theta} = \text{argmax} \prod_{i=1}^{N} Pr(n_i^0, y_i^s | \Theta)$$

(1.18)

In the first step, we have to evaluate $V(q_i, \mu_i)$, the expected value for the consumer when she adopts the optimal search rule in the second stage, conditional on her updated expectation of her product preference $q_i^*$ and preferences for the five advertisers at the sponsored links section,
\( \mu_i \). This calculation is related to the optimal reservation price rule used in the search in the second stage. To do so, we use the following procedures: conditional on a trial \( \Theta \), we

(i) draw \( q_i^{\text{sim}} \) by discretizing a large state space for admissible \( q_i \), and draw \( \mu_i^{\text{sim}} \) for each advertiser;

(ii) draw \( \xi_j^{\text{sim}} \) for each advertiser from their distributions of \( \xi \)'s conditional on the ad position. After the consumer clicks sponsored link \( j \), draw \( \xi_j^{\text{sim}} \) and \( e_{ij}^{\text{sim}} \) that are revealed to the consumer. Conditional on \( \xi_j^{\text{sim}} \) and ad positions of all advertisers, then draw \( \xi_k^{\text{sim}} \) for other advertisers whose links have not been clicked based on the distribution. Repeat the simulations in every step after a sponsored link is clicked;

In every step, calculate reservation prices for the remaining sponsored links using the Weitzman (1979) algorithm, based on \( q_i^{\text{sim}} \), \( \mu_i^{\text{sim}} \), \( \xi_j^{\text{sim}} \) and \( e_{ij}^{\text{sim}} \). Compute the optimal search strategy before each click. Then calculate \( V(q_i^{\text{sim}}, \mu_i^{\text{sim}}) \) by averaging over all simulated \( U_i^{*} - c^{\text{spoon}} \cdot K2 \) (\( U_i^{*} \) from equation 1.14). We then use polynomial approximation method to compute \( V \) for other values of \( q \)'s and \( \mu \)'s. This gives us the expected value in the second stage, conditional on \( q_i \) and \( \mu_i \).

In the second step, we backward induct the value of informational organic link clicks, conditional on \( V(q_i^{\text{sim}}, \mu_i^{\text{sim}}) \). First, beginning with the last click in our backward induction, we draw \( q_{i,k}^{\text{sim}} \) by discretizing a large state space for admissible \( q_{i,k} \), for each \( \mu_i^{\text{sim}} \). Next, we take draws from the distribution of potential signals from organic results, \( S_{i,k}^{\text{sim}} \), from equation (1.9) and update \( q_{i,k} \). We then calculate the updated belief \( q_{i,k+1}^{\text{sim}} \) using the Bayesian rule. For a given
draw, the value of clicking an organic link, \( V_{l,k}^{info,draw}(q_{i,k}^{sim}, \mu_i^{sim}) \), at organic click number \( k \), is calculated as

\[
V_{l,k}^{info,draw}(q_{i,k}^{sim}, \mu_i^{sim}) = V(q_{i,k+1}^{sim}, \mu_i^{sim}) - V(q_{i,k}^{sim}, \mu_i^{sim}) + V_{l,k+1}^{info}(q_{i,k+1}^{sim}, \mu_i^{sim})
\]

where \( V(q_{i,k+1}^{sim}, \mu_i^{sim}) - V(q_{i,k}^{sim}, \mu_i^{sim}) \) is the change in expected value in the second-stage as the consumers belief is updated to \( q_{i,k+1}^{sim} \), and \( V_{l,k+1}^{info}(q_{i,k+1}^{sim}, \mu_i^{sim}) \) is the option value of continuing to click organic links. \( V_{l,k+1}^{info}(q_{i,k+1}^{sim}, \mu_i^{sim}) = 0 \) for the last click in the backward induction. For each \( \mu_i^{sim} \), we can now linearly interpolate the value of clicking an additional organic link at each click \( k \), conditional on \( q_{i,k} \) and \( \mu_i \).

In the third step, we simulate consumer clicks in the first stage, conditional on \( V_{l,k}^{info} \) derived in the second estimation step. Then, we derive probabilities of click sequences in the second stage, conditional on the updated \( q_{i}^{sim} \) from the first stage, in a similar manner to the first estimation step.

First, we draw prior beliefs \( q_{i}^{0,sim} \) and, after interpolating \( V_{l,k}^{info} \), determine whether an organic link is clicked or not. If organic link \( k \) is clicked, the consumer receives a signal from the organic result, \( S_{i,k}^{sim} \). We then calculate the updated belief \( q_{i}^{sim} \) using the Bayesian rule. After each organic link is clicked, the consumer will decide whether to continue clicking organic links or move to the second stage search, based on \( V_{l,k}^{info}(q_{i,k}^{sim}, \mu_i^{sim}) \). This simulation gives us the simulated number of organic clicks, \( n_{i}^{o,sim} \), and each consumer’s updated \( q_{i}^{sim} \).
For each simulation, we use the updated $q_i^{sim}$, from the first stage, for the second stage calculations. Similar to the above procedure (step 1), we draw $\xi_j^{sim}$ based on the ad positions and, after each sponsored links is clicked, we draw $\xi_k^{sim}$ for remaining sponsored links. We then use the reservation price rule again to simulate the optimal sponsored clicks, $y_i^{sim}$. Given that there is a large number of possible sequences of sponsored clicks (120 altogether), the number of simulations required to reliably evaluate the likelihood of a specific $y_i^s$ is exceedingly high and poses a computational challenge in the model estimation. We choose to use a scaled multivariate logistic CDF to smooth the clicking probabilities (McFadden 1989). Similar procedure is also adopted in Honka et al (2014). After $K2$ sponsored links are clicked, the probability of choosing to click one of the remaining sponsored links is a function of its reservation price $R_j$, the reservation prices of other remaining links $R_k$, and $U_{iK2}$ (see equation (1.15)). The probability of clicking link j is specified as

$$Pr(\text{clicking } j) = \frac{\exp(R_j/\sigma)}{\sum_{k \text{ not been clicked}} \exp(R_k/\sigma) + \exp(U_{iK2}/\sigma)}$$

(1.20)

We fixed the scaling parameter $\sigma$ to be 0.025, small enough so that the smoothed probability function can approximate well the discrete clicking choice. Based on this probability we can calculate the probability for each observed $y_l^s$, denoted as $Pr^{sim}(y_l^s | q_i^{sim})$. The probability of $y_l^s$ is calculated as

$$Pr(y_l^s | n_i^o) = Pr^{sim}(j | q_i^{sim}) \times Pr^{sim}(l | \text{clicked } j, q_i^{sim}) \times Pr^{sim}(h | \text{clicked } l \text{ and } j, q_i^{sim}) \ldots$$

(1.21)

By repeating the procedures for $NS$ times, we can calculate the probability for the observed number of organic clicks, $n_i^o$, and click sequence, $y_l^s$, as the following:
\[
Pr(n^o_i, y^s_i | \Theta) = \frac{1}{NS} \sum_{sim=1}^{NS} \{n^{o,sim}_i = n^o_i \} * Pr(y^s_i | n^o_i) \quad (1.22)
\]

We iterate the model parameters \( \Theta \) until the likelihood function in equation (1.18) is maximized.

### 1.5.2 Identification

In this section, we discuss how the model parameters are identified from the data. Given that we only observe the sequence of organic and sponsored clicks, there are several identification assumptions made in the model. First, we assume that the mean of the prior beliefs across consumers is consistent with the mean product preference, \( \bar{q} \), in the population. Therefore, there is no persistent bias in consumers’ prior beliefs about their preference for the product. We also assume that the signals from organic results are unbiased with the mean equal to the true \( q^*_i \) of each consumer. This is a weaker assumption as we can assume that if signals intend to be biased, the consumers can filter through the bias to reveal the true signal. We will test how our results are robust to these assumptions later in the paper.

We begin by discussing the parameters associated with organic link clicks. The mean preference for the keyword, \( \bar{q} \), and the variance in the distribution of prior mean beliefs across the population, \( \sigma_0 \), are identified by the percentage of consumers who first click sponsored links, first click organic links, or choose not to click. From our model, we have 3 moments to identify these 2 parameters: \( P( \text{first click sponsored} ) \), \( P( \text{first click organic} ) \), and \( P( \text{no clicks} ) = 1 - P( \text{first click sponsored} ) - P( \text{first click organic} ) \). A high \( \bar{q} \) and low \( \sigma_0 \) will lead most consumers to click sponsored links only. A high \( \bar{q} \) and high \( \sigma_0 \) will lead many consumers to click sponsored links, but a portion will start with organic links and a smaller portion will click nothing at all. A low \( \bar{q} \)
and low $\sigma_0$ implies that most consumers to start with organic links. And a low $\bar{q}$ and high $\sigma_0$ implies many consumers will start with organic links and a portion will start with sponsored links and a portion will click nothing at all.

The effects of the signal noise, $\sigma_s$, and the marginal cost of clicking organic clicks, $c^{org}$, are similar. A low $\sigma_s$ will incentivize organic clicks, as $i$ will gain a lot of information with each click, while a low $c^{org}$ will also incentivize organic clicks. But note that a low $\sigma_s$ will also lead to diminishing returns for organic clicks as the consumers’ uncertainty will shrink with each click, disincentivizing organic clicks as the consumer clicks more links. The two parameters are identified by the average number of organic links clicked and the distribution of the number of organic links clicked. From the model, we have 5 moments to identify these 2 parameters, each conditional on the consumer having clicked an organic link: P(1 organic click), P(2 organic clicks), P(3 organic clicks), P(4 organic clicks), P(more than 4 organic clicks).

The consumer’s initial uncertainty about their preference for the product, $\sigma_1$, is identified by the proportion of consumers who click sponsored links after having clicked organic links. We have 5 moments to identify this parameter: P(sponsored click | 1 organic click), P(sponsored click | 2 organic clicks), P(sponsored click | 3 organic clicks), P(sponsored click | 4 organic clicks), P(sponsored click | more than 4 organic clicks). If $\bar{q}$ is negative, then each of these probabilities will be larger if $\sigma_1$ is large. Because $\sigma_q^2 = \sigma_0^2 + \sigma_1^2$, if $\sigma_1$ is larger, $\sigma_q$ is larger and a larger portion of the consumers will have a positive true preference for the product, which they learn from organic clicks. Conversely if $\bar{q}$ is positive, the opposite is true, and we would expect to see fewer sponsored clicks after organic clicks.
We now discuss the parameters associated with sponsored clicks. The standard deviation in consumer preferences for individual firms, $\sigma_{\mu}$, is identified by the order in which consumers click sponsored links. Here we have a large number of moments related to this order of sponsored clicks; there are probabilities characterizing which position is clicked first, and then for each first click, there are 4 potential positions clicked second, and so on. Prior to clicking a sponsored link, the consumer has two sources of information about her match with the advertiser: $\mu_{ij}$ and seller $j$’s rank. If $\sigma_{\mu}$ is small, consumers will be likely to click according to the advertisers’ ranks, and we will observe many “top-down” sequences. If $\sigma_{\mu}$ is large, the consumer is more likely to click according to $\mu$, rather than rank, and thus the order in which the ranks are clicked will be relatively more random.

The effects of the standard deviation in individual-specific match value unknown prior to clicking a sponsored link, $\sigma_{e}$, and the marginal search cost of clicking a sponsored link, $c^{\text{sp}}$, are similar. A smaller $\sigma_{e}$ will lead to fewer sponsored clicks, as a lower variance leads to smaller rewards from search. Similarly a larger $c^{\text{sp}}$ will lead to fewer clicks. These two parameters are identified by the average number of sponsored links clicked and the distribution of the number of sponsored links clicked. From the model, we have 5 moments to identify these 2 parameters, each conditional on the consumer clicking at least one sponsored link: $P(1 \text{ sponsored click})$, $P(2 \text{ sponsored clicks})$, $P(3 \text{ sponsored clicks})$, $P(4 \text{ sponsored clicks})$, $P(5 \text{ sponsored clicks})$.

Monte Carlo simulations based on assumed model parameters, and parameter recovery, are reported in Table 1.2. The first column presents the true parameter values from which the simulations were generated. The second column presents the estimated parameters, and the third
and fourth columns present the 95% confidence interval about these estimates. We can see the true parameter values are sufficiently recovered and highly significant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>True Parameters</th>
<th>Estimates</th>
<th>2.5 Percentile</th>
<th>97.5 Percentile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean preference for product q_0</td>
<td>-10.00</td>
<td>-9.95***</td>
<td>-9.99</td>
<td>-9.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std dev. of prior product preference beliefs</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td>15.16***</td>
<td>14.60</td>
<td>15.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. dev. of signal</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>10.06***</td>
<td>9.68</td>
<td>10.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sponsored click cost</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.03***</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. dev. of firm preferences</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.96***</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>2.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. dev. of firm revealed match value</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.12***</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>3.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organic click cost</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.15***</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial product preference uncertainty</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td>15.20***</td>
<td>15.03</td>
<td>15.36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p < 0.01

1.6 Results

Estimation results are presented in Table 1.3. The estimate for each parameter is highly significant. The variance in firm average match value, \( \sigma_\xi \), is normalized to 1, and the utility of the no-purchase option has been normalized to 0.

As expected, \( \bar{q} \) is negative, -13.4, indicating that for the majority of consumers who search “Travel to Jeju Island”, the island is not the best travel place comparing with all other alternative places. There is large heterogeneity in travel preferences, however, as \( \sigma_0 = 16.2 \) indicates that for about 15% consumers Jeju Island is the best option. Further, \( \sigma_s = 16.5 \), suggesting that consumers have large uncertainty regarding their prior expectation \( q^0 \). Also, \( \sigma_0 \) is much larger than \( \sigma_\xi \) that is normalized to 1, indicating that the uncertainty for Jeju Island has
larger weight in consumers’ utility than that for advertisers’ offering. Although the magnitude of the noise of signals from organic results is large, $\sigma_{\beta} = 13.8$, it is less than $\sigma_{0}$, indicating that the organic clicks are informative for consumers to learn about true preferences $q_{i}^{*}$. The cost estimates, $c^{\text{sp}}$ and $c^{\text{org}}$, are 1.4 and 0.21, respectively, suggesting that browsing advertisers’ websites requires more time and cognitive resources. For sponsored links, $\sigma_{\mu} = 1.6$ is larger than $\sigma_{\xi}$. This implies that consumers’ choice of sponsored click is significantly influenced by their prior knowledge of advertisers. Finally, $\sigma_{e} = 2.9$, which is also significantly higher than $\sigma_{\xi}$, indicating the importance of individual-specific match values (as compared with the average match value across consumers $\xi_{i}$) on consumers’ search and purchase decisions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean preference for keyword $q^{0}$</td>
<td>-13.36***</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std dev. of prior product preference beliefs $\sigma_{0}$</td>
<td>16.19***</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. dev. of signal $\sigma_{s}$</td>
<td>16.47***</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. dev. of signal $\sigma_{\beta}$</td>
<td>13.76***</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sponsored click cost $c^{\text{sp}}$</td>
<td>1.37***</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. dev. of firm preferences $\sigma_{qij}$</td>
<td>1.59***</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. dev. of firm revealed match value $\sigma_{\xi_{ij}}$</td>
<td>2.90***</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organic click cost $c^{\text{org}}$</td>
<td>0.21***</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p < 0.01

With these estimates we can answer the question, how do organic links impact the search engine’s revenue, the advertisers’ sales, and the consumers’ welfare? Our dynamic model of consumer learning and search can predict, when aggregated across consumers, how many organic links are clicked ($n_{i}^{0}$), and which and in what order sponsored links will be clicked ($y_{i}^{s}$). Based on model assumptions, the model can also predict the outcome of whether a consumer will purchase and (if yes) from which advertiser she will purchase (i.e. if purchased from advertiser $j$ the expected $U_{ij}$, after obtaining information from organic and sponsored links, has to be
positive, and $U_{ij}$ is larger than the expected $U_{ik}$ from all other links that have been clicked). First, we simulate consumer clicks and purchases. Then we simulate clicks and purchases again, but we do not allow consumers to click on organic links.\textsuperscript{15} Here we can see the impact on search engine revenue, advertiser sales, and consumer welfare when consumers can click on organic links and learn about the product that they are considering. These results help us to understand the value of organic link information to consumers, advertisers, and the search engine. We make two key assumptions. First, we assume that the utility of the outside option remains unchanged at 0. This is a strong assumption, as the outside option may include other travel destinations about which consumers would use organic links to obtain information. Second, we assume that consumers do not find a substitute for the information from organic links (i.e. they do not search for the same information directly on websites, from friends, or from other search engines). These information substitutes may reduce the value calculation, as consumers could, at a greater cost (assuming keyword search at our search engine is cost minimizing), obtain similar information.

Results from the simulation are reported in the second column in Table 1.4. When consumers can learn about their preference for the product in the organic section, clicks on sponsored links increase by 18% with organic links. Consumer purchases will also increase by 19%. All five advertisers gain sales, with lower-ranked advertisers benefitting slightly more.

There are two reasons why these results may be underestimated. First, we assume that consumers are risk-neutral but, when planning an expensive trip, consumers can be very risk averse and, without sufficient information on Jeju Island, they will not click or buy travel packages from any of the advertisers. Second, competition among search engines has not been taken into account.

\textsuperscript{15} The search engine would not consider this strategy; the goal of this counterfactual is to quantify the value of organic link information so that we can better understand how this information may influence consumer search behaviors.
Unlike the U.S., there are several major search engines in Korea. Without organic links to provide valuable information, consumers are likely to switch to other search engines and thus the loss in clicks and sales can be much bigger. This is the key result from Table 1.4. The common belief is that search advertising works because advertisers can target consumers with specific needs and preferences. But, what we see here is that it also works because of the complementarity with the organic links where consumers can learn about their product preferences prior to making a purchase decision. In this case, advertisers are gaining 19% in sales because of this complementarity.

Table 1.4: Counterfactual Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percent change compared with no organic links</th>
<th>Counterfactual 1: &quot;Free&quot; product information</th>
<th>Counterfactual 2: &quot;Free&quot; advertiser information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer utility</td>
<td>29.0%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sponsored clicks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>-15.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank 1</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>-15.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank 2</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank 3</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank 4</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank 5</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>57.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To get a better idea of why these additional sponsored clicks occur, Figure 1.6 shows the distribution of consumers who will click sponsored links in the two scenarios described above. The information from organic results will increase the expected preference for the product for some consumers but at the same time also reduce the expected preference for some others. The black shaded area represents the consumers who will click sponsored links whether or not organic links are available. The dark gray area represents the additional consumers who will click when organic links are not available; they must make their purchase decision based on their exogenously determined prior expected preferences for the product. We can see that consumers
with positive prior preferences for the product will click sponsored links when they cannot learn about their true preferences. The light gray area represents the additional consumers who will click sponsored links after having the ability to first click organic links. We now see consumers with negative prior beliefs about their preferences who have learned that they actually prefer the product and are now clicking sponsored links. There are consumers who no longer click sponsored links because they have learned that they do not prefer the product (dark grey area), but as we can see, the light gray area outweighs the dark gray area, and thus with the ability to click organic links, more consumers are now clicking sponsored links, and making purchases.

Figure 1.6: Who clicks sponsored links?

Finally, we find that the consumer welfare will increase by 29% with the presence of organic links. The reason that this percentage increase is larger than clicks or sales increase is that, with more information on Jeju Island, some consumers who would have visited the island and later regretted (as their true utility is lower than the outside option) can avoid making the
mistake. Clearly the information from organic links provides great value, and this value can be further enhanced via search engine optimization.

1.6.1 Counterfactuals: Search Engines Providing Information

We have discussed how organic links impact the effectiveness of search advertising. We will now discuss what the search engines can do to improve their profitability, the consumers’ welfare, and the advertisers’ sales. In these counterfactuals, we compare two potential search engine policy changes. We assume the search engine may provide information about either the product or the advertisers’ offerings on the search results page, without the consumer having to click. Search engines are currently utilizing both strategies. A search of “Jeju Island” at Google, for example, returns photos of the island, a photo-list of points of interest, and a short summary about the island along the side of the webpage. Consumers can obtain general information about the product without having to click into websites from organic links. A search of “Beach resorts at Jeju Island” at Google, as another example, returns a list of resorts with a photos, a user ratings, and locations of the resorts. These photos, ratings, and locations provide advertiser-related information to the consumers. The type of information (product or advertiser) that delivers more profit to the search engine, sales to the advertisers, and welfare to the consumers may indicate a prescription for what information the search engine should provide. Note that while we do not model search engine competition, improving consumer welfare may lead to increased consumer searches thus brings more revenue to search engines.

