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Society, Consciousness, and Planning,

Dutton, M. Arch. & U.D., 1977

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
School of Architecture


SOCIETY, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND PLANNING

by


THOMAS ALLEN DUTTON

A thesis presented to the
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
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May, 1977
Saint Louis, Missouri

ART

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to extend my appreciation to those who have helped me in one form or another through this happy-turmoil. First of all, the members of my thesis committee: Professors Frants Albert, Gerry Gutenschwager, Richard Ratcliff, and Hanno Weber. All have offered helpful comments. Frants Albert's and Richard Ratcliff's comments on the Postscript were especially beneficial. Gerry Gutenschwager's help actually began way before the thesis, for it was my exposure to him that opened the door to my own investigation.

I am especially indebted to Hanno Weber. His suggestion of writing the Postscript has proven to be personally rewarding, because it has grounded my theoretical inquiries back into the realm of architecture and planning. More importantly, though, is that through our discussions I have come to understand the importance of presenting the thoughts of this thesis in a manner compatible with society.

A very special thanks is due to my good friend Elliott Littman, who although is not formally a part of the thesis committee, read every portion of the main section and offered valuable critique. Our many discussions were beneficial, for through them I was able to clarify many thoughts and concepts.

And thank you Jani.

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INTRODUCTION

This thesis is concerned with the issues of social injustice and suffering and how they might be overcome through social change.

The intent is to examine critically the role of urban planning within contemporary society. So that this may be accomplished effectively, the inquiry is not as much concerned with the fundamentals of planning proper, as it is an attempt to understand the processes particular to the social order, with special scrutiny to the relationship between science, technology, and the economic system. This focus of study is necessary in order to become more acquainted with the nature of the institutional order, within which the institution of planning exists and through which it manifests its general form and province.

The thesis addresses the phenomenon of centralization and bureaucratization. It argues that the centralization of authority and decision-making power enveloping society today has fostered a situation whereby planners most often reflect the prescriptions and interests of the central decision-makers of governments and business, such that citizen participation in the process of decision-making is negligible. Consequently

a form of social exclusion is taking place whereby people are divorced from the formulation of social policy. Planners perpetuate this exclusion and thus perpetuate social injustice.

Urban planning certainly is not the only institution manifesting exclusionary policy and social injustice. This takes on greater meaning, when it is realized that planning, as well as other societal disciplines, are functioning entities physically separate from the structures of centralization. That is, central policy-makers do not govern directly, and for the most part, they do not have a direct hand in the operation of planning. Thus the question must be asked, how is it that planners perform functions which prove to be congenial with central interests? After all, the centers of control cannot simply dictate orders or direct commands to disciplines, for such tactics to mobilize action are much too visible and impersonal. Thus, it is in the best interests of the power structure to have social factions perform in ways which willingly support the institutions and policies of the social system. It is in this way that society as a structural ordering of institutions manifesting and supporting centralization is produced and reproduced through normal systemic processes. Through appropriate education and socialization, people of social disciplines develop expert skills, and generate a loyalty to the social system, thereby crediting the status quo and the structure of dominance imbedded within it. Thus the problem of social injustice and inequity is due to a systemic structuralization: the system as a totality. Social injustice

is a systemic creation.

In order to address the problem of social change there must be an examination of what constitutes "human nature." This is pertinent for if social change is the reorganization of institutions and processes, there must be some attempt to understand the relation between humankind and these processes. In other words, there must be an examination of the relationship which exists between man, his nature, and the social order. This is the focus of the material covered in the first two chapters. Chapter 1 contrasts two world views regarding the nature of man in society, and what these mean in terms of influencing the knowledge base of urban planners: their modes of thinking and doing. Chapter 2 expands this emphasis by attempting to establish the general grounding for the dynamics of the social order by exploring Karl Marx's concept of the mode of production.

Chapters 3 and 4 investigate some social processes vital to society maintenance. Chapter 3 looks closely at the patterns of socialization, education, and legitimation within advanced capitalism, focusing on how seemingly irrational social practices are viewed in a rational manner. Chapter 4 examines the ramifications of these processes with reference to their societal and global impact.

Chapters 5 and 6 are centered on the subject of social change itself. Chapter 5 explores some of the points of view documented in the works of Thomas Kuhn, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Antonio Gramsci, B. F. Skinner, and Bertell Ollman.

From these, the issue of subjective consciousness is raised as to its role in a process of change. In Chapter 6, after a brief summary of the entire essay, the analysis in Chapter 5 is carried further, suggesting an alternative social strategy of decentralization and popular participation, thus facilitating the means for the reduction of social injustice.

The Postscript is the application to urban planning of the social theory discussed in the main body of the thesis. Since the latter is basically theoretical in its scope and analysis of social phenomena, the Postscript attempts to integrate these critical principles with the action of urban professionals by focusing on some housing-related problems brought on by suburban-urban tension and conflict. In this way, the Postscript is primarily a critique of urban planning at present, offering one alternative strategy by which planners and designers can become integral elements in helping people create and self-affirm their existence in a decentralized and collective manner.

1. HUMAN NATURE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER

"Man is above all else mind, consciousness--that is, he is a product of history, not nature."

A. Gramsci
From an article in the
periodical Il Grido, 1916

"All history is nothing but a continuous transformation of human nature."

K. Marx
The Poverty of Philosophy

In American society, characterized by such ideals as "equality" and "freedom," human misery continues unabated. Even with the resource capacity and technical knowledge available to counteract and end the afflicted condition of human degradation,¹ it seems societal forces ensure that segmental populations remain in a state of deprivation. Urban and social planning are a part of these forces in that they seem totally ineffective in abolishing poverty conditions. This does not have to be, for planning as a social process can be a significant instrument in effectuating social change, and it should do this. Yet, attempts at mitigation by contemporary planners have resulted continually in scant achievements. Even when the problem has been stated clearly on a national level with national recognition (War on Poverty), the

alleviation of poverty-affliction has been slight. The "Other America" continues to persist.² Ostensibly then, the traditional role of planning is that of pacification, rather than amelioration.

The continued existence of human degradation is not the result of planning alone. Urban planning is but one institution of the social order, and as such, its dynamic cannot be understood separate from this interrelation. The interplay between planning as an institution, and the larger institutional order, accounts for planning's particular form and function. And it is this interrelation which further accounts for the ineptitude of planning to halt the forces of deprivation.

At present, urban planning reflects the concerns and interests of central policy-makers, and in this regard has little relationship with the common population. The dialogue or urban and design professionals is conducted primarily with those who have the wherewithal to build. As a result dialogue with the general public is minimal, and at best is performed by detached methods that distort true communication and further reflect the judgments and expectations of central decision-makers. Actions consequent to this form of discourse reinforce the imbalance of power in society. Urban renewal is one example of this, where the main intent underlying the superficialities of "grandiose civic projects" is to shift poverty populations (undesirables) to other parts of the city.³ Middle-class dollars enter the scene with greater

profit returns for those who have the capacity to invest. In these people's eyes, the "problem" has been solved. Urban renewal scores a double victory, low-income removal is achieved and confidence in the institution of planning is reaffirmed.⁴

As it is now practiced, the rehabilitation of existing inner-city structures offers another example of the power of centralization. As brought on by pressures of the economic market the poverty-stricken have no alternative but to reside in what is available at the very lowest of rent levels. Such shelter is typically old and dilapidated. Contrasted to this is the gain in popularity of the rehabilitation of debilitated structures. However, the reality underneath this fast-rising pastime is a less blatant process of slum shifting. Rehabilitation offers the disguise of preserving the urban fabric while it too shifts populations that can ill-afford the higher costs of refurbishing. As in urban renewal, low-income populations reluctantly move to other city locations and thus the true problem is only shifted elsewhere. The neighborhood is disbanded, personal trauma results, sometimes with severe consequences.⁵

The effects of centralization and bureaucratization are seen also in public housing where inhabitants can exercise little control, if any, over the quality of their immediate environments. The construction of new packaged housing for low-income families is a double-edged process of appeasement and stigmatization. It requires a saintly degree of altruism on the part of government bureaucracies and developers. The

process, and the end product, have done little to upgrade the quality of life of project residents. Even the U.S. Congress reinforces this policy. In its creation of housing programs, Congress has been meticulously concerned that legislation might build "penthouses for the poor," and strict care has been taken to ensure that living units are not of "elaborate or extravagant design."⁶

To put it simply, central decision-makers have at their disposal the resources to enforce their preferences over the larger society. Through their ability to control effectively the social, political, and economic operations of society, a hierarchy of power is institutionalized, veiled by an ideology of freedom and equality. Because the ideology is institutionalized, it is legitimated; that is, it is part of the taken-for-granted world, considered a part of the natural order of things, uncritically accepted, and ritualistically followed by nearly all of society.

Traditionally, planning seldom calls these factors into question. Planners seem to take for granted the stability and desirability of the existing social order, as well as the institutions which achieve and shape it. They tend to overlook the ideological and psychological dimensions which influence the planning process, as well as the many individuals involved with it and, even more importantly, excluded from it.⁷

Planning functions without acknowledging a societal structure as a definitive construct which influences people's

lives. Planners unconsciously accept the forces that shape the basis of the social order. As such, they are participating in a world with a stunted awareness, presuming themselves to be apolitical, and value-free, while in fact they are responding from an "unacknowledged ideological position."⁸

Through the focused eyes of the traditional planner, the system operates according to natural laws quite apart from human intentions. Planners employ reasoning that searches for explanations of problems in an isolated sense--in cause and effect relationships. This follows from the presupposition that the world is seen as a natural order, and thus if a problem arises, it has a distinct cause that can be isolated and then rectified.

This pattern of reducing social phenomenon to the point where the object of study is isolated from other associative phenomena is not common only to planning. The pattern is largely a carry-over from the realm of science. Planners and related urban professionals have sanctioned the procedures and techniques of science in the course of their practice. The replication of scientific tactics by planning is vast and encompassing. Moreover, it is not solely the methods of science that have been replicated, but correspondingly, the mode of reasoning which is necessary to employ efficaciously the methods in practical action. In this sense, planners sanctify and perpetuate a particular mode of thinking and doing; in short, they espouse a paradigm.⁹ The paradigm of science (and planning) is based on logical positivism.

Logical Positivism

Positivism is a paradigmatic view of reality, a way of believing that the approach of the social sciences should be similar to the approach of the physical sciences. The physical sciences contend that the social and material reality are nothing more than a collection of atomic particles, such that all matter is the dynamic interplay of these particles. With this as a foundation, the task at hand becomes that of breaking down nature to the most isolated level possible in order to examine and categorize. In this state it is believed that the object of interest can be understood best with respect to the laws of nature. This procedure of inquiry is not discriminatory with reference to human beings or material.

Central to this notion is the belief of positivist scientists (physical and social) that all things have an inherent nature that can be discovered by collecting evidence suitable for quantification. This serves a vital purpose. Classifying by quantification supposedly allows scientists "neutral" ways to identify and measure objective facts without distortion from subjective values. This cognitive presumption assures the positivist that his quests are free from ideological assault, and that the search for truth can be accomplished with total objectivity.¹⁰ It is a belief that the scientific method guarantees ethical neutrality in the search for "objective facts" of the world.

The historical roots of logical positivism rest in Ancient Greece, but positivism acquired modern recognition and

power in its effort to oppose idealism, the ideology characteristic of the feudal order. The idealist world-view was an interpretation that explained reality by reference to spiritual causes rooted in a spiritual authority. Feudal society was plagued by exploitation of the serfs by the feudal lords. The reasons for this stemmed largely from the fact that the economic and social conditions of the period were sanctioned by the tribunals of the Church. In short, the feudal reality was ordered in a theological philosophy which contended that both people and nature were fixed in their proper place in the universe, according to the mandate of the spiritual authority.¹¹

Science shattered this ideology with a materialist philosophy where the explication of reality was not sought in idealism or metaphysics but in the material world. Whatever was positive, or factual, in the sense that it could be experienced with the senses became truth. If metaphysics could not be experienced in this fashion, then it did not exist. Nature came to be explained as simply "matter in motion."¹² With this, the relentless search for natural laws enveloped the thrust of science, and the laws had to be derived materially for fear of falling back into idealism. Ideas of evolution were advanced which justified man's materialist base. Man came to be explained through natural laws, a mechanistic interpretation that resulted in man being little more than a complex machine.

Dialectics

One purpose of this essay is to discuss why the prevailing empiricist-positivist paradigm exists, its characteristics, and how it may be overcome. The role of planning in its present form continues to be an inadequate instrument in rectifying elemental social problems. The positivist worldview, perpetuated in part by contemporary planners and design professionals with their power to prescribe realities in a value-free position devoid of laymen input, needs to be removed and replaced with a new paradigm, in which the legitimation of the planner as expert does not prevail, and where advocates are open to all interpretations of reality.

The alternative paradigm is centered on the dialectic. Dialecticians adhere to a perspective in which "society is a human product":¹³ a manifestation of man's interaction with his kind and an environment. Man produces his reality in the limits set by nature, but as the human reality is constructed, it acts back upon nature and man. The essence of man is not the result of natural determinism.

In the dialectic between nature and the socially constructed world the human organism is transformed. In this same dialectic man produces reality and thereby produces himself.¹⁴

A social order is an ongoing human production. However, positive science as the "legitimate" definer of reality has formed the basis of perceiving social reality as a natural phenomenon and not as a human product. Science has advanced interpretations of the social reality that are not dialectic,

and because of this, these judgments only serve to reify the present.* That is, human reality is viewed as a non-human enterprise: it is seen as something outside of the control and construction of human beings. The paradox, of course, is that man continues to produce reality even while apprehending it in a reified manner.

When man does not recognize his authorship of the human world, his existence becomes the product of the "nature of things." The occurrence of everyday life assumes a taken-for-granted validity, a "natural" unfolding of events and experiences. The socially constructed institutional world, through reification and science, merges with the world of nature. Scientistic laws of natural causation predominate the explication of reality, and this of course includes the behavior of man.

Society thus appears, underwritten by scientism and its permeation throughout all of society, as a natural phenomenon which functions independent of human action and intention. Scientists now believe they have the capability to derive experimentally the basis of the social world and thereby estab-

*Reification is "the apprehension of human phenomena as if they were things, that is, in non-human or possibly supra-human terms. Another way of saying this is that reification is the apprehension of the products of human activity as if they were something else than human products--such as facts of nature, results of cosmic laws, or manifestations of divine will. Reification implies that man is capable of forgetting his own authorship of the human world, and further, that the dialectic between man, the producer, and his products is lost to consciousness. The reified world is, by definition, a dehumanized world."¹⁵

lish the "true" nature of man. Positive science turns to biology for the determination of the human essence, a biology that is governed often by the properties of physics and chemistry. Through experimentation based on these properties, positivist scientists advance explanations of man's behavior through his biological composition. For example, in this society, as is too often the case, man is revealed as being a competitive and territorial animal. The judgment by science is that man is by nature an aggressive animal. It may be true that in this society modern man does exhibit aggressive behavior. However, the declaration that man is an aggressor by some biological nature, gives precedence to the fact that science fails to understand the mutually constitutive dynamic of man and society. Positive science may recognize man as being a part of society, but it is a society based on natural forces and evolutionary determinism, not social construction. Under this conviction, the possession of free will becomes a myth, and human actions are determined simply by fortuitous causes.¹⁶ In this view man is essentially only a machine: he operates according to the natural laws of physics and chemistry. As the Nobel Prize winner, Francis Crick, states, "the ultimate aim of the modern movement in biology is in fact to explain all biology in terms of physics and chemistry."¹⁷ Similarly, another Nobel Prize winner, J. Lederberg, comments,

a few eccentrics aside, the whole community of contemporary science shares the view that the same laws of nature apply to nonliving and living matter alike. All of us who investigate the chemistry and physics of living organisms pursue our work as if organisms

were complex machines, and we find man to exhibit no tissues or functions that would except him from this way of analyzing human nature.¹⁸

According to positivist science social orders become a contextual given and are not taken into account when studying the human condition. What is the most definitive construct of man's total existence is not dealt with by positive science.

The mechanistic perspective of positivism cannot adequately explain all of the peculiarities of human behavior. The fact that man has "continued to live a nomadic existence in one place and turned to agriculture in another cannot be explained in terms of biological processes."¹⁹ Man's biological constitution is not designed to implement order automatically. Unlike other animals, man has no "species-specific environment."²⁰ He lives in "world-openness,"²¹ that is, he is not restricted to living in specific geographical locations, and hence establishes himself over most of the earth. Animals, structured through their own instinctual organization, live in fixed biological relationships with their environment. Their instincts and biological drives are developed enough to provide stability for their conduct. "In this sense, all non-human animals, as species and as individuals, live in closed worlds whose structures are predetermined by the biological equipment of the several animal species."²² Man does not have this capacity. He is biologically predestined to inhabit and construct a world with others. Man does have instinctual organization and biological drives, but they are underdeveloped as to provide a basis for human conduct. The biological

drives of man are undirected and unspecialized, hence the need for a social order. Social orders are created by man in order to prevent chaos and to ensure biological implementation. The necessity of a social order stems from man's biological functions. However, a social order is not derived from such functions.

Peculiar to any given society, biological drives and, eventually, all behavior in general will be directed into pre-defined patterns of conduct. For example, the need to reproduce and to seek nourishment are grounded in biological drives, but since these drives are not specialized and directional, man's biological constitution must be reinforced through specific social channels. Man's biological composition

does not tell him where he should seek sexual release and what he should eat. Left to himself, man may attach himself sexually to just about any object and is perfectly capable of eating things that will kill him.²³

The need for specific directional limits socially imposed upon sexuality and nutrition becomes evident. Thus, human sexuality, even though characterized by its high degree of adaptability, is socially channeled, and in turn has imposed limits which are reflective of the given society.

With the existence of many diverse social orders, the social channeling of human activity is reflective of the particular dynamics of the respective orders. Thus human nature is socio-culturally variable. This indicates that sexuality, nutrition, all human activity is a product of "man's own socio-cultural formations rather than of a biologically fixed

human nature."²⁴ There is no human nature apart from the socio-cultural order of man's construction. Therefore, the positivist declaration that there is a human nature founded in innate composition and distinct from a socio-cultural context is erroneous.

In summary, the construction of man's nature is achieved through a dialectic. The social order is an ongoing dynamic interplay between man and society, each forming and shaping the other. This dialectic is not irrespective of an environment, however. This is significant because the environment in which man finds himself is both natural and humanly constructed. The development of the human organism simultaneously takes place within both of these contexts. Man, his constructed order, and the environment are all dialectically related such that the forces of the environment are also significant in the conditioning of man.

History and the Activity of Man

To believe that human beings construct their nature through their externalization is the same as saying human beings make history, and completing the dialectic, history makes human beings. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels stated their position on this subject: "Men make their history upon the basis of prior conditions."²⁵ The positivist interpretation of this comment would be that man is merely conditioned and governed by prior conditions. It is true that history is based on prior conditions, but it is still human interaction

that constructs history and not in any deterministic sense the prior conditions. For man to believe otherwise, history and society at any particular time would be simply an unfolding of "natural" forces, forces that govern man.

Nevertheless, this belief predominates in contemporary society. Rooted in the positivist declaration of the world, history is seen as a process toward progress--that as history develops, the future will automatically harbor life that will be qualitatively better.

Evolutionary determinism establishes quite modestly that present man is at a stage of development that is quite inferior to the truly humane man of the future. Konrad Lorenz in On Aggression, uses the analogy of equating present man with the level of "our ancestors," and that, future man in this context, is man today. From this Lorenz concludes, "it does not require considerable optimism to assume that from us human beings something better and higher may evolve."²⁶

This naturalist interpretation reifies the perception of reality thereby perpetuating the apprehension of history as a progression toward some distant perfection. Historical change is explained by reference to a formal system of evolutionary laws. The positivist world, through its justification of natural laws and determinism dismisses, by consequence, the intentional action of mankind upon the social world. In this light reality becomes immutable and not accessible to change. The fact, however, is that

History does nothing, it possesses no immense wealth, it wages no battles. It is man, real living man, that does all that, that possesses and fights; history is not a person apart, using man as a means for its own particular aims; history is nothing but the activity of man pursuing his aims.²⁷

2. THE CONCEPT OF THE MODE OF PRODUCTION AND THE SOCIAL ORDER

In the preceding chapter the discussion centered on the nature of man. It was argued that man does not have a nature rooted solely in biological composition, but must construct a social order to accommodate his biological functions. Although the relationship of man and his social order is dialectical, no hint was given as to what constitutes the particularities of a social order. It was pointed out that for the number of different cultures existing in the world man's nature for any given culture would be reflective of that culture and that man's nature from culture to culture is distinctly different. The reasons for the dynamics of different social orders will now be discussed.

