Date of Award

Winter 12-15-2022

Author's School

Graduate School of Arts and Sciences

Author's Department

Philosophy/Neuroscience, and Psychology

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Degree Type



I investigate ways by which agents can make their emotions more trustworthy from a perspective that’s informed by recent psychological research on the nature of emotion regulation. This dissertation is a collection of three articles, each addressing one type of cases of untrustworthy emotions in a particular context. Chapter one (Developing Appropriate Emotions) concerns emotions that are untrustworthy because they are irrelevant to the moral or epistemic judgements at hand. By situating the problem in the context of a situationist challenge to neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, I argue that we can address this problem by developing ameliorative abilities such as emotion differentiation. Chapter two (How to Make Emotions Epistemically Trustworthy) concerns emotions that are untrustworthy because they are not fitting. I argue that proper emotion regulation is needed for making emotions fit. I propose a new account of proper emotion regulation that goes beyond the traditional view of reflective control. Chapter three (Zetetic Norms for Emotions) considers “whether emotions should always be epistemically justified in a context of inquiry”. I argue that conflicts can arise between epistemic norms and zetetic norms for emotions and suggest that sometimes successful inquiry may require emotions be epistemically unjustified.


English (en)

Chair and Committee

Allan Hazlett

Committee Members

Tammy English

Included in

Philosophy Commons