Voting Under the Federal Constitution

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There is no explicit, affirmative right to vote in the federal Constitution. At the Founding, States had total discretion to choose their electorate. Although that electorate was the most democratic in history, the franchise was largely limited to property-owning White men. Over the course of two centuries, the United States democratized, albeit in fits and starts. The right to vote was often expanded in response to wartime service and mobilization.

A series of constitutional amendments prohibited discrimination in voting on account of race (Fifteenth), sex (Nineteenth), inability to pay a poll tax (Twenty-Fourth), and age (Twenty-Sixth). These amendments were worded as anti-discrimination provisions with nearly identical language. Although they vastly expanded who was eligible to vote, these constitutional amendments’ negative framing permits States to disenfranchise voters through facially neutral requirements, such as felon disenfranchisement laws.

Starting in the 1960s, the Supreme Court relied on the Equal Protection Clause—rather than the voting rights amendments themselves—to protect the “fundamental” right to vote, applying strict scrutiny to voting qualifications. This line of cases comes closest to recognizing an affirmative right to vote that receives protection even absent an invidious facial classification. These decisions, combined with the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) and the civil rights movement, helped eradicate Jim Crow.

This chapter charts how the United States democratized, and its focus is on voting qualifications under the federal Constitution. As this chapter demonstrates, democratization has been accomplished through federal constitutional amendments, state-law changes, judicial decisions, and popular support during or shortly after wartime.

I. The Original Constitution

As originally written, the Constitution was democratic for its time, but it implicitly approved of racist, sexist, and classist barriers to casting a ballot. And compared to today, the original Constitution was far less democratic in terms of what offices could be voted for. This constitutional design reflected the Founders’ mistrust of unchecked democracy.¹

¹ See CHILTON WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN SUFFRAGE: FROM PROPERTY TO DEMOCRACY,
1. The House of Representatives

At the Founding, the House was the only directly elected branch of the federal government. The original Constitution, however, did not establish a federal standard for who had the right to vote for representatives. The Founders failed to reach agreement on a nationwide standard—such as a property qualification—given the plethora of approaches followed by the States. Instead, Article I, Section Two provided that “Electors … shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature,” which in practice was the lower house. Thus, States controlled who could vote for the federal House.

As a general matter, the franchise was limited to White men who owned property or satisfied taxpaying requirements. Estimates vary but “[b]y 1790 … roughly 60 to 70 percent of adult white men (and very few others) could vote.” To put this in context, the Founders selected “the broadest franchise operating in the states, as opposed to more restricted electorates for various state upper houses and governorships.” And because landownership was more common in the United States, a greater percentage of the White male population could vote than in England.

But by relying on state suffrage qualifications, the original Constitution baked in significant discriminatory barriers to casting a ballot. However, there were a few exceptions: women could vote in New Jersey, and free Black men were technically permitted to vote in a handful of States. Some States enfranchised aliens. And during the Founding, religious qualifications were abandoned in all but one State. Ultimately, these racist, sexist, and classist barriers would require constitutional amendments to be eliminated.


2 See id.
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
5 See id. at 20-21.
7 See id.
8 See KEYSSAR, supra note 4, at 21.
10 The exception was South Carolina, which required voters to pledge that they believed in God. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 1, at 115.
2. The Senate

Unlike Representatives, Senators were originally chosen by state legislatures.¹¹ For many decades, however, voters could express their preferences for senators though a variety of mechanisms. The best-known example is the 1858 contest between Abraham Lincoln and Stephen Douglas for Illinois’s U.S. Senate seat. Rather than appear on the ballot themselves, Lincoln and Douglas urged voters to elect Republicans and Democrats, respectively, to the state legislature, who, in turn, would select their partisan ally for the U.S. Senate.¹² In 1913, the Seventeenth Amendment was ratified and provided for the direct election of Senators. As with U.S. Representatives, the Seventeenth Amendment defines the electorate as those who can vote for “the most numerous branch of the state legislature[].”¹³

3. The President and the Electoral College

As the 2000 and 2016 elections made abundantly clear, the United States does not hold a popular vote for President. Part of “an eleventh-hour compromise,”¹⁴ Article II establishes an indirect method known as the Electoral College, which gives each State a slate of electors based on their number of representatives and senators.¹⁵ Article II further provides that each State shall “appoint” electors “in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct.”¹⁶ In the earliest presidential elections, “state legislatures mostly picked the electors,”¹⁷ but that practice was virtually abandoned by 1832 in favor of awarding electors based on the popular vote.¹⁸ Today, all but two States have a winner-take-all approach to awarding their electors.¹⁹ However,

¹¹ U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
¹² Other mechanisms involved party primaries and the so-called Oregon Plan in which voters selected U.S. Senators in a preference poll and state legislators would pre-commit themselves to vote for the winner. See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, at 410-12.
¹³ U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
¹⁵ Following the Twenty-Third Amendment’s ratification in 1961, the District of Columbia is included in the Electoral College and receives the number of electors it “would be entitled if it were a State, provided in no event more than the least populous State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII, § 1.
¹⁶ Id. art. II, § 1.
¹⁷ Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2321.
¹⁸ Id. The lone hold-out was South Carolina, which appointed electors until the Civil War. See Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 35 n.2 (2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting). In addition, the Florida legislature appointed electors in 1868 and Colorado did so in 1876. See id.
¹⁹ The exceptions are Maine and Nebraska, which award two electors to the winner of
in contrast to the U.S. Senate, no constitutional amendment has explicitly provided for a right to vote for president.