The channeling of biological drives through socially constructed outlets, although the basis for the formation of order, does not dictate its formative characteristics. The manifestation of the idiosyncracies of a social order must be clarified. Humans produce their social existence and are distinct from the animal world in this regard. Man produces, whereas animals collect.¹

Animals do not consider the world; they are immersed in it. In contrast, men emerge from the world,

objectify it, and in so doing can understand it and transform it with their labor.²

Man transforms nature into a host of variations that nature itself cannot replicate. Therefore, the transference of biologically based natural laws of the animal world to the human world is unjustified, and incorrect.

Yet, social reality is continually constructed by a Western man who insists on seeing the world mechanistically. The reasons for this manner of perception, as well as the existence of relevant knowledge are explainable. It is through the understanding of Karl Marx's concept of the mode of production that the essence and knowledge of any given social order can be derived.

Given that knowledge is humanly constructed, the manner in which a social order produces knowledge will give rise to knowledge that is reflective of the construction. If respective social orders go about producing knowledge through different means, knowledge then can be quite different from order to order. "What is real to a Tibetan monk may not be real to an American businessman."³ However, social orders do not exist in isolation and it would be fairly certain that communication and transference of knowledge between orders would be commonplace. It would seem unlikely that a particular order would have absolute control over some knowledge. Nevertheless, it is certain that different social orders will revere some knowledge as being more relevant than others, and will likely repress some knowledge altogether. At any rate, the

qualification and classification of relevant knowledge is still the directing of human behavior through specific social channels. The concept of the mode of production establishes the foundation that explains this directing of human behavior.

The Dialectic of Production
and Consumption

Marx begins his explanation of the concept of the mode of production in the acknowledgement of living human individuals, distinguishing people from the animal world in that they produce their own subsistence. Animals transform nature to a degree, but people transform it to meet their needs through the process of production; producing their existence in an environment and in the accompaniment of their fellowmen.

As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produce and with how they produce. The nature of individuals thus depends upon the material conditions determining their production.⁴

The importance of this is the acknowledgement that man produces his nature. All knowledge is socially constructed, including the construction and interpretation of human needs. The motivation of human beings is centered on the gratification and satisfaction of human needs.

Human nature and the satisfactions of human needs are interlinked with a production process. The process influences human nature not only by its material objects, but also in the manner by which the objects are produced. Through the production of material objects human needs become satisfied, and simultaneously, new needs are created which further direct the

process of production. But this conception of need satisfaction still is not holistic. Specific need gratification is not only dependent upon the objects of production and in the manner by which they are produced, but also in the fashion by which they are consumed. This is a mutually constitutive relationship, for production certainly guides consumption, but consumption guides production as well. One process could not exist without the other. In The Grundrisse, Marx provides an analysis of the dialectical relationship between production and consumption. This dialectic is an important key to the development of an understanding of the concept of the mode of production.

Marx initially points out, according to the mechanistic perspective of orthodox economics, that the economic relations between the processes of production, distribution, exchange, and consumption are normally seen in a linear process; in short, in cause and effect relationships.

Production yields goods adapted to our needs; distribution distributes them according to social laws; exchange distributes further what has already been distributed, according to individual wants; finally in consumption the product drops out of the social movement, becoming the direct object of the individual want which it serves and satisfies in use. Production thus appears as the starting point; consumption as the final end . . .⁵

Marx's dialectical perception did not allow him to view economics in this manner. His thesis was that production and consumption were not separate processes, but, in fact, interrelated. "Without production, no consumption; but on the other hand, without consumption, no production; since

production would then be without a purpose."⁶

Since the interaction between consumption and production is dialectical, the side from which one views the interaction will seem to predominate, and in a sense, "cause" the interaction. For example, from the "consumption produces production" side, the interaction proceeds in two ways. First, consumption provides the finishing touch to a product, for a product is only an object until it becomes a product through consumption. Consumption gives the outcome of production meaning through utility. Second, consumption guides production by "creating the necessity for new production."⁷ Consumption is the satisfaction of needs as it furnishes the image, want, and purpose of the object of production. If there are no needs, there is no production.

From the other side of the dialectic, production provides consumption with its object. Consumption is not consumption unless it has an object, so from this point of view, production produces consumption. But the object is to be used in a certain manner, and this is reflective of the production process. In this way, production provides the finishing touch on consumption. For an object of production is a definite object and its consumption is prescribed by the process of production. Production, therefore, "not only supplies the want with material, but supplies the material with a want."⁸ Whereas consumption influences the act of production to provide an ideal object, according to production the image of the ideal object that consumption needs is created by the

perception of the product itself. Thus the nature of the object creates consumption.

Although there is the dialectic of production and consumption, the predominating process of the interaction is actually production. Production is the point of realization for consumption. Both processes need one another, but the actual starting point is production. Marx comments,

Consumption, as a natural necessity, as a want, constitutes an internal factor of productive activity, but the latter is the starting point of realization and, therefore, its predominating factor, the act in which the entire process recapitulates itself. The individual produces a certain article and turns it again into himself by consuming it; but he returns as a productive and self-reproducing individual. Consumption thus appears as a factor of production.⁹

Therefore,

Production thus produces consumption: first, by furnishing the latter with material; second, by determining the manner of consumption; third, by creating in consumers a want for its products as objects of consumption. It thus produces the object, the manner and desire for consumption.¹⁰

The Dialectic of the Labor Process and the Social Relations of Production

The predominance of the production process over consumption makes it imperative to understand the dynamics peculiar to the production process itself. It is through this understanding that the meaning of the concept of the mode of production evolves. Production is not in a strict sense just the creation of commodities, for it incorporates all processes that are necessary to produce an object for consumption.

The production process is characterized by two inter-

related constituents. First, is the labor process which deals with man-nature relationships. Man transforms nature in order to produce use-values, or products of use. Second, is the social relations of production which from the production side of the dialectic determine the execution of the labor process.

The labor process is characterized by the combination of three basic elements: labor power, that is, the activity of man or work itself; the subject of labor, which is that which labor acts on; and the means of labor, which are the instruments that labor uses.

The process of labor involves the material and technical conditions of production, as it must have these conditions for its performance. What this simply means is that labor and nature are interrelated as participants of the same process. However, of this interrelation, it is the material conditions which largely determine the extent of the labor process. Thus all of nature is the universal subject of labor, but it is the physical laws of nature that dominate and influence the transformation of nature into material products.¹¹

The means of labor is the dominant constituent of the production process, for it possesses the greatest impact within the dialectic of production and consumption. The means of labor, or the instruments of labor, "is a thing, or a complex of things, which the laborer interposes between himself and the subject of his labor and which serves as the conductor of his activity."¹² As was stated earlier, production provides

the object of consumption with a definite outline, character, and finish. This ability of production is afforded by the means of labor. This is the meaning behind Marx's statement in Capital, "it is less what is produced than how it is produced."¹³

In Capital, Marx examines the relationship between the subject of labor and the means of labor.

Leaving out of consideration such ready-made means of subsistence as fruits, in gathering which a man's own limbs serve as the instruments of his labor, the first thing of which the laborer possesses himself is not the subject of labor but its instrument.¹⁴

The preponderance of the means of labor is the determining factor in the process of transforming nature for economic production. In essence, then, the means of labor is the primary determinant of the mode of production.¹⁵

However, the social conditions of the production process must also be taken into account. As the relation of production and consumption proved to be dialectic, so too is the interaction between the material and social conditions of production. Both are mutually supporting and modifying. The social relations of production is the manner by which society organizes itself to perform and implement the means of labor. Human beings must organize themselves socially in a collective capacity in order to produce real material life. The execution of the production process requires a distribution so that the subject of labor can be transformed by the means of labor into a real product for consumption. Marx states:

In its most banal conception, distribution appears as the distribution of products, and thus as further away from and quasi-independent of production. But before distribution is distribution of the product, it is: (1) the distribution of the instruments of production, and (2) what is a further definition of the same relationship, the distribution of the members of the society into the different kinds of production. . . . The distribution of the product is obviously only the result of this distribution which is included within the production process itself and determines the articulation of production.¹⁶

The mode of production is the dialectical unity of the material and social conditions of production. The essence of this unity is that it forms the basic structural framework of any society. It is the general foundation from which a society stabilizes and constructs itself.*

Furthermore, the view should not prevail that the dominant mode of production, and society, are separate elements. Society is the manifestation of the mode of production. Likewise, the mode of production is the construction of society, a reality that is socially produced. The mode of production forms the general basis of societal processes which are in turn necessary to perpetuate the given mode.

In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations . . . namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of

*Let it be clear that the use here of the "mode of production" does not apply to just one dimension of human existence, namely the objective conditions. The mode of production will be used to portray the dialectic of objective and subjective existence in human reality. Thus, the argument here does not advocate a strict "Scientist Marxist" position¹⁷ which asserts that all forms of consciousness are determined by the material conditions in society. The argument stresses the dialectic where subjectivity and material conditions influence one another in a reciprocal relationship.

production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.¹⁸

Society as a Reflection of the Mode
of Production

Every society is a particular mixture of elements, a blend of activities and a patterning of social relationships. The manner in which people organize the production of real material life requires the combination of institutions, or structures, that maintain, legitimize, and self-regulate the production process. Society is a particular combination of structures, and furthermore, different combinative institutional orders will correspond generally to different modes of production.

The construction of reality is much more than the sum of parts. The dialectic is diametrically opposed to "mechanistic materialism," which is the belief that the structures constituting reality have their "own fixed nature quite independent of everything else."¹⁹ It follows from this that with reality being nothing more than independent units unaffected by their interrelation, the character of the whole is then determinable by the properties of the individual parts. Dialecticians counter this perception of reality with the contention that it is not only the existence of the parts, but more

importantly, their interconnection and interrelation that form the character of the whole. Institutions can be recognized distinctly from one another, but they are by no means operationally independent.

All institutions make up the social reality and their interaction initiates a continual process of transformation. It should be realized then, that these institutions which form, and are formed by the social reality, are also the self-regulating mechanisms of that order. Each unit in its own way, comprises and perpetuates the existing order, such that transformation occurs as a result of self-regulation. In short, the essence of an institution cannot be determined apart from the order to which it gives form. Likewise, a social order cannot be understood as just an accumulation of institutions that are isolated, non-regulating, and/or non-relational.

What should become clear in this sketch of the concept of the mode of production is that reality is a combination of institutions that regulate and transform the social order, through the activity of man, and that the meaning behind the regulation and transformation can be found in the way society goes about producing its subsistence. This is the essence of the mode of production, for it forms the general basis of society in an ongoing historical context.

The perpetuation of a given mode of production is the survival of a society. Thus, as manifested in the institutional structuralization, that is society, the dominant mode of production creates the physical and mental conditions

necessary for its existence. Mentally, the conditioning is the general guidance of attitudes, mode of reason, values, beliefs, and other states of social consciousness. The mode of production influences social relations; historically this has been, master and slave, landlord and serf; at present it is capitalist and worker. The dominant mode of production is reality; it influences all knowledge, therefore, it is the basic foundation and motivation for the direction of the socially constructed order.

3. THE LEGITIMATION AND SOCIALIZATION OF IRRATIONALITY

The notion of viewing reality as a combination of institutions has historical implications, some of which are explored in the writings of Marx. He revealed that in order for production to occur, the combination of material and social conditions of production was required, and "The specific manner . . . in which [this] combination is accomplished distinguishes the different economic epochs of the structure of society . . . from one another."¹

Marx's discovery of the concept of the mode of production allowed him to unfold the "law of development of human history,"² or in other words, dialectical materialism. Marx realized that in order to truly understand historical forces there must be an understanding of both the objective and subjective conditions underscoring them. For, until the time of Marx, the ultimate causation for historical changes was sought in the changing attitudes and ideas of man. But this does not take into account why the ideas originated and what were the driving forces behind them. The new conception of history, developed by Marx, established a more accurate means of understanding historical epochs by fusing together human subjectivity

and material reality.

Centralization and Bureaucratization

The concept of dialectical materialism is not only a guide for understanding historical society, but is also a way for discerning the present-day world and its direction. Today American society is reflective of the capitalist mode of production. It is a society becoming increasingly bureaucratic and guided by central decision-makers. More and more of the decisions affecting economic and social existence are made by a corporate elite and their technocratic experts. The economy has "advanced" from individualistic capitalism to the more monopolistic practices of corporate capitalism. Correspondingly, new modes of administrative, political, and social control have penetrated social relations and have infiltrated the innermost recesses of personal existence. As such, one effect of bureaucratic organization is the shaping of the human personality. The submission to authority for the overwhelming majority of the population is now imbedded within the personal consciousness.

A refined, institutionalized form of social injustice has taken place. The distribution of socially created resources is uneven; the disparity between the wealthy and the poor is increasing; and even the ability to self-affirm one's existence is becoming exceedingly difficult. In short, the centralization of social decision-making has brought on the reduction of popular participation in the formation and evalu-

tion of social policy. This task is now performed by specialists and professionals.

This does not mean that social injustice is unique to industrial capitalism. The history of man has always been plagued with inequity and injustice in some form. In past civilizations, chief among the characteristics of a particular society were the oppressor and the oppressed, such that their opposition was a constant struggle. But with the rise of capitalist institutions and organization, new forms of social control have become institutionalized in the very structure of society. Social injustice, therefore, cannot be understood as some undesirable effect of centralization (whether in capitalism or socialism), but since it exists, it results mainly from the structural combination of institutions that is reality. It seems, then, that the capitalist mode of production has also fallen into the historical groove of manifesting the exploitation of one part of society by the other.

The problem of bureaucracy and centralization, in terms of formulating measures to counteract them, is not so much that they exist, but that they seem to be uncritically accepted by society; they are considered a part of the natural order of things. The ritualization of people's everyday existence not only creates and reinforces centrality, but also reifies it: centralization and its consequential outcomes are not even recognized. The actualities of malnutrition, illiteracy, limited education, and poverty-affliction have become anesthetic imagery. Social injustice has become legitimated.

Legitimation and Socialization

Legitimation provides the key to the maintaining of the social order. As a process, legitimation explains and justifies the institutional order thereby diffusing validity to its participants. The order must be subjectively plausible and meaningful so that people believe, intellectually and morally, that the order is not only appropriate, but right. Knowledge of right and wrong is maintained by legitimation. This knowledge is extremely critical, forming the scale by which society can evaluate the behavior of its members. In this way, deviant behavior--behavior that can pose a threat to existing structures of control--can be identified. After identification, the system-maintenance operation of legitimation can handle deviant behavior in principally two ways. Behavior of this nature can either receive "therapeutic application," or it can be, "nihilated."³

"Therapy entails the application of conceptual machinery to ensure that actual or potential deviants stay within the institutional definitions of reality, or in other words, to prevent the 'inhabitants' of a given universe from 'emigrating.'"⁴ Nihilation, on the other hand, is a process of denial. If therapy fails, or if there are other institutional orders which stress different rights and wrongs, measures are taken to assign an "inferior ontological status" to the deviants, and thus alternative views of reality are given a "not-to-be-taken-seriously cognitive status."⁵ With nihilation, anything can be justified.

The poverty populations of this society are a nihilated population, and not only for reasons propagated by a classist society. The inferior status projected onto the poor solidifies the belief that their problems are caused only by them, as they are asked to regard themselves as the pathology of a healthy society. They come to believe that there is nothing wrong with the system, but there is something wrong with themselves.

Socialization is of primary importance in legitimation. Simply speaking, socialization is the process by which new members come to internalize reality. Such a process is crucial for system maintenance. The internalization of reality must be accomplished in a manner compatible with the established society. Therefore, socialization, to a large extent, is the internalization of legitimation. Since legitimation founds validity and knowledge of right and wrong in social processes, the internalization of social processes must be the internalization of legitimation. Thus socialization is one of the deepest forms of legitimation.

However, all of reality cannot be internalized. Socialization is the internalization of socially created and distributed contents, but there is simply too much of this objective reality present to be actually internalized into a subjective reality.* No individual can internalize the

*To internalize what is perceived as real or acknowledged means to crystallize it in an inner consciousness: a subjective reality. Subjective reality is within the individual. Objective reality refers to an external reality, that which

totality of what is objectivated as reality in society, not even if the society and its world are relatively simple ones.⁶

The implication of this is that man lives in a fragmented world. As a singular identity, a person encompasses a limited perspective, and hence possesses limited knowledge about the world. This is further compounded by a society's social division of labor, where a person acquires role-specific knowledge. Moreover, if a society is characterized by a large distribution of knowledge, then social awareness is generally confined to the dimensions of a person's immediacies.

The capitalist mode of production, with its intrinsic need to ensure continual economic growth,⁷ has an ever increasing social division of labor, and accordingly, an ever increasing social distribution of knowledge. Capitalism requires for the purpose of increasing productive efficiency, the break-up of the existing society into subparts.*

Actually, the subparts created become true parts (institutions) which contribute and regulate the order. It is in this context that legitimation is of the ultimate importance. As the social world continually separates into an increasing number of parts, the relationship between objective and

can be interpreted by more than one person. Any action that is outside of an individual is not subjective, it is an objectivation.

*This is an ongoing process, as Marx states, "we thus see how the method of production and the means of production are constantly enlarged, revolutionized, how division of labor necessarily draws after it greater division of labor, the employment of machinery greater employment of machinery, work upon a large scale world upon a still greater scale."⁸

subjective reality becomes evermore asymmetrical. Legitimation is thus needed to maintain the ethos of right and wrong over individuals who do not understand the whole. This is not to say that the task of legitimation is to help individuals visualize the systemic whole. On the contrary, the structuralization of society legitimizes the fragmentation and specialization that is ever-present. Legitimation is a process which integrates people into the social system, but in a manner that restricts and fragments their vision and understanding of the totality.

Society as a Molding Apparatus

It is clear that man is socialized into specializations grounded in the social division of labor. The world of this immediacy becomes the world of a person's present and future. People are channeled by the capitalist order to ensure their economic future and thus the problems of others become foreign to themselves. Indeed, just to survive psychologically in this society, the desire (socially imposed) is to become an expert in some occupational specialization. People feel they must do this, for if they do not, they fear they will be crushed by the social machinery.

So, in order to survive man adapts to the social order. Actually, it is not really an adaption process as much as it is a molding process. People are fashioned in ways that society requires. People sublimate their power to the requirements which society imposes upon them.

This molding process is achieved simply by the normal functioning of the social order. In other words, individual institutions articulate the order and contribute to the molding process. Education provides an example, where the underlying objective is really to reproduce the prevailing ideals and necessities of the order. In advanced-centralized capitalism higher educational objectives have become that of pressing individuals through the requisite molds to fit the divided ranks of labor. Students are taught the mechanics and concomitant processes necessary to manipulate their specialized fields of labor. They learn "know-how" education.¹⁰ Specifically, students of architecture learn the architectural repertoire of space, materials, form, structure, compositions, and proportion as if these human conceptions are something other than human conceptions: as if they are "universal, changeless, and objectively real."¹¹ Through this accumulation of objective and know-how knowledge, students of architecture are able to prescribe realities for the populace on the premise of architect as expert.