In this exercise, we assume the search engine provides "free" information without incurring search costs for consumers. For the first policy experiment, we assume that the product

[45]
information is equivalent to the signal from a single organic link click. There is still noise as the photos and summary that the search engine provides are not full information about what consumers will experience with a purchase. In the second policy experiment, we assume that the advertiser information is equivalent to half of the information on the individual match value from an advertiser, $e_{ij}$. Although the search engine can also reveal $\xi_j$ in a similar manner, the signaling effect of ad positions may no longer work and, consequently, advertisers’ bidding strategy and consumers’ search behaviors may be different from our model assumptions. An example of revealing information on $e_{ij}$ is to post details, including tour length, resort photos, which hotels to stay, which places to visit and so on, on one of the travel packages offered from each advertiser (travel agency). Because consumers have different needs (e.g. how long they can afford for the tour) and preferences (e.g. some prefer luxury hotels and some prefer convenience), the attractiveness of packages for individuals may differ. We assume the same $\sigma_e$ as estimated in the data, but a portion is revealed prior to click. That is, we assume

$$e_{ij} = \gamma_{ij} + \tilde{e}_{ij},$$

(1.23)

and $\gamma_{ij} \sim N(0, .5\sigma_e^2)$, and $\tilde{e}_{ij} \sim N(0, .5\sigma_e^2)$, where $\gamma_{ij}$ is revealed by the search engine prior to clicking any links. The consumer receives “free” information about their preference for advertiser $j$, but there is still some uncertainty to be resolved with a sponsored link click.

We simulate click and purchase behavior under each scenario. The results for “free” product information are in column 3 of Table 1.3, and the results of “free” advertiser information are in column 4. We find that if the search engine provides information about the product, the consumer welfare will increase by 8.5%. This is because it can lower consumers’ costs from searching organic results. Furthermore, with more information, consumers are more likely to
avoid regrettable purchase decisions. For the search engine, there is an 8.2% increase in paid clicks. This is because, for reasons similar to those previously discussed, with more information on the product, some consumers who would not have clicked on sponsored links learn that they would prefer the product and these consumers outweigh those who learn that they do not prefer the product. Consequently, advertisers are also able to generate 8.2% more sales from search advertising.

When the search engine provides advertiser information instead, it will experience a 15% drop in paid clicks. This is because there is less uncertainty regarding advertisers’ match value to resolve, and thus less incentive to click in and resolve such uncertainty. Consumers who would have been likely to search 4 or 5 advertisers to find their best match are now much more likely to search 1 or 2 advertisers, be confident that they have found their best match, and stop their search. Despite receiving fewer clicks, advertisers will generate a 1.4% increase in sales. This increase is small because consumers are not learning about whether or not they want to purchase the product, they are learning, if they do wish to purchase, which seller to purchase from. The top-ranked advertiser, however, has a 15% decrease in sales, while the fifth-ranked advertiser has a 58% increase in sales. This occurs because, without any advertiser information, consumers who are indifferent between advertisers will click high-ranked links due to the signaling effect. With advertiser information, consumers whose revealed preference for the fifth-ranked advertiser, $\gamma_{15}$, is high, may now find it optimal to click that link instead of the top-ranked link. Finally, the consumer welfare will increase by 7.2% due to reduced search costs and better matching, but this benefit is smaller than when the search engine provides product information.

The above results only come from partial equilibrium analysis as the impact of the policy changes on advertisers’ strategy has not been taken into account. Specifically, the free advertiser
information (the second policy experiment) has two effects on advertiser bidding incentive. First, the mitigation in rank effect of search ad positions (the top-rank receives 15% fewer sales and the 5th-rank 58% more sales) may lead to diminished competition among advertisers for these positions, as there is less incentive to increase bids to obtain higher rankings. Second, in aggregate, the decrease in paid clicks and the slight increase in sales imply that the conversion rate will increase, which will increase the value of each ad position. When product information is provided (the first policy experiment), neither of these effects occurs: the rank effect and the conversion rates remain relatively constant. To understand the complete impact of these policy simulations on the search engine and advertisers, we model the optimal advertiser bidding strategy under both scenarios and quantify the impact on these agents. We use the optimal bidding strategy in a generalized second price auction, developed in Varian (2007), to study the change in advertiser bidding following the policy changes. Edelman et al. (2007) show that in a generalized second price auction, advertisers will not simply bid their willingness-to-pay per click. They will bid up to their willingness-to-pay and then reduce these bids in order to maximize profits. Varian derives a range of equilibrium bids, conditional on the mean match value $\xi_j$ and ad position, for each advertiser. We perform two simulations: one assuming firms bid according to the lower bound, and one assuming firms bid according to the upper bound. The advertiser’s value per click is calculated as the product of its conversion rate and margins. Both the conversion rate and margin are estimated as functions of $\xi_j$. Given $\xi_j$, the advertiser predicts these values, and then bids according to Varian (2007). We assume the margin to be proportional\(^{16}\) to the difference in value, averaged across simulated consumers, between the firm’s offering, $EU_{ij}^*$, and the next best alternative, $\max\{0, \max_{k \neq j} \{EU_{ik}\}\}$, conditional that

\(^{16}\) Advertiser bids are a linear function of this proportion, and thus profit is a linear function of this proportion. Results, as percent changes in revenue, are unaffected by changes in this proportion.
$EU_{ij}^*$ is the consumer’s best option among all sponsored links and the outside option, $EU_{ij}^* = \max\{0, \max_k\{EU_{ik}\}\}$. This implies that firms with a better offering, a higher $\xi_j$, earn a higher profit per sale. We also assume a 6\textsuperscript{th} advertiser, $r$, is in the market. This competitor has an average match value of $\xi_r$ drawn from the $N(0, 1)$ distribution and truncated above by $\xi_5$. Given $\xi_r$, advertiser $r$ will bid accordingly. With the generalized second price auction, the advertiser in the 5\textsuperscript{th} slot will pay according to $r$’s bid. We also perform this simulation with 5 additional competitors and obtain similar results.

The simulation results can be found in Table 1.5. We report the changes in average equilibrium cost-per-click (CPC), determined by advertiser bid amounts, for each ad position as compared to our original empirical setup (the base model). We also report the changes in revenue. The results are similar whether advertisers bid according to either the upper or lower bound. The equilibrium bidding strategy when the search engine provides free product information is relatively unchanged, as the average winning bid for each ad position is similar to that of the base model. For the search engine, the 8.2% increase in paid clicks translates to an 8.2% increase in the revenue (see the last two rows in column 3 of Table 1.5). When the search engine offers free advertiser information, the lower bound and upper bound bid amounts for each ad position have increased significantly. This is because, in aggregate, the decrease in paid clicks and the slight increase in advertiser sales (see the last column in Table 1.4) imply an increase in the conversion rate of each sponsored click. The increase in advertiser bids, however, does not outweigh the decrease in revenue due to fewer paid clicks, many of which were from the top-ranked advertiser who is paying the most per click. The net effect is that the search engine’s revenue decreases by 6% (see the last two rows in the last column of Table 1.5). These results
are robust to using either upper or lower bounds of advertisers’ equilibrium bidding strategy.\textsuperscript{17}

The key results here will reverse if $q$ is positive, rather than negative. This would represent a product for which the majority of consumers will purchase, if they receive no further information about the product. Given additional information, some portion of these consumers may learn about, and then choose, a different preferred option instead. Such a situation is likely to be uncommon, as the majority of keyword search involves very low click-through and conversion rates on commercial websites.

### Table 1.5: Counterfactual Bidding Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Percent change from base model</th>
<th>&quot;Free&quot; organic information</th>
<th>&quot;Free&quot; advertiser information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rank 1</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank 2</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank 3</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank 4</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank 5</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>25.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank 1</td>
<td>-0.1%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank 2</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank 3</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank 4</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank 5</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The counterfactual results provide a prescription for search engines on how to utilize search result page space. If choosing between offering general information about the product or information about the individual advertisers, we show that product information is likely to

\textsuperscript{17} To test the robustness of these results to other levels of product and advertiser uncertainty, we recalculate these results such that the consumers’ uncertainty regarding their match with the product, $\sigma_1^2$, and their match with the advertisers, $\sigma_e^2$, vary from 1/8x to 8x their estimated values. With these manipulations, the results remain highly robust. Two changes may occur. First, the consumer will gain more welfare from advertiser information, as opposed to product information, once their uncertainty regarding advertiser fit is sufficiently large. Second, the advertisers will gain more total sales when advertiser information is provided, as opposed to product information, when the consumers’ product uncertainty is sufficiently small.

[50]
provide higher consumer welfare, more paid clicks for the search engine, more sales for advertisers, and increased the revenue from selling keyword ad positions. Search engines, therefore, should move toward providing more information about the product on the search results page. It is not clear whether the search engine should discontinue providing advertiser information because the consumer welfare has increased, which is important for generating more searches at the search engine.

### 1.7 Conclusion

The common belief is that search advertising works because advertisers can target consumers with specific product preferences. We show that for many consumers, sponsored search results alone are not a sufficient condition for search advertising to work. Organic results, which primarily lead users to web pages that provide general information on the product, are critical to induce clicks on sponsored links and convert those clicks into purchases. By allowing consumers to access content that satisfies their information requirements, informational organic results can allow consumers to learn about the product category prior to making their purchase decision, and thus they can make better decisions.

We develop a model characterize the situation in which consumers can search for general information about the product category as well as for information about the individual sellers’ offerings. We adopt the “ranked search” model to model the sponsored search context in which consumers can search through a list of options which have been ranked according to average consumer preferences, in order to find their best match. We estimate this model using a unique
dataset of search advertising in which commercial websites are restricted in the organic listing. Organic links are therefore purely for general information, allowing us to identify consumer clicks as informational (from organic links) or purchase oriented (from sponsored links). With the estimation results, we show that consumer welfare is improved by 29%, while advertisers obtain 19% more sales, and search engines receive 18% more paid clicks, as compared to the scenario without organic links. Furthermore, using counterfactuals we investigate the welfare changes for consumers, advertisers, and the search engine when the search engine provides consumers more reliable and precise information about the product or about the advertisers’ offerings in addition to the organic listings. We find that consumers, higher-ranked firms, and the search engine are likely to be significantly better off when the search engine provides product-related information rather than advertiser-related information. Based on Varian (2007), we find that advertiser bids will remain constant when the search engine provides free product information. When the search engine provides free advertiser information, advertisers will increase their bids because of the increased conversion rate; however, the search engine still loses revenue due to the decreased paid clicks. The findings shed important managerial insights on how to improve the effectiveness of search advertising in terms of attracting clicks and converting clicks into actions and purchases.
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Chapter 2:

Testing the Signaling Theory of Advertising: Evidence from Search Advertisements

2.1 Introduction

Since Nelson (1970, 1974), a stream of theoretical works (e.g., Klein and Leffler 1981, Grossman and Shapiro 1984, Milgrom and Roberts 1986, Bagwell and Riordan 1991, Meurer and Stahl 1994, Anderson and Renault 2006) have been developed to formalize the signaling theory of advertising. However, empirical evidence supporting the signaling function of advertising is rather limited. In this paper, we empirically test the theory using a rich micro-level dataset of search advertising obtained from a search engine. Although alternative explanations for why advertising helps increase sales, including the persuasive and informative functions of advertising, are available in the literature, the signaling theory provides unique insights into how both consumers and advertisers strategically behave in markets with differentiated products. In such markets, consumers have uncertainty regarding the attributes of product offerings, and it is costly for them to search for product information. The theory predicts that, under general conditions, firms with products that can better match with consumer needs and preferences will spend more on advertising to signal the high “match value” of their products. This is because advertisers expect that consumers, after being exposed to the advertising signal, will infer that their products are more likely to meet their needs. At equilibrium, consumers make such rational inferences based on the signals, leading to the positive correlation between advertisement
spending and sales or consumer quality perception. Since the theory has major implications for firm competition and welfare analysis, testing the validity of the theory with real market data is important to firms, policy makers, and academic researchers.

We choose the search advertising market for this study for several reasons. First, search advertising has played a dominant role in the advertising industry. According to a report from the Interactive Advertising Bureau (http://www.iab.net/AdRevenueReport), internet advertising revenues have soared to $42.8 billion in the U.S. in 2013, surpassing broadcast television advertising revenues for the first time. Search advertising is the leading internet advertising format. It has a 43% share of internet advertising revenues, reaching $18 billion, much higher than all other formats including display advertising ($13 billion) and mobile advertising ($7 billion). Understanding the underlying mechanisms that drive the effectiveness of search advertising thus is substantively important. Second, the nature of search advertising offers an ideal environment for testing the signaling theory. In many cases, using keyword search implies that consumers have uncertainty for keyword-related products or services, a necessary condition for signaling theory to work. Another key condition is that consumers have knowledge on which firms spend more on advertising. Since consumers observe the ad positions of sponsored links on the search results page, it is reasonable to assume that they can infer advertisers at higher positions pay more for their clicks, via keyword auctions, than advertisers at lower positions. In contrast, this condition may not be satisfied in other markets such as print and TV advertising. Finally, although past research has tested the relationship between demand and advertising spending and, in the case of search advertising, the impact of ad positions on consumer clicks and purchases, there are no empirical studies testing whether firm strategies are consistent with the predictions from the signaling theory. The rich micro-level data that we use in the study
enables us to test the theory not only on consumer but also on firm behaviors. Alternative explanations for why advertising works have to be examined. As we will discuss in the section of literature review, testing firm behaviors and ruling out alternative explanations are a challenging task in previous empirical studies because they use aggregate data sourced from a single advertising firm which lack data on other advertisers.

In this study, we choose several travel-related keywords that have different properties associated with consumer needs and preferences. The data provides detailed information on both consumers and advertisers, including the identity of every advertiser whose sponsored link is visible to consumers, their ad positions on the search results page, and the entire sequence of clicks for every keyword search made by consumers. We also observe for each advertiser how much it pays as well as how much it bids for a click on its sponsored link. Therefore, we are able to test not only the demand side but also the supply side behaviors predicted by the theory. A typical advertiser (e.g., travel agency) in data carries a full line of differentiated travel services (e.g., packaged tours, flights, hotels, car rentals). For many service attributes, it is impossible for consumers to know all details by just browsing the search results page. Searching for the details at each advertiser’s website, however, is very time-consuming. Consumers therefore may rely on the signals they observe from search advertisements to determine their clicking and purchasing decisions.

We test three main hypotheses that are developed from the signaling theory of advertising. Our empirical tests show that, on the consumer side, sponsored links at high ad positions attract more clicks even after controlling for advertiser fixed effects. Furthermore, consumers are more likely to choose high-positioned sponsored links for terminal clicks, the last link clicked in the search process. We argue that terminal clicks and the probability that
consumers find a match should be positively correlated. This result therefore is consistent with the prediction that the offerings from advertisers at higher (lower) positions match with the needs and preferences for a larger (smaller) proportion of consumers. We also test the advertiser behaviors as predicted by the theory using a unique feature in the data. Advertisers frequently adjust their bids for a click within a day but, because of the uncertainty regarding how much their competitors will bid, it is possible that their ad positions remain unchanged. Empirical tests using these observations show that an advertiser’s decision to increase its bids is positively correlated with terminal clicks. Yet, without changing ad positions, there is no significant correlation between bid amounts and clicks. This provides significant evidence that advertisers’ bid decisions are based on the match value that has to be signaled, and not solely the information that consumers already know prior to clicking sponsored links.

We further examine whether alternative explanations for how advertising works can account for these results. Making use of the individual-level consumer search data, we test how consumer clicks are correlated with changes in ad positions within a day and find similar results, implying that our findings are unlikely to be driven by external factors (e.g., advertising campaigns in other media) that may increase the click potential which we as researchers do not observe. We also show that the persuasive and informative functions of advertising, as well as the consumer non-strategic top-down search behavior, cannot fully explain our findings. In sum, these results provide thorough support that signaling is at work in our empirical context. Finally, we further illustrate from data an important phenomenon of informational externality, where a sponsored link with higher match value has a positive spillover effect on other sponsored links listed above or below. The signaling theory offers an explanation for this finding.

[60]
2.1.1 Related Literature

Nelson (1970, 1974) argues that firms in an experience goods market have incentive to advertise heavily to signal the quality of their products. Later works (e.g., Grossman and Shapiro 1984, Milgrom and Roberts 1986, Meurer and Stahl 1994, Anderson and Renault 2006) formalize the idea by developing a game-theoretic model in which high-quality firms are incentivized to spend more on advertising to signal but low-quality firms do not find it profitable to mimic. Klein and Leffler (1981) endogenize product quality in the signaling model. Bagwell and Riordan (1991) develop a model for durable goods, where price instead of advertising is used to signal product quality, and show that at equilibrium high-quality firms will charge more than the full information price.

A stream of empirical research follows the theoretical development by using aggregate data to test how the signaling theory applies to advertising. Tellis and Fornell (1988), for example, use PIMS datasets to examine how product quality (represented by the difference between the percentage of sales of products superior to competing products and the percentage of sales inferior) is affected by advertising. Caves and Greene (1996) use *Consumer Reports* to examine the relationship between quality ratings and advertising outlays of product brands. Thomas et al. (1998) use data from the U.S. automobile industry and find a positive association between future sales and current advertising levels. The challenge with using aggregate data is that it is difficult to rule out alternative explanations. This is because the relationship between advertising and sales or quality rankings can be due to other unobserved factors (e.g., changed product quality) or other functions of advertising unrelated to quality signaling. Because of this issue, another stream of research uses experimental data to investigate how participants’
perceived product quality changes under manipulated conditions of advertising spending (e.g., Kirmani and Wright 1989, Kirmani 1990, Moorthy and Hawkins 2005).

Our research differs from the existing studies in a few important ways. Our study uses rich micro-level data that help test the theory against other alternative explanations, instead of aggregate-level data. It also differs from the experimental literature by using observational data which is important for the external validity of the study. Most importantly, because we obtain data on not only how consumers search but also how advertisers bid, we are able to study the strategic behaviors on the firm side, which has never been tested in the previous literature, simultaneously with the consumer behavior predicted by the theory.

In the search advertising context, a number of empirical studies have documented the effects of ad positions on clicks and purchase conversions (e.g., Ghose and Yang 2009, Yang and Ghose 2010, Agarwal et al. 2011, Goldfarb and Tucker 2011, Rutz and Bucklin 2011, Yao and Mela 2011, Chan and Park 2014). The common result is that the number of clicks increases as advertiser position moves up in the sponsored list. Recently, Narayanan and Kalyanam (2014) find a few moderators of the positions effects, and show that the effects are weaker for smaller firms and for keywords with less prior consumer experience. These empirical findings have served as the basis for a large stream of research in search advertising (and also served as a guideline for practitioners), but limited research is available to examine the underlying mechanisms of the position effects in search advertising. The exceptions are the theoretical works of Athey and Ellison (2011) and Chen and He (2011), who apply the signaling theory to explain the positive position effects. They study the optimal bidding strategy of advertisers with heterogeneous products or services competing against each other for search ad positions. Their analyses show that, for consumers with heterogeneous needs and preferences who are searching
for product information, when they can rationally infer the equilibrium auction outcomes, advertisers with high match value (i.e., their product offering can match with the needs and preferences of a large proportion of consumers) will bid more for high ad positions, since more relevant advertisers will benefit more from attracting consumers to their website. We therefore observe a separating equilibrium.\textsuperscript{18} The signaling approach we use in this study is based on their models.\textsuperscript{19}

To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that provides empirical evidence that firms use ad positions in search advertising to signal advertiser match value, which will influence consumers’ search behaviors. As the signaling theory has major implications for firm competition and welfare analysis, our findings are important to firms, policy makers, and academic researchers.

\textsuperscript{18} Jerath et al. (2011), however, show that it may also be optimal for a low-quality advertiser to outbid high-quality competitors. This “Position Paradox” occurs when some portion of the consumers are knowledgeable about the firms’ offerings and high-quality advertisers drop their bids to save cost, they do not lose too many clicks to inferior advertisers. It may be optimal for low-quality advertisers to maintain a high bid to attract potential consumers before they browse and click links from high-quality advertisers.

\textsuperscript{19} Search advertising has attracted much research interest in the economics and marketing literature. On the firm side, researchers have focused on the bidding strategies and advertiser competition in position auctions for keywords. In generalized second price auctions, equilibrium bidding strategies of which bidders bid optimally by their value per click have been studied (e.g., Edelman et al. 2007, Varian 2007). Chan and Park (2014) model the decisions of advertisers and propose using the method of moment inequalities when optimal conditions are not well defined. Yao and Mela (2011) structurally model advertisers’ dynamic bidding decisions assuming asymmetric valuations of sponsored positions for advertisers. Edelman and Ostrovsky (2007) estimate advertiser valuations without uncertainty in the search environment, and Athey and Nekipelov (2012) develop a homotopy-based method for computing equilibria when there is uncertainty about the set of competitors and individual users, and competing bids. Our research is also closely related to how consumers search for product information in the optimal sequence. Past literature has studied either non-sequential search (e.g., Stigler 1961) or sequential search (e.g., McCall 1970, Weitzman 1979). Kim et al. (2009) apply the Weitzman framework to model the optimal dynamic search process of consumers when shopping for camcorders at Amazon.com. De los Santos et al. (2012) use data on browsing and prices across websites to test different search models and argue that non-sequential search is more consistent with the data than sequential search and that consumers may update their belief of the distribution of prices during the search. Honka and Chintagunta (2014) use data on consumer shopping behavior in the U.S. auto insurance industry to identify the search strategy consumers use and argue that the largest insurance companies are better off when consumers search sequentially, while smaller companies profit from consumers searching simultaneously.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data. We outline the signaling model and present the key hypotheses to be tested in section 3. Section 4 presents the results of the hypotheses testing. In section 5, we test against several alternative explanations and conclude that our findings cannot be fully explained by these explanations. Section 6 explores an extended test of the data. We conclude with directions for future research in section 7.

