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ORCID

http://orcid.org//0000-0001-8465-4033

Date of Award

Winter 12-15-2018

Author's School

Graduate School of Arts and Sciences

Author's Department

Business Administration

Additional Affiliations

Olin Business School

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Degree Type

Dissertation

Abstract

This dissertation examines how information asymmetry affects various aspects of bank regulation. The first chapter examines the relation between CAMEL rating disclosure and bank actions. The empirical results suggest that CAMEL rating disclosure helped banks remediate asset quality issues, especially those banks that were found to be near critical regulatory thresholds. The second chapter examines the relation between regulator proximity and bank risk-taking activities. The results show that increasing distance between banks and regulators enables banks to increase their leverage. These banks face a higher likelihood of failure. The final chapter studies whether increased information asymmetry allows rating agencies to cater to borrowers. The results show that rating agencies for unlisted firms are more favorable and are less predictive of future default. Results across all three chapters help inform policymakers and regulators as to how to structure banking supervision and regulation.

Language

English (en)

Chair and Committee

Richard Kevin M. Frankel Koharki

Committee Members

Radhakrishnan Gopalan, Xiumin Martin, Carl Sanders, Anjan Thakor,

Comments

Permanent URL: https://doi.org/10.7936/4pct-6h94

Available for download on Thursday, December 15, 2118

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