Education is by no means the only process that reinforces the capitalist institutional order, although it may be argued that it is surely one of the most powerful. Other determinants of the social essence exist:

The means of mass transportation and communication, the irresistible output of the entertainment and information industry carry with them prescribed attitudes and habits, certain intellectual and emotional reactions which bind the consumers more or less pleasantly to the producers and through the latter, to the whole. The products indoctrinate and manipulate; they

promote a false consciousness which is immune against its falsehood. And as these beneficial products become available to more individuals in more social classes, the indoctrination they carry ceases to be publicity; it becomes a way of life.¹²

Yet, perhaps the ultimate sublimation that perpetuates society's existence is the "got to earn a living" compulsion.¹³ People are molded into occupational-specific categories which constitute the division of labor, i.e., useful arrangements that ensure efficiency in production. Thus the capitalist mode of production, motivated by the principle of profit maximization, requires man's utility in the process of production. In other words, a person's usefulness is the mandatory ingredient in gaining admission to the arena of employment. It is not really the person that is wanted, rather, it is "the function he can perform and the skill with which he can perform it" that is necessary¹⁴ in the production process. In this sense, man is only one input of many required for the production of goods and services, and what becomes the goal of all people is the possession of a skill saleable on the market. But there is still a problem, for "If a man's skill is not needed, the man is not needed."¹⁵ And, "If a man's function can be performed more economically by a machine, the man is replaced."¹⁶

It seems that man is not held in very high regard in American society. Reduced to a mere input, man is dispensable. Whatever returns the largest profit with relation to the combination of inputs will determine what inputs are used and, of course, which ones are excluded. Apparently, man is shaped

into any form judged useful by industrial society. Whatever is needed to ensure the perpetuation of the production process becomes reasonable, even if it is based, in part, on the machine substitution of man.

Today what is successful, or right, is determined primarily by the gratifications and the satisfaction of needs as manifested by the process of production. Because of the inherent need in capitalism to grow economically, new products become available on the market which then affect the needs and gratifications of society. Thus man's nature is continually transforming. As such, ideals and values are shaped by what proves successful in the market structure and, furthermore, they are shaped in any fashion whatsoever to ensure market success. Almost anything can become reasonable.

The problem here is that seemingly irrational practices are not perceived as being irrational. Irrationalities molded and formed by the centralized society, such as the dispensability of man in the workplace, and the corresponding rise of technological productive techniques, have been taken for granted and considered as perfectly rational circumstances. In short, the irrational has become rational through legitimation.

Max Horkheimer and The Eclipse of Reason

The irrationality of society is the main thesis of Max Horkheimer in The Eclipse of Reason, in which he provides an interesting account of the incorporation of irrational

social tendencies into the rational, though from a different angle. Horkheimer is concerned with reason, or more specifically, the rise and dominance of what he terms "subjective" reason over the once prevalent "objective" reason.

Objective reason was a view of reality that asserted "the existence of reason as a force not only in the individual mind but also in the objective world--in relations among human beings and between social classes, in social institutions, and in nature and its manifestations."¹⁷ Reason was therefore something inherent in the objective world and was based upon the people's interest, emphasizing ends rather than means. A society predominated by objective reason was one in which people knew the difference between right and wrong; it was an ethical society.

Subjective reason, on the other hand, does not question ends. It is concerned with

the adequacy of procedures for purposes more or less taken for granted and supposedly self-explanatory. It attaches little importance to the question whether purposes as such are reasonable. If it concerns itself at all with ends, it takes for granted that they too are reasonable in . . . that they serve the subjects' interest in relation to self-preservation.¹⁸

Under subjectivist reason, or formalized reasoning, "men are . . . the best judges of their own interests."¹⁹ And whatever becomes habitualized becomes truth; subjective reason reveals truth as habit.

If utilizing subjective reason, a society based on long-term ethical standards would be non-existent. The determination of ultimate ethical values would have a continually

changing foundation. All ends would be accepted, and, as in capitalist society, "the pursuit of any end that eventually yields an income [would be] called productive."²⁰ Similarly, "according to formalized reason, despotism, cruelty, oppression are not bad in themselves; no rational agency would endorse a verdict against dictatorship if its sponsors were likely to profit by it."²¹

Today it is subjective reason that is the "cornerstone of western thinking."²² But objective reason once had its supremacy in history. During the Middle Ages, objective reason had its base in theology; in a spiritual authority through which people believed in certain ultimate truths. It was a fixed society; that is, people believed they were accorded unchanging social positions within the total universe by accident of birth. Emerging during this time period, however, was a new spirit of curiosity and inquiry, which gained momentum by the discovery of new lands and territories. These geographical findings suggested that different realities were quite possible, and that the order of things did not have to be as it was. Utopian writers soon projected their societies of humane conditions, and most were underscored by the rising science, which was the objective manifestation of the new inquiry and curiosity. Man was beginning to question his existence in the objective world as something much more than that which resulted from deterministic placement based in a theological ontology. Science motivated this challenge and thus reinforced its own existence.

The rising science was to be the source of human amelioration, for daily life in the Middle Ages was brutal. Successive outbreaks of diseases, primarily the plague, struck at all classes. Mankind was still at the mercy of the elements. The new science was to be the means to mastery over nature. Through this accomplishment man would not be subordinate to nature, but through his understanding of it, a scientific understanding, he would be able to control nature for his benefit. "Science would give mankind an understanding of nature and thereby provide the technical means for realizing the good life on earth."²³

The rise of science eventually came to confront the established Christian ontology. Science, at first, was not opposed to the prevalent ideology of objective truth, it sought only to reestablish the basis of objective reason under its own guidance and definitive world-view.

The subsequent confrontation neutralized religion as the basis of society, and with this nullification came the abolition of the concept of objective truth entrenched in a spiritual authority. In time, philosophy and the rising bourgeoisie attacked religion, and what was killed "was not the church but metaphysics and the objective concept of reason itself . . ."²⁴ It was this episode that paved the way for the scientific definition of the world as well as the development of capitalism. What evolved were societies underlined by subjectivist reasoning. And as such, self-interest and self-preservation came to prevail.

It should be emphasized here that the new moneyed order which evolved from the decline of the feudal order was not precipitated solely by the rise of science. Coincident with the evolution of science, a polemic was emerging that was opposed to feudal determinism. A new standard of life was being developed that judged people on what they did, rather than what they were. Feudal society was being transformed into a utilitarian culture. Both science and utilitarianism did not occur in isolation. Their relationship was a dialectical one: each reinforced the existence of the other.

The utilitarian standard was necessarily predicated on the existence of a market, in which achieving success became the measure of social worth and prestige. The definition of success was simply that of selling on the market. Society began to arrange itself to implement these appropriate methods of determining success, and the result again was self-interest and self-preservation. It is evident, then, that the deviation from established moral values and objective truths was the significant consequence of a market economy.

The concept of utilitarianism is one component that Horkheimer excluded from his thesis, and it is important to point this out, for it seems that he is establishing the transformation of history irrespective of the manner by which people of society produce their subsistence. There are several reasons, rooted in the dominant mode of production, that explain the dominance of objective reason over subjective reason, or vice versa. For example, Horkheimer's discussion

of subjective reason is such that it is unique and opposite of objective reason. However, one of the most important points that he stresses is that subjective reason has the dangerous potential "of surrendering to the irrational."²⁵ As history has proven, the gradual elimination of objective truth by science, philosophy, and utilitarianism resulted in subsequent societies that abused reason: reason became formalized. Subjectivist reasoning rooted its essence in the "ontology of the factual,"²⁶ thereby delimiting the world to knowable facts. It was a delimitation to knowledge which asserted that empirical verifiability was the criterion of truth.

The essence of subjective reason, therefore, is that it is mutable; without foundation. But here, after establishing reason to be of this nature. Horkheimer declared that it is definitely "more pliable to prevailing interests, more adaptable to reality as it is."²⁷ It is in this declaration that Horkheimer is in error, for reason in all its forms has been interlinked with the dominant base of society. Subjective reason is in no way unique in that it is pliable to the dominant or prevailing interests of society.

Historically, society always has been the struggle between nodes of power, but because of the ability of centralized decision-makers to control capital and the means of production they are able to influence ideology and other forms of legitimation: and this includes reason.²⁸ Reason therefore is not a natural occurrence, it too is a reflection of the dynamics of the socially constructed society. In this

case, there is no real difference between objective and subjective reason in the sense that each is a manifestation of the socially formed society of any historical period.

Therefore, the people of the Middle Ages--that period characteristic of objective reason and truth--did not exist by the power of some spiritual authority. The feudal society too, had a dominant mode of production through which people gained a livelihood. The Church was not contrary to this mode; indeed, it perpetuated the mode through its governing ideology. Moreover, the church owned approximately one-third of the land in every country, and thus had substantial control to ensure the feudal economic and social conditions.

The feudal organization of the Church gave a religious consecration to the secular feudal state system. Besides, the clergy was the only educated class. It was therefore natural that church dogma was the starting point and basis of all thought.²⁹

As the Middle Ages had its central decision-makers, so too does capitalist society today. It is an economic and educated elite that authoritatively maintains and directs the order. Specifically, this means the seeking of outlets for profit maximization and investment expansion. The institutional order is so structured to effect these goals.

With the existence of the "benevolent masters,"³⁰ and the legitimation of centralized and bureaucratic structures forming the organizational framework of society, irrational practices and forms of social injustice are not perceived as such. Correspondingly, equal resource allocation, public participation, and the freedom to choose one's destiny is

severely hampered. Freedom and choice for most of society are, therefore, only illusions. As Herbert Marcuse states,

The range of choice open to the individual is not the decisive factor in determining the degree of human freedom, but what can be chosen and what is chosen by the individual. . . . Free election of masters does not abolish the masters or the slaves.³¹

4. SOME NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL FORMS OF IRRATIONALITY

The coalition of scientism and utilitarianism created a society stabilized in the structural organization of capitalism. Science, although subsumed under the auspices of capitalism, advanced the mechanistic materialist perception of the world. It was a perception that proved compatible with capitalist practices, eventually constituting an exceedingly important ingredient for the order's maintenance and functioning. Scientistic logic in its permeation of society is an important contributor and legitimator, because it is able to "explain" the fragmentation of reality. In other words, reality is described as discrete units in perfect isolation, unaffected by their interrelations.

This logic, however, is not without societal foundation, for reason is not some amorphous agency divorced from the process through which human beings produce their reality. Thus the anti-idealist philosophy advanced by science during the feudal period was reflective of significant alterations which were simultaneously taking place in the society's mode of production. The feudal order did not live on Catholicism, and advanced capitalism today does not live on positive

science. Capitalism and positivism are in fact inseparable allies, establishing and promoting a society which both need in order to exist.

Technological Production and the Problem
of Capital Accumulation

The capitalist mode of production cannot eliminate social injustice. It thrives on it. A class society manifesting exploitation and competition is vital for its survival. Through the mode's intrinsic drive for economic growth and private profit maximization, wealth flows to those people who control investment capital and the means of production. Accordingly, it is where the economic elite seek investment opportunity that will determine what is done and how it is done. Moreover, the capitalist market system, checked by self-regulation, ensures that funds flow to areas of highest profitability. It simply is not reasonable to pour investments into areas with the expectation of little or no economic return. Meeting the needs of the system's downtrodden apparently is one of these areas.

There are sound business reasons why investments flow in the direction they do and not in such ways as to meet the potential needs of this country--for example, to eliminate poverty, to provide the industry which would create equal opportunity to Negroes, to develop the underdeveloped regions of the United States, or create adequate housing. More important, business cannot invest to accomplish these ends and at the same time meet its necessary standards of profit, growth, and security for invested capital.¹

Profitability, the governing principle in capitalism, apparently runs contrary to the goals of the needy. The

capitalist order manifests an irreconcilable condition: there is an internal contradiction, a "conflict between the powers and privileges of the capitalist ruling class that Washington protects, and the needs of workers, who are the overwhelming majority of the population, that the government cannot satisfy."² If it is not profitable to eliminate poverty and other forms of social injustice, then it will not be done.

This situation is becoming more acute, as manifested by the increased use of technological production, and its magnification of the problem of capital shortages. Post-war transformations of the production process have resulted in a massive shift in the means of production. This society has come to rely on technology; it is a necessary ingredient of the economy in that it ensures economic growth and opportunity. Technological innovation, in the form of products and productive techniques, opens new investment opportunities. This is perpetual, for as new technological capability emerges it eventually supersedes prior technique, and economic expansion is maintained.³ Technological innovation is also desired for its productive proficiency. Increased productivity (output/man-hours) is a prime motivation for introducing new technological practices in the process of production.

There is, however, a problem with the employment of sophisticated technology in the production process. Productive technology is capital intensive, and due to the capital drain from the Vietnam War, the problem of accumulating concentrations of capital has worsened. The United States is

experiencing a severe capital shortage: insufficient returns from investment to keep the high level productive technology operating. This is compounded by the fact that the overall rate of profit in the United States has been falling since World War II, and has been declining at an accelerating rate since 1966.⁴

Capital intensive technology is not able to support itself. There is simply not enough profit to procure capital for new production.* The recent trend has been to increase output in order to realize a greater profit. But just to increase output without cutting back on input costs would be meaningless. With less input, and with greater output, the result should be greater profit and hence the generation of capital. The elimination of some input for greater output is possible with capital-intensive machinery, since it is so highly productive. It is in this way that productive technology necessarily subordinates other input for its own existence.

The main inputs into any production process are labor, capital, and natural resources. Since the new productive technology is capital intensive, and requires a vast amount of energy (resource-intensive), the only variable input is human

*"Capital represents the costs of machines that are used in the production process and the factories that house them. As technology advances machines tend to become larger, more complex, and more costly. The added capital cost is acceptable because the new technology is expected to reduce the costs of other inputs, to increase the value of the output (or both), and thereby enhance the overall economic returns."⁵

labor. This input is reduced, or more appropriately, eliminated. Human labor is sacrificed: new technology with its ability to increase productivity triumphs. This brings on a dichotomy, with the increase in technological production, there is also the gradual elimination of the labor force (automation).

Another means of capital procurement is to invest in products that can become instruments of new production. In this way, they are not wasted (or consumed) but contribute to new output. Output serves primarily two economic purposes: either goods are consumed, or they are able to be used again in the production of more output. The former is called consumption, the latter is called capital. With the prevailing capital shortage, one way "to get more capital out of a given amount of production is to reduce consumption."⁶ This is the appeal put forth by the central decision-makers of big business and government. In truth, it is more than an appeal, it has become a necessity.

The people of this country are being asked to consume less. They are being called upon "to reduce their expenditures for food, clothing, housing, household goods, education, health, and recreation."⁷ But this is only the reduction of personal consumption. In the complicated business world,

when the cool, professional term consumption is translated into the language of real life . . . it means that the government would be required to spend less on schools, hospitals, social security, welfare, and the military. Given that the proponents of reduced consumption show little sign of applying the principle to the nation's huge military budget, it becomes clear

that what they have in mind is that less of the output generated by the U.S. production system should be devoted to the welfare of its people.⁸

Thus central decision-makers, those who have control over the new technological means of production, are cutting input costs (labor) for the purposes of increased profits and capital accumulation. At the same time, they appeal for less consumption. But here is the ultimate contradiction:

But suppose that the appeal were heard, and people consumed less. Who then would purchase industry's output, and generate sufficient sales to yield a profit large enough to feed the production system's growing demand for capital? This "solution" is reminiscent of a scheme for perpetual motion.⁹

The inability of big business to accumulate capital for capital-intensive production, resulting in the dismissal of human labor, represents one of the most glaring contradictions of advanced capitalism. And yet, for the popular consciousness, the contradiction seems to be either poorly understood, or not of any importance. It seems that chronic unemployment is viewed simply as just-one-of-those-things.

Ostensibly, the legitimating apparatus of society has successfully created the mental condition whereby people casually accept those contradictions manifested by a contradictory socio-economic order. Moreover, the casual acceptance is strengthened further by (if not because of) the legitimating force of positive science which has come to advance the evolution and character of society on a natural level; that is, it has quietly nihilated or dispelled any belief that the social reality is of human construction. Because of this,

social reality is perceived as being immutable: as being beyond conscious human purpose.

People thus have come to accept their social position as well as the lingering existence of most social problems. This acceptance is augmented by the social division of labor, whereby people learn specific knowledge and come to possess focused views of what reality is all about. Accordingly, the system seems too complex and disparate to understand as a totality. The society is an enveloping force-field, immersing people in the immediacies of their everyday existence. People cannot see beyond this envelopment and can only respond to it.

The wealthy too are bound in this limitation of perspective, for only through it they are able to perpetuate the order for their own interests. Moreover, through their control of capital and the means of production, they are able to influence ideology, states of consciousness, and other forms of legitimation. And this is the crucial point. Although, the injustice experienced by society is a necessary feature to procure profit and capital for further production, it has not been consciously recognized as to its systemic roots. Through legitimation, the contradiction of capital accumulation and chronic unemployment has so far been held at bay. This is so regardless of the forms of injustice manifested--unemployment; the directing of investment away from areas of greatest social need; the apparent social consensus of the view that man is only an input for production purposes, able to be dismissed in periods of economic contraction; and the machine substitution

of manual labor. It seems quite clear that the present society is a highly rationalized reified universe. People not only do not recognize the potency of their own actions to change existing conditions creating injustice, but they apparently do not recognize anything as being too terribly wrong. One thing is fairly certain, however, as economic contraction continues in the form of capital shortages and falling rates of profit, social injustice in this society and abroad will intensify.

Global Presence

As the existence of the poor and rich are interconnected in one social process, so too are the existence of world poverty and world affluence. The human misery of capitalism does not just exist within the borders of the United States and other advanced capitalist countries. The true suffering resides in the underdeveloped countries. The world's poor and poverty-stricken are inextricably connected to the global forces that are predominantly governed by the capitalist mode of production. In order to expand economically, markets must become available. However, if markets become saturated in this country, then they must be found in foreign countries. Thus for the most part, geographic expansion is synonymous with economic expansion. Geographic expansion is not a recent phenomenon, however; the act of extending American control and influence (imperialism) over foreign territories was essentially completed by the beginning of the Twentieth Century. American imperialism was evident in this

nation's infancy, disguised under the misnomer of "westward expansion" and "manifest destiny."¹⁰

The need for foreign markets to expand and secure resources is clear, as evidenced by our global presence. But to be present in foreign countries requires more than just a sales effort; what is needed is the re-shaping of these cultures to meet the dictates of the U.S.*

As the American poor are kept in their place, so too are the world poor. For if underdeveloped countries were to achieve political and economic independence from the grip of Western imperialism, then it would be possible for them to exert counter pressure which could prove to be very destabilizing for the advanced nations. The Western empires are careful then to ensure that underdeveloped countries do not succeed in securing their own economic independence. Affluent countries are dependent upon other societies for their sustenance.**

The imperialist countries need the Third World, and it

*Many policies are designed to accomplish this very purpose, such as, "the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank; the Truman Doctrine and the Point Four Program; the Marshall Plan; the National Security Act; the Organization of American States, NATO, SEATO, CENTO (later the Middle East Treaty Organization), MAAG (to assist the French in Indochina), and the Japanese-American Treaty; the revival of the draft; encouragement of the European Common Market; some wars; lots of espionage; the subversion of governments; and so on."¹¹

**Statistically, this is amazing in itself; in this country there is 6% of the world's population consuming 40% of the world's supply of raw material.¹² The dependency on foreign material resources is critical in maintaining the capitalist productive apparatus. The West, primarily the U.S., must have control over its spheres of influence to ensure access to resources, markets, and investment opportunities.

seems that the Third World also needs the Western presence. However, what is perhaps a more accurate assessment of this situation is that the developing countries are made to accept the capitalist presence. Capitalism, by necessity, alters the traditional way of life to accommodate the extraction of resources and other necessities. Many resources needed for technological production do not exist within the geographic boundaries of the U.S. and therefore, measures are implemented to ensure their extraction from foreign lands. The developing countries are re-arranged precisely for the needs of capitalist economies.* This all transpires under the disguises of "progress," and "improvement," processes which hide the exploitation of unequal exchange. Perhaps the best disguise is the diffusion of a false generosity whereby the exploited countries are pacified. This is called "foreign aid."

what is called "aid," to the poor countries, is with few exceptions an accentuation of this process: the development of their economies toward metropolitan need; the preservation of markets and spheres of influence; or the continuation of indirect political control--sustaining a collaborating regime; opposing, if necessary by military intervention, all developments which would give these societies an independent and primarily self-directed development.¹³

*One example of this is the repercussions brought on by the presence of a large multi-national corporation (assume a factory) in an underdeveloped area. The purpose of the factory is to produce commodities primarily for the mother country. This requires a high sophistication of technology, since the performance of products is conditioned by the means of production. Because of the factory presence, it is not uncommon to find a village being totally dependent on the corporation to provide work of any kind. Essentially the village conforms to the needs of the factory thereby restricting the development of skills necessary on the part of the village to upgrade its existence.