4. States

Within States, the original Constitution provided little direct guidance. Article I, Section Two’s requirement that the federal House have the same electorate as the “most numerous” house of the state legislature presumes—indeed, arguably requires—that there be state-level elections. Furthermore, Congress may preempt state laws concerning the “Times, Places, and Manner of holding Elections” for congressional elections. That power, however, does not extend to setting voting qualifications.

Known alternatively as the Guarantee Clause or the Republican Form of Government Clause, Article IV, Section Four provides that “the United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.” This enigmatic language has spawned a host of theories over the years. Several scholars have latched onto the Guarantee Clause as a source of authority for regulating malapportionment and partisan gerrymandering. Other academics have been far more skeptical of using the Guarantee Clause as a vehicle for protecting individual rights.

the statewide vote and one elector to the winner of each congressional district. See Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2321 & n.1.

20 U.S. CONST. art I, § 4

21 See Inter Tribal Council, 570 U.S. at 16-17 (majority opinion). As discussed below, see infra Section II.4, Justice Black’s opinion announcing the judgment in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 119-25 (1970) (opinion of Black, J.), concluded that the Elections Clause authorized Congress to establish voting qualifications for federal elections. However, the Inter Tribal Council Court deemed that opinion as having “minimal precedential value” given that no rationale commanded a majority. Inter Tribal Council, 570 U.S. at 16 n.8.


22 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.


Notwithstanding robust scholarly interest, the Guarantee Clause has garnered scant attention from the courts and the political branches. For its part, the Supreme Court has construed the Guarantee Clause as raising non-justiciable political questions and has therefore declined to adjudicate disputes under that Clause.\textsuperscript{25} During Reconstruction, Radical Republicans cited the Guarantee Clause as Congress’s source of authority for imposing military rule on the Southern States on the theory that the disenfranchisement of Black men resulted in a majority or near majority of free men being unable to vote.\textsuperscript{26} In modern times, Congress has not relied on the Guarantee Clause to enact voting rights legislation.

II. \textit{The Voting Rights Amendments}

From the Founding to Reconstruction, enfranchisement occurred via changes in state law, rather than through constitutional amendment. Most notably, Jacksonian democracy helped eliminate property requirements and expanded the number of state and local offices that were elected.\textsuperscript{27} But it would take a series of constitutional amendments to enfranchise people of color, women, the poor, and young adults. In many ways, these amendments were direct responses to the Civil War, World War I, and the Vietnam War. Given the centrality of race to U.S. history, legal doctrine, and contemporary struggles over the right to vote, this Section focuses heavily on the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.

1. \textit{The Reconstruction Amendments}

Following the Civil War, Congress passed and the States ratified three constitutional amendments: the Thirteenth abolished slavery; the Fourteenth protected civil rights and imposed an apportionment penalty for States that disenfranchised their adult male residents; and the Fifteenth prohibited racial discrimination in voting. To understand why the Fifteenth Amendment was necessary, a brief historical survey is helpful.\textsuperscript{28}

Emancipation had a perverse unintended consequence. With the infamous Three-Fifths Clause effectively repealed, freedpersons would count as full

\textsuperscript{25} See Luther v. Bolden, 48 U.S. 1, 42 (1849).
\textsuperscript{26} See \textit{Amar, America’s Constitution}, \textit{supra} note 6, at 374-75.
\textsuperscript{27} See \textit{Keyssar, supra} note 4, at 24-25.
\textsuperscript{28} For those interested in primary sources concerning the drafting and ratification of these amendments, see 1 \textit{The Reconstruction Amendments: The Essential Documents} (Kurt T. Lash ed., 2021), and 2 \textit{The Reconstruction Amendments: The Essential Documents} (Kurt T. Lash ed., 2021).
persons for purposes of congressional reapportionment. Given that the Southern States disenfranchised freedpersons, the practical effect was that Southern White men’s political power in the House and Electoral College would be bolstered. This put the Union’s victory at risk, as most Southern White men were supporters of the Confederacy. 29 Indeed, following the war’s end, the reconstituted Southern governments passed the notorious Black Codes, which used strict labor and vagrancy laws to re-establish slavery in all but name only. 30

Congress responded to the Black Codes by passing the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which, true to its name, protected the civil rights of freedpersons. The Act’s constitutionality, however, was questioned, including in the Republican Caucus. Accordingly, Congress passed the Fourteenth Amendment in June 1866 and the States ratified it in July 1868. 31

Here, it is important to keep in mind that the Reconstruction Framers differentiated between civil and political rights. 32 The Reconstruction-era conception of civil rights included, inter alia, the rights to own property, to contract, and to equal treatment under the criminal law. 33 By contrast, political rights included not only the right to vote but also the right to hold office and to serve on a jury. Civil rights were inherent in citizenship; political rights were not. 34

Section One’s text reflected this distinction. The Privileges or Immunities Clause was borrowed from Article IV’s protections for out-of-state citizens and, whatever the outer limits of privileges and immunities during Reconstruction, that term did not extend as far as the franchise. In addition, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses applied to persons—not merely citizens—and thus were viewed to exclude political rights. If the Equal Protection Clause originally applied to political rights, it would not only have invalidated racially discriminatory voting qualifications but also enfranchised women, children, and aliens. 35

Moreover, the Reconstruction Framers repeatedly stated that Section One did not confer voting rights and rejected language that would have explicitly accomplished that goal. Even supporters of Black suffrage recognized that

31 See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 675 (2010).
33 See id. at 1027.
34 See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, at 391.
35 See id. at 391-92.
such a proposal would likely doom ratification in the North. Thus, as originally understood, Section One as a whole and the Equal Protection Clause, in particular, excluded political rights.