2.2 Data

The data are from a leading search engine firm in Korea. In response to a keyword search, a list of sponsored ads is placed at the top of the search results page, with a maximum of five ads displayed. The search engine decides which sponsored links are displayed in which order, based on a second-price position auction similar to what Google uses; however, no quality score based on a link’s click potential is applied. Each advertiser pays each time the link is clicked, this is known as the cost-per-click (CPC) pricing. A list of organic links is placed below the list of sponsored links. Our data provider noted that commercial websites, which sell products related to search queries, are restricted from the organic listing. As such, there is negligible overlap between the links displayed in the organic (informational) and sponsored (commercial) listings. To be viewed by the consumer during the search, advertisers must bid to be placed in the sponsored listing. Organic links are chosen from a proprietary database consisting of different types of related content, such as general information pages on the topic (e.g., pages from

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20 We note that this layout is similar to the layout of popular US search engines such as Google and Bing, which display several (typically, up to three) sponsored links on the top of the results page following by the organic link. We refer readers to Jerath, Ma, and Park (2014) for details of the data.
Wikipedia), news, blogs and cafes (i.e., online communities run by the portal associated with the search engine), and a knowledge database where online users post questions and other users provide answers.

The search engine provided us the data on consumer search and advertiser bidding activities for a set of 8 keywords, all associated with travel, over the period of one month. On average, there are 16,059 search instances per keyword over the data period, with a standard deviation of 10,469. We observe which sponsored links and organic links the individual user clicks and at what time. Thus, the data provides us detailed information on the entire sequence of links clicked by a consumer (including either the sponsored or organic link), and the time of clicks. The information on the order of how consumers click sponsored links is important for this study since it helps test the hypotheses against some of the alternative explanations. Data on the entire sequence of consumer clicks across advertisers provide us a unique opportunity to test signaling effects from search advertising. Past research typically only relied on aggregate data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Across all keywords</th>
<th>Clearance Sale Flight Ticket</th>
<th>Travel Agency</th>
<th>Travel to Jeju Island</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Search volume</td>
<td>16,059</td>
<td>10,469</td>
<td>34,801</td>
<td>26,163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advertisers</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positions held daily per advertiser</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Selling propositions per advertiser</td>
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<td>0.23</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advertisers per ad position</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Position 2</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position 3</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position 4</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position 5</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
sourced from a single advertiser. Based on the sequence of clicks made by an individual consumer, we can correctly identify which link is the last one that a consumer clicks during the search process; thus, unlike Chan and Park (2014) we do not rely on behavioral assumptions (e.g., top-down browsing and sequential search) to infer terminal clicks.

We also observe from the data the identity of each advertiser displayed in the sponsored listing in response to a consumer’s search query. On average, as shown in Table 2.1, there are 15.6 advertisers per keyword competing for ad positions in the sponsored section. This is different from previous works (e.g., Ghose and Yang 2009, Yang and Ghose 2010, Agarwal et al. 2011, Rutz and Bucklin 2011) which often lack data on the complete list of sponsored links presented to consumers, as their data source comes from a single advertiser. In addition, we have data on advertisers’ bid amounts and the prices they pay. An advertiser’s position may change throughout the day as it alters its bid. There is significant variation in ad positions obtained by advertisers within a single day in data. The third row in Table 2.1 shows that the average number of ad positions per advertiser per keyword is 2.4 per day, with a standard deviation of 1.2. The table also presents the descriptive statistics for the top three most searched keywords, “Clearance Sale Flight Ticket”, “Travel Agency”, and “Travel to Jeju Island”, all demonstrating similar patterns. The information on the advertiser bidding activity in sponsored search advertising is unique since it helps understand how advertisers indeed behave in sponsored search advertising. We will explain in later sections how we use this daily variation in ad positions to test the effect of ad positions on click behavior. We also observe advertisers’ selling propositions which typically highlight current promotions, special travel packages, a website’s unique attributes, and so on. Most advertisers use the same proposition throughout the data period. The average number of unique selling propositions for each specific advertiser-keyword combination is 1.2. Table 2.1
shows that selling propositions have never been changed for “Clearance Sale Flight Ticket” and “Travel to Jeju Island” during the data period. The table also provides the information on the average number of advertisers who obtain each position. On average, 9.4 advertisers are placed at the topmost position at some point in the data period, while 15.3 advertisers obtain the fifth position. This indicates significant changes in advertisers’ bidding activity for these keywords in the data period.

It is worth discussing that the travel-related category satisfies several criteria for empirically testing the signaling theory in the search advertising context. First, consumers typically have large uncertainty regarding the travel services that they search. Searches can be costly as it takes time to browse and process all details provided from travel websites. Second, on the advertiser side, the travel service market is highly fragmented, with many competing service providers without anyone dominating. Consumers are not likely to have full information on the service offerings from every website prior to clicking its sponsored link. Advertisers’ offerings, and thus their match values, change frequently as airline seats sell out, hotels fill up, they receive blocks of tickets on promotion, and flight dates approach.

In addition, the travel-related category has a few important data features which help statistical testing. First, we observe a large number of search instances and active bidding from advertisers to obtain ad positions, with all five ad positions being occupied for the majority of the search instances (97.2%). As such, we avoid small sample issues for statistical testing. Second, each ad position has been occupied by many different advertisers (see Table 2.1). This helps us to separate the advertiser fixed effects from the effects of ad positions. For each advertiser, ad positions also vary across search instances, implying intensive competition among the advertisers. Third, we observe significant variations in CPC across ad positions, ranging from an
average of $0.57 for the topmost position to an average of $0.40 for the fifth position (see Table 2.1). We also observe significant variation in CPC for the same position and the same keyword during the data period. Fourth, for the purpose of testing alternative explanations for our findings, it would be desirable to have keywords that are narrowly defined (e.g., “Flight Ticket to Jeju Island”) and some keywords that are more general (e.g., “Flight Ticket”), and keywords focusing on a specific attribute (e.g., price in “Clearance Sale Flight Ticket”) and some which are more comprehensive (e.g., “Flight Ticket”). The purpose for this criterion will become clear later in the paper. Furthermore, because our research objectives are related to firm sales, we look for keywords that are relatively more likely to indicate the purchase intention from consumers. For example, a keyword search for “Flight Ticket to Jeju Island” is likely to be related to the intention of buying tickets, while a keyword search for “Jeju Island” may only serve for informational purposes.

2.3 The Signaling Model and Hypotheses

This section outlines the signaling model and describes how it is applied to the search advertising context. We highlight a set of testable predictions on the behaviors of consumers and advertisers, which constitute the signaling theory. Since our modeling approach is similar to Athey and Ellison (2011) and Chen and He (2011), we refer readers who are interested in how the equilibrium outcomes are derived to their papers for details.

We consider each search instance in the data as a search query made by an individual consumer. Athey and Ellison (2011) assume that each advertiser differs in the match value, i.e.,

\[ \text{We note that all bids are in Korean currency (won), where 1000 won corresponds approximately to $1.} \]
the probability of meeting a consumer’s needs, of its product or service offering, implying that
advertisers are horizontally differentiated. By focusing on horizontal, rather than vertical,
differentiation, we study the most basic case in search advertising, in which search queries could
be sufficiently broad that users may have many different intentions when searching the same
keyword. In such context, the key differentiation among advertisers is the likelihood that their
offerings fit with heterogeneous consumer needs.

Subsequent to a keyword search, consumer $i$ observes advertiser $j$ in the sponsored
listing. To test the signaling theory from data, we use an empirical specification to measure the
likelihood that the advertiser’s offering matches with the consumer’s needs. We assume that the
likelihood is driven by a latent utility that is determined by the advertiser’s offering for
consumer, which is specified as follows:

$$ V_{ij} = u_{ij} + v_{ij}, $$

(2.1)

The first component $u_{ij}$ is the portion of the utility which the consumer already has information
about prior to clicking the advertiser’s sponsored link. In empirical testing, it is specified as

$$ u_{ij} = \alpha_j + e_{ij}, $$

(2.2)

where $\alpha_j$ is the value averaged across consumers, and $e_{ij}$ is assumed to be iid across consumers.
By definition the average value of $e_{ij}$ across consumers is zero. The second component, $v_{ij}$, is
the unknown portion of the utility which the consumer can obtain from the advertiser’s website
by clicking its sponsored link. If $V_{ij}$ is larger than a threshold value (normalized to zero in empirical testing), the match is one, i.e., the consumer finds a match.

As an illustration, suppose the consumer is planning a vacation to Jeju Island, a popular vacation destination in Korea. She searches the keyword “Flight Ticket to Jeju Island” and finds a list of sponsored advertisers, including travel agents and airline carriers. The selling propositions in the ad, which typically consist of a phrase (such as “We offer flights to Jeju Island from major cities”), may convey information on what the advertiser offers to the consumer. This information, and the consumer’s prior knowledge about the advertiser, gives the consumer $u_{ij}$. Still, the consumer may have specific needs or preferences regarding the departure place, date and time of travel, etc. Detailed information of the advertiser’s offerings, captured by $u_{ij}$, is not available on the search results page. To find out what flights are available, she has to search for details from the advertiser’s website. The higher the value of $u_{ij}$, the higher the likelihood that the consumer finds the advertiser’s offering a good match. In empirical testing, we use a reduced-form way to specify this component as follows:

$$u_{ij} = \xi_j + \epsilon_{ij},$$  \hspace{1cm} (2.3)

where $\xi_j$ represents the average match value across consumers, and $\epsilon_{ij}$ captures the individual-specific stochastic component whose value is zero averaged across consumers. In the above example, $\xi_j$ will be higher if the advertiser has more flights to Jeju Island from different cities, or charges lower prices on average. The advertiser can thus match the needs and preferences of experience goods, consumers still have uncertainty regarding the actual consumption experience which information is not revealed from the advertiser’s website. We assume that the consumer’s objective is to maximize the expected value $V_{ij}$ conditional on all of the available information. As long as the uncertainty of post-purchase experience is independent from the conditional expectation, it will have no impact on the consumer’s search and purchase decisions.
more consumers. Some consumers, however, may have low $\varepsilon_{ij}$ because the advertiser does not offer a direct flight from their cities to Jeju Island or, even if there is a flight, the price of that specific flight is higher than the others. Both $\xi_j$ and $\varepsilon_{ij}$ are unknown to consumers by only seeing selling propositions. We also assume that $\varepsilon_{ij}$ is iid across advertisers and consumers.

Search advertising is costly for advertisers via second-price auctions. The higher the ad position the higher the cost an advertiser has to pay for each click. Based on the signaling theory, consumers use the observed ad positions to infer the unobserved match value of advertisers’ offerings. Therefore, the expected utility of the consumer, prior to clicking the sponsored link, can be expressed as:

$$E(V_{ij}|p_j) = \alpha_j + E(\xi_j|p_j) + e_{ij}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (2.4)

Observing that the ad position of advertiser $j$ ($p_j$) is higher than that of advertiser $k$ ($p_k$), the consumer will rationally infer that $E(\xi_j|p_j) > E(\xi_k|p_k)$. At a cost of clicking, $c_i$, the consumer can click on the advertiser’s sponsored link. In the above example, the cost comes from the time of searching for several flights from the departure city to Jeju Island that the advertiser offers on a specific date, checking for the price information, and possibly searching for packages with hotels and car rentals. Psychological costs (e.g., processing the information on flights and their prices) may also incur. Suppose the consumer searches optimally in a sequential way, she will click on the link if its expected match value, conditional on the ad position of the link, is higher than other sponsored links that have not been clicked, and the expected benefit of
clicking the link outweighs the cost of clicking.\textsuperscript{23} This explains why consumers are more likely to click on top ad positions, offering us the first hypothesis to be tested:

\textbf{Hypothesis 1:} \textit{Top ad positions generate more clicks, after controlling for the partial information \((u_{ij})\) that consumers may have prior to clicking.}

After the consumer clicks into the advertiser’s website, the match value component \(u_{ij} = \xi_j + \varepsilon_{ij}\) will be revealed. If the consumer finds the advertiser’s offering a match (i.e., \(V_{ij}\) is larger than the threshold value), she will terminate the search. Otherwise, the consumer will click on the next link which, among all other links that have not been clicked, has the highest expected match value, as long as the expected benefit of clicking the link outweighs the cost of clicking. The process will continue in a similar fashion. When the market is at equilibrium, the consumer’s belief is consistent with the advertiser’s bidding strategy. That is, if \(p_j\) is higher than \(p_k\) (and thus \(E(\xi_j|p_j) > E(\xi_k|p_k)\)), \(\xi_j\) is higher than \(\xi_k\). Therefore, compared with those who click at low ad positions, more consumers who click at top ad positions will be able to find a match.

We do not directly observe the match since we do not have consumer purchase data; however, we observe the entire sequence of sponsored and organic links that a consumer clicks. Since consumers will terminate their search after finding a match, we use terminal clicks of keyword searches to test the prediction. A terminal click refers to the last sponsored or organic link clicked by a consumer during the search process. We argue that terminal clicks and the probability that consumers find a match are positively correlated. This assumption is supported

\textsuperscript{23} In the stylized models in Athey and Ellison (2011) and Chen and He (2011), the link will be the topmost one in the sponsored listing. In our setup, however, consumer \(i\) may start clicking advertiser \(j\) listed at a lower position if the prior knowledge \(u_{ij}\) is sufficiently high.
by Chan and Park (2014) who find that, for search advertising, advertisers’ value comes nearly entirely from such terminal clicks. This result may imply a strong correlation between terminal clicks and purchase occasions, but the opposite for non-terminal clicks and purchase occasions. They argue that, since there is little reason why the probability of non-match occasions for terminal clicks may differ across ad positions, terminal clicks can be a good proxy for the match likelihood. On this logic, non-terminal clicks and terminal clicks on organic links likely indicate that consumers, after clicking sponsored links, do not find a match from advertisers’ offerings. Based on this reasoning, we propose the second hypothesis that focuses on consumer terminal clicks by ad positions:

Hypothesis 2: Conditional on being clicked, top ad positions have a higher likelihood for being a terminal click.

Our empirical tests extend beyond the consumer behavior on the search results page. The signaling theory states that, with a higher match value ($\zeta_j$), an advertiser is willing to bid more for a high ad position to signal the match value. This is because, after clicking the sponsored link, a large proportion of consumers will find the offering a good match; thus, each consumer click is more valuable to the advertiser (see Athey and Ellison 2011). For the theory to work, it is

24 If there is a difference between terminal clicks and the probability of a match across ad positions, it is likely that lower positions will have a disproportionately lower probability of a match, given a terminal click, for two reasons. First, a consumer terminating search on a lower link may have searched through higher positioned advertisers and concluded their search having not found a match. Second, if a consumer were to click multiple links, keeping a tab with a clicked link open, and then return that link to purchase (we will not observe this in the data), it is relatively more likely that the observed terminal click will be a lower positioned advertiser and the match was with one in a higher position. These two points indicate that our results would serve to be conservative due to our use of terminal clicks.

25 Existing studies use aggregate data sourced from a single advertising firm which includes purchase conversions at the advertiser. However, they are conducted from the perspective of one single advertiser, and thus lack data on clicks on sponsored and organic links of other entities on the search results page. In other words, they do not have sufficient data to give a comprehensive picture of user behavior on the search results page. In this study, we use data from a search engine and have information on clicks on the full lists of sponsored and organic links presented after a keyword search.
important that the bidding decision is driven by $\xi_j$, and not entirely by $\alpha_j$, the part that consumers already know before clicking the sponsored link. Testing this prediction is difficult, since consumers’ information set is unobserved to researchers. In this study, we make use of the panel structure of the data: we observe how bid amounts vary not only across advertisers, but also over time within advertisers. For each advertiser, $\xi_j$ is not necessarily fixed over time.

Available flight times to Jeju Island, for example, may fluctuate within the advertiser, depending on how many tickets are sold as the flight date gets closer. We observe a unique feature in the data: often an advertiser’s ad position remains unchanged even when it increases the bid (i.e. the advertiser cannot outbid any of its competitors at higher positions). This is because the advertiser has uncertainty regarding how much other advertisers will bid, so the ad position only fluctuates with bid amounts in a probabilistic way. If the bid decision is driven by the increase in $\xi_j$, we should observe an increase in the likelihood of terminal clicks. However, since $\xi_j$ is not observed by consumers before clicking, the likelihood of clicking the advertiser’s sponsored link should not increase without the change in ad position. On the other hand, if the bid decision is entirely driven by the change in $\alpha_j$, the likelihood of clicking should also change accordingly. Based on this reasoning, we test the last hypothesis as the following:

Hypothesis 3: The likelihood that an advertiser’s link is chosen for a terminal click improves (diminishes), as the advertiser bids more (less) even though the ad position remains unchanged. The likelihood that the link is chosen for a click, however, will not change.

The three hypotheses constitute the signaling story: Consumers believe higher positioned advertisers to be of higher match value, advertisers with higher match value are on average in
higher positions, and when its match value improves, an advertiser increases its bid. This paper uses rich micro-level data to test these hypotheses. It is important to note that we do not argue that signaling is the only explanation for observed consumer and advertiser behaviors. A number of alternative explanations might predict similar outcomes. In a later section, we control for these non-signaling explanations for the results to investigate whether the signaling effects on both consumers and advertisers are still present.

### 2.4 Empirical Analysis and Results

#### 2.4.1 Testing Hypothesis 1

Table 2.2 presents summary statistics about the click-through rate (CTR) and terminal click-through rate (TCTR) by ad positions. It shows that higher CTR associates with higher ad positions. This is consistent with the main finding from the empirical work in search advertising that advertisements at higher positions attract more clicks from consumers (e.g., Agarwal et al. 2009, Feng et al. 2007, Ghose and Yang 2009, Chan and Park 2014). The topmost position is

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Across all keywords</th>
<th>Clearance Sale Flight Ticket</th>
<th>Travel Agency</th>
<th>Travel to Jeju Island</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Std. Dev.</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Std. Dev.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTR (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position 1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position 2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position 3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position 4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position 5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCTR (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position 1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position 2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position 3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position 4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position 5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
especially valuable as its CTR is almost twice that of the second position. We also compare the CTR across positions for the three most commonly searched keywords and find similar results (see the last three columns in Table 2.2). These results provide support for Hypothesis 1, which is consistent with the predictions from the signaling model.

Comparing the average CTR across ad positions, however, does not directly support the signaling theory on how search advertising works. The theory states that high ad positions are more likely to be clicked because they signal the unobserved $\xi$’s, not because of the observed $\alpha$’s (see equation (2.4)). Suppose an advertiser who has a reputation of high match value bids higher to obtain top positions. If consumers have prior knowledge about the reputation, they will be more likely to click the advertiser’s link. Another possibility is that the advertiser provides information about its high match value in the selling propositions (e.g., “50% off flights”). If the advertiser also bids higher, data will exhibit the positive correlation between ad positions and CTR; however, these cases are not consistent with the signaling explanation that we study. Therefore, a regression approach is required for testing Hypothesis 1 to control for the $\alpha$’s of advertisers that consumers know prior to clicking sponsored links.

We use a reduced-form regression that is based on equation (2.4). We assume that consumer $i$ makes a binary choice of whether or not to click on the sponsored link of advertiser $j$, and the stochastic term $e_{ij}$ has an EV Type 1 distribution (for the identification in the estimation). We estimate $\alpha_j$ as a fixed effect. If an advertiser attracts clicks because of its reputation, the fixed effect will capture such effect thus the variation in the positions of the advertiser’s sponsored link should have no impact on CTR. To test the signaling effects, we estimate $\delta_{pj} \equiv$
E(ξj|pj) as a parameter that is specific for each ad position, representing consumers’ inference of the unobserved match value, conditional on the ad position, averaged across all advertisers on that position. As a result, the probability that user i clicks advertiser j’s link for a given keyword in the regression is as follows:

\[
\Pr(\text{user } i \text{ clicks advertiser } j\text{'s link}|p_j) = \frac{\exp(\alpha_j + \delta p_j)}{1+\exp(\alpha_j + \delta p_j)}.
\]

(2.5)\textsuperscript{26}

The results for the effects of ad positions, \(\delta p_j\), are reported in Table 2.3. The first two columns summarize the results from all keywords considered in this research, with the standard deviation of the estimates across keywords, and the last three columns report the results from the three most searched keywords as examples. The effect of the topmost position (Position 1) is normalized to zero, so the estimates for lower positions reflect the change in click potential relative to the topmost position. The estimates from Position 2 to Position 5 are all significant and negative for each keyword, implying that, after controlling for the prior information \(\alpha_j\), consumers expect a higher \(\xi_j\), as the advertiser’s ad position improves, and thus are more likely to click on the website. The largest jump in the click probability occurs when an advertiser

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|cc|ccc|}
\hline
 & Across all keywords & Clearance Sale & Travel Agency & Travel to Jeju Island \\
 & Mean & Std. Dev. & Flight Ticket & & \\
\hline
Position 1: Base & 0.00 & -- & 0.00 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\
Position 2 & -0.72 & 0.20 & -0.82\textsuperscript{a} & -0.62\textsuperscript{a} & -0.59\textsuperscript{a} \\
Position 3 & -0.97 & 0.26 & -1.13\textsuperscript{a} & -0.73\textsuperscript{a} & -0.95\textsuperscript{a} \\
Position 4 & -1.09 & 0.25 & -1.12\textsuperscript{a} & -0.99\textsuperscript{a} & -0.99\textsuperscript{a} \\
Position 5 & -1.13 & 0.30 & -1.28\textsuperscript{a} & -0.97\textsuperscript{a} & -1.13\textsuperscript{a} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Results of Click Behavior}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{a} Significant at the 1 percent level}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{26} Competition effects from other advertisers are not included here. We will examine such effects later in the paper.
moves from Position 2 to Position 1. This result is consistent throughout all other analyses. To conclude, our test results support Hypothesis 1.27

### 2.4.2 Testing Hypothesis 2

For the signaling theory to work, consumers should also be more likely to find the offering from advertisers at higher ad positions a match. Under the assumption that terminal clicks are a good measure for comparing matches, it is expected to find that advertisers at higher positions are more adept at producing terminal clicks once consumers have clicked the link. To test this hypothesis, we first look at the TCTR, unconditional on clicks, from the top to the bottom position in the data. The lower panel of Table 2.2 shows that the higher the ad position the more likely a sponsored link will be chosen as the terminal click during keyword search. Specifically, the topmost position generates twice as many terminal clicks as the second position across the keywords in this study. These patterns are also consistent when comparing the top three searched keywords.

