ORCID

https://orcid.org/0009-0004-1217-2210

Date of Award

5-6-2025

Author's School

Graduate School of Arts and Sciences

Author's Department

Economics

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Degree Type

Dissertation

Abstract

In this thesis, I examine various causes and consequences of market power and imperfect competition on the aggregate economy. One major channel through which the market structure evolves is mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Mergers can lead to significant increases in market power, yet can have economy-wide benefits too. In the first chapter, I develop a general equilibrium model with imperfect competition to study what drives M&A, and what the aggregate implications of M&A are. I model mergers as a centralized matching process in order to build a theory of who will merge with whom and I match the predictions of the model to merger sorting patterns observed in the data. The calibrated model supports the view that mergers drive higher market power and, on average, do not result in large productivity-enhancing synergies. Despite this, counterfactual analysis shows that mergers tend to increase aggregate productivity, as they reduce misallocation by lowering the overall dispersion of markups, but decrease output and welfare through a higher aggregate markup. In the second chapter, I employ empirical methods to study the effect of mergers on firm-level markups and productivity. The findings of this chapter provide micro-level support to the view that mergers result in higher market power, and on average, do not result in higher productivity. In the third chapter, I consider the effects of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) on aggregate outcomes. SOEs are a common tool used in many countries to address market power, yet concerns exist about the effects these firms have on industry and aggregate productivity. I characterize when SOEs improve aggregate outcomes in terms of their efficiency, relative to a counterfactual privatized firm.

Language

English (en)

Chair and Committee

Francisco Buera

Committee Members

Juan Sánchez; Rodolfo Manuelli; SangMok Lee; Yongseok Shin

Available for download on Wednesday, May 05, 2027

Included in

Economics Commons

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