Date of Award
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
This dissertation has four chapters. The first chapter studies the testable implications of stable weighted (hedonic) coalitions. The second chapter explores an extension of Bayesian persuasion where the receiver can acquire additional information after receiving information from the sender. The third chapter studies observable implications when a decision-maker endogenously forms consideration sets. The last chapter examines weighted network formation where agents have social status concerns. Omitted proofs in each chapter are presented in the last section of each chapter.
In the first chapter, we study the testable implications of a stable profile of weighted coalitions. We then apply our result to a model of weighted network formation, which subsumes aggregate matchings and the fractional stable roommates' problem.
In the second chapter, we study persuasion in a setting where a sender cares about a receiver's action, and the receiver can acquire additional information after receiving information from the sender. Our main result indicates that the sender has considerable persuasion abilities. For binary actions, the sender always benefits from persuasion when there is a need for persuasion. For multiple actions, we give a sufficient condition for the sender to benefit from persuasion. We argue that this condition is frequently satisfied.
In the third chapter, we model a decision-maker that is unable to consider all of the available alternatives due to costly attention. The decision-maker will optimally choose a subset of given alternatives by maximizing the expected utility of having that set minus the cost of attention required for considering that set. In particular, we provide a representation theorem for random choice rules where subsets of menus, which are interpreted as consideration sets, are formed by maximizing an objective function, and the probability of choosing alternatives outside this set is equal to zero.
In the last chapter, we study environments where individuals allocate resources across relationships with others, creating a weighted, directed network. Value is achieved both through an exogenous factor and maintaining close connections to high-value individuals. We consider two cases corresponding to the direction benefits flow along links. In Model T (for ``taking'') agents receive benefits through the links they create, whereas in Model G (for ``giving'') the reverse is true: agents pass value along their links. Equilibrium and socially efficient networks are characterized. In Model G equilibrium networks do not necessarily maximize group welfare, but in Model T efficient networks and equilibrium networks coincide despite extensive network externalities.
Chair and Committee
Ye, Lintao, "Essays in Microeconomics" (2022). Arts & Sciences Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 2786.