We further utilize the regression approach to test Hypothesis 2. From equations (1) to (3), the consumer latent utility can be written as

\[ V_{ij} = \alpha_j + \xi_j + \omega_{ij}, \]

where \( \omega_{ij} \equiv v_{ij} + e_{ij} \). After clicking into a website, the consumer will terminate search if the advertiser’s offering matches her needs; otherwise she will continue searching. Conditional on

---

27 There are additional issues, as \( \alpha_j \) may vary over time and lead to the change in the advertiser’s ad position. In this case our estimated \( \delta_{pj} \) may be biased. Further, consumers may simply search in a non-strategic top-down manner. Such behavior could also explain our results. We will investigate these issues in the next section when we examine alternative explanations for the results.
the ad position $p_j$, the probability that the link is a match implies that $V_{ij}$ is larger than a threshold (normalized to zero) is

\[ \Pr(\text{user } i \text{ terminates search after clicking link } j \mid p_j) = \Pr(V_{ij} \geq 0 \mid p_j). \]

The signaling theory predicts that $p_j$ is monotonically increasing with $\xi_j$; therefore, we can rewrite the above probability function as

\[ \Pr(\text{user } i \text{ terminates search after clicking link } j \mid p_j) = \Pr(\alpha + \xi(p_j) + \omega_{ij} \geq 0), \quad (2.6) \]

where \( \xi(p_j) \) is a monotonically increasing function of the ad position.

We use a reduced-form regression to test the relationship between $\xi_j$ and $p_j$. For the identification of model estimation, we assume that $\omega_{ij}$ has EV Type 1 distribution, and treat $\xi(p_j)$ as a position-specific parameter to be estimated. Therefore, probability function (2.6) is as follows,

\[ \Pr(\text{user } i \text{ terminates search after clicking link } j \mid p_j) = \frac{\exp(\alpha_j + \xi(p_j))}{1 + \exp(\alpha_j + \xi(p_j))}. \quad (2.7) \]

Let $S_i$ be the set of links clicked by consumer $i$, and $t_{ij}$ be an indicator function that is equal to 1 if the user terminates search after clicking link $j$, and 0 otherwise. At most one link from $S_i$ has $t_{ij} = 1$ and, if none of the clicks are terminal clicks, we have $\sum_{j \in S_i} t_{ij} = 0$. The conditional likelihood of the choice of terminating clicks $\{t_{ij}; j \in S_i\}$ is

\[ \Pr(t_{ij}; j \in S_i \mid \mathbf{p}) = \prod_{j \in S_i} \left( \frac{\exp(\alpha_j + \xi(p_j))}{1 + \exp(\alpha_j + \xi(p_j))} \right)^{t_{ij}} \times \left(1 - \frac{\exp(\alpha_j + \xi(p_j))}{1 + \exp(\alpha_j + \xi(p_j))} \right)^{1-t_{ij}}, \quad (2.8) \]
where $p$ is the vector of all advertisers’ positions. Under this specification, the likelihood is the product of binary logit probabilities, conditional on the set of links that have been clicked.\(^{28}\)

Table 2.4 presents the estimation results. The negative estimates for $\xi(p_j)$ suggest that the $\xi$’s at lower positions are lower than that for the top position, which is normalized to 0. Furthermore, the lower the ad position the smaller the estimated $\xi(p_j)$, a monotonic relationship predicted by the signaling theory. These results provide significant evidence supporting Hypothesis 2 and the signaling prediction that advertisers at higher positions are more likely to match with consumers than advertisers at lower positions.

### Table 2.4: Results of Terminal Click Behavior

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Across all keywords</th>
<th>Clearance Sale</th>
<th>Travel Flight Ticket</th>
<th>Travel Agency</th>
<th>Travel to Jeju Island</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Std. Dev.</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Std. Dev.</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position 1: Base</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position 2</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>-0.21(^b)</td>
<td>-0.22(^b)</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position 3</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>-0.29(^b)</td>
<td>-0.24(^c)</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position 4</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position 5</td>
<td>-0.34</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Significant at the 1 percent level, \(^b\) 5 percent, \(^c\) 10 percent

### 2.4.3 Testing Hypothesis 3

We now test the relationship between an advertiser’s bid decision and the likelihood that its link will match with a given consumer. As we have discussed before, advertisers in our data frequently change bids for specific keywords but their ad positions could remain unchanged (i.e., they cannot outbid advertisers on top). The signaling theory predicts that, when an advertiser

\(^{28}\) A multinomial logit (MNL) model is not a correct specification. The implicit assumption of the MNL model is that a consumer first clicks on a number of links and then determines which will be her terminal click. The main issue is that if only one sponsored link is clicked, the likelihood that the link is a terminal link is 100% no matter how estimates change; thus, this observation is non-informative for estimating the position effects. In our data most of these consumers choose the top-positioned link. On the other hand, consumers who click multiple links typically terminate their search at lower positions. This is because consumers often start searching at top positions and, if the links are not a match, they will continue down the list and stop searching at lower positions. We estimate such a model. Results show that, relative to the topmost position, lower-ranked positions are more likely to generate terminal clicks, clearly inconsistent with the observations from Table 2.2.
increases its bid, it will generate more terminal clicks, while remaining at the same ad position, as the bid increase reflects an increase in the match value unobserved to consumers \((\xi_j)\). The consumer will be more likely to terminate her search with the advertiser because, after clicking into the advertiser’s website, the consumer will be more likely to find a match.

We test the correlation between the TCTR of an advertiser and its bids. We construct indicator variables for every advertiser-position combination in the data set, and then model terminal click as a MNL decision out of all listed sponsored links for each search occasion. The probability that user \(i\) chooses advertiser \(j\) at position \(l\) for the terminal click is as follows:

\[
Pr(\text{user } i \text{ terminal-clicks advertiser } j\text{'s link at position } l) = \frac{\exp(BID_{ij} \beta + \alpha_{jl})}{1 + \sum_{j' = 1}^{J} \exp(BID_{ij'} \beta + \alpha_{j'l'})},
\] (2.9)

where \(\alpha_{jl}\) is the fixed effect for advertiser \(j\) listed at position \(l\), and \(\alpha_{j'l'}\) is the fixed effect for competing advertiser \(j'\) at position \(l'\). \(BID_{ij}\) is the bid amount of advertiser \(j\) for the keyword. Terminal clicks for organic links, or no clicks at all, are the outside option, whose value is captured by “1” in the denominator. We estimate 503 advertiser-position fixed effects in the regression. If changing bid amounts leads to changing positions, the effect on terminal clicks is captured by such fixed effects. The parameter \(\beta\), therefore, is estimated from the variation in advertisers’ bids which does not alter their positions. The reason that we choose the MNL specification is because it controls for competitor effects, where other advertisers may also increase bids and have an effect on the TCTR of advertiser \(j\). Our estimation results show that \(\beta\) is positive (0.56) and is significant at the 1% level. This indicates that an advertiser’s bid is positively correlated with the TCTR, even when its ad position remains unchanged, providing support for the first part of Hypothesis 3.
To test whether this positive correlation is due to some “macro shocks”, under which the advertisers simultaneously increase (decrease) bid amounts, due to increased (decreased) profitability from search advertising shared by everyone (e.g., advertisers may drop their bids at night if fewer clicks at night convert to purchases), but remain in the same ad positions, we further estimate another MNL model, allowing indicators for both the day of the month and the time of the day as additional explanatory variables in the regression. In this robustness check, $\beta$ remains positive (0.63) and significant at the 1% level. The results are strong evidence supporting the firm behaviors predicted by the signaling theory.

The second part of Hypothesis 3 states that the change in the advertiser’s bid decision is not driven by the change in $\alpha_j$, the part in the latent utility that consumers already know before clicking into the advertiser’s website. If only $\xi_j$ changes, the CTR should not correlate with the advertiser’s bid decision, since consumers do not observe how much each advertiser bids. To test this hypothesis, we further run a “placebo” test by using a logit model to regress clicks, rather than terminal clicks, against advertiser-position fixed effects and bid amounts. Our estimation results show that the estimated $\beta$ is small in magnitude and statistically insignificant ($\beta = 0.09$, $p$-value = 0.48). Therefore, when an advertiser increases its bid, but remains in the same position, it is more likely to generate terminal clicks, but not more likely to generate clicks. Combining all of these test results, it suggests that when advertisers increase their bids, it is not entirely due to the change in their service offering that is known by consumers prior to clicking sponsored links. They do so because of the improvement in the unknown match value, which they can signal through their ad positions.
In total, these tests have provided evidence for the three main predictions of signaling theory: consumers are more likely to click on advertisers in higher positions, consumers are more likely to match with advertisers in higher positions, and when advertisers will increase their bids, their offerings are more likely to match with consumers’ needs. In the next section we will discuss a number of possible non-signaling explanations for these results.

2.5 Alternative Explanations

In section 4 we have established the key results to support that signaling theory is at work in our empirical context. However, there may be other, non-signaling, explanations that lead to such results. In this section we explore several key alternative explanations and show that they cannot fully explain our findings. We do not argue that these factors do not affect consumer click behaviors, or that signaling is the only explanation; instead, our goal is to test whether, despite the existence of other factors, signaling match value plays a significant role in the search advertising market.

2.5.1 Endogeneity due to External Factors

We have shown a positive relationship between the positions of advertisers and their CTR and TCTR. Sponsored positions, however, are endogenously determined by the bidding decisions of advertisers. Suppose advertisers engage in marketing activities (e.g., an ad campaign in radio or on TV may increase consumers’ interest in the advertiser) that consumers know prior to clicking into their websites but as researchers we do not observe. If advertisers also bid for higher positions, this creates an endogeneity issue what can lead to biased results in the tests for
Hypotheses 1 and 2. Notice that if an advertiser participates in such activities that increase its match value, and at the same time improves its ad position to send signals to consumers, this is consistent with the signaling model. We differentiate between the activities of which consumers are informed only via signaling from ad positions, and activities that do not rely on signaling. To establish the signaling effect from search advertising, we have to control for the latter explanation.

Results from testing Hypothesis 3 partly address such a concern, since they suggest that advertisers’ bid decisions are not entirely driven by the activities that consumers already know. This strategy of testing, however, relies on the observations in which the advertiser’s ad position does not change with bids. What about the test results that are conditional on changes in ad positions? To rule out that they are driven by the external factors that are observed by consumers prior to clicking, we turn to the binary logit model in equation (2.5) that we use to test Hypothesis 1, where we assume \( \alpha_j \) to be an advertiser-specific fixed effect. If the advertiser’s external activities (as well as any other factors that impact consumer clicks) remain unchanged in the data period, then the effect has been captured by \( \alpha_j \). The concern is that the advertiser effect may change within the data period because of time-varying external factors. We use a unique feature in our data to control for this possible explanation: on average, an advertiser in data is placed in 2.4 (or 2 as the median) positions per day. We estimate the consumer click decision with a binary logit model, but allow for unique advertiser-day fixed effects. This estimation will separate out the effects from unobserved external factors that remain constant within a day from the position effects. The latter effects can only be identified from those advertisers whose ad positions have changed within a day. The results are presented in Table 2.5. We again find significant position effects that are of roughly the same magnitude to those estimates presented in [84].
Table 2.3. The results provide significant evidence that unobserved outside factors are not key drivers for the positions effects, since their effects should have a more gradual effect on the consumer search behavior.

Table 2.5: Results of Click Behavior with Advertiser-Day Fixed Effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Across all keywords</th>
<th>Clearance Sale Flight Ticket</th>
<th>Travel Agency</th>
<th>Travel to Jeju Island</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Std. Dev.</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Std. Dev.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position 1: Base</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position 2</td>
<td>-0.71</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>-0.77*</td>
<td>-0.64*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position 3</td>
<td>-0.90</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>-1.16*</td>
<td>-0.75*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position 4</td>
<td>-1.02</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>-1.25*</td>
<td>-1.09*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position 5</td>
<td>-1.09</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>-1.25*</td>
<td>-1.06*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Significant at the 1 percent level

After controlling for the advertiser-day fixed effects, there may still be a reason why $\alpha_j$ varies even within the same day. Sponsored search ads convey messages, selling propositions, to consumers regarding advertisers’ offerings or promotions in their websites. Consumers observe the ads but as researchers we don’t. If, by creating more attractive ad message, advertisers also increase bids and thus obtain top positions, our results are generated by the change in the ad message, and not by the signaling effect. In our data, however, advertisers rarely change ad messages (108 of 116 advertiser-keyword combinations use the same selling propositions throughout the data period) even when positions change frequently. To ensure that the eight remaining advertisers who have used multiple selling propositions are not driving the position effects, we estimate the click model for three keywords, “Clearance Sale Flight Tickets”, “Travel Agency”, and “Travel to Jeju Island”. For these keywords, no advertisers change selling propositions within the sample period. We find that the position effects are still significant and of similar magnitude compared to the other keywords (see results from Table 2.3).
2.5.2 Top-Down Browsing

Another potential explanation is that consumers simply employ non-strategic top-down browsing. If the search cost is high, consumers are more likely to click top-positioned links and also terminate their search process there. There is an important distinction to be made here. If users are searching from top to bottom on the search results page because they infer that advertisers with higher match value are placed at the top, this is consistent with the signaling model we are testing. We will show that our findings are not entirely driven by non-strategic behaviors due to habit or preference for the simplicity of browsing.

To investigate this explanation, we classify top-down browsing as the case when a consumer clicks on sponsored links from top to down (they can skip links), then follow with clicking organic links, on the search results page. In 37% of the search occasions, in which consumers click on multiple links and at least one being a sponsored link, such top-down behavior is exhibited. Since we do not have data on the positions of the organic links clicked by a consumer, and it is possible that these consumers followed a strategic decision process that simply led to a top-down browsing pattern, this is the maximum proportion of consumer clicking non-strategically from top down on the search results page, implying that at least 63% of the searches do not follow such behavior. We further investigate the position effects among those 63% search instances. We first study consumers whose first clicks are on an organic link, and employ the binary logit regression as in equation (2.5). This segment of consumers self-selects out of being a top-down searcher if they then click on a sponsored link. Note that this behavior does not violate the signaling model in a general sense, because consumers may collect information from organic links first, then go back to decide from which advertiser they will buy.
Bentley et al. (2015) study why, when there are uncertainties for the keyword and advertisers’ offerings, consumers may search organic results before clicking sponsored links, and how the

Table 2.6: Results of Click Behavior with First Clicks Being on Organic Links

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Across all keywords</th>
<th>Clearance Sale</th>
<th>Travel Flight Ticket</th>
<th>Travel Agency</th>
<th>Travel to Jeju Island</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Std. Dev.</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position 1: Base</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position 2</td>
<td>-0.55</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>-0.73*</td>
<td>-0.45*</td>
<td>-0.47*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position 3</td>
<td>-0.71</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>-1.00*</td>
<td>-0.59*</td>
<td>-0.70*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position 4</td>
<td>-0.86</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>-1.07*</td>
<td>-0.78*</td>
<td>-0.74*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position 5</td>
<td>-0.87</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>-1.05*</td>
<td>-0.75*</td>
<td>-0.98*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a Significant at the 1 percent level

information from organic results impacts the probability of clicking sponsored links. Table 2.6 presents the regression results. The position effects are still significant, similar to our previous findings. These cannot be explained by the top-down browsing behavior.

To further investigate the explanation of top-down browsing behavior, we estimate two additional models in which consumers select out of top-down browsing. First, we estimate the model conditional on observations in which consumers first click on the fifth (last) sponsored link. Very few consumers do so (1,124 out of 128,473 search instances), and even fewer follow up by clicking more sponsored links. Because of the lack of observations, we pool all keywords in the estimation and only focus on the effect from the top position. The estimated coefficient is 0.34 (the effects of lower-positions are normalized to zero), significant at the 1% level, indicating that the topmost position attracts more clicks than all other positions that are above the fifth link. We also estimate the model conditional on the first click being at any sponsored link lower than the topmost position. Again, we only estimate the effect from the topmost position, while normalizing the effects from all lower positions to be zero. Once again we find a significant positive top rank effect (0.19 at the 5% level). Both results provide further evidence

[87]
that the non-strategic top down behavior is not the sole driver of the results in our empirical context.

2.5.3 Persuasive Function

Another potential driver of our results on the signaling theory is persuasion in advertising. The signaling model suggests that consumers believe that advertisers with high match value are more likely to occupy high ad positions. In a broad sense, the persuasion explanation is consistent with such a model. The alternative explanation we investigate here is that the consumer belief is not rational, as advertisers with lower match value outbid advertisers with higher match value to gain clicks and sales from consumers who follow the belief. Jerath et al. (2011) offer a possible explanation why such bidding strategy is an equilibrium outcome and rationalize the so-called “Position Paradox”. They assume that uninformed consumers follow a top-down search strategy which, in some occasions, may not be optimal given advertisers’ bidding strategy, while informed consumers begin their search with the superior firm regardless of ad position in sponsored listing. Our goal is to test whether our findings are only driven by this pure persuasive advertising explanation.

Suppose consumers’ expectation is not consistent with advertisers’ bidding strategy. In such case, it is expected to find TCTR not to be positively correlated with the ad position. This is inconsistent with our findings when testing Hypothesis 2. A potential counter-argument is that, suppose search is costly for consumers. Consumers are more likely to stop searching after clicking top positions. However, this argument cannot explain our findings when testing Hypothesis 3. There should be no reasons that the TCTR increases with increasing bids from advertisers, when their ad positions remain constant. Also, since the CTR does not change (as we
have shown in the “placebo” test) in this scenario, the persuasion function of ad positions does not seem to have improved. Therefore, the tests for Hypotheses 2 and 3 show that our findings are not solely driven by the pure persuasive function of ad positions.

We follow up with another test comparing the position effects across keywords. There are some “general” keywords that consist of multiple product or service offerings (e.g., “Flight Ticket” consists of flights to different destinations), and multiple attributes for the offerings (e.g., “Flight Ticket” consists of not only prices but also departure and arrival places and flight schedules), that consumers care about. For these keywords, the offerings from an advertiser may be a good match for some consumers but not for the others. The markets are therefore more horizontally differentiated. In contrast, there are “focused” keywords that are restricted to specific product or service offerings (e.g., “Flight Ticket to Jeju Island” focuses on a single destination) or attributes (e.g., “Clearance Sales Flight Ticket” targets consumers looking for low prices). For such keywords, the needs and preferences of consumers are well defined and less heterogeneous. The difference can be illustrated from equation (2.3). The magnitude of the variance of $\xi$’s across advertisers, relative to the magnitude of the variance of $\epsilon$’s across individual consumers and advertisers, should be larger for focused keyword than for general keywords. For focused keywords, advertisers with high $\xi$’s have a larger likelihood that their offerings match the needs and preferences of individual consumers who click at their sponsored links, so they are more likely to bid higher than advertisers with low $\xi$’s. Knowing this, rational consumers are also more likely to click on high-positioned sponsored links. The signaling function thus is stronger for focused keywords than general keywords. If our findings are only driven by persuasive advertising, however, there should not be any difference between “general”
keywords and “focused” keywords regarding the advertiser and consumer behaviors, as consumers would not be rationally inferring advertisers’ bidding incentives.