This process of domination is typically supported by military presence and, if need be, war. The truth of what is actually happening in foreign policy is veiled from the American public through the purported practice of protecting them from the evils of communism. Even if communism did not exist, another "evil" would have been created to justify the imperialist force of capitalist expansion.

Capitalist products in foreign territories ensure a major goal. As stated in Chapter 2, needs are created through the perception and use of commodities as they are reflective of the production process. Marx demonstrated that production governs consumption, and presently the commodities consumed by underdeveloped countries are largely produced in the developed capitalist countries, or by local factories owned by Western capital. As material products are distributed in societies by capitalist mechanisms, they become desired and, eventually, needed. An artificial demand has been created, artificial in the sense that cultural tradition is disassembled. Capitalism breaks down culturally derived consumption patterns and constructs its own needed culture.*

*This is by no means a recent condition, for Marx and Engels saw it happening in 1848 when they wrote the Communist Manifesto: "The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country . . . all old-established national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. They are dislodged by new industries, whose introduction becomes a life and death question for all civilized nations, by industries that no longer work up indigenous raw material, but raw material drawn from the remotest zones; industries whose products are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe."¹⁴

Material products diffused throughout the world effectively accomplish two capitalist objectives. First, the pervasiveness of the global market creates a universal world with universal needs that can be satisfied by the capitalist production process. The indoctrination of alien products, resulting in cultural dissipation, brings on a global universality. National differences vanish with the subsequent establishment of universal consumption patterns.

The spread of capitalist production techniques and organization tends to establish uniform consumption patterns not only throughout the developed capitalist world but also in the underdeveloped . . . countries. Today the use of certain basic commodities--such as cottons, drugs, beer, and other consumer goods, and concrete, steel, and other capital goods--is nearly universal.*¹⁵

The second objective of diffusing capitalist products is that with these products dominating the global market Third World countries are severely restricted from world trade. Industrial capitalist production, characterized by its use of sophisticated technology, is able to produce commodities in a manner the Third World countries cannot replicate. This has "greatly intensified the economic inequities which impoverish developing countries, for these countries are particularly well suited to produce . . . natural materials [utilizing low technology] and thereby gain position in world trade."¹⁶

*Even metropolitan built forms everywhere are becoming monotonously the same, primarily brought on by such products and services as the automobile and its concomitant accessories, building materials, and technology. Architecturally, buildings have lost their cultural aesthetics that once prevailed: contemporary buildings all look alike.

Thoughts on Totalitarianism and
Ideological Hegemony

The above references are provided to indicate the global framework of advanced centralized capitalism. It is a vast framework, necessarily integrating many cultures under the auspices of bureaucratic and centralized structures embodied mainly in the advanced capitalist nations. The existence of such centralized measures are becoming mandatory to better predict the necessary expansion and fluctuation of markets--nationally and internationally. Economic planning is now becoming more structurally centralized under the strict control of central decision-makers. Positivist social science techniques are being employed to produce statistical information for future capitalist development. The accumulation of data is for the purposes of reducing risk in economic decision-making. The decisions have come to be made primarily by "value-free" experts, a rationale legitimized by societal forces.

These technological and bureaucratic structures are becoming legitimized totalitarian sources of political hegemony and social control. The potential ramifications of this are serious: "Centralization over the economic process will entail . . . increased coercion and manipulation; beyond a certain point, the process becomes one of establishing a fascist state."¹⁷ The actuality of acquiring a monopoly is enhanced through centralization. The inevitable and necessary social domination culminating from this course of action is not

realized. Man passively conforms to everyday tasks, not realizing the standardization of reality that is taking place. Western society and its influence in the world is becoming totalitarian. A greater restriction of freedom is transpiring.

In this society, the productive apparatus tends to become totalitarian to the extent to which it determines not only the socially needed occupations, skills, and attitudes, but also individual needs and aspirations. It thus obliterates the opposition between the private and public existence, between individual and social needs. Technology serves to institute new, more effective, and more pleasant forms of social control and social cohesion.¹⁸

What is frightening, is that the totalitarian tendency being exhibited more and more within American society, for the purposes of capital control and accumulation, market penetration, resource extraction, and investment opportunity, is made possible by ideological hegemony. That is, values, morals, attitudes and beliefs are the means through which social control and the "non-recognition" of exploitive practices are maintained.

Hegemony in this sense might be defined as an "organizing principle," or world-view . . . that is diffused by agencies of ideological control and socialization into every area of daily life. To the extent that this prevailing consciousness is internalized by the broad masses, it becomes part of "common sense"; as all ruling elites seek to perpetuate their power, wealth, and status, they necessarily attempt to popularize their own philosophy, culture, morality, etc., and render them unchallengeable, part of the natural order of things.¹⁹

Because of this there is no need of military or political coercion, except in extreme cases of deviancy.

Ideological hegemony is nowhere as perfected as in the United States. This is principally due to its history, in

that it did not pass through a feudal epoch. Feudalism never appeared in this country, as American colonization transpired when the European transformation towards capitalism was becoming a reality. This had significant impact upon the development of the U.S. Early Americans established themselves in the present; the American culture of that time was devoid of feudal restraints, thereby fostering the mentality of new ideals, new land, new ways, and new methods. The road to capitalist development was eased because obstacles intrinsic to the feudal state did not have to be overcome. The American elite was able to rise to power without opposition from a feudal counterpart, and upon this accomplishment was able to monopolize wealth, power, values, and prestige; characteristics held then, as now, in high esteem.

American capitalist development gave birth to a new man in a new social and physical environment, a man that even today is essentially a-historical; sealed in the enclosed world of the present. Feudal remnants like church dignitaries, landlords, and a large peasantry were physically (and intellectually) non-existent, thus reducing the possible realization of historical contradictions and transformations on the part of colonists. Within this, the diffusion of a dominant ideology became a relatively simple process. A sufficient ideological foundation was formed which brought forth the subsequent unequal and centralized characteristics of capitalism, under the subterfuge of equality.

Comments on the Duplication of History

The need is clear to break through the armor of ideological hegemony manifested by the ever more totalitarian features of centralization and bureaucratization. But this can happen only by a transition to a more qualitative society. This task of social reorganization will not happen automatically; future society will not necessarily harbor life that is more humane and loving. Indeed, it appears that the very opposite may be true. Thus, a society characterized by a more equal allocation of resources and the facilitation of public policy will have to be consciously constructed, and this is possible since it is man who constructs his order, and thereby produces his consciousness and nature.

Attempts at social change must counter the social and ideological processes which influence consciousness. Hence, it becomes a matter of calling into question present processes of legitimation and socialization. To be sure, these processes are ideologically influenced by all of society, but even more so by the actions of central decision-makers because of their indirect control over the mode of production, presupposed by their direct control of capital flow and the means of production.

Attempts at social change must also seek to alter the dominant mode of production. If human suffering is to be abated, a transformation to a new institutional ordering must be given precedence. But this in itself is incomplete, because a new institutional order will not necessarily guarantee

the elimination of central structures of social control and partiality. It is just as possible that a social reorganization can bring on new forms of control in the place of old ones.

Historically, this has been the model. Social change in past societies has always been the exchange of power groups, therefore, repression in some form has continued. New power groups would seize control over society, establish a dogma, and implement procedures (overtly or covertly) to ensure their perpetuation.

In order not to duplicate history in the area of social change, a new vision and understanding of change must be realized. Social change must be motivated by a "dialectical consciousness." Admittedly, all social change is dialectical in the sense that there is the confronting interaction of two or more parties. But dialectical consciousness is more properly interpreted as social change transpiring with a de-reified consciousness; the understanding that any social order is of human construction, and is not something natural or immutable. Through this recognition, there can be the realization of the societal processes of socialization and legitimation, and accordingly, one can understand the dynamics of the socially constructed order. Moreover there can be the further realization of the choice between alternative world views. A dialectical/de-reified consciousness therefore is an understanding of reality as it truly is, and is not a "false consciousness," i.e. the apprehension of reality dominated by present

ideological manipulation. Social change rooted in a dialectical understanding would not be a power group exchange, because the dynamic of the consciousness is that it does not advocate a correct way of viewing the world. It is open to all interpretations of reality and seeks to incorporate disparate interpretations into a synthesis.

The dialectic . . . proposes a process of understanding which allows the interpenetration of opposites, incorporates contradiction and paradoxes, and points to the processes of resolution. Insofar as it is relevant to talk of truth and falsity, truth lies in the dialectical process rather than in the statements derived from the process. These statements can be designated as "true" only at a given point in time and, in any case, can be contradicted by other "true" statements. The dialectical method allows us to invest analyses if necessary, to regard solutions as problems, to regard questions as solutions.²⁰

5. EXPLORATION OF POSSIBLE MODES OF CHANGE

Social change has to be a process as opposed to an event. When an event, it typically culminates in dogmatic exchange, where there has been no significant structural alteration of the order, just an exchange of personnel. More consequential is that the popular consciousness is still reified: cognitive transformation has not occurred. When social change is a process, it can allow for an efficacious diffusion of a popular dialectical consciousness, such that change can become a conscious and non-exploitive activity.

Thomas Kuhn and the Structure of Scientific Revolutions

In the attempt to understand social change as a process, it is relevant to gain insight into an analagous process of change. The analogue is the discussion and competition during paradigm confrontation in the scientific community. This analogy, as a base, can be useful for the conscious inauguration of paradigm change in the social reality.

Paradigm change in the physical sciences (scientific revolutions) has occurred repeatedly, and will continue to do so. Thomas Kuhn provides an interesting analysis of this

phenomenon in his Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Kuhn's main thesis is that through the practice of normal science, i.e., that part of science that is accumulating knowledge in support of the established paradigm, anomalies inevitably arise. Anomalies are deviations from the rule, paradoxes and phenomena that cannot be explained by the paradigm. As these anomalies accumulate, normal science is plunged into a period of crisis where some scientists break off from the established paradigm and attempt to create a new one. These attempts try to resolve the problems posed by the anomalies, as well as incorporate the concepts and theories of the existing paradigm. As this crisis period ensues, physical scientists commit themselves to competing paradigms, guided not only by problem-solving capability, but also by aesthetic criteria and faith. When a new paradigm is finally formed, normal scientific activity once again resumes.

As a model from which to draw parallels in contemporary society, Kuhn's analysis of scientific paradigm change is largely inappropriate for primarily two reasons. First, it seems to be the case in American society that the starting point for paradigm change in the physical sciences will not necessarily be the starting point for paradigm change in the social sphere. In other words, there is no guarantee that anomalies will be recognized, such that social reorganization might not occur at all. The recognition of an anomaly is the point of realization for the subsequent process of scientific revolution. Although this is the key to the revolutionary

process, Kuhn leaves the matter of anomaly recognition to inevitability--

scientific revolutions are inaugurated by a growing sense . . . that an existing paradigm has ceased to function adequately in the exploration of an aspect of nature to which the paradigm itself had previously led the way.¹

Second, with the recognition of anomalies, there is apparently little or no technique to diffuse a false consciousness (ideological manipulation of the scientific context) such that true choice of paradigm alternatives is possible. These two points will now be examined more fully.

Kuhn's thesis clearly illuminates the competitive nature of paradigm change in the scientific context. Implicit in this competition, however, is that scientists are fully aware of the qualities constituting the prevailing paradigm. Scientists seem to realize that they are conducting research and experimentation in accordance with a paradigm, and as alternate paradigms arise, scientists have sufficient knowledge (or consciousness) to argue a viewpoint and to make a decision between them. This intellectual capability apparently is true, due to the fact that anomalies are periodically perceived. To take this one step further (and this is significant with relation to social change), since the perception of an anomaly is acknowledged, there is no need for the prevailing paradigm to be explained, for it must be understood as the basis by which the anomaly is judged.

Such is hardly the case in the social reality. The social world is generally accepted without question,

unacknowledged as a socially constructed enterprise, and least of all understood. Therefore, the "growing sense" of awareness that something is not right in this society has not developed. Either that, or the development has transpired on such a meager level that ideas for change are seen as just a utopian vision. This is frightening because there are many social indicators that can prove there is something wrong with the existing state of things--the strain of inflation and recession, continual unemployment, environmental crises, the prospect of nuclear holocaust, and more. Yet at present, these occurrences are legitimated; effectively neutralized and hidden from the popular consciousness, from the point of potential recognition and ameliorative action, to the point of normal acceptance. Anomalies in the American social reality are not recognized, and, hence, ideological and physical structures continue unchallenged.* The mass consciousness is a reified consciousness.

The Necessity of Subjective Reinterpretation

The key to paradigm change in the scientific context--the recognition that something is not right--has not proven to be the key to paradigm change in the social context. It seems

*Perhaps "anomalies" is the wrong word to be used here, for the potential indicators mentioned above are certainly not deviations from the rule, with reference to the capitalist mode of production. Recessions, unemployment, global poverty and starvation are conditions imposed on man, intrinsically generated by and for the perpetuation of the capitalist production process.

objective world conditions have had little success in inaugurating measures to effect social change. What is required, therefore, is the impartation of a subjective meaning to the members of society, a subjective reinterpretation of society such that the structural cause of the dehumanizing conditions of the objective reality can be exposed. This points to social change as a process, for a consciousness transformation cannot be achieved all at once.

Consciousness transformation is not a unique process, however. Because social reality is constantly bending and shifting, consciousness is responding to and even influencing this transformation. Thus objective and subjective reality are dialectically interwoven, each serves and modifies the other. As objective reality transforms, so does subjective reality transform in response to its objective counterpart, and vice versa. Subjective reality formulates meaning to objective reality, such that when transformations take place in the latter, the former is altered to accommodate the transformation. "What is real 'outside' corresponds to what is real 'within.'"²

Of this dialectic, subjective reality is perhaps the most crucial element, as it directs and governs individual human behavior. The way in which one interprets reality, or gives meaning to it, will influence how that individual participates within the world. Subjective reality justifies and explains objective reality, so, as is the case today, this is the reality that is controlled and manipulated through

legitimation. Herein lies the problem.

Ideological control of popular consciousness, as the main source of ^{سازشگری} manipulation and domination over the more blatant form of military or political repression is maintained to perpetuate the bureaucratic and centralized practices of advanced capitalism. As such, the exclusion of public participation from nearly all realms of existence has been legitimized to the point of complacency. Inasmuch as the capitalist mode of production has transformed the objective reality, so has it simultaneously and necessarily transformed the subjective reality in order to guarantee its existence.

It is of major importance for the survival of the capitalist reality, and, of course, the dominant interests, that the general populace does not come to realize this subjugation, which effectively holds them in a state of intellectual abeyance. This is not to imply that those in control fully understand the dialectical interaction between objective and subjective reality. It is enough to point out, however, that they will implement any measure necessary to ensure their dominion. Measures are inaugurated to keep the popular consciousness from realizing the subjugating dynamism of the capitalist production mode.

The capitalist world is not the only social reality obscured through ideological hegemony and other forms of legitimation. Other world views incompatible with capitalist processes are nihilated without exploration or understanding. Communism and socialism, for example, are terms which conjure

up realities of threat, evil, and overt repression. It is not the intent here to discuss the validity of these accusations, the point is that alternative interpretations of reality are physically and/or ideologically eliminated (nihilated) from the immediate scene, even when there is little or no comprehension about what these interpretations entail. These manipulative procedures ensure that anomalies are not recognized. An alternative view of reality is never allowed to progress to that degree where it can evoke serious anomaly realization which could lead to a crisis stage in society. Another clear example of this is the subtle suppression of Marx and Marxist literature in this society. Marx is portrayed as an "evil" person, and that his writings should not be taken seriously. It is feared that if interest and attention is given to Marxist literature, it would prove disquieting to advanced capitalism and its structures of control. According to David Harvey,

the Marxist theory was clearly dangerous in that it appeared to provide the key to understanding capitalist production from the position of those not in control of the means of production. Consequently, the categories, concepts, relationships and methods which had the potential to form a new paradigm were an enormous threat to the power struggle of the capitalist world.³

(Although these statements are presented in the past tense, the statements are surely applicable today.)

The diminution of threatening alternative perceptions of reality is also accomplished through the restructuring of the order, or in other words, social transformation. Indeed, to eliminate or compromise alternative structures is the style

of transformation. Periodic transformation of the order is imperative for reality maintenance. When alternative structures evolve into reality so that they pose a threat to the existing order, a transformation occurs to resolve the conflict. The essence of this procedure ensures the incorporation of the new structure into the order, thereby diluting its potency as a threat. It is through this indoctrination that the basic dominating structural framework remains unscathed. Potential anomalies are placed under the wing of the existing societal paradigmatic framework, thus the framework itself goes unchallenged. This is how the system is able to cleanse and protect itself.

But this is merely looking at one side of a system transformation: the negative side. It is conceivable that transformations can be positive, that they can result in the reduction of human suffering, and perhaps even total liberation. The latter would most certainly require a radical transformation, for such a process would have to address the very system itself, the institutional structuralization and its web of cohesion. Thus the real problem in the attempt to change society has not been confronted: the roots of the system have been left untouched. Capitalist means assure capitalist ends such that typical transformations have only resulted in increased conformity and compliance. This has been a problem even for social forces with radical intent. Evidently, attempts at social change which do not confront the order's structural roots often end up eroded or even turn into

vehicles of stabilization.⁴ Trade and labor unions are examples of this fatalistic process.

The Devolution of Labor Unions

The central thrust behind the formation of trade unions was to exert collective proletarian pressure against bourgeois rule and dominance in the occupational arena. The impetus toward union organization was directly related to the rise of technological production: industrialization.⁵ Man became alienated from his work and soon became alienated from himself. Marx and Engles wrote, "the unceasing improvement of machinery, ever more rapidly developing, makes their [workers] livelihood more and more precarious."⁶

At that time industrial machinery accounted for increased intellectual sterility. The industrial revolution was not only replacing human muscle with the machine, but was also sterilizing the human brain (perhaps immobilizing it for increased ideological manipulation?). The worker was becoming merely "an appendage of the machine,"⁷ forced into the factory and required to perform monotonous tasks for meager subsistence. Individual craftsmen and tradespeople were effectively obliterated by the rising industry. Wages were extremely low; in 1840, for example, in England, "the wage of an ordinary laborer came to eight shillings a week, which were six shillings less than he needed to buy the bare necessities of life."⁸

Reaction understandably was rising against this state

of affairs. Growing worker dissatisfaction was gaining in force, culminating in the formation of compact trade unions. Increased wages, safer working conditions, greater decision-making power, and less hours were the objectives of these unions. However, there was fierce resistance against the formation of labor unions in the rising industrialized countries. As such, social justice in early industrial capitalism was abhorrent. In England, under the Conspiracy Doctrine and the Combination Laws (1800)

thousands of workmen were punished for combining to raise wages--although in no case were employers punished for combining to lower them. Indeed, for a quarter of a century, British unionists were treated as rebels or common criminals, as they also were, for that matter, in France or Germany.⁹

The only alternative for the worker was to send his wife, his children, or both, out to find employment. If they were fortunate enough to find work, they were then beset with squalid working conditions and extremely long working hours. At the beginning of the Nineteenth Century, the fourteen hour work day was not uncommon. As mounting pressure (feeble as it was) rose up against this, the work day was gradually reduced to ten hours. Robert Heilbroner provides a schematic progression:

In 1802, pauper apprentices were legally limited to a twelve-hour day and barred from night work. In 1819, the employment of children under nine was prohibited in cotton mills; in 1833, a 48- to 69-hour week was decreed for workers under eighteen . . . and a system of government inspection of factories was inaugurated . . . in 1847, a 10-hour daily limit (later raised to 10-1/2) was set for children and women.¹⁰

In The Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels refer to the 10-hour daily limit as a positive outcome of the proletarian-bourgeoisie struggle.¹¹ Although beneficial, they saw this legislation as only the beginning; much more being attainable through proletarian organization. Rather than being dispersed because of their mutual competition, Marx and Engels believed the proletariat would have the capacity to achieve amelioration of working conditions through unionism, first by the compact combination of trades, then by a super-combination that could generate a class consciousness. Historically, the trade unions developed, but the class consciousness has not, and this was the danger that Marx and Engels saw; that if the super-combination did not evolve, true emancipation would be thwarted. They asserted,

Now and then the workers are victorious, but only for a time. The real fruit of their battles lies, not in the immediate result, but in the ever-expanding union of workers.¹²

Today the labor unions tend only to reinforce the institutions of capitalism, rather than mitigate worker conditions of alienation and insignificance. In brief, labor unions have integrated workers more peacefully into the centers of bureaucracy and control.