Although obscure today, Section Two’s Apportionment Clause sought to incentivize the enfranchisement of the freedmen. Section Two provides for a reduction in House seats—and concomitantly, in the Electoral College—if a State “denied” or “abridged” the “right to vote” of its adult “male” “citizens.” Given contemporary suffrage laws and racial demographics, this penalty would have disproportionately impacted the South compared to the Northern and the Border States.

Section Two is also noteworthy for introducing the word “male” into the Constitution. Because western migration was predominantly led by men, many Eastern States had far greater proportions of women. A sex-neutral Section Two, therefore, would have incentivized enfranchising women. Section Two’s exclusion of women created a fissure between the abolitionist and suffragette movements—one that was deepened by failed attempts to include protections for sex in the Fifteenth Amendment.

Section Two was not—and never has been—enforced. By the time of the post-1870 apportionment, a series of state laws, federal statutes, and the Fifteenth Amendment had enfranchised Black men nationwide.

At the end of the Civil War, only five States had enfranchised Black men—all in New England and with minuscule Black populations. Shortly thereafter, Black men were enfranchised via a judicial decision in Wisconsin and via referenda in Iowa and Minnesota. Tennessee’s state legislature enfranchised Black men following its re-admission to the Union, becoming the only ex-Confederate State to do so voluntarily.

In 1867, Congress enfranchised Black men in areas of federal control. Congress mandated Black male suffrage in the District of Columbia and the federal territories. Congress also required that Nebraska adopted universal

37 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
38 See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, at 394.
39 See William W. Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, the “Right” to Vote, and the Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 S. CT. REV. 33, 47 (“[B]ecause pioneer California had a far higher percentage of males over the age of twenty-one than did Vermont, 58 per cent of the California population consisted of voters as against only 19 per cent in Vermont.”).
42 See Crum, Superfluous, supra note 36, at 1593-94.
male suffrage as a fundamental condition of its admission to the Union.43

Most importantly, Congress passed the First Reconstruction Act, which drastically transformed the South. The Act imposed military rule and declared the existing Southern governments—which had all White male electorates—to be null and void. Congress mandated Black male suffrage, correctly predicting that Black voters would defend their own interests by overwhelmingly supporting the Republican Party.44 As Professor Eric Foner has observed, the First Reconstruction Act inaugurated “a stunning and unprecedented experiment in interracial democracy.”45

Following the 1868 presidential election, Republicans recognized that nationwide Black male suffrage was both a moral and political necessity.46 Some Radicals, such as those with deep roots in the abolitionist movement, had long been committed to political rights for Black men. Others were persuaded by the military service of Black men, who accounted for ten percent of the soldiers in the Union army. Some had more partisan motivations, believing that Black men would help the Republican Party win elections.47

When Congress started debating the Fifteenth Amendment in early 1869, the States were evenly divided: seventeen States permitted Black male suffrage; seventeen did not.48 At first, Radical Republicans in Congress

43 See id. at 1594-95.
44 See id. at 1595-96. Tennessee was excluded from the Act’s strictures because it had ratified the Fourteenth Amendment and was re-admitted to the Union.
45 FONER, RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 40, at 278.
46 Scholars have debated whether the primary motive to pursue a constitutional amendment was to enfranchise Black men in the North or to provide Congress with authority to prevent backsliding in the re-admitted Southern States. Compare WILLIAM GILLETTE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: POLITICS AND PASSAGE OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 77 (2d ed. 1969) (arguing the former), with JOHN MABRY MATHEWS, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 21 (1909) (arguing the latter).
48 This disparity existed even though the Fourteenth Amendment had been ratified in 1868. This state of affairs is further evidence that Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment was originally understood to not apply to political rights. See Crum, Superfluous, supra note 36, at 1602.

To be specific, these States barred Black men from voting: California, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia. See id. at 1602-03 n.362. In addition, New York technically permitted Black men to vote, but racially discriminatory property and residency qualifications disenfranchised virtually all of them. See id. at 1593.

The right to vote free of racial discrimination existed in these States: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin. See id. at 1602 n.363. Black men could vote in Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia, but those States had not yet been re-admitted to the Union. See id. at 1603; see also Travis
argued that a federal statute was sufficient to mandate nationwide Black male suffrage. After constitutional and political concerns were raised by moderate Republicans, the statutory proposal was defeated in favor of a constitutional amendment.⁴⁹

The metes and bounds of the proposed amendment’s language were hotly contested. Many versions included explicit protections for not only the right to vote but also the right to hold office. However, a last-minute change by the conference committee omitted the officeholding language.⁵⁰ Other proposals were race conscious. Senator Jacob Howard introduced an amendment that would have protected the right to vote of “[c]itizens of the United States of African descent.”⁵¹ Most radically, some proposals came tantalizingly close to adopting an affirmative right to vote for adult men of “sound mind,” with an exception for felon disenfranchisement laws.⁵²