We compare four pairs of keywords in which the first keyword in the pair is more general than the second, which is more focused, as follows:

1. “Flight Ticket” vs. “Flight Ticket to Jeju Island”
2. “Travel to Jeju Island” vs. “Flight Ticket to Jeju Island”
3. “Travel Agencies” and “Price Comparison of Travel Agencies”
4. “Flight Ticket” and “Clearance Sale Flight Ticket”

“Flight Ticket to Jeju Island” is similar to “Flight Ticket” without the variety of destinations, “Flight Ticket to Jeju Island” is a specific travel mode of “Travel to Jeju Island,” “Price Comparison of Travel Agencies” narrows down the attributes of interest for “Travel Agencies” to price, as does “Clearance Sale Flight Ticket” when compared to “Flight Ticket.”

We run a binary logit model of consumer clicks to estimate the position effects for general keywords, and the differences in the effects between the two types of keywords for each ad position. The coefficient for the top position is normalized to zero, so a negative coefficient for the differences will mean that the signaling effect (of top position, relative to lower positions) is stronger for focused keywords. Table 2.7 shows the results. All coefficients are negative, with the majority being significant. These results offer further evidence that the persuasive effect cannot fully explain our findings. Yet the signaling theory can rationalize why there are differences between keywords.
Table 2.7: Results of Click Behavior with Differences in Position Effects between General and Focused Keywords

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Keyword Pairs</th>
<th>Position 1: Base</th>
<th>Position 2</th>
<th>Position 3</th>
<th>Position 4</th>
<th>Position 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General keywords</td>
<td>Flight Ticket</td>
<td>Travel to Jeju Island</td>
<td>Travel Agencies</td>
<td>Flight Ticket</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focused keywords</td>
<td>Flight Ticket to Jeju Island</td>
<td>Flight Ticket to Jeju Island</td>
<td>Price Comparison of Travel Agencies</td>
<td>Clearance Sale Flight Ticket</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position 1: Base</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position 2</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.25&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-0.46&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position 3</td>
<td>-0.31&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>-0.72&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-0.32&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position 4</td>
<td>-0.43&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-0.30&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-0.58&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-0.34&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position 5</td>
<td>-0.31&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-0.77&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-0.29&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Significant at the 1 percent level, <sup>b</sup> 5 percent, <sup>c</sup> 10 percent

2.5.4 Informative Function

Another important role of advertising identified in the literature is the informative function. Broadly speaking, the signaling function of advertising is also informative to consumers regarding the match value of advertisers. We examine here the narrow definition of the informative function, i.e., the selling proposition in an advertisement informs consumers about the existence of the advertiser’s website, prices, and product or service offerings that affects consumers’ click and purchase decisions.

If an ad in sponsored listing is to inform consumers of the advertiser’s website, there is no reason why top positions will get more clicks than lower positions, assuming that consumers browse all sponsored links before clicking. If consumers browse top-down and decide whether they will click each sponsored link sequentially, the advertiser at the top position may generate more clicks. However, our previous tests, using observations in which consumers click organic links first and click lower positions first, do not support this argument. Therefore, we can rule out that our findings of the position effects are driven by the informative function of search advertising on the consumer awareness. Furthermore, since we have included advertiser fixed
effects when testing Hypothesis 1, the position effects we have identified could be driven by the changes in selling propositions within advertisers. As we have shown in Section 5.1 when investigating the alternative explanation that the advertiser effects may be time-varying, advertisers rarely change ad messages even when positions change frequently. We also find that the position effects are still significant for the three keywords of which selling propositions have never changed. Therefore, the position effects we have documented are not driven by the informative function.

2.6 Spillover Effects of Advertising

We study in this section how the CTR of a sponsored link is influenced by competing sponsored links, and show the existence of an information externality that is consistent with the signaling framework. In search advertising, sponsored ads appear so that consumers can navigate through listings to search for information. The advertisement from an advertiser with good offerings may send a positive signal about the match value of other sponsored links. Jeziorski and Segal (2014) suggest that “such updating would generate positive informational externalities across ads, i.e., an ad would benefit from having better ads in the same impression.” On the other hand, such an advertiser will also attract consumers searching its website first and thus may reduce the likelihood of clicking other sponsored links, creating a competitive effect. Which effect dominates the other one is an important empirical question for online advertisers as well as search engines.

The phenomenon of the “informational externality” can be rationalized via the signaling model. In the model of Athey and Ellison (2011), consumers update the expected value for the
ξ’s for the links that have not been clicked, conditional on the revealed ξ’s from links that have been clicked, as well as the positions of all links, in a Bayesian way. Consider searching the keyword “Travel to Jeju Island” returns two sponsored links. Let the match value ξ’s be distributed uniformly from 0 to 1, with 1 being the highest possible value. Suppose a consumer finds that the average match value of the advertiser at the top position is high at 0.8 (e.g., the advertiser offers low prices for packaged tours to Jeju Island) but nothing matches with her specific needs (e.g., there are no tours on the dates she wants to travel). Based on the information of the match value of the advertiser, the consumer will infer the match value of the advertiser below is between 0 and 0.8, with the updated expectation equal to 0.4. She may continue her search by clicking the sponsored link below. If, instead, the average match value of the top advertiser is 0.2, the consumer will infer that the average match value of the advertiser below is between 0 and 0.2 with the updated expectation at 0.1. The consumer may be more likely to terminate her search after clicking the sponsored link at the top. This suggests that the existence of an advertiser with high match value may increase the number of clicks that a competing advertiser obtains, creating a “market expansion” effect, i.e., increasing the number of consumers who clicks sponsored links. Competition of course is also important. If most consumers, after first searching the website of the advertiser at the top, find a match and thus terminate the search, the advertiser below will not get additional clicks. In this case the negative competitive effect dominates the positive informational externality.

We use two ways to test the magnitude of the spillover effects. We first use the binary logit model from equation (2.5) but modify as follows:

\[
\Pr(\text{user } i \text{ clicks advertiser } j's \text{ link}) = \frac{\exp(\alpha_j + \delta_j + \text{SPILOVER}_{ij} \gamma)}{1 + \exp(\alpha_j + \delta_j + \text{SPILOVER}_{ij} \gamma)}.
\]  

(2.10)
where $\text{SPILLOVER}_{ij}$ is a measure of the match value of all other advertisers above and below advertiser $j$’s ad position for a given keyword, and $\gamma$ is a set of parameters that captures the net spillover effects. The regression controls for the advertiser fixed effects, $\alpha_j$, and the position effect, $\delta_{pj}$. $\text{SPILLOVER}_{ij}$ is specified as a function of $\{\alpha_k, \text{for all } k \neq j\}$, the set of all advertisers competing with advertiser $j$ on the search results page. We estimate the above model with three specifications for $\text{SPILLOVER}_{ij}$. The first specification (“Mean”) takes the average of the estimated fixed effects from competing advertisers, from advertisers positioned above (zero for the topmost position) and positioned below (zero for the lowest position). The second specification (“Max”) takes the advertiser, positioned above and below, with the highest fixed effect. For the third specification (“Percent”), we calculate for a specific advertiser the percentage of advertisers who have a higher fixed effect, positioned above and below.

Since the click probability of each advertiser depends on not only its own fixed effect but also the fixed effects from advertisers at other ad positions, we estimate all advertiser fixed effects simultaneously through equation (2.10) for all of the advertisers. Results are reported in Table 2.8. For each specification, an increase in the match value of higher positioned advertisers will increase the click potential for a given advertiser, significant at the 1% level. In the Mean and Max specifications, we also find a positive spillover effect from lower-positioned advertisers, significant at the 10% and 5% level, respectively. Since the estimates represent the combined spillover effects and competitive effects, and because the latter is a negative effect, these results suggest that the positive information externalities from high-match value competitors are strong in the search advertising context.
Table 2.8: Results of Click and Terminal-Click Behavior with Spillover Effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specification</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Binary logit model with clicks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With effects from advertisers listed above</td>
<td>0.14&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.12&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.28&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With effects from advertisers listed below</td>
<td>0.03&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.04&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multinomial logit model with terminal clicks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With effects from advertisers listed above</td>
<td>0.08&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.11&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.28&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With effects from advertisers listed below</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.06&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Significant at the 1 percent level, <sup>b</sup> 5 percent, <sup>c</sup> 10 percent

Our results suggest that high-match value advertisers increase consumer clicks for competing firms. It is possible that, due to their high match value, they may end up stealing terminal clicks. We next examine the impact of competition on consumers’ terminal click decisions using a MNL model. The dependent variable is, given the full set of sponsored links and an organic option, which link is chosen to be the terminal click. We employ the same three specifications utilized above to generate the measure for competition (SPILLOVER<sub>ij</sub>). Results are reported in the lower panel in Table 2.8. Again there is a significant positive impact from increased match value from advertisers at higher positions in all three specifications. In the Max specification we also see a significant positive impact from advertisers at lower positions.

The findings of positive spillover effects from high-match value competitors on consumer clicks and terminal clicks have an important managerial implication. In the advertising literature, previous studies have shown how competitors’ advertisements can “crowd-out” the effectiveness of advertising. In the search advertising context, past research has typically focused on the competitive effects (e.g., Mela and Yao 2011, Chan and Park 2014). These studies suggest that a high-match value advertiser will steal clicks and sales from other advertisers. Our results instead suggest the spillover effects from high-match value advertisers may increase consumer clicks and terminal clicks for competing firms.

[95]
2.7 Conclusions

In this paper, we test the empirical validity of the signaling theory of advertising in the search advertising context. By using detailed data of travel-related keywords which are obtained from a search engine, we have tested a series of predictions both on consumer and advertiser behaviors in accordance to the signaling theory of advertising. We have shown that consumers are more likely to not only click on an advertiser listed at higher positions but also terminate their search at such link. On the advertiser side, we find that the increase in terminal clicks is positively correlated with the increase in advertisers’ bid amounts, even when ad positions remain unchanged. However, there is no increase in CTR. In sum, our empirical results support predictions from the signaling theory of advertising in the literature. Additionally, we have controlled for several key alterative explanations for how search advertising works, and find that our results still hold. Finally, we find that advertisers can generate more clicks and terminal clicks when competing against advertisers with higher match value, due to an information externality. This finding can be explained based on the signaling theory.

Our application has two important limitations that should be addressed by further research. First, we focus on a dataset of travel-related keywords to empirically test the signaling theory in the search advertising context. We chose the travel category because consumers have uncertainty regarding the attributes of products or services they search and their searches are costly in such experience goods markets with differentiated products or services. This means our conclusions may not generalize to other settings. Future work can build on our approaches and findings by analyzing other types of keywords and/or obtained from other sources, which can
possibly lead to the empirical generalization regarding the relevance of the signaling theory in advertising. Second, we used terminal clicks to proxy whether an advertiser’s offering is a match for consumer needs, because our data did not include post-conversion behavior. The availability of data on post-click conversion rates can further enhance our understanding of consumer behavior. By the same token, the availability of data on advertisers’ other types of marketing activities can help study the signaling theory in a broader advertising context. We hope that this study demonstrates the efficacy of the signaling theory and can motivate further research in the contexts where both consumers and advertisers strategically behave when uncertainty exists.
2.8 References


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Chapter 3

Solving the Similarity and Dominance Problems: The Elimination-by-Aspects (EBA) Demand Model for Differentiated Products

3.1 Introduction

“The EBA functional form has considerable potential for econometric applications” – Daniel McFadden (1981)

The logit model is used with aggregate scanner data to model brands’ market shares as functions of their marketing variables. However, the logit suffers from an undesirable mathematical property called Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), which creates two adverse behavioral consequences, called similarity and dominance problems. The similarity problem is the following: Suppose a brand (Milky Way) cuts its price at a store this week. One would expect this price cut to disproportionately, and adversely, impact the market shares of brands that are perceived to be more similar (Snickers) to the focal brand in terms of underlying characteristics, rather than the market shares of brands that are perceived to be less similar (Skittles) to the focal brand. The logit cannot handle this asymmetric impact of price cuts.

In order to solve the similarity problem, three alternative models of brands’ market shares have been proposed in the literature: probit, nested logit and mixed logit. However, none of these
three models is well designed to satisfactorily handling the similarity problem. Their deficiencies in this regard are given below.

1. The probit accommodates only pair-wise inter-brand similarities which severely restricts the range of similarity structures that the probit can handle,

2. The nested logit, unlike the probit, can handle a broad range of inter-brand similarity structures, but imposes a long menu of alternative tree structures that need to be estimated, which renders the nested logit practically infeasible,

3. The mixed logit can handle flexible similarity structures (unlike the probit) and is also practically wieldy (unlike the nested logit), but it is not theoretically well grounded as a model of individual consumer choice. Furthermore, the continuous mixed logit, just like the probit, can only accommodate pair-wise inter-brand similarities.

To the extent that flexibly accounting for similarity patterns in demand in a behavior-theoretic manner is necessary to obtain superior empirical predictions of brands’ market share changes in response to changes in brands’ marketing variables, the above-mentioned deficiencies of existing models is troubling. Further, and even more importantly, none of the above models can handle the dominance problem. The dominance problem is the following: Suppose a dominated brand (i.e., one whose price and quality are both simultaneously worse than at least one existing brand) is introduced to a market. Such a brand would not be expected to steal any market share from existing brands. The probit, nested logit and mixed logit cannot satisfactorily handle this either.

Therefore, a satisfactory modeling solution to the similarity and dominance problems is called for in market share models. In this paper, we propose a closed-form market share model that, in fact, offers this solution. Our model is called the Elimination-By-Aspects (EBA) demand
model for differentiated products. This model relies on the specification of shared aspects among brands to flexibly account for similarity and dominance effects in demand. The shared aspects represent not just pair-wise inter-brand similarities (as in the probit) but also all possible higher orders (triple-wise, quarter-wise etc.) of similarities. These shared aspects also end up rendering our proposed demand model immune to the Invariant Proportion of Substitution (IPS) restriction that the probit, nested logit and mixed logit all additionally suffer from (Steenburgh 2008). In our proposed demand model, aspect similarity among brands plays a central role in explaining shifts in market share among brands in response to relative changes in the marketing mix. This feature is critical while employing a demand model for differentiated products. This modeling flexibility presents the potential for profit-improving marketing mix prescriptions for brand managers and retailers. Using scanner data from 9 product categories, we show that this EBA model outperforms the mixed logit and probit models in terms of in-sample fit and holdout predictions. We also show that the retailer can improve gross profits up to 34.4% from pricing based on this EBA model rather than the mixed logit model (which is generally, but wrongly, regarded as the most flexible way of addressing similarity and dominance problems in demand). We expand on these issues in the next section.

3.2 Modeling Brand-Level Market Shares

The logit model is a commonly used predictive model of demand for brands. The theoretical roots of the logit model can be traced to the Luce choice axiom (Luce 1958) and some early empirical applications of the logit model in marketing used the logit model to specify market shares of brands as functions of their marketing variables (e.g., Nakanishi, Cooper and
Kassarjian 1974, Malhotra 1984 etc.). With the advent of new industrial organization methods in recent years, the logit model has increasingly become the workhorse model of aggregate demand for differentiated products for empirical economists and marketing researchers alike (see, for example, Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes 1995, Sudhir 2001 etc.).

Despite its wide use and predictive ability, the logit model suffers from the undesirable IIA property (Debreu 1960). An adverse consequence of the IIA property is called the similarity problem: If a new brand (e.g., Ralph Nader) were introduced to the market (e.g., Presidential Election), the logit model would imply that the new brand would steal market shares from existing brands (e.g., George W. Bush and Al Gore) in direct proportion to their existing market shares (poll numbers). In reality, however, one would expect the new brand (Nader) to steal greater market share from an existing brand that is relatively similar (Gore) to the new brand than from an existing brand that is relatively dissimilar (Bush). Addressing the similarity problem, therefore, warrants the use of a predictive model of market shares that explicitly accounts for inter-brand similarities.

A predictive model of market shares that accounts for pair-wise inter-brand similarities is the probit, whose theoretical roots can be traced to Thurstone (1927), which allows for pair-wise (asymmetric) correlations among brands’ market shares using a correlated random utility framework. However, the probit model is computationally more difficult to estimate than the logit model. Further, it can only handle inter-brand similarities among pairs (and not triples, quartets etc.) of brands, which restricts its modeling flexibility in addressing the similarity problem. This especially becomes a concern in a situation where three or more brands may share a relevant aspect (for example, in the soda category, multiple brands share the “cola”
characteristic). That said, the probit has been shown to have superior predictive ability compared to the logit (e.g., Chintagunta 2001).

Another predictive model of market shares that accounts for inter-brand similarities is the *nested logit*, first developed by Ben-Akiva (1973) and then derived as a special case of the Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) model by McFadden (1978). This model groups brands into different groups, such that relatively similar brands occupy the same group, while relatively dissimilar brands fall within different groups. This form allows substitutability among brands within the same group to be higher than substitutability among brands in different groups. Just like the logit, the nested logit has an analytical closed-form, making it easy to estimate. However, the nested logit requires a postulated tree-structure as the process model governing the grouping of brands by consumers. Since the number of possible tree structures that can be postulated increases in a rapidly convex manner with the number of brands in the category, the estimation of the nested logit becomes computationally impractical with aggregate scanner data that typically involve many (>5) brands. With 5 brands, for example, even assuming a one-stage hierarchy, there are $2^5 - 1 = 31$ possible trees with 2 groups, $3^5 - 1 = 93 = 149$ possible trees with 3 groups and so on. For this reason, researchers have almost never used the nested logit to model market shares of brands. A few exceptions are Goldberg (1995) and Sudhir (2001), both of whom estimate the nested logit model, and Hui (2004) who estimates a generalized extreme value model. However, these market share models are all based on specifically assumed, rather than endogenously estimated, product characteristics and tree structures. Typically one does not know what the correct tree structure is, which makes this approach unsatisfactory from an application standpoint.

[107]
A third predictive model of market shares that accounts for inter-brand similarities is the mixed logit (McFadden and Train 2000), which postulates a population mixture representation of unobserved heterogeneity in the parameters of the logit across consumers. When applied to aggregate market share data, the mixed logit resembles the probit in that the correlated brand intercepts of the mixed logit are like the correlated error terms of the probit. Furthermore, the mixed logit additionally allows for randomness in the remaining utility parameters, e.g., marketing mix coefficients. The mixed logit can be shown to approximate the choice probabilities from any discrete choice model derived from random utility maximization (McFadden and Train 2000). This study has led to the singular use of the mixed logit in economics and marketing over the past 14 years as the appropriate market share model to address IIA issues (e.g., Sudhir 2001). However, there is a major theoretical limitation to the mixed logit. Unlike the probit and nested logit, it theoretically relaxes the similarity problem at the population level and not at the individual consumer level. Instead, if one directly views the mixed logit to be a model of individual consumer choice, the mixed logit does not have a natural theoretical interpretation as does the logit, probit or nested logit. In other words, the mixed logit is not a theoretically well specified model of individual consumer behavior.

3.2.1 The Dominance Problem

A second adverse consequence of the IIA property is called the dominance problem: in the presidential election example of the previous section, suppose a new brand (e.g., Donald Trump) were introduced to the market that is perfectly dominated by one of the existing brands (Bush) in terms of product characteristics, that is, Bush offers a bundle of characteristics (e.g., “conservative values”) to the market that is no worse than the bundle of characteristics offered
by Trump and is at least better on one characteristic (say, “relevant executive experience as state governor”). This new brand, then, would be expected to steal no market share from the existing brands (Bush and Gore), leaving their market shares unchanged. However, if Trump entered the market solely against Gore, Trump would be expected to steal market share in a magnitude similar to that of Bush. The logit model would, however, wrongly imply that the new brand would steal market shares from existing brands in direct proportion to their existing market shares (poll numbers). The nested logit also cannot handle the dominance problem, but the mixed logit can (as we will show using numerical examples in the next section).

A behavioral phenomenon that is an extreme manifestation of the dominance problem is called the *attraction problem* (also called *asymmetric dominance* or *decoy effect*), where the introduction of the dominated brand (Trump) increases the market share of an existing, dominating brand (Bush). This effect has been documented in choice data from laboratory experiments (Huber, Payne and Puto 1982, Huber and Puto 1983). None of the existing market share models is designed to handle the attraction problem (see Malkoc, Hedgcock and Hoeffler 2013 for a good review).

### 3.2.2 Contribution of Research

In this research, we propose a model of brand-level market shares that flexibly solves the similarity and dominance problems associated with existing models by explicitly allowing for all possible shared aspects among all pairs, triples, quartets etc. of brands. Our model is called the *Elimination-By-Aspects* (EBA) demand model for differentiated products. This model relies on the specification of shared aspects among brands to flexibly account for similarity and dominance effects in demand. The model extends Tversky’s (1972) EBA model for
differentiated products to handle time-varying covariates. The model nests the widely used logit as a special case.

Why is modeling similarity and dominance important? Let us consider similarity effects, for example. Suppose a brand (Milky Way) cuts its price at a store this week. One would expect this price cut to disproportionately, and adversely, impact the market shares of brands that are perceived to be more similar (Snickers) to the focal brand in terms of underlying characteristics, rather than the market shares of brands that are perceived to be less similar (Skittles) to the focal brand. A market share model that is flexible enough to represent such asymmetric similarities across brands would more correctly predict the cross-brand demand impacts of price cuts. The logit, for example, would severely restrict each cross-brand price elasticity to depend only on, and be directly proportional to, the market share and price of the brand changing its price. However, the cross-price elasticity could in reality also depend on the product characteristics of the brand whose demand is affected, as well as that brand’s similarity to the brand changing its price. Having a more accurate predictive model of brand-level demand would lead to superior marketing mix prescriptions for brand managers and retailers.