One of the earliest Marxist writers to realize all of this was Antonio Gramsci.¹³ Gramsci was an ardent socialist, the main premise of his theory being the creation in society of a new "network of proletarian institutions."¹⁴ At the time of his writings (1916-1937, of which the last eleven years

were spent in prison because of his socialist beliefs), labor unions had devolved into a non-revolutionary force. The unions had not combined, nor had class consciousness been generated. Competition between unions was the norm. Rather than confronting the bourgeois order, the unions had become stabilized in the pragmatic, operating through the accepted capitalist framework. In fact, from Gramsci's viewpoint, labor unions were a central element of bourgeois hegemony.

In his analysis of Gramsci, Carl Boggs points to three principal reasons for this. First, the unions did not combat the notion that labor was still just a commodity; a unit of production that could either be bought or sold within the prevailing capitalist market structure. "Most unions defined workers as consumers rather than producers who themselves had created the material foundations of the capitalist economy and who therefore could play a major role in transforming it."¹⁵ Second, unions accepted things as they were, they sought higher wages for workers without calling into question the exploitive nature of wage labor: surplus value. Third, as labor unions have evolved, they have become just as bureaucratic and elitist as corporate structures, divorced from the true needs of workers. An intra-union hierarchy has developed, creating a mini-class system analogous to the super-class system of the social context. This produces a dilemma, for the unions "assert economic demands but [can] never raise the more challenging issue of self-management or worker's control, since this would threaten the vested interests of union

leadership."¹⁶

In short, in their beginning, labor unions were radical structures attempting to transform the system by calling for humane working conditions and basic rights for workers. To a certain degree this has been accomplished. But on the other hand, union development has backfired because it reinforces centralization and specialization, thus unions are only institutionalized fixtures of the capitalist network. Unions have become stabilizing elements of society, a far cry from their radical objectives.

Subjective Understanding versus
Class Consciousness

It is clear there is a need for imparting a new subjective understanding that calls into question the structural roots of the social system. It is necessary for all people to realize the process of ideological manipulation, and how the institutional order is able to regulate and legitimize such processes. Social change has to confront the present modes of ideological hegemony, which is possible only through a reinterpretation of the present society.

Many Marxist writers today contend that to develop such a reinterpretation is to develop a class consciousness among the present-day proletariat. This is reflective of the classical Marxist approach where the dominant class and the institutional order under its direction manifest the basis of exploitation. And, to reach freedom, a class consciousness must unfold by the system's downtrodden, so as to counter the

prevailing ideology with one of its own. For the most part there is extreme danger in this mode of logic, that is, in developing class consciousness as opposed to imparting subjective awareness and meaning. By empowering one class to contrapose another, the danger is that the exchange of power groups will most likely result in new forms of authority and legitimacy which would only replace the old. Class consciousness implies the traditional contest of right versus wrong; it is still the historical continuation of imposition, imposing one world view over another. There is no guarantee that the new master class will be more humane and loving, or that classes will be abolished altogether. Given this, however, it is still pertinent to investigate more deeply a class consciousness approach to social change in order to compare such a process to a process of imparting subjective reinterpretation. One example characterizing the class consciousness approach is the work of Bertell Ollman in his "Towards Class Consciousness Next Time."

This article is an exploration into the reasons why worker populations have failed to revolt and radically restructure the existing society into a non-repressive one. Ollman is concerned with how workers might be compelled to initiate action to overcome their deprived state. He reveals that in the historical failure to revolt, "workers were not able to attain class consciousness in conditions that were more or less ideal for them to do so."¹⁷ With this as a base, Ollman provides the reader with a step-by-step procedure

necessary for class consciousness development on the part of today's proletariat. He describes the process briefly as follows:

First, workers must recognize that they have interests. Second, they must be able to see their interests as individuals in their interests as members of a class. Third, they must be able to distinguish what Marx considers their main interests. Fourth, they must believe that their class interests come prior to their interests as members of a particular nation, religion, race, etc. Fifth, they must truly hate their capitalist exploiters. Sixth, they must have an idea, however vague, that their situation could be qualitatively improved. Seventh, they must believe that they themselves, through some means or other, can bring about this improvement. Eighth, they must believe that Marx's strategy, or that advocated by Marxist leaders, offers the best means for achieving their aims. And, ninth, having arrived at all the foregoing, they must not be afraid to act when the time comes.¹⁸

Ollman ends his article with an interesting but somewhat frightening twist. Based on Marx's largely inadequate study of the family as a social system, Ollman points to the concept of "character structure" as a means to developing class consciousness necessary for social change. He states, "whenever the system has been in a crisis, when it was in the worker's interest to construct new solutions, their character structure has disposed them to go on seeking old nostrums, where they can continue to act as they have been and know how to."¹⁹ Similarly, "if Marx had studied the family more closely, he surely would have noticed that as a factory for producing character it is invariably a generation or more behind the times, producing people today who, tomorrow, will be able to deal with yesterday's problems."²⁰

This inadequacy of workers to deal with possible

alternatives and solutions is a valid point. People, conditioned by society, are hesitant of the unknown and reluctant to create a society of different priorities and goals. The fear of freedom phenomenon is real*; often when persons are on the brink of creating something new, they resort to their prior experiences of what they know and understand; their own sociology of knowledge. Society's processes are instrumental in ensuring this condition. Socialization and legitimation make sure that alternative world views are non-existent, or irrational. These same processes assure competition between social classes and activate motivating impulses to elevate oneself up the social ladder. Those divorced from power desire to fill the shoes of the powerful. The latter wish to maintain their power and authority. This form of self-regulation almost dictates social change to be of class confrontation.

Ollman's solution to this problem is to have some manner of affecting the character structure of workers during their formative years, so that a fear of freedom will not inhibit necessary action in subsequent years. What is being called for is a new process of socialization, and this is its

*Marx was perhaps the first to realize the fear of freedom possession: "the tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. And just when they seem engaged in revolutionizing themselves and things, in creating something that has never yet existed, precisely in such periods of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from them names, battle cries and costumes in order to present the new scene of world history in this time-honoured disguise and this borrowed language."²¹

goal:

The concrete aims of radical activity, on the basis of this analysis, are to get teen-age and even younger members of the working class to question the existing order along with all its symbols and leaders, to loosen whatever doesn't make sense in terms of their needs as individuals and as members of a group, to conceive of the enemy as the capitalist system and the small group of men who control it, to articulate their hopes for a better life, to participate in successful protest actions no matter how small the immediate objective, and to create a sense of community and brotherhood of all those in revolt.²²

In Ollman's view, everything and anything bourgeois is to be repudiated. In essence, Ollman's view is another form of nihilation. Everything must submit to the objective of class consciousness formation and, moreover, this attitude must be encouraged and structured when future workers are quite young. The envisaged goal is the rising up of the proletarian class, to where they not only stand in contraposition to the dominant class, but they seize power and establish a new order. History has been once again duplicated. The young are not brought up to learn a dialectical process--to enter into a dialogue--they are socialized with the ploys of propaganda and other forms of mass brainwashing, in order to rebel against established authority. The socialization of the young is to ensure they understand the right consciousness for repudiation and revolt.

This mode of change is reminiscent of B. F. Skinner's modern utopia Walden Two.²³ To be sure, mass ideological manipulation is omnipresent in this society, but Ollman and Skinner's theses differ from society in that both are tactics

of conscious social conditioning by authorities of expertise. Skinner directly states this measure, Ollman merely implies it. Both authors seek the conscious manipulation of values, attitudes, and beliefs to instill a correct consciousness for pre-determined social ends. Skinner's utopia is a classic example utilizing positivist methods and techniques.* Ollman is dialectical, and thus even more frightening, for he utilizes the dialectic to convert and not to understand.

Conversion versus Dereification

The goal of a new subjective consciousness is to impart knowledge so that the governing and operation of the social order can be fully understood. Out of this realization can come liberating change. The new meaning transmitted must not seek to convert, but must dereify. The distinction between conversion and dereification is substantial and

*It does not take much insight to apprehend some of the deterministic qualities that would result from an approach of this character. Skinner's thesis is that people are already conditioned (biological nature and social events) but the usual outcome, as history has shown, is a society annoyed with oppression in some form. Skinner poses the question of why conditioning cannot progress in a manner where desirable ends are the result. This in turn, poses another question: who would do the conditioning and why should these people be the conditioners? Surely it is clear that such a process of subjection withdraws any allowance of freedom for a person to direct his own life.

These moral questions are valid and certainly need to be addressed. However, one interesting fact cannot be ignored that preempts any uneasiness perceived in the above questions. It is now possible, given the omnipresence of the mass media and all other forms of social technology, to consciously control social development and human personality. The actuality cannot be ignored, hoping that it will not happen. Impotence or ignorance cannot offer escape from the frightening reality that conscious social control is possible.

significant. Kuhn uses the word "conversion" in his discussion of scientific revolutions. Conversion, as a social process, attempts to sway or alter the common populace from one dogma to another: from one ideology to another. Conversion therefore is only a process of substitution, substituting one power group for another. Dereification, on the other hand, attempts to diffuse an understanding, a realization that social change has been, historically, only a process of substitution and mass conversion. It is the process through which the popular consciousness apprehends and fully understands that the social reality is of human construction. Dereification initiates a dialogue; explanation utilizing the dialectical method to impart understanding of the dynamics of the social order. Demystification is not dereification, the former being the spontaneous or superficial questioning of objective conditions that primarily leads to activism. Dereification is much deeper than this, it develops the subjective awareness capable of realizing that world views are simply world views; that there are innumerable ways to apprehend the world, and all of them are correct for the persons involved. The proclamation that one perspective of reality is more truthful than another does not fit into the dereifying process, for it seeks to incorporate all perspectives into a dialogue, such that there is no repression of one world outlook over another. The dereified consciousness accommodates many "true" interpretations of reality, and calls them true interpretations rather than contradictions.

6. TOWARD AN ALTERNATIVE EPISTEMOLOGY

The struggle for human liberation begins with the dereifying recognition that people in all levels of society are systemically channeled through structures of their own making, such that it is they who can collectively change the undesirable practices which are, in turn, the result of the structures. Dereification breaks through this hardened shell of legitimized irrationality thereby exposing the vulgar truth that is manifested in American society by capitalist centralization and bureaucratization.

The capitalist social network is a complete system: ideologically efficient, refined, and systematic, and it has effectively created the measures necessary for its own perpetuation. Needs and satisfactions manufactured through the process of production perpetuate the servitude of the exploited. Men and women come to feel that to reject this system is to reject themselves. Here human exploitation, in its most sophisticated form is looked on as naturally as "baseball, hotdogs, apple pie, and Chevrolet."

Advanced capitalism has come to be measured by its own terms. It is measured by the wealth it produces, by the destructive means it produces, and by the quantity of goods it

produces. The social reality is so caught up with quantity over quality, that quantity is perceived as quality. The system requires numbers, equations, and statistics, and needless to say, it is extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible to put social, psychic, and human emotional costs into equations. The present society cannot recognize the suffering and outcry of the impoverished because they do not fit into an equation.

Attempts to diffuse an alternative consciousness for structural change have been stymied by the legitimating power of corporate capitalism. The social machinery has directed consciousness in support of itself; the mass media and other forms of ideological techniques have adjusted and molded moral and emotional faculties into a direction whereby the populace subliminally abdicates any alternative world views. As such, the capitalist irrationality has been effectively hidden from the consciousness of society. The abundance and unceasing generation of material wealth also conceals the irrationality. This accumulation, conducted at the expense of suffering populations throughout the world, has been labeled a marvelous achievement. The greatest injustice to the world is the success and proliferation of centralized-capitalism (as well as centralization in socialist states).

The capitalist reality is nothing more than a neo-feudalistic society with just one difference--the illusion of freedom. Whereas the feudal epoch was characterized by divine placement (and control was realized), American society has

managed to diffuse a subterfuge of freedom where in actuality, control is maintained. The result is that Americans think and feel they are free, but this occurs only because ideological gymnastics ensure that people do not see reality as it truly is. The implanted ideology is that everyone is something, the truth is that the majority is nothing--simply cogs of the social machinery. If the populace were ever to realize this state of affairs (dereification) structural change surely would be the result.

The social order is structurally composed to ensure little direct verbal interchange between central decision-makers and the general populace. A pseudo-dialogue is carried on with the general public, that is, in fact, merely a monologue. Questionnaires, attitude surveys, interviews, and opinion polls are not effective dialogical measures. Furthermore, universal application cannot account for idiosyncracies in regional dynamics, let alone neighborhood dynamics. The data compiled, for whatever is to be done with them, are manipulated data, filtered and interpreted through the economic elite's own class philosophy. This is no secret; opinion polls are techniques employed to further the interests of the power structure. Surveys and polls "have become integral elements in the structure of power, extensions of the interests that dominate the society."¹

So that an effective dialogue can ensue, the elimination of social classes has to be the basis for structural change. True dialogue can never be the means of communication

in a class system, for it would be counter to the interests of the dominant class. Since the society is stratified, central decision-makers reinforce their self-preservation at the expense of others who do not have the means to affirm their existence. The institutional structuring of society, as it has evolved, ensures decision-making to be of this quality. To eliminate social class distinctions would be to integrate all people into a decentralized decision-making process.

People should not be deliberately excluded from decision-making, for all are directly affected by decisions made by central authorities. This exclusion, though, has been all too obvious, as just the physical environment (inner-city ghettos, low-income housing) from this process justifies; it is disastrous and destructive.

Planning as a social process perpetuates these effects of centralization through its failure to break out of its reified mold. Planning expresses the dominant world outlook, sustains, and even exacerbates social injustice through its ignorance of the socially constructed reality. The institution of planning is still just one division of labor--a specialization of the fragmented world--such that the knowledge it encompasses is empirical. Planners do not understand the construction of reality and therefore, participate in the world on an empirical level; in the empirical reality. The empirical reality is unavoidably a superficial reality. The structural causes of reality are considered as being irrelevant, or worse yet, they are not even considered or

acknowledged. For the most part, structural causes do not fit into the role of orthodox planning.

Planners do not call these structural societal processes into question. Under the assumption of being value-free and neutral, planners are merely expert technicians. They unconsciously perpetuate centralized decision-making, thereby seeing to it that those in power will not only stay in power, but will thwart any tactic that tries to contradict their power. The planning institution is simply an arm for decision-makers to use in instilling their interests and dominion. The people who have the economic capacity, define the world, and all others are either implementors or followers. For example, planners and other design professionals often enter an urban design problem after the problem has been economically defined and programmed. And given the way a problem is outlined and defined will presuppose a solution that is a reflection of that definition. Orthodox planners therefore simply execute what has already been defined and programmed.

There is something wrong with the present society. Vulgarity and inequity are omnipresent, and are not undesirable ambiguities floating throughout reality. Social injustice is structurally imbedded within the institutional order, that is, the capitalist reality. Thus directions for change must focus on this structuralization and not on destructive action against individuals of the upper echelon.

Present economic constriction has created more illusive forms of social control, stifling attempts toward

fundamental change, and culminating in the demoralization and bewilderment of the general population. People can adapt to any social reality.

There is no such thing as a situation so intolerable that human beings must necessarily rise up against it. People can bear anything, and the longer it exists the more placidly they will bear it.²

The negative utopias of 1984 and Brave New World offer our future populations the frightening possibility of not only what might be, but more importantly, what can be. Hence the passing of history is not a predestined progression. It is not some deterministic march toward societies characterized by beauty, love, and humanness. The reverse is just as possible, and by interpreting the signs of the present, this is a more probable prediction.

Ameliorative social change will not occur naturally. Yet, the insistence by society to believe that change will occur automatically is due to the fact that the social reality is not viewed as a humanly constructed order, but as a natural order. The world has a taken-for-granted validity, promoting the mentality of neutrality--that people as individuals need not do anything, that everything will turn out fine. This mentality prevails precisely because man does not recognize his ability to construct and form realities.

Social change most often occurs when things get better, not when things get worse, and they seem to be getting worse. The structural violence of corporate capitalism will surely intensify the world over. Submerged and overpowered by

ideological manipulation, much of the societal population withdraws into itself. To be sure, this strata "feels" its present life situation and the need for its alteration. But still, they apparently cannot see any means employable for structural change resulting in amelioration.

A new social process is required that is fundamentally geared to ongoing structural change and decentralized decision-making. The conscious exclusion of popular communities from decision-making has to be combatted with an alternative epistemology that incorporates them. The answer to structural change is not better-trained experts. The process required is an authentic praxis.

The Concept of Praxis

The concept of praxis is the dialectical interdependency of subjective reflection and objective action: the combination of critical theory and practice in order to achieve social change. The strength of the revolutionary praxis lies in its realization that the human world is socially constructed. Social reality does not follow a predetermined set of natural laws divorced from the intentions and actions of mankind. Reality does not transform by chance. The alternative praxis attempts to bring on this recognition and understanding through reflection and action. In other words, since man creates reality, he can apprehend this significance, and with this knowledge can consciously act upon reality to con-

structively transform it into something humane and decent.* Thus, in terms of social injustice, in order for the praxis to be truly effective, there must first be the awareness that the reality of that injustice is not absolute; it is a limiting situation that can be transformed.

This understanding evolves from dereification: seeing reality in its true form. As the inaugurators of change come to apprehend the theoretical side of the praxis dialectic, their consciousness transformation has to be directed and implemented as a motivating force for liberating action. Dereification is meaningless without physical action. The interaction of subjective and objective realities is what makes the praxis authentic. Perceiving society dialectically, and not critically intervening, will not lead to fundamental change, because the new subjective awareness in itself cannot bring on change. Critical theory has one great handicap: it is only theory, and in this state it is limited until it is coupled with practice. Only through practice can liberating tendencies of critical theory reach utilization. This is the essence of the praxis.

It should be clear that the point of realization for the implementation of the praxis has to be the theory component. It is the role of the alternative praxis to impart a

*To construct reality with a dereified consciousness is the essence for Jean-Paul Sartre, as Hazel E. Barnes explains, "Sartre states that the ultimate ideal for mankind would be a world in which all men worked together in full consciousness to make their history common."³

dialectical consciousness throughout the popular consciousness. This epistemology is not solely for the disenfranchised, it has to be attempted in all facets of life. No doubt a praxis of this nature will be met more favorably among the poverty-afflicted strata than among the upper levels of society. Nevertheless, the attempt must be made to undergo dereification throughout all the stratified layers of the order.

Praxis without theory dissolves into pragmatic practice, or mere activism. This, in effect, accomplishes very little. The outcome is typically moderate human amelioration without structural change. Therefore, the amelioration is unstable and short term; the problem could easily rise again because the conflict has not been structurally confronted: the roots have been left untouched.

The repudiation of theory and the obsession with immediate practicalities seem to be central to American reasoning and action.⁴ This brings up a problem. Given that people are socialized precisely for societal purposes, and thus participate in life under the ideological blanket of false consciousness, it stands to reason that to meet immediate needs under this blanket will only serve to solidify present hegemony. People respond to needs as they are generated and created largely by the dominant mode of production. To be ignorant of this fact can only lead to greater reformism. For example, as is often the case, organized action on the part of the impoverished usually results in more jobs, better enforcement

of housing code standards, or some other concern. While these outcomes are certainly desirable and important, they are by no means complete in their attempt to effectuate structural change. What has been achieved is amelioration without significant change; the exploitive capitalist mechanisms are still at work. Organized practice, devoid of theory, in its attempts to change, culminates in the peaceful integration of the alternative into the standard.* The best that pragmatic practice can hope for is "pressure-group type bargaining within the capitalist order."⁵ Thus in the final analysis, theory absent from practice is nothing more than the reaffirmation of the established ideology.

Theory, as the dialectical counterpart to practice is imperative. It is through theory that a "true consciousness" can emerge. Needs and immediate concerns have to be discussed dialogically so that the blanket of false consciousness can be thrown off, thereby exposing the truth of advanced capitalism. Through theory and dialogue, needs can be analyzed as to their validity and genesis, thus unveiling these taken-for-granted concerns so vital to the process of production. Critical questioning must occur, on, not only what is produced, but also on why there are certain products and services designed to meet, and create, needs at all.

