This item is under embargo and not available online per the author's request. For access information, please visit

Date of Award

Summer 8-15-2015

Author's School

Graduate School of Arts and Sciences

Author's Department


Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Degree Type



Dissertation Abstract

Essay 1: Negative Information Sharing in Cooperative R\&D

This paper develops a framework to analyze the effects of sharing negative results. We consider a negative result one either not worth publishing from an academic standpoint, or one not worth patenting from a corporate standpoint. We show that verifiability of negative results are necessary but not sufficient for sharing negative outcomes, and there is a range of prices where sharing negative outcomes can occur when the negative outcomes are verifiable.

Essay 2: Probabilistic Assignment under Top-dominance Condition

We show that the impossibility result that is stated by Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) can be overcome by a domain restriction, namely top-dominance condition. Under top dominance condition, the assignment rule, probabilistic serial dictatorship (PSD) satisfies ordinal efficiency, strategyproofness and no-envy. Moreover, we conjecture that a generalized version of top dominance condition would be maximal.

Essay 3: Social Choice without the Pareto Principle under Weak Independence

We show that the class of social welfare functions that satisfy a weak independence condition identified by Campbell (1976) and Baigent (1987) is fairly rich and freed of a power concentration on a single individual. This positive result prevails when a weak Pareto condition is imposed. Hence, we can overcome the impossibility of Arrow (1951) by simultaneously weakening the independence and Pareto conditions. Moreover, under weak independence, an impossibility of the Wilson (1972) type vanishes.


English (en)

Chair and Committee

David K Levine

Committee Members

Bruce Petersen, Paulo Natenzon, Mariagiovanna Baccara, Elizabeth M Penn,


Permanent URL:

Available for download on Thursday, August 15, 2115

Included in

Economics Commons