The probit and nested logit can handle only similarity, but not dominance, effects (while the logit can handle neither). On the other hand, the mixed logit can handle both similarity and dominance effects in demand (as will be demonstrated in the next section). Our first goal is to analytically compare our proposed model to the nested logit and mixed logit to see whether important differences in their ability to explain similarity and dominance effects emerge. We show that our proposed model is more flexible, as well as more easily interpretable (in terms of its underlying behavioral parameters), than the nested logit and mixed logit. Unlike the mixed logit, our proposed model addresses the similarity and dominance problems directly at the
individual consumer level, which makes it theoretically more appealing and managerially more useful. Further, the mixed logit only handles similarity when specified with the correct number of segments. As we will show, it can be the case that determining segments with the BIC criterion will lead to an incorrectly specified model and one which does not properly handle similarity.

Theoretical richness notwithstanding, we want to empirically compare our proposed model to the mixed logit and probit in terms of explaining (in sample) and predicting (out of sample) observed brand-level market shares. For this purpose, we compare our proposed model to the mixed logit and probit in terms of their relative abilities to fit and predict share outcomes using aggregate scanner data in 9 different product categories. We find that our model empirically outperforms the mixed logit and probit in a majority of product categories in terms of both in-sample fit as well as holdout prediction. We document significant differences in the estimated price elasticity matrices between the two models and then derive implications for retailer and manufacturer pricing. We find that the retailer will obtain a substantively sizeable increase (34.4 %) in gross profits from using the EBA model over the mixed logit model as the predictive model of demand in each category, while determining optimal retail prices for brands, under the assumption that consumers behave according to the EBA model. We also find that the manufacturer will obtain an average gross profit improvement of 13.2% from unilaterally embracing the EBA model, while all competitors use the mixed logit instead, as the predictive model of demand while setting wholesale prices.

While marketing researchers have been well aware of Tversky’s (1972) EBA model, data limitations have hampered its use. Estimation of the shared aspect parameters of the EBA model (as discussed in the next section) requires consumers at a store to face different choice sets in different weeks so that non-IIA switching patterns among brands can be explicitly observed and,
therefore, exploited in the estimation of shared aspects. The only way to see different choice sets in scanner data is when product stockouts occur and are observed. However, since product stockouts are rare, they do not offer enough variation in choice sets across weeks for estimation purposes. Thus, the only recourse to estimating the EBA model was to use discrete choice experiments where choice set compositions were systematically varied (Batsell et al. 2003, Gilbride and Allenby 2006). In this research, we solve this problem by extending the EBA model to handle time-varying covariates such as marketing variables (price and promotions) without observing stockouts. We show that what allows the estimation of shared aspects is the temporal variation in the relative prices of brands across weeks. This is an important and innovative modeling contribution of this study and will be explained in detail in the next section.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 3, we develop our proposed Elimination-By-Aspects (EBA) demand model for differentiated products. We show how Tversky’s (1972a, b) EBA model and the logit model are important special cases of our proposed demand model. In section 4, we present a set of numerical illustrations and simulations to compare the relative ability of our proposed demand model versus that of the probit, nested logit and mixed logit to handle similarity and dominance effects in demand. In section 5, we present the empirical results from estimating our proposed demand model, as well as comparison models (continuous mixed logit, discrete mixed logit, probit) using aggregate scanner data from 9 different packaged goods categories. Section 6 derives pricing implications for the retailer and the manufacturers. Section 7 concludes with directions for future research.
3.3 Elimination-by-Aspects (EBA) Demand Model for Differentiated Products

We develop our model in three stages. First, we present Tversky’s (1972a, b) Elimination-By-Aspects (EBA) model of consumer choice among differentiated products. Second, we show how Tversky’s EBA choice model has a mathematically equivalent random utility formulation. Third, we extend this random utility formulation to handle marketing variables (or, more generally, time-varying covariates), and create our proposed Elimination-By-Aspects (EBA) demand model for differentiated products. To simplify model exposition, we assume that the consumer is choosing among only 3 differentiated products. Once we develop our model, we discuss how to estimate it using aggregate scanner data on brand sales.

3.3.1 Step 1: Tversky’s (1972) Elimination-by-Aspects (EBA) Model

According to the EBA model, each product contains aspects (or attributes) that are unique to it (“unique aspects”), as well as aspects that are shared with other products (“shared aspects”). A consumer chooses one of the three products by sequentially eliminating products using their underlying aspects. We will explain this in detail below. Before doing so, we set up notation. Let $C_1$, $C_2$ and $C_3$ refer to unique aspects of products 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Let $C_{12}$, $C_{13}$ and $C_{23}$ refer to shared aspects of product pairs (1, 2), (1, 3) and (2, 3), respectively.
3.3.1.1 Choice Set with 2 Products

Let us ignore product 3 and assume that the consumer is choosing between products 1 and 2 only. According to the EBA model, a consumer’s choice of product 1 can be explained using one of the following two processes:

1. The consumer chooses aspect \( C_1 \) and, therefore, eliminates product 2 (which does not contain the aspect \( C_1 \)) from the choice set, leaving him to choose product 1 (the only remaining option containing aspect \( C_1 \)).

2. The consumer chooses aspect \( C_{13} \) and, therefore, eliminates product 2 (which does not contain aspect \( C_{13} \)) from the choice set, leaving him to choose product 1 (the only remaining option containing aspect \( C_{13} \)).

Accordingly, the consumer’s choice probabilities for products 1 and 2 can be written as

\[
\begin{align*}
    P_{1}^{(1,2)} &= \Pr(C_1) \cdot \Pr(1|C_1) + \Pr(C_{13}) \cdot \Pr(1|C_{13}), \\
    P_{2}^{(1,2)} &= \Pr(C_2) \cdot \Pr(2|C_2) + \Pr(C_{23}) \cdot \Pr(2|C_{23}),
\end{align*}
\]  

(3.1)

where \( P_{j}^{(1,2)} \) is the consumer’s probability of choosing product \( j \) (\( j = 1, 2 \)) from choice set \{ 1, 2 \}; \( \Pr(C_u) \) is the consumer’s probability of choosing unique aspect \( C_u \) from all available aspects \{ \( C_1, C_2, C_{13}, C_{23} \) \}; \( \Pr(C_{uv}) \) is the consumer’s probability of choosing shared aspect \( C_{uv} \) from all available aspects \{ \( C_1, C_2, C_{13}, C_{23} \) \}; \( \Pr(j|C_u) \) is the consumer’s conditional probability of choosing product \( j \) (\( j = 1, 2 \)) given that the consumer has chosen unique aspect \( C_u \); \( \Pr(j|C_{uv}) \) is the consumer’s conditional probability of choosing product \( j \) (\( j = 1, 2 \)) given that the consumer has chosen shared aspect \( C_{uv} \). Equation (3.1) can be simplified to

[114]
\[
P_{1}^{[1,2]} = \Pr(C_{1}) + \Pr(C_{13}),
\]
\[
P_{2}^{[1,2]} = \Pr(C_{2}) + \Pr(C_{23}),
\]

(3.2)

because each conditional probability (representing the consumer’s probability of choosing a brand from a singleton choice set containing that brand only) on the right hand side of equation (3.1) is 1. The aspect choice probabilities are obtained by scaling the aspect parameters to yield

\[
P_{1}^{[1,2]} = \frac{C_{1}}{C_{1} + C_{2} + C_{13} + C_{23}} + \frac{C_{13}}{C_{1} + C_{2} + C_{13} + C_{23}},
\]
\[
P_{2}^{[1,2]} = \frac{C_{2}}{C_{1} + C_{2} + C_{13} + C_{23}} + \frac{C_{23}}{C_{1} + C_{2} + C_{13} + C_{23}},
\]

(3.3)

which, in turn, reduces to

\[
P_{1}^{[1,2]} = \frac{C_{1} + C_{13}}{C_{1} + C_{2} + C_{13} + C_{23}},
\]
\[
P_{2}^{[1,2]} = \frac{C_{2} + C_{23}}{C_{1} + C_{2} + C_{13} + C_{23}},
\]

(3.4)

which represent the consumer’s EBA choice probabilities for the choice set \{1, 2\}. Similarly, the consumer’s EBA choice probabilities for the choice set \{1, 3\} are

\[
P_{1}^{[1,3]} = \frac{C_{1} + C_{12}}{C_{1} + C_{3} + C_{12} + C_{23}},
\]
\[
P_{3}^{[1,3]} = \frac{C_{3} + C_{23}}{C_{1} + C_{3} + C_{12} + C_{23}},
\]

(3.5)

and the consumer’s choice probabilities for the choice set \{2, 3\} are

\[
P_{2}^{[2,3]} = \frac{C_{2} + C_{12}}{C_{2} + C_{3} + C_{12} + C_{13}},
\]
\[
P_{3}^{[2,3]} = \frac{C_{3} + C_{13}}{C_{2} + C_{3} + C_{12} + C_{13}},
\]

(3.6)
To summarize, equations (4) - (6) represent the consumer’s EBA choice probabilities for choice sets with 2 products. Notice that in a choice set, aspects that are shared by all products do not play a role in the choice probabilities. For example, $P_{j}^{(1,2)}$ is not a function of $C_{12}$. Let us next consider the full choice set with 3 products.

### 3.3.1.2 Choice Set with 3 Products

Now the consumer is choosing between products 1, 2 and 3. According to the EBA model, a consumer’s choice of product 1 can be explained using one of the following two processes:

1. The consumer chooses aspect $C_1$ and, therefore, eliminates products 2 and 3 (neither of which contains aspect $C_1$) from the choice set, leaving him to choose product 1,

2. The consumer chooses aspect $C_{12}$ and, therefore, eliminates product 3 (which does not contain aspect $C_{12}$) from the choice set, leaving him to choose product 1 from the choice set \{1, 2\},

3. The consumer chooses aspect $C_{13}$ and, therefore, eliminates product 2 from the choice set, leaving him to choose product 1 from the choice set \{1, 3\}.

Accordingly, the consumer’s choice probabilities for products 1, 2 and 3 can be written as

$$
\begin{align*}
P_{1}^{(1,2,3)} &= \Pr(C_1) + \Pr(C_{12}) \cdot P_{1}^{(1,2)} + \Pr(C_{13}) \cdot P_{1}^{(1,3)}, \\
P_{2}^{(1,2,3)} &= \Pr(C_2) + \Pr(C_{12}) \cdot P_{2}^{(1,2)} + \Pr(C_{23}) \cdot P_{2}^{(2,3)}, \\
P_{3}^{(1,2,3)} &= \Pr(C_3) + \Pr(C_{13}) \cdot P_{3}^{(1,3)} + \Pr(C_{23}) \cdot P_{3}^{(2,3)},
\end{align*}
$$

which reduces to

$$
\begin{align*}
\Pr(1) &= \Pr(C_1) + \Pr(C_{12}) \cdot P_{1}^{(1,2)} + \Pr(C_{13}) \cdot P_{1}^{(1,3)}, \\
\Pr(2) &= \Pr(C_2) + \Pr(C_{12}) \cdot P_{2}^{(1,2)} + \Pr(C_{23}) \cdot P_{2}^{(2,3)}, \\
\Pr(3) &= \Pr(C_3) + \Pr(C_{13}) \cdot P_{3}^{(1,3)} + \Pr(C_{23}) \cdot P_{3}^{(2,3)},
\end{align*}
$$

[116]
\[ P_1^{(1,2,3)} = \frac{C_1 + C_{12} + P_1^{(1,2)} + C_{13} + P_1^{(1,3)}}{C_1 + C_2 + C_3 + C_{12} + C_{13} + C_{23}}, \]

\[ P_2^{(1,2,3)} = \frac{C_2 + C_{12} + P_2^{(1,2)} + C_{23} + P_2^{(2,3)}}{C_1 + C_2 + C_3 + C_{12} + C_{13} + C_{23}}, \]

\[ P_3^{(1,2,3)} = \frac{C_3 + C_{13} + P_3^{(1,3)} + C_{23} + P_3^{(2,3)}}{C_1 + C_2 + C_3 + C_{12} + C_{13} + C_{23}}, \]  

(3.8)

where the probabilities \( P_1^{(1,2)}, P_2^{(1,2)}, P_1^{(1,3)}, P_2^{(2,3)}, P_3^{(2,3)} \) are as given in equations (3.4) – (3.6). Equation (3.8) represents the consumer’s EBA choice probabilities for the choice set \{1, 2, 3\}.

### 3.3.2 Step 2: Random Utility Formulation (RUF) of Tversky’s (1972) EBA Model

Consider a consumer whose indirect utilities for the products in choice set \{1, 2\} are

\[ U_1^{[1,2]} = \ln (C_1 + C_{13}) + \varepsilon_1, \]

\[ U_2^{[1,2]} = \ln (C_2 + C_{23}) + \varepsilon_2, \]  

(3.9)

where \( C_1, C_2, C_{13} \text{ and } C_{23} \) represent product aspects as explained earlier, \( \varepsilon_1 \text{ and } \varepsilon_2 \) represent the stochastic components of the consumer’s utilities for the 2 products. Suppose we assume \( \varepsilon_1 \text{ and } \varepsilon_2 \) to be distributed iid Gumbel with location parameter 0 and scale parameter 1, then the consumer’s choice probabilities for the 2 products are given by equation (3.4). Similarly, if the consumer’s indirect utilities for the products in choice set \{1, 3\} are

\[ U_1^{[1,3]} = \ln (C_1 + C_{12}) + \varepsilon_1, \]

\[ U_3^{[1,3]} = \ln (C_3 + C_{23}) + \varepsilon_3, \]  

(3.10)
then the consumer’s choice probabilities for the 2 products are given by equation (3.5).

Similarly, if the consumer’s indirect utilities for the products in choice set \{1, 3\} are

\[
U_{2}^{[2,3]} = \ln (C_2 + C_{12}) + \varepsilon_2,
U_{3}^{[2,3]} = \ln (C_3 + C_{13}) + \varepsilon_3,
\]

then the consumer’s choice probabilities for the 2 products are given by equation (3.6). In other words, equations (3.9) – (3.11) represent random utility formulations of Tversky’s EBA choice probabilities (3.4) – (3.6). The deterministic component of each random utility is a composite of all aspects that render the product to be uniquely different from the other product. Extending this argument, if the consumer’s indirect utilities for the products in the choice set are \{1, 2, 3\} are

\[
U_1^{[1,2,3]} = \ln \left( C_1 + C_{12} * P_1^{(1,2)} + C_{13} * P_1^{(1,3)} \right) + \varepsilon_1,
U_2^{[1,2,3]} = \ln \left( C_2 + C_{12} * P_2^{(1,2)} + C_{23} * P_2^{(2,3)} \right) + \varepsilon_2,
U_3^{[1,2,3]} = \ln \left( C_3 + C_{13} * P_3^{(1,3)} + C_{23} * P_3^{(2,3)} \right) + \varepsilon_1,
\]

then the consumer’s choice probabilities for the 3 products are given by equation (3.8). Again, the deterministic component of each random utility represents what is unique about the product when compared to the other 2 products in the choice set. For example, consider the utility equation for product 1. There are 3 terms within parentheses. The first term, \(C_1\), directly represents what is unique to product 1. The second term has 2 components, \(C_{12}\) and \(P_1^{(1,2)}\). While the first component represents what is unique to both products 1 and 2 when compared to product 3, the second component represents what is unique to product 1 when compared to product 2 (as explained under equation (3.11)), therefore, the two multiplicative components collectively represent what is unique to product 1. Similar arguments apply for the third term.
3.3.3 Step 3: Extending the RUF of Tversky’s (1972) EBA Model to Handle Marketing Variables

Since we have established a random utility formulation that is mathematically equivalent to Tversky’s EBA model, extending the model to incorporate the effects of marketing variables (or, more generally, time-varying covariates) is straightforwardly achieved as follows.

\[
U_1^{[1,2,3]} = X_1 \beta + \ln \left( C_1 + C_{12} * P_1^{[1,2]} + C_{13} * P_1^{[1,3]} \right) + \epsilon_1, \\
U_2^{[1,2,3]} = X_2 \beta + \ln \left( C_2 + C_{12} * P_2^{[1,2]} + C_{23} * P_2^{[2,3]} \right) + \epsilon_2, \\
U_3^{[1,2,3]} = X_3 \beta + \ln \left( C_3 + C_{13} * P_3^{[1,3]} + C_{23} * P_3^{[2,3]} \right) + \epsilon_3, 
\]

(3.13)

where \( X_1, X_2 \) and \( X_3 \) represent 3-dimensional row vectors representing the price, display and feature that are associated with the product, and is the corresponding 3-dimensional column vector of parameters. Similarly, we get

\[
U_1^{[1,2]} = X_1 \beta + \ln \left( C_1 + C_{13} \right) + \epsilon_1, \\
U_2^{[1,2]} = X_2 \beta + \ln \left( C_2 + C_{23} \right) + \epsilon_2, 
\]

(3.14)

and

\[
U_1^{[1,3]} = X_1 \beta + \ln \left( C_1 + C_{12} \right) + \epsilon_1, \\
U_3^{[1,3]} = X_3 \beta + \ln \left( C_3 + C_{23} \right) + \epsilon_3, 
\]

(3.15)

and

\[
U_2^{[2,3]} = X_2 \beta + \ln \left( C_2 + C_{12} \right) + \epsilon_2, \\
U_3^{[2,3]} = X_3 \beta + \ln \left( C_3 + C_{13} \right) + \epsilon_3, 
\]

(3.16)

where all the error terms are iid Gumbel (0, 1).
Equations (3.13) – (3.16) together yield the following choice probabilities.

\[ P_{1}^{(1,2,3)} = \frac{e^{X_{1}\beta + \ln[C_{1} + C_{12} + p_{12}^{(1,2)} + C_{13} + p_{13}^{(1,3)}]}}{e^{X_{1}\beta + \ln[C_{1} + C_{12} + p_{12}^{(1,2)} + C_{13} + p_{13}^{(1,3)}]} + e^{X_{1}\beta + \ln[C_{1} + C_{12} + p_{12}^{(2,1)} + C_{23} + p_{23}^{(2,3)}]} + e^{X_{1}\beta + \ln[C_{1} + C_{13} + p_{13}^{(1,3)} + C_{23} + p_{23}^{(2,3)}]}}, \]

\[ P_{2}^{(1,2,3)} = \frac{e^{X_{2}\beta + \ln[C_{2} + C_{12} + p_{12}^{(1,2)} + C_{13} + p_{13}^{(1,3)}]}}{e^{X_{1}\beta + \ln[C_{1} + C_{12} + p_{12}^{(1,2)} + C_{13} + p_{13}^{(1,3)}]} + e^{X_{1}\beta + \ln[C_{1} + C_{12} + p_{12}^{(2,1)} + C_{23} + p_{23}^{(2,3)}]} + e^{X_{1}\beta + \ln[C_{1} + C_{13} + p_{13}^{(1,3)} + C_{23} + p_{23}^{(2,3)}]}}, \]

\[ P_{3}^{(1,2,3)} = \frac{e^{X_{3}\beta + \ln[C_{3} + C_{13} + p_{13}^{(1,3)} + C_{23} + p_{23}^{(2,3)}]}}{e^{X_{1}\beta + \ln[C_{1} + C_{12} + p_{12}^{(1,2)} + C_{13} + p_{13}^{(1,3)}]} + e^{X_{1}\beta + \ln[C_{1} + C_{12} + p_{12}^{(2,1)} + C_{23} + p_{23}^{(2,3)}]} + e^{X_{1}\beta + \ln[C_{1} + C_{13} + p_{13}^{(1,3)} + C_{23} + p_{23}^{(2,3)}]}}. \]

(3.17)

where

\[ P_{1}^{(1,2)} = \frac{e^{X_{1}\beta + \ln[C_{1} + C_{12}]} + e^{X_{2}\beta + \ln[C_{2} + C_{23}]}}{e^{X_{1}\beta + \ln[C_{1} + C_{12}]} + e^{X_{2}\beta + \ln[C_{2} + C_{23}]}} \]

(3.18)

and

\[ P_{1}^{(1,3)} = \frac{e^{X_{1}\beta + \ln[C_{1} + C_{12}]} + e^{X_{3}\beta + \ln[C_{3} + C_{23}]}}{e^{X_{1}\beta + \ln[C_{1} + C_{12}]} + e^{X_{3}\beta + \ln[C_{3} + C_{23}]}} \]

(3.19)

and

\[ P_{2}^{(2,3)} = \frac{e^{X_{2}\beta + \ln[C_{2} + C_{12}]} + e^{X_{3}\beta + \ln[C_{3} + C_{13}]} + e^{X_{3}\beta + \ln[C_{3} + C_{23}]}}{e^{X_{2}\beta + \ln[C_{2} + C_{12}]} + e^{X_{3}\beta + \ln[C_{3} + C_{13}]} + e^{X_{3}\beta + \ln[C_{3} + C_{23}]}} \]

(3.20)
This completes the exposition of our proposed model. **Equations (3.17) – (3.20) collectively represent our proposed EBA demand model for differentiated products.** When $\beta = 0$, our model reduces to Tversky’s (1972) EBA model. When all shared aspects, $C_{uv}$, are 0, our model reduces to the familiar logit model.