Whether it is long-range planning or immediate needs that are contemplated, the central thrust underwriting

*The discussion of labor unions in the preceding chapter provides a case in point.

dialogue and the diffusion of critical theory, is the development of an awareness attuned to the order's dynamism. And that the prevailing world view authoritatively maintained by the dominant interests of the order, is one world view, rooted in the institutionalization of the order. The dominant world view and its firm structural base is, after all, a paradigm that institutionalizes behavior into typified roles. For human liberation, the recognition of this is critical. People must come to the realization that they are responding and acting out their lives in accordance with a paradigm. From this, further recognition should follow that other world views with different structural bases are possible. An intellectual disassembling of the right-versus-wrong confrontation can be accomplished. The process of change does not become one of asserting one closed world view over another, it becomes that of understanding motives behind other reality interpretations. It is a phenomenological attitude, trying to ascertain the intentions of others no matter what philosophical position they contend.

The viability of the praxis lies in the introduction of the social change process into everyday existence. The power of the praxis is that its implementation leading to revolutionary change can and must occur through daily experience. This must be the case, as the order is so perfected that capitulation is inescapable. Change, therefore, must evolve from within. People can truly understand societal operations, but even with this knowledge, they must still

participate within the system just for the satisfaction of basic needs.

The praxis is an attempt to mend the chasm between thinking and doing. The bifurcation of theory and practice results in the separation of forces whereby each is the cause for the other's failure to produce structural alteration. Practice devolves to activism, theory devolves to verbalism. Practice has the power and organization to effectuate change, but divorced from theory, it only reifies present power. Theory is the knowledge and explanation of the order's repressive qualities, but divorced from practice it is impotent. As the chasm widens, the stratification intensifies, culminating in antagonistic positions, where theoreticians are viewed as intellectual snobs, and small-scale organizations and grass-root movements are viewed as ineffective and worthless appeals to the problem of change. Both visions are essentially correct, for both theory and practice need to be married to allow for popular action. For change to be significant, there cannot be the separation of the praxis components. The failure to integrate theory and practices ultimately reinforces present hierarchical tendencies of advanced-centralized capitalism.

It is clear that needed structural change is not going to be an inevitable outgrowth of this society. A new institutional ordering resulting in total human liberation must be consciously constructed. This is the key to human emancipation. This is the essence of dereification. The dereifying

praxis is the means to overcoming the pervasiveness of centralized-capitalist irrationality, or for that matter, any systemic irrationality. This is the first objective of social change, to expose the irrationalities of society. The objective cannot be that of settling economic or materialistic inequity because this only leads to further class struggle and injustice. It is only through the dereifying praxis, that human values can take precedence over economic values, and perhaps, human misery will no longer continue unabated.

POSTSCRIPT

PARADIGM CONFRONTATION AND THE
URBAN-SUBURBAN CRISIS

You admire the charming variety, the inexhaustible riches of nature. You do not demand from the rose that it should have the same scent as the violet. But the richest thing in the world, the human mind, must only be allowed to exist in one kind. . . . Every dewdrop, into which the sun shines, glistens with an inexhaustible play of colours. But the intellectual sun, in however many individuals and objects it is reflected, must be allowed to produce only the official colour.

K. Marx
Collected Works of K. Marx
and F. Engels, 1841-1850

The Problem

There is no absolute answer in the attempt to understand reality. Possible human comprehension of the social and material reality is infinite. Albeit, most accept this to be true in a general sense, discrepancies do arise as to what may be considered the most accurate mode of comprehension. As people interact and participate in the natural and human setting they unavoidably come to affirm, consciously or unconsciously, an ethic, a world view: a paradigm. The definitive character of paradigms is significant, not only because of the knowledge they affirm, but also because of the knowledge they reject. Paradigms are simultaneously expanding and

constraining constructs, forming the abiding parameters through which people's outlook on reality is continually expanded, molded, and focused. It is this guidance which shapes people's actions as they participate in the world.

Given this, the intent of this section is to contrast, within the setting of an urban problem, two viewpoints of planning, both of which are rooted in paradigmatic commitments. This section will offer an alternative interpretation (based on the dialectic) of an urban problem in opposition to the conventional interpretation (based on empiricism-positivism) typically purported by urban planners, economists, and related professionals associated with the urban climate.

Specifically, the problem to be discussed is the "housing problem." This section seeks explanations centered about (1) the unceasing continuance of suburban expansion; (2) the continuing decay of central city housing and services; and (3) the continuing inadequacy of the private sector to provide shelter for segments of the population at prices they can realistically afford. It is hoped that by contrasting the two perspectives, a deeper awareness of urban phenomena will emerge; an awareness that can guide human action toward realizing its self-potential. Such an awareness is important in order for a problem to be confronted effectively, for it must be understood with respect to its social, economic, and political origins, as well as to its overt, or empirical manifestations. The dialectical paradigm can bring on this understanding; the empirical paradigm cannot, and historically, has not.

Overview

Implicit to paradigm confrontation is the dialectic. As a form of reasoning, the dialectic best accommodates the contradictions and discrepancies which inevitably arise from paradigm contraposition. Contradiction is the essence of the dialectic, as it is the heart of life. It follows then that contradiction should be encouraged, allowing argumentation and participation about what is and what ought to be, at all levels of decision-making, and in all levels of life.

However, when modes of reasoning progress, and point to absolute and universally correct ways of thinking and doing, the dialectic becomes abused and stymied. Argumentation is repressed, and a linear form of reasoning becomes supreme. The problem with linear reasoning is that it tends to be exclusionary. The disavowal of major segments of the population reinforces a hierarchical society, with those who set up the rules determining who play the game and consequently who do not. Ideology, dogma, and even paradigms are guilty of exclusionary reasoning.

On a societal level there is little difference between the meanings of ideology and paradigm. The present socio-economic order is a paradigm: it is a framework of theories, concepts, philosophies, and methods. What accounts for the dominant ideology of the order exemplifies the crucial roles of socialization and legitimation as they are dialectical constituents of the society's mode of production. The latter, and its corresponding superstructure, dialectically guide the

production and reproduction of values, morals, attitudes, beliefs: hence, ideology.

It was argued in main body of this thesis that society is a human product; that man and society are entwined in a dialectical relationship where both are engaged in a mutually reciprocal process of forming and shaping the other. Therefore, all people are contributors to the formation of the social reality. This is so regardless of ideology, dogma, or any other form of reasoning which might suggest otherwise. The social world is a veritable dialectic, and absolutism or universalism can never exist.

Yet it seems that the strive for universalism and the proclamation that there is one best way for reflection and action are the major fuels for the operation of this society. It is no coincidence that these cornerstones of society are also fundamental to the processes of science. Science occupies a prestigious role within society as members of disparate societal disciplines utilize its procedures and methods. The application of science (technology) is widespread. This is not inherently bad. However, the technological rationality which has evolved with the rise of science is a large factor contributing to the suppression of the dialectical mode of reasoning.

Planning and architecture have not escaped the scientific-technological rationality. Design professionals and urban planners have not only replicated the tools of science but have also replicated in some degree, its logic, methodology,

and world-view. This may suggest that science is the governing force of reality and that other social disciplines imitate its properties. It is not that simple. Science is not a functioning body irrespective of the mode of production. Like all other institutions comprising social reality, science too is a constituent, and its particular form and function is not assessable separate from this interrelationship. The properties of science are determined, guided, and modified by its position in reality. Therefore, the replication of scientific methods by urban planning is not an incidence derived from science alone, but is a structural occurrence emanating from the interplay of institutions manifested from a dominant mode of production.

Science and society are entwined in a mutually constitutive interaction where the role of science is that of legitimator of the social order. Science explains, defines, and justifies reality in methods that science itself has created and validated. Science explains by means of facts, and facts are considered something different from values. Facts are facts, and apparently in science that is all there is, such that, proof by experimentation and research can correctly establish the true essence of what exists. Society reasons in the same manner, that is, the very logic of society is separation: distinction between fact and value, object and subject, theory and practice. The problem here is that facts and values are actually the same in that they are humanly constructed. Facts and values are social properties in origin.

Yet, according to the reasoning and logic of the society-science interface, it cannot see this to be so. Consequently, society as a dialectic is not realized. Society is envisioned as a natural order, following natural laws which regulate independently of human intention and action.

The social and political repercussions of this interface have been ineffectual. Since the subjective element of human existence (intention) has been neatly disposed of, the social origin of what is experienced in the world is not acknowledged, and action reflects this. For example, urban professionals tend to follow step-by-step analyses where each step disregards the interconnection of all the analytic steps; they try to extract an object of study from its associative connections (reductionism), believing that in this state that study is most productive; they assemble large quantities of data suitable for quantification (and computer application), not realizing that the data they collect is that which they deem important, thus they preoccupy themselves with empirically verifiable "facts" assumed to be objective knowledge free from ideological assault;¹ and finally, for the most part they cling to the belief that the methods they employ can be applied universally, culminating in a one-best solution. Such a practice negates human processes as the origin of social reality. And it is this intellectual posture which accounts for the inept action attempted thus far in solving the housing problem.

Empiricist-Positivist Planning
and Suburbanization

The urban scene is a complex entanglement of physical structures and social processes which must be visualized as a totality. The attitude of planners to separate and isolate disrupts the interrelated nature of the totality. Processes related to a specific problem are typically divorced from one another, resulting in fragmentation and ineptitude in confronting the whole problem as it truly exists. For example, the proliferation of suburban sprawl is viewed separately from the problem of inner-city decay; and red-lining is viewed as an occurrence only associated with the inner-city. In general, it seems all processes particular to the city are seen as a result of the city and processes particular to the suburb are seen as a result of the suburb, with no interconnection between the two geographical areas.

In the phenomena of suburbanization, the purported causes advanced by urban specialists are tinged with an air of natural passivity. After all, if a city population increases where are people supposed to reside? Edward Banfield in The Un-Heavenly City Revisited attempts an explanation. Banfield lays out his views according to what he calls, "the logic of metropolitan growth."² This logic is composed of three imperatives,

The first is demographic: if the population of a city increases, the city must expand in one direction or another. . . . The second is technological: if it is feasible to transport large numbers of people outward (by train, bus, and automobile) but not upward or downward (by elevator), the city must expand outward. The

third is economic: if the distribution of wealth and income is such that some can afford new housing and the time and money to commute considerable distances to work while others cannot, the expanding periphery of the city must be occupied by the first group (the well-off) while the older, inner parts of the city, where most of the jobs for the unskilled are, must be occupied by the second group (the not well-off).³

Ostensibly, what Banfield is saying is that if a city population grows, and if a transportation technology develops, and if there is a certain distribution of income, "certain consequences must follow."⁴ Banfield's three imperatives cannot be disqualified as untrue, though they are very simple and do not reveal any underlying cause for the processes he describes. (This issue will be taken up again later.)

Central to the urban professionals' explication of suburbanization is the tacit assumption that those concerned with the production of shelter (developers, realtors, planners, financial institutions) are merely fulfilling the desires of the public. They assert that suburban growth, and the public idolization of the single-family unit intimately associated with suburban form, are not the marketable creations of developers and builders. It is believed that suburbanization occurs because builders are supplying housing where people want to live.

The alleged ideologically-free position of empirical planners is now superbly clear. To be sure, all people respond and act in the world according to the gratification of needs. However, the question that is rarely raised, is why do people respond to that which they respond? Without

attempting to effectively explore the character of people's needs and satisfactions, the social origin of their desires is negated. Thus, the complex process of need generation, as rooted in a production-consumption dialectic is not encompassed. This insufficiency intrinsic in the empiricist-positivist paradigm creates the condition whereby there is little chance to recognize that demand for commodities could be consciously induced within people to further a market economy; or that the popular consciousness could be a "false consciousness"--ideologically manipulated to influence consumption and to reinforce the structures of control. The buying and selling of shelter is no different. In this society suburban housing is like all else, a commodity, and its existence on the market depends greatly on demand-raising and sustaining techniques.

A belief cultivated from the "what the people want" syndrome is the notion that people naturally desire to live in a country setting as opposed to the city. The closest location to the country available to city workers is the suburb. The pseudo-rural ideal supposedly offers attractive living free from the congestion and density of inner-urban areas.* The intent here is not to discount these beliefs, for the processes underlying the creation of the suburb are more complex. Empirical explanations of the suburban form eventually

*The following is an excerpt from an advertisement: "In Monmouth Heights at Marlboro, you'll enjoy the kind of satisfying life you've always dreamed of. A quiet country life with clean fresh air, green fields, an unhurried atmosphere--all the peace and privacy you need so badly at the end of a busy day. And what a great place for children to grow!"⁵

rest on the fulfillment of man's romantic feelings for nature, sensations that city environments cannot accommodate. But these yearnings to be close to nature have only recently come into being. Thus perhaps the city may not have always been dark and ugly, just as the country may not have always been pastoral and innocent.

The metaphysical qualities associated with rural life today grew out of the city darkness of early industrial capitalism, primarily in England.⁶ Before the period of industrialization, economic power was not implemented and centered in the city, but principally in a rural economy. Country life during this period was excessively hard and demanding. However, as the transformation from feudalism to agrarian capitalism gained momentum, the brutal life was still experienced by most of society, although in a different form. What came into being was a new system rooted in social and economic control, as opposed to the prior mode of physical coercion. With the rise of industrial capitalism out of agrarian capitalism, the requisite formation of dense urban areas evolved. Peasants and tenant farmers held landless by the Enclosure Acts became the working class of the rising industrial centers. Production situated in cities where a large population could be localized for the production process itself, as well as ensure market penetration and command. These urban areas were places of work, dominated by engines and mills, with effluents blackening both air and water. It is no surprise that the big city came to be seen as death in life: loss of meaning and purpose,

struggle, indifference, were all seen as anguished features characteristic of the city. Contrasted to this was the natural rhythm of nature: night and day, the passing of the seasons, the air of innocence, such that a new serenity of country life was rising by the negation of urban imagery.

What evolved was an aspirational myth to revert to a time of a happier past. When compared to the pastoral dream, the mechanical order of the city was (and is) felt as an evil source of artificial routine and general inhumanity.

The aspiration for the past is perhaps a habit. It seems "the good old days" will always be used as a means to criticize the present. But this form of criticism, this reverted plea for a society more humane is really a misdirection because it negates processes that create the present, and also the past. Critical reaction to the present is directed toward reminiscence and not to the structural questions of why and what can be.

The suburban settlement is a form of an aspirational myth, and thus reifies human existence within society's ideological envelope. Suburbanization and its symbolic representation of rural life cannot be explained as the accommodation of people's innate desires, for such an explanation is much too empirical. Even if the suburb has been created to fulfill an innate drive to embrace and commune with nature, it has not succeeded at all.*

*Evidence of this is becoming increasingly obvious. There are those who contend that the "Suburbs as a whole are becoming

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and the Central City

In any metropolitan area, most, if not all, of the poor and poverty-afflicted population will be confined to the inner-most part of the city. There is a strange irony in this. The central city is plagued with over-crowding--families huddling together to commonly meet expenditures of rent and utilities--while simultaneously the same geographical area has the greatest number of vacant structures.⁸ Land use within the inner-city is extremely varied, and this is reflected by the debilitating condition of housing. Since residential property is resting on high-priced land adjacent to other land uses, which are able to generate greater returns of profit (industry, commercial, and business) the land is subject to enormous speculative pressure. The result is that residential property receives little maintenance, as these expenditures are considered wasteful when compared to the lucrative possibilities afforded by a land-use change.

Such blatant facts are not new to urban professionals. However, the underlying causes and methods for solving them, as set forth by planners and other urban experts, are simply too shallow.

In the previous discussion of suburbanization, the process is justified empirically as people pursuing what they

older, more congested, higher in density, more polluted, and plagued by higher crime rates and poorer schools. In short, many suburbs are coming to resemble central cities in everything except centrality."⁷

feel is important in terms of residency. Although this is incomplete, there is validity in the fact that suburbs are populated by the middle classes, a body of people with more resources at their disposal to implement their desires and preferences.

Explanations for decaying inner-city areas cannot be so simple. Surely, the existence of impoverishment cannot be explained as a lifestyle the poor try to attain: a mode of life people pursue because it is the way they truly wish to live. Generally, the poverty-stricken have no choice of residency location. They inherit what has been vacated by higher classes, a process known as trickling-down, or filtering-down. As new housing construction is initiated, normally in the metropolitan periphery, the middle and upper classes who can afford such an expenditure leave behind good quality housing. The vacancy is typically occupied by the next lower income group, who view the available housing as a step up the social ladder. This process is the means by which the poor eventually acquire better housing. But the problem of overcrowding has not been eliminated; families still have to congregate to meet basic expenses. In addition, the newly acquired housing is usually aged such that intensive physical use brought on by overcrowding leads to further dilapidation, and finally abandonment. Poverty once again shows its face.⁹

Urban planners in this regard are confronted with a dilemma. They realize the fundamental need of housing for low-income populations, and further recognize that most of this

group cannot afford housing even at the most basic level of decency outlined in building codes. Filtering and government intervention in the private market have been the means by which the poor have achieved housing. Because of this accomplishment, meager as it may be, these processes are deemed helpful remedies for the poor. Further, with respect to filtering, there are those who argue that by enlarging the supply of housing through new construction, consumers then would have greater selection, thus forcing down rents and prices because of increased competition between the sellers of housing. Filtering, therefore, is to be encouraged by the unceasing construction of new housing units. New construction must be the mode of operation because rehabilitation of existing structures seems to put a damper on filtering.¹⁰ Rehabilitation discourages mobility, and to this extent retards the transfer of housing to families of lower income. However, filtering, even when strongly encouraged, is still inept in reaching the very lowest income families.

The role of government to provide housing has proven to be paramount because of the inadequacy of the private sector to provide shelter for the poor. Significant government intervention within the housing process first took form in the 1930's.¹¹ The intent of these reforms was to initiate new jobs and restructure the troubled economy. As for providing housing, this was a secondary function. The legislation was not considered a charitable enterprise, and was directed not to the very poor, but toward wage earners who were presently

unemployed, but would be back in the labor market soon. The importance of these acts is that they still form the attitudinal basis of housing policy today. The legislation was designed to stimulate the economy; the role of government within the housing process today is for the very same purpose.

The explanation for government intervention promulgated by economists and urban planners is that the economy is in a downturn, and intervention is required to spur incentive for investment, thus stimulating production. This is the whole crux of the matter as they see it; production is occurring at less than full capacity. Thus to prod developers, subsidies become available in many forms, for example, tax breaks and low interest loans on development. Subsidies are not oriented directly to consumers, but are oriented to construction processes: land costs, interest rates, and dwellings get the subsidies.*

The tendency of legislative action geared toward

*Implied here is the idea that a better alternative to present subsidization policy would be to direct subsidies to consumers. However, an income-support policy has its own problems, and as a singular strategy would be insufficient in raising the housing quality of the poor. Indeed, in order to function it still would require the present processes of production that supply housing. Very little will have changed. A related example to income support is the social services provided through welfare reform. It can be argued that financial aid is very beneficial to the poor, but the attitude through which the benefits are distributed cannot be ignored. First, an individual seeking help must accept an evaluation placed on him by a middle-class professional. If the applicant receives aid, his overall condition of despair remains unchanged. Welfare bureaucracies are powers that distort and manipulate while also assuring the upper classes that all is managed well.

production is really an overt manifestation of a deeper belief--that there is nothing wrong with the system a little "fine-tuning" cannot remedy. Certainly there are problems to be addressed, but it is claimed that solutions are possible with minor adjustments. In other words, the system is functioning more or less perfectly, and the problems that preoccupy urban planners are restorative through increased production. In any case, the cause for retarded production certainly is not systemically based.

The Dialectical Paradigm

The dialectical urban professional looks at the same housing problem in a completely different manner. Dialecticians understand social reality to be an ongoing dynamic of interrelated institutions. In this regard, they consider the tendency of empirical planners to isolate social phenomenon to be a limited means of comprehending reality. Dialecticians believe all parts, or structures, or institutions constituting social reality have meaning only in their interconnection with other parts. This reciprocal relation forms the character of the social totality, and what accounts for the formation and distribution of parts depends significantly on the manner by which society produces and reproduces its subsistence.

