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Date of Award
Olin Business School
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
This dissertation examines how information asymmetry affects various aspects of bank regulation. The first chapter examines the relation between CAMEL rating disclosure and bank actions. The empirical results suggest that CAMEL rating disclosure helped banks remediate asset quality issues, especially those banks that were found to be near critical regulatory thresholds. The second chapter examines the relation between regulator proximity and bank risk-taking activities. The results show that increasing distance between banks and regulators enables banks to increase their leverage. These banks face a higher likelihood of failure. The final chapter studies whether increased information asymmetry allows rating agencies to cater to borrowers. The results show that rating agencies for unlisted firms are more favorable and are less predictive of future default. Results across all three chapters help inform policymakers and regulators as to how to structure banking supervision and regulation.
Chair and Committee
Richard Kevin M. Frankel Koharki
Radhakrishnan Gopalan, Xiumin Martin, Carl Sanders, Anjan Thakor,
Gopalan, Yadav Krishna, "Essays in Bank Regulation" (2018). Arts & Sciences Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 1709.
Available for download on Thursday, December 15, 2118