The key theoretical difference between the indirect utility formulation of the EBA, as discussed here, and the indirect utility formulation that is typically invoked in random utility models (such as the logit, probit etc.) is two-fold: (1) the indirect utility yielded by a brand to the consumer under our EBA formulation is choice-set specific, as represented by the superscripts on the left-hand side of equations (3.13) - (3.16), while the indirect utility is not choice-set specific in existing random utility models; this property of the EBA can be taken to be a manifestation of what behavioral researchers label *context effects* in demand, where consumers’ preferences for brands depend on the choice context (in our case, the choice set); (2) the presence of lower-order choice probabilities (e.g., $P_1^{(1,2)}$) within the consumer’s indirect utility function for brands in higher-choice choice sets (e.g., $U_1^{(1,2,3)}$) appears atheoretical; the reason is that the indirect utility function in equation (3.13) must be interpreted as a reduced-form solution to a deeper utility-theoretic specification of the impact of brands’ aspects on consumer’s direct utilities for brands, much like the use of lagged choice indicators or brand loyalty variables in random utility models to represent structural state dependence (Guadagni and Little 1983).

In the absence of, or indifference toward, a random utility formulation, one could view the EBA and, therefore, our proposed extension of the EBA, as a probabilistic model of consumer choice. In that case, the consumer’s choice probability for a brand is directly specified by overlaying multiplicative terms, which represent the exponentiated attractiveness of brands in
terms of their marketing mix, in the numerators and denominators of the original EBA choice probabilities. This is illustrated below for the choice set (1, 2).

\[
P^{[1,2]}_1 = \frac{(C_1 + C_{13})e^{X_1\beta}}{(C_1 + C_{13})e^{X_1\beta} + (C_2 + C_{23})e^{X_2\beta}},
\]

\[
P^{[1,2]}_2 = \frac{(C_2 + C_{23})e^{X_2\beta}}{(C_1 + C_{13})e^{X_1\beta} + (C_2 + C_{23})e^{X_2\beta}},
\]

which is mathematically equivalent to equation (3.18). Whether one directly works with the choice probabilities, or additionally derives them from random utility primitives (as we do), is a matter of personal research taste. The modeling flexibility of the EBA accrues regardless of this taste.

### 3.4 Estimation of Our Proposed Model Using Aggregate Scanner Data

Before we discuss estimation, let us first explain what is observed in aggregate scanner data. In any given day, we observe an outcome vector \( y_t = (y_{1t} \ y_{2t} \ ... \ y_{jt})' \), where each element \( y_{jt} \) represents the unit sales for brand \( j \) during day \( t \). Further, during each day \( t \), we observe the price \( (P_{jt}) \), display \( (D_{jt}) \), and feature \( (F_{jt}) \) covariates associated with each brand \( j \). We assume the market size, \( M_t \), to be equal to the total number of transactions observed in the store during day \( t \). We then assume that each unit of each brand sold in a given day \( t \) is to a different household. Each household, in turn, is assumed to choose among \( J+1 \) options (\( J \) brands plus the outside good) in the category. Demand for the outside good, \( y_{0t} \), is imputed in the usual way by subtracting the summed sales across all \( J \) brands from the market size. These assumptions are
typically invoked in market share models (e.g., Sudhir 2001, Chintagunta 2001, Mantrala et al. 2006) since neither individual household choices nor purchase incidences / quantities are explicitly observed in aggregate scanner data.

Let $P_{jt}$ denote the choice probability, under our proposed model, for a household for brand $j$ in day $t$. These are given by equation (3.17), suitably extended to the case of $J$ brands (see Batsell et al. (2003) for a canonical algebraic representation of Tversky’s (1972) original EBA model for the $J$-brand case, but without time-varying covariates, within which one could incorporate marketing variables as in equation (3.17)). In these choice probabilities, each brand’s intercept term will involve not only the brand’s unique aspect ($C_j$) but also all shared aspects that are contained in that brand (i.e., $C_{jk}$’s, $C_{jkl}$’s etc.). Further the $J$ choice probabilities will each contain lower-order, i.e., $(J-1)$, $(J-2)$ etc., choice probabilities on the right-hand side, as in equation (3.17). The following likelihood function is maximized to estimate model parameters.

$$L = \prod_{j=1}^{T} \prod_{j=0}^{J} P_{jt}^{Y_{jt}},$$

where $T$ is the number of days in the aggregate scanner data. For a recent application of Tversky’s (1972) original EBA model to discrete choice experimental data, see Gilbride and Allenby (2006).

To obtain model parsimony and, therefore, a clear behavioral explanation of consumer choice behavior, the estimation of an EBA model should result in a compact number of shared aspects that can be easily interpreted given what is known about the products, which additionally renders the model to be managerially actionable. For this purpose, although we begin with the estimation of all possible aspects (30 in our 5-product case), we sequentially remove
insignificant aspects from the model. The aspects are removed one-by-one as long as the BIC improves, much like segments are added in the discrete mixed logit as long as the BIC improves. Once the removal of an aspect fails to improve the BIC, we then try the removal of other aspects to see if a better fit can still be established. With regard to which aspect to remove, we use aspect significance. While it may take some time to calculate aspect significance, aspect magnitude is highly correlated with significance and can also be used as the determinant of removal (initially, many aspects will be very close to zero). We have used both removal rules with nearly identical results.

3.4.1 Identification of Shared Aspects

It is useful to explain what aspect of aggregate scanner data permit the estimation of the shared aspect parameters, especially since the constitution of the available choice set of brands at a store does not vary from day to day (which, if it were not the case, would allow one to exploit the entries and exits of one or more brands, and the consequent impacts on the demands of the remaining brands, to estimate the shared aspects). When the relative prices, displays and features of the \( J \) brands change from one day to another, the unit sales of the brands change as a consequence. This variation enables the estimation of shared aspects. For example, if the decrease in price of brand \( i \) decreases the demand of brand \( j \) disproportionately more than it decreases the demand of brand \( k \) (beyond what is implied by their current relative market shares), then it would serve as the source of identification of a shared aspect between brands \( i \) and \( j \). If it decreases the demand of both brands \( j \) and \( l \), then it would serve as the source of identification of a shared aspect between brands \( i, j \) and \( l \). On the other hand, if demand of brand \( i \) is relatively immune to the price cuts of any of the other brands, then it would serve to identify the unique
aspect of brand \( i \). It is the incorporation of these time-varying covariates (such as price, display and feature) that allows for identification the EBA model on scanner data. Previously, the EBA model required either survey data with varying choice sets or stock-out data in order to provide variation in \( \Pr(j \mid C_{uv}) \) and, therefore, permit the identification of the shared aspects. In fact, it is the presence of shared aspects in our proposed demand model that makes it immune to the Invariant Proportion of Substitution (IPS) restriction of the mixed logit, which was first pointed out by Steenburgh (2008). In our proposed demand model, attribute similarity among products plays a central role in explaining shifts in market share among brands in response to relative changes in the marketing mix. This feature is critical while employing a demand model for differentiated products.

### 3.4.2 Comparison Models

We estimate the mixed logit and probit as comparison models. The mixed logit is operationalized as follows: in equation (3.15), we set all shared aspects, \( C_{uv} \), to 0, which reduces our model to the logit; we then assume that the intercept terms of the logit, i.e., the logarithms of the unique aspects of the products, follow a random distribution. We make two alternative assumptions about this random distribution: (1) semi-parametric, with discrete support points (“discrete mixed logit”), (2) multivariate normal with a general covariance structure (“continuous mixed logit”).

The probit is operationalized as follows: in equation (3.15), we set all shared aspects, \( C_{uv} \), to 0, plus assume that the error terms are distributed normal (instead of Gumbel) with a general covariance structure. We do not estimate a nested logit for the reason discussed in the introduction section, i.e., it requires all possible tree structures to be explicitly allowed for and
estimated on the data which is computationally impractical, which is why it has been ignored in the literature on market share models.

An alternative formulation of price within Tversky’s (1972) EBA model has been proposed by Rotondo (1986). However, that model requires the *a priori* ad-hoc specification of, as well the estimation of, a large number of price cut-off parameters. Further, incorporating additional time-varying covariates beyond price (such as display and feature) vastly increases the dimensionality of the parameter space. Also, the model is not based on random utility primitives. Therefore, appropriately specifying and estimating a suitable version of the Rotondo (1986) model for our aggregate scanner data, for comparison, is beyond the scope of our analyses.

Fader and McAlister (1990) propose a market share model that can handle promotional variables. However, much like the nested logit, their model also requires a priori specification, rather than the endogenous determination, of a decision tree. Gilbride and Allenby (2006), as noted earlier, only estimate a traditional EBA model (without marketing variables) using experimental choices, and not market shares.

### 3.5 Numerical Illustrations of Similarity and Dominance Effects in Demand

First, we illustrate, using two numerical examples, the relative ability of the EBA to handle similarity and dominance effects in demand when compared to the nested logit and mixed logit. Second, we illustrate, using a third numerical example, the difference between our proposed demand model and the logit in explaining demand data with marketing variables, and derive the
implied differences in price elasticities between the two models. Third, we illustrate, using a fourth numerical example, the probit’s inability to handle similarities among more than two brands, unlike the EBA. Fourth, we simulate demand data, with marketing variables included, using our proposed demand model, and then study the consequences of estimating the mixed logit and the probit on the simulated data.

### 3.5.1 EBA versus Nested Logit, Mixed Logit and Logit

Consider the following set of 3 western classical symphonies: (1) Mozart’s 5th Symphony (M), (2) Beethoven’s 5th Symphony (B1) and (3) Beethoven’s 7th Symphony (B2). Suppose we run a discrete choice experiment in which consumers in a lab are presented multiple choice sets and asked to choose one symphony within each choice set, where the choice sets are constructed using all possible subsets of the above 3 symphonies (with at least two alternatives in a choice set). The choice sets, along with the observed choice shares are given below in Table 3.1.

**Table 3.1: Choice Shares Displaying Similarity Effects in Demand (Numerical Example 1)**

*Within parentheses are the choice shares fitted by the logit*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Choice Set Composition</th>
<th>Observed Choice Share</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>B1</td>
<td>B2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(M, B1)</td>
<td>0.58 (0.64)</td>
<td>0.42 (0.36)</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(M, B2)</td>
<td>0.58 (0.64)</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>0.42 (0.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B1, B2)</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>0.50 (0.50)</td>
<td>0.50 (0.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(M, B1, B2)</td>
<td>0.58 (0.47)</td>
<td>0.21 (0.27)</td>
<td>0.21 (0.27)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As can be observed above, the logit, which allows for only the unique aspect parameters of the three products (whose maximum likelihood estimates in this case are 0.47, 0.27 and 0.27), cannot fit the observed choice shares. It overestimates the choice share of M in (M, B1) and underestimates its share in (M, B1, B2). It is easy to show that a suitably specified nested logit (which groups B1 and B2 within one nest, and M within another), as well as a mixed logit, and the EBA can perfectly fit the above shares. However, the EBA and nested logit do so more parsimoniously (using 3 effective parameters, $C_{MB1}$, $C_{MB2}$, $C_{B1B2}$, with $C_{M}$ normalized) than the mixed logit (which uses 5 effective parameters). In addition, given that researchers typically use penalized fit criteria, such as the BIC, to identify the optimal number of support points for a discrete mixed logit, it is often the case that one stops adding support points sooner than is warranted to fully relax the similarity and dominance restrictions in the data (in fact, we find this to be the case in our numerical simulations where we accept the one support solution based on BIC when, in fact, the two-support solution is required to handle the simulated similarity and dominance patterns). Therefore, even when the mixed logit is capable of successfully handling the similarity and dominance patterns in the data, identifying the appropriate mixed logit is often stymied in the estimation.

Now consider the case of dominance. Suppose that the choice sets, along with the observed choice shares are as given below in Table 3.2. Again, the logit, (whose unique aspects in this case are 0.43, 0.48 and 0.09), cannot fit the observed choice shares. It underestimates the choice share of M in (M, B1) and in (M, B1, B2) and greatly overestimates it in (M, B2). Interestingly, even the best-fitting, among all possible tree structures, nested logit does almost as badly as the logit, which shows that the nested logit cannot handle dominance effects. The mixed logit and the EBA can perfectly fit the above shares. However, the EBA does so more
parsimoniously (using 2 effective parameters, $C_M$ (normalized), $C_{MB1}$, $C_{B1B2}$) than the mixed logit (which uses 5 effective parameters).

Table 3.2: Choice Shares Displaying Dominance Effects in Demand (Numerical Example 2)

(Within parentheses are the choice shares fitted by the logit, nested logit)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Choice Set</th>
<th>Observed Choice Share</th>
<th>Composition</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>B1</th>
<th>B2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(M, B1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.58 (0.48, 0.38)</td>
<td>0.42 (0.52, 0.62)</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(M, B2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.58 (0.83, 0.78)</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>0.42 (0.17, 0.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B1, B2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>na</td>
<td>1 (0.84, 0.86)</td>
<td>0 (0.16, 0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(M, B1, B2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.58 (0.43, 0.58)</td>
<td>0.42 (0.48, 0.36)</td>
<td>0 (0.09, 0.36)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above numerical examples show that the mixed logit cannot handle similarity and dominance effects in general. While the mixed logit can accommodate both similarity and dominance effects in the simple case of 3 alternatives, identifying the appropriate mixed logit using fit criteria, such as BIC, leads to an under-specified model that does not adequately handle similarity and dominance effects. However, the empirically identified EBA always handles similarity and dominance effects in the data, and does so with far fewer parameters than the mixed logit and, thus, has greater predictive efficiency. Further, we find that when we impose only a moderate level of dominance (rather than the extreme dominance in Table 3.2) in the data, we find that the EBA becomes even more parsimonious compared to the mixed logit in that it requires fewer effective parameters to fit the data (results are available from the authors). As noted earlier, the “mixture” in the mixed logit also has no behavioral interpretation at the individual-level since it represents across-consumer heterogeneity. However, the EBA is
behaviorally specified at the level of an individual consumer. From a behavior theoretic standpoint, this is a strength of the EBA over the mixed logit.

### 3.5.2 Proposed Model versus Logit with Marketing Variables

Consider the same 3 western classical symphonies as before, except that they are now assumed to be available in CD form at different prices ($10 or $20 per CD). Suppose we run a discrete choice experiment in which consumers in a lab are presented multiple choice sets and asked to choose one symphony within each choice set, where the choice sets are different in terms of the relative prices of the 3 symphonies (with at least two alternatives in a choice set). The choice sets, along with the observed choice shares are given in Table 3.3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Choice Set Composition</th>
<th>Observed Choice Share</th>
<th>M (Observed)</th>
<th>B1 (Observed)</th>
<th>B2 (Observed)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(M: $10, B1: $10, B2: $20)</td>
<td>0.50 (0.53)</td>
<td>0.35 (0.29)</td>
<td>0.15 (0.18)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(M: $10, B1: $20, B2: $10)</td>
<td>0.50 (0.53)</td>
<td>0.15 (0.18)</td>
<td>0.35 (0.29)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(M: $20, B1: $10, B2: $10)</td>
<td>0.40 (0.35)</td>
<td>0.30 (0.33)</td>
<td>0.30 (0.33)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(M: $10, B1: $10, B2: $10)</td>
<td>0.48 (0.46)</td>
<td>0.26 (0.27)</td>
<td>0.26 (0.27)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The logit (whose unique aspects are 0.46, 0.27 and 0.27), yields fitted choice shares that are different from the observed shares. However, our proposed model is able to perfectly fit the above market shares. We present the price elasticity matrix that is implied by our proposed model, as well as by the logit, in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: Price Elasticity Matrix Implied by Proposed Model in the Presence of Marketing Variables (Numerical Example 3)

(Within parentheses are the price elasticities implied by the logit)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Change in demand of column brand for % change in price of row brand</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>B1</th>
<th>B2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>-0.21 (-0.27)</td>
<td>0.19 (0.24)</td>
<td>0.19 (0.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B1</td>
<td>0.10 (0.14)</td>
<td>-0.49 (-0.38)</td>
<td>0.30 (0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B2</td>
<td>0.10 (0.14)</td>
<td>0.30 (0.14)</td>
<td>-0.49 (-0.38)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The cross-elasticities in the third row of Table 3.4 are seriously mis-estimated by the logit when compared to our proposed model. For example, the cross-elasticity of B1 demand with respect to B2 price is 0.30 according to our proposed model, but only 0.14 according to the logit. To the extent that these price elasticities serve as inputs to figuring out optimal retail prices of the 3 brands, significant distortions in the estimated price elasticities will lead to seriously sub-optimal prices and, therefore, lowered retail profits. We explicitly investigate these issues in section 5.

3.5.3 EBA versus Probit

To illustrate the probit’s inability to handle similarities among three (or more) brands, consider the following set of four soft drink brands: (1) Sprite (S), (2) Coke (C), (3) Pepsi (P) and (4) RC Cola (RC). Suppose we run a discrete choice experiment in which consumers in a lab are presented multiple choice sets and asked to choose one soft drink within each choice set, where the choice sets are constructed using all possible subsets of the above 4 options (with at least two
alternatives in a choice set). Suppose that some of these consumers prefer non-cola (i.e., S), while others prefer cola (i.e., C, P, RC). Suppose further that all of these consumers strictly prefer C or P over RC, but are indifferent between C and P. The probit cannot fully represent this situation. While the probit can successfully represent the preference for cola using all possible pair-wise correlations among C, P and RC, it cannot simultaneously capture the dominance of C and P over RC. On the other hand, the EBA can. The choice sets, along with the observed choice shares and the predicted choice shares yielded by the probit are given in Table 3.5. The probit consistently under-predicts the choice share of S and especially struggles when predicting

**Table 3.5: Choice Shares Displaying Dominance Effects in Demand (Numerical Example 4)**

*(Within parentheses are the choice shares fitted by the probit)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Choice Set</th>
<th>Observed Choice Share</th>
<th>Composition</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>RC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(S, C)</td>
<td>0.6 (0.56)</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S, P)</td>
<td>0.6 (0.54)</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S, RC)</td>
<td>0.6 (0.83)</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C, P)</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C, RC)</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(P, RC)</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S, C, P)</td>
<td>0.6 (0.55)</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S, C, RC)</td>
<td>0.6 (0.53)</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S, P, RC)</td>
<td>0.6 (0.56)</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C, P, RC)</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S, C, P, RC)</td>
<td>0.6 (0.55)</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[132]
choice shares in the choice set containing S and RC. The EBA perfectly predicts the choice
shares in all choice sets.

3.5.4 Proposed Model versus Discrete Mixed Logit, Continuous Mixed Logit
and Probit

We simulate brands’ market shares in a fictional 5-brand category over 10,000 days using our
proposed demand model and assuming the following demand parameters: \( C_1 = 3.9, C_2 = 4, C_3 = 3, C_{45} = 5, C_{124} = 1, C_{235} = 3, \beta_P = -1.5, \beta_D = 0.35, \beta_F = 0.25 \). We draw the prices of the 5
brands independently from Uniform (0, 6) distributions and the displays and features of the 5
brands independently from Uniform (0, 1) distributions. We estimate our proposed demand
model, discrete mixed logit, continuous mixed logit and probit using the first 9000 days of the
simulated data (our proposed model perfectly recovers the assumed parameters). We predict
holdout outcomes in the last 1000 days. The results of the comparison are in Table 3.6 below.

Table 3.6: Performance Comparison of Models on Simulated Data
(Note: The discrete mixed logit is based on a 7-support distribution)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performance Criterion</th>
<th>Proposed Model</th>
<th>Discrete Mixed Logit</th>
<th>Continuous Mixed Logit</th>
<th>Probit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In-sample LL</td>
<td>-6221</td>
<td>-6269</td>
<td>-6302</td>
<td>-6721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-sample BIC</td>
<td>12516</td>
<td>13040</td>
<td>12740</td>
<td>13596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holdout LL</td>
<td>-694</td>
<td>-699</td>
<td>-703</td>
<td>-750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holdout MSE</td>
<td>4.7E-13</td>
<td>0.0012</td>
<td>0.0014</td>
<td>0.0099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holdout MAD</td>
<td>1.6E-7</td>
<td>0.0241</td>
<td>0.0294</td>
<td>0.0786</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[133]
The EBA model dramatically outperforms the comparison models in terms of aggregate predictive metrics, i.e., Mean Squared Error (MSE) and Mean Absolute Deviation (MAD), which are of focal interest when making market share predictions. This happens despite our using a fully saturated discrete mixed logit with 7 support points. Even such a fully saturated discrete logit cannot explain the simulated data while the EBA can. In practice, since researchers use the “best-fitting” (in terms of criteria such as BIC) discrete mixed logit, which will have far fewer support points than 7, for prediction purposes, the difference between the EBA and such a discrete mixed logit will be even more striking in practice. Next we compare the models using empirical data.