Most proposals, however, were framed in the negative. And here, the debate centered on what characteristics merited an anti-discrimination provision. On one end of the spectrum was a targeted approach that singled out race, color, and previous condition of servitude. At the other end were proposals that would have also included sex, nativity, property, education, and creed.⁵³ After suffragettes failed to include sex-based protections in the Fifteenth Amendment, prominent leaders, such as Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, opposed the amendment’s ratification.⁵⁴

Ultimately, the narrowest approach passed Congress on a party-line vote, with some Radical Republicans boycotting the final vote because they believed that the amendment’s protections were too narrow.⁵⁵ The Fifteenth Amendment was ratified by States in New England, the Midwest, and the South. It was opposed by the Border States and the West Coast, which opposed enfranchising Black men and Chinese-American men, respectively.⁵⁶

Crum, The Lawfulness of the Fifteenth Amendment, 97 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1543, 1580-89 (2022) (discussing Georgia’s unique position as only partially re-admitted to Congress).

⁴⁹ See Crum, Superfluous, supra note 36, at 1602-16.

⁵⁰ The reason for this deletion is the subject of scholarly debate. Compare Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participating Akin to Voting, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 203, 228-34 (1995) (arguing that the right to vote includes the right to hold office), with EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863-1869, at 154 (arguing that the officeholding provision was deleted out of fear that its inclusion would doom ratification).

⁵¹ CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong. 3d Sess. 828 (1869).

⁵² Id. at 728.

⁵³ See id. at 1224-26;


⁵⁵ See GILLETTE, supra note 46, at 73-76.

⁵⁶ See id. at 81-85; Crum, Lawfulness, supra note 48, at 1572.
All three of the Reconstruction Amendments contain clauses giving Congress the power to “enforce” their provisions through “appropriate legislation.” This terminology was a purposeful borrowing of McCulloch’s test for Congress’s broad authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause. Put simply, in the aftermath of Dred Scott, the Reconstruction Framers viewed the Supreme Court as part of the problem and put itself in the proverbial driver’s seat for protecting the newfound civil and political rights of freedpersons.57 The Reconstruction Congress would subsequently pass several acts enforcing the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.58

Unfortunately, the Fifteenth Amendment proved to be a parchment promise in the Jim Crow South. The Amendment’s failure to affirmatively guarantee the right to vote or to explicitly protect against additional forms of discrimination opened the door to recalcitrant Southern States enacting literacy tests and poll taxes to disenfranchise Black voters. Following the withdrawal of federal troops from the South in 1877 and the adoption of new Southern constitutions in the 1890s and early 1900s, Black men were disenfranchised on a wide scale.59 Congress’s decision to reserve robust enforcement power to itself would prove crucial during the civil rights movement, when the VRA would help make the dream of the Fifteenth Amendment a reality.

2. The Nineteenth Amendment

The exclusion of women’s suffrage from the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments would have longstanding consequences. Toward the end of Reconstruction, the Court’s decision in Minor v. Happersett rejected a claim brought by suffragettes that the Privileges or Immunities Clause conferred the right to vote on women.60 Indeed, the Court referenced the necessity of passing the Fifteenth Amendment as one reason why the Privileges or Immunities Clause did not encompass the franchise.61 Following Minor,

59 See Foner, Second Founding, supra note 40, at 126. Going beyond the Jim Crow South, Native Americans faced widespread disenfranchisement until Congress passed the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, which granted them citizenship regardless of their tribal affiliation or whether they continued to live on reservations. See Laughlin McDonald, American Indians and the Fight for Equal Voting Rights 18 (2010). Here, one should avoid anachronism. At the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, “most Indians did not want national citizenship if it meant dissolving tribal sovereignty and making their land available to encroachment by whites.” Foner, Second Founding, supra note 40, at 72.
61 See id. at 175.
suffragettes recalibrated their strategy and pushed for a constitutional amendment.62

Meanwhile, women were winning the right to vote, starting in Wyoming Territory in 1869. The vanguard of women’s enfranchisement were Western States and territories, a reform motivated, at least in part, by a desire to encourage women to move there in the late 1800s.63 After the so-called “doldrums” of the suffragette movement at the turn of the twentieth century, the 1910s witnessed a rapid succession of victories.64 Women’s mobilization in support of World War I helped provide the final push over the finish line.65 When the Nineteenth Amendment was ratified in 1920, fifteen States had fully enfranchised women. Several more States and territories had enfranchised women in certain elections, such as for President or for school boards.66

Although Reconstruction-era drafts sometimes looked to the Fourteenth Amendment for inspiration,67 the Nineteenth Amendment’s text was modeled on the Fifteenth Amendment. Some of the most vociferous debates—such as over the right to hold office—were “noticeably absent” during Congress’s deliberations.68 The Nineteenth Amendment Framers’ decision to borrow the Fifteenth Amendment’s “denied or abridged” language has been followed ever since for the Constitution’s voting rights amendments.