Related to this, and most important, is that all cognitive and subjective conceptions of the world originate in social processes. Human beings give meaning to the world, such that there is nothing "out-there" independent of human-

derived meaning. Things do not have an intrinsic nature that can be discovered by classifying according to weight, height, length, or any other means of quantification.

The fetishism of classification on the part of empirical urban planners is all too evident. Cities are cities because they meet certain quantifiable characteristics. The disenfranchised are disenfranchised for similar reasons. Through quantification planners believe they are seeing something real and true, but actually they are seeing themselves, their history and culture. In this respect, planners and urban professionals engulfed in the empirical tradition offer explanations of urban processes that are, in fact, not explanations, but only descriptions. The problems they address are not really problems, they are merely symptoms of a larger disorder.

Herein lies the essence of reification, that is, action in the world becomes only a reflection of what is existing already. The empirical epistemology is just a process of methods based on empirical data, thus the outcome reflects and describes, rather than explains. The course of action derived from this "flattened epistemology"¹² perpetuates the already deteriorating qualities of the city.

In contrast, dialecticians rally behind Sartre's comment, "statistics can never be dialectics."¹³ Dialectical planners seek out the human relations hidden beneath the data of experience, bringing into focus the genesis of products, appearances, and institutions. Rather than just describe

social processes, fundamental questions arise from the dialectical standpoint which search for the roots of problems in relation to other factors. Nothing is taken for granted. To provide a negative example, Banfield's account of metropolitan growth implicitly took for granted the existence of cities as dense urban areas. In a similar vein the strategy to induce the production of dwelling units, allowing the poor access to housing via filtering, ignores basic reasons that might evolve in an understanding of why impoverished conditions are present in the first place. The existence of large cities and low-income populations are not social forms that just happen. They perform a strategic operation within society, and if the structuralization of society remains as it is, cities and poverty populations will remain as they are.*

Without going into elaborate detail about the required existence of poverty populations and the big city as a particular built form, some discussion, however, is warranted.

*An example of reasoning that disavows any notion of totality or interrelation can be found in the following excerpt: "Why is there poverty in the world? Because the world has always been poor, and the process of changing it isn't finished yet. Until the last century, all countries were poor by today's standards. About 200 years ago, the West discovered how to get rich. Those countries that first learned how to do it have become rich already. Others, for a variety of reasons, are still learning."¹⁴ In other words, national and international poverty is simply a fact of life that apparently has no relation to a socio-economic order. This view of poverty ultimately rests in the Malthusian interpretation that human misery had to rest somewhere, and would always exist regardless of human intention to do otherwise. With this as a base, any attempt to mitigate the welfare of the poor is superfluous. Why do anything at all if the poor are going to persist anyway? Today, this rationale is still present, disguised under the term "benign neglect."

In a theoretical sense, since these two social forms are recognizable in the objective reality, they are then constituents of the societal order. They exist because they are structural components, and they must exist as they exist. Each form, in its own way, helps to stabilize the mode of production. The forms are self-regulating mechanisms which help create the conditions necessary for the mode to flourish.

On a more practical level, poor populations serve as a social scale by which a hierarchical society can gauge itself. A stratified society also reinforces the inclination to consume. It is believed that commodities correspond to social class and status, such that, as people elevate themselves up the social scale, they acquire commodities which mirror their status image. In this way, consumption becomes self-perpetuating.

Corresponding to their location in the center cities, the downtrodden are the reserve army of the process of production; able to be brought into the labor force in time of economic prosperity. Herein lies one of the most revealing consequences of industrial capitalism, and that is the interdependency which exists between the continuing rise of industrial-production centers and the poor that are entrapped within them.

This takes on greater meaning when it is realized that there are periodic fluctuations inherent in the capitalist economy. Better known as business cycles, these are periods of economic stability and instability that occur periodically.

Even to classical economists, it is no secret the economy is cyclical, that upswings and downswings are as common as the oscillations encountered at a yo-yo competition. But when the economy is in a downturn, surplus workers are dismissed, and when the economy is once again stable, surplus labor is reinstated. This uneven performance transpires principally in metropolitan areas, for they have become the foci of the production of commodities and also the market for the exchange and circulation of those commodities. In essence, then, the emergence of urbanism is the emergence of huge production-consumption centers that command surplus labor, utilizing or discharging it according to the condition of the economy. This of course results in a geographically immobile, centralized labor pool which hopes the economy returns to full productive capacity. Thus urbanization and its enslavement of poverty populations are inextricably enmeshed, and moreover, it is clear that both fulfill requisite functions within the economic system.

One of the emanating consequences of this historical development is the housing problem. It seems that this is poorly understood. Attempts to solve the urban crisis, or the housing problem, have been totally immersed in physical processes; in building, construction, and physical packages. An alternative approach is to understand all problems in accordance to their economic, political, and social roots. Only through this recognition can meaningful action ensue. To do otherwise is destined to failure, because the methods employed

will still be reflective of the economic and institutional framework, and self-regulation would automatically thwart any tendency for change. The system self-regulates, it will not willingly counter itself.

One more factor needs to be introduced into the discussion here. This is the structural necessity of economic expansion, i.e., the proliferation of production and capital accumulation. Economic growth is the foundation upon which the capitalist economy rests. The private production of commodities, made possible by concentrated capital, must be perpetual. Likewise, consumption must be perpetual. If commodity consumption begins to cease, capital in the form of profits cannot be re-accumulated. This stymies production capacity and leads to recession.

The drive to incessantly produce demands the mandatory action of consumption as a way of life. The desire and need for products must be instilled in the popular consciousness, therefore mechanisms are engaged to ensure the propensity to consume. But even with this persuasive conditioning, the production system spews forth an over-abundance of goods. Because of this, product redundancy results, leading further to underconsumption and eventually to a downturn in the economy. Counteraction is required and is made possible by fundamental regulating processes intrinsic to the economic system. These processes foster the activity of production through the circulation and accumulation of capital, thereby avoiding the calamity of market saturation. These processes are, (a)

technological innovation--the invention of new goods and production techniques; (b) the creation of new markets and investment outlets, irrespective of nationality or culture; and (c) actual and psychological planned obsolescence--the deliberate production of goods designed to break down quickly, and the frequent introduction of "new and improved" models which supersede the older models.

This systemic generalization has its particular reflection in the urban arena. The formation of the suburb, the decay of the inner-city, the persistent shortage of housing, governmental action, and the negative action of red-lining are all interconnected processes which concentrate capital and regulate the production of shelter. These processes, in relation, form the true-to-life urban manifestations of technological modernization, new market creation, and planned obsolescence.

Critique of Urban-Suburban Processes

The end of World War II saw the United States as the dominant world power. But this was not due only to the bitter and victorious struggle over Japan and Germany. The war itself proved paramount to the stability of the American economic system. Prior to the war, much of the world, and in particular, the United States was experiencing the Great Depression. It was a period plagued with unemployment, food lines, and general economic collapse. The call to war proved Keynesian economic theory was correct (increase government deficit

spending) and the country was able to turn its troubled economy around.* However, at the war's end there was a general fear among central policy-makers that the economy could fall back into a recession, or even worse, another depression. Although this was subsequently alleviated in part by the militarization of the economy,¹⁶ a major strategy was also to keep production levels high in other areas. Indeed, this strategy was imperative. During the war production levels soared in response to the production of military armaments and other war-related paraphernalia. The trick now was to maintain this high productivity, but retool the economy and direct production into new investment outlets. New markets had to be opened and mass consumption had to be inspired.**

Suburbanization became one way of fulfilling this need, a process that subsequently has proven to be indispensable to the stability of the socio-economic order in its entirety.¹⁷ For, the proliferation of suburban settlements is not just the creation of a new housing market (not to mention how important this is in itself for investment opportunity and capital accumulation). Suburbanism is also the rise of complementary

*Some interesting statistics: from 1929-1939 government expenditure in industrial production increased 70 percent, however, in the period from 1939-1944 government expenditure soared over 580 percent!¹⁵

**To a large degree the problem of inducing consumption was not to be a problem. During the war years, inordinate thriftiness, in accordance with the war effort, seemed to have a harnessing effect on the public, such that, at the end of the war the general populace was all too willing to counter this trend through consumption.

activities where through their interaction investment outlets become available.

Suburban sprawl has made possible the development of huge shopping centers, supermarket chains, and a host of retail-commercial uses that have followed the middle-class migration. New leisure activities have spawned; for example, miniature golf courses, private swimming pools, and drive-in theaters. The automobile has become the dominant mode of transportation, thus facilitating investment outlets in its concomitant relations such as highway construction, which, in turn, depends on cement manufacturers and steel industries. For the construction of the car itself, there are industries manufacturing rubber, glass, fiberglass, metal, and plastics. To keep the car operating there are oil and gasoline products, auto parts suppliers, junkyards, car mechanics, and of course service stations.* Yet, even more revealing is that the

*Carrying this discussion further, it is significant to point out the reluctance of state and federal officials to emphasize the possibilities of utilizing mass transit systems during the premiere of suburban expansion. The reluctancy, however, is understandable, supported by the fact that the automobile industry was able to counter proposals to use public transit systems, due to its substantial achievement of economic power. For it was because of the profit realized from the ever growing ownership of the automobile that the industry was able to dismantle alternative means of transportation, primarily the railway and street car companies, thereby consolidating its power and ensuring its existence (especially in alliance with the above complementary practices). Today the automobile industry is absolutely essential to the stability of the whole economy, as David Harvey makes plain enough, "If the United States were suddenly covered by public transit systems, there would be massive unemployment in Detroit and an economic recession far more serious than the collapse of the 1930's."¹⁸ It should be noted further that the decentralized individual mode of transport afforded by the automobile proved to be

detached single-family home has become the ultimate model for the maximization of consumption. Every household is totally self-sufficient. Refrigerators, dishwashers, washers and dryers, stoves, ovens, televisions, stereos, furniture, garden equipment and maintenance tools, have all become absolute necessities, individually exhibited under one roof. Gas, water, electricity, and telephone utility companies serve every home, requiring the expansion of pipelines and the stringing of power lines.*

immensely compatible with the mass production of new housing, which in turn was precipitated by federal government intervention in the form of mortgage loan insurance. (See page 127) Thus in actuality, the federal government and the auto-related industries facilitated suburban sprawl. But even more interesting, the federal government as well as subsidizing the exodus to the suburb by opening up the mortgage market, also subsidized the auto-related industries: "The government paid ninety percent of the highway construction and it has spent, in 1973, sixty times more in this category than in urban collective transportation for the whole country."¹⁹

*The expansion of pipelines is not necessarily a subsidiary process performed after the planning and development of a suburban community. "To a large extent, suburban growth is shaped by where water and sewer agency officials decide to put the pipes. The farther out they go and the more pipe they lay, the bigger their multimillion-dollar bureaucracies grow and the more connection fees they collect from developers, so they tend to encourage and provide the plumbing for increasing sprawl. Most water and sewer agencies operate on the policy that anyone who gets the necessary zoning should get water and sewer lines, too, even if it means laying pipe through miles of cow pastures to reach rezoned land. And to collect as much as it can in connection fees on that pipe, the agency is soon pressuring zoning officials to allow the cow pasture to be rezoned as well. In some places, water and sewer agencies draw up master plans projecting the extension of their lines far out into the undeveloped countryside. When such a plan is approved by the local government, speculators gain just the excuse they need to go before the zoning and planning agencies: Because the sewers are already planned to reach the distant farmland they just bought, they argue, it should be rezoned to permit development."²⁰

Suburbanism is therefore quasi-colonialism: created for the purposes of furthering market penetration and investment opportunity. In this respect, suburban growth has been devastatingly successful. The suburban pattern has made it possible not only to induce and maximize consumption on a very large scale, but also to ensure the effective demand for the automobile, oil products, and highway and road construction. Indeed, precisely because the suburban built form is what it is, it has created the condition whereby, "it is all but impossible to live a 'normal' social life without a car."²¹ In other words, the suburban physical form necessitates the employment of the automobile for transportation. In this regard, the automobile industry through its total support of suburbanization has created a need, while at the same time it has removed any possibility of that need being met by anything other than the car itself.

Furthermore, the single-family home is now the living ideal for nearly every American family. The status that it bears assures effective demand for years to come. And yet, perhaps the most significant feature of the entire suburban process lies within the social relationships developed within the suburban setting. These relations tend to reproduce and strengthen the concepts, values, and consumptive tendencies which are so vital to the perpetuation of a market economy based on private capital accumulation and competition.

Some specific values reproduced include individualism, conformism, and the notion of homogeneity. At first glance,

individualism and conformism seem contradictory. In point of fact, they are not. In reaction to the uniformity of society, i.e., universalism--a society in which everything-everywhere-is-becoming-the-same--the drive for individuality is evident. Indeed, it is an obsession. The suburban family seeks privacy and personal identity, even to the extent where individual family members compartmentalize their roles and routines, creating, at times, disjuncture and stress on the total unity. The physical layout of a typical single-family home magnifies overt disunity. When economically feasible, it is felt that children should have their own bedrooms, bathrooms, telephones, and playthings.* It seems there is a new American destiny, and consumption (conformism) lies at the root of its achievement. Consumption then fulfills two purposes: first, it accommodates the "imperative" need to materially individualize, and second, it becomes the compensation for the alienation and loneliness that individualization manifests. Individualism is therefore a mask. It veils the truism of people conforming to the unwritten scripture of the market structure. Mass consumption is the norm, and the economic structure remains intact.

The desire for a homogeneous population in suburban

*What is quickly becoming the ultimate status symbol among the wealthy, and which is also an expression of individualism and disunity, is the double bath adjacent to the master bedroom. As one house broker put it, "Years ago, it was okay for the husband and wife to sit on the same john. . . . Today, forget it. It's like yecch. God forbid their toothbrushes should be in the same place."²²

areas reinforces social segregation, and by extension, class stratification. Again, consumption lies at the root, for a stratified society furthers material consumption through the individual desire to maintain status level or initiate upward mobility. Thus the result is commodity accumulation in terms of quantity and specificity.

Investment-Disinvestment

Financial institutions have played an essential role in the formation of the suburban social and physical form. However, the decisive element in the process of suburban development was the action taken by the federal government to insure mortgage lenders against the risk of financial loss occurring from borrower default.²³ By this action the flood-gates were opened; the governmental support of the institutions supplying mortgage credit led directly to huge capital flows in the mortgage market, facilitating the mass production and consumption of new dwelling units. The economic possibilities entwined in the whole process of suburban expansion were numerous and varied. As such, it would have been sheer economic folly had not financial institutions sought and offered investment opportunities. The profit extracted from suburban growth was substantial, and this in turn precipitated more investment.

As a result of capital being directed toward the suburban market, the amount of capital available for center-city construction and rehabilitation was lessened. Moreover, the

middle-class migration to the suburb eroded the economic base of the central city, significantly reducing the quality of public services needed by the remnant population. This migration, however, was not only a preoccupation with residency relocation. That is, the suburbs did not become just bedroom communities. Enticed by the residential exodus, a vast assortment of activities and services followed in pursuit, the most significant of which were industrial, commercial-retail, and manufacturing establishments.* It was this total outward migration which necessarily directed substantial portions of both private and public capital investment away from the central cities, and toward the suburbs. Hence, the process of suburban expansion was simultaneously the process of inner-city decay. Suburban investment was simultaneously urban disinvestment.

The urban-suburban investment pattern is by no means over, nor seemingly will it ever be. As suburban investment continues, so must urban disinvestment. This is already clear. However, urban corrosion cannot be linked only to the investment-disinvestment process. That is, the decline of much of the urban core is not because of suburban investment alone. Other factors come into play which must be recognized. Tactics are employed in the urban arena to deliberately

*This occupational departure to the suburbs reduced the quantity and quality of job categories in the central cities. At present, there are primarily three categories still holding their own within each metropolitan area. These are service jobs, office work, and government jobs.²⁴

precipitate specific area devolution.* These tactics are a form of planned obsolescence, and therefore are especially crucial to the maintenance and continuance of capital accumulation and economic expansion as they ensure investment outlets.

Planned obsolescence perpetuates the availability of investment opportunity in principally two ways. First, and most obvious, since an area has been consciously blighted, it must be re-developed. Corroded inner-city areas are ripe for redevelopment, because as these locations devolve, especially to the stage of abandonment, the acquisition of land becomes a relatively simple and inexpensive procedure. In addition, the developer is typically awarded tax reductions or even abatements on the property he wishes to develop. Moreover, when these areas are neighborhoods or large residential districts, it is not infrequent to find that a new land-use jurisdiction has been appropriated from the city allowing the developer access to a more lucrative investment. The city, too, benefits from a land-use change because higher intensive uses generate more revenue for the city as a whole, as well as bolster the city's economic base.

The second means by which planned obsolescence induces

*Perhaps the most pronounced tactic is red-lining. The term originated from the practice of lending institutions drawing red lines around urban neighborhoods designated as high risk areas. People in the red-lined neighborhoods are typically refused financial support of any kind, or at best, excessively high downpayments and interest rates are imposed when support is awarded. Also, it is not uncommon to find loans granted for a very short period of time.

building construction is in its creation of demand for new housing. When an area is deliberately blighted, landlords, realizing the impossibility of any long-term gain on investment, direct their attention to short-term practices. They extract all the worth possible from the property and leave it in a state of physical obsolescence.* This presents a greater problem, because urban dilapidation and obsolescence are not stationary. They tend to spread geographically. As blight creeps from neighborhood to neighborhood (neighborhood succession),²⁵ property values fall, and economic and social pressures intensify. In order to escape economic devaluation people try to relocate their residency. But those who desire to move can only do so if housing is available in other locations. This pent-up pressure is usually relieved through new construction which takes place principally in the suburban periphery.

The central city and the suburb, therefore, are not mutually exclusive entities; they are dialectical. The dynamism of the urban realm has repercussions in the suburban realm, and vice versa. Suburban investment is urban disinvestment, but urban disinvestment is also the stimulation of suburban investment. The interdependency between the urban core and the suburban fringe ensures the process of production and consumption. If housing demand drops, new demand can be

*It should be clarified that the process leading to physical obsolescence is not solely initiated by planned obsolescence. Many urban areas deteriorate under their own accord, or as a result of decadence in adjacent areas.

created by means of urban blighting. In addition, suburban investment precipitates urban decay, thereby fostering more suburban investment. As long as all these processes continue to operate, markets for investment opportunity will continually unfold, ensuring the elemental process of economic growth.

One Alternative Praxis

The focus of this chapter thus far has been centered about the interpretation of urban-suburban phenomena as based in two contrasting viewpoints: logical empiricism and dialectics. It has been a cognitive exercise, involved with critical reflection, consciousness transformation, and dereification. The inability of urban planners and related professionals to discern the socio-economic origins of urban processes is reification. Planners reify the present, they reify human processes in general, and accordingly, they have consecrated the association of "what is," with "what has to be." Logical empiricism is reification, the dialectic is an imperative to dereification.

Central decision-makers have not solved the housing problem, for to do so would be destabilizing for the economic-production system. It follows then that central city corrosion and suburban sprawl, urban disinvestment and suburban investment, as well as other systemically based manifestations of the housing problem are necessary features of the advanced capitalist economy. To counteract these tendencies, a popular awareness must evolve which can expose the systemic roots of

these features. Thus, an alternative strategy, based on the dialectic, must be developed which facilitates dereification--the recognition that "what is," is not necessarily "what has to be." Such a strategy would most likely counter the prevailing systemic features by emphasizing popular discussion and argumentation in order to inform and extend knowledge about "what is." To facilitate this, it would seem necessary to form cohesive communities of direct democracy, thereby countering centralized policy-making with a more organic and decentralized process. The urban planner and design professional must become integral components of this process.

Central to achieving such an alternative, the belief that shelter is merely a commodity to be bought or sold on the market must be overcome. In other words, understood as a mass-produced-packaged-commodity, housing is totally detached from users except in its use. The market economy dictates this to be so. In this industrialized society the present process of housing production is technology intensive, energy intensive, and consequently, capital intensive. The rise to this high-level sophistication is fairly recent, inspired largely by the rapid post-war transformation of production technology. Out of this transformation evolved the economic power consolidated in the giant corporations. Today's economy is a corporate economy, and in housing production, only large scale developments are compatible with large scale corporations. This restricts the housing process (finance, management, design, construction) to special segments of the

population.