3.6 Empirical Results

We employ scanner data from a single store in a midwestern market tracking the choices of panelists in 9 different product categories (which have been identified as representing the typical shopping basket of a US household, see Bell and Lattin 1998) – bacon, butter, coffee, soda, crackers, detergent, hot dogs, ice cream, tissue -- over a 104-week period (1993-1995). We use the aggregate sales across all panelists for analysis purposes. We partition the aggregate sales data for each category into two subsets: estimation sample (91 weeks of data), and holdout sample (13 weeks). The top 4 brands in each category are aggregates of all SKUs under the same brand name, and are treated as the 4 focal brands. They account for the following cumulative shares in the 9 listed categories: 82%, 58%, 66%, 48%, 43%, 54%, 52%, 59%, 66%, respectively. We lump the remaining brands in to an alternative called “Other” which is also taken to represent the outside good for our pricing simulations (discussed in the next section).
We compare the empirical performance of our proposed demand model to that of each comparison model (discrete mixed logit, continuous mixed logit, probit). In terms of in-sample fit (Bayesian Information Criterion, BIC), Table 3.7 shows that our proposed demand model outperforms the other 3 models in 8 out 9 categories, and is second-best (after the discrete logit) in 1 category (hot dogs). The probit does the worst in all 9 categories which is not surprising since, as we observed earlier, the continuous mixed logit approximately nests the probit as a special case and, therefore, should do no worse than the probit. The discrete mixed logit, on account of imposing a more flexible distribution of heterogeneity, does better than the continuous mixed logit. Given that the discrete mixed logit turns out to be the best comparison model in-sample, we turn to holdout sample to see how our model does relative to the discrete

**Table 3.7: In-Sample Fit Comparison of Models on Scanner Data**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In-Sample</th>
<th>Proposed Model</th>
<th>Discrete Mixed Logit</th>
<th>Continuous Mixed Logit</th>
<th>Probit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>7041</td>
<td>7051</td>
<td>7090</td>
<td>7145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ice Cream</td>
<td>10766</td>
<td>10784</td>
<td>10848</td>
<td>10928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bacon</td>
<td>4974</td>
<td>4984</td>
<td>4988</td>
<td>5104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detergent</td>
<td>7573</td>
<td>7591</td>
<td>7631</td>
<td>7671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tissue</td>
<td>14101</td>
<td>14114</td>
<td>14146</td>
<td>14334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crackers</td>
<td>10639</td>
<td>10681</td>
<td>10748</td>
<td>10821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butter</td>
<td>13716</td>
<td>13731</td>
<td>13787</td>
<td>13901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hot Dogs</td>
<td>11675</td>
<td>11632</td>
<td>11738</td>
<td>11771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soda</td>
<td>30882</td>
<td>30894</td>
<td>30961</td>
<td>31021</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
mixed logit. We use three predictive criteria – predictive Log-Likelihood (LL), Mean Squared Error (MSE) and Mean Absolute Deviation (MAD). Table 3.8 shows that our proposed model does better than the discrete mixed logit in 8 out of 9 categories in terms of MSE, and in 7 out of 9 categories in terms of LL and MAD. Overall, Tables 3.7 and 3.8 collectively show that our proposed model fares very well in terms of both explaining in-sample shares and predicting holdout shares.

Table 3.8: Holdout Performance of Proposed Model on Scanner Data (Discrete Mixed Logit Performance Within Parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>LL</th>
<th>MSE</th>
<th>MAD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>-459.9  (-462.6)</td>
<td>0.07486 (0.07560)</td>
<td>0.20514 (0.20557)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ice Cream</td>
<td>-820.5  (-824.9)</td>
<td>0.03544 (0.03630)</td>
<td>0.14647 (0.14727)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bacon</td>
<td>-293.9  (-300.2)</td>
<td>0.13352 (0.14017)</td>
<td>0.29372 (0.30381)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detergent</td>
<td>-481.4  (-483.9)</td>
<td>0.05664 (0.05924)</td>
<td>0.18722 (0.19008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tissue</td>
<td>-998.9  (-1018.3)</td>
<td>0.03650 (0.04366)</td>
<td>0.13823 (0.15850)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crackers</td>
<td>-665.7  (-670.8)</td>
<td>0.03575 (0.03912)</td>
<td>0.14386 (0.15202)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butter</td>
<td>-1036.4 (-1028.3)</td>
<td>0.03801 (0.03679)</td>
<td>0.14241 (0.14002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hot Dogs</td>
<td>-1140.9 (-1176.0)</td>
<td>0.03182 (0.04074)</td>
<td>0.14085 (0.16030)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soda</td>
<td>-2392.2 (-2391.6)</td>
<td>0.00963 (0.00960)</td>
<td>0.07287 (0.07285)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We report the estimated marketing mix coefficients of the proposed demand model for the 9 categories in Table 3.9. We see that the price coefficients are negative and significant, while the display and feature coefficients are positive and significant, in all 9 cases, as expected.
In other words, as price of a brand decreases, its market share increases, while as display (feature) activity on a brand increases, its market share increases, in each of the 9 categories.

The estimated aspects yielded by the proposed demand model for the 9 categories are reported in Table 3.10. While the total number of aspects in the 5-brand case is 30 (32 possible subsets of 5 objects minus the null set and the universal set), the number of “effective” non-zero aspects in a category turns out to be only either 6 or 7 (with the identities of the significant aspects varying across categories). The remaining aspects are estimated to be 0. This is an attractive feature of the EBA model, i.e., while it has 30 aspects in principle, which gives it great flexibility in handling a wide range of similarity and dominance structures, only a small number of shared aspects becomes practically necessary in order to handle the market share shifts that are observed in aggregate scanner data. More importantly, this small number of effective aspects
is sufficient for our proposed model to outperform the mixed logit and probit, both of which have a larger number of significantly estimated parameters (in the covariance matrices pertaining to the marketing mix coefficients and error terms, respectively). Note that we estimate at least one

Table 3.10: Estimated Aspects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Aspects Estimates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>$C_1$ $C_3$ $C_4$ $C_{25}$ $C_{124}$ $C_{345}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 4.4$^a$ 2.7$^a$ 1.4$^a$ 3.3$^a$ 0.76$^a$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ice Cream</td>
<td>$C_1$ $C_{24}$ $C_{25}$ $C_{35}$ $C_{134}$ $C_{245}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 16.2$^a$ 5.5$^a$ 7.1$^a$ 6.3$^a$ 2.8$^a$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bacon</td>
<td>$C_1$ $C_3$ $C_{14}$ $C_{123}$ $C_{125}$ $C_{145}$ $C_{245}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 0.12$^a$ 0.17$^a$ 0.26$^a$ 0.18$^a$ 0.05$^c$ 0.53$^a$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detergent</td>
<td>$C_1$ $C_2$ $C_4$ $C_5$ $C_{123}$ $C_{135}$ $C_{235}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 1.9$^a$ 1.3$^a$ 0.86$^a$ 4.7$^a$ 2.2$^a$ 0.82$^a$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tissue</td>
<td>$C_1$ $C_2$ $C_3$ $C_4$ $C_5$ $C_{1234}$ $C_{1345}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 275$^a$ 32.1$^a$ 49.7$^a$ 380$^a$ 62.6$^a$ 862$^a$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crackers</td>
<td>$C_1$ $C_2$ $C_{45}$ $C_{134}$ $C_{135}$ $C_{2345}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 416 155 705 924 0.35$^a$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butter</td>
<td>$C_1$ $C_2$ $C_4$ $C_5$ $C_{13}$ $C_{45}$ $C_{234}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 28.4$^a$ 51.4$^a$ 3.5$^a$ 12.8$^a$ 22.0$^a$ 17.0$^a$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hot Dogs</td>
<td>$C_1$ $C_2$ $C_3$ $C_5$ $C_{134}$ $C_{245}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 0.34$^a$ 0.79$^a$ 1.3$^a$ 3.5$^a$ 2.8$^a$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soda</td>
<td>$C_1$ $C_5$ $C_{34}$ $C_{235}$ $C_{1234}$ $C_{1245}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 0.26$^a$ 0.37$^a$ 0.81$^a$ 2.1$^a$ 0.64$^a$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^a$ Significant at the 1 percent level, $^b$ 5 percent, $^c$ 10 percent
triple aspect (i.e., similarity among three brands) in each category. This sheds light on our proposed model’s ability to outperform the probit, given the probit’s limitation of only allowing for pair-wise brand similarities.

Table 3.11 provides market share and average price, display, and feature statistics for the 5 products in the 9 categories. With this table as a reference, we will take a look at the estimated aspects for the 3 most heavily purchased categories: soda, butter, and tissue. This exercise will throw light on the substantive insights that can be gleaned from the EBA model.

For the soda category, we have 5 aspects apart from the normalized $C_1$. $C_5$ represents a unique aspect for the non-cola private label, a product much like Sprite. To the extent that many consumers visit the store with a strong preference for the most inexpensive, non-brand name, option and eliminate all other options in making their choice, this aspect may reflect such behavior. $C_{34}$ is an aspect representing cola, but something other than the predominant supermarket brand, Pepsi. $C_{235}$ captures the aspect “most popular”, which, by market share, represents Coke, Pepsi, and non-cola private label (perhaps these options enjoy the most shelf space at the store). The aspect with the largest value is $C_{1234}$, which includes all options other than private label. This aspect reflects “brand name soda.” The final aspect is $C_{1245}$, which includes all options other than Coke, which may reflect an “anything but the most expensive” aspect (since Coke is the most expensive product in the category).

For the butter category, apart from the normalized $C_1$, we have 3 individual aspects, $C_2$, $C_4$, $C_5$, with the largest aspect being recovered for Land O’Lakes butter. In this category, Land O’Lakes is the only branded product for true butter. Imperial and Shedds both specialize in non-butter margarine and vegetable oil spreads. If a consumer wants real butter, they are likely to
choose Land O’ Lakes, and its unique aspect reflects such behavior. \( C_{13} \) represents smaller brands and the private label, which may reflect a “non-major brand name, but real butter” aspect. \( C_{45} \) may reflect a “standard for a type of product” aspect since Land O’ Lakes is the standard brand of butter, while Shedd’s is the standard brand of margarine. The other brand name, Imperial, typically offers healthier alternatives including vegetable oil and cholesterol-free spreads. \( C_{234} \) includes the most expensive and most popular options.

The tissue category provides an interesting contrast to the soda category. In tissue, all 5 products have a unique aspect. Further, there are 2 "everything but" aspects. \( C_{1234} \) represents an “anything but the most expensive” aspect, since it includes all products except Scott, which is significantly more expensive than the other options. \( C_{1345} \) is the largest aspect in the category and represents the "not private label" aspect. This represents a preference for a major branded product.

The above discussion throws light on the kind of substantive insights that can be gleaned from our proposed EBA demand model. Such rich substantive insights cannot be obtained using the estimated covariance parameters of the mixed logit or probit. Therefore, in addition to better explaining and predicting market shares, the EBA has superior substantive value than the mixed logit and probit models.

Next, we derive the implications of our proposed model for retailer pricing, and compare the resulting optimal retail prices and, more importantly, retail profits, to those yielded by the best comparison model, the discrete mixed logit.
Table 3.11: Summary Statistics for Brands in the 9 Categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Market Share</th>
<th>Price</th>
<th>Display</th>
<th>Feature</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bacon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oscar Meyer</td>
<td>37.7%</td>
<td>$3.20</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
<td>32.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilson</td>
<td>31.6%</td>
<td>$1.60</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dubuque</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>$3.06</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lazy Maple</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>$2.02</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Detergent   |              |       |         |         |
| Oscar Mayer | 45.8%        | $0.00 | 0.0%    | 0.0%    |
| Tide        | 24.1%        | $1.42 | 61.2%   | 41.3%   |
| Wisk        | 13.8%        | $1.21 | 49.1%   | 31.2%   |
| Private Label| 9.2%       | $0.91 | 43.3%   | 14.0%   |
| Surf        | 7.0%         | $1.23 | 35.3%   | 14.1%   |

| Detergent   |              |       |         |         |
| Other       | 45.8%        | $0.00 | 0.0%    | 0.0%    |
| Tide        | 24.1%        | $1.42 | 61.2%   | 41.3%   |
| Wisk        | 13.8%        | $1.21 | 49.1%   | 31.2%   |
| Private Label| 9.2%       | $0.91 | 43.3%   | 14.0%   |
| Surf        | 7.0%         | $1.23 | 35.3%   | 14.1%   |

| Coffee      |              |       |         |         |
| Oscar Mayer | 37.7%        | $3.20 | 27.5%   | 32.8%   |
| Tide        | 24.1%        | $1.42 | 61.2%   | 41.3%   |
| Wisk        | 13.8%        | $1.21 | 49.1%   | 31.2%   |
| Private Label| 9.2%       | $0.91 | 43.3%   | 14.0%   |
| Surf        | 7.0%         | $1.23 | 35.3%   | 14.1%   |

| Coffee      |              |       |         |         |
| Oscar Mayer | 37.7%        | $3.20 | 27.5%   | 32.8%   |
| Tide        | 24.1%        | $1.42 | 61.2%   | 41.3%   |
| Wisk        | 13.8%        | $1.21 | 49.1%   | 31.2%   |
| Private Label| 9.2%       | $0.91 | 43.3%   | 14.0%   |
| Surf        | 7.0%         | $1.23 | 35.3%   | 14.1%   |

| Crackers    |              |       |         |         |
| Oscar Mayer | 37.7%        | $3.20 | 27.5%   | 32.8%   |
| Tide        | 24.1%        | $1.42 | 61.2%   | 41.3%   |
| Wisk        | 13.8%        | $1.21 | 49.1%   | 31.2%   |
| Private Label| 9.2%       | $0.91 | 43.3%   | 14.0%   |
| Surf        | 7.0%         | $1.23 | 35.3%   | 14.1%   |

| Crackers    |              |       |         |         |
| Oscar Mayer | 37.7%        | $3.20 | 27.5%   | 32.8%   |
| Tide        | 24.1%        | $1.42 | 61.2%   | 41.3%   |
| Wisk        | 13.8%        | $1.21 | 49.1%   | 31.2%   |
| Private Label| 9.2%       | $0.91 | 43.3%   | 14.0%   |
| Surf        | 7.0%         | $1.23 | 35.3%   | 14.1%   |

| Butter      |              |       |         |         |
| Oscar Mayer | 37.7%        | $3.20 | 27.5%   | 32.8%   |
| Tide        | 24.1%        | $1.42 | 61.2%   | 41.3%   |
| Wisk        | 13.8%        | $1.21 | 49.1%   | 31.2%   |
| Private Label| 9.2%       | $0.91 | 43.3%   | 14.0%   |
| Surf        | 7.0%         | $1.23 | 35.3%   | 14.1%   |

| Butter      |              |       |         |         |
| Oscar Mayer | 37.7%        | $3.20 | 27.5%   | 32.8%   |
| Tide        | 24.1%        | $1.42 | 61.2%   | 41.3%   |
| Wisk        | 13.8%        | $1.21 | 49.1%   | 31.2%   |
| Private Label| 9.2%       | $0.91 | 43.3%   | 14.0%   |
| Surf        | 7.0%         | $1.23 | 35.3%   | 14.1%   |
3.7 Pricing Implications

Taking our estimated demand model as an input to the retailer’s profit maximization problem, we calculate optimal retail prices for the 4 focal brands in each of the 9 categories. In each category, the retailer is assumed to engage in the following maximization objective.

$$\max_{(P_j)_{j=1}^J} \Pi = \sum_{j=1}^J (P_j - c_j) \cdot Pr_j,$$

(3.22)

where $c_j$ for each brand is assumed to obey the following rule: the average observed price of the brand in the data implies a 20% mark-up over its cost. We call the resulting optimized retail prices OPTPRICES and the resulting retail profit MAXPROFIT. We then re-compute the optimal retail prices for the 4 brands taking the discrete mixed logit as the input to the retailer’s profit maximization problem (as is usually done in the empirical IO literature, see Chintagunta 2001, Sudhir 2001 etc.). Let us call these optimized retail prices SUBOPTPRICES and the resulting retail profit (calculated by plugging SUBOPTPRICES within our proposed demand model) SUBMAXPROFIT. We calculate the difference between MAXPROFIT and SUBMAXPROFIT in order to understand the retail profit implication of using our proposed demand model, rather than the discrete mixed logit, for retail pricing. In percentage terms, this difference turns out to be 34.4%, on average, across the 9 product categories. This is a substantively meaningful increase in retail profit, especially considering that the retailer’s margins are typically wafer thin. This finding becomes more significant when one considers that our proposed model is being compared to a fairly sophisticated comparison model (discrete mixed logit), rather than a naïve model or a subjective decision rule, for pricing purposes. For example, Mantrala et al. 2006 use the discrete mixed logit in their retail price optimization to
compute store-specific retail prices of brands and then document a realized gross profit increase of 30%, from the existing retail profit of the retailer, using a field experiment on 300 stores. Our findings in this section imply that retail profit could be increased further (in our case, by 34.4%) if the retailer used our proposed demand model as the predictive model of demand.

Next, we take our estimated demand model as an input to the manufacturer’s profit maximization problem after assuming that the retailer uses a 20% mark-up on the wholesale price charged by the manufacturer. In this case, we calculate optimal Bertrand-Nash equilibrium wholesale prices for the 4 focal brands in each of the 9 categories. In each category, the manufacturer is assumed to engage in the following maximization objective.

\[
\max_{\{w_j\}_{j=1}^J} \prod_{j=1}^J (w_j - c_j) \times \Pr_j,
\]

where \( c_j \) for each brand is assumed to be 0. We call the resulting optimized wholesale prices (which are the fixed points to the \( J \) profit maximization problems of the \( J \) manufacturers) OPTWPRICES and the resulting wholesale profit MAXWPROFIT. We then assess the consequence of a single manufacturer determining their optimal price using the discrete logit instead (while his competitors use our proposed model for pricing purposes). This “less analytical” manufacturer’s wholesale profit decreases by 8.6%, on average, across all manufacturers across the 9 product categories. Alternatively, if we assume that all competitors use the discrete mixed logit, while the focal manufacturer uses our proposed demand model, this “more sophisticated” manufacturer’s wholesale profit increases by 13.2%, on average, across all manufacturers across the 9 product categories. Again, this is a substantively meaningful increase in wholesale profit, especially considering the competitive pressures that exist in each category on account of the presence of three other major brands.
These pricing implications for the retailer and the manufacturers show that our proposed demand model serves an important managerial role beyond explicating the consumer’s choice process using aspects that are unique to, versus shared among, various brands in a product category (something that existing models, such as nested logit, mixed logit and probit cannot do). This role is in determining profit-improving retail and wholesale prices for retailers and manufacturers, respectively.

3.8 Conclusions

The mixed logit is widely used by structural modelers as a demand model for differentiated products (see, for example, Sudhir 2001, Thomadsen 2007 etc.). The mixed logit is also used by analytically enlightened retailers, such as Tesco (in the UK) and Kroger (in the US) for setting product prices and promotions (see Mantrala et al. 2006 for a recent pricing application by a US retailer). Given this, our findings in this paper about the descriptive superiority, in terms of relaxing IIA to better capture similarity and dominance effects in demand, as well as prescriptive superiority, in terms of yielding significantly higher retail profit when used for retail pricing, of our proposed EBA demand model for differentiated products call for serious consideration of our demand model as the preferred market share model for aggregate scanner data. The fact that it reduces to the logit as a special case would lead to the standard model becoming adequate and appropriate if warranted by the data. This should facilitate its adoption. We leave it for future research to integrate our proposed demand model within an oligopoly model of pricing in a distribution channel and study the implications for inferences about pricing behavior. It is
possible that inferences about price competition among manufacturers may be sensitive to whether one uses the mixed logit or our proposed demand model as the market share model.

Another attractive modeling alternative to the mixed logit, in terms of flexibly handling similarity and dominance effects in demand, is the market share model of Batsell and Polking (1985). However, extending that model to include marketing variables, as well as giving the resulting model a utility foundation, would be non-trivial challenges to overcome. If surmountable, that line of research presents an interesting intellectual alternative to our research.

An interesting modeling extension of our proposed demand model would be to explicitly incorporate observed brand attributes (such as package size, flavor etc.) within the model. There is a fairly straightforward way to achieve this in our demand model. We can allow the unique aspects to be linear functions of unique observed attributes, and the shared aspects to be linear functions of shared observed attributes among brands, and then test whether the aspects, in fact, end up significantly depending on these observed attributes. If one does a “variance decomposition” of the estimated aspects into learning how much of their estimated magnitudes can be explained using observed attributes versus how much cannot, it gives one an opportunity to understand how consumers view brands, as in Multidimensional scaling methods. Existing random utility models, such as the mixed logit and probit, typically lump all brand attributes, regardless of whether they are unique to, or shared among, brands in to a linear function specification of the brand intercepts, which is far less flexible than the aspect specification of our proposed demand model.

Last, but not least, it would be useful to extend our proposed demand model to handle attraction effects (as in Huber, Payne and Puto 1982, Huber and Puto 1983). Kivetz, Netzer and
Srinivasan (2004), for example, have shown how to modify existing choice models to handle the compromise effect, another behavioral bias in consumer choices. The attraction effect remains unaddressed so far.
3.9 References