Even though the electorate “nearly doubled in size” between 1910 and 1920, “voting patterns and partisan alignments were little affected.”69 Put differently, unlike Black men during Reconstruction, the political preferences of women did not materially differ from the pre-existing electorate. Those racial differences persisted into the 1920s, and racially discriminatory laws in the Jim Crow South disenfranchised Black men and women alike.70

3. The Twenty-Fourth Amendment

Although property qualifications withered during Jacksonian democracy, the role of class did not disappear from voting qualifications. A “poll tax” is

64 See id. at 177-78.
65 See KEYSSAR, supra note 4, at 173-75.
66 See id. at 365-68.
67 See Siegel, supra note 62, at 974.
68 Katz, supra note 63, at 185.
69 KEYSSAR, supra note 4, at 175.
a head tax that applies to all adults, and by the twentieth century, poll taxes were employed as barriers to the right to vote rather than as a revenue generator.\footnote{1}{See Louis B. Boudin, State Poll Taxes and the Federal Constitution, 28 VA. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1941).}

During the New Deal, “progressives framed their opposition to the poll tax as an issue of class, not race.”\footnote{2}{Bruce Ackerman & Jennifer Nou, Canonizing the Civil Rights Revolution: The People and the Poll Tax, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 71 (2009).} The poll tax was part of the Southern States’ toolkit to disenfranchise Black voters, but other measures, such as literacy tests, also played a role.\footnote{3}{See id. at 72-73.} Although estimates vary based on the relevant decade and the particular law, it is likely that substantial numbers of White voters were also disenfranchised by the poll tax.\footnote{4}{See V.O. Key, Jr. Southern Politics in State and Nation 608 (1949) (estimating that between five and ten percent of White voters were disenfranchised by the poll tax during the 1920s through 1940s); see also J. Morgan Kousser, The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restrictions and the Establishment of the One-Party South, 1880-1910, at 71 (1974) (estimating that Georgia’s poll tax disenfranchised between a quarter and a third of White men in the 1880s).} Efforts to eliminate poll taxes stalled following the Court’s 1937 decision in Breedlove v. Suttles, which rejected a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to poll taxes.\footnote{5}{302 U.S. 277 (1937).}

By the 1960s, the poll tax was once again in the limelight. However, opponents differed in their strategies and motivations. The NAACP and other civil rights groups called for Congress to eliminate poll taxes via legislation enacted pursuant to its Reconstruction Amendment enforcement authority. Civil rights groups feared that using a constitutional amendment would set a dangerous modern precedent that Congress could not legislate as to voting qualifications. By contrast, Senator Holland of Florida advocated for a constitutional amendment. Holland was a notorious segregationist who opposed the poll tax for class-based reasons. Ultimately, Holland’s strategy prevailed for poll taxes in federal elections.\footnote{6}{See Ackerman & Nou, supra note 72, at 69-73.}

Ratified in 1964, the Twenty-Fourth Amendment prohibits the denial or abridgement of the right to vote in federal elections for failure to pay a poll tax. The Twenty-Fourth Amendment’s language differs in two ways from the other voting rights amendments. First, the Twenty-Fourth Amendment’s scope is limited to federal elections, rather than all elections. Second, the Twenty-Fourth Amendment explicitly applies to presidential primaries, recognizing the relatively recent development of those elections.\footnote{7}{See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, at 443.}

As explained more below,\footnote{8}{See Section III.2.} the Twenty-Fourth Amendment was absent
from the Court’s decision in *Harper*, which just two years later invoked the Equal Protection Clause to prohibit poll taxes in state and local elections.\(^\text{79}\)

4. *The Twenty-Sixth Amendment*

The Twenty-Sixth Amendment’s history is intimately linked to wars. The first congressional proposal to lower the voting age to eighteen was introduced in 1942, shortly after the U.S. entered World War II and the military decreased the draft age to eighteen. The Vietnam War, along with an unpopular draft and student mobilization, led to more successful efforts to enfranchise young adults.\(^\text{80}\)

In 1970, Congress reauthorized the temporary provisions of the VRA, which largely targeted the Jim Crow South. In that Act, Congress also lowered the voting age to eighteen for federal and state elections.\(^\text{81}\) At the time, only four States had voting ages lower than twenty-one.\(^\text{82}\) Congress’s actions here thus stand out for two reasons. First, Congress passed a statute regulating voter qualifications rather than pursue a constitutional amendment. Second, unlike those prior amendments, Congress was not policing outliers. In other words, very few States had already adopted more lenient voter qualifications. Unsurprisingly, the 1970 VRA was immediately challenged.

In *Oregon v. Mitchell*, a deeply fractured Court upheld Congress’s power to lower the voting age in federal elections but denied it that power in state elections.\(^\text{83}\) In a solo opinion announcing the judgment of the Court, Justice Black reasoned that “Congress has ultimate supervisory power over congressional elections” in light of the Elections Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause.\(^\text{84}\) In Black’s view, Congress lacked similar oversight over state elections under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment given that the Equal Protection Clause was originally understood to exclude voting rights and that Congress was legislatively against age—rather than racial—discrimination.\(^\text{85}\) In four other opinions, the Justices sparred over whether the

\(^{\text{79}}\) See Ackerman & Nou, *supra* note 72, at 68. Congress eventually followed the NAACP’s preferred strategy in Section 10 of the VRA, which declared that all poll taxes were unconstitutional and authorized the Department of Justice to bring suits against them. See *id.* at 108-11.


\(^{\text{82}}\) Those States were Alaska (19), Georgia (18), Hawaii (20), and Kentucky (18). See *Oregon v. Mitchell*, 400 U.S. 112, 245 n.28 (1970) (opinion of Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ.).

\(^{\text{83}}\) See *id.* at 117-18 (opinion of Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ.).

\(^{\text{84}}\) *Id.* at 124.

