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ORCID

https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4042-0432

Date of Award

Spring 5-15-2017

Author's School

Graduate School of Arts and Sciences

Author's Department

Business Administration

Additional Affiliations

Olin Business School

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Degree Type

Dissertation

Abstract

In financial markets, investors with different limitations in their access and capacity to process information interact on a daily basis. This dissertation examines the impact of these limitations in explaining different phenomena that are observed in practice. First, I theoretically study the role of risk limits in risk management, and show how they not only help to alleviate the limitations of traders to correctly analyze the collected information, but also convey benefits in the provision of incentives. Second, I analyze the effect of changes in the credit rating of firms on the informativeness of their corresponding stock price when some investors can overreact to salient information, thus affecting overall incentives to acquire information. Third, I examine how heterogeneous beliefs about the ability of a firm’s CEO between insiders and outside investors, and the varying quality of the information that is available to each of them, shape the compensation contract offered to the executive.

Language

English (en)

Chair and Committee

Philip H. Dybvig

Committee Members

Anjan Thakor, Jeongmin Lee, Jason R. Donaldson, John Nachbar,

Comments

Permanent URL: https://doi.org/10.7936/K7D50KD3

Available for download on Saturday, May 15, 2117

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