First, finance management and crucial decision-making is restricted to those groups of people who control capital flow and accumulation. Second, design activity is relegated to expert professionals who through their education and professional training feel they are the best equipped to do what is correct for all persons. Third, the activity of construction is relegated to construction corporations, which have the sophistication and technical know-how to handle the high-level technology involved in building.

The belief of design professionals of possessing the means and resources to do what is correct necessitates a kind of detachment and neutrality on their part, enabling them to truly "discover" the best interests of society. But this is a false premise. In any building problem the range and limits of "discovering" have already been set to a considerable degree. By the time design activity is introduced in the housing process, decision-makers have already outlined what is to be done, the general cost of construction, the general cost of operation and maintenance, the methods of financing, and the profit expectation. These are major constraints which determine not only prices and rents, but correspondingly the general income-category of users, as well as the general physical image and aesthetics. In this regard, planners and design professionals unconsciously reflect the attitudes and interests of those who control decisions. But design professionals, not realizing this, cling to their belief of possessing the

accurate wherewithal to conceptualize form and aesthetics. Thus the design of physical environments is exclusionary, conducted in isolation, and without citizen input.

The consequence is that people have no voice in a decision-making process which can allow them, as well as diverse local actors to contribute and express what is to be built, by whom, and why. Because of this, people are divorced from participating in the formative processes which control their lives, and are excluded from consciously shaping their culture. They have become passive onlookers; spectators watching the course of events. As such, the typical housing process is an alienating process. But alienation is not present simply within the man-product relationship. It has become diffused, encompassing man in his social relations: man is alienated from his fellow man.

The isolation and separation that results from the exclusion of participatory measures is detrimental. This form of alienation distorts and stymies human action, rendering social lethargy among users. Inasmuch as people do not recognize the potentiality of their own actions, everyday life is viewed as something beyond human purpose and control. Their existence is perceived as being immutable, alienating them all the more.

Centralized decision-making is the root of detachment and alienation. Likewise, centralization lies at the root of the present process of housing production: a process that understands shelter to be only a material quality, a complete

packaged commodity. This is precisely the problem. Housing understood merely as a commodity reinforces centralization, and more importantly, reinforces the functioning of the institutions necessary for producing housing as a commodified package. The problem is circular, it feeds itself, it has become all engrossing. Centralization has created the material and ideological conditions requisite for its perpetuation.

The task is clear. An alternative strategy is needed, based in the social goal to de-alienate and dereify. It must be, then, a strategy of de-centralization, of collective decision-making and discourse, allowing people the opportunity to manage, design, and construct their own homes, to control decisions over their lives and the environment, and to create a vehicle whereby thought and action can be unified in a liberating praxis to counter centralization. An alternative would stress, therefore, intermediate technological building practices, facilitating labor-intensive materials and procedures, self-help development, and employment for small contractors and material suppliers. Construction, rehabilitation, and general development would be incremental, not simply because of labor-intensive techniques, but because incremental development is more compatible with collective capital generation. The procurement of capital is the one great hardship that confronts families in their attempt to build and develop, even when this is done incrementally and utilizing self-help methods.

The problem of capital obtainment, as well as the

other problems that afflict families, made manifest by centralization, are conditions that persist because counteraction has proceeded primarily on an individual basis. An alternative strategy, in order to achieve decentralization and collective decision-making would stress the formation of family collectives, or cooperatives, thereby propelling united initiative, responsibility, dialogue, and thought and action. In metropolitan areas, cooperatives could be neighborhood cooperatives. The economic and emotional investment in neighborhood dynamics could be the springboard to fundamental change. The formation of the cooperative can offer its members access to financial, administrative, or any other collectively desired resource. With reference to capital securement, the cooperative can take the responsibility for repayment on borrowed capital. However, it would be hoped that the collective would be much more than an economic enterprise. Participation in, and contribution to the cooperative can be on the basis of money, time, and manual labor. For example, families unable to contribute much economically can contribute more in time and labor, perhaps in development and rehabilitation. Small businesses and contractors, likewise, can obtain credit through the cooperative, and can reciprocate by helping the neighborhood in the ways that they can. The cooperative can do all of this, not because it is a collective, or a structure, but because it is a group of human individuals and families struggling together as a collectivity to self-affirm their existence. Herein lies the potential of a collective--the true source of resources.

In the quest for fundamental change and the striking down of poverty affliction, the urban professional must become an integral component in the process to decentralize and collectivize. Urban planning, a process which treats the city as a physical conglomeration of buildings, highways, and green spaces, or as a physical graphic carpet, is clearly unattuned to laymen's needs and aspirations. The attempt to discern social, economic, and production-based processes through quantified labeling and measuring, compatible with computer operations, cannot be the central model from which policy is derived. Indeed, in order for the model to function properly requires the abstraction and distortion of the human reality. The model excludes and negates social processes which cannot be encompassed within the parameters defined by the model itself. Consequently vast portions of life are missed, and only life can speak for itself.

A truly effective integration of urban professionals and citizens would be ensured only by the professionals themselves working and living within the same environment of the cooperative. An organic wholeness could be achieved between the two factions. Professionals can invest their economic and emotional faculties in the neighborhood, establishing roots and solidarity. Engaged in the dynamics of the collective, the planner would be in the role of a true participator, rather than a facilitator of participation. A planner's expertise would be introduced into the very fabric of the collective's lifestyle and everyday existence, thereby ensuring continuity

between theory and practice.

Dialecticians, not specifically attached to neighborhood cooperatives and other social movements, can still preserve the continuity between professionals and laymen. Planners now must not only participate, but facilitate discourse between professionals and citizens, between cooperatives and similar movements, and between cooperatives and the municipality. Planners, as well as offering expertise, can also continue to articulate alternative concepts and interpretations of the existing order of things, and allow these ideas to become respectively embodied in collectives, neighborhoods, and other social forms and movements. Even in a collective, it cannot be taken for granted that a critical consciousness will evolve.

On the city level, planners and related personnel must guide and formulate funding policies to be compatible with neighborhood organization. Federal funding strategy is typically geared to capital-intensive packaging operations, shying away from self-help and incremental development. As it is all too clear, large-scale funding policies are fundamental to system maintenance, specifically required to boost production. This is one internal contradiction that must be brought to light, allowing embryonic movements to understand this imposed limitation of centralization, such that mobilization can proceed to transcend and change.

The integration of dialectical professionals and citizen organizations is an extremely crucial development. It

must be encouraged. Hence when planners are engaged in community participation, yet, do not have an established basis in the community, they must not be ignored or considered as having no relevance to the cause. Although non-solidarity does tend to precipitate a dropping-in and dropping-out pattern of professional help, collective action must encourage aid on any level, even if the relationship is not ideal. Movements still need access to all types of information, in all types of people, and in all types of institutions. If classification is to occur at all it should be in regard to subjective interpretation and commitment. To be sure, this will happen anyway. However, the commitment to social change must not be stratified according to class or any other homogeneous element. A heterogeneous movement can be tremendously unifying, initiating change on many fronts, in all class levels, and in all levels of societal life. For collectives and other popular struggles to ignore help, or to concentrate power and thrust about a homogeneous identity would be seriously counterproductive. When this happens, movements repel other movements, even when all cling to similar goals and objectives.

The exclusion of other movements, or correspondingly, the isolation of one movement, is the one danger seemingly inherent in all movements. If a movement becomes concentrated in its neighborhood localism, ethnicity, race, or class, it then creates the shortcomings which stunt its own quest for change. Worse yet, movements become socially and politically

isolated, adverse competition between groups dissipates the potency of any mass assemblage, and the development toward change becomes an institutionalized fragment leading nowhere.*

Given that centralized decision-making has dominated the course of shelter production, and furthermore, has evolved the institutional structuralization which supports itself, decentralization will have to evolve from within the people, from within grass-root movements and collectives, perhaps centered in urban neighborhoods. As an alternative strategy gains in momentum, it must enlarge its knowledge base, unifying heterogeneous elements within one popular effort. Yet, all this presupposes the starting point in the attempt to counter centralization, and this is the recognition that social change is humanly possible. Change can occur because it is possible. To put it another way, the institutional framework giving power to centralized structures is not an irreversible situation. Institutions certainly channel social activity, sometimes in ways that seem unalterable. But what is generally forgotten is that it is people who lie at the very base of institutions, forming and shaping social consequences. Therefore, it is not some ambiguous institution which shapes human behavior, but people. After all, institutions are not objective phenomena, that is, they cannot actually be touched, seen, or heard. As such is the case, they must be subjective

*The reader is reminded of the devolution of the trade and labor unions outlined in Chapter 5.

creations, the creation of the subjective reality, of ideas and thoughts. Thus what is defined as an institution, is only a measure of people's subjective commitment to it. Likewise, an institutional order is simply a measure of commitment. Hence the "unchangeability" of an institutional framework is not inherent within the framework itself. Unchangeability and changeability simply rest with the will, desire, and commitment of the people. This is what must be realized through theory and action. And this is dereification.

NOTES: CHAPTER 1

¹For examples of food-producing capability, see Barry Commoner, The Poverty of Power, p. 233, and, Frances Moore Lappe, Diet for a Small Planet.

²The "Other America" refers to the millions of poverty-afflicted Americans, see Michael Harrington, The Other America.

³For an excellent example of this very process, see Chester Hartman, Yerba Buena: Land Grab and Community Resistance in San Francisco. See also Brian Anson, "From Radical to Revolutionary," Architectural Association Quarterly, p. 34.

⁴See David Harvey, Social Justice and the City, p. 280.

⁵See William Michelson, Man and His Urban Environment, Chap. 7.

⁶From Irving H. Welfeld, "Toward a New Federal Housing Policy," in Housing Urban America, eds. Jon Pynoos, Robert Schafer, Chester Hartman, p. 546.

⁷Richard S. Bolan, "Mapping the Planning Theory Terrain," in Planning in America: Learning from Turbulence, ed. David R. Godschalk, p. 15.

⁸Elliott J. Littman, "Thoughts on the Illusion of Objectivity," an unpublished thesis presented for the Master of Architecture and Urban Design Degree, 1976, pp. 1-3.

⁹The term paradigm is used here in the fashion defined by Thomas Kuhn, see The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed.

¹⁰For a good discussion of the value-free problem see, Brian Easlea, Liberation and the Aims of Science, Chap. 6, and also see, David Harvey, "Population, Resources, and the Ideology of Science," in Economic Geography, pp. 256-277.

¹¹Maurice Cornforth, Materialism and the Dialectical Method, p. 31.

¹²Brian Easlea, Liberation and the Aims of Science, pp. 253-257.

¹³Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, p. 61.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 183.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 89.

¹⁶Konrad Lorenz, On Aggression, p. 214.

¹⁷Francis Crick, Of Molecules and Men, p. 10.

¹⁸J. Lederberg, quoted in Brian Easlea, Liberation and the Aims of Science, p. 259.

¹⁹Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, p. 47.

²⁰Ibid., p. 47.

²¹Ibid.

²²Ibid.

²³Ibid., p. 181.

²⁴Ibid., p. 50.

²⁵Quoted in Hazel E. Barnes, "Introduction," in Jean-Paul Sartre, Search for a Method, p. xviii.

²⁶Konrad Lorenz, On Aggression, p. 221.

²⁷From originally Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The Holy Family, quoted here from Howard Selsam and others, eds., Dynamics of Social Change, p. 25.

NOTES: CHAPTER 2

¹Frederick Engels, "Dialectics of Nature," quoted from Howard Selsam and others, eds., Dynamics of Social Change, p. 81.

²Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, p. 119.

³Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, p. 3.

⁴Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology, p. 7.

⁵Karl Marx, The Grundrisse, p. 22.

⁶Ibid., p. 24.

⁷Ibid., p. 25.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Ibid., p. 27.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 26.

¹¹For a greater discussion of this see Louis Althusser, "Marx's Critique," in Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar, Reading Capital, p. 171.

¹²Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, quoted from Howard Selsam and others, eds., Dynamics of Social Change, p. 266.

¹³Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, quoted from Louis Althusser, "Marx's Critique," in Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar, Reading Capital, p. 173.

¹⁴Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, quoted from Howard Selsam and others, eds., Dynamics of Social Change, p. 266.

¹⁵See Louis Althusser, "Marx's Critique," in Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar, Reading Capital, p. 173.

¹⁶Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, quoted from Louis Althusser, "Marx's Critique," in Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar, Reading Capital, p. 173.

¹⁷For an excellent account contrasting the views of scientific and critical Marxism, see Alvin W. Gouldner, For Sociology, Chap. 16.

¹⁸Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, pp. 20-21.

¹⁹Maurice Cornforth, Materialism and the Dialectical Method, p. 146.

NOTES: CHAPTER 3

¹Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 2, quoted from Louis Althusser, "Marx's Critique," in Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar, Reading Capital, p. 175.

²Frederick Engels, "Speech at the Graveside of Karl Marx," quoted from Howard Selsam and others, Dynamics of Social Change, p. 30.

³See Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, pp. 112-116.

⁴Ibid., pp. 112-113.

⁵Ibid., p. 115.

⁶Ibid., p. 134.

⁷For a discussion on the intrinsic necessity of capitalism to expand economically, see Brian Easlea, Liberation and the Aims of Science, Chaps. 5 and 7, see also Douglas F. Dowd, The Twisted Dream, pp. 33-37.

⁸Karl Marx, "Wage-Labor and Capital," quoted from Neil J. Smelser, Karl Marx: On Society and Social Change, p. 93.

⁹For a discussion of the role of education, see Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society, pp. 344-348, and see Paulo Freire, The Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Chap. 2.

¹⁰See E. F. Schumacher, Small Is Beautiful, pp. 79-101.

¹¹For an excellent critique of the epistemological base of the design professional, see Michael Pyatok and Hanno Weber, "Re-Learning Design in Architecture," in Man-Environment Systems, pamphlet series, 1976.

¹²Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, p. 12.

¹³For a greater in-depth analysis of this problem-necessity, see Jose Miranda, Marx and the Bible, pp. 5-10.

¹⁴Alvin W. Gouldner, The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology, p. 73.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Max Horkheimer, The Eclipse of Reason, p. 4.

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 3-4.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 26.

²⁰Ibid., p. 41.

²¹Ibid., pp. 31-32.

²²Elliott J. Littman, "Thoughts on the Illusion of Objectivity," an unpublished thesis presented for the Master of Architecture and Urban Design Degree, 1976, p. 11.

²³Brian Easlea, Liberation and the Aims of Science, p. 88.

²⁴Max Horkheimer, The Eclipse of Reason, p. 18.

²⁵Ibid., p. 13.

²⁶See J. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 85.

²⁷Max Horkheimer, The Eclipse of Reason, p. 13.

²⁸For a discussion of how the dominant class guides "mental production," see Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology, pp. 39-41.

²⁹Frederick Engels, "Juristic Socialism," quoted from Howard Selsam and others, Dynamics of Social Change, pp. 59-60.

³⁰See Herbert Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, p. 6.

³¹Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, p. 7.

NOTES: CHAPTER 4

¹Harry Magdoff, "Economic Aspects of U.S. Imperialism," Monthly Review Pamphlet Series No. 27, p. 18.

²Dick Roberts, Capitalism in Crisis, p. 6.

³See David Harvey, Social Justice and the City, p. 266, and also Douglas F. Dowd, The Twisted Dream, p. 34.

⁴Barry Commoner, The Poverty of Power, pp. 247-252.

⁵Ibid., p. 223.

⁶Ibid., p. 250.

⁷Ibid., p. 251.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰See Douglas F. Dowd, The Twisted Dream, p. 49.

¹¹Douglas F. Dowd, "Accumulation and Crisis in U.S. Capitalism," in Socialist Revolution, pp. 36-37.

¹²Brian Easlea, Liberation and the Aims of Science, p. 186.

¹³Raymond Williams, The Country and the City, p. 284.

¹⁴Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The Communist Manifesto, p. 20.

¹⁵James O'Connor, The Corporations and the State, p. 9.

¹⁶Barry Commoner, The Poverty of Power, p. 236.

¹⁷Douglas F. Dowd, "Accumulation and Crisis in U.S. Capitalism," in Socialist Revolution, p. 43.

¹⁸Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, p. xv.

¹⁹Carl Boggs, Gramsci's Marxism, p. 39.

²⁰David Harvey, Social Justice and the City, p. 130.

NOTES: CHAPTER 5

¹Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 92.

²Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, p. 133.

³David Harvey, Social Justice and the City, pp. 126-127.

⁴See Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud, p. ix.

⁵For a discussion of industrialization and the rise of labor unions, see Robert Heilbroner, The Making of Economic Society, 3rd ed., p. 95.

⁶Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The Communist Manifesto, p. 24.

⁷Ibid., p. 22.

⁸Robert Heilbroner, The Making of Economic Society, p. 79.

⁹Ibid., p. 95.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 79.

¹¹Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The Communist Manifesto, p. 24.

¹²Ibid.

¹³For an excellent analysis of Gramsci's views, see Carl Boggs, Gramsci's Marxism.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 91.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 87.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 88.

¹⁷Bertell Ollman, "Towards Class Consciousness Next Time: Marx and the Working Class," in Politics and Society Reader, p. 311.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 312.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 325.

²⁰Ibid., p. 324.

²¹Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, p. 15.

²²Bertell Ollman, "Towards Class Consciousness Next Time: Marx and the Working Class," in Politics and Society Reader, p. 326.

²³See B. F. Skinner, Walden Two.

NOTES: CHAPTER 6

¹See Sheldon S. Wolin, "Looking for Reality," New York Review of Books, February, 1975.

²Philip Slater, The Pursuit of Loneliness, p. 122.

³Hazel E. Barnes, "Introduction," in Jean-Paul Sartre, Search for a Method, p. xxvii.

⁴For a discussion of American pragmatism, see Carl Boggs, Gramsci's Marxism, p. 124.

⁵Ibid., p. 110.

NOTES: POSTSCRIPT

¹For a more detailed discussion on the ethical neutrality assumption, see David Harvey, "Population, Resources, and the Ideology of Science," in Economic Geography, July 1974.

²Edward C. Banfield, The Unheavenly City Revisited, p. 25.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., p. 26.

⁵The advertisement is from William Michelson, Man and His Urban Environment, p. 144.

⁶For a more in-depth account of the relationship between industrialism and nature, see Raymond Williams, The Country and the City.

⁷Anthony Downs, Opening Up the Suburbs, p. 22.

⁸See David Harvey, Social Justice and the City, Chap. 6.

⁹For a greater discussion of the filtering-down process, see Anthony Downs, Opening Up the Suburbs, pp. 4-12, and also J. T. Little and others, The Contemporary Neighborhood Succession Process.

¹⁰See George Sternlieb, The Tenement Landlord, pp. 10-11.

¹¹For a good summary of federal housing legislation, see the HUD publication of A Decent Home, Part Two.

¹²Elliott J. Littman, "Thoughts on the Illusion of Objectivity."

¹³Quoted from Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society, p. 206.

¹⁴Max Singer and Paul Bracken, "Don't Blame the U.S.," in The New York Times Magazine, Nov. 7, 1976, p. 34.

¹⁵See Brian Easlea, Liberation and the Aims of Science, p. 193.

¹⁶For a good discussion on the militarization of the U.S. economy see *ibid.*, pp. 192-203.

¹⁷The importance of suburbanization with respect to the economy see the following: Anthony Downs, Opening Up the Suburbs, pp. 19-22; Manuel Castells, "The Wild City," in Kapitalistate, pp. 2-30; Louis H. Masotti and Jeffrey K. Hadden, eds., Suburbia in Transition, pp. 82-110; and Michael Stone, "The Housing Crisis, Mortgage Lending, and Class Struggle," in Antipode, p. 31.

¹⁸David Harvey, Social Justice and the City, p. 271.

¹⁹Manuel Castells, "The Wild City," in Kapitalistate, p. 6.

²⁰Leonard Downie, Jr., Mortgage on America, p. 91.

²¹David Harvey, Social Justice and the City, p. 271.

²²Richard Warren Lewis, "Whaddya Want for \$135,000?" in New West, July 5, 1976, p. 38.

²³For a deeper analysis of this governmental action, see Michael Stone, "Housing, Mortgages, and the State," in Housing in America: Problems and Perspectives.

²⁴See Anthony Downs, Opening Up the Suburbs, p. 22.

²⁵For an excellent discussion of neighborhood succession in St. Louis, see J. T. Little and others, The Contemporary Neighborhood Succession Process.

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