Title

Auctions without Common Knowledge

Authors

Sviatoslav B. Brainov, Washington University in St Louis
Tuomas W. Sandholm, Washington University in St. Louis

Document Type

Technical Report

Department

Computer Science and Engineering

Publication Date

1999-01-01

Filename

WUCS-99-05.PDF

DOI:

10.7936/K79021ZR

Technical Report Number

WUCS-99-05

Abstract

This paper proves that the revenue equivalence theorem ceases to hold for auctions without common knowledge about the agents' prior beliefs. That is, different auction forms yield different expected revenue. To prove this, an auction game is converted to a Bayesian decision problem with an infinite hierarchy of beliefs. A general solution for such Bayesian decision problems is proposed. The solution is a generalization of the standard Bayesian solution and coincides with it for finite belief trees and for trees representing common knowledge. It is shown how the solution generalizes the frequently used technique of backward induction for infinite belief trees. The solution can be applied to any game with infinite belief trees. Computation of the solution does not rely on approximating the infinite trees with finite ones. The method can be used, for example, to analyze the expected revenue of alternative auction forms.

Comments

Permanent URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.7936/K79021ZR

Recommended Citation

Brainov, Sviatoslav B. and Sandholm, Tuomas W., "Auctions without Common Knowledge" Report Number: WUCS-99-05 (1999). All Computer Science and Engineering Research.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/cse_research/483