\(^{\text{85}}\) See *id.* at 125-27.
original meaning of the Equal Protection Clause and the propriety of recent precedents—discussed below—extending that Clause to protect the fundamental right to vote.\textsuperscript{86} Put simply, the Mitchell Court was unable to coalesce around a single rationale for its parsing of Congress’s power to impose voting qualifications.\textsuperscript{87}

Following Mitchell, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment was quickly adopted out of concerns that running the 1972 election with different minimum voting ages for federal and state elections would prove too bureaucratically costly and difficult.\textsuperscript{88} In effect, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment lowered the voting age from twenty-one to eighteen nationwide.\textsuperscript{89}

III. The Fundamental Right to Vote

Notwithstanding this history of voting rights amendments, the Court currently interprets the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause to encompass the right to vote. The Court first invoked the Equal Protection Clause to strike down a voting qualification in the 1927 case of Nixon \textit{v. Herndon}, which invalidated Texas’s White primary.\textsuperscript{90} But in the 1960s, the Warren Court radically changed its approach to the right to vote under the Equal Protection Clause. Although race was often a subtext of these decisions, the Court’s jurisprudence adopted universalist protections for the right to vote.\textsuperscript{91}

1. The Old Regime

To see how quickly and dramatically the Court’s jurisprudence changed, consider its 1959 decision in \textit{Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections}.\textsuperscript{92} There, Black plaintiffs challenged North Carolina’s literacy test,\textsuperscript{93} a common Jim Crow voter-suppression tool. As the case reached the Court, the key issue was whether the literacy test was \textit{facially} invalid under

\textsuperscript{86} See Eric S. Fish, \textit{The Twenty-Sixth Amendment Enforcement Power}, 121 YALE L.J. 1168, 1190-93 (2012) (summarizing these opinions); see also infra Section III.2.

\textsuperscript{87} For how the \textit{Inter Tribal Council} Court would subsequently give Mitchell little precedential weight, see supra note 21.

\textsuperscript{88} See Keyssar, supra note 4, at 227-28.

\textsuperscript{89} For recent efforts to further lower the voting age at the local level, see Joshua A. Douglas, \textit{The Right to Vote Under Local Law}, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1039, 1052-62 (2017).


\textsuperscript{91} Because this chapter’s focus is on voter qualifications, it does not dwell on decisions that implicate Congress’s enforcement authority.

\textsuperscript{92} 360 U.S. 45 (1959).

\textsuperscript{93} See \textit{id}. at 45.
the Fourteenth Amendment; the plaintiffs did not raise a discriminatory intent claim.\footnote{See id. at 50. The plaintiffs also brought their challenge under the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Amendments. See id.}

In a unanimous opinion by Justice Douglas, the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ challenge. Remarking that “States … have broad powers” to set voter qualifications,\footnote{Id.} the Court explained that “[r]esidence requirements, age, [and] previous criminal record [were] obvious examples” of valid restrictions.\footnote{Id. at 51 (internal citation omitted).} As for literacy tests, the Court observed that “[t]he ability to read and write likewise has some relation to standards designed to promote intelligent use of the ballot” and that “a State might conclude that only those who are literate should exercise their franchise.”\footnote{Id. at 51-52.} Thus, as the civil rights movement entered its defining decade, \textit{Lassiter} made clear that rational-basis review governed non-race-based challenges to voter qualifications under the Equal Protection Clause.\footnote{Congress would later prohibit the use of literacy tests, and the Court upheld that legislation as valid Fifteenth Amendment enforcement legislation. See \textit{South Carolina v. Katzenbach}, 383 U.S. 301, 333-34 (1966) (upholding ban on literacy tests in covered jurisdictions); \textit{Oregon v. Mitchell}, 400 U.S. 112, 132 (1970) (opinion of Black, J.) (upholding nationwide ban on literacy tests).}

2. \textit{The Warren Court}

In 1965, the tide began to turn. In \textit{Carrington v. Rash}, the Court invalidated a Texas law that prohibited U.S. servicemembers who moved to the State from voting.\footnote{380 U.S. 89, 89 (1965).} In defending the law, Texas cited its interest in stopping “concentrated balloting of military personnel” from overwhelming “small local civilian communit[ies]” as well as its interest in preventing mere “transients” from voting.\footnote{Id. at 93.} Acknowledging that States may “impose reasonable residence restrictions,”\footnote{Id. at 91.} the Court concluded that Texas violated the Equal Protection Clause because it targeted servicemembers out of “fear of the[ir] political views”\footnote{Id. at 94.} and “invidious[ly] discriminat[ed]” against them by imposing heightened residency requirements.\footnote{Id. at 96.} \textit{Carrington} was the first time the Court invoked the Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate a voter qualification in a non-race case.\footnote{See id. at 97 (Harlan, J., dissenting).} The harshness of Texas’s ban on
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servicemembers registering to vote may have played a role in the Court finding it irrational, but a series of later decisions would make plain that the standard of review was being ratcheted up.

In its 1966 decision in *Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections*, the Court invalidated the poll tax on equal protection grounds.\textsuperscript{105} Recall that, just two years earlier, the Twenty-Fourth Amendment banned poll taxes in federal elections. But *Harper* involved a challenge to Virginia’s poll tax in state elections and therefore fell outside the recently ratified Amendment’s plain text. Interestingly, Justice Douglas’s majority opinion did not even acknowledge the Twenty-Fourth Amendment’s existence.

The *Harper* Court adopted what is perhaps the most candidly living-constitutionalist reasoning contained in the U.S. Reports. Relying on the one-person, one-vote cases and *Brown*’s repudiation of segregated schools, the Court declared that “the Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political theory of a particular era” and that unconstitutional discrimination “has never been confined to historic notions of equality.”\textsuperscript{106} According to the Court, “once the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn that are inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause.”\textsuperscript{107} In other words, the right to vote was a “fundamental right[] … under the Equal Protection Clause” and any classification “must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined.”\textsuperscript{108} Building off this point, the Court explained that “[w]ealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to one’s ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process.”\textsuperscript{109} The *Harper* Court thus overturned *Breedlove*\textsuperscript{110} and distinguished *Lassiter*’s approval of literacy tests on the grounds that the ability to read and write was germane to voting.\textsuperscript{111}

The Court’s new approach to protecting voter qualifications came into “full flower”\textsuperscript{112} in its 1969 decision in *Kramer v. Union Free School District*.\textsuperscript{113} In that case, “a 31-year old college-educated stockbroker who live[d] in his parents’ home”\textsuperscript{114} challenged a New York law that limited the right to vote for school board elections to owners/lessee’s of taxable property (or their spouses) and parents/guardians of children enrolled in public

\textsuperscript{105} 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
\textsuperscript{106} Id. at 669.
\textsuperscript{107} Id. at 665.
\textsuperscript{108} Id. at 670.
\textsuperscript{109} Id. at 668.
\textsuperscript{110} Id. at 669.
\textsuperscript{111} See id. 666.
\textsuperscript{112} Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 362 (1972) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the result).
\textsuperscript{114} Id. at 624.
schools. In one of Chief Justice Warren’s final opinions, the Court held that strict scrutiny applies whenever a State “grants the right to vote to some bona fide residents of requisite age and citizenship and denies the franchise to others.” The Court further explained that rational-basis review’s deferential approach “assum[es] that the institutions of state government are structured so as to represent fairly all the people” and that challenges to voter qualification laws are “challenge[s] of this basic assumption.” Thus, in invalidating New York’s voting qualification, the Court went farther than Harper in applying strict scrutiny even in the absence of a classification like wealth.

To be clear, the Court’s new approach to the Equal Protection Clause did not go unchallenged. In a series of lengthy dissenting opinions, the second Justice Harlan argued that “the Equal Protection Clause was not intended to touch state electoral matters.” In defending what he viewed as the original public understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, Harlan criticized the Court for “impos[ing] upon America an ideology of unrestrained egalitarianism.” According to Harlan, the Court should have adhered to the rational-basis standard and respected the traditional role that States have played in setting voting qualifications.

Within a decade, the Court went from upholding the facial validity of literacy tests under a rational-basis standard to invalidating voting qualifications under strict scrutiny. The Court’s arc from Carrington to Harper to Kramer is often categorized as the fundamental rights strand of equal protection. This line of cases comes closest to acknowledging and

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115 Id. at 623.
116 Id. at 627.
117 Kramer, 395 U.S. at 628.
118 See id. at 633.
120 Carrington, 380 U.S. at 97 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Harper, 383 U.S. at 681 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 591-92 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
122 See id. at 683-84.
protecting an affirmative right to vote, even absent an explicit textual basis for that right.

3. Concurrent and Subsequent Developments

Although outside this chapter's scope, two concurrent developments should be mentioned to provide full context. First, the Court also applied the Equal Protection Clause in the redistricting context, initially to malapportionment and then to racial vote dilution. Second, Congress enacted the VRA, which the Court upheld as valid Fifteenth Amendment enforcement legislation. Within a few years, the VRA helped to quickly enfranchise Black voters and narrow—but not close—the racial registration gap in the Southern States. Viewing all of these changes as a whole and in context, the United States in the early 1970s was the most democratic it had ever been in its history.

One final point about current controversies. A contemporary reader might wonder what relevance the fundamental right to vote cases have to voter-suppression laws that have been passed in recent years, especially after the Supreme Court invalidated the VRA's coverage formula in Shelby County v. Holder. These voter-suppression laws have raised barriers to the right to vote rather than changes to voting qualifications. In this context, the Court employs the so-called Anderson/Burdick balancing test. If a burden on the right to vote is "severe," then the law needs to satisfy strict scrutiny; but if the state "imposes only reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions … the State's important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify the

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1 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964). Technically, the Equal Protection Clause is only relevant to the one-person, one-vote requirement for state-legislative districts. For congressional districts, the Court relied on Article I's requirement that representatives be elected by the people. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964).


3 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 337 (1966); see also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 646 (1966) (upholding Section 4(e) of the VRA, which protected the voting rights of Puerto Ricans living in New York, as valid Fourteenth Amendment enforcement legislation).


restrictions.”\textsuperscript{130} As a general matter, the Anderson/Burdick balancing test has not prevented States from adopting restrictive measures like photo ID laws.\textsuperscript{131}

IV. Contextualizing the Right to Vote

In this final Section, I identify a few themes that emerge from this historical narrative and chart paths for future research into the voting rights amendments.

1. Themes

Three themes emerge from the constitutional expansion of the right to vote. First, the electorate has often been broadened in response to military conflict.\textsuperscript{132} Black men’s service in the Union Army proved critical to their enfranchisement via the First Reconstruction Act and the Fifteenth Amendment. Women’s mobilization in support of the war effort during World War I helped secure support for the Nineteenth Amendment. And the draft during the Vietnam War was the major impetus for the Twenty-Sixth Amendment.

Second, federalism has been a virtue and a vice. On the one hand, federalism has allowed for experimentation at the state-level. Western States and territories blazed a path forward on women’s enfranchisement. The Twenty-Fourth Amendment was an exercise in policing outliers in the Jim Crow South. Our federal system also leaves some room for Congress. Congress’s role was perhaps most prominent during Reconstruction. Recall that Congress exercised its authority to prohibit racial discrimination in voting in areas of federal control, which, given the recent Civil War, included the Reconstructed South.

But on the other hand, the Constitution’s federal structure has repeatedly limited Congress’s ability to protect the right to vote from State infringement. The Reconstruction Congress declined to enact a nationwide Black male suffrage statute against the States. The subsequent lack of congressional oversight during Jim Crow allowed several Southern States to backslide and effectively disenfranchise their Black populations. And although Congress attempted to lower the voting age in 1970, a fractured Court upheld that authority only as to federal elections and without agreeing on a single rationale.

\textsuperscript{130} Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Finally, the Court has played a prominent part in this narrative. The Court’s decisions in *Minor*, *Breedlove*, and *Mitchell* were setbacks in the expansion of the right to vote but, ultimately, those decisions helped set in motion the adoption of targeted constitutional amendments—as opposed to mere statutes—that expanded the right to vote. It was not until the Warren Court’s expansive interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause that anything close to a universal, affirmative right to vote has been recognized under our federal Constitution.

2. Paths Forward

To be crystal clear, the fact that the Equal Protection Clause was originally understood to exclude voting rights is not the equivalent of saying that the Warren Court’s decisions were wrongly decided or indefensible as precedent. After all, law is “methodologically eclectic.” But given the ascendance of originalism and the disrespect for *stare decisis* on the current Supreme Court, many of these decisions are at serious risk of reconsideration. Indeed, Justice Thomas, often at the vanguard of the Court’s originalists, has signaled his support for Harlan’s approach in malapportionment cases. So how should the academy respond?

For starters, there are other potential fonts for protecting the fundamental right to vote than the original understanding of the Equal Protection Clause. In response to the Warren Court’s decisions, Professor John Hart Ely famously advanced his political-process theory, arguing that courts should invalidate laws to open the channels of political change. More recently, Professors Randy Barnett and Evan Bernick have claimed that, in light of the voting rights amendments, the Privileges or Immunities Clause should now be read to protect a fundamental right to vote. Professor Pam Karlan has argued that substantive due process is a more appropriate doctrinal hook than equal protection. Professor Franita Tolson has advocated reading Sections Two and Five of the Fourteenth Amendment in tandem and as evidence of “the Reconstruction Congress’s attempt to constitutionalize a mechanism that

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would allow Congress to all but legislate universal suffrage."\textsuperscript{138}

Another path is a revival of the forgotten voting rights amendments. Given the current interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment and given that most racial discrimination cases are litigated under the VRA, the voting rights amendments are relatively underdeveloped. Consider the Fifteenth Amendment, which has received the most judicial attention. The Court has not answered two key questions about the Fifteenth Amendment: whether the Fifteenth Amendment extends to redistricting or includes an intent requirement. As for redistricting, a plurality found that the Fifteenth Amendment does not extend that far, but the Court has subsequently stated that the issue remains open.\textsuperscript{139} As to the second question, a plurality concluded there is an intent element, \textsuperscript{140} but a majority has never held that. As I have written elsewhere, a doctrinal approach that takes the Fifteenth Amendment seriously as an independent constitutional provision would have a distinctive flavor than the Court’s colorblind intuitions in equal protection cases.\textsuperscript{141}

Lower courts have adopted narrow readings of the other voting rights amendments. For instance, the Eleventh Circuit recently held that the Nineteenth Amendment has an intent element.\textsuperscript{142} And the Fifth Circuit concluded that the Twenty-Sixth Amendment was not violated when Texas permitted senior citizens to obtain no-excuse mail-in ballots. According to the Fifth Circuit, “the right to vote in 1971 did not include a right to vote by mail” and therefore extending the right to no-excuse mail-in ballots only to senior citizens did not “abridge” that right.\textsuperscript{143}

Courts have often read the voting rights amendments \textit{in pari materia} and therefore whatever interpretation is adopted for one is likely to be adopted for all. Given the sheer number of open doctrinal questions in this area, scholars have ample room to engage in historical research and normative argumentation about the voting rights amendments.

\textsuperscript{139} See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 65 (1980) (plurality opinion) (interpreting the Fifteenth Amendment as limited to “register[ing] and vot[ing] without hindrance”); Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 159 (1993) (“This Court has not decided whether the Fifteenth Amendment applies to vote-dilution claims.”).
\textsuperscript{140} See Bolden, 446 U.S. at 62 (plurality opinion).
\textsuperscript{142} See Jones v. Governor of Florida, 15 F.4th 1062, 1067-68 (11th Cir. 2021) (rejecting Nineteenth Amendment challenge to Florida law that required ex-felons to pay all legal financial obligations before restoring their right to vote).
\textsuperscript{143} Texas Democratic Party v. Abbott, 978 F.3d 168, 188 (5th Cir. 2020).
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